

## THE INSTITUTE FOR POLISH–JEWISH STUDIES

The Institute for Polish–Jewish Studies in Oxford and its sister organization, the American Association for Polish–Jewish Studies, which publish *Polin*, are learned societies that were established in 1984, following the International Conference on Polish–Jewish Studies, held in Oxford. The Institute is an associate institute of the Oxford Centre for Hebrew and Jewish Studies, and the American Association is linked with the Department of Near Eastern and Judaic Studies at Brandeis University.

Both the Institute and the American Association aim to promote understanding of the Polish Jewish past. They have no building or library of their own and no paid staff; they achieve their aims by encouraging scholarly research and facilitating its publication, and by creating forums for people with a scholarly interest in Polish Jewish topics, both past and present.

To this end the Institute and the American Association help organize lectures and international conferences. Venues for these activities have included Brandeis University in Waltham, Massachusetts, the Hebrew University in Jerusalem, the Institute for the Study of Human Sciences in Vienna, King's College in London, the Jagiellonian University in Kraków, the Oxford Centre for Hebrew and Jewish Studies, the University of Łódź, University College London, and the Polish Cultural Institute and the Polish embassy in London. They have encouraged academic exchanges between Israel, Poland, the United States, and western Europe. In particular they seek to help train a new generation of scholars, in Poland and elsewhere, to study the culture and history of the Jews in Poland.

Each year since 1987 the Institute has published a volume of scholarly papers in the series *Polin: Studies in Polish Jewry* under the general editorship of Professor Antony Polonsky of Brandeis University. Since 1994 the series has been published on its behalf by the Littman Library of Jewish Civilization, and since 1998 the publication has been linked with the American Association as well. In March 2000 the entire series was honoured with a National Jewish Book Award from the Jewish Book Council in the United States. More than twenty other works on Polish Jewish topics have also been published with the Institute's assistance.

Further information on the Institute for Polish–Jewish Studies can be found on their website, <[www.polishjewishstudies.pl](http://www.polishjewishstudies.pl)>. For the website of the American Association for Polish–Jewish Studies, see <[www.aapjstudies.org](http://www.aapjstudies.org)>.

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*‘Get wisdom, get understanding:  
Forsake her not and she shall preserve thee’*

PROV. 4: 5

**POLIN**  
STUDIES IN POLISH JEWRY

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VOLUME TWENTY-SIX

*Jews and Ukrainians*

Edited by

YOHANAN PETROVSKY-SHTERN  
and  
ANTONY POLONSKY

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**RICHARD PIPES**

*a great scholar and exemplary human being  
on the occasion of his ninetieth birthday*

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## *Preface*

THIS VOLUME of *Polin* is the first in which we provide a comprehensive survey of the millennium-long history of Jews in the lands of what today is Ukraine, building on volume 12, which examined the triangular relationship of Poles, Ukrainians, and Jews in Austrian Galicia. Unprecedented in east European scholarship in any language, this volume explores, first, the beginnings of Jewish settlement in the Ukrainian lands, suggesting the multiple itineraries that brought Jews there. Second, it considers Jews who served the Polish nobility administering Ukrainian lands, who were inevitably caught up in the resentment that Polish rule provoked in the local population, above all among the Cossacks and peasant serfs. Third, it looks at Jewish responses to the establishment of Russian and Austrian rule in the areas of Ukraine that had formerly been part of the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth, particularly the Jewish reaction to the rise of Ukrainian nationalism and the subsequent Ukrainian struggle for independence. The fourth overarching topic is the impact of the sovietization of Ukraine on Jewish–Ukrainian relations, particularly during the 1932–3 famine (Holodomor), the Second World War, and the post-war Soviet reconstruction. The volume also gives special attention to the growing rift between Jews and Ukrainians triggered by the rise of radical nationalism among Ukrainians living in the Ukrainian lands outside the Soviet Union, and by conflicting views of Germany’s genocidal plans regarding the Jews during the Second World War. We hope in this way to shed new light on these complex and highly controversial topics, each of which deserves a separate monograph. We also seek to provide a broader historical context that can move the discussion beyond the old paradigms of conflict and hostility.

In its New Views section, the volume includes articles on the way the British government reacted to the anti-Jewish violence in Lemberg in late 1918, on the question of the merry-go-round which functioned during the Warsaw ghetto rising, and on how the writer Jarosław Iwaszkiewicz reflected on the fate of the Jews in his wartime diary.

*Polin* is sponsored by the Institute of Polish–Jewish Studies, which is an associated institute of the Oxford Centre for Hebrew and Jewish Studies, and by the American Association for Polish–Jewish Studies, which is linked with the Department of Near Eastern and Judaic Studies, Brandeis University. As with earlier issues, this volume could not have appeared without the untiring assistance of many individuals. In particular, we should like to express our gratitude to Professor Frederick Lawrence, president of Brandeis University, to Mrs Irene Pipes, president of the American Association for Polish–Jewish Studies, and to Andrzej Szkuta, treasurer of the Institute for Polish–Jewish Studies. These three institutions all made substantial contributions to the cost of producing the volume. A particularly important contribution was that made by the Mirisch and Lebenheim Foundation, and the volume also

benefited from a grant from the the Lucius N. Littauer Foundation. As was the case with earlier volumes, this one could not have been published without the constant assistance and supervision of Connie Webber, managing editor of the Littman Library, Ludo Craddock, chief executive officer, Janet Moth, publishing co-ordinator, Pete Russell, designer, John Saunders, production manager, and the tireless copy-editing of George Tulloch and Joyce Rappoport.

Plans for future volumes of *Polin* are well advanced. Volume 27 will investigate the situation of the Jews in the Kingdom of Poland between 1815 and 1918, volume 28 will analyse aspects of Jewish writing in Poland, and volume 29 will examine the historiography of Jews in the Polish lands. Future volumes are planned on Jewish education in eastern Europe, on a comparison of the situation over the *longue durée* of Jews in Poland and Hungary, and on Jewish musical life in the Polish lands. We should welcome articles for these issues. We also welcome any suggestions or criticisms. In particular, we are always grateful for assistance in extending the geographical range of our journal to Ukraine, Belarus, and Lithuania, both in the period in which these countries were part of the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth and subsequently.

We have long felt concerned at how long it takes to publish reviews in an annual publication. We have now therefore decided to post all our reviews on the website of the American Association for Polish Jewish Studies (<aapjstudies.org>) instead of publishing them in hard copy, which will enable us to discuss new works much nearer to their date of publication. We welcome the submission of reviews of any book or books connected with the history of the Jews in Poland–Lithuania or on Polish–Jewish relations. We are happy to translate reviews submitted in Polish, Russian, Ukrainian, Lithuanian, Hebrew, or German into English. They should be sent to one of the following: Dr Władysław T. Bartoszewski, Forteczna 1A, 01-540, Warsaw, Poland (email: wt@wtbartoszewski.pl); Professor ChaeRan Freeze, Department of Near Eastern and Judaic Studies, Brandeis University, Waltham, MA 02254-9110 (email: cfreeze@brandeis.edu); Professor Antony Polonsky, Department of Near Eastern and Judaic Studies, Brandeis University, Waltham, MA 02254-9110 (email: polonsky@brandeis.edu); Professor Joshua Zimmerman, Yeshiva University, Department of History, 500 West 185th Street, New York, NY 10033-3201 (email: zimmerm@yu.edu).

We note with sadness the deaths of the following colleagues: Professor Zenon Guldon of the Higher Pedagogical Institute in Kielce, a major scholar of Jews in pre-modern Poland–Lithuania and a frequent contributor; Dr Edward Kossoy of Geneva, a formidable amateur historian and a contributor to our yearbook; Professor Jadwiga Maurer of the University of Kansas, a major Polish Jewish scholar and writer; Professor Jacek Woźniakowski of Kraków, art historian, social activist, long-standing contributor to *Tygodnik Powszechny*, and a courageous editor of the publishing house Znak; Professor Andrzej Garlicki, one of the great experts on twentieth-century Polish history; and Dr Krzysztof Michalski, long-standing director of the Institut für die Wissenschaft von Menschen in Vienna.



# POLIN



We did not know, but our fathers told us how the exiles of Israel came to the land of Polin (Poland).

When Israel saw how its sufferings were constantly renewed, oppressions increased, persecutions multiplied, and how the evil authorities piled decree on decree and followed expulsion with expulsion, so that there was no way to escape the enemies of Israel, they went out on the road and sought an answer from the paths of the wide world: which is the correct road to traverse to find rest for their soul? Then a piece of paper fell from heaven, and on it the words:

*Go to Polaniya (Poland)!*

So they came to the land of Polin and they gave a mountain of gold to the king, and he received them with great honour. And God had mercy on them, so that they found favour from the king and the nobles. And the king gave them permission to reside in all the lands of his kingdom, to trade over its length and breadth, and to serve God according to the precepts of their religion. And the king protected them against every foe and enemy.

And Israel lived in Polin in tranquillity for a long time. They devoted themselves to trade and handicrafts. And God sent a blessing on them so that they were blessed in the land, and their name was exalted among the peoples. And they traded with the surrounding countries and they also struck coins with inscriptions in the holy language and the language of the country. These are the coins which have on them a lion rampant from the right facing left. And on the coins are the words 'Mieszko, King of Poland' or 'Mieszko, Król of Poland'. The Poles call their king 'Król'.

And those who delve into the Scriptures say: 'This is why it is called Polin. For thus spoke Israel when they came to the land, "Here rest for the night [*Po lin*]." And this means that we shall rest here until we are all gathered into the Land of Israel.'

Since this is the tradition, we accept it as such.

# POLIN

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## *Note on Place Names*

POLITICAL connotations accrue to words, names, and spellings with an alacrity unfortunate for those who would like to maintain neutrality. It seems reasonable to honour the choices of a population on the name of its city or town, but what is one to do when the people have no consensus on their name, or when the town changes its name, and the name its spelling, again and again over time? The politician may always opt for the latest version, but the hapless historian must reckon with them all. This note, then, will be our brief reckoning.

There is no problem with places that have accepted English names, such as Warsaw. But every other place name in east-central Europe raises serious problems. A good example is Wilno, Vilna, Vilnius. There are clear objections to all of these. Until 1944 the majority of the population was Polish. The city is today in Lithuania. 'Vilna', though raising the fewest problems, is an artificial construct. In this volume we have adopted the following guidelines, although we are aware that they are not wholly consistent.

1. Towns that have a form which is acceptable in English are given in that form. Some examples are Warsaw, Kiev, Moscow, St Petersburg, Munich.
2. Towns that until 1939 were clearly part of a particular state and shared the majority nationality of that state are given in a form which reflects that situation. Some examples are Breslau, Danzig, Rzeszów, Przemyśl. In Polish, Kraków has always been spelled as such. In English it has more often appeared as Cracow, but the current trend of English follows the local language as much as possible. In keeping with this trend to local determination, then, we shall maintain the Polish spelling.
3. Towns that are in mixed areas take the form in which they are known today and which reflects their present situation. Examples are Poznań, Toruń, and Kaunas. This applies also to bibliographical references. We have made one major exception to this rule, using the common English form for Vilna until its first incorporation into Lithuania in October 1939 and using Vilnius thereafter. Galicia's most diversely named city, and one of its most important, boasts four variants: the Polish Lwów, the German Lemberg, the Russian Lvov, and the Ukrainian Lviv. As this city currently lives under Ukrainian rule, and most of its current residents speak Ukrainian, we shall follow the Ukrainian spelling.
4. Some place names have different forms in Yiddish. Occasionally the subject matter dictates that the Yiddish place name should be the prime form, in which case the corresponding Polish (Ukrainian, Belarusian, Lithuanian) name is given in parentheses at first mention.

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# *Note on Transliteration*

## HEBREW

An attempt has been made to achieve consistency in the transliteration of Hebrew words. The following are the key distinguishing features of the system that has been adopted:

1. No distinction is made between the *alef* and *ayin*; both are represented by an apostrophe, and only when they appear in an intervocalic position.
2. *Veit* is written *v*; *het* is written *h*; *yod* is written *y* when it functions as a consonant and *i* when it occurs as a vowel; *khaf* is written *kh*; *tsadi* is written *ts*; *kof* is written *k*.
3. The *dagesh hazak*, represented in some transliteration systems by doubling the letter, is not represented, except in words that have more or less acquired normative English spellings that include doublings, such as Hallel, kabbalah, Kaddish, rabbi, Sukkot, and Yom Kippur.
4. The *sheva na* is represented by an *e*.
5. Hebrew prefixes, prepositions, and conjunctions are not followed by a hyphen when they are transliterated; thus *betoledot ha'am hayehudi*.
6. Capital letters are not used in the transliteration of Hebrew except for the first word in the titles of books and the names of people, places, institutions, and generally as in the conventions of the English language.
7. The names of individuals are transliterated following the above rules unless the individual concerned followed a different usage.

## YIDDISH

Transliteration follows the YIVO system except for the names of people, where the spellings they themselves used have been retained.

## RUSSIAN AND UKRAINIAN

The system used is that of British Standard 2979:1958, without diacritics. Except in bibliographical and other strictly rendered matter, soft and hard signs are omitted and word-final -й, -ий, -ый, -ій in names are simplified to -y.

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## PART I

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# Jews and Ukrainians

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# Introduction

YOHANAN PETROVSKY-SHTERN  
and  
ANTONY POLONSKY

THIS VOLUME OF *Polin* is the first to be specifically devoted to the history of Jews in Ukraine, although we have already produced an issue (volume 12) which took as its theme ‘Galicia: Jews, Poles, and Ukrainians, 1772–1918’, and there have been a number of important contributions covering this subject, particularly in volume 10 on ‘Jews in Early Modern Poland’, volume 14 on ‘Jews in the Polish Borderlands’, and volume 15 on ‘Jewish Religious Life, 1500–1900’. In this volume we have attempted to look much more broadly at the relationship between Jews and Ukrainians and hope to add to the growing literature which seeks to go beyond the old paradigms of conflict and hostility.<sup>1</sup>

Jews have a long history in Ukraine. There seems little doubt that individual Jews from Palestine, Byzantium, and Persia settled in the territory of Kievan Rus and even established communities such as the one in tenth-century Kiev, and perhaps in Chernigov and Vladimir, though some nineteenth-century historians exaggerated their importance in the later development of Jewish life.<sup>2</sup> Some of them came from the Khazar kingdom, a short-lived nomadic polity which had some Jewish presence but which most likely did not have Judaic ruling elites descending from eighth-century converts, as several medieval legends claimed and many Jewish historians have repeated. There was also a significant Jewish presence in Crimea, where Jews, together with the Karaites, engaged in maritime trade even prior to the establishment

<sup>1</sup> For the new approaches going beyond the established paradigm, see H. Abramson, *A Prayer for the Government: Ukrainians and Jews in Revolutionary Times, 1917–1920* (Cambridge, Mass., 1999); I. R. Makaryk and V. Tkacz (eds.), *Modernism in Kyiv: Jubilant Experimentation* (Toronto, 2010); P. R. Magocsi, *A History of Ukraine: The Land and its Peoples*, 2nd edn. (Toronto, 2010); Y. Petrovsky-Shtern, *The Anti-Imperial Choice: The Making of the Ukrainian Jew* (New Haven, 2009); M. Shkandrij, *Jews in Ukrainian Literature: Representation and Identity* (New Haven, 2009); A. Glaser, *Jews and Ukrainians in Russia’s Literary Borderlands: From the Shtetl Fair to the Petersburg Bookshop* (Evanston, Ill., 2012).

<sup>2</sup> On this, see B. D. Weinryb, ‘The Beginnings of East European Jewry in Legend and Historiography’, in M. Ben-Horin, B. D. Weinryb, and S. Zeitlin (eds.), *Studies and Essays in Honor of Abraham A. Neuman* (Leiden, 1962), 445–502. See also B. D. Weinryb, *The Jews of Poland: A Social and Economic History of the Jewish Community in Poland from 1100 to 1800* (Philadelphia, 1976), 19–22. A more favourable view of the Old Russian sources is taken by H. Birnbaum, ‘On Jewish Life and Anti-Jewish Sentiments in Medieval Russia’, *Viator*, 4 (1973), 225–55.

of the Grand Duchy of Kiev, as is described by the Turkologist Dan Shapira in his essay in the present volume. Certainly the Jewish presence in Kiev is well documented from the tenth century, when the ‘Kievan Letter’ was written. Discovered among the Cairo Genizah documents, it is a unique letter of recommendation written by the local Jewish community on behalf of one of its members. The community was composed of Jews of various origins, including Slavonic and Khazarian.<sup>3</sup> Slavonic sources which refer to Jewish disputes with early Christian monks are relatively abundant but are of polemical origin and should not be treated as referring to actual Jews. Thus ‘Khazarian Jews’ almost certainly did not come to Vladimir as is stated in a legend included in the Russian *Primary Chronicle* (986–8), while St Theodosius of the Cave Monastery of Kiev most likely never had any disputes with Jews.<sup>4</sup> The historicity of these and other sources is discussed in the chapter by the Swedish Slavist Alexander Pereswetoff-Morath, the first to demonstrate the extent to which sources usually treated as historical have in fact thick literary layers and even embody predominantly invented, literary images of ‘infidel Jews’.

A Jewish presence in Volhynia which seems to have been mostly derived from Ashkenaz and which involved more than a mere trading post has been documented both in a Slavonic source—the *Hypatian Chronicle*, which under the year 6796 (1288) describes Jews weeping ‘as during the capture of Jerusalem, when they were led into the Babylonian captivity’, on the occasion of the death of the Prince Vladimir Vasilkovich—and in several Jewish sources.<sup>5</sup> The *Book of Remembrance* (*Sefer hazekhirah*) by R. Efraim of Bonn (1133–96), which describes the persecution of Jews in western Europe during the Crusades, refers to R. Benjamin of Vladimir visiting Cologne for the purpose of engaging in trade.<sup>6</sup> Before the beginning of the fourteenth century there also seem to have been students and scholars from Rus living and studying in Toledo and even instructing English scholars how to write and speak an East Slavonic language. Probably these travelling Jewish scholars and merchants came from early east European communities which were part of the cultural realm of Ashkenazi Jewry and were connected to Ashkenazi yeshivas. These communities were for the most part small, isolated, and dependent on external religious authority.<sup>7</sup>

<sup>3</sup> For the dating of the ‘Kievan Letter’, see N. Golb and O. Pritsak, *Khazarian Hebrew Documents of the Tenth Century* (Ithaca, NY, 1982), and A. Poppe, ‘Khazarian Hebrew Documents of the Tenth Century’, *Polin*, 3 (1988), 335–42.

<sup>4</sup> *Das Paterikon des Kiever Höhlenklosters*, ed. D. Abramovič and D. Tschizewskij (Munich, 1964), 65.

<sup>5</sup> Quoted in A. Kulik, ‘The Earliest Evidence on the Jewish Presence in Western Rus’, unpublished.

<sup>6</sup> A. Haberman, *Gezerot ashkenaz vetsarfat* (Jerusalem, 1956), 128.

<sup>7</sup> A. Kulik, ‘O evreiskom prisutstvii na Volyni v XII–XIII vv.’, in W. Moskovich and I. Fijałkowska-Janiak (eds.), *Jewish–Polish and Jewish–Russian Contacts* (Jerusalem and Gdańsk, 2003), 194–202; id., ‘Yehudei rusyah bimei habeinayim: lemetodologiyah shel hameḥkar’, *Pe’amim*, 111–12 (2007), 185–208; id., ‘Judeo-Greek Legacy in Medieval Rus’, *Viator*, 39 (2008), 51–64; id., ‘Evrei Drevnei Rusi: Istochniki i istoricheskaya rekonstruktsiya’, *Ruthenica*, 7 (2008), 52–70; id., ‘The Earliest Evidence of the Jewish Presence in Western Rus’, *Harvard Ukrainian Studies*, 27/1–4 (2004–5), 13–24.

From the second half of the twelfth century, Jewish communities, largely derived from the lands of Ashkenaz, were established in the Kingdom of Poland and in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. In the following century a properly functioning communal structure was established here, which had connections with and absorbed the religious values of the German pietists (*hasidei ashkenaz*), who espoused an austere, elitist, and deeply mystical form of Judaism.<sup>8</sup> Emigration to Poland and Lithuania continued in the next centuries as the situation of Jews in central Europe deteriorated, particularly in Bohemia and other Habsburg territories as well as in Hungary, where they were expelled from many towns and regions. Comparable expulsions took place in most lands of western Europe, including England, France, later Spain and Portugal, and many German territories, from towns such as Regensburg.

These Jews initially settled in the towns which were under the jurisdiction of the monarchy, where they faced constant conflict with the burghers and hostility from the Catholic Church, although the Counter-Reformation had a comparatively weaker impact in Poland–Lithuania than in western and central Europe. The Jewish situation in the royal town of Lviv (Lwów) is described in the chapter by the Ukrainian historian Myron Kapral, who has published extensively in the field of the early modern history of this town. Kapral points out significant economic and financial benefits that the royal and urban administration (and the town at large) derived from the Jews—to the extent that the attempts made by the Catholic Church in Lviv to impose religiously driven limitations on Jewish economic and trade activities were of little effect. The problems they faced in these royal towns led many Jews to take advantage of the opportunities created by the Polish colonization of Ukraine, which had been transferred after the Union of Lublin in 1569 from the Grand Duchy of Lithuania to the Kingdom of Poland, the Korona. There they settled in the towns established by the great Polish magnates, who obtained vast territories in the eastern part of a rapidly expanding Poland in compensation for their military service to the Crown.

There were two contrasting aspects of the position of the Jews in early modern Poland–Lithuania. On the one hand, they were in many respects a corporation, with the legal right to govern themselves as did all medieval corporations, whether those of an estate, like the Polish nobility (*szlachta*), or of a specific group, like the burghers of a particular town. On the other, the Jews were a pariah group, tolerated in an inferior position, a status highlighted by the constant references to them in legal documents from the sixteenth century as ‘unbelieving’ (*infidus, perfidus, or incredulus*) and by the contempt in which they were held by most Christians. Their religion was rejected as both false and harmful by the dominant Roman Catholic Church. The essence of the position of the Church was formulated by St Augustine in the fifth century, and it held that the Jews were to be tolerated as the witnesses of

<sup>8</sup> I. M. Ta-Shma, ‘Letoledot hayehudim bepolin bame’ot ha-12–ha-13’, *Tsiyon*, 53 (1988), 347–69; id., ‘Yediyot hadashot letoledot hayehudim bepolin bame’ot ha-12–ha-13’, *Tsiyon*, 54 (1989), 208; id., ‘On the History of the Jews in Twelfth- and Thirteenth-Century Poland’, *Polin*, 10 (1997), 287–317.

the advent of Jesus and the people of the Book, yet should be 'placed low' in society in order to demonstrate the truth of Christianity.

This position was codified as part of canon law at the Third and Fourth Lateran Councils in Rome in 1179 and 1215, and further developed by St Thomas later in the thirteenth century. Jews were now subject to a number of restrictions: they were required to pay tithes on properties they acquired, to wear clothes that would distinguish them from Christians, and to stay at home during Holy Week and the Easter holiday, so as not to 'profane' the Christian observances. They were not to hold public office or to employ Christian servants. Following the seventh-century Isidore of Seville, the Church believed that the Jews had rejected the God-sent Messiah and been rejected by him: they were no longer 'chosen' or 'elect'. The Church, the New Israel, had superseded the Old Israel, the rites and rituals of which became obsolete after the passion of Christ.

The Catholic Church in Poland consistently tried to implement the directives of the Vatican on Jewish matters, although its attempts were often curbed because of the Jews' economic bond with the Polish nobility and the part Jews played in trade, banking, tax farming, and colonization. Perhaps because of the extraordinary role of Jews in the economy of the Korona, the Polish Catholic Church rarely resorted to the harsh anti-Jewish vocabulary frequently found among the Church Fathers of Eastern Christianity, such as St John Chrysostom, who compared Judaism to vomit and the synagogue to a whore. What is less clear is how far Roman Catholic attitudes affected the views held by the Greek Orthodox and Greek Catholic churches on the Jews and how far the Greek Orthodox Church developed its own teachings on them. These topics form the subject of the chapter by Alexander Pereswetoff-Morath, who argues that scattered references to the Jews (or the Jew) in Christian literature of the medieval period are polemical and rhetorical: they do not reflect any social reality, and address imaginary, not real, Jews. Only later, in the fifteenth century, did translations of apocalyptic texts into Church Slavonic reflect a closer co-operation, even a dialogue, between Jews and Christians. The much more extreme anti-Judaic and anti-Talmudic polemic within Greek Orthodox literature seems to be the result of the much later early modern impact of Roman Catholic anti-Judaic polemics on the Greek Orthodox theological discourse.

A new period of Polish-Lithuanian history began in 1569 when a common Polish-Lithuanian parliament meeting in Lublin transformed the personal union of the two states into a 'Commonwealth of Two Nations' (*Rzeczpospolita Obojga Narodów*) with a common monarchy and a single parliament. The country now became less tolerant as it came under the increasing influence of the Counter-Reformation. Already in 1564 the Jesuit Order had been invited into the country by Cardinal Stanisław Hosius, who had been a papal legate at the Council of Trent, for which he had written a new confession of the Catholic faith. Yet in early modern times the missionary zeal of what came to be known as Catholic reformation was considerably mitigated by the role various religious groups played in the Polish economy. For



example, in the town of Lviv, Jews, Tatars, and Armenians (Monophysite Christians) were allowed to reside permanently, establish guilds, and engage in trade.

The revived Catholic Church attracted some sympathy among reform-minded Orthodox clerics in Kiev, Lviv, and Lutsk, including Gedon Balaban, Orthodox bishop of Lviv, and Ipaty Potis, Orthodox bishop of Lutsk, and in 1596 the two churches were united at the Synod of Brest-Litovsk (Brześć), a move which was also the product of pressures from Rome and was intended to strengthen the Commonwealth against the rising power of the Grand Duchy of Muscovy. The Greek Catholic Church (or Uniate Church) which this union established retained its own Eastern (Russian, Greek, or Orthodox) Christian liturgy and a married lower priesthood while acknowledging the supremacy of the papacy. It did win a certain amount of support, particularly as the Basilian Order, reformed on Jesuit lines, did provide the new church with a well-educated priesthood. However, it was rejected by most of the Orthodox laity of the Commonwealth, including the great magnate Prince Konstanty Wasyl Ostrogski (1526–1608), who founded as a counter-measure the Ostrog Academy to train a new Greek Orthodox leadership and check the eastward expansion of the Uniates and Catholics. The union certainly stimulated attempts to revive and reform the Orthodox Church. Followers of the Greek Orthodox Church continued to practise their faith, and a parliamentary bill of 1609 restored to it a quasi-legal status by allowing Orthodox nobles to continue to hold office. Władysław IV Vasa (ruled 1632–48) attempted further to conciliate the Orthodox, granting legal recognition to ‘the’ Orthodox Church and appointing Petro Mohyla Metropolitan of Kiev.<sup>9</sup>

These concessions came too late to undo the anger caused by the union. The attack on the Orthodox Church was most bitterly resented by the Cossacks, a group of frontiersmen and runaway serfs who had established themselves on the lower Dnieper in a self-governing military unit known as the Cossack Republic at Zaporozhye (Ukr. Zaporizhzhya, literally ‘beyond the rapids’), headed by a hetman with a staff of adjutants, a chancellor, a quartermaster, and a judge. From this base they resisted Tatar slave-raiding incursions and mounted their own raids into the Ottoman empire. Serving as a buffer zone between south-eastern Poland and the Ottoman-controlled Crimean peninsula, the Cossacks entered a marriage of convenience with the Poles, who could not afford to keep a significant army in this distant borderland of the Commonwealth and found it convenient to legalize the Cossacks while also attempting to control the Zaporozhye Cossack population and limiting their number through a royal register.

The disaffection of the Cossacks was the more serious because, just before the Union of Lublin, the fertile provinces of Volhynia, Bratslav, and Kiev, formerly subject to the Grand Duchy of Kiev, passed from the Grand Duchy of Lithuania to

<sup>9</sup> On these developments, see S. M. Horak, ‘The Kiev Academy—a Bridge to Europe in the Seventeenth Century’, *East European Quarterly*, 2 (1968), 117–37; H. F. Graham, ‘Peter Mogila, Metropolitan of Kiev’, *Russian Review*, 14 (1955), 345–56.

the Kingdom of Poland. This laid them open to colonization by the great magnates such as the Potockis, Ostrogskis, Wiśniowieckis, and Sanguszkos, many of them converts from Orthodoxy to Catholicism. One aspect of this colonization was the intensification of the burdens on the peasantry, including ‘unregistered’ Cossacks (that is, those not included in the royal register), who were now subjected to the same process of progressive enserfment which had earlier occurred in Poland. The magnates also founded as many as two hundred towns, in many of which they settled considerable numbers of Jews, who often administered their estates, collected taxes, provided credit to both nobles and peasants, and acted as a major intermediary between the village and the market town. In addition, many Jewish merchants and artisans established themselves in the region. As early as 1569, Jews lived in twenty-four towns in Ukraine, and numbered some 4,000 altogether. By 1648, Jews lived in 115 Ukrainian towns and their number had risen to around 40,000.<sup>10</sup>

These developments created a potent mix of religious, social, and ethnic tensions, resulting in at least six short-lived Cossack rebellions in the first half of the seventeenth century and culminating in the great Cossack uprising under the leadership of the Eastern Orthodox nobleman Bohdan Khmelnytsky (Chmielnicki) which began in 1648. This also led to large-scale Jewish casualties, although the estimates of chroniclers such as Nathan Nata Hannover are clearly exaggerated. It is now estimated that about 14,000 Jews died, while others became refugees, converted under duress, or were taken prisoner to be subsequently sold at the slave markets in Istanbul.<sup>11</sup> Significant numbers may have fled the country in the wake of the uprising, and more perished in the subsequent Swedish and Muscovite invasions, although the most recent research has shown that as little as five years after the uprising major Jewish communities in Ukraine were managing to rebuild themselves.<sup>12</sup>

Ukraine was now divided between Poland–Lithuania and Muscovy. Under the Peace of Andruszów (Andrusovo) of January 1667, which brought to an end the war between the two countries, Ukraine on the east bank of the river Dnieper was ceded to Muscovy. Kiev was ceded for two years but remained under Muscovite rule thereafter, confirmed by the Treaty of Grzymułtowski in 1684. Zaporozhye was placed under a joint protectorate.

Jews were officially excluded from left-bank Ukraine, but the old social relationships continued in right-bank Ukraine, where their role as the agents of the great Catholic (sometimes Greek Catholic) and Polish magnates continued to arouse tensions with the local Orthodox peasantry and Cossacks. Violence remained endemic in the Polish part of Ukraine in the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, much

<sup>10</sup> S. Ettinger, ‘Helkam shel hayehudim bekolonizatsiyah shel ukrainah (1569–1648)’, *Tsiyon*, 21 (1956), 110–11, 119–24; S. Stampfer, ‘What Actually Happened to the Jews of Ukraine in 1648?’, *Jewish History*, 17 (2003), 207–27.

<sup>11</sup> See Shaul Stampfer, ‘What Actually Happened to the Jews of Ukraine in 1648’, *Jewish History*, 17/2 (2003), 207–27.

<sup>12</sup> M. Rosman, ‘Dubno in the Wake of Khmel’nyts’kyi’, *Jewish History*, 17 (2003), 239–55.

of it perpetrated by outlaws (*haidamaky*) who went from banditry to opposition to Polish rule. Thus in 1734, in the aftermath of the interregnum and the disputed election of King Augustus III under Russian control, Verlan, a Cossack officer in the private army of Jerzy Lubomirski, mutinied and organized Cossack-style units of about a thousand peasants each. He raised the standard of revolt against the Polish nobles, promising the removal of Polish lords, Jews, and Catholic institutions from Ukraine. This revolt was renewed in 1750 and was followed in 1768 by a much more extensive *haidamak* revolt, the Koliyivshchyna, which was led by Maksym Zaliznyak. At its height, it encompassed almost all of the Kiev and Bratslav provinces and most of Volhynia, and required a combination of Russian and Polish troops to crush it. In the worst episode around two thousand Jews were massacred in the town of Uman when the local commander of the Polish garrison, Ivan Gonta, went over to the rebels.

In spite of these outbursts of violence directed predominantly against the Polish nobility, the right-bank Ukraine remained a major centre of Jewish life. Jewish population losses in the Khmelnytsky uprising were soon made good, largely as a result of natural increase. By 1720 the Jewish population of Poland–Lithuania had risen to perhaps 375,000, and by 1764 to around 750,000 out of a total population of between 12.3 and 14.0 million, thus constituting some 5 or 6 per cent of the general population. By this stage, the bulk of Jews lived in the eastern part of the Commonwealth. Only 12 per cent were to be found in Wielkopolska and 17 per cent in Małopolska, as against 27 per cent in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and 44 per cent in Ukraine/Ruthenia. The majority of Jewish urban concentrations were also to be found in the eastern part of the country. Of the forty-four towns with a Jewish population of more than one thousand, four were in the west, seven in the centre, five in Lithuania, and twenty-seven in Ukraine/Ruthenia. One (Warsaw) was in Mazovia.<sup>13</sup> Most of these towns in Ukraine belonged to the Polish nobility and had the status of private towns, which—unlike the Crown towns with their church headquarters and Christian urban competitors with the Jews—did not have the privilege *de non tolerandis Judaeis* (of not tolerating Jews) and by and large had no restrictions on Jewish settlement or occupational opportunities. In her essay in this volume, Judith Kalik demonstrates how the Jews' economic role as leaseholders of the Polish magnates (rather than their position as adherents of Judaism) shaped their conflicts with the Eastern Orthodox Church, which, in turn, disputed its property rights with the Catholic magnates. Here too we find economic, and not ideological or religious, considerations shaping the relations between Jews, Catholics, and Eastern Orthodox elites in the lands of the Korona.

<sup>13</sup> The figure of 750,000 is derived by Raphael Mahler from the Polish–Lithuanian census of 1764. For Mahler's views, see his *Yidn in amolikh poyln in likht fun tsifern* (Warsaw, 1958). Other important studies are S. Stampfer, 'The 1764 Census of Polish Jewry', *Annual of Bar-Ilan University*, 24–5 (1989), 41–147, and Z. Guldon and W. Kowalski, 'Jewish Settlement in the Polish Commonwealth in the Second Half of the Eighteenth Century', *Polin*, 18 (2005), 307–21.

## FROM THE PARTITIONS OF POLAND TO THE OUTBREAK OF THE FIRST WORLD WAR

The partitions of Poland by Austria, Russia, and Prussia in 1772, 1793, and 1795 brought left- and right-bank Ukraine under Russian rule. Red Rus was joined with Małopolska to form the Austrian province of Galicia, and Austrian rule was also confirmed in Bukovina and Subcarpathian Ruthenia. The relations between Jews, Ukrainians (then called Ruthenians), and the imperial authorities differed significantly in these areas. As a result of the partitions, the tsarist empire came to control the destinies of about one million Jews of the former Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth. By 1820 the Jewish population was 1.6 million, which constituted about 3.5 per cent of the total population of the empire of some 46 million. By 1880, the Jewish population had grown to 4 million, the largest concentration of Jews in the world, 4.7 per cent of the empire’s population of 86 million. Of these, a very large proportion lived in the lands in which Greek Orthodox Ukrainian-speakers formed the majority of the population. The tsarist authorities began the process of aggressive integration of the borderlands into the empire, by suppressing elements of the previously granted Ukrainian autonomy, intensifying the process of enserfment, Russifying local Ukrainian and Polish elites, and forcefully resubmitting the Uniate Christians (Greek Catholics) to the Eastern Orthodox Church. Poles and Jews, who had resided for centuries in the eastern parts of Poland–Lithuania, also became objects of this Russification process.

Before the partitions of Poland–Lithuania only a very small number of crypto-Jews lived within the borders of the Grand Duchy of Muscovy and of its successor, the Russia of Peter the Great. The Augustine thesis that Jews should be tolerated as witnesses of Jesus’ coming was accepted by the Greek Orthodox clergy, although the views of John Chrysostom expressed in his extremely sharp Judaeophobic language were popular and widely accepted. Hence Judaeophobia was a strong and more widespread factor in Muscovite Rus, and hostility to Jews persisted into the eighteenth century. While Peter the Great may have tolerated some crypto-Jews at his court and may have toyed with the idea of allowing Jews to settle in Russia, his successor Catherine I reverted to the earlier policy, expelling all Jews from the area of Ukraine under Russian rule. Small numbers of Jews did manage to penetrate Russia, both in the Baltic area and in Ukraine, but they were expelled by Peter’s daughter, Elizabeth. Still, because of the economic interests of the Greek Orthodox nobility in left-bank Ukraine, Jewish merchants, wine-dealers, and tavern-keepers had a not insignificant presence in the borderland territories.<sup>14</sup>

The European Enlightenment had a profound impact on the policy-making of the Russian tsars. Catherine II (ruled 1762–96), an admirer of Diderot and Voltaire,

<sup>14</sup> V. Gerasimova, ‘Sotsiokul’turnyi oblik evreev v Rossii v XVIII veke’, doctoral diss. (Russian State University for the Humanities, Moscow, 2009).

attempted to 'transform' her Jewish population into 'useful subjects'. She legalized the Jewish presence in Russia's newly acquired western borderlands, abandoning the non-admission policy of the previous monarchs. Following Peter the Great, Catherine also attempted to transform Russia into an estate society on Western lines, with four main estates made up of nobles, merchants, townspeople, and peasants in accordance with her belief in a society 'in which each legally-defined category of the population possessed its own clearly enunciated and exclusive rights, privileges and obligations'.<sup>15</sup> Of these estates only the nobility was granted limited rights by Catherine's Charter of the Nobility in 1786, and even these did not in any serious way compromise the autocratic character of the government. Given the inadequacy of the bureaucracy in the tsarist state, these estates were self-administered. The problem of where in this hierarchy to place the Jews, the second most numerous ethnic group in the incorporated areas (after Polish Catholics), constantly perplexed tsarist administrators. The conservative character of the monarchy preserved the dominance of the Polish nobility in these parts until at least the Polish uprising of 1863. At the same time, however, the bureaucrats were suspicious of the long-standing links between the Polish nobility and the Jews and sought ways to undermine this alliance, which, they thought, financially and economically supported the explosive and rebellious nationalist sensibilities among the nobility. To facilitate a faster incorporation of the borderland ethnicities into the monarchy, the Russian authorities allowed groups such as the Old Believers, the Muslims, and the Karaites, and also the Jews, to administer themselves. The Russian bureaucrats were constantly looking for an element in Jewish society which they could make use of in order to reform the Jews in the Russian interest.

In the period between the first partition of Poland-Lithuania in 1772 and the death of Alexander I in 1825, although many plans for the Enlightenment-style reform of the Jews were introduced, little was done to change their situation. Most of the far-reaching legislation of potentially transformative character remained unimplemented. In this respect, the period came to be remembered widely in Jewish collective memory as a golden age in which the Jews were largely left alone and allowed to manage their own affairs. At the same time, the administration, assisted by the advisory Jewish Committees, one in Warsaw and another in St Petersburg, formulated in these years the basic concepts which were to dominate Jewish policy under Nicholas I and his successors. These concepts were characterized by a strong belief in the negative impact of the Jews on the surrounding population, summed up in the belief that Jewish 'exploitation' was responsible for the miserable state of the peasantry. This principle also lay at the root of the decision to confine the Jews to the 'Pale of Settlement', an area made up of the fifteen western provinces annexed from Poland together with the land recently acquired from the Ottoman

<sup>15</sup> V. Kamendrowsky and D. M. Griffiths, 'The Fate of the Trading Nobility Controversy in Russia: A Chapter in the Relationship between Catherine II and the Russian Nobility', *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas*, 26 (1978), 220.

empire north of the Black Sea. While, in accordance with Enlightenment principles, Russian bureaucrats did accept that Jews could be transformed into useful subjects, they were also convinced that this transformation would require substantial effort on the part of the government. In his chapter, Taras Koznarsky explores how Russian nineteenth-century travellers understood these principles by analysing the travellers' attempts intellectually (and benevolently), if somewhat condescendingly, to appropriate the newly acquired ethnicities of the western borderlands—Poles, Ukrainians, and Jews—and incorporate them into their enlightened imperial discourse.

These principles were at the root of the way the 'Jewish problem' was to be handled by Nicholas I (ruled 1825–55) in the next thirty years. Nicholas was determined to reorganize and systematize the administration of his empire and transform it into a *Polizeistaat*, at that time understood as a 'properly governed (well-managed) state', on the model of eighteenth-century Austria and Prussia. Nicholas's goal was the establishment of effective methods of state administration and control which would unify his multi-confessional and ethnically diverse empire. As a consequence, his reforms were characterized by the creation of new administrative agencies and the reform and centralization of existing ones.

His government intervened on a substantial scale in Jewish life with the objective of 'moulding the Jews in ways consistent with the emperor's overall aims and ideology'<sup>16</sup> and turning them into loyal subjects of the tsar by establishing direct state supervision of the life and religious activity of the Jewish community and eliminating the traditional mediators between the state and the Jews such as the communal deputies. Yet, in spite of the presence in his administration of Enlightenment-minded reformers such as Sergey Uvarov and Pavel Kiselev, the three decades of Nicholas's rule succeeded neither in creating a body of modernized Jews on the French or German model, nor in transforming the mass of Jews into what the tsarist bureaucrats could regard as 'useful subjects'. The ill-thought-out and poorly conceived initiatives, ranging from the introduction of conscription for Jews to the establishment of state schools and two rabbinic seminaries, undermined the authority of the traditional Jewish leadership without putting much in its place. They greatly increased social stratification in the community with devastating consequences for communal solidarity. They also created a huge gulf between the small group of Westernizers and integrationists, including the maskilim (supporters of the Haskalah, the Jewish enlightenment), who trusted naively in the good faith of the authorities and sought empowerment, and the overwhelming majority who saw the government as deeply hostile, persecuting, and conversionary. While the former became modernized and achieved empowerment as censors, instructors in the rabbinic seminaries, crown (state-paid) rabbis, and expert Jews (*uchenye evrei*, the advisers of the Russian high-ranking bureaucrats and ministers), the latter

<sup>16</sup> M. Stanislawski, *Tsar Nicholas I and the Jews: The Transformation of Jewish Society in Russia, 1825–1855* (Philadelphia, 1983), p. xii.

remained largely untouched by modernization and cleaved instead to the rising leadership of Orthodoxy, mostly of the pietistic hasidic stock, especially in the Ukrainian lands. The rifts in the community, which were later to become still more profound, made a transition to modernity, always unlikely under tsarist autocracy, even more difficult.

The accession of Alexander II in February 1855 saw major changes in policy. Alexander proceeded to plan for the long-overdue abolition of serfdom and also proposed a number of other major reforms, including the introduction of a more representative system of local government, the establishment of a new legal system with trial by jury and much more scope for legal advocacy, and the reorganization of the army. The Jewish elite placed high hopes in the 'reforming tsar'. However, instead of abolishing all restrictions on the Jews, the government put forward a policy which Benjamin Nathans has identified as 'selective integration': rewarding those sections of Jewish society which had succeeded in transforming themselves on the lines advocated by the authorities, 'a process by which the tsarist state hoped to disperse certain categories of Jews into the Russian social hierarchy'.<sup>17</sup> It was premised on the assumption that some groups within the Jewish community would respond to incentives of the sort offered by the government and would 'cease to constitute a separate estate, or even a distinct social and legal entity'.<sup>18</sup>

The government ultimately decided to ease the restrictions on three groups of Jews, who it was thought would contribute to the economy and who were unlikely to come into conflict with the peasantry: merchants of the first guild, university graduates, and certified artisans. For the remaining Jews, the absolute majority, the restriction to the Pale of Settlement was retained. The terms used to describe the government's policy were union (*soedinenie*), rapprochement (*sbliizhenie*), and, above all, merger (*sliyanie*).<sup>19</sup> These were to be achieved above all through education, and in Alexander's reign the separate Jewish school system was largely done away with and Jews were encouraged to attend the state schools and universities. This continued the process which had begun under Nicholas of the emergence of a Russian-speaking Jewish intelligentsia. Seeking an escape from the narrowing economic opportunities in the Pale of Settlement, young Jews took pains to gain access to higher educational establishments and eventually to establish themselves 'beyond the Pale'. Many of them, after completing the rabbinic seminaries (in Zhitomir and Vilna), continued their careers at the Russian universities in the capitals, instead of following the path of the crown rabbis as expected of them by the government. Increasingly, however, the success of the Jews in taking advantage of these new educational opportunities aroused resentment and calls for restrictions, which were introduced under the arch-conservative government of Alexander III (ruled 1881–94).

<sup>17</sup> B. Nathans, *Beyond the Pale: The Jewish Encounter with Late Imperial Russia* (Berkeley, 2002), 78.

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>19</sup> On this, see J. D. Klier, *Imperial Russia's Jewish Question, 1855–1881* (Cambridge, 1993), 66–83.

The policy of 'selective integration' was certainly attractive, above all to the economic elites who had profited from the economic changes of the first half of the nineteenth century. The first generation of Russian Jewish financiers made their fortunes primarily as military contractors and wholesale grain merchants. Their successors owed their wealth mainly to the enormously lucrative state liquor monopoly, but soon moved into new fields, such as banking and railway construction. Among the prominent Jewish financiers were the banking families of the Efrussis, the Galperins, and, most famously, the Guenzburgs, the railway magnates Samuel Polyakov and Abram Varshavsky, the Kiev sugar magnate Iosef Brodsky, and the Kiev urban construction contractor Yakov Faibishenko. This group saw themselves as inheriting the mantle of the *shtadlanim* who had been the representatives of the Jews before the authorities in Poland–Lithuania, and they hoped to improve the lot of the Jews by intercession with the authorities, with whom they were well acquainted. They were conscious that this could only be done gradually, although they did achieve immediate success in contributing to Jewish causes and in sponsoring, among other things, the establishment of synagogues in Kiev and Odessa, hospitals in Berdichev and Kiev, and vocational training and artisan schools in Berdichev and Zhitomir, and in endowing university stipends for Jewish and Christian students.

The second group which benefited from selective integration were the maskilim and the products of the Jewish school system, which were beginning to coalesce in what was to become the Jewish intelligentsia. This emerging intelligentsia acquired some of the traits of the Polish and Russian intelligentsias, above all a populist penchant—the belief that it had the responsibility to articulate the needs of the larger group—and in the 1860s it began to debate the difficult problem of the nature of Jewish identity. This was complicated by the fact that Russian identity was itself a matter of dispute between Slavophiles and Westernizers, and that the question of what was 'Russian' (*russkii*) in the context of the multinational (*rossiiskii*) empire was never to be resolved satisfactorily. In addition, the Pale of Settlement was part of what had been the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth, and the majority of its population was composed of people who were beginning to see themselves as Lithuanians, Ukrainians, and, more slowly, Belarusians. The Jewish intelligentsia was also well aware of the inadequacies of the rationalist and positivistic, yet simultaneously utopian and naive maskilic view of the world and began to seek alternatives. Mostly they were less committed to Hebrew than their predecessors and some developed a passionate interest in the Russian language and Russian culture, seeking to integrate into the majority culture and become imperial Jews. Thus, it is not surprising that one of the main monthly journals of the Jewish intelligentsia, *Sion*, soon found itself plunged into a bitter controversy with the emerging Ukrainian national movement and its monthly *Osnova* published in St Petersburg from 1861 to 1862.<sup>20</sup>

<sup>20</sup> On this, see R. Serbyn, 'The *Sion-Osnova* Controversy of 1861–1862', in P. J. Potichnyj and H. Aster (eds.), *Ukrainian–Jewish Relations in Historical Perspective* (Edmonton, 1988), 85–110.



This led *Sion* to define more clearly its view of what constituted Jewish identity. Much more sensitive to ethnocentric and non-imperial trends than the mainstream Russian press, it claimed that some specific aspects of Jewishness would survive the 'merger' with the Russian nationality.

From the late 1860s, it was increasingly apparent that Alexander was not going to introduce a constitution or a consultative assembly. He also seemed to have no intention of lifting any of the remaining restrictions on the Jews. The Polish uprising of 1863–4, which elicited substantial although not overwhelming support in the nine formerly Polish provinces of the empire, particularly the Vilna and Kovno provinces, led to an outpouring of Great Russian chauvinism and the desire radically to Russify the affected areas. In the north-east the repression of the Poles was particularly severe.

Initially the Jews were not much affected by this repression since, with some exceptions, they had not supported the revolt either in Lithuania or in Ukraine.<sup>21</sup> Indeed some Jews felt that the situation in the aftermath of the revolt would make the local authorities more sympathetic to their interests. One aspect of the repression was the confiscation of the lands of those Polish noblemen who had supported the uprising, and the determination of the government to strengthen Russian landholding in the region. This finally put an end to the private Polish ownership of towns in Ukraine, brought recently liberated serfs into the market, and subsequently undermined Jewish economic predominance in the shtetl marketplace. There were those in the local administration of the area, such as Prince Illarion Vasilchikov, governor-general of the South-West (the provinces of Kiev, Podolia, and Volhynia), who held the view that Jews could be used to weaken Polish landholding provided adequate safeguards for the interests of the peasants could be established. This view was ultimately rejected by the central government, partly under the influence of General Mikhail Muravyev, military governor of the provinces of Vilna, Grodno, Kovno, Vitebsk, Minsk, and Mogilev, who in his memoirs wrote acidly yet misleadingly that 'the Jews played a double game: they feigned joy [on the occasion of Russian victories] but this was a sham because they helped the insurgents everywhere and gave them money'.<sup>22</sup> Thus, by the decree of 5 March 1864 Jews, like 'persons of Polish origin', were barred from taking up the tax exemptions and financial assistance created for Russian purchasers of land in the 'Polish' provinces. Properties acquired with this assistance could not be leased, managed, bought, or inherited by persons of Polish origin or by Jews, though Jews were still permitted to lease distilleries and taverns on such land. In addition, to strengthen the Orthodox peasantry the holdings they received were somewhat larger than elsewhere, and

<sup>21</sup> On this, see B. Nadel, 'O stosunku Żydów na Wileńszczyźnie do powstania styczniowego', *Biuletyn Żydowskiego Instytutu Historycznego*, 28 (1958), 41, and J. D. Klier, 'The Polish Revolt of 1863 and the Birth of Russification: Bad for the Jews?', *Polin*, 1 (1986), 96–110.

<sup>22</sup> I. Shatskin, 'K istorii uchastiya evreev v pol'skom vosstanii 1863 g.', *Evreiskaya starina*, 1915, no. 1, pp. 29–30.

the system by which they had to perform labour services or make payments to their landlords was brought to an end.<sup>23</sup>

These years did see some Jews adapting to the new and more commercial situation in agriculture and establishing themselves both as bailiffs (in Bessarabia) and leaseholders (in Ukraine), particularly because Russian landlords had no desire to change the so far quite advantageous economic links between the estate owners and the Jewish leaseholders, and continued employing Jews as estate managers. According to one estimate, in 1868 Jews had leased 701 out of 5,143 noble estates in Kiev, Volhynia, and Podolia. These figures aroused fear that this process would gather speed and would also lead to these individuals giving employment to many more Jews in the countryside, while also increasing alarm that the attempts of the authorities to preserve the Russian nobility as an effective and coherent social force were failing.<sup>24</sup> Jews moved not only into the lucrative banking business and wholesale grain trade but also into manufacturing, above all sugar refining, railway building, urban construction, the making of bricks, candles, gloves, and noodles, and textile production. Although Jews were only a small part of the nascent Russian capitalist class, they soon came to be seen as responsible for the ills of industrialization and the development of an industrial society as another source of Jewish power. It is at that time that the 'Jewish question' came to occupy a central position in the Russian liberal and conservative press, with Jews now seen as the foil for any discourse on the obstacles to imperial modernization.

Not only was there growing unease about Jewish 'exploitation' of the peasantry, but Russian bureaucrats were increasingly convinced that the Jews were not transforming themselves into people engaged in useful professions and loyal subjects of the empire in the way that was expected of them, in spite of what the administrators saw as generous treatment by the authorities. The inability of the educated minority, mostly living 'beyond the Pale', to impose reform on the predominantly traditional community residing within the Pale undermined belief within bureaucratic circles in the value of even the partial measures of emancipation which had been embarked on.

Jewish 'separatism'—generated by the existing institutions of social segregation such as the Pale of Settlement—was increasingly seen by the authorities as the root of their problems with the Jews. As a result the government weakened in its commitment to abolish the restrictions under which the Jews laboured. The worsening situation was highlighted by the outbreak of a pogrom in Odessa, the main centre of acculturation in the south, in March 1871, which followed an earlier anti-Jewish

<sup>23</sup> M. I. Mysh (ed.), *Rukovodstvo k russkim zakonam o evreyakh*, 4th edn. (St Petersburg, 1914), 354–5, 371.

<sup>24</sup> I. G. Orshansky, *Evrei v Rossii: Ocherki ekonomicheskogo i obshchestvennogo byta russkikh evreev* (St Petersburg, 1877), 123–5; B. D. Weinryb, *Neueste Wirtschaftsgeschichte der Juden in Russland und Polen, I: Das Wirtschaftsleben der Juden in Russland und Polen von der 1. polnischen Teilung bis zum Tode Alexanders II (1772–1881)* (Breslau, 1934), 56–61, 217–18; P. P. Chubinsky, *Materialy i issledovaniya*, vii (St Petersburg, 1872), 6, 182–4.

riot in April 1859. The Odessa pogrom was the consequence of the growing commercial rivalry between the Greek community, previously dominant in the grain trade, and the Jews, who were now increasingly taking on a more important role and marginalizing the Greek monopolists. Even more disturbing than the three days of rioting and destruction, in which eight people died and twenty-one were seriously injured, was the response of the authorities. According to the governor-general of New Russia, Count Pavel Kotzebue, the Jews were themselves responsible for the violence, 'having started first', an attitude which re-emerged later during a major outbreak of violence following the assassination of Alexander II on 1 March 1881.

In 1869 the Kiev-based newspaper *Kievlyanin* undertook a major campaign against the evils of Jewish leaseholding, which probably induced the local governor, Prince Aleksandr Dondukov-Korsakov, to propose early in the following year that a regulation forbidding Jews to lease or purchase estates acquired with government assistance be extended to all noble property in the provinces of Kiev, Volhynia, and Podolia which were under his authority. In addition he proposed that the restrictions on Jewish trading in liquor in the rural areas of the Pale, which had been relaxed in 1863 and 1865, should be reintroduced.

The late seventies saw further restrictions on Jewish economic activity, while fears of the negative impact of Jewish leasing in the countryside became heightened. The long-standing Jewish involvement in the liquor trade was also attacked. While the liberal-minded Count Mikhail Loris-Melikov discussed, as part of his 'dictatorship of the heart' initiatives of 1880–1, the abolition of the Pale, which he thought would allow a more even distribution of the Jews in the empire and would put an end to the leaseholding system in the west, the early 1880s brought to power bureaucrats who evinced a much more conservative vision of the Jewish problem.

Before the assassination of Alexander II and the top-down silent *coup d'état* orchestrated by Alexander III, Jews were condemned for their participation in the various revolutionary movements which burgeoned in Russia at the end of the reign of Alexander II. Jews played no part in the first socialist groups organized in the tsarist empire and few participated in the initial 'going to the people' in the mid-1870s. However, recent research has shown that there was a greater Jewish participation in the later Populist movement than previously believed, and that some 20 per cent of the Populist activists in Ukraine were Jews, although they performed secondary roles, with responsibility for logistics, distribution of propaganda materials, and the smuggling of explosives across the border.

By the end of Alexander II's reign Judaeophobia had become a central element in the ideology of Russian conservatism. The Jews were seen as the embodiment of the capitalist system, the inevitable consequences of which were parliamentary rule, the undermining of the agrarian social structure and the landed nobility, and revolutionary unrest and the threat this posed to the monarchy. The conservative press, such as *Kievlyanin* and especially *Grazhdanin*, and later *Novoe vremya*, portrayed

Jewish revolutionaries as the embodiment of ‘nihilism’ and a threat to the social order. This ‘conservative utopianism’ drew heavily on the racial antisemitism that was simultaneously emerging in central Europe, inspired by Joseph-Arthur de Gobineau (the term ‘antisemitism’ was coined by Wilhelm Marr), and the negative synergy between the two movements intensified in subsequent decades.<sup>25</sup>

The situation of the Jews rapidly deteriorated in the years between 1881 and 1905, exacerbated, among other factors, by the rapid industrialization of the empire and the pauperization of artisans and small traders. The increasingly hostile policy towards the Jews went along with a worsening political situation, which in conjunction with the growing unrest among the emerging Russian proletariat resulted in 1905 in the first Russian revolution. These conditions led to the radicalization of the Jewish elite, which grew sceptical about the policy of integration and the transformation of the community through education and Russification. It is true that protagonists of integration remained a significant element within the Jewish community until 1914 and beyond, but in the last decades before the outbreak of the First World War, ethnicity rather than religion came increasingly to be seen as the main marker of Jewish identity. The Jews were clearly becoming a proto-nation, like the other proto-nations whose emergence dates from these years, the Ukrainians, Belarusians, Lithuanians, and Latvians, and this change affected all aspects of Jewish political life.

The worsening situation of Russian Jewry and the radicalization of Russian society at large provoked a series of new responses among the Jews. First, as part of the large-scale emigration from east Europe, over two million Jews took to the road, fleeing to Palestine, Argentina, and South Africa, but mostly to the United States. Major new political movements came to the forefront and eclipsed the Populists and the maskilim, above all Zionism and Jewish autonomism, which rejected integration and stressed peoplehood as the main marker of Jewish identity. Many Jews also adhered to the various socialist groups which emerged in these years, seeing capitalism as the main obstacle to the integration of Jews into society at large. The crisis also fostered a new literary climate, which involved an increased sense of the value of traditional Jewish life, which had been so bitterly attacked by the Haskalah, and gave a new dynamism to both Hebrew and Yiddish literature.

The years between 1905 and 1907 saw the most sustained outbreak of social and political violence in the tsarist empire since the Pugachev rebellion in the late eighteenth century. As in Austria in 1848, the government eventually regained power but its authority was severely shaken. It was forced on 17 October 1905 to grant a constitution—in a document that came to be known as the October Manifesto—which introduced a parliament, the Duma, with restricted powers, and which also greatly increased the freedom of the press, recognizing a situation which had come into being during the months before the manifesto.

<sup>25</sup> On this, see J. D. Klier, ‘Russian Judeophobes and German Antisemites: Strangers and Brothers’, *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas*, 37 (1989), 524–40.

As a result of what was in effect a counter-revolutionary coup on 3 June 1907 the government was able significantly to reduce the power of the Duma, but was unable to return to a fully autocratic system. Petr Stolypin, appointed Chairman of the Council of Ministers (i.e. Prime Minister) in July 1906, attempted to broaden the basis of its support, seeking to win Russian nationalist backing by adopting a strongly nationalist line in relation to the non-Russians of the empire, whose representation in the Duma was also reduced.

For the Jews, the 1905 revolution had a double character. On the one hand, it brought about an unprecedented political mobilization of all sectors of the Russian Jewish world, similar to that taking place among all other national minorities of the empire. Those movements—Zionism, autonomism, socialism in its various incarnations—which had previously been espoused by small groups of enthusiasts now became mass movements with large followings. Jewish liberalism also transformed itself during these years and became a major force, while the Orthodox adopted modern political techniques to defend the interests of the religiously conservative section of the community. Although the main legal restrictions on Jews were not done away with, they did receive the franchise with the rest of the male population of the empire under the constitution which the tsar was forced to concede in October 1905. There were twelve Jews in the first Duma, and although the number of Jewish representatives fell to four in the second, two in the third, and three in the fourth Duma, this parliamentary experience contributed to a new political sophistication. Yet none of this led to a change in government policy, which remained hostile to the Jews, a hostility which was manifested in the support in the highest government circles for the decision to put Mendel Beilis on trial in Kiev on a charge of ritual murder. Although in 1913 a peasant-based jury found Beilis not guilty, the court also ruled that even if he had not committed a ritual murder, such murders *were* carried out by Jews. A fictionalized account of the trial was written by the philo-semitic Ukrainian socialist Volodymyr Vynnychenko, one of the leaders of the short-lived independent Ukrainian Republic, whose impressive literary corpus (some of it still unpublished) is described in Mykola Soroka's chapter in this volume. He shows how Vynnychenko attempted in his fiction to bring Ukrainians and Jews, as two marginalized and stateless peoples, into the framework of an anti-imperial partnership.

At the same time the revolutionary period was marked by mass violence, particularly anti-Jewish, on an unprecedented scale. Pogroms took place in three waves. The first, with pogroms in Kishinev in April 1903 and Gomel in September, had much in common with earlier outbreaks except that it was much more brutal and, in Gomel, brought about the emergence of Jewish self-defence units. The second, in 1904, was above all a product of the patriotic exaltation provoked by the war with Japan, while the third was a response, partly orchestrated by the radical right and partly spontaneous, of those alarmed at the concessions made by the tsar in the manifesto of 17 October 1905. The violence was on a much larger scale than in

1881–2 and led to the deaths of over 3,100 Jews. While some of those in command of the forces of order did attempt to contain the attacks on Jews, others, enticed by the far-right propaganda of the military, condoned them and even on occasion encouraged them, particularly in 1906 in Białystok.

### JEWES IN THE UKRAINIAN BORDERLAND: GALICIA

The situation of the Jews was very different in Galicia. The territorial extent of the province varied considerably in the century and a half that the area was under Austrian rule. The core of the province was the eastern area of Red Rus, with its capital of Lviv (Lwów, Lemberg), which had passed from the rule of one of the princely successor states of the Grand Duchy of Kiev to the Polish crown in the fourteenth century. The western area of Małopolska around Kraków was incorporated into Austria as a consequence of the third partition of Poland but was then transferred to the Napoleonic Duchy of Warsaw in 1809. Under the third partition, the area around Lublin, including the town of Zamość, which became an important centre of the Haskalah, passed to Austria. In 1809 this area was also transferred to the Duchy of Warsaw and in 1815 became part of the Kingdom of Poland, a semi-independent state in dynastic union with the tsarist empire. In 1809 the area around Ternopil (Tarnopol), another important Haskalah centre, became part of the tsarist empire but returned to Habsburg control in 1815. Bukovina, which had never been part of Poland, and whose population was largely Ukrainian and Romanian, with significant Polish, German, and Jewish minorities, was part of the Galician administrative district until 1848.

The area was highly diverse culturally, ethnically, religiously, and geographically. Galicia developed a distinct character and contained within its borders one of the largest concentrations of Jews in east-central Europe. Its Jewish population grew from around 178,000 in the 1790s (out of a total population of just over 3 million inhabitants) to 317,000 in 1850 (out of 4.7 million) and 811,000 in 1900 (out of 7.3 million), when Jews made up over 11 per cent of the total population.<sup>26</sup> By that date a significant proportion of the Jews still lived in the countryside—36.6 per cent by one estimate—and there seems to have been a re-emigration of Jews to the villages in the last quarter of the nineteenth century, following the political emancipation of Jews in Austria in 1868.<sup>27</sup> Jews were also a significant presence in cities and market towns, in at least seven of which they formed the majority of the population.

The process of Jewish integration in Galicia was marked by a number of specific features. In the first place, the German element in Galicia was much weaker than in either Prussian Poland or the Czech lands and most Germans in the province were

<sup>26</sup> *Jewish Encyclopedia* (New York, 1901–16), s.v. 'Galicia'.

<sup>27</sup> J.-P. Himka, 'Ukrainian–Jewish Antagonism in the Galician Countryside during the Late Nineteenth Century', in Potichnyj and Aster (eds.), *Ukrainian–Jewish Relations in Historical Perspective*, 116.

rapidly Polonized. This, along with the gradual decline of German hegemony in Austria as a whole, meant that, although there was some support initially by the Austrian authorities and sections of the Jewish leadership for the transformation of the Jews into Germans, or possibly Austrians 'of the Mosaic faith', ultimately the Jewish integrationists here came to favour a Polish orientation.

Secondly, like the Ukrainian lands in the tsarist empire, Galicia was a stronghold of hasidism. The Jewish reformers and integrationists found themselves here in a bitter conflict with hasidim as well as other Orthodox opponents of the modernization of the Jews. Certainly down to 1848, the Austrian authorities were rather suspicious of the Galician maskilim and often supported local hasidim because of their social conservatism, impressive outreach, and clout with the community.<sup>28</sup> In addition, the economic backwardness of Austria and in particular of Galicia meant that the area was still largely agricultural at the end of the nineteenth century and was still dominated by the Polish nobility. As a consequence, although there was some reorganization of the economic structure of the Jewish community, the granting of equal rights in 1868 was not followed by social integration on a significant scale.

Finally, the mixed ethnic character of the region, with Poles dominant in the western part of the province but a minority in the largely Ukrainian eastern area, had a major impact on the situation of the Jews. The Jewish elite, after the granting of provincial autonomy to the Polish nobility in the late 1860s, for the most part initially favoured an alliance with the dominant Poles, whom the Austrians empowered as representatives of local bureaucracy in both urban and rural areas. They were, however, concentrated in the largely Ukrainian eastern section of Galicia and had to take into account the growing strength of Ukrainian nationalism.

In the second half of the nineteenth century the national conflict between Poles and Ukrainians came to dominate all aspects of life in Galicia. The Ukrainians were deeply disappointed by the constitutional arrangements of the late 1860s in Cisleithanian (non-Hungarian) Austria and responded by adopting three types of position: a pro-Russian, a nationalist Ukrainian, and an abstentionist. For some time the leading role in Ukrainian political life was played by imperial-minded Russophiles, who considered the Ukrainians part of the Russian nation. However, Lviv slowly but steadily turned into a haven for moderate Ukrainian nationalists such as the historian Mykhailo Hrushevsky, who emigrated or were banished from the part of Ukraine under tsarist control, and eventually the area became increasingly anti-Russian and anti-Polish, adopting instead a nationalist vision of Ukraine. The increasingly dominant National Populists (*narodnyky*) now championed the concept of a completely independent Ukrainian nationality and in 1899 created a moderate nationalist party, the Ruthenian National-Democratic Party (Rus'ka natsional'no-demokratychna partiya), which soon acquired a considerable following. This stressed

<sup>28</sup> On this, see R. Mahler, *Hasidism and the Jewish Enlightenment: Their Confrontation in Galicia and Poland in the First Half of the Nineteenth Century* (Philadelphia, 1985), 69–73.

the unity of all Ukrainians across the Austrian–Russian political divide and their solidarity with those under Russian rule, supporting their aspirations for the transformation of Russia into a constitutional–federal state. The party also created a powerful social base through the establishment of credit unions and village co-operatives.<sup>29</sup> More radical political organizations also emerged at this stage, above all the Ruthenian–Ukrainian Radical Party (Rus'ko-ukrayins'ka radykal'na partiya; its name was intended to emphasize the kinship of Ukrainians on both sides of the Dniester) and subsequently the Ukrainian Social–Democratic Party (Ukrayins'ka sotsial-demokratychna partiya). The way in which the socialist activist and early feminist Nataliya Kobrynska depicted Jews in her fiction is the subject of the chapter by Amelia Glaser, who explores her class-based literary understanding of Jewish society.

Because of the delicate population balance in the province, the Jews occupied a pivotal, if uncomfortable, position in its politics. In 1869, shortly after the introduction of autonomy, Galicia's population numbered approximately 5,450,000, of whom some 2,510,000 were Poles, 2,316,000 Ukrainians (Ruthenians), and 50,000 Germans and others. The Jews numbered about 575,000, which meant that if they could be Polonized there would be a clear Polish majority in the province as a whole. On the other hand, if they could be won for the Ukrainian political cause, then the Ukrainians would be a majority in the province. Thus the Jews in Galicia became a potential electoral pool for which Ukrainian and Polish politicians fiercely competed against one another. Given the corrupt and unrepresentative electoral system, the fact that the Jews were concentrated in the eastern, predominantly Ukrainian, part of the province meant that the local Polish elite saw them as an important element in retaining its political control. In 1869 the number of Jews in eastern Galicia was 428,000, almost three times as many as the 147,000 in the west. Jews also constituted a higher percentage of the overall population in eastern Galicia than they did in the west: in 1869 they formed 12 per cent of the total population, which was 65 per cent Ukrainian and 22 per cent Polish. Not surprisingly, the role of the Jews in preserving Polish aristocratic hegemony provoked both bitter resentment from Ukrainians and occasional attempts, as in 1873 and 1907, to form tactical alliances with them to challenge Polish political control and create what would be called the first independent Ukrainian (and also Jewish) club in the Austrian Reichsrat.

The 'new Jewish politics', ranging from Diaspora nationalism to Marxism, began to make its impact in Galicia, threatening the position of the Jewish integrationists, who had not succeeded in extending their influence beyond a relatively narrow circle in towns such as Kraków, Lviv, Przemyśl, Tarnopol, and Tarnów, while the bulk of Galician Jewry remained Orthodox and hasidic and unaffected by modern developments. Under the impact of the rise of Ruthenian (later Ukrainian)

<sup>29</sup> J. Romanczuk, 'Die kulturellen Bestrebungen der Ruthenen in Galizien', *Ruthenische Revue*, 3 (1903), 68. See also, more generally, I. L. Rudnytsky, 'The Ukrainians in Galicia under Austrian Rule', *Austrian History Yearbook*, 3 (1967), 394–429.



nationalism, Zionism thus began to establish itself in the province from the late 1880s, gaining a significant number of adherents and proving attractive to some former integrationists.<sup>30</sup> Unlike their western European colleagues, who agitated first and foremost for the creation of an autonomous Jewish polity, Galician Zionists were Diaspora nationalists: they sought to mobilize the masses in an attempt to secure a better political representation in the Austrian parliament and subsequently to improve the social and cultural conditions of the Jewish population, if not to establish national-political autonomy.<sup>31</sup>

Pressure for political change in Austria led to the granting in 1907 of universal male suffrage in elections to the Reichsrat and to a major debate about the reform of the suffrage in elections to the local parliament in Galicia. These changes took place against the bitter intensification of the conflict between the Ukrainians and the Polish administration, which often, particularly in the villages, erupted into violence committed by the Polish-controlled police against the Ukrainians and Ukrainian-supporting Jewish political agitators. The Ukrainian national idea also now began to have some support in Bukovina, although in Subcarpathian Ruthenia any Ukrainian political aspirations were ruthlessly suppressed by the Hungarian government.

The new electoral law prompted a renewal of the tactical alliance between the Jews and the Ukrainians first seen in the election of 1873. The Zionists and the Ukrainian National Democrats, both fighting against the increasingly chauvinistic Polish political parties, came to an agreement to work together in the hope of electing a significant number of deputies in eastern Galicia. Most likely never formalized in a written form, the agreement required that the Zionists would agitate Jews in the predominantly Ukrainian electoral districts to vote for Ukrainian National Democrats, while the National Democrats would call on their supporters to vote for Zionists in the districts with a majority Jewish population. Simultaneously, Jewish newspapers in Yiddish, German, and Polish and Ukrainian-language newspapers such as *Dilo* that supported the alliance started publishing articles sympathetic to each other's national cause and emphasizing the common fate of the two ethnic minorities, Jews and Ukrainians, manipulated, oppressed, and disempowered in the imperial framework.<sup>32</sup> The elections which took place in May 1907 were bitterly fought. The Zionists put forward twenty candidates, of whom one was successful at the first ballot. Two others, including their leader Adolf Stand, won seats on the second round. Two Jewish members of the Polish Social-Democratic Party of Galicia and Cieszyn Silesia (Polska Partia Socjalno-Demokratyczna Galicji i Śląska Cieszyńskiego) were elected, Hermann Lieberman in Przemyśl and Hermann Diamand in Lviv, where, with the support of Zionist votes, he defeated the 'assimilationist' Samuel Horowitz, the

<sup>30</sup> N. M. Gelber, *Toledot hatenuah hatsiyonit begalitsiyah*, i (Jerusalem, 1958). Much useful material is also to be found in Vienna's *Die Welt* during the period 1880–1900.

<sup>31</sup> J. Shanes, *Diaspora Nationalism and Jewish Identity in Habsburg Galicia* (Cambridge, 2012).

<sup>32</sup> J. Shanes and Y. Petrovsky-Shtern, 'An Unlikely Alliance: The 1907 Ukrainian–Jewish Electoral Coalition', *Nations and Nationalism*, 15 (2009), 483–505.

president of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry and a candidate of the Polish Club.<sup>33</sup> Also elected were two Jews pledged to the Polish Club and a Jewish member of the Polish National Democrat Party (Stronnictwo Narodowo-Demokratyczne). So too was Adolf Gross of the Party of Independent Jews (Stronnictwo Niezawisłych Żydów), who had campaigned for the democratization of Galician political life but was against the autonomy demanded by the Zionists and what were described as the Zionists' 'unrealistic' demands, and who defeated the Jewish deputy mayor of Kraków, Józef Sare, the candidate of the Jewish establishment and of the Kraków conservatives. In spite of Ukrainian support, the Zionists failed to elect their candidates in Stanyslaviv, Terebovlya, Buchach, and Buchach-Rural, in part because of electoral fraud. Jews did follow the directives of the Jewish National Party and vote for Ukrainian candidates in a number of constituencies, but this did not significantly increase the number of seats won by the Ukrainians. In one constituency Jewish voters refused to vote for a Greek Catholic priest, and also sometimes abstained from voting. In addition a large number of Jews cast their votes for the candidates of the Polish Club even in the twelve urban districts in which Jews were in the majority.<sup>34</sup>

The three Zionist representatives from Galicia, together with Benno Straucher, a pro-Ukrainian candidate elected in Bukovina, formed the first Jewish Club in a European parliament dedicated to the struggle for Jewish national rights and the recognition of Yiddish as the Jewish national language. However, the Ukrainian-Jewish alliance did not prove durable, and Adolf Stand, the Club's chairman, declared soon after the elections that its policy would be one of neutrality in the Polish-Ukrainian conflict. Jewish deputies from Galicia did nevertheless join the Ukrainians in publicly celebrating the first Ukrainian parliamentary representation, and the electoral alliance made a durable cultural impact remembered as a positive experience by nationalist Jews and Ukrainians in years to come.<sup>35</sup> The Jewish Club itself did not last much longer and did not outlive the parliament elected in 1907.

The situation of the Jews in Galicia resembled more closely that of the Jews in Hungary than of those in the tsarist empire. In particular, the alliance between the Polish nobility and the Jewish élite in Galica resembled the relationship between the Magyar modernizing elite and the Jews after 1848 and, even more so, after 1867. There were, however, a number of differences. In the first place, while the enthusiastic Magyarization of the Jews of the peripheral areas of post-1867 Hungary embittered relations between Jews and Slovaks and Jews and Romanians, the situation was not wholly comparable to that in Galicia, although the Polish-Jewish alliance and the intensification of the Polish-Ukrainian conflict did greatly complicate the situation of the large majority of Galician Jews who lived in the eastern, predominantly Ukrainian, part of the province. In addition, although political antisemitism did not play the same role in Galician political life that it did in Russia and Russian

<sup>33</sup> *Die Welt* (Vienna), 1907, no. 21, pp. 5, 19; *Wschód*, 1907, no. 32.

<sup>34</sup> W. A. Jenks, *The Austrian Electoral Reform of 1907* (New York, 1974), 198.

<sup>35</sup> *Die Welt*, 1907, no. 25, p. 18.

Poland, it was certainly more a feature of both the Polish and the Ukrainian political culture of the province than it was of the Hungarian. There was some truth in the view of the Galician Zionist monthly *Wschód* that the Jews were caught between the hammer and the anvil—in the east the Ukrainian was against *lyakh i zhyd* (the Pole and the Jew), and in the west the Mazur (Polish peasant) was against *pan i Żyd* (the lord and the Jew).<sup>36</sup>

It is this which explains the strength and specificity of Galician Zionism, particularly in eastern Galicia and in Bukovina. Galician Zionists, in competition with both the Ukrainian and the Polish national democrats, formulated a programme focused on the national minority rights of Jews in Galicia—quite often responding to calls made by Ukrainians encouraging them to adopt a more articulate nation-centred and anti-assimilationist programme. This context of competing nationalisms singled Galician Zionists out among other Zionist parties elsewhere in Europe that were striving to find answers to the rising political antisemitism.

Finally, because of the economically underdeveloped character of the province, the integrationists were much weaker than in Hungary. A number of synagogues, particularly the Progressive Synagogue (Synagoga Postępowa) in Lviv, resembled in their organization and ritual those of the Hungarian Neologs, but by contrast with the situation in Berlin and Budapest, the integrationists (of Reform stock) were very much a minority in the community. Much more than in Hungary, Jews tended to be linked to the great hasidic courts of the area, most notably the Ruzhiner court in Sadagora in Bukovina, and those in Bełz, Rimanov (Rymanów), Komarno, Przemyślany, and Sandz (Nowy Sącz) in Galicia.

Nevertheless, there was some truth in the myth of the good emperor Franz Joseph and of the Habsburg community of nations. For all the tension and conflict, interethnic relations were certainly less inflamed here than in the tsarist empire. Jews certainly felt more comfortable here and referred fondly to the emperor as 'Froym Yosl' (a Yiddish diminutive of 'Franz Joseph').

#### FROM THE OUTBREAK OF THE FIRST WORLD WAR TO THE NAZI INVASION OF THE SOVIET UNION

In 1914 the three powers which had partitioned Poland went to war with each other. Unlike the war in the west, the war in the east was one of motion, with rapidly shifting fronts. This inevitably affected adversely the civilian population, particularly the Jews, whom Russian army commanders considered German or Austrian spies since they spoke Yiddish, which sounded like German to the ears of the Russians.

The German defeat and collapse in November 1918 and the break-up of the Habsburg monarchy led to a confused situation in eastern Europe as the Poles, Balts, and Ukrainians sought to consolidate their independence and the Bolsheviks

<sup>36</sup> *Wschód*, 1905, no. 4, p. 3, and the editorial against Polish antisemitic attacks in *Słowo Polskie*, in *Wschód*, 1905, no. 36, p. 1.

and the Whites fought for control of the former tsarist empire. This brutal three-way civil war between the Whites, the Reds, and the various nationalist forces came to an end only in 1921 with the defeat of the Whites, the consolidation of Soviet power in much of the former tsarist empire, including Ukraine, and the establishment of the independence of Poland, the three Baltic states, and Finland.

These conditions made possible the Ukrainian bid for independence. Here the overthrow of the tsar was followed by the creation of a Ukrainian Central Council (Ukrayins'ka tsentral'na rada) by moderate Ukrainian nationalists, including Mykhailo Hrushevsky, Volodymyr Vynnychenko, and Symon Petlyura. First and foremost socialists and democrats, and only then nationalists, these political leaders initially called only for autonomous rights for Ukraine within a federated state, but on 25 January 1918 they proclaimed the complete independence of the Ukrainian People's Republic. It should be noted that all three leaders of the short-lived independent Ukraine, particularly Petlyura and Vynnychenko, were well-known journalists with strong socialist and philosemitic views. Petlyura wrote sympathetically about Jews in his Russian-language journal *Ukrainskaya zhizn'* dedicated to Ukrainian issues, while Vynnychenko placed Jews firmly at the centre of his most acclaimed plays and stories ('Between Two Powers', 'Talisman', 'Kol Nidrei').

Ukrainian political independence proved difficult to maintain. On 7 February, this government was compelled by the Bolshevik advance under Vladimir Antonov-Ovseenko to abandon Kiev. It was only able to return to power by seeking a separate peace with the Germans, which was concluded at Brest-Litovsk in early March 1918. German policy in Ukraine in 1918 was dominated by military considerations, and because the Ukrainian People's Government lacked the ability to ensure the supply of those goods which the German High Command needed, it was ousted from power by a coup in late April 1918 and replaced by the Hetmanate of Pavlo Skoropadsky, a large landowner and former tsarist general of Ukrainian origin. His authoritarian government was supported by landowners and conservatives in Ukraine and maintained in power by the German military.<sup>37</sup>

The Ukrainian Central Council introduced a far-reaching system of national autonomy for the minorities of Ukraine, including the Jews, as advocated by its president, Hrushevsky. Jews were represented in the parliament on a par with other ethnic minorities of the Ukrainian People's Republic. Several prominent leaders from various Jewish parties—Arnold Margolin, Solomon Goldelman, Pinkhos Krasny, Moshe Zilberfarb, Avraham Revutsky, and others—were appointed to important positions in the Ukrainian government, including the Ministry of Religions and the Ministry of Labour. Jews in this short-lived polity were granted full national-cultural autonomy and were allowed to establish schools and receive substantial social relief funds from the state. Simultaneously the Ukrainian govern-

<sup>37</sup> On this, see M. von Hagen, "I Love Russia, and/but I Want Ukraine", or How a Russian General Became Hetman of the Ukrainian State, 1917–1918', *Journal of Ukrainian Studies*, 29/1–2 (2004), 115–48.

ment issued its first banknotes (the currency was the *karbovanets'*) with inscriptions in Yiddish—the first time in modern Jewish history that Yiddish had appeared on the state currency. In this way the Ukrainians hoped to win Jewish support for their bid for independence.

The Jewish autonomous system ceased to function during the Hetmanate but was re-established when, after the withdrawal of German troops from Kiev in November 1918, the city was taken by troops loyal to the Directory, the executive body of the Ukrainian People's Republic, headed by Vynnychenko and Petlyura. The Directory remained in power for over a year, during which it again co-opted Jews into the government, but it was again forced out of Kiev by a new Bolshevik advance in February 1919, re-establishing itself in a small part of western Podolia, where it made its headquarters in Kamyanyts-Podilsky between June and November of that year. Several prominent Jewish politicians, including Margolin and Goldelman, extended their services and loyalties to the Ukrainian government in exile, despite the massive scale of the anti-Jewish violence that was occurring in Ukraine in 1918–19, for which contemporaries blamed the Directory, its troops, and its leadership.

The German and Austrian capitulations of October–November 1918 initiated the worst period of the Russian Civil War, which lasted until November 1920, when the last of the anti-Bolshevik (White) forces were evacuated from southern Russia. The most violent clashes took place in Ukraine, and these were marked by heightened anti-Jewish violence.<sup>38</sup> All the political groups involved in the struggle for power in Ukraine were culpable, including the Red Army, the Directory, the White Guards, the Polish troops, and numerous gangs headed by independent peasant warlords (*otamany*) such as Nychypir Hryhoryev (Nikifor Grigoryev) and 'Zeleny' (Danylo Terpylo). Until July 1918 the violence was, above all, the work of troops nominally under the command of the Ukrainian Directory, while a peak in violence in May of that year was the result of the activities of the warlord Hryhoryev. The pogroms in the summer of 1918 and in 1919 were primarily the responsibility of the White troops under the command of General Anton Denikin. By the second half of 1919, as the Red Army consolidated its hold over Ukraine, the scale of violence diminished. The retreat of Denikin's troops in December 1919 was, however, accompanied by large-scale looting and killing of Jews. Almost 80 per cent of the nearly 1,300 recorded pogroms occurred in the provinces of Kiev, Podolia, and

<sup>38</sup> There is a very large literature on the pogroms which accompanied the Russian Civil War. Among the more important items are S. I. Gusev-Orenburgsky, *Kniga o evreiskikh pogromakh na Ukraine v 1919 g.: Sostavlena po ofitsial' nym dokumentam, dokladam s mest i oprosam postradavshikh*, ed. M. Gorky (Petrograd and Berlin, 1921; repr. Tel Aviv, 1972); P. Kenez, *Civil War in South Russia, 1919–1920: The Defeat of the Whites* (Berkeley, 1977); O. Budnitsky, *Rossiiskie evrei mezhdru krasnymi i belymi, 1917–1920* (Moscow, 2006); and *Kniga pogromov: Pogromy na Ukraine, v Belorussii i evropeiskoi chasti Rossii v period Grazhdanskoi voiny, 1918–1922 gg. Sbornik dokumentov*, ed. L. B. Milyakova (Moscow, 2007). On the Civil War itself there is an even larger literature. See J. Smele (ed.), *The Russian Revolution and Civil War, 1917–1921: An Annotated Bibliography* (London, 2003).

Volhynia, where the large majority of the Jewish population of Ukraine lived at this time; these territories changed hands many times in the course of one year—Kiev alone nineteen times over only a couple of months. It is uncertain how many people died in the pogroms, and the most reliable estimates vary from 50,000 to 100,000. These estimates do not include the many more who were wounded or raped, while as many as 200,000 children were orphaned. There were also many affected by psychological disorders.

How far was the Directory responsible for the pogroms carried out by its troops? It is certainly true that the control exercised over the troops by the government first from Kiev and then from Kamyanets-Podilsky was rather tenuous, and that the government itself did not speak with one voice. Moreover, the Directory's leadership issued proclamations and leaflets denouncing the pogroms and emphasizing that they both undermined the solidarity between the previously oppressed Ukrainians and Jews, and also benefited the enemy, the Bolsheviks, who could then present themselves to the local Jewish population as an army of liberation. In his careful study of this problem, Henry Abramson has found, on the one hand, no order from the Directory calling for pogroms. On the other, as he points out, 'there was a tendency in some circles, even in official bulletins, to issue inflammatory statements that may have acted as incitements'. In his words:

It is difficult to blame the Directory as a whole with agency in the pogrom waves. Nonetheless, the question of *accountability* must be considered. For the Directory to be absolved of the charge of accountability, it would have to be shown that it took energetic and decisive action against the pogroms, arresting perpetrators and issuing strongly worded condemnations of the violence. Although it is true that several such condemnations were issued, actions taken against the perpetrators were insufficient.<sup>39</sup>

A particularly complex issue is the responsibility of Symon Petlyura, the head of state under the Directory, a question which has been complicated by the controversies arising from his assassination by Sholom Schwarzbard in 1926 and Schwarzbard's later acquittal by a French court on the grounds that Petlyura bore a major responsibility for the wave of pogroms. Petlyura was known for his philo-semitic publications during his literary career before 1917 and for his personal aversion to anti-Jewish violence, but his political position was not secure and his control over the government he headed, and particularly over its troops, was never total, to say the least. He was also willing to give support to Jewish self-defence groups. In addition, as Avraham Revutsky, briefly Minister of Jewish Affairs, pointed out, although great efforts were made during the Schwarzbard trial to find an order by Petlyura authorizing pogroms, none was ever found.<sup>40</sup>

What does seem to be true is that Petlyura had no option but to tolerate those

<sup>39</sup> Abramson, *Prayer for the Government*, 133.

<sup>40</sup> A. Revutsky, 'Aynlaytung', in M. Sadikow, *In yene teg: zikhroynes vegen der rusisher revolutsye un di ukrayner pogromen* (New York, 1926), 15.

guilty of anti-Jewish violence in his own armed forces (although several of the most vicious perpetrators were shot by a firing squad on his orders), for fear that if he took action his army would disintegrate. In addition, despite the leaflets he commissioned and ordered to have distributed among the troops, he failed to issue a stronger condemnation of pogroms in the period between mid-January and April 1919 when the violence was at its height. This was, of course, a particularly difficult period for the Directory, when it lost Kiev to the Bolsheviks and failed to win French support. On the other hand, it is not clear whether his proclamations could have had any desirable effect, especially on the semi-independent warlords who were in charge of the units comprising the Directory's troops. Thus the question of the responsibility or accountability for the mass anti-Jewish violence is predicated on the question of who actually had power over territory or the belligerent groups in 1919 in Ukraine.

The Directory did issue some strong statements condemning the pogroms, but these—such as that of 11 January 1919, signed by Vynnychenko, president of the Directory, Petlyura, and two other members—came too late to have much effect. In addition, while this declaration condemned the pogroms, its impact was somewhat undermined by its simultaneous call on 'the whole of democratic Jewry to fight energetically those individual anarchist-Bolshevik members of the Jewish nation who behave as enemies of the working people of Ukraine and of the State'.<sup>41</sup> After Jewish protests, including a threat by Revutsky to resign as minister, a stronger declaration was issued to the military by the *otaman* Andry Melnyk two days later.<sup>42</sup> (In 1938 Melnyk was to become head of one of the two main factions of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists.)

These appeals had little effect and it was only on 12 April that the Directory issued another decree condemning pogroms, signed by Borys Martos, President of the Cabinet of the Ukrainian People's Republic.<sup>43</sup> As Martos's power was only nominal and the troops were mostly under local command that ignored orders from above, this had only a limited effect in halting the violence, and in the summer, perhaps conscious of the Republic's negative image in Western eyes, Petlyura as commander in chief and his chief of staff Yunakiv issued several additional proclamations to the army of the Directory condemning anti-Jewish violence.<sup>44</sup>

It is certainly true that the number of pogroms committed by the Ukrainian forces now diminished considerably. This was partly the result of the impact of these declarations, but was also the consequence of the consolidation of Soviet power in Ukraine and the formation of Jewish self-defence groups. It remains an open question whether an earlier stand could have diminished the amount of bloodshed, yet no new research in this field can disregard the issue of control over the

<sup>41</sup> This appeal is quoted in full in Abramson, *Prayer for the Government*, 143–4. The original Ukrainian text is reproduced in S. V. Petlyura, *Statti, lysty, dokumenty*, 2 vols. (New York, 1956–79), ii. 353.

<sup>42</sup> Abramson, *Prayer for the Government*, 145–7.

<sup>43</sup> This document is in the Tcherikower archive, YIVO Institute for Jewish Research, New York, and is quoted in full in Abramson, *Prayer for the Government*, 147.

<sup>44</sup> These appeals are quoted in full in Abramson, *Prayer for the Government*, 157–61.

troops and the power of the Directory's leadership—limited, often disrupted, and sometimes simply non-existent.

These self-defence groups, organized under the auspices of the Directory's Ministry of Jewish Affairs, suffered from the same vice—the lack of a centralized command, which greatly impeded the effectiveness of locally established units. Some 'self-help' committees organized local militias, but these were often useless against the pogroms organized by the regular troops of the Directory, by the White Army, and even by the more powerful warlords (*bat'ky* and *otamany*). They were fairly effective against less organized attacks. It remains a moot point whether the earlier creation of a co-ordinated system of Jewish self-defence could have limited the scale of the wave of pogroms. Local peasants often helped to protect 'their' Jews, the familiar and trusted shopkeepers and craftsmen in their town.

One of the principal effects of the wave of pogroms was to undermine Jewish faith in both the Whites and the Ukrainian People's Government. To many Jews, only the Bolsheviks seemed able and willing to put a stop to the anti-Jewish violence, not necessarily because Red Army troops were less violent, but rather because of the highly effective and centralized propaganda of the Bolsheviks. Many Jews joined the Red Army forces to avenge the murders of their families and the destruction of their communities. The Bolsheviks recognized this trend and noted that many entered the Red Army partly out of hatred of the White pogromists. Claiming that the nationalists, including the Ukrainian government, represented the bourgeoisie and hence were interested in inciting national hatred, the Bolsheviks in their propaganda blamed the allegedly antisemitic Directory for premeditated pogroms, presenting Petlyura and Vynnychenko as bloodthirsty, merciless, and rebellious warlords. Later this propaganda shaped much of twentieth-century scholarship on the Civil War in Ukraine, the pogroms, and Ukrainian–Jewish issues.

The extensive Jewish losses of the First World War, in addition to the toll of civil war, affected the Jewish community both culturally and economically for decades to come. Many shtetl communities, already impoverished by the impact of the war, were destitute, while thousands of orphans roamed the streets begging. In contrast to the general increase of 36 per cent in the population of Ukraine between 1897 and 1926, the Jewish population fell by 5 per cent, so that by 1926 there were 80,000 fewer Jews here than in 1897. This diminution was due both to the casualties of the war and the Civil War and to emigration, which continued, although on a smaller scale than in the early 1900s, to be an important demographic factor well through the late 1920s.<sup>45</sup>

Galicia was also the scene of violent conflict as the Ukrainian majority in the eastern part of the province sought to establish control here and was challenged by the forces of the Polish state. The Ukrainian forces which fought here are described in the chapter by Yaroslav Tynchenko, part of a larger project on which he is

<sup>45</sup> Z. Gitelman, *A Century of Ambivalence: The Jews of Russia and the Soviet Union, 1881 to the Present*, 2nd edn. (Bloomington, Ind., 2001), 71.



working which aims to document the military efforts of those Jews who sought to support the Ukrainian nationalist endeavours. In the conflict over the future of eastern Galicia, the Jews initially attempted to remain neutral, a position accepted by the Ukrainians but not by the Poles. This led to further anti-Jewish violence. The worst incident occurred in Lviv, where after the recapture of the town by Polish forces on 22 November 1918, widespread accusations of treason were made against the Jews, which the Polish military command did nothing to counter. This provoked a wave of anti-Jewish violence, in the course of which at least seventy-two Jews were killed and some three hundred wounded. Similar incidents, though on a smaller scale, occurred in Przemyśl, Borysław, and elsewhere in the eastern Polish borderland territory. One contemporary observer claimed that a total of some two hundred Jews lost their lives as a result of this violence.<sup>46</sup> The violence, among other political considerations, pushed young Jews into the Jewish Shock Battalion (*Zhydivs'kyi proboyevyi kurin'*), a subdivision of the Ukrainian Galician Army. Using previously unknown memoir sources, Tynchenko explores how nationalist-minded Ukrainians sought military support from the Zionist-oriented Jews and how the military of the short-lived West Ukrainian People's Republic (*Zakhidno-Ukrayins'ka Narodna Respublika*) integrated Jews into their ranks.

The peace settlement after the First World War again partitioned the Ukrainian lands. Eastern Galicia and Volhynia came under Polish rule, Subcarpathian Ruthenia became an autonomous part of the Czechoslovak Republic, and Bukovina and Bessarabia were annexed by Romania. The largest part of the Ukrainian lands came under Soviet rule and was organized as the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic (Ukrainian SSR). Here a radical social revolution took place. Lenin's decision to seize power in November 1917 was dictated by his belief that the Communist Party should take advantage of the strength it had acquired in the Petrograd and Moscow Soviets and undertake measures which he believed would spark off revolution elsewhere and which would be followed by a fundamental socialist transformation of the world. The revolution in Russia was to be the first step towards world revolution.

Lenin consolidated the power of the Bolshevik regime and won the Civil War, but world revolution did not follow. He now needed to secure Bolshevik power in Russia. The Bolsheviks had retained power not because of popular support but because of their effective and centralized management and because of the division

<sup>46</sup> L. Chasanowitsch, *Die polnischen Judenpogrome in November und Dezember 1918* (Stockholm, 1919), 33–42. For two more recent studies of the events in Przemyśl, see Z. Konieczny, *Walki polsko-ukraińskie w Przemyślu i okolicy: Listopad—grudzień 1918* (Przemyśl, 1993), and W. Wierzbieniec, 'Zajścia antyżydowskie w Przemyślu pod koniec 1918 r.', in K. Jasiewicz (ed.), *Świat niepożegnany: Żydzi na dawnych ziemiach wschodnich Rzeczypospolitej w XVIII–XX wieku* (Warsaw, 2004), 573–80. On the events in Lviv, see J. Tomaszewski, 'Lwów, 22 listopada 1918', *Przegląd Historyczny*, 35 (1984), 281–5, and W. Hagen, 'The Moral Economy of Popular Violence: The Pogrom in Lwów', in R. Blobaum (ed.), *Antisemitism and its Opponents in Modern Poland* (Ithaca, NY, 2005). The Polish integrationist Wiktor Chajes gave his account of what happened in *Semper fidelis: Pamiętnik Polaka wyznania mojżeszowego z lat 1926–1939* (Kraków, 1997).

and mistakes of their opponents. The Bolsheviks had seen civil war not so much as a military struggle as the opportunity to capitalize on class divisions and class hatred and create a new socialist society which would eliminate such class enemies as the bourgeoisie. The radical policies they were pursuing—the planned economy inherent in ‘war communism’, the large-scale requisitions from the peasantry, and the attacks on religion—not to speak of the use of terror on a large scale to suppress opposition, led to widespread resistance to the new regime, both in the towns and in the countryside, particularly in the former imperial borderlands such as Ukraine. As a result, Lenin decided to abandon ‘for not less than a decade and probably more’ the radical transformation of society, and to adopt what became known as the New Economic Policy (*Novaya ekonomicheskaya politika*; NEP), which favoured small-scale private trade and manufacturing. Industrialization was now to be pursued slowly—at the pace of a tortoise, in the words of Nikolay Bukharin, one of the principal advocates of the new policy. The economy did recover, both in the cities and in rural areas, where thousands of new kulaks (‘robust’, or wealthy, cattle-owning peasants) appeared at that time, particularly in the Ukrainian countryside, but the burgeoning private sector was anathema to many Bolsheviks, who saw it as a betrayal of the class-based interests of the workers to the new capitalist class, the ‘NEPmen’ (among whom there were many Jews), and the new landowning peasantry.

The period was also marked by relative political liberalization. Although variegated party factions with vastly different agendas were allowed to exist and to debate publicly about the Bolsheviks’ strategic agendas, the monopoly of power of the Communist Party was maintained, and the party dominated all aspects of government through a vast bureaucracy, which now became the main bulwark of the regime. At the same time, cultural life was left relatively uncontrolled and national autonomy was granted not only to nationalities with a clear territorial base, such as the Ukrainians and the Belarusians, but also to those who lacked such a base, such as Latvians, Germans, Poles, and Jews. To win the support of the borderlands, mobilize national minorities, and channel communism to the non-Russian masses, the Bolsheviks introduced a campaign that came to be known as *korenizatsiya* (indigenization). It pursued the empowerment of the new cultural and political elites with moderate nationalist agendas mitigated by communist utopianism. The Kremlin planned to make these elites responsible for bringing the communist message to the masses in ethnic languages, through newly established national minority newspapers, literature, art, and especially visual propaganda exploiting traditional imagery. For the Ukrainian SSR this meant a thoroughgoing Ukrainianization, which opened up a new period of intense Ukrainian–Jewish co-operation in various fields and brought about the emergence of a Ukrainian and Jewish artistic avant-garde, a topic partially covered by recent research into Yiddish and Ukrainian Jewish literatures but still rather neglected.

The incapacitation of Lenin by a stroke in May 1922 and his death in January

1924 led to a struggle for power and a dispute over policy and economic priorities—a conflict that was ultimately won by Joseph Stalin, General Secretary of the party since 1922, who sided first with the right, but having once achieved a dominant position proceeded to adopt the policies of the left. Stalin curtailed the indigenization campaign, orchestrated the trials of the leftist communists who sought cultural autonomy for their Soviet republics, decimated the newly emerged political and cultural elites of the national minorities, and transformed the ‘dictatorship of the proletariat’ into the ‘dictatorship of the party’. Within the party the concept of ‘democratic centralism’ now came to signify that the decisions of the leadership, essentially Stalin himself, were transmitted without discussion to the lower echelons, ending the relatively free debates of the early 1920s. The most important of these decisions was to move to rapid industrialization, central planning, and the collectivization of agriculture (in 1926 peasants living in some 613,000 villages made up over 82 per cent of the Soviet Union’s population of 147 million). The pursuit of these measures brought about enormous suffering, particularly in Ukraine, where between 3.3 and 3.9 million people died in 1932–3 in an artificially created famine. This is discussed in the chapter by Myroslav Skhandrij, who argues against scholarly attempts to exonerate the Kremlin authorities for the humanitarian catastrophe in Ukraine.

In the 1930s, the Kremlin almost entirely curtailed the indigenization campaign, which for Ukraine signified purging the upper echelons of party functionaries and the cultural elites. The regime became vigorously Russocentric, and attempts to secure a limited level of cultural autonomy were brutally suppressed. Seeking to quell any opposition to its new policies, in 1929 the Kremlin orchestrated the expulsion of nearly 10 per cent of the members of the Ukrainian Communist Party, and went aggressively against the nationalist-minded intellectuals and those responsible for ‘nationalist deviations’.<sup>47</sup> Mykola Skrypnyk, the most effective proponent of indigenization, who held the post of Ukrainian People’s Commissar of Education from 1927 until February 1933, was viciously attacked for alleged bourgeois nationalism and took his own life in July 1933. His suicide followed that of the leading prose writer and national communist Mykola Khvylyovy two months earlier. With the Ukrainian political and cultural elites suppressed, or intimidated into complacency, or exiled, or murdered, the Kremlin was now in a position to initiate a policy of slow but steady political, linguistic, and cultural Russification of the Soviet borderlands.

This marked a significant departure from the leftist utopianism of the 1920s and was aimed at the construction of a Russocentric Soviet empire. Stalin successfully suppressed internal party opposition, proclaimed a departure from the communist utopianism of the 1920s, arguing that socialism could be constructed in a single country, and moved to a further purge of the party and the rounding up of what were described as ‘relics of the capitalist past’ (petty criminals, vagrants, former

<sup>47</sup> S. Yekelchik, *Ukraine: Birth of a Modern Nation* (Oxford, 2007), 96.

kulaks, and prostitutes), most of whom were sent to the Gulag. By 1936 the number of people confined in labour camps, labour colonies, and 'special settlements' had reached 2.4 million, with another 500,000 in prisons. According to NKVD figures, 150,000 people died in labour camps between 1932 and 1936.<sup>48</sup>

In the following year, 1937, a new wave of repression began which dwarfed everything that had gone before. In the years 1937–8 at least 1.3 million people were arrested for crimes against the state, and according to the official figures 681,692 of them were executed in these years (this may be an underestimation of the true number), making up 91 per cent of all those executed for political crimes between 1921 and 1940. The population of Gulag labour camps and colonies grew from 1,196,369 in 1937 to 1,881,570 a year later, a figure which does not include at least 140,000 who died in the camps in this period and an unknown number who died en route to the camps.<sup>49</sup>

In their policy towards the Jews, both Lenin and Stalin followed double standards that reflected the differences between strategic and tactical agendas. On the one hand, they denied that the Jews were a nation and sought to integrate them into society at large. At the same time, in order to facilitate their integration into the new socialist world, a specific socialist Jewish identity, expressed through a secularized version of Yiddish, could be tolerated for a period. Some Jews, and even some Bolshevik leaders such as the president of the Soviet Union, Mikhail Kalinin, thought this could become permanent. A key role was to be played in the creation of this identity by the *evseksii*, the Jewish sections of the Communist Party.

Some success was achieved in integrating the Jews, particularly in admitting them into the upper echelons of the state and party; this kind of empowerment made Jews feel proud of their association with the communist state, but it also stirred up an increase of political antisemitism as the Soviet state now came to be identified with Judaeo-communism (*zhydokommuna*). In the twenty years between the end of the Civil War and the Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union a major transformation occurred in the situation of the Jewish population of the country. Integration was encouraged by the abolition of all tsarist restrictions on Jews. In addition, the emigration of over two million people from Russia in the aftermath of the revolution (some 50,000 of them Jews), most of them from the educated classes, created a huge gap in skilled personnel. In these circumstances, many Jews moved to the larger towns and took up new positions there. The educational opportunities open to Jews increased enormously, as the regime did away with previous restrictions and saw the expansion of education as the key to the modernization and

<sup>48</sup> S. Wheatcroft, 'The Scale and Nature of German and Soviet Repression and Mass Killings, 1930–45', *Europe-Asia Studies*, 48 (1996), 1338–40; S. Rosefield, 'Stalinism in Post-Communist Perspective: New Evidence on Killings, Forced Labour and Economic Growth in the 1930s', *Europe-Asia Studies*, 48 (1996), 969.

<sup>49</sup> M. Ellman, 'Soviet Repression Statistics: Some Comments', *Europe-Asia Studies*, 54 (2002), 1151–72; H. Kuromiya, 'Accounting for the Great Terror', *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas*, 53 (2005), 88; A. Applebaum, *Gulag: A History of the Soviet Camps* (London, 2003), 516, 519.

industrialization of the country. Jews were particularly well represented in metropolitan universities and those in capital cities, and constituted 35.6 per cent of university students in Kiev.<sup>50</sup> In the Ukrainian SSR, the increased visibility of Jews among the political elite—a presence only proportionate to their share of the general population, but unheard of before 1917—fuelled grass-roots hatred among the much less urbanized Ukrainians.

Intermarriage, which had been rare before 1917 and usually required conversion, now became much more frequent. By 1926, 21.0 per cent of marriages in the Russian Federation were exogamous and in the following year the figure in Ukraine was 11.1 per cent. By 1936 the percentage had increased to 42.3 per cent in the Russian Federation, 15.3 per cent in Ukraine, and 12.6 per cent in Belarus.<sup>51</sup> Linguistic assimilation also proceeded rapidly. In 1926, 25 per cent of those of 'Jewish nationality' gave Russian as their mother tongue, a figure which by 1939 had risen to 54 per cent.

In the Ukrainian areas outside the Soviet Union, the late 1930s brought a significant increase in hostility towards the Jews. Approximately 7 million Ukrainians lived outside the borders of Soviet Ukraine in the inter-war period, in Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Romania. The development of relations between Jews and Ukrainians in Subcarpathian Ruthenia is the subject of the chapter by Raz Segal, who grapples with a peripheral but by no means insignificant question: how political and territorial disputes over Subcarpathian Ruthenia between the Czechs, Hungarians, Poles, and Soviets contributed to the destruction of the local Jewish population, who experienced almost no antisemitism before the 1940s and lived in peace with the predominant Subcarpathian Ruthenian population.

Over 5 million Ukrainians lived in Poland. They fell into two distinct groups. In the provinces of Stanisławów, Lwów, and Tarnopol, before the First World War part of Galicia, they were largely Greek Catholic and possessed a strong sense of Ukrainian national identity. In Volhynia, which had been under tsarist rule, the Ukrainian population was largely Greek Orthodox and national sentiment was less well developed. In former eastern Galicia the defeat of the West Ukrainian People's Republic left a residue of bitterness, which was exacerbated by the Poles' failure to fulfil a promise to establish a separate Ukrainian university, by the transformation of the system of Ukrainian primary schools established in autonomous Galicia into bilingual ones in which Polish was dominant, and by the constant pressure on Ukrainian cultural organizations. The problems faced by Ukrainians in studying at Polish universities and the need to educate those who had fled from the Soviets led to the establishment in Prague of a Ukrainian Free University. Together with the Agricultural Academy in Czech Poděbrady (later dismantled), which employed among others Solomon Goldelman, the university evinced sympathy towards Jews seeking rapprochement with national-democratic Ukrainians, as Nicolas Szafowal

<sup>50</sup> M. Altshuler, *Soviet Jewry on the Eve of the Holocaust: A Social and Demographic Profile* (Jerusalem, 1998), 118–27, 308.

<sup>51</sup> *Ibid.* 74.

argues in his essay on co-operation between Jews and Ukrainians in the European diaspora in the realm of higher education and scholarly research.

In 1934 the Polish authorities were able to reach an agreement with the principal moderate nationalist organization, the Ukrainian National Democratic Alliance (Ukrayins'ke natsional'no-demokratychnе ob'yednannya; UNDO), which gave it a fixed number of seats in parliament, provided credits for Ukrainian banks and co-operatives, and gave an amnesty to Ukrainian political prisoners.<sup>52</sup> However, the intensified attempts to Polonize these provinces after the death of Piłsudski in May 1935 diminished the influence of the UNDO, which repudiated the agreement in 1938. By now leftist and communist influence, which had been strong in the Ukrainian areas of Poland under the inspiration of the national communist policies being pursued in Soviet Ukraine, had been largely undermined by an awareness of the disastrous impact of the introduction of collectivization and the purge of the national communists. This leftist communist internationalism was finally discredited by the Kremlin's betrayal of the Spanish communists during the civil war in Spain, and even more so in the summer of 1938 when Stalin dissolved the Communist Party of Poland and also its subsidiary, the Communist Party of Western Ukraine, which he claimed had become a 'band of spies and provocateurs'.<sup>53</sup>

This created a void in political activism that was immediately filled by the supporters of right-wing extremism, particularly among younger Ukrainians. In 1920, in the aftermath of the armed conflict over eastern Galicia, an underground body had been established, the Ukrainian Military Organization (Ukrayins'ka viis'kova orhanizatsiya), which had links with German military intelligence. In 1929 it merged with other groups to create the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (Orhanizatsiya ukrayins'kykh natsionalistiv; OUN), whose main ideologist, Dmytro Dontsov, a prolific demagogue and an extreme xenophobe, advocated a Ukrainian variant of integral nationalism and carried out a series of attacks on Polish officials and Ukrainians who opposed its influence. In 1934 the OUN succeeded in assassinating Bronisław Pieracki, the Polish Minister of the Interior.<sup>54</sup> In 1938 a split developed in the organization between those abroad, who wished to base the strategy of the organization on links with Nazi Germany, and those in Galicia, who wished to rely only on their own forces and on violence to attain their goals. This led to the emergence in 1940 of two groups, the OUN(m), headed by Andry Melnyk (who had assumed the leadership of the OUN when his predecessor Yevhen Konovalets, the head since 1921, was assassinated by a Soviet agent in 1938), and the more intransigent OUN(b), headed by Stepan Bandera. Both groups, taking their lead from Dontsov, were hostile to Jews, and the extent to which this hostility translated itself into the participation of

<sup>52</sup> On the UNDO, see O. Zaitsev, 'Ukrayins'ka narodna trudova partiya (1919–1925)', *Ukrayina moderna*, 7 (2002), 69–90, and M. Kuhutyak, *Istoriya ukrayins'koyi natsional-demokratiyi, 1918–1929* (Kiev and Ivano-Frankivsk, 2002).

<sup>53</sup> S. V. Kulchytsky, *Ukrayina mizh dvoma viinamy, 1921–1939 rr.* (Kiev, 1999), 302.

<sup>54</sup> On Dontsov, see S. Kvit, *Dmytro Dontsov: Ideolohichniy portret* (Kiev, 2000).

the OUN in the mass murder of Jews in western Ukraine after 1941 has been the focus of hot scholarly debate over the last ten years. Dontsov's views and those of the OUN are examined in the chapter by Taras Kurylo, who demonstrates that there was no real consensus on Jewish issues among the OUN leadership, although its tactical anti-Jewish stance did in fact lead to OUN participation in the mass murder of Jews after 1941. Against this view, Alexander Motyl distinguishes in his chapter between the nationalist (as political) and the fascist (antisemitic and antidemocratic) agendas of the OUN, and, without denying the short-term involvement of the OUN in anti-Jewish atrocities, he convincingly argues that the OUN was preoccupied above all with a political state-building agenda and that it considered Jewish issues as at best tertiary, focusing instead on its anti-Russian and anti-Polish policies.

The outbreak of war and the Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union certainly contributed to a further widening of the gulf between Jews and their Ukrainian neighbours. In the part of Poland that they occupied the German authorities were determined to exacerbate anti-Jewish feeling. The numerous gratuitous acts of violence carried out against Jews, the seizure of Jews for forced labour, their subjection to humiliating physical punishments, and the pulling off or cutting off of the beards (and often the hair) of Orthodox Jews were all intended, at least in part, to show that the Jews had no rights and could be attacked and assaulted with impunity by anyone, not necessarily by Nazi soldiers. The widespread confiscation of Jewish property had the same intention.

Everywhere in the region antisemitism was greatly increased by resentment at what Nazi propaganda consistently and not without success labelled as Jewish 'collaboration' with the Soviet authorities established after the Soviet occupations of September 1939 and the summer of 1940. It is certainly true that a fair number of Jews (like the overwhelming majority of Belarusians, a considerable number of Ukrainians and Lithuanians, and even some Poles) welcomed the establishment of Soviet rule. In the Jewish case this welcome was natural, for a number of reasons: a desire to see an end to the insecurity caused by the collapse of Polish rule, fear of the consequences of Nazi occupation and the belief that the Soviets were a lesser evil, resentment at Polish anti-Jewish policies in the inter-war period, and support for the communist system. Although the Soviets offered new opportunities to individual Jews, they acted to suppress organized Jewish life, both religious and political, dissolving *kehilot*, banning virtually all Jewish parties and arresting their leaders, and shutting down synagogues. Jews made up just under a third of the more than half a million people deported (and in many cases thereby unintentionally saved) by the Soviets from the areas they annexed. Under these conditions, the overwhelming majority of the Jewish population of the area very quickly lost whatever illusions they had about the Soviet system.

This was not how most Ukrainians felt about the Soviet regime. In the western Ukrainian areas some Soviet policies, such as the Ukrainianization of the educational system, including Lviv University (now named after the revolutionary romantic

Galician Ukrainian poet and civic activist Ivan Franko), and the establishment of new Ukrainian theatres, gained public approval.<sup>55</sup> Peasants also initially welcomed the confiscation of large estates, the removal of Polish settlers, and the redistribution of about half the land acquired in this way to those with little land. Other aspects of Sovietization aroused considerable resentment, some of which was directed against the allegedly 'Jewish' character of the new order. These included the intensive political re-education undertaken by the new rulers, and the closing of Ukrainian cultural institutions such as the Prosvita Society, which aimed to spread Ukrainian culture among the population, and the Shevchenko Society. The expropriation of the large estates of the Greek Catholic Church and the creation of state and collective farms which peasants were pressured to join also aroused resentment. So too did the political repression, with the arrest of many Ukrainians and the large-scale deportation of them. According to one estimate, Ukrainians made up 20 per cent of those deported.<sup>56</sup> It was among the groups negatively affected by the new developments that the identification of Jews with Bolshevism resonated most strongly.

The consequences of the increase in antisemitism were clear. Those Ukrainians most threatened by Soviet repression fled to the German-occupied Generalgouvernement, especially to the Lemko and Chełm regions, which had substantial Ukrainian populations. Their number has been estimated at nearly 30,000.<sup>57</sup> The position of those Ukrainians who favoured a German orientation had been seriously undermined by the fate of the Ukrainians of Subcarpathian Ruthenia. In the aftermath of the Munich agreement, the area was granted autonomy and a Ukrainian nationalist government headed by Avhustyn Voloshyn had established itself in power. Although it was forced to cede the south-western part of the area to Hungary in November 1938, it re-established itself in Khust, where it created the Carpathian Sich, a military force 5,000 strong, made up mostly of OUN supporters from Galicia.<sup>58</sup> There was some speculation that Hitler, whose government established a consulate in Khust in the same month, was intending to use the area as a jumping-off point for an attack on the Soviet Union. In the event, however, when the rump Czechoslovakia broke up in March 1939, Hitler abandoned his Ukrainian supporters here and acquiesced in the incorporation of the area into Hungary, leaving his hitherto staunch Galician supporters from the OUN disillusioned.<sup>59</sup>

<sup>55</sup> K. Kondratyuk, 'Politychni, sotsial'no-ekonomichni i dukhovni aspekty "radyanyzatsiyi" zakhidnykh oblastei Ukrayiny u 1939–1941 rr.', in id. (ed.), *1939 rik v istorychnii doli Ukrayiny i ukraiyintsiv* (Lviv, 2001), 26.

<sup>56</sup> Yu. Slyvka (ed.), *Deportatsiyi: Zakhidni zemli Ukrayiny kintsya 30-kh–pochatku 50-kh rr.*, 3 vols. (Lviv, 1996–2002), i. 8 n.

<sup>57</sup> G. N. Finder and A. V. Prusin, 'Collaboration in Eastern Galicia: The Ukrainian Police and the Holocaust', *East European Jewish Affairs*, 34/2 (2004), 98.

<sup>58</sup> A. V. Kenty, *Narysy istoriyi Orhanizatsiyi ukraiyins'kykh natsionalistiv (1929–1941 rr.)* (Kiev, 1998), 92–3.

<sup>59</sup> P. R. Magocsi, *The Shaping of a National Identity: Subcarpathian Rus', 1848–1948* (Cambridge, Mass., 1978), 242; M. Shvahulyak, 'Ukraiyns'ke pytannya v mizhnarodnykh politychnykh kryzakh



Faith in German backing for Ukrainian national aspirations was further undermined by the Nazi–Soviet pact and the subsequent incorporation of all west Ukrainian lands apart from Subcarpathian Ruthenia into the Soviet Union. Yet all these setbacks did not discourage those inhabitants of western Ukraine who sought German help to overthrow Bolshevism. In the Generalgouvernement, the German authorities encouraged the development of Ukrainian social and cultural organizations and permitted the establishment of a Ukrainian Cultural Committee headed by Volodymyr Kubiiovych, which was able to set up a network of Ukrainian schools, co-operatives, and youth organizations. A nationally oriented Ukrainian Orthodox Autocephalous Church was also allowed to come into existence and it eventually extended its jurisdiction to conquered Soviet territories.<sup>60</sup>

Both sections of the OUN now established themselves in the Generalgouvernement, although the Germans did not allow the open functioning of Ukrainian political parties. Kubiiovych acted to protect the less radical OUN(m), to which he was closer. In April 1941 he petitioned Hans Frank, the head of the Nazi administration in the Generalgouvernement, to purge the ethnically Ukrainian territories of the Generalgouvernement of ‘Polish and Jewish elements’.<sup>61</sup> In the same month the German authorities allowed the OUN(b) to create two Ukrainian army battalions, Nachtigall and Roland, which were to take part in the planned invasion of the Soviet Union. In addition, on the eve of the Nazi invasion both branches of the OUN began to organize ‘expeditionary groups’ to conduct nationalist propaganda in the areas which would come under German rule.

The growing rift between the Jews of the area and their Ukrainian neighbours had a number of causes. In the period before the outbreak of the war in September 1939, antisemitism—second only to rabid anti-Polish and anti-Russian sentiments—had increased everywhere in the region as a result of the persistence of the economic crisis and the growing attractiveness of Nazi radicalism to younger nationalists. It is not clear how deeply antisemitism was rooted in Soviet Ukraine and to what extent it had been either strengthened or weakened by collectivization and the famine. Certainly the integral nationalists were surprised that their deep-rooted hostility to Jews (and Russians) did not always receive a sympathetic reception when they encountered eastern Ukrainians after June 1941.<sup>62</sup> In the areas occupied by the Nazis after the defeat of Poland, sedulous and successful attempts were made

peredodnya Druhoyi svitovoyi viiny (1938–1939)’, *Visnyk L’vivs’koho universytetu: Seriya istorychna*, 35–6 (2000), 303–4.

<sup>60</sup> Kubiiovych wrote an account of these years. See V. Kubiiovych, *Ukrayintsi v Heneral’nyi Huberniyi, 1939–1941: Istoriya Ukrayins’koho Tsentral’noho Komitetu* (Chicago, 1975).

<sup>61</sup> Quoted in F. Golczewski, ‘Shades of Grey: Reflections on Jewish–Ukrainian and German–Ukrainian Relations in Galicia’, in R. Brandon and W. Lower (eds.), *The Shoah in Ukraine: History, Testimony, Memorialization* (Bloomington, Ind., 2008), 127.

<sup>62</sup> On this, see A. Weiner, *Making Sense of War: The Second World War and the Fate of the Bolshevik Revolution* (Princeton, 2001), ch. 5, and K. Brown, *A Biography of No Place: From Ethnic Borderland to Soviet Heartland* (Cambridge, Mass., 2004), ch. 8.

by the occupiers to incite anti-Jewish hatred. In the areas annexed by the Soviets, the fact that a substantial number of Ukrainians saw the Soviets as a more dangerous foe than the Nazis, while almost all Jews saw the Soviets as a significantly lesser evil and only a minority of Ukrainians supported Soviet power, further widened the gulf between the two groups. These sentiments, not unknown to most Ukrainians, reinforced the already well-established stereotype of the pro-Soviet and revolutionary Jew, emphasized in the wartime Ukrainian-language antisemitic propaganda sponsored by the Nazis. In addition, many Ukrainians, feeling themselves victims of the oppressive Bolshevik regime, looked to the Germans to enable them to profit from the expropriation of Jewish property and to displace Jews from their positions as clerks with the municipal authorities and state government. This created an explosive mix, which was to be brutally and cynically exploited by the Germans after their invasion of the Soviet Union.

#### THE SECOND WORLD WAR AND THE HOLOCAUST IN UKRAINE

It was the invasion of the Soviet Union on Sunday 22 June 1941 by German forces, supported by troops from Finland, Hungary, Italy, Romania, and Slovakia, that made genocide possible. The conflict which followed was presented by the Nazis as an ideological crusade and a war of extermination (*Vernichtungskrieg*). Hitler and his circle saw the war as an opportunity to carry out an even more radical ethnic reshaping of the areas east of Germany than that attempted in the Polish areas directly incorporated into the Third Reich. Generalplan Ost, formulated early in 1941, envisaged massive German settlement in the areas they hoped to conquer, which would be made possible by the expulsion or starvation of '31 million Slavs' and, presumably, by the elimination of most of the local Jews. In addition, the awareness that Germany was fighting a war of attrition, and the memory of the hardships created by the blockade during the First World War, meant that Nazi planning was based on the rapid conquest of the Soviet Union and the seizure of its resources, above all grain and oil, which would be needed for the war with the British empire and, in due course, the United States. The military requirement for a rapid campaign, combined with the Wehrmacht's logistical shortcomings, led to a decision to live off the land. That decision, plus the regime's determination to exact food for the home front, contributed to a policy of deliberate starvation by which the Germans expected to kill off a large portion of the Soviet population. Terror would be necessary to ensure the provision of food for the army and the German home front, and also because of the shortage of German personnel to carry out the grandiose plans of the Third Reich. Moreover, German military strategy had long been based on the principle that pre-emptive action was necessary to forestall civilian resistance.

These considerations led to the adoption of a policy of genocide immediately after the Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union. Several million Jews who had inhabited

the western areas of the Soviet Union but who now found themselves in Nazi-occupied territory were a negation of the Nazis' previous attempts to make the lands of the Third Reich free of Jews by means of deportation. Furthermore, Jews were deep in the rearguard of the advancing German troops, far removed from the front lines, which made their mass extermination not only desirable in the eyes of the Nazis but also physically possible. During the first phase of the genocide, it seems clear that the SS (*Schutzstaffel*), the body entrusted with carrying out Nazi policy towards the Jews, was not sure how to proceed. In the period after September 1939, it had experienced a number of failures, most notably the scheme for a Jewish reservation around Nisko, near Lublin, to which by March 1940 nearly 95,000 Jews had been expelled, but which was abandoned in April of that year, and the attempt to send Jews to Madagascar, to which a great deal of effort had been devoted. Its leaders were eager to exploit anti-Jewish resentment among the local populations and to see whether it could be harnessed to their purposes. This was clear in the instructions sent by Reinhard Heydrich, the head of the Reich Main Security Office, to the *Einsatzgruppe* (task force) commanders on 29 June 1941, and was also referred to in a report of 15 October submitted by Franz Walter Stahlecker, the commander of *Einsatzgruppe A*, in which he wrote:

It was unwelcome that the *Sicherheitspolizei* [Security Police] should be seen to be involved with actions which were in fact exceptionally harsh and which were bound to create shock in German circles. It was necessary to demonstrate that the indigenous population had taken the first measures on its own initiative as a national reaction to decades of Jewish oppression and communist terror.<sup>63</sup>

The fateful combination of local anti-Jewish hatred and Nazi incitement led to a wave of massacres from Lithuania in the north to Romania in the south in the weeks after the Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union. These were overwhelmingly carried out by the local populations with the encouragement and sometimes the participation of the invading German troops. Around 16,000 people were killed in this way in Lithuania, several thousand in north-eastern Poland, and perhaps 35,000 in Ukraine, including 12,000 in the formerly Polish-ruled areas.<sup>64</sup> These murders and the violence which accompanied them, sometimes sexual in nature, became a form of ritual signalling the end of 'Judaeo-Bolshevism' and the inauguration of a new order. Everywhere the killings were watched by large crowds assembled to witness the ritualistic humiliation of the Jews. In most cases, these actions were carried out by the local police, who were hired by the Nazis after the institutions of Soviet power had been dismantled and who were eager to demonstrate their loyalty to the new regime. In many cases, but not in all, these police troops had served in the same

<sup>63</sup> International Military Tribunal, *Trial of the Major War Criminals before the International Military Tribunal*, xxxvii (Nuremberg, 1949), 180-L, p. 672, quoted in C. Streit, 'Wehrmacht, Einsatzgruppen and Anti-Bolshevism', in D. Cesarani (ed.), *The Final Solution: Origins and Implementation* (London, 1994), 104–5.

<sup>64</sup> Golczewski, 'Shades of Grey', 130–1.

positions as militia during the Soviet period and had been trained to conduct round-ups, deportations, and executions of the 'class enemies' and 'enemies of the people' during the purges of the Stalin period.

The Germans sometimes encountered resistance to their attempts to incite pogroms and often dealt with such situations by stressing the role played by Jews in Soviet atrocities and by equating the oppressive, viciously anti-Ukrainian orientation of Bolshevism with what they claimed was the over-representation of Jews among the Soviet state security and party leadership. Thus in Zhytomyr, where there was some local reluctance to take part in the massacre of Jews, a show trial of an individual, a Jew named Wolf Kieper who was alleged to have participated in a series of brutal murders while serving in the Soviet secret police (OGPU, later NKVD), was used to incite the town's population. Kieper was publicly hanged and his execution was followed by the shooting of 402 local Jews. The officers of Einsatzgruppe C recommended others to follow their example.<sup>65</sup>

The areas occupied by the German forces in the western Soviet Union, which included all of Belarus and all of Ukraine except for some parts of the Voroshylivhrad (Luhansk) oblast, were divided into two administrative spheres. That close to the front line, running from Leningrad to the Caucasus, was under military administration. The area behind it was, in due course, placed under a civilian administration headed by Alfred Rosenberg as Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories. It was divided into two *Reichskommissariate*: Reichskommissariat Ostland, which included Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and parts of western Belarus (including the city of Minsk); and Reichskommissariat Ukraine, which included south-west Belarus and areas of Ukraine up to the Donbass region and the north-western shores of the Sea of Azov. The area of Transnistria between the Dniester and Southern Bug rivers, including the city of Odessa, as well as Bessarabia and northern Bukovina, were handed over to Romanian administration. The formerly Polish provinces of eastern Galicia (south-west Ukraine), including the city of Lviv, were incorporated into the Generalgouvernement.<sup>66</sup>

The occupation of the western Soviet Union was accompanied by massacres of Jews carried out by *Einsatzgruppen* and the German Order Police (Ordnungspolizei), who were subordinated to the Chief Police Commander of the SS for South Russia. The German army provided them with intelligence, ammunition, transport, fuel, and housing and also dictated their march routes and often requested the elimination of

<sup>65</sup> Ereignismeldung UdSSR, no. 58 (20 Aug. 1941), 9–11, in *Einsatzgruppen in der UdSSR und die Judenfrage* (n.p., n.d.), Yad Vashem Archives, Jerusalem, 051114a. This source consists of photocopied short excerpts from the Ereignismeldungen UdSSR, the Tätigkeits- und Lageberichten der Einsatzgruppen der Sicherheitspolizei und des SD in der UdSSR, and the Meldungen aus den besetzten Ostgebieten; quoted in J.-P. Himka, 'Ukrainian Collaboration in the Extermination of the Jews during the Second World War: Sorting Out the Long-Term and Conjunctural Factors', in J. Frankel (ed.), *The Fate of the European Jews, 1939–1945: Continuity or Contingency?* (New York, 1997), 173.

<sup>66</sup> The best account of German occupation policy in the Soviet Union is A. Dallin, *German Rule in Russia, 1941–1945: A Study of Occupation Policies*, 2nd, rev., edn. (Boulder, Colo., 1981).

particular groups. On occasion it provided troops to assist in the killings. In this way the SS and the police became an integral part of the army's rear area security plan.<sup>67</sup>

The *Einsatzgruppen* and Order Police were assisted by auxiliary police units (*Schutzmannschaften*) and 'Hiwis' (from *Hilfswillige*, 'volunteers') recruited from among the local inhabitants. In Ukraine, the six German police battalions were responsible for considerably more murders than *Einsatzgruppen* C and D combined.<sup>68</sup> The auxiliary police units, mostly composed of Ukrainians and Belarusians, but including some Lithuanians and Poles, were routinely assigned to apprehend and convey Jews to the sites of mass execution and to carry out mass killings; subsequently they were used to guard Jews while they were being loaded onto trains to be taken to death camps, and to clear ghettos. Local Germans (*Volksdeutsche*) also played an important role in assisting those carrying out the murders, often acting as intermediaries because they spoke both German and the local language.<sup>69</sup> Until the summer of 1942 these forces were made up of volunteers, most of whom joined to escape prisoner-of-war camps or forced labour in Germany, rather than out of pro-Nazi sentiments. Subsequently their ranks were filled by conscription. Although they were not always free to leave, 'no instances are known in which a local policeman was actually shot for refusing to shoot Jews'.<sup>70</sup> The number of Ukrainians in such forces has been estimated at over 100,000.<sup>71</sup>

The testimonies collected since 1990 by the French Catholic priest Father Patrick Desbois give graphic accounts of the involvement of Ukrainians, both members of police forces and civilians, in the mass murder of the Jews. Civilians were compelled to dig burial pits, to transport Jews to execution sites, and to carry the bodies of Jews from killing sites to mass graves. They were also made to stand guard over Jews who were about to be killed, to pull out the Jews' gold teeth just before execution, and to walk back and forth across the bodies of dead and wounded Jews so as to compact the piles of corpses. Others were recruited to supply sand and lime to killing sites, to shovel it over the dead and dying, to supply and spread out the hemp and sunflowers used to burn corpses, and to spread ash over the sites as part of the clean-up. In addition, villagers were also obliged to provide lodging for the members of *Einsatzgruppen* and the Order Police and to cook for them, to store shovels and other implements used in the killing process, and to gather, sort, and mend clothing and other possessions left behind by Jews so that they could be reused or sold by the Germans.

<sup>67</sup> On this, see G. Megargee, *War of Annihilation: Combat and Genocide on the Eastern Front, 1941* (Lanham, Md., 2006).

<sup>68</sup> D. Pohl, 'The Murder of Ukraine's Jews under German Military Administration and in the Reich Commissariat Ukraine', in Brandon and Lower (eds.), *Shoah in Ukraine*, 40.

<sup>69</sup> M. Dean, *Collaboration in the Holocaust: Crimes of the Local Police in Belorussia and Ukraine, 1941–44* (New York, 2000), 101–2; id., 'The German *Gendarmerie*, the Ukrainian *Schutzmannschaft* and the "Second Wave" of Jewish Killings in Occupied Ukraine: German Policing at the Local Level in the Zhitomir Region, 1941–1944', *German History*, 14 (1996), 168–92; K. C. Berkhoff, *Harvest of Despair: Life and Death in Ukraine under Nazi Rule* (Cambridge, Mass., 2004), 64, 68–9, 76, 82–3, 295.

<sup>70</sup> Dean, *Collaboration in the Holocaust*, 102.

<sup>71</sup> Pohl, 'Murder of Ukraine's Jews', 55.

One shocking feature of Desbois's testimonies is that many of those carrying out these tasks were children. His witnesses stress that they acted under coercion and also give graphic accounts of the brutality of the German occupying forces and their willingness to use massive force against any who opposed them.<sup>72</sup>

Ukrainian police units were also established after the creation of the Generalgouvernement in the Lublin and Kraków provinces. They were set up on a larger scale after the incorporation into the Generalgouvernement of eastern Galicia and the dissolution of the Ukrainian militias which had been created there by the nationalist forces. Many of those recruited were members of the OUN(b) and OUN(m) who concealed their political affiliations. By spring 1942 this force numbered nearly 4,100 officers and men, more than double the number of Germans in the Security Police (Sicherheitspolizei) and Order Police.<sup>73</sup> In his final report on 'The Solution of the Jewish Question in Galicia', SS-Gruppenführer and General Lieutenant of the Police Fritz Katzmann listed the forces which aided him in making the District of Galicia *judenfrei*, a difficult task given the 'the great number of Jews and the vast area to be combed', as 'the Security and Order Police, the Gendarmerie, the Special Service and the Ukrainian Police'.<sup>74</sup>

The killings usually took place in ravines, abandoned quarries, or anti-tank ditches close to the areas where the victims lived. Such massacres occurred in the summer of 1941 in Maly Trostenets near Minsk, in the Baby Yar outside Kiev, in the Drobysky Yar near Kharkiv, and in Bohdanivka in Transnistria. From the autumn eight gas vans were used in the procedure for carrying out murders—Jews were sealed inside them and killed with carbon monoxide fumes piped in from the exhaust—but most killings were still carried out by shooting. In the initial massacres which were organized and which continued until December 1941, between 800,000 and 1,000,000 Jews were murdered. Nearly four hundred ghettos were established from July 1941 in the areas formerly making up the Soviet Union, some of them 'open ghettos' without a fence, but in which the Jews were compelled to live and flight from which was punished by death. Most of the Jews in these ghettos were murdered between May and December 1942. In all, it has been calculated that more than 500,000 victims of the Holocaust in the Soviet Union were at some stage confined in ghettos. In eastern Galicia, which was part of the Generalgouvernement, many of the more than thirty enclosed ghettos established here were set up in

<sup>72</sup> P. Desbois, *The Holocaust by Bullets: A Priest's Journey to Uncover the Truth behind the Murder of 1.5 Million Jews* (New York, 2008), 66, 75, 81, 84, 97.

<sup>73</sup> On this, see Finder and Prusin, 'Collaboration in Eastern Galicia', 105–6; T. Sandkühler, 'Anti-Jewish Policy and the Murder of the Jews in the District of Galicia, 1941/42', in U. Herbert (ed.), *National Socialist Extermination Policies: Contemporary German Perspectives and Controversies* (New York, 2000), 127 n. 67; D. Pohl, *Nationalsozialistische Judenverfolgung in Ostgalizien, 1941–1944: Organisation und Durchführung eines staatlichen Massenverbrechens*, 2nd edn. (Munich, 1997), 92.

<sup>74</sup> See Katzmann's final report, 'Lösung der Judenfrage in Distrikt Galizien', 30 June 1943, Nuremberg trial document L-18, partially edited in International Military Tribunal, *Trial of the Major War Criminals before the International Military Tribunal*, xxxvii. 391–431, quotation at p. 404.

the autumn of 1942, after the mass deportations to the death camp of Belzec, and were mostly liquidated in 1943.<sup>75</sup> A large number of Jewish forced labourers worked on the construction of Thoroughfare IV (Durchgangstrasse IV), the main supply route for the Army Group South, but very few survived.<sup>76</sup> By the end of 1943, almost all the Jews in Reichskommissariat Ukraine had been killed, the total deaths numbering between 1,400,000 and 1,600,000.

The bulk of the Jews in Bessarabia and northern Bukovina were murdered by Romanian and German forces in the first months of the occupation (between June and August 1941); at least another 154,000 were exiled to Transnistria. Most of the Jews in the latter area, including those of Odessa, perished in the final months of 1941 and in early 1942. The remainder, together with the Jews expelled from Moldavia and Bukovina, were imprisoned in ghettos and labour camps. In western and south-western Ukraine, the *Einsatzgruppen* carried out mass *Aktionen* in a number of places, including Lutsk (where they murdered 2,000 Jews), Ostroh (3,000), and Ternopil (5,000). Most of the Jews living in this area (nearly 250,000) were murdered between the spring and autumn of 1942 in the Belzec death camp, which was established in March of that year.

A small number of Jewish craftsmen and specialists who were regarded as essential for the German war effort were held in ghettos in Minsk, Lviv, and a number of other locations. These ghettos were subject to periodic *Aktionen* in which those unable to demonstrate that they could contribute to war production were sent to death camps. Most of the ghettos were liquidated in the period after the spring of 1943 when the Germans were forced to retreat by the Soviets, and all were ultimately done away with before the final German retreat of 1944.

When the area was liberated by the Red Army, barely 100,000 to 120,000 Jews were still alive in the areas formerly occupied by the Germans. About half of these were in the areas under Romanian occupation, where the implementation of the genocide had been halted in the summer of 1942. The second largest group of survivors were those in partisan family camps, while several thousand had been able to find shelter with the surrounding population. Most of those who survived from these areas had fled or had been evacuated to the areas which the Germans were not able to occupy. In all, between 2,460,000 and 2,600,000 were murdered in the areas occupied by the Nazi forces (1,400,000 to 1,600,000 in Ukraine and around 120,000 in the Russian Federation, and the remainder in Belarus). In addition, perhaps 85,000 Jewish prisoners of war were murdered in POW camps solely because they were Jews, and between 120,000 and 180,000 died fighting in the Red Army.<sup>77</sup>

<sup>75</sup> M. Dean, 'Ghettos in the Occupied Soviet Union: The Nazi "System"', in *The Holocaust in the Soviet Union: Symposium Presentations* (Washington, DC, 2005), 46–7.

<sup>76</sup> On this, see A. Angrick, 'Annihilation and Labor: Jews and Thoroughfare IV in Central Ukraine', in Brandon and Lower (eds.), *Shoah in Ukraine*, 190–223.

<sup>77</sup> Based on M. Kupovetsky, 'Estimation of Jewish Losses in the USSR during World War II', *Jews in Eastern Europe*, 24 (1994), 34; S. Krakowski, 'The Fate of the Jewish POWs of the Soviet and

Some Ukrainians hoped to establish a collaborationist government allied to the Germans. There was little basis for these hopes. Operation Barbarossa envisaged large-scale German colonization in the East and the reduction of the local *Untermenschen* to rightless slaves.<sup>78</sup> Initially there was some dispute among Nazi bureaucrats about how the locals should be treated before the final victory, with Alfred Rosenberg, Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories, arguing that giving non-Russians some degree of self-government would make it possible for them to be enlisted for the anti-Bolshevik crusade, while Ernst Koch, Reichskommissar of Ukraine, was against any such concessions. As early as 16 July 1941, the highest party leadership rejected Rosenberg's proposals and incorporated eastern Galicia into the Generalgouvernement.<sup>79</sup> In September 1941 the issue was finally decided by Hitler. He told his inner circle: 'In 1918 we created the Baltic states and the Ukraine. But now we have no interest in the continued existence of the Eastern Baltic states and a free Ukraine.'<sup>80</sup>

In the case of the Ukrainians, on the day after the invasion of the Soviet Union Volodymyr Stakhiv, director of the political division of the OUN(b), wrote to Hitler expressing the hope that Operation Barbarossa would 'destroy the corrupting Jewish-Bolshevik influence in Europe and finally break Russian imperialism . . . restoration of an independent national Ukrainian state along the lines of the Brest-Litovsk Treaty will firmly establish the ethnic [*völkische*] new order in eastern Europe'.<sup>81</sup> The collapse of Soviet rule was followed by attempts by Ukrainian activists, with the help of thousands of nationalist volunteers from western Ukraine, to establish local police forces, administrations, and newspapers. In some cases collective farms were divided up and many Orthodox churches were reopened. The activists found, to their disappointment, that the Ukrainian national idea had much less support here than in western Ukraine.

The hope that the Germans would seek high-level Ukrainian political collaboration was misplaced. When Lviv was captured on 30 June 1941, OUN(b) activists convened a 'National Assembly' which proclaimed Ukrainian independence and entrusted the position of prime minister to Yaroslav Stetsko, one of Bandera's close associates and a man strongly hostile to the Jews.<sup>82</sup> They also managed to obtain

Polish Armies', in A. Cohen, Y. Cochavi, and Y. Gelber (eds.), *The Shoah and the War* (New York, 1992), 229–30; M. Altshuler, *Soviet Jewry since the Second World War: Population and Social Structure* (New York, 1987), 4; Y. Arad, *Toledot hasho'ah: berit hamo'atsot vehashetaḥim hamesupaḥim*, 2 vols. (Jerusalem, 2004), ii. 1014.

<sup>78</sup> On Nazi views on the Ukrainians, see R. A. Mark, 'The Ukrainians as Seen by Hitler, Rosenberg and Koch', in T. Hunczak and D. Shtohryn (eds.), *Ukraine: The Challenges of World War II* (Lanham, Md., 2003), 23–36.

<sup>79</sup> On this meeting, see 'Introduction', in Brandon and Lower (eds.), *Shoah in Ukraine*, 18.

<sup>80</sup> Dallin, *German Rule in Russia*, 56–7.

<sup>81</sup> *Akten zur deutschen auswärtigen Politik, 1918–1945*, ser. d (1937–1941), vol. xiii: *Die Kriegsjahre*, vi/1: 23. *Juni bis 14. September 1941* (Göttingen, 1970), 122.

<sup>82</sup> Finder and Prusin, 'Collaboration in Eastern Galicia', 102.



statements of support from Metropolitan Sheptytsky and some more moderate Galician figures. The Germans responded by demanding the withdrawal of the declaration of independence, and when this was not forthcoming, they arrested both Stetsko and Bandera, who spent most of the war in German captivity, being released only in the autumn of 1944 when relations between the Ukrainian Insurgent Army and the Germans improved.<sup>83</sup> Shortly after his arrest, perhaps in an attempt to win German support, Stetsko wrote in an autobiographical sketch: 'I fully appreciate the undeniably harmful and hostile role of the Jews, who are helping Moscow to enslave Ukraine. I therefore support the destruction of the Jews and the experience of bringing German methods of exterminating Jewry to Ukraine, barring their assimilation and the like.'<sup>84</sup>

The bitter feud between the two factions of the OUN now led to a violent confrontation, with assassinations and mutual denunciations. The Germans responded by suppressing both groups and disbanding most of the expeditionary forces they had organized. The Nachtigall and Roland battalions were withdrawn from the front and reorganized as a regular battalion, which served in Belarus until the end of 1942, when it was in turn dissolved and most of its Ukrainian officers arrested. The OUN(m) attempted in October 1941 to establish a Ukrainian National Council (Ukrayins'ka Natsional'na Rada) in Kiev as the nucleus for a future government, but this was suppressed in the following month by the German authorities. In the Generalgouvernement too a Ukrainian National Council was created in Lviv (Ukrayins'ka Natsional'na Rada u L'vovi) in July 1941 by more moderate individuals, including the Metropolitan and the UNDO politician Kost Levytsky, but it too was dissolved by the Germans, in March 1942. Only in Kraków was a Ukrainian Central Committee allowed to function under Volodymyr Kubiiovych, but its activities were largely restricted to relief. It was this body that was responsible for the creation in April 1943 of the Waffen-SS Division 'Galizien'. The use of the term 'Galician' rather than 'Ukrainian' for this force showed how limited was the autonomy the Germans were prepared to concede.<sup>85</sup> From late 1942 round-ups to obtain forced labourers for work in the Reich became frequent. At the same time, the Ukrainian Central Committee's newspaper, *Krakivs'ki visti*, strongly supported German policy and published a series of antisemitic articles in the spring of 1943, during the final murder of the Galician Jews, attacking the Jews for their economic

<sup>83</sup> S. V. Kulchytsky, 'L'viv, 30 chervnya 1941 roku', *Kyryvs'ka starovyna*, 2000, no. 2, pp. 32–44; A. Bolyanovsky, 'Nimets'ka okupatsiina administratsiya i natsional'nyi rukh oporu Ukrayiny u 1941–1944 rokakh', *Zapysky NTSh*, 238 (1999), 348–81.

<sup>84</sup> Quoted in K. C. Berkhoff and M. Carynyk, 'The Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and its Attitude toward Germans and Jews: Iaroslav Stets'ko's 1941 *Zhyttiepis*', *Harvard Ukrainian Studies*, 23/3–4 (1999), 152, 171.

<sup>85</sup> M. Yurkevich, 'Galician Ukrainians in German Military Formations and in the German Administration', in Y. Boshyk (ed.), *Ukraine during World War II: History and its Aftermath* (Edmonton, 1986), 76; A. Bolyanovsky, *Ukrayins'ki viis'kovi formuvannya v zbroinykh sylakh Nimechchyny, 1939–1945* (Lviv, 2003).

exploitation of the Ukrainian peasantry and their support of the Soviet regime between 1939 and 1941.<sup>86</sup> Many other Ukrainian publications were permitted and a network of Ukrainian schools established.

The Ukrainians were to suffer appallingly under Nazi occupation. In the defence of Kiev, which fell to the Nazis on 19 September 1941, the Soviets lost over 616,000 dead and 665,000 taken prisoner. By the end of 1941 Ukrainians probably made up around 1.3 million of the 3.6 million prisoners of war in German hands and only around half of them survived German captivity.<sup>87</sup> In occupied Ukraine, the Germans' main objective was to ensure adequate grain supplies to the home front. As a result they failed to revive the industry of the area and forbade farmers to sell grain to the towns, creating serious hardship and even starvation and an exodus to the countryside. They treated the Ukrainians like a colonial people, establishing shops, restaurants, and public transport restricted for German use. They also closed down all universities and limited education to four years in primary school. Over 2.3 million Ukrainian citizens were rounded up and sent to Germany as forced labourers.<sup>88</sup>

These policies inevitably aroused widespread resistance. Nearly 3.2 million inhabitants of Ukraine served in the Red Army to the end of 1943. In 1944 and 1945, another 4.5 million did so.<sup>89</sup> In addition, the Soviets encouraged partisan warfare on a large scale in Ukraine. By the end of the war there were some 2,000 partisan groups here, with possibly as many as 200,000 fighters, more than half of them Ukrainian. The Germans responded savagely to this resistance. Villages were held collectively responsible for guerrilla attacks and all their inhabitants murdered, while public corporal punishment was widely used for minor offences.<sup>90</sup>

How did the Ukrainians under Nazi occupation respond to the genocide? Ukrainian attitudes have not been thoroughly studied and we are largely dependent on memoir material. The majority of Jewish memoirs stress the hostility of their neighbours, while those of Ukrainians highlight solidarity, compassion, and voluntary assistance to Jews. There are some German reports which seem to suggest that some Ukrainians reacted with abhorrence to the German massacres of Jews. On 10 May 1942 the chief of staff of the rear areas of Army Group South sent the following instruction to the 197th field headquarters: 'It is essential that you use all means to prevent the population from witnessing possible acts of the elimination of the

<sup>86</sup> J.-P. Himka, 'Krakivs'ki visti and the Jews, 1943: A Contribution to the History of Ukrainian-Jewish Relations during the Second World War', in S. S. Miller (ed.), *Ukraine: Developing a Democratic Polity. Essays in Honour of Peter J. Potichnyj*, special issue of *Journal of Ukrainian Studies*, 21/1-2 (1996), 81-95.

<sup>87</sup> G. F. Krivosheev (ed.), *Grif sekretnosti snyat: Poteri Vooruzhennykh Sil SSSR v voynakh, boevykh deistviyakh i voennykh konfliktakh* (Moscow, 1993), 166-7.

<sup>88</sup> Berkhoff, *Harvest of Despair*, 133; M. Slobodyanyuk, 'Selyany Ukrayiny pid natsysts'kym okupatsiinym rezhymom, 1941-1944', *Kyiv's'ka starovyna*, 2000, no. 2, pp. 44-57; Yekelchik, *Ukraine*, 140.

<sup>89</sup> I. Drobot et al., *Ukrayins'kyi narod u Druhii svitovii viini* (Kiev, 1998), 219-20.

<sup>90</sup> M. V. Koval, *Ukrayina v Druhii svitovii i Velykii Vitchyznyanii viinakh, 1939-1945 rr.* (Kiev, 1999), 270-1.

Jews by the SS.<sup>91</sup> Some Ukrainians feared that the Germans' treatment of the Jews foreshadowed their own fate. A report filed by the Security Service of the SS in Kiev in 1942 recorded a popular verse: 'The Germans have come—*gut*; for the Jews—*kaput*; for the Gypsies—*tozhe* [also]; for the Ukrainians—*pozzhe* [later].'<sup>92</sup>

There were certainly times when Ukrainians murdered Jews. According to Rabbi David Kahane, many Jews from Lviv escaped from the trains taking them to the Belzec death camp: 'Some peasants took pity on the jumpers, fed them, and showed them the way back to the city. Other peasants turned them over to the Ukrainian police or the Gestapo.'<sup>93</sup>

According to the Jewish partisan Joshua Wermuth,

The last remnants of the Horodenka Jews, seeing no other way out for themselves, decided to cross the Dniester and head for the towns of Tlust and Buczacz. Not all made the journey safely. Some were robbed on the way by bands of Ukrainians, and arrived penniless. . . . [Later] all the unarmed Jews in nearby forests concentrated themselves around our [partisan] group. They were in constant danger of attacks, mainly by the local Ukrainian population. The Ukrainians would lie in wait for them along the roads that led to the villages. Every unarmed Jew was beaten mercilessly, robbed of his money and clothing and left completely naked.<sup>94</sup>

These accounts need to be set against the heroic actions of those who risked their lives to rescue Jews. Over 2,000 Ukrainian citizens have been recognized by Yad Vashem as 'Righteous among the Nations'. Most rescue here was by individuals, although the Metropolitan of the Greek Catholic Church, Andrey Sheptytsky, provided shelter for over 150 Jews, including Rabbi David Kahane and his family, both in St George's Cathedral in Lviv, the principal shrine of his Church, and in other monasteries.<sup>95</sup> In some cases, quite large numbers of Jews were assisted: in Sambir, Oleksandr Kryvoshyya rescued fifty-eight Jews, and in Pidhaitsi, Levko and Roman Biletsky saved twenty-three.<sup>96</sup>

In Ukraine, large-scale partisan resistance was organized by the Soviets. Alongside it, there also arose a significant nationalist guerrilla movement. This was

<sup>91</sup> Tsentral'nyi derzhavnyi arkhiv vyshchykh orhaniv vlady ta upravlinnya, Kiev, f. KMF-8, op. 2, spr. 156, fo. 129, quoted in M. Koval, 'The Nazi Genocide of the Jews and the Ukrainian Population', in Z. Gitelman (ed.), *Bitter Legacy: Confronting the Holocaust in the USSR* (Bloomington, Ind., 1997), 53.

<sup>92</sup> Tsentral'nyi derzhavnyi arkhiv hromads'kykh ob'ednan' Ukrayiny, Kiev, f. 166, op. 2, spr. 179, fos. 2–3, quoted in Koval, 'Nazi Genocide of the Jews and the Ukrainian Population', 53.

<sup>93</sup> D. Kahane, *Lviv Ghetto Diary*, trans. J. Michalowicz (Amherst, Mass., 1990), 76.

<sup>94</sup> J. Wermuth, 'The Jewish Partisans of Horodenka', in *They Fought Back: The Story of the Jewish Resistance in Nazi Europe*, ed. and trans. Y. Suhl, 2nd edn. (New York, 1975), 226–7.

<sup>95</sup> On Ukrainian efforts to help Jews, see F. Golczewski, 'Die Revision eines Klischees: Die Rettung von verfolgten Juden im Zweiten Weltkrieg durch Ukrainer', in W. Benz and J. Wetzel (eds.), *Solidarität und Hilfe für Juden während der NS-Zeit*, ii: *Regionalstudien Ukraine, Frankreich, Böhmen und Mähren, Österreich, Lettland, Litauen, Estland* (Berlin, 1998), 9–82, and id., 'Shades of Grey'.

<sup>96</sup> On Sambir, see P. Friedman, *Roads to Extinction: Essays on the Holocaust* (New York, 1980), 176–208; on Pidhaitsi, see T. Hunczak, 'Ukrainian–Jewish Relations during the Soviet and Nazi Occupations', in M. Marrus, *The Nazi Holocaust: Historical Articles on the Destruction of European Jews*, v/1: *Public Opinion and Relations to the Jews in Nazi Europe* (Westport, Conn., 1989), 404.

formed in the forests of Volhynia and Polesie in the second half of 1941, and in the spring of 1942 it was given the name Ukrainian Insurgent Army (Ukrayins'ka povstans'ka armiya; UPA). It began to attack the Germans, and it was greatly strengthened in the spring of 1943 when the adherents of the OUN(b), who had joined the German-organized police forces in large numbers, deserted in their thousands.<sup>97</sup> The different partisan groups, including those established by the OUN(m), were forcibly united in 1943 by the Banderites and placed under the command of Roman Shukhevych, a former officer in the Nachtigall batallion. They now numbered around 40,000 and in the spring of 1943 began a campaign to force the local Poles out of Volhynia, which they hoped would be the core of an independent Ukraine. The Poles, organized in the Home Army (Armia Krajowa), responded in kind, and some Poles also joined the local German-controlled police force. In a brutal campaign with appalling atrocities on both sides, which spread over into Galicia and the eastern part of the Lublin province, some 50,000 Poles were killed in Volhynia and another 20,000 in eastern Galicia. Between 10,000 and 20,000 Ukrainians lost their lives in Polish self-defence and reprisal actions, some of the most brutal conducted by Poles in the German-organized police.<sup>98</sup>

During this period the OUN(b) proclaimed that it was fighting against both Nazi and Soviet imperialism and for a democratic system. It did not either condemn the anti-Jewish genocide or call on Ukrainians not to take part in it, although it did stress the multi-ethnic nature of the future Ukraine, where Jews would be allowed to live.<sup>99</sup> Together with the UPA and some other political groupings, it established a clandestine Ukraine Supreme Liberation Council (Ukrayins'ka holovna vyzvol'na rada) in eastern Galicia in July 1944, hoping for Western support. Although after the end of the war this support was forthcoming on a small scale, it could in no way hinder the re-establishment of Soviet power in this area. However, armed resistance to Soviet rule continued here until the early 1950s.<sup>100</sup> During 1944 and the first six months of 1945

<sup>97</sup> J. A. Armstrong, *Ukrainian Nationalism*, 2nd edn. (Littleton, Colo., 1980), 148.

<sup>98</sup> There is a large literature on this conflict, which is reviewed in A. Polonsky, "The Conquest of History?" Toward a Usable Past in Poland': the Zaleski Lectures, Lecture 3: 'Polish-German and Polish-Ukrainian Historical Controversies', *Harvard Ukrainian Studies*, 27/1-4 (2004-5), 287-313. See in particular B. Berdychowska, 'Ukraińcy wobec Wołynia', *Zeszyty Historyczne*, 146 (2004), 65-104; R. Wnuk, 'Recent Polish Historiography on Polish-Ukrainian Relations during World War II and its Aftermath', *InterMarium On-Line Journal*, 7/1 (2004): <<http://ece.columbia.edu/research/intermarium/vol7no1/wnuk.pdf>>; A. Sowa, *Stosunki polsko-ukraińskie, 1939-1947: Zarys problematyki* (Kraków, 1998), 173-5; G. Motyka, 'Postawy wobec konfliktu polsko-ukraińskiego w latach 1939-1953 w zależności od przynależności etnicznej, państwowej i religijnej', in K. Jasiewicz (ed.), *Tygiel narodów: Stosunki społeczne i etniczne na dawnych ziemiach wschodnich Rzeczypospolitej, 1939-1953* (Warsaw, 2002), 326-9; G. Motyka, *Tak było w Bieszczadach: Walki polsko-ukraińskie, 1939-1948* (Warsaw, 1999); I. I. Ilyushyn, *Volyns'ka trahediya 1943-1944 rr.* (Kiev, 2003), 167, 191-4, 221-2.

<sup>99</sup> I. Lysyak-Rudnytsky, 'Natsionalizm i totalitaryzm (Vidpovid' M. Prokopovi)', *Journal of Ukrainian Studies*, 7/2 (1982), 85.

<sup>100</sup> I. Bilas, *Represyyno-karal'na systema v Ukrayini, 1917-1953: Suspil'no-politychnyi ta istoryko-pravovyi analiz*, 2 vols. (Kiev, 1994), ii. 314, 549-70, 604, 608; J. Burds, *The Early Cold War in Soviet West Ukraine, 1944-1948* (Pittsburgh, 2001).

alone, the Soviets claimed to have killed nearly 92,000 guerrillas and detained over 96,000.

There is not much documentation on the behaviour of the UPA in relation to Jews. In Volhynia in December 1943/January 1944, when they were engaged in armed conflict both with Soviet partisans and with the local Poles, they deliberately lured surviving Jews into the camps they ran and then murdered them. According to Doba Melamed, a Jew who fled to the forest with her family from the Tuchyn ghetto in Volhynia, whose testimony was taken by the Jewish Historical Institute shortly after the war, probably in 1945,

In the summer of 1943 the Banderites [supporters of Bandera] began to kill the Poles . . . We found out that near the town of Antonivka in the village of Rezyca [Rechytsya], Jews were living in liberty, that the Banderites had announced that they would not kill the Jews because they were fighting against a common enemy. We went to Rezyca. In fact there were 200 Jews living at liberty, working for the peasants as tanners, tailors, cobblers, and the like.

The Melameds were suspicious and fled further:

The houses of the Poles stood empty. Then the Banderites announced that England and America, as countries with which they were allied, had forbidden them to kill Jews, that they would allow Jews to take over the homes abandoned by the Poles . . . In December 1943 the Banderites again began to register the Jews. After registration they announced that if one Jew escaped, the rest would be killed . . . In December 1943 a certain Jew knocked on our window pane and shouted: 'Run for it, the Banderites have killed the Antonivka Jews.' We fled to the forest. We sent the forester to investigate. He came back with the news that the Banderites had killed all the Jews, with axes and knives.<sup>101</sup>

There are also poorly documented accounts that some UPA units rescued Jews or provided Jews with false papers. In all only six documented cases of Jews serving in the UPA have been found. The organization did on occasion conscript Jewish doctors to provide medical services for their forces.<sup>102</sup>

The position of the Greek Catholic Church is complex and forms the subject of John-Paul Himka's chapter on the controversial Metropolitan Andrey Sheptytsky, who was personally responsible for saving dozens of Jews during the Nazi occupation of Galicia. A focus of heated debates by historians, political leaders, and journalists as a possible candidate for the title of Righteous among the Nations, long denied to him, Sheptytsky emerges from Himka's essay as a person who only slowly became aware of the unfolding Final Solution, as a thinker deeply disturbed by the murder of the Jews, and as a courageous leader who defied Himmler himself, questioning the Nazi policy towards the Jews. When the Nazis took Lviv, Metropolitan

<sup>101</sup> Archiwum Żydowskiego Instytutu Historycznego, Warsaw: Relacje. Zeznania ocalałych Żydów, 301/397, fos. 12–14. We are grateful to John-Paul Himka for this reference.

<sup>102</sup> Recent claims that large numbers of Jews served in the UPA, such as those made on the BBC Ukrainian service on 14 October 2008 by Moisey Fishbein and by the Ukrainian Security Service on its website <[http://www.sbu.gov.ua/sbu/control/uk/publish/article?art\\_id=77963&cat\\_id=81484&mustWords=євпеї&searchPublishing=1](http://www.sbu.gov.ua/sbu/control/uk/publish/article?art_id=77963&cat_id=81484&mustWords=євпеї&searchPublishing=1)>, are not credible: communication from John-Paul Himka.

Sheptytsky, 76 years old and in poor health, issued a qualified statement welcoming them as the regime reinstating the authority of the Church. He failed to condemn unequivocally the anti-Jewish violence in Lviv in July 1941, in spite of requests to do so, but was unaware of the magnitude of the forthcoming massacres of Jews. As we have seen, he did organize shelter for over 150 Jews; he also argued in favour of tolerance and benevolence towards Jews throughout his career, from as early as 1904. Although his attitude to the Jews was marked by the ambiguities which characterized Catholicism before the issuing of the encyclical 'Nostra Aetate' in 1965, he did issue an eloquent pastoral letter on 21 November 1942 stressing the need for the faithful to observe together the commandments 'Thou shalt not kill' and 'Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself', a clear reference to the mass murder of the Jews, and calling for the excommunication of church members involved in these murders. The letter is discussed in Himka's essay. What is unclear is how many people were subjected to this punishment and what effect this appeal had.<sup>103</sup>

The primary responsibility for the adoption and implementation of the policy of genocide against the Jews clearly lies with the Nazi leadership, above all Hitler himself, the SS and the German Army, and the German people who gave them support. At the same time it is clear that the deep divide between Jews and their neighbours which developed in the years before 1941 over the whole of north-eastern Europe, leading to mutual incomprehension, suspicion, and even hatred, made the genocide easier for the Germans to carry out, and also made much more difficult the task of those who wished to assist the Jews. In these circumstances, it is even more important to stress the heroism of those who did try to help and who often paid for their efforts with their lives.

#### FROM 1944 TO THE EMERGENCE OF AN INDEPENDENT UKRAINE

Perhaps for the first time in history, the Soviet victory in the Second World War made possible the unification of all the Ukrainian lands in the Ukrainian SSR. At the same time, the immediate post-war period was marked by the violent suppression of the movement for Ukrainian independence, and guerrilla war continued until the early 1950s. It was accompanied by large-scale arrests, executions, and the imprisonment of many in labour camps, where Ukrainian nationalists for the first time found themselves in the same barracks with the Jewish inhabitants of the Soviet Gulag. The war also had a devastating impact on the situation of the Jews in Ukraine. The Jewish population here in 1945 was approximately 600,000, most of whom had survived by fleeing to areas not under Nazi control and who in 1944 began coming back home only to find their apartments taken by the relocated

<sup>103</sup> On this, see S. Redlich, 'Metropolitan Sheptyts'kyi and Ukrainian-Jewish Relations', in Gitelman (ed.), *Bitter Legacy*, 61-76, and J. J. Bussgang, 'Metropolitan Sheptytsky: A Reassessment', *Polin*, 21 (2009), 401-25.

Russians and Ukrainians and their property looted. Antisemitism persisted, partly because of the poisonous effect of Nazi wartime propaganda, partly because of the identification of Jews with the returning communist regime, and partly because of the resentment at attempts by Jews to regain their property. The impact of these developments in fostering anti-Jewish violence in Kiev is described in the chapter by Victoria Khiterer, who uses new archival evidence to reconstruct the precarious situation of those Jews who survived or escaped the Holocaust and who tried to integrate into post-war urban Soviet society in the capital city of Soviet Ukraine. Anti-Jewish disturbances also seem to have occurred in Dnipropetrovsk in the summer of 1944. In western Ukraine and south-eastern Poland, the UPA's resistance to Soviet and Polish rule, which continued until the early fifties, also led to the deaths of some Jews.

In June 1944 the NKVD investigated rumours in Lviv that Jews were committing ritual murders of children in their synagogue. The situation led Gersonsky, who from his name seems to have been Jewish, the deputy head of the Second Department of the Ukrainian People's Commissariat for State Security (Narodnyi komissariat gosudarstvennoi bezopasnosti; NKGB), to draft a memorandum on antisemitic incidents in Ukraine in early August 1944.<sup>104</sup> The response of the Soviet authorities in Ukraine foreshadowed Stalin's subsequent actions against the Jews of the Soviet Union. Gersonsky submitted his memorandum to Sergey Savchenko, head of the NKGB in Ukraine and a close associate of Lavrenty Beria, the head of the security apparatus. Savchenko seems to have redrafted the memorandum and on 13 September submitted it to Nikita Khrushchev, then the first secretary of the Ukrainian Communist Party. Khrushchev's response was to set up a three-man commission, which concluded that the report had exaggerated the amount of antisemitism and that if there was any increase in hostility to the Jews this was the result of their provocative and anti-Soviet behaviour.

Ultimately all the Jews who survived the war in eastern Europe owed their lives to the collapse of the Third Reich. However, although the Soviets played a major role in defeating Hitler, the war had two consequences which were significantly to undermine the situation of the Jews in the Soviet Union. First, the constant stress on the primary role of the Russian people at the expense of other, even Slavonic, national minorities such as Belarusians and Ukrainians in defeating the Nazis made the position of the Jews much more marginal in Soviet society. Research into the post-war era has been largely focused on the Kremlin-orchestrated antisemitism, while its immediate source—the increasingly Russocentric chauvinism of the late

<sup>104</sup> 'Special Report on Manifestations of Antisemitism in Ukraine', in *Documents on Ukrainian Jewish Identity and Emigration, 1944–1990*, ed. V. Khanin (London and Portland, Oreg., 2003), 41–58; Weiner, *Making Sense of War*, 192; M. Altshuler, 'Antisemitism in Ukraine toward the End of World War II', in Gitelman (ed.), *Bitter Legacy*, 77–90. Gersonsky's memorandum is not available; that of his superior Sergey Savchenko and the report of the three-member commission set up by Khrushchev to study the problem are reproduced in Gitelman (ed.), *Bitter Legacy*, 300–14.

Stalin years—has been often overlooked. When, on 24 May 1945, Stalin received the commanders of the Red Army in the Kremlin to celebrate the victory over Nazi Germany, he singled out the role of the Russian people in the victory, whom he described as ‘the most outstanding nation among the peoples of the Soviet Union’ and the ‘driving force’ of the war. This placed the Russians on the pedestal of the victorious nation, while other minorities, Jews above all, were believed to have fought against the Nazis in ‘Tashkent’, thousands of miles from the front line.

Secondly, Jewish faith in the Soviet internationalist dream was further undermined by the revelation that at least some Soviet citizens had been willing to aid the Nazis in murdering their Jewish neighbours. Jewish marginality was exacerbated by the strong sense of Jewishness that the war evoked in almost all Soviet Jews and in particular among the 400,000–500,000 of them who served in the ranks of the Red Army and partisan units during the war.<sup>105</sup>

Stalin’s suspicion of Jews grew after the war, particularly because of the close links which the leadership of the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee (*Evreiskii anti-fashistskii komitet*), set up in mid-1942 to support the Soviet war effort, had established with Jews outside the Soviet Union, especially in the United States. His hostility was only intensified by the fact that the leading members of the committee had called in 1944 for the establishment of an autonomous Jewish republic, at first in the Crimea and then on the Volga, seeking to solve the housing problem of the Jewish survivors, and had continued to stress their links with the entire Jewish people and to emphasize the uniqueness of Jewish suffering during the Holocaust. Stalin’s suspicion also led to the suppression of the *Black Book*, edited by the leading Soviet writers of Jewish origin Ilya Ehrenburg and Vasily Grossman, in which the editors manage to document meticulously the Jewish suffering at the hands of the Nazis. Stalin reacted negatively to any attempts to commemorate and emphasize the particularity of the Jewish suffering during the Second World War and instead maintained that the entire Soviet people suffered. His answer shaped the predicament of any Soviet commemoration of Jewish victimhood (the word ‘Holocaust’ was never used in Soviet sources) well into the late 1980s.

Stalin’s hostility increased with the worsening international climate and the onset of the Cold War, which led to a renewal of purges and terror in the Soviet Union. Under the slogan ‘The war on fascism ends, the war on capitalism begins’, Stalin was determined to rein in the intelligentsia and to end the relative freedom which had prevailed after 1941. This led to Andrey Zhdanov’s campaign against ‘rootless cosmopolitans’, a large number of whom were Jews, who were guilty of ‘servility and cringing before foreign culture’.

Stalin was also alarmed by the enthusiastic response accorded by Jews in the Soviet Union to the emergence of the state of Israel. In the immediate post-war period he had supported Zionist aspirations in Palestine, mainly because he thought

<sup>105</sup> On the difficulty of estimating the exact number of Jews in the Red Army, see Altshuler, ‘Anti-semitism in Ukraine toward the End of World War II’, 89–90.



that in this way he could deal a blow to the imperialistic British and their 'feudal' Arab allies, and also perhaps because he exaggerated the amount of pro-Soviet sentiment among Jews in Palestine, hoping that the future Jewish state with its three communist parties would become the Soviet satellite of the Middle East, if not a colony of the now rapidly expanding Soviet empire. Thus the Soviets voted on 29 November 1947 in favour of the resolution dividing Palestine into Jewish and Arab states. They also gave immediate recognition to the state of Israel in May 1948 and allowed the Czechoslovak government to sell crucial weapons to the new state.

However, his support for the emergence of Israel did not diminish Stalin's suspicion of Jews within the Soviet Union and in late 1948 he moved against them. As in other purges, he operated on several levels, taking action both against those who were prominent in Soviet Yiddish culture and against the larger group of acculturated and Sovietized Jews who still held prominent positions in the Soviet bureaucracy and in cultural life. He moved first against the Yiddish activists by dissolving the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee and closing down its newspaper *Eynikayt* and the Emes publishing company in November. This was done, among other things, to suppress publications on the extraordinary role of the US and Soviet Jewish elites in fostering the Lend-Lease campaign that supported the Soviet army with ammunition, transport, and food supplies.

Those who had been instrumental in promoting Soviet–US rapprochement in the war years had to be eliminated as the victory was now considered to have been secured by the Russian people led by the Communist Party—and nobody else. At the end of December 1948, the poet Itsik Fefer and the actor Veniamin Zuskin were arrested, and in January 1949 so too were the remainder of the leadership of the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee. The same fate befell several hundred other Yiddish cultural figures. Stalin seems to have intended a public show trial but this was made impossible when a number of those accused refused to confess and the chief prosecutor resigned from his position, being unwilling to follow the advice from above and 'beat confessions out of' the leading Soviet Jewish public figures. In the end, thirteen representative figures, including Perets Markish, Fefer, and David Bergelson, were condemned in secret for treason and collaboration with imperialists and Zionists and were executed on 12 August 1952. Among the charges were that they had sought to bring about the secession of the Crimean Peninsula from the Soviet Union.

The campaign reached its climax on 13 January 1953 when it was announced that ten doctors working in the Kremlin medical clinic, nine of whom had obviously Jewish names, had been exposed as foreign agents. It was claimed that they had already killed two leading Soviet politicians, Andrey Zhdanov and Aleksandr Shcherbakov. They were now intending to murder several leading military figures and were linked with Western intelligence agents who were attempting to kill Stalin. A thinly disguised antisemitic campaign followed, and the 'rootless cosmopolitans', intellectuals with Jewish surnames, were found guilty of treason against the state.

The ensuing campaign aimed at the removal of Jews from the Soviet political apparatus. Rumours circulated in early 1953 about a planned large-scale deportation of Jews from Moscow, Kiev, and Leningrad to either Siberia or Soviet Central Asia, and made many contemporaries believe and even claim in their memoirs that this was indeed planned and was averted only by Stalin's death. Most likely, these rumours were unfounded: scholars working with the declassified archives after the collapse of the Soviet Union have found no proof that such mass action was being planned or that measures for transportation were being prepared. Still, at the grassroots level the atmosphere of insecurity and hostility was extremely menacing, particularly in big urban areas, where thousands of Jews who worked in hospitals, publishing houses, colleges, high schools, and other cultural institutions were hastily laid off, accused of rootless cosmopolitanism. In Kiev it was reported that patients refused to go to doctors with Jewish surnames, and that such doctors were obstructed from attending to patients.

The situation of the Jews improved only marginally after the death of Stalin. Jews still remained part of the Soviet professional elite. However, they were now clearly regarded as an 'untrustworthy' nationality. National identity could now easily be ascertained from the notorious 'paragraph 5' of the internal passport, an inconsistency with the official Soviet policy of integration.

The extreme form of integrationism pursued by the Soviet authorities also lay at the root of the way in which the Holocaust was treated in the post-war years. The view that the Jews had been singled out by the Nazis was purged from publications. Nazism was the highest form of monopoly capitalism and targeted all working people, while seeking the collaboration of bourgeois elements, including the Jewish bourgeoisie, particularly in its Zionist incarnation. In addition, Jews were hardly mentioned in official histories. There does not appear to be a single reference to Jews in the six-volume official Soviet history of the war, published between 1960 and 1965. The terms 'antisemitism' and 'Holocaust' do not appear in the index.<sup>106</sup> This also explains the failure to memorialize sites of Jewish murder or to recognize the exclusive character of the anti-Jewish persecutions. Soviet Ukraine, owing to its subservient status vis-à-vis the centralized Moscow-based power of the party, could afford even less liberalism on the Jewish issue. Dmitry Shostakovich's 13th (Baby Yar) Symphony, which incorporates Evgeny Evtushenko's poetry, including *Babii Yar*, was performed in Moscow but never in Kiev. We reproduce in this volume the

<sup>106</sup> P. N. Pospelov et al. (eds.), *Istoriya Velikoi Otechestvennoi voiny Sovetskogo Soyuzha 1941–1945 gg.*, 6 vols. (Moscow, 1960–5). On this, see Z. Gitelman, 'Politics and Historiography of the Holocaust in the Soviet Union', in id. (ed.), *Bitter Legacy*, 21. In addition, on the Soviet treatment of the Holocaust, see H. Asher, 'The Holocaust and the USSR', in D. Herzog (ed.), *Lessons and Legacies*, vii; *The Holocaust in International Perspective* (Evanston, Ill., 1991), 253–68; L. Hirszowicz, 'The Holocaust in the Soviet Mirror', in L. Dobroszycki and J. S. Gurock (eds.), *The Holocaust in the Soviet Union: Studies and Sources on the Destruction of the Jews in the Nazi-Occupied Territories of the USSR, 1941–1945* (New York, 1993); and R. Weinberg, 'The Politics of Remembering: The Treatment of the Holocaust in the Soviet Union', in Herzog (ed.), *Lessons and Legacies*, vii. 314–29.

documents of the controversy aroused by the protest of Ivan Dzyuba, a leading Ukrainian literary critic and dissident, at the failure to erect a monument at Baby Yar and recognize the fate of the Jews in Ukraine. Dzyuba's speech at the Baby Yar memorial meeting in 1966 and the reaction it provoked shed light on the attempts made by the national democrats among the Ukrainian cultural elite to give some degree of recognition to the specific character of the Jewish experience in the Second World War.

Jews constituted a large proportion of the members of the dissident movement, and the regime mercilessly suppressed them. Anatoly Partashnikov, one of the Kiev-based group of Zionists who denounced the regime's stance on the Jewish emigration issue, was beaten up by the KGB in the Kiev subway. Leonid Gluzman was arrested and sentenced for writing an independent expert opinion for General Petro Hryhorenko (Grigorenko), a Ukrainian dissident whom the regime was trying to present as mentally ill. Iosif Zissels from Chernivtsi was arrested (twice) for keeping and sharing Samizdat literature and sentenced to eight years in a correction colony. Young intellectuals such as the poet Moisey Fishbein, who did not participate actively in the dissident movement but shared the dissidents' critique of the regime, were intimidated by the state security and compelled to leave the country. Those Russians and Ukrainians in Ukraine who supported Jews that were struggling against their status as second-rank citizens or arguing for free Jewish emigration were also persecuted. Gely Snegirev, a highly successful film producer, was taken by force to the KGB hospital, where the doctors made him into a cripple. Svyatoslav Karavansky, who filed a written protest with the Supreme Soviet of Ukraine arguing against the anti-Jewish quota in Ukrainian universities, was arrested and sentenced, while Andry Biletsky, a leading Ukrainian linguist, was barred from the Academy of Sciences of Ukraine for his alleged participation in literary meetings with Jewish intellectuals.

Co-operation was also established between Jewish dissidents and the burgeoning Ukrainian movement. Stalin's death was followed by the Ukrainianization of the republic's leadership, and from the mid-1950s most of the senior bureaucrats were Ukrainian. By 1972, Ukrainians also made up 65 per cent of the members of the Communist Party of Ukraine. However, they saw their role as the integration of Ukraine into the economic and political system of the Soviet Union, and this gave rise to an opposition which first emerged in the 1960s with the rather disparate group which described itself as the *shestydesyatnyky* (the generation of the sixties). The group was at first savagely persecuted and was unable to achieve widespread influence until the 1980s. However, in the correction colonies contacts between Ukrainian and Jewish political prisoners became a significant phenomenon. We have included in this volume a famous essay by the nationalist-oriented Ukrainian Yevhen Sverstyuk written in the correction colony at the request of Jewish (Zionist-minded) fellow inmates. Sverstyuk's essay is preceded by a memoir about Ukrainian dissidents penned by Yury (Arye) Vudka, a Jewish

inmate of the same correction colony who became aware of his own Jewish and Zionist identity under the impact of nationally conscious Ukrainian inmates. These documents demonstrate shared political goals and a high level of mutual sympathy among the Ukrainian and Jewish dissidents, and reveal the tip of an iceberg which still needs to be investigated.

Most Soviet Jews were transformed by the Six Day War of 1967. Believing Soviet propaganda, they feared for the safety of Israel and rejoiced in its victory. They were outraged by the virulence of Soviet anti-Zionist propaganda, which, with its antisemitic overtones, they took as directed also against them, and by the decision of the countries of the Warsaw Pact to break off relations with Israel in mid-June. Especially galling were the frequent equation of Zionism with Nazism, made particularly graphic through offensively antisemitic posters and cartoons that appeared regularly in daily Soviet mainstream newspapers such as *Pravda*, *Izvestiya*, *Trud*, and *Krasnaya zvezda*, and the forced participation of Jews in the 'anti-Zionist' campaign. For many Jewish members of the dissident intelligentsia, the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 was also a great shock. It clearly barred the way to further democratization within the Soviet Union, and many felt personally shamed by the actions of their government.

The crisis within the Soviet bloc of 1968–70 thus had important consequences for both Jews and Ukrainian activists. It showed that attempts to reform the communist system from within were doomed to failure and that alternative structures would need to be created outside party control. The viciousness of the regime's anti-Zionist propaganda alienated many Jews, who were already barred from most sensitive positions in the state. It enormously strengthened the resolve of those Jews who wished to leave the Soviet Union and go to Israel and left many of the rest much more conscious of their Jewish feelings and uncertain about their future.

These developments all intensified in the 1970s. Leonid Brezhnev, as part of his *détente* with the West, allowed the emigration of nearly a quarter of a million people by 1980, when the exodus was effectively brought to an end as a result of worsening relations between the Soviet Union and the West. This large-scale exodus stimulated hopes among many of those who remained that they too would be allowed to emigrate. The need for radical reform in the Soviet Union, which was recognized when Mikhail Gorbachev became general secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in 1985, led to demands for greater freedom of the press. In Ukraine, it greatly strengthened the position of the nationalists, who rallied around recently freed dissidents such as Vyacheslav Chornovol and Levko Lukyanenko, who now succeeded in making their views widely known. The main nationalist organizations were the Taras Shevchenko Ukrainian Language Society (*Tovarystvo ukrayins'koyi movy imeni Tarasa Shevchenka*), the Ukrainian branch of the 'Memorial' organization, dedicated to recording the fate of those sent to the Gulag, and, the most important, the Popular Movement of Ukraine for Perestroika (*Narodnyi Rukh Ukrayiny za perebudovu*), better known simply as Rukh ('The Movement'). It is

particularly important that these nationalist Ukrainian groupings and later parties not only publicly denounced the regime's antisemitic and anti-Israeli policies but also co-opted Jews and Jewish factions into their movements. The role of nationalist dissidents who recognized their shared fate with the Jewish dissidents behind bars in the Soviet Union was crucial in fostering political sympathies between the Ukrainian national democrats and the Jewish activists before and after the collapse of the Soviet Union. It is symptomatic that precisely in the early 1990s Yaroslav Dashkevych, a leading Lviv-based dissident and an outstanding Ukrainian historian, was the first to make public the story of the Ukrainian–Jewish 1907 electoral coalition in Galicia. At the same time the emerging new nationalist political elites within and beyond the party leadership argued for a new course in international relations independent of Moscow which would allow the immediate establishment of diplomatic relations with Israel. Under pressure from the now released dissidents, seen in Ukraine as heroes of national resistance, the decision was made to acknowledge the exclusiveness of the Holocaust and apologize for the involvement of some Ukrainians in the mass murder of the Jews.

#### SINCE UKRAINIAN INDEPENDENCE

The proclamation of an independent Ukrainian state on 24 August 1991 after the collapse of the anti-Gorbachev coup began a new period in the history of Ukraine. Although the history of Ukraine as an independent polity has been stormy and the promise of the 'Orange Revolution' has not been fulfilled, there have been significant advances in the creation of a civil society and in a free exchange of opinions on a large range of controversial topics. There has also been a major effort to recognize the needs of the Jewish minority, to reject the Soviet-style treatment of Jews and the Jewish past, and to take action against antisemitism. Nowadays Ukraine's Jewish community, ranging—according to different estimates—from 100,000 to 270,000 people, is much smaller than the 450,000 of the late 1980s because of the second wave of emigration which began in Gorbachev's last years. The survey of the world Jewish population conducted by the American Jewish Committee in 2005 adopts as its criterion for membership of a Jewish community outside Israel the concept of 'core Jewish population', which includes

all those who, when asked, identify themselves as Jews; or, if the respondent is a different person in the same household, are identified by him/her as Jews . . . Such a definition of a person as a Jew, reflecting *subjective* feelings, broadly overlaps but does not necessarily coincide with *halakha* (rabbinic law) or other normatively binding definitions. Inclusion does *not* depend on any measure of that person's Jewish commitment or behavior in terms of religiosity, beliefs, knowledge, communal affiliation or otherwise.<sup>107</sup>

<sup>107</sup> 'World Jewish Population, 2005', *American Jewish Year Book*, 105 (2005), 91.

In Ukraine, the survey estimated the core Jewish population in 2005 as 84,000, the eleventh largest in the world. This was significantly down from the population census undertaken by the Ukrainian government on 5 December 2001, which counted 104,600 Jews, a fall caused by continued emigration, and even further down on the estimate of 276,000 made at the end of 1992 and the Soviet census figure for 1990 of 454,000.<sup>108</sup> Between 1970 and 1997, 422,000 Jews emigrated from Ukraine as opposed to 308,500 from the much larger community in the Russian Federation.<sup>109</sup> The Jews of Ukraine were mostly Russian-speaking, although many, particularly the intelligentsia, have now adopted Ukrainian. The Jewish emigration from Ukraine has stabilized over the last ten years and is now at a level of 11,000–13,000 per year, the most frequent destinations being Germany and Israel. This emigration has created a large Russian-speaking Jewish diaspora spread all over the world. At the same time it has left in Ukraine a significant community with the critical mass necessary to ensure the continuation of Jewish life. The role of Yiddish in the identity of this community is examined in the chapter by Vladimir Khanin, who has written extensively on various aspects of the Ukrainian Jewish renaissance after 1991, particularly on the legalization of Jewish communal life and the establishing of various Judaic educational and religious institutes, a process he has called elsewhere the ‘rabbinic revolution’.

There has been a revival in Ukraine of Jewish studies, which have been introduced into the curriculum of such institutions as the Kiev-Mohyla Academy, the Zaporizhzhya National University, and the Ivan Franko National University of Lviv. Several scholarly institutions have produced an impressive corpus of Ukrainian- and Russian-language publications on different aspects of Jewish studies, with a focus on local, literary, and art history. The Academy of Sciences of Ukraine has re-established in Kiev its Cabinet of Jewish Studies, shut down in the late 1940s in the wake of the anti-cosmopolitan campaign, which focuses on Yiddish literature and culture. The Centre for Studies of the History and Culture of Eastern European Jews, based in Kiev, has organized conferences and art exhibitions, amassed a significant documentary archive, and published a range of scholarly materials, including a Ukrainian version of *Polin* and an annual almanac *Yehupets’*, of which more than twenty issues have appeared. The School of European Studies in Lviv has established regular summer sessions on east European Jews and Jews in Galicia, while the Zaporizhzhya National University is home to a faculty that publishes on Jews in south-eastern Ukraine.

No less important is the revival of the study of the Holocaust, a process occurring on different levels. Many higher educational establishments and secondary schools have integrated the Holocaust into their curricula. In Dnipropetrovsk, a Tkuma All-Ukrainian Center for Holocaust Studies has been established as a

<sup>108</sup> *All-Ukrainian Population Census 2001*: <<http://2001.ukrcensus.gov.ua/eng/>>; M. Tolts, *Main Demographic Trends of the Jews in Russia and the FSU* (Jerusalem, 2002).

<sup>109</sup> Gitelman, *Century of Ambivalence*, 262.

national focus for the study and teaching of the Holocaust. It aims to follow the guidelines set down in the Declaration of the Stockholm International Forum on the Holocaust and hosts the biggest Holocaust museum in eastern Europe. Yet this practice has not become universally accepted, and local situations vary.

Until the establishment of independence, there was little discussion in Ukraine of Ukrainian–Jewish relations and of the Holocaust in Ukraine, while the attempts made by Ukrainian writers such as Borys Kharchuk, Yury Shcherbak, Yury Mushketyk, Anatoly Dimarov, and others to address these issues were carefully, but not always successfully, purged by the Soviet censors. The Soviets subsumed the Jewish experience during the war in the general suffering of the Soviet people, and in Ukraine there was little desire to examine the vexed issue of local complicity. In addition, many of the new officials assented to popular antisemitic prejudices, both because they had filled positions previously held by Jews and because they desired to attune the regime more closely to the local mood. As a consequence, the Holocaust became submerged in the general memory of war, insurgency, counterinsurgency, and the atrocities of the period. Prolonged debate about the most painful points in Ukrainian–Jewish history did, however, take place outside Ukraine, starting in the early 1980s at an international conference which brought together Jews and Ukrainians living in North America and Israel. The legacy of this debate and its relevance to contemporary scholarship is discussed in the chapter by Howard Aster and Peter Potichnyj, who were instrumental in initiating a rapprochement between Ukrainian and Jewish scholars in the last quarter of the twentieth century. Aster and Potichnyj point to a growing awareness of the field of Ukrainian–Jewish studies and emphasize some key issues that triggered and continue to trigger debates among scholars of eastern Europe.

Independence has made possible a more open airing of difficult historical problems in Ukraine itself. A humorous discussion of how these problems affect an encounter between Jewish tourists and local Ukrainians is presented in the essay by Mykola Ryabchuk, a prominent liberal-minded Ukrainian thinker. There has not yet been a thorough examination of the mass murder of the Jews, although the debate in 2003 over the violent Polish–Ukrainian conflict which began in 1943 in Volhynia and soon spread to the whole of western Ukraine revealed the existence of a sharp divide between, on the one hand, those historians who advocated a form of civic nationalism, and on the other the ethno-nationalists and supporters of the former Ukrainian right-radical movements such as the UPA.<sup>110</sup> The question whether the UPA and the SS Division Galizien should be rehabilitated as precursors of Ukrainian independence has also aroused fierce controversy.<sup>111</sup>

<sup>110</sup> Ya. Hrytsak, 'Shcho nam robyty z nashoyu ksenofobiyeyu?', *Krytyka*, 2005, no. 4 (also available online at <<http://www.ukraine-poland.com/u/publicystyka/publicystyka.php?id=3584>>). Hrytsak was also scheduled to present a paper at a conference in Italy in November 2004 entitled 'The First Ukrainian Historikerstreit: Academic Debates on Volhyn 1943 and their Public Dimension': see <[http://aisu.it/convegna/03-100\\_Programme.pdf](http://aisu.it/convegna/03-100_Programme.pdf)>.

<sup>111</sup> The Holocaust issue was raised beyond the borders of Ukraine. The Federation of Jewish Communities of Russia condemned President Viktor Yushchenko for honouring Roman Shukhevych.

The first major debate on the Holocaust in Ukraine was provoked by the memoirs of Yevhen Nakonechny, a scholar of Ukrainian philology, on the fate of the Jews in Lviv. This account was in many ways self-vindicating, setting out to dispel the view that ‘it was not the Germans who planned, organized, and carried out the “final solution of the Jewish question” (*Endlösung*), but the Ukrainians themselves, especially the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists’.<sup>112</sup> Nevertheless it gave a sympathetic picture of the plight of the Jews during the Nazi occupation. In addition, the discussion which it provoked showed that Nakonechny’s apologetic point of view was not universally shared, as evidenced by the responses written by Zhanna Kovba and Sofiya Hrachova.<sup>113</sup>

A more serious, albeit also a much more elitist, debate took place on the pages of the liberal Kiev periodical *Krytyka*. It was provoked in April 2005 by Sofiya Hrachova’s article just mentioned, which strongly attacked Ukrainian ethnocentrism in dealing with Ukrainian–Jewish relations and criticized one of the leading and indeed one of the most liberal and philosemitic Ukrainian historians, the Lviv-based Yaroslav Hrytsak. Hrachova, not prepared to discuss the many attempts to integrate Ukrainian and Jewish history—such as the growing volume of Ukrainian-language publications on Jews in Galicia by leading western Ukrainian historians based in Lviv—and seeking to focus solely on victimization, was particularly incensed by the absence of any public recognition of the pogroms in Galicia in the summer of 1941, in contrast to the widespread commemoration of the mass murders perpetrated by the NKVD that preceded them. She also criticized what she felt was the tendency of even liberal Ukrainian historians to see the Jews in stereotypical terms and to provide excuses for antisemitism and pogroms. In her view the painful issues raised by the Holocaust were not being properly discussed. She concluded: ‘As for me, I have no doubt that there is such a thing as civic responsibility, a responsibility for what our fellow citizens say and do today. And if the memory of the victims is not honoured and if the perpetrators continue to be honoured as heroes, then we are all responsible for this.’<sup>114</sup>

This was certainly the most challenging set of statements about the Holocaust and its memory to appear in a Ukrainian publication and it provoked a lively debate.

Referring to the decree awarding Shukhevych his title, the Federation wrote: ‘Under “personal contribution to the struggle for Ukraine’s independence” the Ukrainian President evidently implies the mass killing of Jews and Poles perpetrated by Shukhevich’: ‘FJCR Condemns Yuschchenko’s Decision to Bestow Hero’s Title on URA [Ukrainian Rebel Army] Commander Shukhevich’, *Interfax-Ukraine News*, 18 Oct. 2007. President Yushchenko ‘was dogged during his visit [to Israel in November 2007] by criticism of Shukhevych’: S. Gaffney, ‘Ukraine President Defends National Hero’, *Associated Press News report*, 15 Nov. 2007.

<sup>112</sup> Ye. Nakonechny, *‘Shoa’ u L’vovi: Spohady*, 2nd edn. (Lviv, 2006), 6.

<sup>113</sup> Zh. Kovba, review of Ye. Nakonechny, *‘Shoa’ u L’vovi*, in *Holokost i suchasnist’*, 2007, no. 1, p. 137: <[http://www.nbu.gov.ua/portal/Soc\\_Gum/Gis/2007\\_1/Book\\_reviews\\_Kovba.pdf](http://www.nbu.gov.ua/portal/Soc_Gum/Gis/2007_1/Book_reviews_Kovba.pdf)>; S. Hrachova, ‘Vony zhyly sered nas?’, *Krytyka*, 2005, no. 4, p. 2.

<sup>114</sup> Hrachova, ‘Vony zhyly sered nas?’, 16.



In the same issue of *Krytyka*, Hrytsak responded.<sup>115</sup> He quite soundly argued that she had exaggerated Ukrainian ethnocentrism and had failed to recognize the growth that had taken place in the understanding of the complex problems she had discussed. Seeking to go beyond the established historiographic narratives, Hrytsak himself rejected both a historiography which sought to justify past Ukrainian behaviour and one which sought primarily to attack Ukrainians for the crimes committed on their territory. He took this approach ‘not out of a lack of patriotism, but out of the realization that this method of writing history does not provide any explanation for many problems both in the past and in the present . . . the differences among the historians in that case will be perceived as being between the accusers and the apologists’.<sup>116</sup>

Three historians based in Canada, John-Paul Himka, Serhiy Bilenky, and Marco Carynnyk, also took part in the discussion, as did Zhanna Kovba. Summing up the debate, Himka, whose sharp publications and firm stance on scholarly standards stirred a controversy among the Ukrainian community in North America and cost him his good relations with the mainstream periodical of the North American Ukrainian diaspora, called for Ukrainian scholarship on these issues to become less parochial:

A striking feature of the whole episode is that most of the participants were immersed in a more international scholarly culture: graduate students between Ukraine and North America (Bilenky, Hrachova), Canadians of Ukrainian origin (Carynnyk, Himka), and a professor in an English-language university in Budapest (Hrytsak). Only one participant was an exception to this direct exposure to Western scholarship—Zhanna Kovba, and her contribution exhibited the most conservative positions. Clearly, the integration of Ukrainian scholarship into global scholarship is provoking a rethinking of the past, a rethinking that is painful and awkward, but promising.<sup>117</sup>

A similar debate over the Ukrainian nationalist movement was sparked off when Stepan Bandera was declared a Hero of Ukraine in early 2010 by former president Viktor Yushchenko. The Ukrainian nationalist movement is the subject of the chapter by Alexander Motyl and is touched on by a number of other contributors to this volume who seek to place Bandera in a broader spectrum of east European political, ethnic, and social problems.

It seems to us that it is these debates among historians that offer the best chance to move forward and we hope that this volume will contribute to the process by providing, among other things, a comparative context for what Myroslav Shkandrij presents in his contribution as a ‘parallel victimhood’ of Jews and Ukrainians. It is part of a development that could begin only after the collapse of the communist system—a coming to terms with many neglected and taboo aspects of the past. For the Ukrainians, this involves the history of the Ukrainian SSR, the famine

<sup>115</sup> Hrytsak, ‘Shcho nam robyty z nashoyu ksenofobiyeyu?’

<sup>116</sup> *Ibid.* 5.

<sup>117</sup> J.-P. Himka, ‘The Reception of the Holocaust in Post-Communist Ukraine’, unpublished.

of 1932–3 (the Holodomor), the struggle for Ukrainian independence, and the relations between Ukrainians and Jews, Poles, and Russians. For too long these topics have been the subject of mythologization and apologetics. The first stage of approaching such issues has to involve a settlement of long-overdue accounts and a recognition of the moral culpability of those who collaborated with the Germans to murder Jews.

In the case of Ukrainian–Jewish relations, we believe we are beginning to enter a second stage, where apologetics will increasingly be replaced by careful and detailed research and reliable and nuanced first-hand testimony. It should be possible to move beyond strongly held competing and incompatible narratives of the past and reach some consensus that will be acceptable to all people of good will and that will bring about a degree of normalization both in the Ukrainians' attitudes to the past and in Ukrainian–Jewish relations. What this normalization should mean was summed up by the young Polish historian Sławomir Sierakowski, editor of *Krytyka Polityczna*, who in the course of the debate on Polish–Ukrainian relations between 1943 and the end of the war called in *Gazeta Wyborcza* on 11 June 2003 for a 'fundamental paradigm shift'. It is our hope that this volume will contribute to this paradigm shift, which, according to Sierakowski, should 'transcend the logic of national suffering' and replace confrontational history with 'post-Holocaust universalism'.

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# The First Jews of Ukraine

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BY THE EARLY TWENTIETH CENTURY, Jews were one of the larger ethnic groups in Ukraine, so much so that Ukraine was sometimes called ‘Yiddishland’. Yiddish was an official language of the Ukrainian People’s Republic, in existence at the final stage of the First World War, and one of the founding fathers of modern Zionism, Ze’ev Jabotinsky, frequently stated that there could be no independent Jewish state without an independent Ukraine. Jewish history was shaped, to quite a large degree, by the fact that Jews inhabited Ukraine; in the same way, the destinies of other ethnic groups in Ukraine were determined by their sojourn with Jews of Ukraine. Here I consider ‘Ukraine’ as a cultural and ethnic condominium, rather in Paul Robert Magocsi’s vein.<sup>1</sup> However, it is difficult to confine the histories of different segments of the populations of Ukraine, among them the Jews, in the Procrustean bed of modern political boundaries; in addition, Ukraine has always been open to influences from outside, as, for example, in the case of those whom I call ‘the first Jews of Ukraine’. Because of Ukraine’s colonial past, the question whence Jews first came there has been made into a political one, sometimes without a Ukrainian context; thus, if Ashkenazi Yiddish-speaking Jews of the last five centuries are viewed as having come from Poland, with all the obvious, and sometimes tragic, implications, the (non-)question of what happened to Khazarian Jewry evolved in the Russian imperial context into ‘who was here first’, ‘who deserves to be granted political and human rights’, and ‘why it went wrong’. On the Jewish side, attempts to define the beginnings of the Jewish presence in Ukraine went hand in hand with apologetics and with the desire of Jews to find (or invent) a cultural pedigree and identity: were the Jews a ‘Western’ (i.e. ‘German-like’) cultured people? Were they ‘autochthonous natives’ of Mosaic faith? Did they come from the shores of the Mediterranean or from the Caucasian mountains? Have they, simply, belonged, and if so, in what way?

In this essay, I shall deal solely with clear-cut evidence and shall completely ignore the various Khazarian speculations, for we have absolutely no evidence about Jewish–Khazarian continuity in Ukraine or elsewhere.<sup>2</sup> We have very little material

<sup>1</sup> See P. R. Magocsi, *A History of Ukraine* (Toronto, 1996).

<sup>2</sup> Thus, I ignore any contribution by the late Omeljan Pritsak, as great a scholar as he was, made in N. Golb and O. Pritsak, *Khazarian Hebrew Documents of the Tenth Century* (Ithaca, NY, 1982). A refutation of the many mistakes and misconceptions found in this book would call for another book-size publication.

at our disposal about the Jews of Kievan Rus or about the first two Lithuanian centuries in the history of Ukraine—that is, before the influx of Ashkenazi (including Bohemian) Jews from Poland.<sup>3</sup> At the same time, we have a good deal of material—relative to the scarcity from Kievan Rus territories—from the ‘marginal’ territories of Ukraine, namely from the Crimea, that part of Ukraine whose shores could be said to be ‘washed by the waters of the Mediterranean’, to borrow a Polish saying. And this logic of the evidence in our possession will guide my further presentation.

Of all ethnic groups inhabiting present-day Ukraine, Greeks and Jews are the most ancient. They have lived there for more than two millennia, though there is lack of continuity in their physical presence on the territory of what is now Ukraine. Both Greeks and Jews first settled in the Crimean peninsula and in adjacent areas of the Black Sea coast. Initially, Jews appeared in the Crimea in the first century BCE, or even earlier. Their immigration was part of the Jewish dispersion in the Hellenistic world. The documented Jewish population of the northern Black Sea basin included Hellenistic Jews, Jewish converts, and ‘God-fearers’ who lived in Greek cities that were part of the Kingdom of Pontus. Remnants of these Jewish communities were unearthed beginning in 1828.<sup>4</sup> The Romans ruled the Crimea from 63 BCE, followed by the Byzantines. The Jewish community of Byzantine-ruled Chersones continued to exist, possibly with interruptions, until the late eleventh century.<sup>5</sup> The first Christians in Ukraine were possibly converted Jews of Chersones and semi-converts to Judaism, the ‘God-fearers’. Basically, the spread of the Christian Gospel was no different in the Crimea and Black Sea Ukraine from that in Galatia and other Jewish centres of Asia Minor; before becoming a Christian site in the fifth century CE, the basilica of Chersones had served as a synagogue.<sup>6</sup> It is not known whether Hellenistic Jews of earlier times survived the tribulations of the epoch of mass migrations (*Völkerwanderung*) or whether new Jews reached the Crimea from other places. There is an old and unsolved question about a Samaritan presence in the Crimea in Byzantine times.<sup>7</sup>

<sup>3</sup> See the contributions by A. Kulik and J. Kalik in the recent work edited by A. Kulik, *Toledot yehudei rusyah, i: mimei kedem ad ha’et haḥadashah hamukdemet* (Jerusalem, 2010) (Russian version *Istoriya evreiskogo naroda v Rossii, i: Ot drevnosti do rannego novogo vremeni* (Moscow and Jerusalem, 2010)): A. Kulik, ‘Hakdamah: toledot yehudei rusyah’, 17–20; id., ‘Hayehudim berusyah hakedumah: mekorot veshihzur histori’, 169–77; J. Kalik, ‘Yahadut rusyah ha’atidit: hayehudim beḥalakeiha hamizrahiyim shel mamleket polin–lita’, 205–21. The issues regarding sources have not changed dramatically since the appearance of I. Berlin, *Istoricheskie sud’by evreiskogo naroda na territorii Russkogo gosudarstva* (Petrograd, 1919).

<sup>4</sup> Their documents known by the mid-nineteenth century were published in A. Harkavy, *O yazyke evreev, zhivshikh v drevnee vremya na Rusi* (Vilna, 1865); id., *Hayehudim usefat haslavivim* (Vilna, 1867).

<sup>5</sup> See M. Kizilov, *Krymskaya Iudeya: Ocherki istorii evreev, khazar, karaimov i krymchakov v Krymu s antichnykh vremen do nashikh dnei* (Simferopol, 2011), 33, 86, 90.

<sup>6</sup> E. Overman, R. Maklennan, and M. I. Zolotarev, ‘K izucheniyu iudeiskikh drevnostei Khersonesa Tavricheskogo’, *Arkheolohiya*, 1997, no. 1, pp. 57–63. However, one cannot trust the Hebrew text in this article.

<sup>7</sup> As signalled by the Life of St Constantine, the Enlightener of the Slavs; see J. T. Milik, ‘Abba

In the eighth century, the Turkic-speaking and still pagan Khazars ruled parts of the Crimea. The longer version of the Letter of Khazar King Joseph, written presumably to the Cordoban vizier Hasdai ibn Shaprut, did mention a series of localities in the Crimea, apparently because they had Jewish populations.<sup>8</sup> Later, after the destruction of Khazaria in 965–8, a Jewish presence was again recorded in the formerly Khazar regions of the Crimea. In Partenith, a Crimean locality mentioned in the longer version of the Letter, Jewish tombstone inscriptions were found in the 1860s and were reviewed by Abraham Geiger in 1869; according to Daniel Chwolson, they can be dated prior to the eighth century.<sup>9</sup> According to the Life of St Constantine, around 861 CE Jews were present in Chersones and learning Hebrew was essential if one were to enter the Khazar realm.

The study of Crimean Jewry, especially that of Crimean Karaites, has long been hampered as a result of extensive interference with documentation such as manuscripts and burial inscriptions, including the creation of actual forgeries, by the collector and communal functionary Abraham Firkovich during the 1840s–1860s,<sup>10</sup> and also because of the nationalist separatists who came after him, who attempted to rewrite the Karaite history of the Crimea. The source material has been affected to such a degree that it was hard for some to write about the Jews of the Crimea and Ukraine without relying on rewritten and forged documentation. However, the epigraphic materials upon which Firkovich based his ‘theories’ have been checked anew, and scholars are in a position to reconstruct the different stages of Jewish history in the Crimea with a high degree of accuracy.<sup>11</sup>

Zosimas et le thème des Tribus Perdues’, *Bulletin d’études karaïtes*, 1 (1983), 7–18, where the evidence is blurred. Syrian Christians from Chersones are mentioned in the Old Church Slavonic texts: see D. Shapira, ‘Irano-Slavono-Tibetica: Some Notes on Šaxaiša, Mithra, Lord Gshen-rab, Bon, and a Modern Myth’, *Khristianskii Vostok*, new ser., 3 (9) (2002), 308–17; V. M. Lurye, ‘Okolo “Solunskoi legendy”’: Iz istorii missionerstva v period monofelitskoi unii’, in *Slavyane i ikh sosedi*, vi: *Grecheskii i slavyanskii mir v srednie veka i rannee novoe vremya* (Moscow, 1996), 23–52.

<sup>8</sup> P. K. Kokovtsov, *Evreisko-khazarskaya perepiska v X veke* (Leningrad, 1932).

<sup>9</sup> D. Chwolson, *Corpus Inscriptionum Hebraicarum* (St Petersburg, 1882), 142–7.

<sup>10</sup> A. Firkovich, *Sefer avnei zikaron* (Vilna, 1872); cf. A. Harkavy, *Altjüdische Denkmäler aus der Krim, mitgeteilt von Abraham Firkowitsch (1839–1872)* (St Petersburg, 1876); A. Harkavy and H. L. Strack, *Catalog der hebräischen Bibelhandschriften der Kaiserlichen Öffentlichen Bibliothek in St. Petersburg* (St Petersburg, 1875).

<sup>11</sup> D. Shapira, ‘Yitshaq Sangari, Sangarit, Bezalel Stern, and Avraham Firkowicz: Notes on Two Forged Inscriptions’, *Archivum Eurasiae Medii Aevi*, 12 (2002–3), 223–60 (a Russian version appears in *Materialy po arkheologii, istorii i etnografii Tavrii*, 10 (2003), 535–55); id., ‘Iitskhak Sangari, Sangarit, Betsalel’ Shtern i Avraam Firkovich: Istoriya dvukh poddel’nykh nadpisei’, *Paralleli*, 2–3 (2003), 363–88 (a slightly different Russian version of the preceding); id., ‘Remarks on Avraham Firkowicz and the Hebrew *Mejelis* “Document”’, *Acta Orientalia Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae*, 59/2 (2006), 131–80 (a fuller version: ‘The *Mejelis* “Document” and Tapani Harviainen: On Scholarship, Firkowicz and Forgeries’, in M. Alpargu and Y. Öztürk (eds.), *Omeljjan Pritsak Armağanı / A Tribute to Omeljjan Pritsak* (Sakarya, 2007), 303–93); id. (ed.), *Matsevot beit ha’alemin shel hayehudim hakara’im betsafatkah, krim: duaḥ mishlahat epigrafit shel mekhon ben-tsevi* (Jerusalem, 2008); A. Fedorchuk and D. D. Y. Shapira, ‘Ketovot matsevot 1–326 mesefer avnei zikaron le’avraham firkovits benushan

In the Khazar era, Jews lived in the Crimea, primarily in Kerch on the eastern side of the peninsula. This is confirmed both by archaeological discoveries and by two Khazar–Hebrew documents: one is known as the Cambridge Document,<sup>12</sup> the other is the longer version of the Letter of Joseph, the Khazar king. The author of the latter text was a Jew who knew the Crimea better than any other part of Khazaria. It is significant that this author, while noting a series of Crimean localities apparently populated by Jews, does not, however, state the names of places that later became important Jewish–Karaitite settlements, such as Sulkhāt, Kaffa, and Qırqyer (Çufut-Qal‘eh), for the simple reason that these places did not yet exist in the ninth century CE. As already hinted, there has been speculation about Khazar converts to Judaism who could have formed a major component of future Ukrainian Jewry; however, the depth of Judaization in Khazaria was rather shallow and it seems that the majority of Khazar converts reverted to Islam after the collapse of the Khazar state, as Muslim sources tell us.

Scholars do not even have information concerning Jewish settlement in either Çufut-Qal‘eh or Mangup in the Crimea in the middle of the thirteenth century, immediately following the Mongol invasions. Nevertheless, it was at the beginning of the Mongol era that the first Karaite communities in the Crimea were founded. One may assume that these Karaites came from Iran and Central Asia (directly or via the trade cities of the lower course of the Volga), and from Egypt—the places whence came the first Muslim preachers and traders to the Crimea, along with the Jews—and also from Constantinople.<sup>13</sup> The same applies, partly, to Karaite communities in Galicia and Podolia, as well as to those in ethnic Lithuania, which were established not earlier than the mid-fifteenth century, by immigrants from the Golden Horde, the former Byzantine realms, Jerusalem, Egypt, and the Crimea.<sup>14</sup>

As already stated, Jewish, and especially Karaite, presence in Ukraine in this period, prior to the influx of Ashkenazi Jews from Germany to Poland in the early sixteenth century, is better documented in Crimea than in other Ukrainian territories. We possess very little reliable information about a Jewish presence in Ukraine proper before the Ashkenazi immigration. We now have a letter written by a Rabbanite Jewish community in the tenth century that deals with the community of Kiev.<sup>15</sup> Whatever the authorship, or the addressee, the existence of a Rabbanite

ha’amiti ve’im hata’arikhim ha’amitiyim: pirsum makdim’, in D. D. Y. Shapira and D. J. Lasker (eds.), *Eastern European Karaites in the Last Generations* (Jerusalem, 2011), 36–82.

<sup>12</sup> Or the ‘Schechter Document’: see S. Schechter, ‘An Unknown Khazar Document’, *Jewish Quarterly Review*, new ser., 3/2 (1912–13), 182–219; cf. Golb and Pritsak, *Khazarian Hebrew Documents of the Tenth Century*.

<sup>13</sup> D. Shapira, ‘Persian, and Especially Judeo–Persian, in the Medieval Crimea’, in Sh. Shaked and A. Netzer (eds.), *Irano–Judaica: Studies Relating to Jewish Contacts with Persian Culture throughout the Ages*, vi (Jerusalem, 2008), 253–89; cf. G. Akhiezer and D. Shapira, ‘Kara’im belita uvevolhin-galitsiyah ad hame’ah ha-18’, *Pe’amim*, 89 (2001), 19–60.

<sup>14</sup> See Akhiezer and Shapira, ‘Kara’im belita uvevolhin-galitsiyah ad hame’ah ha-18’.

<sup>15</sup> See Golb and Pritsak, *Khazarian Hebrew Documents of the Tenth Century*.

community at that time in Kiev is beyond doubt. A 'Jewish gate' is mentioned in the Rus *Primary Chronicle* three times in the first half of the twelfth century. But the majority of our information on Jews in Kiev comes from twelfth-century western European Jewish sources: during that century, the talmudic scholar Moses of Kiev visited western Europe.<sup>16</sup> He was in correspondence (and, probably, in personal contact) with Jacob son of Meir Rabbenu Tam in Ramerupt and with the *gaon* Samuel son of Eli in Baghdad. Ysaak de Russia, mentioned in English sources between 1180 and 1182, is probably the same as Isaac (*y-ts-h-*) of Chernigov (*ts-r-n-g-w-b*) in *Sefer hashoham*; Benjamin Hanadiv of Vladimir was mentioned in Cologne in 1171;<sup>17</sup> and Asher son of Sinai from the land of Russia is mentioned in Toledo in the early fourteenth century.<sup>18</sup>

Petahyah son of Jacob Halavan (= Weiss) from Prague and Regensburg travelled in the Middle East between 1170 and 1180;<sup>19</sup> though he passed through Ukraine twice, his only reference to Jews is perhaps in a comment about some 'heretics' (*minim*) whom he found in the steppe next to the Crimea: apparently the people he noted lived amongst the local Turkic-speaking nomads or Slavonic-speaking Brodniks. Scholars have generally identified them with Karaites. However, Petahyah's stories about his travels were not recorded by him personally but by his former mentor, the renowned scholar Judah the Pious (Yehudah ben Shemuel Hehasid), known for his anti-Karaite bias. It thus seems that Petahyah's stories about simple-minded and ignorant Jews living in the Ukrainian steppe among nomads were interpreted by Judah the Pious as stories about his own enemies, the Karaite 'heretics'.

There is evidence in Jewish sources about western European Jews who visited Rus/Ukraine, or about Jews from Rus who went abroad. At least three sources demonstrate that these Jews knew the local language of Rus, or that it was their mother tongue. When Kiev was annexed by Lithuania in 1320, local Jews were granted certain rights; during that period, both the Rabbanite and the Karaite communities seem to have grown in numbers and achieved prosperity.

I have also undertaken a survey of Jewish centres in the Crimea. This shows that Sulkhath (Sulxat), called Eski Qırım or simply Qırım in Turkic and Sary Krym in Ukrainian, was the first capital of Muslim Turkic Crimea. Its name came to be used for the entire peninsula. The fact that Jews had a presence there is not surprising, as it served as the capital for the rulers of the Mongol Horde. The Karaite scholar Aaron the Elder, author of *Sefer hamibhar*, may have been born there; he mentions an event that occurred there in 1278 to which he was a first-hand witness: a dispute between Karaites and Rabbanites concerning the *molad* of the month of Tishrei (the

<sup>16</sup> *Sefer hayashar* (Vienna, 1811), no. 522. There were attempts to identify this person with the Moses of Russia mentioned in *Sefer hashoham*. In scholarship, he was frequently confused with his namesake, who lived in the second part of the fifteenth and beginning of the sixteenth centuries.

<sup>17</sup> *Sefer hazekhirah* by Ephraim son of Jacob. In the same century, under 1288, Jews are mentioned in Vladimir in the *Hypatian Chronicle*.

<sup>18</sup> *Even ha'ezer*, no. 118.

<sup>19</sup> M. Grinhaut, *Sivuv harav rabi petihah meregensburg* (Frankfurt am Main, 1905).

conjunction of the earth, moon, and sun—the beginning of the New Year). This is the earliest literary testimony of the presence of Karaite Jews in the Crimea. The Rabbanite scholar R. Abraham Qırımî wrote his important work *Sefat emet* in this city in 1358, upon the request of the Karaite *nasi*, Hizkiyah b. Elhanan.<sup>20</sup> There is just one surviving tombstone from the town (that of Mordechai son of Mordechai, 1517 CE), though the three medieval Jewish cemeteries of Sulkhat are described in the 1830s as huge and ‘ancient’; however, in the mid-eighteenth century there was only one Karaite left in Sulkhat, for the former residents of Sulkhat had moved, towards the eighteenth century, to the more prosperous Çufut-Qal‘eh.<sup>21</sup>

Kaffa (Capha, Keffe, Theodosia, Feodosiya) was established as a Genoese settlement after the years 1261–3. The Jewish presence there was already well documented in the late thirteenth or early fourteenth century (1309 CE?), when a synagogue, presumably the Karaite one, was built. It seems that Sulkhat and Kaffa, Sulkhat’s seaport, had a significant Jewish presence. Jews from Italy, Crete, Anatolia, and north-western Iran were attracted to the port, one of the largest in the world at the time, which stood at the northern end of the Silk Route, reopened as a consequence of the Mongol invasions. The city’s economy was based on trade with the Far East, trade in local produce from the area that is today Ukraine, and trade in Turkic slaves, who were much in demand in Mamlûk Egypt. At the end of the fourteenth or the beginning of the fifteenth century, the captive German soldier Johann Schiltberger noted that ‘two kinds of Jews’ resided in Kaffa, generally identified as Karaites and Rabbanites, and that they had two synagogues.<sup>22</sup> In 1381 the Karaites of Kaffa were writing letters to Karaites in Kiev, implying the existence of a community there.<sup>23</sup>

In 1449 the Genoese republic published an edict prohibiting the Catholic bishop of Kaffa from meddling in the internal affairs of the Armenian, Greek, and Jewish communities. In 1455, following the Ottoman conquest of Constantinople, the Genoese republic relinquished its hold on settlements in the Black Sea basin to

<sup>20</sup> S. Tsinberg, ‘Avraam Krymskii i Moisei Kievskii’, *Evreiskaya starina*, 11 (1924), 92–109.

<sup>21</sup> See M. Ezer and D. Shapira, ‘Sulkhat’, in Shapira (ed.), *Matsevot bet ha’alemin shel hayehudim hakara'im betsafat-kaleh, krim*, 198–204.

<sup>22</sup> See H. Schiltberger, *Reisebuch nach der Nürnberger Handschrift*, ed. K. F. Neumann (Munich, 1859), 57; *Hans Schiltbergers Reisebuch* (Tübingen, 1885), 63. See also ‘Puteshestvie Ivana Shil'tbergera po Evrope, Azii i Afriki, s 1394 goda po 1427 god’, ed. and trans. F. Brun, *Zapiski Imperatorskogo Novorossiiskogo universiteta*, 1 (1867), 1–2; cf. *Regesty i nadpisi: Svod materialov dlya istorii evreev v Rossii (80 g.–1800 g.)*, i: *Do 1670 g.* (St Petersburg, 1899), no. 185. Many scholars ascribe to this important source the statement that Jews also possessed 4,000 houses in the outlying areas, but these words are not in the original manuscript: see M. Kizilov, ‘K istorii maloizvestnykh karaimskikh obshchin Krymskogo poluostrova’, in *Tirosh: Trudy po iudaike*, vi (Moscow, 2003), 123–40; D. Shapira, ‘Beginnings of the Karaites of the Crimea Prior to the Early Sixteenth Century (with Contributions by M. Ezer, A. Fedortchouk, M. Kizilov)’, in M. Polliack (ed.), *A Guide to Karaite Studies: The History and Literary Sources of Medieval and Modern Karaite Judaism* (Leiden, 2003), 709–28. The actual wording used in the printed editions is ‘Es sein zwaierlei Juden in der stat und haben zwoe sinagog auch in der stat.’

<sup>23</sup> See Berlin, *Istoricheskie sud'by evreiskogo naroda*, 190.



the Genoese Saint George Bank. The bank then sent its officials to Kaffa to improve the increasingly ineffective administration of the city. The heads of the residents of the city sent a letter of petition to the bank, asking for the retention of the bank commissioner, Niccolo Bonaventura, in his post. Leaders of the Jewish community appended their signatures to this letter. They included Obadiah b. Moses, Nathanel b. Abraham, Canibey b. Paşa, Jacob b. Rabbani, and Kokoz b. Isaac.

A wealthy and influential Jew from Kaffa, Khozya (= Khwâja, 'master') Kokoz (or Kokos), was the principal political and economic agent for the Grand Prince of Muscovy, Ivan III, in the Crimea in the 1470s. He served in this consular capacity before the authorities of Kaffa, the Armenian Greek Prince of Mangup, and the Khan Mengli-Girây. He might be identical with, or related to, Kokoz b. Isaac, a signatory of the letter of petition discussed above. A generation or so later, relatives of Khozya Kokoz, possibly his sons, donated Pentateuch scrolls to the congregations of Kaffa and Sulkhât.<sup>24</sup>

In 1475 Kaffa was conquered by the Ottomans and became the capital of an *eyâlet* ruled by the future sultan, Selim the Grim (1470?–1520, ruled from 1512). It would appear that the Jewish community did not particularly suffer from the Ottoman conquest. Just a few years later, a unified Rabbanite community was organized in Kaffa that included Ashkenazim, Romaniots, Sephardim, Babylonians, and others, headed by R. Moses Hagoleh Harusi, an exile from Kiev who had been taken captive by the Tatars in Lyady in Lithuania and was brought to the Crimea in 1506. Later generations ascribed to him the creation of the Rabbanite prayer book for festive days, *Minhag kafah*, but this is in actuality an earlier composition. In the early sixteenth century, the Rabbanite community of Kaffa existed alongside the Karaite one, and it was the anti-Karaite activities of R. Moses of Kiev that prompted the final schism between the Karaites and the Rabbanites, the amalgamation of different Rabbanite communities into one, and the secession of the Karaite groups. According to Ottoman sources, the Jewish community of Kaffa had a mixed constitution in 1545.<sup>25</sup>

'Western' Jews (Sephardim or Ashkenazim?) lived in the neighbourhood of Giri Yüzbaşı/Frenk Hisâr (42 houses, 270 persons). There were also Efrenciyân Jews (eight houses, 64 persons), among whom were forty unmarried people (indicating that it was a new community, presumably Western judging by its name, and not mentioned in the previous census). A small number of Circassian Jews (with three houses, 15 persons) also lived in Kaffa. The Işâq Yüzbaşı community (81 houses, 465 persons), possibly Karaite, was the largest community. In 1545 Jews made up 8 per cent of the total non-Muslim population of Kaffa; Armenians constituted

<sup>24</sup> See M. Ezer and D. Shapira, 'Kaffa', in Shapira (ed.), *Matsevot beit ha'alemin shel hayehudim hakara'im betsufat-kaleh, krim*, 204–17; Kizilov, *Krymskaya Iudeya*, 191–6, 209.

<sup>25</sup> A. Bennigsen et al., *Le Khanat de Crimée dans les archives du Musée du Palais de Topkapı* (Paris and The Hague, 1978); A. Fisher, 'The Ottoman Crimea in the Mid-Seventeenth Century: Some Problems and Preliminary Considerations', *Harvard Ukrainian Studies*, 3–4, pt. 1 (1979–80), 215–26; id., 'The Ottoman Crimea in the Sixteenth Century', *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 5/2 (1981), 135–70.

65 per cent. According to the 1545 census, there were 134 Jewish households in Kaffa.<sup>26</sup> By the seventeenth century, Kaffa had already turned into a remote provincial city; its Jewish community, then mostly Karaite, persisted until the twentieth century.

Beginning in the mid-sixteenth century, the Rabbanite community of Crimea moved from Kaffa, relocating mainly to the town of Qarasubazar or Qarasu (now Belogorsk), where Tatar-speaking Jews—of mixed Sephardi, Ashkenazi, Byzantine, Italian, Georgian, and Circassian extraction—survived until the Holocaust; the Rabbanite synagogue was built in 1516. This isolated community produced—or preserved—an extremely rich assortment of manuscripts, and it was from there that the bulk of the Firkovich First Collection (now stored at the Russian National Library in St Petersburg) came. On the other hand, Karaites were migrating en masse in the same period into Çufut-Qal‘eh, abandoned by then by its Tatar khans, who had just built the new capital of Bâhçe-Serây nearby. The result of these two interwoven emigration waves from Kaffa by the first half of the sixteenth century was that the Rabbanites found themselves in the dying town of Qarasubazar, while the Karaites achieved prosperity at Çufut-Qal‘eh. This wealth was a consequence of their eager involvement in the slave trade,<sup>27</sup> which quickly developed after the Crimean Tatars set upon raiding Ukraine, Muscovy, and Poland from the late fifteenth century on. The community of the Rabbanites of Qarasubazar was constantly strengthened by Ashkenazi Jews captured in Ukraine and ransomed in the Crimea, to the extent that the Ashkenazi component totalled one-third of the community.<sup>28</sup>

From the fourteenth century through the third quarter of the fifteenth, Mangup/Theodoro/Dori in the Crimean mountains served as the capital of the Gavras monarchy, the Princedom of Theodoro. The dynasty was perhaps of Armeno-Trabezundian origin and claimed a relationship to the Comnenus imperial family; in about 1395 the town was visited by the hieromonk (*hieromonachos*) Matthew, who produced a poem of 153 verses about the town.<sup>29</sup> The town was destroyed by Timur-Lang and rebuilt by Prince Alexios I (ruled 1402–34).<sup>30</sup> The

<sup>26</sup> See Ezer and Shapira, ‘Kaffa’.

<sup>27</sup> M. Kizilov, ‘Slave Trade in the Early Modern Crimea from the Perspective of Christian, Muslim and Jewish Sources’, *Journal of Early Modern History*, 11/1–2 (2007), 1–31; id., ‘Slaves, Money Lenders, and Prisoner Guards: The Jews and the Trade in Slaves and Captives in the Crimean Khanate’, *Journal of Jewish Studies*, 58/2 (2007), 189–210.

<sup>28</sup> See D. Shapira, ‘Some Notes on the History of the Crimean Jewry from the Ancient Times until the End of the 19th Century, with Emphasis on the Qırımçaq Jews in the First Half of the 19th Century’, in W. Moskovich and L. Finberg (eds.), *Jews and Slavs: Essays on Intercultural Relations*, xix: *Jews, Ukrainians and Russians* (Jerusalem and Kiev, 2008), 65–92.

<sup>29</sup> H.-V. Beyer, *Istoriya krymskikh gotov kak interpretatsiya Skazaniya Matfeya o gorode Feodoro* (Ekaterinburg, 2001), reviewed in ‘Geschichte der Krimgoten als Interpretation der Darlegung des Matthaios über die Stadt Feodoro’, *Byzantinische Zeitschrift*, 96/1 (2003), 283–5.

<sup>30</sup> See N. Bănescu, ‘Contribution à l’histoire de la seigneurie de Théodoro-Mangoup en Crimée’, *Byzantinische Zeitschrift*, 35 (1935), 20–37.

first tombstone with Jewish inscriptions dates from this period. It was apparently under Alexios II (ruled 1434–44), son of Alexios I, and under his brother, John-Olubey (ruled 1444–60), that Jews came from Constantinople/Istanbul because of its Byzantine–Greek cultural milieu (Constantinople was about to fall into the hands of Turkish-speaking Ottomans) and because the site was suitable for tanneries, the traditional trade of the Constantinopolitan Karaites. It seems that their emigration strengthened between 1453 (when the Ottomans conquered Constantinople) and 1475, when Mangup/Theodoro itself was conquered by the Ottoman Grand Vizier, Gedik Ahmet Paşa. In any event, the total number of surviving tombstone inscriptions at Çufut-Qal'eh versus those at Mangup-Qal'eh in the fifteenth century (but prior to 1475) is comparable; nevertheless, the presence of Jews in Mangup in that time span is more articulated than in Çufut-Qal'eh.<sup>31</sup> The land of the Jewish cemetery had served earlier, according to the description by the aforementioned hieromonk Matthew (c.1395), as gardens for the inhabitants of the town, who built a set of terraces there. It was only later, in the mid-fifteenth century, that these terraces were used for Jewish burial.<sup>32</sup>

As already mentioned, in the very early 1470s the Crimean Jew Khwâja Joseph Kokoz of Kaffa, called Khozya Kokoz in Russian sources, served as a political and financial agent of the Muscovite Prince Ivan III (1440–1505) at the court of the princes of Mangup and before the notables of the then Genoese Kaffa.<sup>33</sup> The Ottomans conquered the fortress in December 1475 after a bloody siege of six months; after they seized the town, there was a massacre of the local Christian population.<sup>34</sup> After the Ottoman conquest, the territory of the Princedom of Theodoro became the Mangup *qadılıq*, part of the Keffe *eyâlet*.<sup>35</sup> In 1493 the town burned down; the Ottoman governor of Mangup, Tzula, rebuilt the city walls after 1503. In 1520 there were forty-eight Jewish families at Mangup, about a quarter of the total population (935 people, of which 460 were Greeks, 252 Karaites, 188 Muslims, and 35 Armenians);<sup>36</sup> in 1542/3 the community had shrunk to thirty-five families. With

<sup>31</sup> See D. Shapira, 'Istanbul/Qushta', in id. (ed.), *Matsevot beit ha'alemin shel hayehudim hakara'im betsafat-kaleh, krim*, 272–3.

<sup>32</sup> A. G. Gertsen, 'Archeological Excavations of Karaite Settlements in the Crimea', in *Proceedings of the Eleventh World Congress of Jewish Studies*, division B, vol. i (Jerusalem, 1994), 181–7 (Russian version 'Arkheologicheskie issledovaniya karaimskikh pamyatnikov v Krymu', *Materialy po arkheologii, istorii i etnografii Tavrii*, 6 (1998), 744–51); id., 'Raskopki Mangupa v 1992 g.', *Krymskii muzey*, 1994, no. 1, p. 139; id., 'Jewish Community of Mangoup According to Archeological Data', *Proceedings of the Twelfth World Congress of Jewish Studies* (Jerusalem, 1999); A. G. Gertsen and Yu. M. Mogarichev, 'Chufut-Kale—iudeiskaya krepost', in E. Solomonik (ed.), *Evrei Kryma* (Simferopol and Jerusalem, 1997), 23–32; A. G. Gertsen, *Krepost' dragotsennosti: Kyrk-Or. Chufut-Kale* (Simferopol, 1993).

<sup>33</sup> Ezer and Shapira, 'Kaffa', 206.

<sup>34</sup> See A. G. Gertsen, 'Po povodu novoi publikatsii turetskogo istochnika o zavoevanii Kryma', *Materialy po arkheologii, istorii i etnografii Tavrii*, 8 (2001), 366–87.

<sup>35</sup> See Shapira, 'Beginnings of the Karaites of the Crimea', 722–6.

<sup>36</sup> See H. Jankowski, *A Historical-Etymological Dictionary of Pre-Russian Habitation Names of the Crimea* (Ann Arbor, 2006).

a similar shrinkage of the non-Jewish populations, Jews made up one-third of the total population.<sup>37</sup> The Polish ambassador, Marcin Broniewski, visited Mangup in 1578 and noted that the city had been devastated; one Greek was living there, and a few Jews and Turks.<sup>38</sup>

When the 'New Mosque', or Valide Cami'i, was built in Istanbul in 1597–1663 on the site of the old Karaite quarter, near the modern Galata Bridge, the Karaite community was forcibly removed to Hasköy, the Sultan's private village on the other side of the Golden Horn; deprived of their property, many Karaites preferred to emigrate to the Crimea, to Çufut-Qal'eh and Mangup. Indeed, the Karaite communities in the Crimea grew significantly during the first quarter of the seventeenth century, owing to immigration from Istanbul. Sometimes such immigration has been described as religiously motivated, as appears on the tombstone inscription from 1627 of 'Raḥel the elder that came from Qusṭanthinah to the town of Mangup to keep the paths of faith, zealous in her religion'.<sup>39</sup>

During the same period, in the first third of the seventeenth century, the Crimea was a target of constant raids by both the Zaporozhye and the Don Cossacks; at least once, in 1626, they penetrated as deep as Mangup and wreaked havoc in the area.<sup>40</sup> Some Karaites were killed by the Cossacks, as is evident from tombstone inscriptions—from the year 1629, for example.<sup>41</sup>

The most famous Karaite community in the Crimea is that of Çufut-Qal'eh. Its fame is in no small way due to the fact that Abraham Firkovich, who lived there for a number of years, rewrote its history in a somewhat tendentious manner. The city was originally known by the Turkic name Qırqyer/Qırq-Or. Islamization of the

<sup>37</sup> See G. Veinstein, 'La Population du sud de la Crimée au début de la domination ottomane', in *Mémoire Ömer Lûtfi Barkan* (Paris, 1980), 242. See also Fisher, 'Ottoman Crimea in the Mid-Seventeenth Century', 221. Cf. also Ezer and Shapira, 'Kaffa', 207–9.

<sup>38</sup> See *Martini Bromiovii, de Biezdzsede, bis in Tartariam, nomine Stephani Primi Poloniae Regis legati, Tartariae Descriptio* (Cologne, 1595), 7.

<sup>39</sup> D. Shapira, A. Fedorchuk, and D. Vasyutinski, *Tombstone Inscriptions from the Jewish-Karaite Cemetery of Çufut-Qal'eh, the Crimea, i: The Oldest and Forged Inscriptions*, forthcoming.

<sup>40</sup> According to the Armenian chronicle of Xaçatur Keffec'i: see E. Schütz, 'Eine armenische Chronik von Kaffa aus der ersten Hälfte des 17. Jahrhunderts', *Acta Orientalia Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae*, 29/2 (1975), 133–86; this raid remained unnoticed by 'Evliyâ' Çelebî, who visited Mangup only two decades later. On other Cossack razzias, see M. Berindei, 'Le Problème des "Cosaques" dans la seconde moitié du XVI<sup>e</sup> siècle', *Cahiers du monde russe et soviétique*, 13/3 (1972), 338–67, and, especially, id., 'La Porte Ottomane face aux Cosaques Zaporogues, 1600–1637', *Harvard Ukrainian Studies*, 1/3 (1977), 273–307. See also V. Ostapchuk, 'The Human Landscape of the Ottoman Black Sea in the Face of the Cossack Naval Raids', in K. Fleet (ed.), *The Ottomans and the Sea: Papers from a Conference Held in Cambridge, England, in 1996* (Rome, 2001), 23–99.

<sup>41</sup> The same date is equated with 1649 in *Avnei zikaron*, Çufut-Kal'eh no. 327: Shapira, Fedorchuk, and Vasyutinski, *Tombstone Inscriptions from the Jewish-Karaite Cemetery of Çufut-Qal'eh*, vol. i. This inscription is quoted in G. Akhiezer, 'The History of the Crimean Karaites during the Sixteenth to the Eighteenth Centuries', in Polliack (ed.), *Guide to Karaite Studies*, 731. Cf. D. Shapira, 'Martyrdom and Strange Death', in id. (ed.), *Matsevot beit ha'alemin shel hayehudim hakara'im betsufat-kaleh, krim*, 283–5.

region had only just begun, and in 1346 Khan Canibek built a mosque there. The earliest Jewish tombstones in Çufut-Qal'eh date from this period. Among them is that of Manuş, the daughter of Shabetai, from 1363/4; that of Sarah, the daughter of Abraham, from 1386/7; perhaps that of a woman called Parlaq from 1330; and that of Yeshuah son of Zadok, perhaps from 1383. These are the oldest medieval Jewish burial sites in Ukraine as well as in the whole of eastern Europe. The names indicate that the interred had affiliated with the Turkic cultural sphere, yet there is no information as to whether they were Rabbanites or Karaites (though Yeshuah son of Zadok was almost certainly a Karaite). The origin of the buried people—or of their ancestors—might have been Sulkhath.

In winter 1385–6 Toqtamiş, the Khan of the Golden Horde, conquered Tabrîz, a large Turkic-speaking commercial city in south Azerbaijan/north Iran known for its large Armenian and Jewish populations. Toqtamiş took many captives, including a number of artisans and craftsmen, and brought them to his encampment on the lower course of the Volga. It is noteworthy that the provenance of many Crimean families of Jews and Armenians, and similarly of the manuscripts (copied prior to 1385) owned by them, is Tabrîz. There are some vague Karaite and Armenian traditions that connect their arrival in the Crimea in general and at Çufut-Qal'eh in particular as representing a migration from the Volga region in connection with the events of the wars between Toqtamiş, Mamai, and Timur-Lang. It seems that there was a large concentration of Karaites in the cities of the Golden Horde and the lower course of the Volga. Some of the Karaite, Armenian, and Tatar refugees reached the Crimea; others escaped to Troki and Lutsk, the capital cities of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania.<sup>42</sup> Indeed, in the early fifteenth century there was a significant growth of the Jewish community, whose members were buried at the Çufut-Qal'eh cemetery; again, the rule of Khan Hacı-Girây in the Crimea between the 1440s and 1460s was beneficial both for the Crimea and for its Jewish population. Crimean khans were interested in attracting Jews to Qırqyer and granted them *yarlıqs* (bills of rights) in 1459, 1468, and 1485 (and later).<sup>43</sup>

In 1475 the Ottoman Grand Vizier, Gedik Ahmet Paşa, began the conquest of the Crimea, starting with the former Genoese colonies and proceeding to the principality of Theodoro/Mangup. One indirect consequence of the Ottoman conquest of the Crimea was the final and formal victory of the Grand Principality of Muscovy over the remnants of the Golden Horde. Lithuania lost permanently its former ally, the Crimean Khanate, which passed to the Ottoman sphere, and the Crimean Tatars began invading southern Poland–Lithuania, posing a permanent threat to

<sup>42</sup> Akhiezer and Shapira, 'Kara'im belita uvevolhin-galitsiyah ad hame'ah ha-18'.

<sup>43</sup> I. S. Kaya, 'Khanskie yarlyki, dannye krymchakam', *Evreiskaya starina*, 7/1 (1914), 102–4; V. D. Smirnov, 'Tatarsko-khanskie yarlyki iz kollektsii Tavricheskoi uchenoi arkhivnoi komissii', *Izvestiya Tavricheskoi uchenoi arkhivnoi komissii*, 1918, no. 4, pp. 1–19; S. E. Malov, 'Izuchenie yarlykov i vos-tochnykh gramot', in N. I. Konrad et al. (eds.), *Akademiku V. A. Gordlevskomu k ego semidesyatipy-atiletiiyu: Sbornik statei* (Moscow, 1953), 187–95; A. P. Grigoryev, "'Yarlyk Edigeya": Analiz teksta i rekonstruktsiya soderzhaniya', *Istoriografiya i istochnikovedenie istorii stran Azii i Afriki*, 11 (1988), 55–9.

both Jews and non-Jews there for some three hundred years. Thus, in 1482 Kiev was sacked and many Jews were taken to the Crimea as captives (*yasir*), both Karaite and Rabbanite, and the Karaite community of Kiev fled to Volhynia; some of the Karaite captives of the invasion are buried at Çufut-Qal'eh, for example Daniel from Man-Kermân (Kiev), who died in 1483. In 1495 Jews were expelled from Kiev and Lithuania (they were allowed to return to the latter in 1503); some found refuge in the Crimea.<sup>44</sup> Among them were a number of Karaites from Lutsk who found refuge in Çufut-Qal'eh and served as religious leaders there, as indicated by their tombstone inscriptions.

The Ottoman era in the annals of the Crimea lasted from 1475 to 1774. The territories conquered by Gedik Ahmet Paşa were incorporated into the empire proper. These territories included former European—Genoese and Venetian—colonies and the land of the Principality of Theodoro, together with Doros/Mangup, its capital, whereas Qırqyer/Çufut-Qal'eh, next to Mangup, was not included in the new Ottoman territories. The Crimean Karaites strengthened their connections with their brethren in Istanbul and Edirne (Adrianople), and a strong current of migration began to flow towards the Crimea. The Karaites of Istanbul and Edirne were drawn to the Crimea owing to the great prosperity that accompanied the early stages of the establishment of the Khanate in the Ottoman sphere. In the sixteenth century, and again in the 1620s–1640s, a huge flow of Karaites went from Istanbul to Çufut-Qal'eh, as revealed in an unprecedented growth of burials. The division of the peninsula between the two entities, the Empire and the Khanate, was a direct continuation of the pre-Ottoman situation; the Ottoman *eyâlet* of Crimea took the place of the Christian entities (the Principality of Theodoro and the Genoese colonies). In the course of the Ottoman period, this dual and parallel situation of Khanate and *eyâlet* left an increasingly pronounced impression on the Crimean Jewish Karaite community. However, during the Ottoman era, this duality was not only caused by political factors, but was also the result of the final transition of the Crimean Karaites to the sphere of influence of the Karaites from Istanbul. This distinction is reflected in migratory patterns. Hence, on the one hand there was migration of Karaites from Constantinople who followed the conservative approach of R. Bali and R. Bagi, who settled in Ottoman Mangup, and on the other hand there was the migration of those who took the conciliatory and pro-Rabbanite approach of the Bashyatsi dynasty, who settled in Çufut-Qal'eh of the Girâys. Of great importance was the migration from Istanbul in about 1501 of Sinan Çelebi, otherwise known as Joseph b. Moses b. Caleb Rabitsi, the brother of the well-known Karaite author from Edirne, Belgorod (Aq-Kermân), and Istanbul, Caleb Afendopulo (Firkovich called him an immigrant from Persia).

Now that the *pax Ottomana* had reached the region, Mengli-Girây began to build a new capital beside Qırqyer, according to the Ottoman model, called 'Palace of

<sup>44</sup> For Muscovite sources referring to Kievan Jews who fled to Çufut-Qal'eh, see Kizilov, *Krymskaya Iudeya*, 122.

Gardens' (Bâhçe-Sarây). He died, however, in 1515. Sahib I Girây, who ruled between 1532 and 1550, transferred the capital to Bâhçe-Sarây at the beginning of his reign (apparently in 1532), and Muslim residents of the former capital joined him in moving there. It was only non-Muslims—Jews and some Armenians—who remained in the city of Qırqyer. Known as Çufut-Qal'eh, meaning 'Fortress of the Jews', it became something of a ghetto or a suburb of the new capital.

All told, Çufut-Qal'eh functioned as the capital of the Khanate for only about a century (1420–1520). One can state with certainty that it was during these hundred years that the Jewish Karaite community, which formed between 1330 and 1410, became established and took shape. While, in general, the Ottoman takeover led to a decline in the importance of the older cities—including those with Jewish communities such as Kaffa and Sulkhât—Bâhçe-Sarây and Çufut-Qal'eh flourished and experienced an era of unprecedented prosperity in the history of the Jewish Karaite community, which absorbed immigrants from the older cities of the Crimea, Istanbul, and elsewhere. Little is known about the immigration to the Crimea from the somewhat obscure Karaite communities of Anatolia. Later on, new cities would rise in the Crimea and attract Jews: Gözleve (Eupatoria, Evpatoriya), which had both a Karaite and a Rabbanite community, and Qarasubazar (Qarasub), which primarily absorbed Rabbanite Jews from Sulkhât and Kaffa.

A new pan-Karaite centre was taking shape in the Crimea that would replace the old centre of Edirne–Istanbul. Among its characteristics was linguistic and cultural Turkification. It should be added that an unusual situation existed in the Crimea, where the centre of gravity and hegemony within the Jewish collective was inclined in favour of the Karaite faction, whereas the Rabbanites were seen more as an accretion.

What picture can we assemble from these pieces of a puzzle? It is no surprise that the conclusion is the same that one would draw when reflecting on the history of Ukraine as a whole. Though Byzantine by religion, basically, Kievan Rus/Ukraine was the most eastern outpost of this chain of western and central European states. Jews who came to Kievan Rus proper, or left it, came from the west or went west; prior to the Ashkenazi influx in the early sixteenth century, this territory had a very small Jewish population. By contrast, the Crimea was always part of the world that the conquest of Alexander the Great had created and Jews and others here were connected to Italian cities or to their Aegean colonies, to Constantinople/Istanbul, to Anatolia, and to northern Iran. The territory of what is now Ukraine thus included, like Byzantium, the pre-Classical Ottoman empire, northern Iran, and Anatolia, a heterogeneous Jewish population with a distinctive Karaite tint.

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# The Jews of Lviv and the City Council in the Early Modern Period

MYRON KAPRAL

THE HISTORY OF JEWS IN LVIV in the early modern period has been studied comprehensively since the 1860s.<sup>1</sup> The first source-based study was published in Yiddish by Gabriel Suchystaw, an amateur historian, and consisted of biographical data about rabbis and members of the Jewish community, tombstone inscriptions, and the teachings ('responsa') of Jewish scholars.<sup>2</sup> The information in Suchystaw's survey was not always authentic or exact, but was later referred to in other Yiddish-language books.<sup>3</sup> In 1894 the Chief Rabbi of Lviv, Jecheskiel Caro, published a history of the Jews of that city in German; however, his work was essentially a compilation of previous sources.<sup>4</sup>

In the early twentieth century one of the major scholars of the history of the Jewish community in Lviv was Majer Bałaban.<sup>5</sup> His first monograph on this subject, covering the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, was based on an insightful analysis of newly discovered archival sources and books on Jewish themes that are now lost. It contained a thorough description of the legal, economic, religious, and cultural life of the city-centre and suburban Jewish communities of Lviv.<sup>6</sup> (Unfortunately, neither the Ukrainian nor the Armenian communities of Lviv have ever managed to produce such a comprehensive study.) Bałaban's textbooks on the history of Polish Jewry included a rich selection of source material from Lviv.<sup>7</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Stefan Gąsiorowski surveyed the studies of the history of Jewish *kahals* in Lviv in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries in an article titled 'Stan badań nad dziejami gmin żydowskich na ziemi lwowskiej w XVII i XVIII wieku', in K. Pilarczyk (ed.), *Żydzi i judaizm we współczesnych badaniach polskich: Materiały z konferencji, Kraków, 21–23. XI. 1995* (Kraków, 1997), 191–212.

<sup>2</sup> G. Suchystaw, *Matsevet kodesh*, 4 vols. (Lviv, 1860–9). On Suchystaw, see M. Bałaban, *Żydzi lwowscy na przełomie XVI i XVII wieku* (Lwów, 1906), 552–3.

<sup>3</sup> Majer Bałaban offered a thorough analysis of these publications in *Żydzi lwowscy na przełomie XVI i XVII wieku*, 551–8.

<sup>4</sup> J. Caro, *Geschichte der Juden in Lemberg von den ältesten Zeiten bis zur Theilung Polens im Jahre 1792 aus Chroniken und archivalischen Quellen* (Kraków, 1894).

<sup>5</sup> Bałaban's life and research are treated in I. Biderman, *Mayer Balaban, Historian of Polish Jewry: His Influence on the Younger Generation of Jewish Historians* (New York, 1976).

<sup>6</sup> Bałaban, *Żydzi lwowscy na przełomie XVI i XVII wieku*. The time span in the title of the study is slightly inaccurate, however, as it covered the sixteenth century and the first half of the seventeenth century.

<sup>7</sup> See e.g. M. Bałaban, *Z historii Żydów w Polsce: Szkice i studia* (Warsaw, 1920); id., *Historja i*

Various aspects of the judicial system of the autonomous Jewish community in the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth were explored by Mojżesz (Moses) Schorr, Zbigniew Pazdro, and Ignacy Schiper, also on the basis of material in the Lviv archives.<sup>8</sup> In the second half of the twentieth century Maurycy Horn has been a prolific historian of the Jews in Galicia; his demographic and statistical studies are particularly noteworthy.<sup>9</sup>

The past few decades have witnessed very little research on the Jewish communities of Lviv in the sixteenth–eighteenth centuries, with the exception of a few works published by foreign scholars, who did not, however, have access to archival sources in Lviv.<sup>10</sup> A notable example is a volume on the privileges granted to the Jewish communities in the Polish Commonwealth, edited by Jacob Goldberg, who presents only two out of the numerous privileges granted to Lviv.<sup>11</sup> Goldberg has also discussed the activities of the Lviv deputies to the sejms in the context of conflicts with Jews in Lviv.<sup>12</sup> Another monograph is a work by Vladimir Melamed on the Jews in Lviv, but the sections devoted to the early modern period contain no new information, which casts doubt on the academic value of the study.<sup>13</sup> In recent years a few surveys of Lviv's synagogues, including those of earlier historical periods, have been published by Iosif Gelston, Maria Piechotka, and Oksana Boiko.<sup>14</sup> Among other publications there are more specific investigations of the Jews' economic activities,

*literatura żydowska z szczególnem uwzględnieniem historii Żydów w Polsce*, iii: *Od wygnania Żydów z Hiszpanji do Rewolucji Francuskiej* (Lwów, 1925).

<sup>8</sup> M. Schorr, 'Organizacja Żydów w Polsce od najdawniejszych czasów aż do r. 1772', *Kwartalnik Historyczny*, 13 (1899), 482–520, 734–75; S. Pazdro, *Organizacja i praktyka żydowskich sądów podwojewódzińskich w okresie 1740–1772 r.* (Lwów, 1903); I. Schiper, 'Wewnętrzna organizacja Żydów w dawnej Rzeczypospolitej', in I. Schiper, A. Tartakower, and A. Hafftko (eds.), *Żydzi w Polsce Odrodzonej: Działalność społeczna, gospodarcza, oświatowa i kulturalna*, 2 vols. (Warsaw, 1932–3), i. 81–110.

<sup>9</sup> M. Horn, *Żydzi na Rusi Czerwonej w XVI i pierwszej połowie XVII w.: Działalność gospodarcza na tle rozwoju demograficznego* (Warsaw, 1975); id., 'Rozwój demograficzny i struktura wyznaniowo-narodowościowa mieszczaństwa na ziemiach ukraińskich Korony w latach 1569–1648', in F. Nieuważny (ed.), *Z problemów ukrajinoznawstwa* (Warsaw, 1987), 67–84; id., 'Społeczność żydowska w wielonarodowościowym Lwowie, 1356–1696', *Biuletyn Żydowskiego Instytutu Historycznego*, 157 (1991), 3–14.

<sup>10</sup> Among others, S. Gąsiorowski, 'Proces o znieważenie hostii przez Żydów we Lwowie z roku 1636', *Nasza Przeszłość*, 82 (1994), 353–7.

<sup>11</sup> *Jewish Privileges in the Polish Commonwealth: Charters of Rights Granted to Jewish Communities in Poland–Lithuania in the Sixteenth to Eighteenth Centuries*, ed. J. Goldberg (Jerusalem, 1985), 169–83.

<sup>12</sup> J. Goldberg, 'Posłowie miasta Lwowa na sejmy wobec Żydów lwowskich w XVII–XVIII wieku', *Rocznik Naukowo-Dydaktyczny WSP w Krakowie*, 203 (1999), 85–94.

<sup>13</sup> V. Melamed, *Evrei vo L'vove (XIII–pervaya polovina XX veka): Sobytiya, obshchestvo, lyudi* (Lviv, 1994), 52–97. These sections have recently been translated into Ukrainian without change: V. Melamed, 'Pid zakhystom korolivs'kykh pryvileiyiv (XIV–XVII st.st.)', in *Hebreis'kyi L'viv = Nezalezhnyi kul'turolohichnyi chasopys 'Yi'*, 51 (2008) 18–35.

<sup>14</sup> I. Gelston, 'Synagogy u L'vovi', in *Hebreis'kyi L'viv = Nezalezhnyi kul'turolohichnyi chasopys 'Yi'*, 51 (2008), 276–95; M. Piechotka, 'The Synagogues of Lwów', in T. W. Gaetgens (ed.), *Künstlerischer Austausch: Akten des XXVIII. Internationalen Kongresses für Kunstgeschichte*, 3 vols. (Berlin, 1993), iii. 443–54; O. Boiko, *Synahohy L'vova* (Lviv, 2008).

which focus primarily on medieval and very early modern times.<sup>15</sup> The absence of new research based on primary sources testifies to shortcomings and gaps, if not yet to a crisis, in the study of the Jewish community in the period under discussion. However, a dissertation by a young German scholar on the Jewish community from the fourteenth to the late sixteenth centuries, though not introducing any new sources, stands as a promising if somewhat compilatory survey.<sup>16</sup>

The present chapter, which deals with the relations between the Jewish communities in Lviv and the municipal authorities, is based on rich source material from municipal registers that are either little-known or are used here for the first time. It focuses on the legal and economic aspects of these relations, as well as on the ways, whether lawful or violent, in which conflicts were resolved. It is based on the author's monograph written in Ukrainian and published in 2003, which investigated the social and legal aspects of relations between the Jewish and Christian communities.<sup>17</sup>

#### TIME OF TRIAL: THE CITY COUNCIL IN LVIV AND THE JEWS IN THE SECOND HALF OF THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY

Bohdan Khmelnytsky's uprising in the mid-seventeenth century presented enormous problems for the Jews of Lviv. In 1648 and 1655, Jews in the city and its suburbs withstood sieges by both the Cossack and Tatar armies and participated in the defence of the city.<sup>18</sup> During the first siege, in 1648, the Polish city council placed so much trust in the Jewish community, given their shared anti-Cossack sentiments, that Jewish youths received two hundred rifles to defend a section of the city fortification wall and the tower of the Dormition Church on Ruska Street. By contrast, the Ukrainian community that actually resided on that street was not at all trusted by the municipal authorities. During the sieges, Khmelnytsky's side demanded that the Jews be handed over to them, with all their property; however, the inhabitants of Lviv refused to do so.<sup>19</sup> The Jewish historian Nathan Hannover

<sup>15</sup> E. Nadel-Golobič, 'Armenians and Jews in Medieval Lvov: Their Role in Oriental Trade, 1400–1600', *Cahiers du monde russe et soviétique*, 20/3–4 (1979), 345–88; J. Mazur, 'Joszko ze Lwowa — "theloneator totius Regni" — i jego działalność na tle dziejów Żydów lwowskich na przełomie XV i XVI wieku', in K. Pilarczyk (ed.), *Żydzi i judaizm we współczesnych badaniach polskich*, iii (Kraków, 2003), 25–34; J. Heyde, 'The Jewish Economic Elite in Red Ruthenia in the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Centuries', *Polin*, 22 (2010), 156–73.

<sup>16</sup> H. Petersen, *Judengemeinde und Stadtgemeinde in Polen: Lemberg, 1356–1581* (Wiesbaden, 2003).

<sup>17</sup> M. Kapral, *Natsional'ni hromady L'vova XVI–XVIII st. (sotsial'no-pravovi vzayemyny)* (Lviv, 2003).

<sup>18</sup> M. Horn, *Powinności wojenne Żydów w Rzeczypospolitej w XVI i XVII wieku* (Warsaw, 1978), 98.

<sup>19</sup> D. Zubrytsky [Zubrzycki], *Khronika mista L'vova*, trans. I. Svarnyk (Lviv, 2002), 282. Whether the Cossacks did really demand that the Jews be handed over remains a debatable issue in Ukrainian historiography: S. Tomashivsky, 'Mezhy Pylyavtsyamy i Zamostyem', in *Materiyaly do istoriyi Halychyny*, iii: *Lytopynsni pamyatky z r. 1648–1657*, ed. S. Tomashivsky (Lviv, 1913), 127; S. Plokhyy, 'Khmel'nychyna ta yevreyi: Prychynky do ideolohiyi povstannya', in B. Yakymovych et al. (eds.), *Prosfōnēma: Istorychni ta filolohichni rozvidky, prysvyacheni 60-richchyu akademika Yaroslava Isayevy-cha* (Lviv, 1998), 484.

reported that ten thousand died during the 1648 siege alone; this number, however, as well as many other facts in his emotional account, apparently written under stress, has never been verified and remains questionable.<sup>20</sup>

On 10 October 1649, the *ordines et nationes* of Lviv and the city-centre and suburban Jewish communities came to an agreement about the reimbursement of municipal expenses incurred in paying a ransom to Khmelnytsky's army.<sup>21</sup> A commission which had been appointed to resolve this controversial issue had received submissions from both Polish municipal and Jewish representatives. The citizens insisted that the Jews pay 200,000 zlotys, or one-fifth of the entire ransom, in accordance with the decree of 1642 issued by King Władysław IV. Eventually, after long and tense negotiations, the Jews' share was reduced under pressure from the commissioners to 84,000 zlotys, while the municipal community agreed not to pursue a lawsuit in the royal court. The conditions of payment were not particularly convenient for the city, since the Jewish community had to pay only 4,000 zlotys in cash immediately. The greater part of the amount was to be paid in goods in three instalments during the Jarosław fair between 1650 and 1652. Out of the total, 20,000 zlotys was set aside as capital, on which the Jews were supposed to pay an annual interest of 8 per cent until 1655.<sup>22</sup> However, they did not completely fulfil their financial obligations as outlined in the 1649 agreement. In 1662 the city council sent representatives to the king and demanded that the Jews pay 26,520 zlotys for breaking the agreement of 1649 and failing to pay the 20,000-zloty principal and interest.<sup>23</sup>

In 1652 the term of the trade agreements that had been extended in 1637 expired, and Jewish merchants tried to renew them. However, municipal lawyers blocked this move, and the king issued a decree prohibiting the conclusion of any agreements without his permission.<sup>24</sup> Nevertheless, thanks to a letter from the royal chancellor, difficult negotiations between the citizens of Lviv and the Jewish elders on the conditions of the agreements did begin in the following year. Both sides adamantly defended their positions and were unwilling to compromise. In his diary, the community *regent*<sup>25</sup> Jan Buski reported one episode from these negotiations; he recalled that the Jewish elders used very expressive and sometimes foul language in

<sup>20</sup> F. Sysyn, 'Yevreyi ta povstannya Bohdana Khmel'nyts'koho', in *Mappa mundi: Studia in Honorem Jaroslavi Daškevyč Septuagenario Dedicata / Zbirnyk naukovykh prats' na poshanu Yaroslava Dashkevycha z nahody ioho 70-richchya* (Lviv, 1996), 481.

<sup>21</sup> Tsentral'nyi derzhavnyi istorychnyi arkhiv Ukrainy, Lviv (hereafter TsDIAL), f. 52, op. 2, spr. 617, fos. 102–3; Zubrytsky, *Khronika mista L'vova*, 289–90. *Ordines et nationes* ('estates and nations') refers to a structure of urban authority established in the late sixteenth or early seventeenth century. Among its members were Catholic burghers (merchants and artisans) and Ruthenian and Armenian elders (*seniores*). In the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth it was unique to Lviv.

<sup>22</sup> TsDIAL, f. 52, op. 1, spr. 135, fos. 150–152<sup>v</sup>.

<sup>23</sup> *Ibid.* 166.

<sup>24</sup> Zubrytsky, *Khronika mista L'vova*, 293.

<sup>25</sup> The *regent* was the head of the College of Forty Statesmen (see n. 43 below). He was elected annually, alternately from among the merchant elites and from among the richest artisans.

their arguments with the municipal delegates.<sup>26</sup> A protest made against the Jewish elders' contemptuous attitude was supported by city councillors and members of the municipal court.

At the request of 'important people' the trade agreements were nonetheless signed in 1654. Essentially they were no different from the previous agreements. Buski's diary outlines the main demands of the municipal authorities and the proceedings of the negotiations.<sup>27</sup> In the final version of the agreement, the Jews managed to negotiate a decrease in the annual fee they paid the city to 1,450 zlotys, cutting 4,000 zlotys from the payment.<sup>28</sup> In the same year, King Jan Kazimierz issued a decree introducing an annual fee of 400 zlotys for a permit to sell liquor.<sup>29</sup>

It was not long before the two sides went back on their promises after the agreements had been signed and other conflicts had been settled. For several years, until 1658, the Jewish community conscientiously made payments to the municipal tax administration, but later it stopped paying these taxes and other municipal fees.<sup>30</sup> In 1657 the Jews living in the suburbs refused to pay the liquor levy and other taxes. On 26 March 1658, at the request of the Lviv city council, King Jan Kazimierz issued a decree to the officials of the Ruthenian voivodeship (*województwo ruskie*) requiring them to curb the smuggling activities of both foreign Jewish merchants (Scottish, German, Turkish, etc.) and those of Lviv, who were bypassing the warehouse in Lviv.<sup>31</sup> This decree introduced a new custom that had been adopted in Kraków: after a fair, all the merchandise belonging to foreigners and Jews had to be placed in securely locked warehouses, keys to which were kept by a merchant and two specially elected citizens.

In 1662 the city council imposed new financial obligations on the suburban and city-centre Jewish communities amounting to more than 100,000 zlotys, including payments for the construction of fortifications (one-fifth to be paid by the Jews) and for the enlisting of a mercenary infantry during military conflicts, the recompense of financial losses incurred as a result of violating trade agreements, trading in liquor, and so on.<sup>32</sup> These charges even included 300 zlotys for the rifles and spears that the Jewish community had received from the city during the siege of 1648. Later, in 1663 and 1666, two additional decrees obliged the Jewish community to pay their debts.<sup>33</sup>

However, after the pogroms of 1664, which will be discussed below, officials close to the king and the royal courts began to treat the robbed and tortured Jews

<sup>26</sup> Zubrytsky, *Khronika mista L'vova*, 297–8.

<sup>27</sup> *Ibid.* 300–1.

<sup>28</sup> TsDIAL, f. 52, op. 2, spr. 617, fos. 162–6; Bałaban, *Żydzi lwowscy na przełomie XVI i XVII wieku*, 453.

<sup>29</sup> TsDIAL, f. 52, op. 1, spr. 138, fos. 174–7. It can be deduced that an agreement between the city and Jews residing in the suburbs, regarding the fee for a liquor permit, had been in place since 1641, because a document of 1657 speaks of arrears over the previous sixteen years.

<sup>30</sup> TsDIAL, f. 52, op. 1, spr. 139, fos. 17, 60.

<sup>31</sup> *Ibid.* 10–11.

<sup>32</sup> TsDIAL, f. 52, op. 1, spr. 138, fos. 166–168<sup>v</sup>, 180–181<sup>v</sup>.

<sup>33</sup> TsDIAL, f. 52, op. 2, spr. 617, fos. 181–2, 193–194<sup>v</sup>.

more favourably. In 1667 the Court of Assessment, in which the royal chancellor had much influence, set up a commission to inspect the amounts of debt submitted by the city representatives.<sup>34</sup> In 1670 the new king, Michał Korybut Wiśniowiecki, annulled most of the debts accrued by the Jewish community.<sup>35</sup>

Mutual lawsuits and legal disputes between the citizens of Lviv and the Jewish community continued in the following decades. The royal decrees and mandates were not observed because of their often self-contradictory nature. Litigation cost both sides much money and effort but rarely yielded the desired results. In 1686 the two parties decided to normalize their relationship through an acknowledgement by the Jews of the debt that they owed to the city. A document of 3 January 1686 has been preserved, with the title 'The Cancellation of Debts with the Jews at the City Hall'. It lists twenty-one claims, concerning numerous liabilities, tax evasion, the refusal to fulfil various obligations to the city, the problem of water supply, the garbage disposal service, etc.<sup>36</sup> The total debt owed by the Jewish community amounted to 115,000 zlotys.

In response, the Jewish elders offered a detailed and well-supported understanding of the debt situation. First, they refused to acknowledge the debts of homeowners, believing that they should be considered on an individual basis. All other debts of the Jewish community, dating back to the siege of 1648, had been annulled by the king's decree of 1670. The Jews were willing to negotiate on other issues and if necessary pay what was required. After agreements had been drafted, they also stated that, for the benefit of the city, they were prepared to close the breweries and a wax refinery that had been constructed illegally in the suburbs.<sup>37</sup> The Jews were also willing to contribute financially to works that the city might undertake to repair walls and roads, clean the moats, or construct ramparts. In addition, they offered if need be to dispose of their own garbage and manure near the city walls in their quarter. In view of the danger of pogroms, the Jewish elders promised to announce in the synagogues that business and trade were prohibited on Christian holidays and Sundays, even agreeing to caution members of their community against quarrelling with Christians, a behaviour that could escalate into conflicts and pogroms.

Negotiations between the two sides and discussions regarding payments lasted for two years. To put pressure on the municipal authorities, the Jews sought the mediation of magnates, who sent letters defending the interests of the Jewish community. Eventually, on 2 June 1688, the Jewish elders signed an undertaking to transfer 12,000 zlotys—not the initially negotiated 115,000—to the city treasury.<sup>38</sup> In August, the municipal authorities issued a receipt for the payment of only 10,000 zlotys. The remaining 2,000 zlotys were never paid.

Since only a tiny fraction of the debt had been paid off, the municipal authorities retained the right to sue the Jewish community in the future. In 1690 King Jan III

<sup>34</sup> Zubrytsky, *Khronika mista L'vova*, 341.

<sup>35</sup> TsDIAL, f. 52, op. 1, spr. 139, fo. 30.

<sup>36</sup> *Ibid.* 19–22<sup>v</sup>.

<sup>37</sup> *Ibid.* 21.

<sup>38</sup> TsDIAL, f. 52, op. 2, spr. 617, fo. 19; f. 52, op. 1, spr. 139, fo. 34–34<sup>v</sup>.

Sobieski brought an action against the city-centre and suburban Jewish communities on behalf of the city.<sup>39</sup> However, Sobieski, a military hero who had defeated the Turks in Vienna in 1683, treated the Jews of Lviv sympathetically, as Emanuel de Jona, his personal physician, and Jacob Betsalel (Becal), who was in charge of the royal customs throughout the entire Polish state, had both originally come from Lviv.<sup>40</sup> The hearing of that case thus kept being delayed.

At the end of the seventeenth century, to prevent the growth of Jewish trade, the city council initiated negotiations for the conclusion of a trade agreement with the Jewish community. (In 1701 city officials were to express public regret that these discussions had been going on for almost fifteen years and that much effort had been expended in vain.) Emanuel de Jona, who was one of the Jewish elders and, as has been mentioned, personal physician to Sobieski, was the Jewish community's plenipotentiary at the negotiations. The Ruthenian voivode (*wojewoda ruski*), Jan Stanisław Jabłonowski, participated in the negotiations twice, trying to reconcile the two sides, but no agreement was reached.<sup>41</sup> The Jews of Lviv insisted that no changes be introduced to the status quo, under which they could buy or sell merchandise without restriction. Conversely, the municipal authorities and citizens of Lviv would by no means accept such terms, saying they would rather perish than agree to them.<sup>42</sup>

In the late seventeenth century, relations between the Christian and Jewish communities showed some signs of improvement. City councillors, court officials, representatives of the so-called College of Forty Statesmen,<sup>43</sup> and representatives of the Armenians and Ukrainians prepared a lengthy memorandum in which they informed the Jewish elders of the conditions for their future economic activities in the city.<sup>44</sup> Having regard to the king's will and the intercession of 'persons of high rank' who had intervened on behalf of the Jews, the municipal authorities were prepared to discuss the restoration of trade agreements. Yet at the same time they emphasized that Jewish merchants had consistently violated the previous agreements of 1654 and the privileges and rights of the citizens, and even though the city council yielded to the requests from those in high places that agreements be concluded, it did not drop an action against the Jews, which continued to be heard in the royal courts.

The conditions which the city representatives wanted to include in future agreements were similar to those previously put forth: restrictions on Jewish retail trade, which was basically to be permitted only at fairs; a reduction of the role of Jewish merchants to that of supplying goods for their Christian counterparts; and severe

<sup>39</sup> TsDIAL, f. 52, op. 1, spr. 139, fos. 42–3.

<sup>40</sup> M. Bałaban, 'Becal, celnik ziem ruskich w XVII w.', in his *Z historii Żydów w Polsce*, 49–58; Melamed, *Evrei vo L'vove*, 91–2.

<sup>41</sup> TsDIAL, f. 52, op. 1, spr. 139, fo. 61.

<sup>42</sup> Ibid. 61–61<sup>v</sup>.

<sup>43</sup> The College of Forty Statesmen (Kolegium Czterdziestu Mężów) was an organization of urban authority established by King Stefan Batory in 1577, comprising twenty merchants and twenty artisans. It represented the interests of the burghers of Lviv and had executive power, controlling in particular expenditure and taxes.

<sup>44</sup> TsDIAL, f. 52, op. 1, spr. 138, fos. 167–173<sup>v</sup>.

punishment for violators of the agreements, responsibility for whom was to be carried by the entire Jewish community. The annual fee for the trade agreements was also to rise to 3,000 zlotys. Once more it was reiterated that Jews could not trade in copper, steel, saltpetre, gunpowder, nails, and what was then referred to as 'Austrian' merchandise—that is, iron goods such as sheet metal, axes, and shears.<sup>45</sup> A ban was also to be placed on so-called 'Cossack' items, such as saddles, stirrups, and other equestrian equipment, as well as light arms, for example bows, and armour.<sup>46</sup> In addition, the municipal authorities could not countenance the buying up of grain, wax, hops, honey, and other commodities by Jewish procurers, which they characterized as an attempt at monopoly. In future agreements, the citizens wanted to prohibit Jews from trading in all these goods, with the exception of wax, which they would be allowed to buy in remote areas but not in Lviv and its suburbs.

In addition to trade relations, the memorandum sent to the Jewish community by the municipal authorities also touched on other controversial areas of economic and daily life. The municipal representatives demanded the closure of clandestine wax refineries, maltings, breweries, and taverns in the suburbs, whose existence they claimed violated citizens' rights and worked against their interests. Moreover, they requested that Jews refrain from buying land and property in the suburbs and also pay city taxes on that which had already been bought. Christian merchants were greatly dissatisfied with Jewish profiteers, who combined the functions of both buyer and seller and by doing so reaped benefits. There were a great many Jewish profiteers in the city, and they had developed such a strong network that, according to the municipal memorandum, scarcely any goods could be sold without their participation. The citizens believed that it was precisely this monopolistic activity that was the main cause of the day-by-day rise in prices.<sup>47</sup> The citizens also had complaints about money-changers (Polish *mekslarze*), who for the most part circulated debased coins in the city, while those of full value were taken out of the country.<sup>48</sup> The authors of the memorandum naively appealed to the Jewish elders, asking them to put an end to profiteering and to money-changing because of the fraud they engendered.<sup>49</sup>

The craft guilds in Lviv began to decline because of Jewish competition, and some had to close completely. Such trades as brocade-making by hand, glassworking, and tinsmithing belonged exclusively to Jewish craftsmen. Other trades, such as machine-worked embroidering, needle-making, or gunsmithing, were pursued by only a handful of Christians, many of whom had been forced to leave the city or face beggary. Others, even if they had previously been master craftsmen, chose to

<sup>45</sup> Describing the trade agreements of the late sixteenth century and the first half of the seventeenth, Bałaban misunderstood the prohibition on trade in 'Austrian' merchandise as a ban on using western trade routes, which were safer than the eastern ones. Bałaban, *Żydzi lwowscy na przełomie XVI i XVII wieku*, 401. <sup>46</sup> TsDIAL, f. 52, op. 1, spr. 138, fo. 167<sup>v</sup>. <sup>47</sup> Ibid. 170<sup>v</sup>.

<sup>48</sup> For more information on the different types of coins, see TsDIAL, f. 52, op. 1, spr. 139, fo. 63<sup>v</sup>.

<sup>49</sup> TsDIAL, f. 52, op. 1, spr. 138, fo. 170<sup>v</sup>.



work for Jews, 'as did not befit the dignity of a Christian'. Eventually, Jews began to organize their own guilds without permission from the king, choosing foremen and training apprentices.<sup>50</sup> The fact that Jews held such control over craftsmanship affected the city's defensive capacity, because when the city was attacked it was the craftsmen who played the important role of supplying ammunition and provisions.

Therefore, every craft guild had specific complaints against the Jews. Local craftsmen referred to royal decrees that restricted the number of Jewish artisans. For example, butchers claimed that the king's decrees allowed for only eight sworn Jewish butchers with two assistants, while in reality Lviv was home to twenty-two Jewish butchers who had never been sworn and who had numerous assistants. In turn, the bakers uncovered eighty-seven illegal Jewish stalls and tents selling bread and pastry. They also insisted that there were considerably more Jews who sold their goods without a permanent stall. Christian goldsmiths contended that there was a 'legion' of Jewish goldsmiths despite the fact that the craft guild statute, approved by the king, allowed for only six Jews, whose duties were restricted to a certain process in the refining of gold (in Polish, *szejdowanie*).<sup>51</sup> Furriers complained that Jews 'have stolen our trade, as just about every Jew is now a furrier'.<sup>52</sup> Most of the shops owned by the guild furriers went bankrupt because of Jewish competition. Representatives of other trades, such as shoemakers, barbers, needle-makers, and sword-makers, also complained about the Jews, claiming that they had gained an unfair advantage over their Christian counterparts. They complained especially about Jewish profiteers, who enticed Polish noblemen to visit the Jewish quarter. The general opinion among the Christian craftsmen was that Jews should be prohibited from practising crafts but should be allowed to pursue their trades if they signed appropriate agreements with the city.<sup>53</sup> However, no agreements were made, and the municipal authorities again had to file lawsuits at the royal court.

#### WITHOUT MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING: ECONOMIC AND LEGAL DISPUTES IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY

After Lviv was conquered in 1704 by the armies of the Swedish King Charles XII, the city began to fall into decline. Its population decreased owing to famines, epidemics, fires, and floods, as well as by migration to neighbouring towns in Galicia such as Brody and Stanyslaviv. Meanwhile, the legal quarrels between the municipal authorities and the Jewish communities continued with some intensity.

<sup>50</sup> According to Maurycy Horn, at the beginning of the eighteenth century Lviv was home to four Jewish craft guilds. By the end of the century that number had doubled. M. Horn, *Żydowskie bractwa rzemieślnicze na ziemiach polskich, litewskich, białoruskich i ukraińskich w latach 1613–1850* (Warsaw, 1998), 109–10. <sup>51</sup> TsDIAL, f. 52, op. 1, spr. 138, fo. 171<sup>v</sup>. <sup>52</sup> *Ibid.* 172.

<sup>53</sup> A practice of concluding such agreements between Christian and Jewish craftsmen became widespread in the eighteenth century. It obliged the latter to pay a quarterly tax in order to pursue their trade: H. Yatsenko, 'Rozklad tsekhiv u L'vovi v 1740–1770 rr.', in I. Krypyakevych (ed.), *Z istoriyi zachidnoukrajyns'kykh zemel'*, ii (Kiev, 1957), 76.

In 1701 municipal lawyers prepared an extensive document titled ‘A Report on the Dispute between the City and the Jews’, for the use of the city’s representatives at the Sejm in Warsaw.<sup>54</sup> The citizens took this desperate measure in an attempt to have the matter decided once and for all, at the cost of ‘squeezing the last drops out of the poor’.<sup>55</sup> For the first time, there were two separate lawsuits, one against each of the communities (city and suburban); this was motivated by the different rights enjoyed by the two communities. The citizens’ complaints and demands were those traditional in the second half of the seventeenth century. They demanded that free trade by Jewish merchants be banned, that Jewish breweries and maltings operating in the suburbs be closed, and finally, that Jews abide by the restrictive royal decrees of the sixteenth and the first half of the seventeenth centuries. The citizens contended that unsupervised and unregulated trade by Jews after the 1670 decree had led to the growth of the Jewish population in the city and had allowed them to generate tremendous profits. According to the citizens’ estimate, a few dozen Jews in Lviv owned trading capital exceeding 100,000 zlotys each.<sup>56</sup> With such financial resources available to them, the Jews, they claimed, could always ‘buy’ any desired decision in a court or institution. This point was made by a municipal representative at one of the *sejmiki* in the Ruthenian voivodeship, when the Jewish community had enlisted the help of the voivode in order to carry a resolution for the creation of a commission on trade agreements. The municipal authorities were concerned that through bribery the Jews might manipulate the nobles and clergymen on the commission in order to achieve their goals. The above-mentioned report therefore obliged the delegates from Lviv to appeal to representatives from other large cities in the Commonwealth for support, so that commerce and trade would be preserved as Christian activities.<sup>57</sup> As in the early sixteenth century, the expected allies of the Lviv city council were cities that faced similar problems with Jewish communities that had established monopolies on trade and crafts. However, the influence that municipal councils were able to exert in the political life of the Commonwealth, dominated as it was by magnates and the nobility, turned out to be minimal, even compared with the first decades of the sixteenth century. In addition, the military events of the early seventeenth century, the seizure of Lviv by the Swedes in 1704, and the depopulation of the city through epidemics all served to delay the judicial process.

It was only on 5 April 1710 that the decree regulating relations between the city and the Jewish community was issued<sup>58</sup>—technically a contumacious decree, as it was issued in the absence of the Jewish side. According to its provisions, Jews living in Lviv had to accept the conditions of 1521 that allowed them to trade there in only four types of merchandise. Within two weeks, they were to conclude new agreements with the citizens of Lviv, and within eight weeks were to pay 20,000 zlotys for losses they had caused and to repay a debt of 37,000 zlotys. Those residing in the

<sup>54</sup> TsDIAL, f. 52, op. 1, spr. 139, fos. 58–68<sup>v</sup>. <sup>55</sup> Ibid. 58. <sup>56</sup> Ibid. 68. <sup>57</sup> Ibid.

<sup>58</sup> TsDIAL, f. 52, op. 2, spr. 618, fos. 35–44, 47–55. A detailed description of the decree can be found in Zubrytsky, *Khronika mista L'vova*, 416–17.

city were prohibited from operating taverns and selling liquor and were ordered to contribute a quarter of their profits to the municipal funds. According to Dionizy Zubrzycki, another decree was issued concurrently, prohibiting Jews in the suburbs from producing and selling liquor and stripping them of all rights.<sup>59</sup>

But it was not only the economic aspects of the dispute that were regulated by the royal court. A week later, on 12 April 1710, King Augustus II approved the regulation on separate habitation adopted by the *ordines et nationes* of Lviv, which was aimed at preventing Jews from living in Christian communities.<sup>60</sup> In explaining the reasons for this decision, the citizens adduced not only economic but also religious factors, namely the failure of Jews to observe Christian holidays. For this reason, the municipal *ordines et nationes* decided that any citizen who dared to rent out lodging, a warehouse, or a tavern to Jews would be fined 500 zlotys if they were wealthy, or 200 zlotys if poor. To enforce this regulation, the citizens created a committee which was supposed to make an inventory of all the houses and premises in the city centre and to evict Jewish lessees and shopkeepers. But the Jewish elders used their connections and found a way to get this decree annulled on 23 April, even though the annulment had not been issued by the king himself and still had to be officially approved.<sup>61</sup> Meanwhile, Colonel Andrzej Jasperski, a garrison commandant in Lviv, had been creating obstacles for the citizens in their evicting (Polish *myrogumanie*) of Jews from Christian houses, so the city council had to ask the king for assistance. On 21 April 1710, King Augustus II ordered that the commandant abide by the royal decree.<sup>62</sup> But ultimately this had little effect.

Over the first half of the eighteenth century, a further seven similar royal decrees were issued. All dealt with punishment for the Jewish community, including such matters as exile for illegal trade, the repayment of sums borrowed, and the closure of pubs and breweries.<sup>63</sup> Zubrzycki provided an extensive analysis of these decrees.<sup>64</sup> However, the Jews found ways of appealing to have the decrees annulled or held over for further scrutiny. When committees, consisting of members of the nobility and the clergy, were created, they were usually bribed and would normally fail to arrive in Lviv on time. Even when committee members did convene (as was the case in 1713), their decisions were subject to approval by the royal court.<sup>65</sup> This situation was aptly characterized by Bałaban, who stated that ‘nobody in Poland paid attention to decrees if their adversaries were not powerful enough to enforce those decrees’.<sup>66</sup>

<sup>59</sup> Zubrytsky, *Khronika mista L'vova*, 417.

<sup>60</sup> TsDIAL, f. 52, op. 1, spr. 139, fo. 84. As early as 27 May 1656, King Jan Kazimierz had banned the cohabitation of Jews and Christians in Lviv; however, in the second half of the seventeenth century this decree was never observed: M. Bałaban, *Dzielnica żydowska, jej dzieje i zabytki* (Lwów, 1909), 43.

<sup>61</sup> TsDIAL, f. 52, op. 1, spr. 139, fo. 86–86<sup>v</sup>.

<sup>62</sup> Ibid. 88.

<sup>63</sup> All the decrees against the Jews were collected by the city officials into a separate book: TsDIAL, f. 52, op. 2, spr. 618, fos. 35–309.

<sup>64</sup> Zubrytsky, *Khronika mista L'vova*, 416–17 (1713), 418–20 (1713), 421 (1714), 424 (1724), 425 (1732), 427–8 (1738), 430–1 (1744).

<sup>65</sup> TsDIAL, f. 52, op. 1, spr. 139, fos. 122–124<sup>v</sup>.

<sup>66</sup> Bałaban, *Żydzi lwowscy na przełomie XVI i XVII wieku*, 473.

The Jewish elders explained their obstinacy by arguing that they could not pay the state taxes and at the same time honour all their financial obligations before the nobility and the clergy. In 1712, during negotiations at the city council on the conditions for signing the agreements as regulated by the decree of 5 April 1710, representatives of the Jewish community said that in their demands the citizens of Lviv should not be governed by the circumstances of the early sixteenth century.<sup>67</sup> According to them, at that time circumstances had been more favourable for all: there were no wars, all enjoyed freedom, and fairs flourished in various regions.<sup>68</sup> Today, however, the fairs had ceased to exist, they said. This had led to the impoverishment of the Jewish merchants, who had to borrow large sums of money from Catholic monasteries and the nobility. Almost all Jewish landlords, they continued, had run up debts. In the Ruthenian voivodeship, it was the Jewish community in Lviv ('the synagogue') that owed the largest amount.<sup>69</sup>

During the difficult period of the early eighteenth century, Christians began to compete in trades which they had previously deemed unworthy and which had generally been considered to be in the Jewish sphere, for example selling hard liquor. Referring to the decree of 1670 and other privileges, Jews stated they were only prepared to sign trade agreements which would allow for both retail and wholesale trade in all kinds of merchandise, except for fabrics, particularly blue silk, which was to be distributed wholesale. The craft guilds were to come to terms with them separately, irrespective of the trade agreements adopted.

However, no accord between the two sides was reached in 1712. Much time was spent on clarifying the formal side of the negotiations (selecting the plenipotentiaries, outlining their functions and duties, and so on). At this stage, even before the actual discussion of issues had begun, the citizens protested against the Jews' use of the title *burmistrz* ('mayor') in their authorizations, which was the prerogative of the organs of municipal government.<sup>70</sup> This episode implicitly indicated a conflict of interest between the Polish (i.e. municipal) and Jewish communal authorities, even when it came to questions of jurisdiction.

By 1738 the Jews had further strengthened their trading position in the city of Lviv, and during a new round of negotiations the Jewish elders proposed a condition that their merchants should have the right to virtually free trade without restrictions.<sup>71</sup> All the city councillors could do at that point was try to insist yet again on compliance with the statutes, state constitutions, and royal decrees, including all the prohibitions and limitations the latter contained. Considering that both

<sup>67</sup> TsDIAL, f. 52, op. 1, spr. 139, fo. 106–106<sup>v</sup>.

<sup>68</sup> Ibid. 106.

<sup>69</sup> In 1727 the debt amounted to 438,000 zlotys: M. Bałaban, *Dzieje Żydów w Galicyi i w Rzeczypospolitej Krakowskiej, 1772–1868* (Lwów, 1914), 4; A. Leszczyński, *Sejm Żydów Korony, 1623–1764* (Warsaw, 1994), 142. For the sake of comparison, in the eighteenth century the Jewish *kahals* in Drohobych and Przemyśl, also in the Ruthenian voivodeship, owed significantly smaller amounts, which never exceeded 150,000 zlotys: J. Krochmal, *Krzyż i menora: Żydzi i chrześcijaństwo w Przemyślu w latach 1559–1772* (Przemyśl, 1996), 104.

<sup>70</sup> TsDIAL, f. 52, op. 1, spr. 139, fo. 114<sup>v</sup>.

<sup>71</sup> Ibid. 263–264<sup>v</sup>.

sides were adamant, reconciliation between the two communities was hardly possible. Meanwhile, the Jews found ways to expand their trade and crafts by renting warehouses, houses, and other premises from the nobility and the clergy. In 1738 twenty-five homeowners belonging to either the nobility or the clergy, including members of the Catholic chapter, canons of the cathedral, and fathers of the Dominican, Carmelite, and other orders, were summoned to appear before the judge for renting out parts of their houses to Jews, whether to live in or for selling their goods.<sup>72</sup> However, the citizens were not eager to lose the profitable opportunity to rent out their premises to Jews. Noblemen, city councillors, members of the municipal court, and poorer citizens continued to do so despite the prohibition of 1710.

On 20 April 1738 a royal commission completed an inventory of shops and other premises in the centre of Lviv.<sup>73</sup> The commissioners found seventy shops or warehouses that were rented to Jews in sixty buildings. Trade was being conducted here in honey, fur, spices, cut glassware, hard liquor, and other merchandise. A brief quotation from the inventory gives a vivid picture of the Jewish economic offensive: 'The honourable gentleman Mrozowiecki's house is inhabited exclusively by Jews, from where they carry out various trading activities; they lack there only the facility of a synagogue.'<sup>74</sup>

In accordance with a royal decree of 11 February 1738, Jews were to be denied residence on all streets of the city, except within the Jewish quarter and, for a period of one year only, on Ruska Street.<sup>75</sup> The next inventory, of 13 April 1739, revealed that the royal decree was being almost completely ignored by the Jews, who continued to rent fifty-four warehouses and shops in twenty-five buildings.<sup>76</sup> In 1743 the community *regent* Florian Nuszczyński complained that the decree of 1738 was not being observed by the Jews, who were trading 'in full swing' and occupying shops and properties in the city.<sup>77</sup> According to a court official's report of 4 December 1744, there were nineteen houses in central Lviv, not counting Żydowska ('Jewish') Street, where Jewish merchants and craftsmen were residing illegally.<sup>78</sup> After 1738 Jewish merchants did for the first time begin to leave some Catholic neighbourhoods in Lviv, but the trend was soon reversed and they both regained the lost sites and found new ones for trade and crafts. Bałaban reports that on 21 June 1740 the Jews managed to sign new trade agreements with the city council, based on those of 1592, and not containing a provision according to which Jews agreed to abandon Christian properties.<sup>79</sup> However, only a draft agreement bearing that date has been preserved in the city archive, not signed by either party. No other sources provide evidence that these agreements were ever in force, and indeed in subsequent years city councillors continued to demand that Jewish trade be stopped and that Jews be allowed to reside strictly in their own quarter. In 1744 the last royal decree was

<sup>72</sup> Ibid. 241–246<sup>v</sup>.

<sup>73</sup> Ibid. 253–254<sup>v</sup>.

<sup>74</sup> Ibid. 253.

<sup>75</sup> Zubrytsky, *Khronika mista L'vova*, 427.

<sup>76</sup> TsDIAL, f. 52, op. 1, spr. 139, fos. 271–272<sup>v</sup>.

<sup>77</sup> Ibid. 297–9.

<sup>78</sup> Ibid. 318<sup>v</sup>–322<sup>v</sup>.

<sup>79</sup> Bałaban, *Dzielnica żydowska, jej dzieje i zabytki*, 46.

issued that dealt with the dispute between the city and the Jews. The royal court representative, Lawrenty Kieszniewski, had to deliver its judgement—of exile and infamy as a punishment for both Jewish *kahals* in Lviv—in the remote Belarusian city of Grodno.<sup>80</sup> Apparently, this anti-Jewish sentence could not be pronounced in Lviv, as it would have been met with opposition.

By 1759 the relationship between the two communities had changed little. Announcing the creation of a new royal commission, commissioner Feliks Czacki reported that more than 160 property-owners in Lviv of the nobility and clergy were giving shelter to Jewish merchants and manufacturers.<sup>81</sup> His wordy decree of 12 February 1759 (259 pages, in typical eighteenth-century fashion) contained fifty-seven clauses, the majority of which prescribed that Jews be evicted from Christian properties and reiterated the old prohibitions on Jewish trade, crafts, the selling of liquor, and the operation of pubs and wax refineries.<sup>82</sup> This decree had no more effect than previous ones, and on 12 April an action was brought against Czacki and the Lviv city council by the two *kahals*, on the grounds that the judgement of the commission was unduly restrictive.<sup>83</sup> An anti-Jewish riot and a pogrom, which took place shortly after the decree was issued, also played a part in preventing it from being enforced.<sup>84</sup> The Jewish elders accused the city council of being passive and of condoning anti-Jewish sentiments. Under these circumstances, the king annulled the commissioners' decree.

In July 1759 Lviv witnessed a famous dispute between Orthodox Jews and the supporters of Jacob Frank, who were leaning towards conversion to Christianity.<sup>85</sup> During the debates, the Frankists accused their fellow Jews of so-called 'ritual crimes' (such as the consumption of Christians' blood and the theft of the Eucharistic elements). The royal court and the Roman Catholic clergy, who backed the Frankists, expected that this dispute in Lviv would lead to the mass conversion of the Jewish population. But these expectations turned out to be vain. Only those Frankists who came from small towns primarily in Podolia converted to Christianity.<sup>86</sup>

<sup>80</sup> *Regesty dokumentów i ekscerpty z Metryki Koronnej do historii Żydów w Polsce, 1697–1795*, i: *Czasy Saskie, 1697–1763*, ed. M. Horn (Wrocław, 1984), 77 (no. 365).

<sup>81</sup> TsDIAL, f. 52, op. 2, spr. 640, fos. 6–22.

<sup>82</sup> Bałaban erroneously called commissioner Czacki's decree of 12 February 1759 a decree of King Augustus III: Bałaban, *Dzielnica żydowska, jej dzieje i zabytki*, 50.

<sup>83</sup> TsDIAL, f. 52, op. 1, spr. 140, fo. 10–10<sup>v</sup>.

<sup>84</sup> *Akta grodzkie i ziemskie z czasów Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej*, x (Lwów, 1884), no. 7258; TsDIAL, f. 9, op. 1, spr. 582, pp. 1863–5 (a record of material losses suffered by the Jews during the pogrom of 13 March 1759).

<sup>85</sup> A more detailed description of the dispute can be found in A. Kraushar, *Frank i frankiści polscy, 1726–1816: Monografia historyczna osnuta na źródłach archiwalnych i rękopiśmiennych*, 2 vols. (Kraków, 1895), i. 149–53. Another useful source is M. Bałaban, 'Studien und Quellen zur Geschichte der frankistischen Bewegung in Polen', in *Livre d'hommage à la mémoire du Dr. Samuel Poznański* (Warsaw, 1927), 25–75.

<sup>86</sup> Over the course of 1759–60, 514 Frankists were baptized in Lviv. See Kraushar, *Frank i frankiści polscy*, 208, 327–77 (excerpts from birth registers); L'vivs'ka natsional'na naukova biblioteka im. Stefanyka, Lviv, f. 132 (L'vivs'kyi universytet), spr. 112, fo. 73.

In the eighteenth century, especially its second half, Lviv lost some of its appeal as a city in which Jews could live. Large Jewish *kahals* were created in neighbouring Galician towns, including Brody, Zhovkva, and Bibrka. The rabbis in these towns soon began to compete with those of Lviv. This can be explained by the fact that the confrontation between the local Jewish *kahals* and the municipal authorities in the city continued, whereas in small towns Jews never experienced such tensions<sup>87</sup> and in fact even enjoyed the patronage of urban landowners.<sup>88</sup>

#### ANTISEMITIC ATTACKS AND POGROMS OF THE SEVENTEENTH AND EIGHTEENTH CENTURIES

The relatively peaceful sixteenth century—despite the complicated and controversial relations between the Catholic and Jewish populations—did not see mass violence, riots, and armed attacks against Jewish communities. The historian Daniel Tollet, comparing the restrictions imposed by municipal authorities on Jewish communities in three large cities of the Polish Commonwealth in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries—Kraków, Lviv, and Poznań—states that the situation was best in Lviv and worst in Poznań, where the number of houses in the Jewish quarter was strictly defined, and where the municipal authorities pursued a severe segregation policy to ensure the separation of the Catholic and Jewish populations.<sup>89</sup>

After the difficult war years of Bohdan Khmelnytsky's uprising and the so-called Swedish 'Deluge', the devastated and depopulated Lviv of 1664 experienced the two largest anti-Jewish pogroms in its history.<sup>90</sup> The first attack, against the suburban Jewish community, occurred on 3 May. On that day, both in central Lviv and in the suburbs, huge gatherings of people of the two Christian denominations simultaneously celebrated the Catholic Feast of the Invention of the Cross and the Orthodox Feast of St George. It was on precisely this day that the Jews in the suburbs had decided to hold a musket drill by the city walls, safeguarded by an infantry unit that they had engaged from the Lviv *starosta*. They were evidently apprehensive about possible anti-Jewish riots during the holiday period and wanted to guarantee their

<sup>87</sup> In Przemyśl, according to an agreement signed in 1757, the Christian and Jewish communities received absolutely equal residential and commercial rights: Krochmal, *Krzyż i menora*, 206.

<sup>88</sup> A vivid example of how the Polish magnates protected the Jewish community in the town of Zhovkva, not far from Lviv, can be found in S. Gąsiorowski, *Chrześcijaństwo i Żydzi w Żółkwi w XVII i XVIII wieku* (Kraków, 2001), 130–57.

<sup>89</sup> D. Tollet, *Historia Żydów w Polsce od XVI wieku do rozbiorów*, trans. D. Zamojska (Warsaw, 1999), 27.

<sup>90</sup> An extensive, but mostly biased, coverage of these tragic events based on the records of the municipal authorities can be found in Zubrytsky, *Khronika mista L'vova*, 367–73. A cursory examination of the pogroms can also be found in several works by Bałaban: Bałaban, *Żydzi lwowscy na przełomie XVI i XVII wieku*, 497; id., *Dzielnica żydowska, jej dzieje i zabytki*, 32–3; id., 'Iz proshlogo "Evreiskoi ulitsy" vo L'vove (XVII–XVIII v.)', *Evreiskaya starina*, 1 (1909), 239–40. In the first of these, Bałaban mistakenly identified 1663 as the year of the great pogrom, and this incorrect date has consequently appeared in other studies too, e.g. Melamed, *Evrei vo L'vove*, 90.

security. But their plan backfired. The military exercise attracted attention, and many spectators gathered to watch it. Students and young people from the city started poking fun at the Jews and throwing stones at them. According to representatives of the municipal administration, who later testified about the events, Jews reacted inappropriately to the ridicule, rushing on the crowd with their weapons and beating up some of the Christians. The municipal record reports that some were even killed, though this is doubtful, as no documents in the subsequent judicial proceedings attest to this.

After word spread that Christians had been beaten up by Jews, several thousand people, including students, servants from the households of the nobility, and country people who were in the city to celebrate the holidays, launched an uncontrolled attack on the suburban Jewish community. Even the infantrymen who were supposed to be protecting the Jews joined in the riot. The municipal authorities sent a few dozen men to restore order, but they were unable to hold back the crowd of several thousand people.

After the pogrom, almost all the Jews left the suburbs to live in the city centre. The city administration requested that the Jewish elders engage a military unit for their protection, but the Jews instead sought help from the Great Crown Hetman Stanisław Potocki, who assigned two companies to protect them.<sup>91</sup> The city council complained that the military were stationed not in the Jewish quarter but in Christian districts, and that poor people were expected to accommodate and feed them. Later, upon the citizens' insistence, one of the companies left Lviv.

In this tense situation, a second pogrom occurred, this time in the centre of Lviv. On 12 June 1664, the Catholic Feast of Corpus Christi, students of the Jesuit College gathered near the Dominican Church after a solemn procession and attacked homes in the Jewish quarter, despite precautions taken by the municipal authorities. The mayor, Józef Bartłomiej Zimorowic, attempted to get the situation under control. Accompanied by his assistants, he personally attended the site of the pogrom and to begin with calmed the situation somewhat. He notified the Catholic archbishop, the rector of the Jesuit College, and government officials of the danger of a pogrom. In the event that violence escalated and the situation became critical, the mayor also ordered cannons to be fired over the heads of the attackers. As a result of infelicitous or inept cannon fire—instead of a cannoneer it was actually a baker who fired the cannon—several people died,<sup>92</sup> but even this failed to stop the crowd. The dragoon company that had remained in the city to protect the Jews, that of the nobleman Tarnawski, failed to put up any resistance. To allow the dragoons, who were stationed in the suburbs, to enter the city, the mayor opened the gate,

<sup>91</sup> In his *Evrei vo L'vove*, 90–1, Volodymyr Melamed gives inaccurate information about the pogroms of 1664, which may perhaps be attributed to a poor grasp of the literature (sometimes one gets an impression that Melamed's command of Polish is quite weak). He is not aware, for example, that there were two pogroms, one in the suburbs and one in central Lviv, and he asserts that Hetman Potocki, with a small company, tried to prevent the pogrom, whereas Potocki was not in the city at the time of the pogrom.

<sup>92</sup> TsDIAL, f. 52, op. 1, spr. 138, fos. 189–190<sup>v</sup>.



which gave a good many rioters access. In his later testimony, Zimorowic condemned the actions of the commander of the dragoons, claiming that he had acted imprudently, threatening citizens with a drawn sabre and swearing he would kill them.<sup>93</sup> Under such circumstances nothing could prevent the pogroms and looting.

In these two pogroms 129 Jews were killed, seventy-eight in the suburbs and fifty-one in central Lviv.<sup>94</sup> Buildings were destroyed, houses plundered, personal and communal belongings looted, and paperwork documenting their rights and privileges burnt or stolen. The Jewish elders estimated the losses at 700,000 zlotys. As Zubrzycki writes, the question of reimbursement arose, and the elders, following the advice of influential friends and protectors, sued the municipal authorities for their failure to protect the community against the pogroms.<sup>95</sup> The most active participants in the pogrom (students of the Jesuit College, servants, petty or impoverished noblemen, and chance visitors to Lviv) might find ways of avoiding prosecution, so it was most convenient to file a lawsuit against the municipal administration.

For more than a month, from 21 July to 23 August 1664, a royal commission known as a commissarial court, headed by the castellan of Kamyanets, Mikołaj Bieganowski, investigated the causes of the pogroms. One of the main questions raised by the investigation was why no branch of government authority had managed to prevent them.<sup>96</sup> Another key question concerned lost valuables and other belongings which had been placed in pawn with Jews, chiefly by noblemen. Soon after the pogroms, both they and the clergy began to bring actions against Jews, demanding that valuables be returned and debts repaid. This gave the king cause to intervene, and he issued a mandate to certain powerful magnates and governors of the Ruthenian voivodeship in defence of the Jews.<sup>97</sup>

The plaintiffs in the legal action at the commissarial court were the suburban and city-centre Jews whose relatives had been killed in the pogroms,<sup>98</sup> and the entire Jewish community of Lviv. Among the defendants were the former mayor Jakub Kraus, mayor Józef Bartłomiej Zimorowic, the city council, and the entire community of Lviv. The municipal syndic, Stefan Dotkiewicz, tried to cast doubt on the court's authority, alleging a violation of statutory provisions and privileges which excluded Lviv from the jurisdiction of any commissarial court. However, the court's mandate was validated by other statutory provisions concerning pogroms and the security of the city. In sum, the court was only to conduct an investigation, leaving the final decision to the king.

<sup>93</sup> *Ibid.* 231.

<sup>94</sup> Zubrytsky, *Khronika mista L'vova*, 371. Melamed erroneously gives the number of casualties as seventy-five Jews killed and 200 seriously injured, and reports that Jewish families who suffered losses received compensation: Melamed, *Evrei vo L'vove*, 90–1.

<sup>95</sup> Zubrytsky, *Khronika mista L'vova*, 372. <sup>96</sup> TsDIAL, f. 52, op. 1, spr. 138, fos. 205–229<sup>v</sup>.

<sup>97</sup> *Pryvileyi natsional' nykh hromad mista L'vova, XIV–XVIII st.*, ed. M. Kapral (Lviv, 2000), 464–6.

<sup>98</sup> Approximately fifty families were represented (though altogether 129 Jews were killed): TsDIAL, f. 52, op. 1, spr. 138, fos. 213<sup>v</sup>–214.

The Jewish elders collected all the evidence of violations of 'security in the frontier city' of Lviv caused by the municipal authorities' failure to take action. The elders and other representatives of the Jewish community had more than once made requests, both before and during the pogroms, for military support or other assistance, but city councillors had advised them to stay calm and remain in their houses. After the tragic events, the Jews drew their own conclusion: 'No doubt the councillors' intention was that all the Jews be murdered.'<sup>99</sup> The harshest complaints were voiced against Zimorowic, who before the second pogrom offered the Jews nothing but empty reassurances, failed to organize protection of the Jewish quarter, sent only six or seven dragoons rather than a larger military force, and so on. In 1665 Zimorowic made a separate testimony in which he attempted to exculpate himself.<sup>100</sup> These accusations seem to have haunted Zimorowic, the author of the chronicle 'Leopolis Triplex', in which he describes the Jewish people in offensive terms.<sup>101</sup>

During the work of the court, which lasted more than a month, the Jews, according to the testimony of syndic Dotkiewicz, were bribing witnesses so that they would testify against municipal officials as initiators of the pogroms. A Carmelite monk, Teodor Łabuński, was captured during the pogrom and imprisoned in Pidhaitsi. During a hearing in the court of the crown hetman, at the insistence of two Lviv Jews (Boniech and Gerszon) he admitted that councillor Zimorowic and other municipal officials had inveigled him into bringing stolen merchandise to his home estate. Later, before the church court, the monk renounced his testimony, which he said he had been forced to give under threat of capital punishment.<sup>102</sup>

Another witness, a nobleman from the Bełz voivodeship named Jakub Korycki, reported an attempt to bribe him. He said he had been given notes stating what he was supposed to say during the hearing, and was offered the return of a pawned sabre if he would testify as instructed. He was supposed to portray the actions of the municipal authorities, particularly of Zimorowic and of Józef Tołoczko, in a negative light, and to claim that they egged on the rioters by yelling from the city's fortification walls.<sup>103</sup>

The commissarial court decided to reject the testimonies of those witnesses who might have been corrupted and ruled that the final decision should be made by the king. In addition, the royal commissaries also prepared a document, titled 'Ordinatio securitatis civitatis Leopoliensis' ('A Regulation on the Security of the City of Lviv').<sup>104</sup> Five provisions in this regulation were aimed at securing peace in the city and preventing violence. First of all, two councillors and four representatives of the *ordines* had to inspect all suburban buildings, houses, and yards and conduct a census of all the people irrespective of status, sex, and age. Vagrants were

<sup>99</sup> TsDIAL, f. 52, op. 1, spr. 138, fos. 213<sup>v</sup>–214.

<sup>100</sup> Ibid. 231–231<sup>v</sup>.

<sup>101</sup> J. B. Zimorowic, 'Leopolis Triplex', in *Opera quibus res gestae urbis Leopoli illustrantur*, ed. C. Heck (Lviv, 1899), 43, 63, etc.

<sup>102</sup> TsDIAL, f. 52, op. 1, spr. 138, fo. 185–185<sup>v</sup>.

<sup>103</sup> Ibid. 195–195<sup>v</sup>.

<sup>104</sup> Ibid. 226<sup>v</sup>–229.

to be interrogated, and possible participants in pogroms were to be imprisoned. After the census had been taken, elders, chieftains of the hundreds, and chiefs of the dozens were to be elected from among the homeowners, shopkeepers, and servants. After taking an oath of allegiance to the king and the city council, they were to create units of hundreds and of dozens to patrol the city streets and ensure security. Every week they were to report to the mayor on the state of affairs in their neighbourhoods. Upon the outbreak of a pogrom, all citizens living within the city walls were to gather with their units, and all those living in the suburbs were to appear in person ('in personis suis'), under the leadership of their officers. The city was to contribute three-fifths of the cost of maintaining this force, and the city-centre and suburban Jewish communities two-fifths.<sup>105</sup>

Four years after the pogroms, on 17 July 1668, King Jan Kazimierz issued a contumacious decree from his court. In the absence of lawyers representing the city council and community, the Jews were successful in obtaining the imposition of a severe sentence on the municipal authorities and the citizens.<sup>106</sup> In accordance with the Jewish statute of 1264, for every Jew killed the city had to pay the so-called *taxa capitum*, while four representatives from each of the three *ordines* (i.e. councillors, court officials, and the community) were to be imprisoned for a term of one year and six weeks. All the losses caused by the pogroms as well as the costs of litigation, which the Jews estimated at 700,000 zlotys, were to be reimbursed by the citizens in two weeks. Moreover, Jews residing in Lviv received the right to free trade and other economic activities (including the running of taverns and the renting of property) without restrictions. Enforcement of this decree was to be overseen by the royal authorities (*urząd grodzki*) in Lviv. Analysing the decree, Zubrzycki wrote bitterly of the 'gratitude' with which the Commonwealth repaid the city of Lviv for the sieges withstood in 1648 and 1655 and for the financial losses suffered by its citizens.<sup>107</sup>

However, King Jan Kazimierz's decree of 17 July 1668 never came into effect. It was his successor King Michał Wiśniowiecki who delivered the final sentence on 20 December 1670.<sup>108</sup> He annulled the previous decree and defined the new conditions which were to be met by both the city council and the citizens. The former mayors Jakub Kraus, Józef Bartłomiej Zimorowic, and Józef Tołoczko were compelled by the royal court to testify under oath that they had not instigated the pogroms in the city centre and in the suburbs, and had not subsequently allowed fifteen participants to escape from the municipal prison. In addition, the decree contained

<sup>105</sup> In this 'Ordinatio' of 1664, the fire-safety requirements were formulated for the first time. It read: 'In case of fire, a homeowner in the city or in the suburbs shall have enough water, ladders, and other means to extinguish the fire': TsDIAL, f. 52, op. 1, spr. 138, fo. 228<sup>v</sup>. The author of a monograph about the development of the firefighting profession in Lviv claims that the first fire-safety regulation was a municipal ruling of 1681: S. Popovych, *Pozhezhnystvo L'vova: Istorychnyi narys* (Lviv, 2002), 144–5.

<sup>106</sup> TsDIAL, f. 52, op. 1, spr. 138, fos. 241–245<sup>v</sup>. Zubrytsky gives the date incorrectly as 24 July 1668: Zubrytsky, *Khronika mista L'vova*, 374.

<sup>107</sup> Zubrytsky, *Khronika mista L'vova*, 375.

<sup>108</sup> TsDIAL, f. 52, op. 1, spr. 139, fos. 24–30<sup>v</sup>.

two very important and beneficial provisions for the Jewish community. First, the Jews were exempted from repaying any debts owed to the city, except in respect of two houses that they rented; second, they could enjoy all the economic and trading privileges and rights possessed by citizens of the Commonwealth's large cities. By these provisions of the decree, Jews and the citizens of Lviv now had absolutely equal rights in terms of economic activity: they were exempt from paying taxes, they were permitted to sell liquor and to open market stalls, and, most importantly, they could trade freely in any merchandise without temporal or other limitations.

During this period of litigation, Lviv narrowly escaped another pogrom. One of the suburban elders and two synagogue officials lodged a complaint against the mayor and the entire community of Lviv. According to this complaint, on 16 June 1668 a delegation, headed by Zimorowic and other councillors, arrived in the Krakowskie suburb in order to enforce a commissarial decree on the closure of second-hand dealers' stalls in front of the city gate.<sup>109</sup> The commission, set up by the king to delimit the municipal and castle jurisdictions, had almost finished its work, and the stalls of Jewish second-hand dealers had come to fall under the municipal jurisdiction. The municipal delegation, joined by many other people, almost caused a new pogrom. The crowd had already started looting Jewish houses, and it was only the intervention of the commissaries and voivodeship officials that suppressed the violent antisemitic sentiments of the mob.

In the eighteenth century, threatening situations which fomented xenophobic sentiments among the citizens of Lviv arose fairly often. As in earlier years, Jews sought protection from their powerful high-ranking connections, to whom they often made significant loans. In 1718 the Ruthenian voivode Jan Stanisław Jabłonowski sent a reproachful letter to the mayor of Lviv, councillors, and other municipal officials as well as to the rector of the cathedral school calling on them to prevent a pogrom against the Jews of Lviv.<sup>110</sup> Another threatening situation arose after the violent death of a Christian maid who worked for Jews. It was only thanks to the Great Crown Hetman and Castellan of Kraków Adam Mikołaj Sieniawski, who sent in military units, that violence was averted. Even so, some Jewish houses were looted. At the scene, the military arrested twenty-five disreputable people of various backgrounds, including members of the nobility, townspeople, and country people. Those whom the testimony of at least six witnesses could identify as perpetrators were sentenced to death.<sup>111</sup>

In 1728 there was a court case in Lviv in which the Reizes brothers, Yeshua and Hayim, and the Rabbi of Shchyrets were accused of proselytism in relation to one Jan Filipowicz, who was newly converted to Catholicism.<sup>112</sup> It is possible that the

<sup>109</sup> TsDIAL, f. 52, op. 1, spr. 138, fos. 239–40.

<sup>110</sup> TsDIAL, f. 52, op. 1, spr. 139, fos. 149–52.

<sup>111</sup> Ibid. 153–4.

<sup>112</sup> The proceedings, including the circumstances that had led up to them, and the effect produced on the Jews, are described in Bałaban, *Dzielnica żydowska, jej dzieje i zabytki*, 34–7, and id., 'Iz proshlogo "Evreiskoi ulitsy" vo L'vove', 242–6.

convert came from outside Lviv and had doubts about his new faith, leading the Jews to reclaim him for Judaism. They were accused of capturing Filipowicz on his way home and holding him in a beer-cellar under the administrative building of the *kahal*. There they tried to wash the chrism from the forehead of the newly christened Filipowicz, and also broke and stamped on the cross he was wearing.<sup>113</sup> This blasphemy was taken by Christians as a pretext for severe judicial persecution of the entire *kahal*. The *starosta* of Lviv, Stanisław Potocki, ordered the arrest of all the rabbis and *kahal* elders in Lviv and the neighbouring towns, but only the Reizes brothers and the rabbi were detained, and indeed the latter managed to escape from prison (his name is not found in the official documents). The sentence passed by the highest officials of the Ruthenian and Podolian voivodeships was extremely harsh: 'To tear out the tongues of the convicted, burn their hands, put them in the pillory, quarter them alive, and finally burn them.'<sup>114</sup> Only one of the brothers, Hayim, who headed the rabbinical court in Lviv, was subjected to these terrible tortures on 13 May 1728. Before his death he refused to be converted to Catholicism and thus became a martyr.<sup>115</sup> Throughout the whole of the sixteenth to eighteenth centuries this was the only judicial process in Lviv concerning an offence against religion which ended in capital punishment. Elsewhere in the Ruthenian voivodeship, death sentences for Jews in similar cases were pronounced more often. For example, six Jews were executed in Przemyśl in 1759 alone.<sup>116</sup>

A further serious attack on the two Jewish neighbourhoods in Lviv took place in 1732. It was precipitated by the fatal beating of a student from the Jesuit College by an unknown Jew, who came under the jurisdiction of the commandant of Lviv, Ludwik Zawadzki. Over the next few days, students gathered and tried to enter the Jewish quarter. Two houses on Krakowska Street, where Jews had rented property, had already been destroyed by the attackers.<sup>117</sup> The vice-voivode, Józef Błażejowski, who was responsible for judging Jewish issues, held the Jesuit fathers responsible for instigating the pogrom and accused the municipal authorities of taking no action to stop it. The city council did indeed fail to prevent the outbreak of large-scale rioting on 26 July 1732. At first, students, idlers, and unskilled workers looted several houses in the city-centre Jewish quarter. Then the crowd proceeded to the suburbs, where close on 160 houses were looted. The rioters plundered the suburban synagogue, taking religious valuables, utensils, books, and records of debts and other documents.<sup>118</sup>

The Jewish leadership naturally accused the city councillors of failing to prevent the violence, and even blamed them for instigating the riot, suggesting that at secret meetings in the city hall they had instructed the students on how to act. The Jews

<sup>113</sup> TsDIAL, f. 9, op. 1, spr. 521, pp. 1410–11.

<sup>114</sup> Bałaban, 'Iz proshlogo "Evreiskoi ulitsy" vo L'vove'.

<sup>115</sup> Bałaban, *Dzielnica żydowska, jej dzieje i zabytki*, 37.

<sup>116</sup> Z. Guldon and J. Wijaczka, 'Procesy o mordy rytualne na Rusi Czerwonej, Podolu i Prawo-brzeżnej Ukrainie w XVI–XVIII wieku', *Nasza Przeszłość*, 81 (1994), 61–3.

<sup>117</sup> TsDIAL, f. 52, op. 1, spr. 139, fos. 215–217<sup>v</sup>.

<sup>118</sup> *Ibid.* 220.

presented four people who had been injured during the pogrom and also stated that two children aged 3 and 4 had disappeared. The material losses suffered by approximately 190 Jewish families, primarily in the suburbs, amounted to hundreds of thousands of zlotys.<sup>119</sup>

During the second half of the eighteenth century, three further major pogroms occurred in Lviv, in 1751, 1759, and 1762.<sup>120</sup> These events predictably provoked in the Jews feelings of mistrust and suspicion in the urban environment. They were unwilling to obey the decrees of the Crown and its deputies, while the city authorities, supported by all the citizens of Lviv, continued to place restrictions on their residence and trade.

After Lviv became part of the Austrian empire in 1772, Austrian officials, who inherited a minimal 'credit' of trust in matters concerning Christian–Jewish relations, did manage to prevent pogroms against the Jewish population by means of strict compulsion.<sup>121</sup> However, although the officials provided security for the Jewish residents, they also actively, if randomly, interfered in the life of the Jewish community by such actions as deporting the poor, introducing high fees for marriages, and forcing Jews to perform military service.<sup>122</sup> Under Austrian rule, the Jewish community in Lviv, as well as other national communities, faced a totally different legal situation.

*Translated from the Ukrainian by Roman Ivashkiv and Natalia Kovaliova*

<sup>119</sup> TsDIAL, f. 52, op. 1, spr. 139, fo. 224.

<sup>120</sup> Bałaban, *Dzielnica żydowska, jej dzieje i zabytki*, 34; TsDIAL, f. 52, op. 1, spr. 140, fos. 3–5<sup>v</sup>.

<sup>121</sup> See F. A. Szabo, 'Austrian First Impressions of Ethnic Relations in Galicia: The Case of Governor Anton von Pergen', *Polin*, 12 (1999), 49–60.

<sup>122</sup> Bałaban, *Dzieje Żydów w Galicyi i w Rzeczypospolitej Krakowskiej*, 3–17.

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# Christian Anti-Judaism and Jewish–Orthodox Relations among the Eastern Slavs up to 1569

ALEXANDER PERESWETOFF–MORATH

Quand on aborde une spiritualité exotique, on comprend surtout ce qu'on est prédestiné à comprendre par sa propre vocation, par sa propre orientation culturelle et celle du moment historique auquel on appartient.

MIRCEA ELIADE  
*Yoga*

THE MAJORITY OF LITERARY WORKS known to medieval East Slavs were imported from Byzantium in Church Slavonic translations. The more religious and highbrow the genre, the more true this general rule. With few exceptions, these works were common to all of Orthodox Slavdom and, although circulating in national recensions of Church Slavonic (but almost never in the vernacular), they had generally been Slavonicized in the south—in Bulgaria, Serbia, or on Greek Mount Athos, ‘the Holy Mountain’, with its many monastic foundations. It follows that the currency of a text in an East Slavonic recension (at least until the sixteenth century) does not require there to have been, at any particular point, specific East Slavonic reasons for executing a translation.

As a rule, the output on Judaism of the translators, compilers, and authors of the eastern regions of *Slavia Slavonica* (or *Slavia Orthodoxa*) grew from this rich transplanted heritage, while the life and doings of Jews on Rus soil, even their dealings with Christian Slavs, constituted another universe, and one far less known at that. There are moments when we catch glimpses of common dimensions, of channels of

This chapter has been previously published in translation, in a differently abbreviated form, as ‘Khristianskii antiiudaizm i iudeisko-pravoslavnye otnosheniya v vostochnoi Slavii v srednie veka i rannee novoe vremya (do 1570 g.)’, in A. Kulik (ed.), *Istoriya evreiskogo naroda v Rossii, i: Ot drevnosti do rannego novogo vremeni* (Moscow and Jerusalem, 2010), 414–48, and as ‘Hapolmos ha’anti-yehudi berusyah’, in A. Kulik (ed.), *Toledot yehudei rusyah, i: mimei kedem ad ha’et hahadashah hamukdemet* (Jerusalem, 2010), 322–48. In only a few instances have works published after 2007 been taken into account. I refer throughout to my *A Grin without a Cat*, 2 vols. (Lund, 2002) (hereafter *GWAC*). For a succinct general survey of texts, see J. Ledit, ‘Russie (pensée religieuse)’, in *Dictionnaire de théologie catholique, contenant l’exposé des doctrines de la théologie catholique, leurs preuves et leur histoire*, xiv (Paris, 1939), 221 ff.

communication. These are rare, however, and can be fixed with even a modicum of precision mainly from the fifteenth century. It is furthermore almost certain that much of the anti-Judaic output of Orthodox Rus literature would have been produced even without the existence of nearby Jewish communities. Such is its traditionalistic character and such the nature of its emergence from internal Christian needs. Many lists of historical facts on Judaism which have been extracted from literary works in Slavonic must therefore be heavily decimated, and there is very much we must simply forget from the classic treatments of Kievan Jewry of a Bershinsky or a Dubnow—not to speak of a Malyshevsky or a Baratz or of some present-day nationalist *littérateurs*.<sup>1</sup> On the whole, indigenous East Slav sources exhibit small interest in ‘minority’ views and actions, as long as no conflicts with the history-writing ‘majority’ elite arose.

But the loss of various spectral facts does not turn into proof that there were no settled Jewish communities—indeed, there were! It all merely invalidates some traditionally cited pieces of evidence which ought never to have been presented without additional support. The *silence* on Jews in contemporary chronicles cannot therefore be used to draw positive conclusions *e silentio* of anything like the *absence* of settled Jews; instead, the historian must attempt to mould an informed opinion of what is likely to have been the ‘unmarked’ case (to use a linguistic term)—presence or absence of Jews at a specific time and place—or rule that all of this is, at the present stage of scholarship, an unknowable.<sup>2</sup> My views have at times been misrepresented on these points, and I must needs repeat here that the missing ‘cat’ of the Carrollian metaphor in the title of my two-volume study, *A Grin without a Cat*, is *not* the Jews but Christian–Jewish head-on confrontation—the body—of which we have a ‘grin’—the disembodied attitude—in the many texts *adversus Iudaeos* in circulation in Rus.

Rus anti-Judaica contain exceedingly little that is ‘antisemitic’ in a stricter sense, with traits marking it out much from ‘common’ xenophobia or apologetical theological anti-Judaism. In this it is generally remote from the monstrosities of the modern era, as well as, indeed, from some popular medieval sentiment of western Europe. It will not as a rule fit the defining criterion of antisemitism proper as proposed by a leading modern student of the subject of pre-modern anti-Judaism, namely that of being *chimerical*.<sup>3</sup> Avid readers of works on secular stereotypes of the European Middle Ages and Renaissance, with scrofulous, odorous Jews as lusty poisoners, cloak-and-dagger merchants, and ritual murderers, will be disappointed by Rus anti-Judaica. There are only the faintest of traces of this. Despite frequent innuendoes to the contrary, such myths entered Russia only in the modern era.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup> See *GWAC*, vol. ii, and Pereswetoff-Morath, ‘Khristianskii antiiudaizm’, 419.

<sup>2</sup> See now, however, the first volume of the multi-author *Istoriya evreiskogo naroda v Rossii*, published in 2010.

<sup>3</sup> G. I. Langmuir, *Toward a Definition of Antisemitism* (Berkeley, 1990).

<sup>4</sup> M. Dmitriev, ‘Christian Attitudes to Jews and Judaism in Muscovite Russia: The Problem Revisited’, *CEU History Department Yearbook* (2001–2), 21–41; A. I. Peresvetov-Murat [Pereswetoff-



## CHRISTIAN VERSUS JEW

Jews appear in the mental universe of the Orthodox bookman mainly in connection with the traditional business of interpreting either the Old Testament (the term I shall use here for the Tanakh) or the Passion of Christ, drawing mainly from liturgy and traditions from the Gospel of John. The Old Testament in particular was a difficult matter to approach for theologians and laymen alike. While supplying Christianity with a venerable past and providing the very prophecies whose fulfilments the authors of the New Testament set out to illustrate, it also depicted a divine people elect. This people lingered on, still denying, it appeared, much in the Old Testament that was regarded as central and self-evident truth by Christians. In handling this mystery, the Prophets came in handy along with the Passion of Christ. As the risen Jesus himself tells the disciples in Luke (24: 25–7): “O fools, and slow of heart to believe all that the prophets have spoken” . . . And beginning at Moses and all the prophets, he expounded unto them in all the scriptures the things concerning himself.’ Internally intended ‘catalogues of sins’ of Israel given by men such as Isaiah and Jeremiah began to be read as indictments by proto-Christians (‘the righteous’, *praved’ nii*, prophets) of much of the entire Jewish people, true for all times and places. The Passion of the Son of God in the Johannine tradition then proved the point of the utter despicability and fall from grace of the Jews. *Quod erat demonstrandum*.

This resulted not only in the denigration of the Jewish ‘people’ but also in the exaltation—and exultation—of the Christian ‘people’, now enjoying God’s benevolence as the New Israel. Furthermore, depictions of the Jewish people, on whose general ‘badness’ all could agree, served as a perfect foil for depictions of Christian virtues. Describe a trait or an action as the opposite of a Jewish one and it is characterized as good and virtuous; describe the opposite of a virtuous and good trait and it will probably turn out to be applicable to Jews. The rhetorical uses that the Jew, this ultimate ‘Other’, could be put to by Christian thinkers (and, at times, vice versa) in this era of monotheism were countless. Of course, throughout Christian Europe people were often apt to distinguish the rhetorical Jew from ‘the Jew next door’; as a rule, these two figures really did inhabit separate universes, and even when the two did communicate, it might rather be the Jew next door who tempered the image of the exegetical Jew. But at times of societal or religious crisis, the barriers might break; and in places where few or no Jews could be found, the darkness of the image of the Jew might prove untemperable. There *may* have been such tendencies in north-eastern Rus after the collapse, in the mid-thirteenth century, of the state centred on Kiev. But we do not know this with certainty.

Morath], “Adonai, zabludikhom!”: Ob obraze *sporyashchego zhidovina* v vostochnoslavyanskoi pis’mennosti (XIV–XV vv.), in O. V. Budnitsky (ed.), *Arkhiv evreiskoi istorii*, iv (Moscow, 2007), 51–83.

Exegetical works and works on world history (which often seem to have amounted to tracing a line, in the work of God through human history, from the Old Testament and Josephus Flavius to Christian Rome, including what we call Byzantium and further on to Rus), such as the so-called *Philosopher's Speech* incorporated in the *Primary Chronicle*, are prone to address the problems of the Jews, particularly in order to point out the abundance of prophecies of Jesus the Messiah on one hand, and of the fall from grace of the Jewish people on the other, at times exploding into that peculiar medieval 'ubi est?' poetics: 'Where be now your sacrifice, where be now the Holy of Holies, where be now your country?' But particularly, it is a common rhetorical device to burst out into 'Don't you understand, O wretched Jew?', 'Do you see, O Jew?', and so on. The use of the same trick in sermons clearly designed for church use, or in commentaries on texts such as the epistles of Paul, which are patently internal Christian documents, betrays a rhetorical purpose and suggests that we cannot automatically draw conclusions about interactions with real Jews, even when the literature might have allowed it on principle. Clearly imported examples which set the agenda are the *Commentary on Psalms* of Hesychius of Jerusalem or the Bulgarian Exarch John's *Hexaëmeron*.

#### THE INTERPRETED PALAIA AND THE SAYINGS OF THE HOLY PROPHETS

The most impressive of these exegetical works was, however, a Slavonic composition which came to enjoy considerable popularity from the mid-fifteenth century on: the *Interpreted Palaia* (from the Greek *hē Palaiā*, 'Old (Testament)').<sup>5</sup> The *Palaia* survives in several redactions with complicated genealogy. It is possible that the original work was never finished. The text was gradually added to, and some more or less anti-Judaic texts were not seldom copied out along with it in a peculiar appendix (*prilozhenie*). Certain manuscripts even elaborate the title of the work as 'The Interpreted *Palaia*, which is against the Jew(s)', and in late tradition the work is occasionally and confidently, though quite erroneously, ascribed to the fourth-century preacher John Chrysostom, known for his anti-Judaic tirades. The *Palaia* comments, chapter after chapter, on the Christological and divinely ordained historiosophical ('economical') meaning of the Bible from Genesis to the Third or Fourth Book of Kings, but it is a moot point to what extent it was originally meant

<sup>5</sup> Edition: *Paleyeva tolkovaya, po spisku sdëlanomu v g. Kolomně v 1406 g.: Trud uchenikov N. S. Tikhonravova*, 2 vols. (Moscow, 1892–6); cf., with caution, *Paleyeva tolkovaya*, ed. A. M. Kamchatnov et al. (Moscow, 2002), with a modern Russian translation (contrast N. Trunte's review in *Zeitschrift für slavische Philologie*, 62/2 (2003), 441–5). Text and redactions: F. J. Thomson, 'The Slavonic Translation of the Old Testament', in J. Krašovec (ed.), *The Interpretation of the Bible: The International Symposium in Slovenia* (Sheffield, 1998), 870–3; A. A. Alekseev, 'Paleyeva v sisteme khronograficheskogo zhanra', *Trudy Otdela drevnerusskoi literatury*, 57 (2006), 25–32; A. A. Turilov, 'Barsovskaya Paleya', in *Pravoslavnaya entsiklopediya*, iv (Moscow, 2002), 360.

to encompass the ‘entire’ Old Testament. The best-informed view, and a very convincing one at that, has for some time now been that it was largely an East Slavonic work of the mid-thirteenth to mid-fourteenth century, but the case for an Old Bulgarian origin was recently reopened, though it has not been widely accepted.<sup>6</sup> It is clear that, apart from anti-Judaic texts, the *Palaiia* has incorporated ‘texts’ of ultimately talmudic origin, but it is still largely unknown whether there are among these any taken over via *direct* interaction with Jewish tradition. In most cases, close study suggests a Greek intermediary layer between actual talmudic tradition and its manifestations in Slavonic texts.<sup>7</sup>

A continuation of sorts of the *Palaiia*, although somewhat different in style and purview, is the similarly anti-Judaic *Sayings of the Holy Prophets* (also known as the *Prophecy of Solomon*).<sup>8</sup> Here, too, the jury is still out on the question of whether we have before us a work of a Kievan Rus author, of an early author from north-east Rus, or (as the present writer is inclined to believe) of one from fourteenth- or fifteenth-century Ruthenia. (For this text as well, a South Slavonic origin is still occasionally proposed.<sup>9</sup>) Final judgement must depend on whether the *Interpreted Palaiia* can be quite firmly rooted in the early literature of the East Slavs, but the difficulty—and the varying judgements—has also to do with the fact that this kind of text may incorporate older works, perhaps even datable ones, and tends to evolve and swell in the manuscript tradition. As a result, the discrete identity of a ‘text’, and hence the origin of it, can be difficult to fix.

In texts such as these, where the addressed Jew appears as a foil for ‘correct’ interpretations of the Bible, no actual image of ‘the Jew’ as a person or as a type emerges. Nor is there at the present stage of scholarship much basis for positing a direct link between literature and Jewish history when discussing the origin of these texts. Their ‘Jew’ is almost entirely biblical or intra-testamental.<sup>10</sup>

<sup>6</sup> T. Slavova, *Tälkovnata Paleya v konteksta na starobälgarskata knizhnina* (Sofia, 2002).

<sup>7</sup> On some possible exceptions, see M. Taube, ‘Eres’ “zhidovstvuyushchikh” i perevody s evreiskogo v srednevekovoi Rusi’, in Kulik (ed.), *Istoriya evreiskogo naroda v Rossii*, i. 369–70; id., ‘Jewish–Christian Collaboration in Medieval Slavic Translations from Hebrew’, forthcoming. Contrast, e.g., A. A. Alekseev, ‘Apokrify Tolkovoi Palei, perevedennye s evreiskikh originalov’, *Trudy Otdela drevnerusskoi literatury*, 58 (2007), 55–6.

<sup>8</sup> Editions: I. E. Evseev, ‘Slovesa svyatykh prorok—protivoiudeiskii pamyatnik po rukopisi XV vëka’, in *Drevnosti: Trudy Slavyanskoi komissii Imperatorskago Moskovskago arkheologicheskago obshchestva*, iv/1 (Moscow, 1907), 153–200; ed. E. G. Vodolazkin and T. R. Rudi, in E. G. Vodolazkin, *Vsemirnaya istoriya v literature Drevnei Rusi (na materiale khronograficheskogo i paleinogo povestvovaniya XI–XV vekov)* (Munich, 2000), with studies; 2nd edn. (St Petersburg, 2008). Cf. *GWAC*, i. 42–51, and A. I. Pereswetoff-Morath, ‘Whereby We Know that It Is the Last Time’: *Musings on Anti-Messiahs and Antichrists in a Ruthenian Textual Community* (Lund, 2006), 120–1.

<sup>9</sup> Thus, cautiously, B. Lourié, ‘Slavonic Text of Hard Fate: The *Prophecy of Solomon* and Some Others. Towards a Recent Book’, *Scrinium: Revue de patrologie, d’hagiographie critique et d’histoire ecclésiastique*, 5 (2009), 364–90 (review of Vodolazkin, *Vsemirnaya istoriya v literature Drevnei Rusi*, 2nd edn.).

<sup>10</sup> But see Taube, ‘Jewish–Christian Collaboration’.

THE ‘SECOND SOUTH SLAVONIC INFLUENCE’ AND  
SOME LATE TRACTS

In a remarkable literary undertaking in the fourteenth-century Slavonic Balkans, Bulgarian bookmen and Athonite monks (mainly, but hardly exclusively, Bulgarians and Serbs) brought about a very large number of new translations and reintroduced and recirculated older works, often in new redactions. In its effects on the culture of the East Slavs, this endeavour is known as the ‘Second South Slavonic Influence’, and through it, from the very late fourteenth century onwards, a great many new texts were available to East Slav bookmen.

Most notably with reference to anti-Judaica, a number of more or less fictitious Byzantine ‘disputations’ between Christians and Jews were now introduced, some of which were to become tremendously popular and frequently alluded to or expanded from the late fifteenth century on. Thus, we find the prolix disputation of St Gregentius of Taphar (in Slavonic, ‘Grigory’) with the rabbi Herban, which makes up the better part of his Saint’s Life (translated on Mount Athos in the second half of the fourteenth century; known in the East Slav lands from the 1430s), and the *Jerusalem Disputation* (translated, or, just possibly, re-edited from an older translation, in the second half of the fourteenth century, and known to the East Slavs from the very early fifteenth century). The *Teachings of Jacob the Newly Baptized Jew* or *Book of Jacob* (an ancient, most likely Old Bulgarian, translation) and the *Dialogue of Timothy and Aquila* (possibly equally old) were probably reintroduced at the same time, even though the latter, curiously, never became widely known.<sup>11</sup> We may add to this group the *Tale of Twelve Fridays* (suspected of heresy but widely read) and a small number of less specific texts. In particular, the disputation of Pope Sylvester and Rabbi Zambri, known from the *Miracle of Sylvester*, was an old translation which already had some spread in Rus but was probably put on a par with the other texts as time passed,<sup>12</sup> as was perhaps the disputation of Constantine the Philosopher at the Khazarian court as retold in his Saint’s Life.<sup>13</sup> These works,

<sup>11</sup> On early traces in the literature of the East Slavs, see A. I. Peresvetov–Murat [Pereswetoff-Morath], ‘Agraf proroka Ezdry: Vnov’ identifikirovannyi istochnik Rechi Filosofa’, *Drevnyaya Rus’: Voprosy medievistiki*, 33 (2008), 48–50; A. I. Pereswetoff-Morath, ‘The Book of Jacob Revisited: New Textual Traces in Kievan Rus’’, unpublished paper read at the Institute for Advanced Studies, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 3 Aug. 2011; id., ‘Whereby We Know that It Is the Last Time’, 115–17.

<sup>12</sup> As, perhaps, a little-known text of uncertain origin, the *Addresses to a Jew on the Incarnation of the Son of God*: see *The Izbornik of the XIIIth Century (Cod. Leningrad, GPB, Q.p.I.18): Text in Transcription*, ed. H. Wątróbska (Nijmegen, 1987), 180–96. Cf. *GWAC*, i. 125–47.

<sup>13</sup> Editions: *Life of Gregentius* and *Teachings of Jacob*, in *Velikiya Minei Chetii, sobrannyya vserossiiskim mitropolitom Makariem*, xii: *Dekabr’, dni 18–23* (Moscow, 1907); *Jerusalem Disputation*: G. M. Prokhorov, ‘“Styazanie” s iudeyami po sborniku Kirilla Belozerskogo RNB, Kirillo-Beozerskoe [sic] sobr., No. XII’, *Trudy Otdela drevnerusskoi literatury*, 52 (2001), 174–91, reproduced in *Entsiklopediya russkogo igumena XIV–XV vv.: Sbornik prepodobnogo Kirilla Belozerskogo, Rossiiskaya Natsional’naya Biblioteka, Kirillo-Belozerskoe sobranie, No. XII*, ed. G. M. Prokhorov (St Petersburg, 2003), 320–9; *Tale of Twelve Fridays*: D. S. Likhachev et al. (eds.), *Biblioteka literatury drevnei Rusi*, iii: *XI–XII veka*

which were generally recommended by the official Church, occasionally informed interested Rus readers of more animate, at times humanly believable, Jews (although the works were perhaps not historically true!). They present a pageantry of Jewish elders, priests, scribes, and sorcerers, and even a post-biblical Jewish monarch from the Yemen passes by. While there are lugubrious images of Jewish parricide, treachery, and evil, there are also Jews touchingly true to their faith and sincerely interested in others; Jews intellectual; Jews preparing vegetables in their kitchens; and Jews throwing their turbans in the dust in the heat of discussion.<sup>14</sup>

At a later stage, in the very first years of the sixteenth century, a small number of treatises of another kind were awkwardly translated, this time from Latin, in the scholarly circle of Archbishop Gennadius of Novgorod. These were the thirteenth-century biblical scholar Nicholas of Lyra's *On the Coming of Christ and Against the Jews* and pseudo-Samuel of Morocco's *On the Coming of the Messiah*. These were not translated at one sitting, as has often been suggested, even though the two translations were both executed by the learned Dmitry Gerasimov (c. 1465 to at least 1536).<sup>15</sup> Acquaintance with the translation of Nicholas's work, with its importance for biblical study, would seem to have led to the commissioning of a translation of pseudo-Samuel too, this time because the anti-Judaic matter in Nicholas had aroused interest. Yet the texts were never to make a lasting impression on East Slav bookmen, and Nicholas's knowledge of a work called *Tavl' mud'* and other authentic Jewish writing (see below), as also his appreciation of Hebraic verity (*veritas Hebraica*, demanding that true understanding of the biblical text called for knowledge of the Hebrew original), thus passed unnoticed. Even those actively searching for anti-Judaic tracts generally settled on traditional Byzantine examples. It is most notable that the two anti-Judaic works which perhaps best explained the true problems of interpretation that might arise in actual discussion with Jewish exegetes, Nicholas's *On the Coming of Christ and Against the Jews* and the Byzantine *Dialogue of Timothy and Aquila*, were among the least known of the available polemical tracts.

Yet, constructive use was made of many of those traditional anti-Judaic texts that had been accumulated over time. We understand this from a formidable erudite

(St Petersburg, 1999), 242–7; *Miracle of Sylvester: Velikiya Minei Chetii, sobrannyya vserossiiskim mitropolitom Makariem: Yanvar' 1–6* (Moscow, 1910); *Life of Constantine*: for example, *Constantinus et Methodius Thessalonicenses: Fontes*, ed. F. Grivec and F. Tomšić (Zagreb, 1960); the Slavonic text of the *Dialogue of Timothy and Aquila* remains unedited. Generally on these texts, see *GWAC*, i. 113–98; G. M. Prokhorov, 'Predislovie perevodchika', in I. Kantakuzin, *Beseda s papskim legatom, Dialog s iudeem i drugie sochineniya*, ed. G. M. Prokhorov (St Petersburg, 1997); Peresvetov–Murat, "'Adonai, zabludikhom!'", *passim*; Peresvetoff–Morath, 'Whereby We Know that It Is the Last Time', 24–8, 115–17. On the Byzantine tradition, see A. Külzer, *Disputationes graecae contra Iudaeos: Untersuchungen zur byzantinischen antijüdischen Dialogliteratur und ihrem Judenbild* (Stuttgart and Leipzig, 1999); G. Dagron and V. Déroche, *Juifs et chrétiens en Orient byzantin* (Paris, 2010).

<sup>14</sup> Peresvetov–Murat, "'Adonai, zabludikhom!'", 66, 68, 80, 82.

<sup>15</sup> *GWAC*, i. 201–9; arkhim. Makary [Veretennikov], 'Gerasimov Dmitrii', in *Pravoslavnaya entsiklopediya*, xi (Moscow, 2006), 171–3.

such as Joseph of Volok, who in his anti-heretical output (against the ‘Judaistically philosophizing’—known in historiography as ‘the Judaizers’) quotes or alludes to the sermons *Against the Jews* by John Chrysostom, the *Teachings of Jacob*, the *Life of Gregentius*, and the *Jerusalem Disputation*. It should be noted, however, that Joseph does not necessarily use these works in an anti-Jewish fashion, as it were, and occasionally even edits away allusions to Jews in his quotations in order to exploit their common dogmatic or exemplary potential.<sup>16</sup>

### AMONG THE JEWS

There can be little doubt that the old Kievan community possessed at least something akin to a *Toledot yeshu* tradition (i.e. the legendary, often vitriolic Jewish tales of the life of Jesus of Nazareth) for internal use, along with other traditions treating Christian topics. This is a conclusion by *induction* from the general European situation, not by *deduction* from Kievan evidence (of which there appears to be none), but in so far as such works were composed in Hebrew, such literature was potentially international.<sup>17</sup> It is another matter that, because of the specific power balance, Jewish resentment of that perceived heretic, sorcerer, and *mamzer*, whose followers had early on distanced themselves from—and been put at a distance by—rabbinical Jews, was, obviously, far from tolerated in a Christian society. Any attitudes that writers and copyists may have intended this literary vitriol to foster would have been expected to remain within the community. The presence of such writing—and talking—in the later fifteenth-century, ‘second’, flowering of the Kievan *kahal* is even more probable (even though the first documented reference in the work of a Ruthenian Jew to anything like it occurred a century or so later).<sup>18</sup> There we detect unquestionable polemical inclinations at least with regard to Karaism, and we can substantiate, in the activity of translators, a higher awareness of Church Slavonic literary traditions and may tease out the existence of new impulses. Thus, an influx of Jewish Byzantine and Provençal literature is probable,<sup>19</sup>

<sup>16</sup> *GWAC*, i. 241–4; cf. 82, 166–7; A. I. Pereswetoff-Morath, “‘Simulacra of Hatred’: On the Occasion of an Historiographical Essay by Mr. Dennis Eoffe”, *Ab Imperio*, 2003, no. 4, pp. 638–41. Cf. M.-V. Dmitriev, ‘Joseph de Volokolamsk était-il antisémite?’, in M. Dmitriev, D. Tollet, and E. Teiro (eds.), *Les Chrétiens et les juifs dans les sociétés de rites grec et latin: Approche comparative. Actes du colloque organisé les 14–15 juin 1999 à la Maison des sciences de l’homme, Paris* (Paris, 2003), 77–98.

<sup>17</sup> See, for the general picture, W. Horbury, ‘Hebrew Apologetic and Polemical Literature’, in N. de Lange (ed.), *Hebrew Scholarship and the Medieval World* (Cambridge, 2001), 194–6; N. Roth, ‘Polemics, Anti-Christian’, in id. (ed.), *Medieval Jewish Civilization: An Encyclopedia* (New York and London, 2003), 525–33.

<sup>18</sup> Isaac ben Abraham Troki, *Faith Strengthened*, trans. M. Mocatta (London, 1851), 204; there are several modern reprints. I have had recourse only to this translation, which has been somewhat bowdlerized in order not to seem too provocative to nineteenth-century Christian sensibilities.

<sup>19</sup> See M. Taube, ‘The Book of Job in Vilnius 262’, in W. Moskovich and S. Nikolova (eds.), *Jews and Slavs*, xv: *Judaeo-Bulgarica, Judaeo-Russica et Palaeoslavica* (Jerusalem and Sofia, 2005), 281–96; S. Yu. Temchin, ‘Skhariya i Skorina: Ob istochnikakh Vilenskogo vetkhozavetnogo svoda (F 19-262)’,

and the constant arrival of news of Ashkenazi experiences must be posited from western Europe, where inter-faith conflict had long been intensifying. As to the precise nature of any Kievan polemical tradition, however, we appear to possess no information. However, postulating inner-communal traditions is one thing, but arguing that such works were *used* in polemics with Rus Christians, or were even reasonably well known to Rus Christians, is quite another. Furthermore, such Jewish anti-Christian traditions as may be most easily posited would not mainly have been *polemical* in a narrow sense but *apologetic*.

Certainly, the nocturnal discussions with Kievan Jews which Theodosius ‘P’ of the Caves is reported by a hagiographical source to have conducted in complete secrecy and during which he reproached and reviled them, were thought by his hagiographers to be, in a sense, lifelike and probable: ‘The blessed one had the custom of frequently getting up at night without anyone’s knowledge [*otai všěkhũ*] and going out to the Jews to argue with them about Christ, reproaching and reviling them, and calling them apostates and lawbreakers, because he wanted to be killed preaching about Christ.’<sup>20</sup>

Yet, equally ‘probable’ were, at the time, the exchanges between monks and demons reported in the same breath; disputations with Jews and the conversion of Jews constituted a not particularly rare topos of the hagiographical literature inherited from Byzantium.<sup>21</sup> The quotations on Jews from Theodosian sermons and epistles, which have commonly been repeated in the secondary literature, are founded on inauthentic statements and must be discarded.<sup>22</sup> As for the possibility that Kievan Christians would have studied with Jewish scholars, which has on occasion been suggested as an explanation for Theodosius’s nocturnal visits to Jews, it should be pointed out that the indiscriminating passion and quest for knowledge that was a hallmark of a very few highly cultured Byzantine—and western European—Christian scholars, and which could make them seek out Jewish colleagues,<sup>23</sup> can hardly be expected in medieval Rus, at least not before the fifteenth century, and then only in Ruthenia.

There is no evidence for a Judaism openly opposing Christianity in Rus during 988–1400 (and the scenario appears unlikely), and nothing analogous to the ardour

*Senoji Lietuvos literatūra*, 21 (2006), 289–316; and, cautiously, P. Gardette, ‘Judaeo-Provençal Astronomy in Byzantium and Russia (14th–15th centuries)’, *Byzantinoslavica*, 62 (2005), 195–209.

<sup>20</sup> Quoted with some emendations from *The ‘Paterik’ of the Kievan Caves Monastery*, trans. M. Heppell (Cambridge, Mass., 1989), 73.

<sup>21</sup> *GWAC*, ii. 97–102; V. Déroche, ‘Regards croisés des hérésiologues, des canonistes et des hagiographes sur les Juifs à Byzance’, in A. Rigo and P. Ermilov (eds.), *Orthodoxy and Heresy in Byzantium: The Definition and the Notion of Orthodoxy and Some Other Studies on the Heresies and the Non-Christian Religions* (Rome, 2010), 69 ff.; A. Ducellier, ‘Juifs et Chrétiens d’après les textes hagiographiques grecs’, in C. Bordes-Benayoun (ed.), *Les Juifs et la ville* (Toulouse, 2000), 15–33.

<sup>22</sup> *GWAC*, vol. ii, appendix B.

<sup>23</sup> See, for Palaiologan Byzantium, J.-C. Attias, *Le Commentaire biblique: Mordekhai Komtino ou l’herméneutique du dialogue* (Paris, 1991), and, for the West, G. Dahan, *Les Intellectuels chrétiens et les juifs au Moyen Âge* (Paris, 1999).

even of a Theodosius of the Caves is known in a Rus Jew before a *possible* but very questionable incident was reported by Maxim the Greek in about 1520. Nor are any examples of Jewish anti-Christian polemical writing firmly known from Kievan, Lithuanian, or Muscovite Rus until Isaac of Troki composed his influential *Fortress of Faith* in the late sixteenth century. To speak of likelihoods, one should consider with Israel Berlin those pagan Slavonic and Finnic priests or shamans who dared oppose Christian teachings in Kievan Rus but were put to death after short ‘disputational’ tests of power,<sup>24</sup> obliging one to assume that no Jewish propaganda is likely ever to have been voiced that openly. Byzantine ecclesiastical law prescribed the death penalty for any Jew who ‘should dare to pervert the Christian faith’, and even though the capital punishments required by Byzantine canonical law were generally alleviated in Slavonic versions, it would have been inadvisable to test the limits.<sup>25</sup> Public debates with adherents of other religions were always foreign—and repugnant—to the culture of *Slavia Orthodoxa*, and when they later came about, the Russian side was generally badly prepared. Kievan Jews, like Dominican friars and Irish monks who were also present in ancient Kiev, would have kept a low profile while practising their religion, and, accordingly, neither group is ever mentioned as such in Rus chronicles. The eleventh-century Greek metropolitans of Kiev, such as John II or George, in their canonical responsa, which were composed in Greek and were apparently thoroughly Byzantine, underlined the inadmissibility of dealings with Jews, but these had little to do with Kievan realia;<sup>26</sup> and at any rate, in actual life such admonitions were increasingly moderated with every added mile of distance from the metropolitan’s court.

One must conclude that Judaism, like the equally reviled Catholicism, enjoyed *some* tolerance in Rus. Whilst pagan shamans were violently killed, Jewish rabbis were apparently allowed to function. Resident Jews were de facto tolerated, and there were no verifiable ‘pogroms’, forced baptisms, or secular anti-Jewish legislation, but that is all. For there are on the other hand few positive statements of love or respect, and the frequent outbursts against Jews in literature must have prepared the ground for a society in which Jews were regarded as diabolical; the liturgical exhortations during Holy Week could scarcely have passed quite unheeded.

But the pseudo-annalistic entries on early medieval expulsions of Jews from Rus, such as that of 1010 or by Prince Vladimir Monomachus in the twelfth century, are apocryphal. Furthermore, both the enmity towards Jews ascribed to Monomachus

<sup>24</sup> I. Z. Berlin, ‘Evrei v Yuzhnoi Rusi v epokhu Kievskago i Galitsko-Volynskago gosudarstva’, in *Istoriya Evreev v Rossii*, ii/1 (Moscow, 1921), 122; cf. E. E. Golubinsky, *Istoriya russkoi tserkvi*, i/1, 2nd edn. (Moscow, 1900), 211–14.

<sup>25</sup> Cf. *GWAC*, ii, 84–6; the quotation is from S. B. Bowman, *The Jews of Byzantium, 1204–1453* (Tuscaloosa, Ala., 1985), 273.

<sup>26</sup> V. Ya. Petrukhin, ‘Evrei v drevnerusskikh istochnikakh XI–XIII vv.’, in O. V. Budnitsky (ed.), *Arkhiv evreiskoi istorii*, ii (Moscow, 2005), 152–3, with references; notwithstanding unsubstantiated claims about Metropolitan Nicephorus I (died 1121) in *Tvoreniya mitropolita Nikifora*, ed. M. N. Gromov (Moscow, 2006), 20, 22, 127, 334–5, 342.



and the uncommonly positive attitude attributed to his predecessor and antagonist Svyatopolk are figments of scholarly and belletristic imagination,<sup>27</sup> not least dependent on the flights of fancy of the eighteenth-century historian Vasily Tatishchev.<sup>28</sup> A certain aversion towards Jews, or a denial to them of full rights, would have been expected in Christian medieval Europe. Still, secular attitudes, as we have seen, would have been much more pragmatic than attitudes ecclesiastic and monastic. The first certifiable banning of unbaptized Jews from any land with a substantial East Slav population was, in fact, from Lithuania in 1495, and this lasted only for a few years. Word of the expulsion of heretics from Spain—partly, it is true, Jewish conversos whose sincerity the Inquisition would not trust—by the Most Catholic Majesties had travelled fast to the East Slavs and was known and approved of in Novgorodia in 1490.<sup>29</sup> It is mentioned in modern scholarship too, but it should also be noted that any East Slav references to the large-scale expulsion of Iberian Jews two years later have yet to be identified.

In fifteenth-century Kiev, under the grand dukes of Lithuania, some additional freedom of profession may be assumed, and in the learned internal Jewish culture the figure of Jesus was occasionally discussed, if only obliquely (and, when in writing, in Hebrew). Apparently, in the work of R. Moses Hagoleh of Kiev even a faint air of venerability attaches to him, as to one initiated in divine secrets whom the Christians really have not quite comprehended.<sup>30</sup> Otherwise, Byzantium arguably provides our best model for Kievan Jewish thinking on Christianity, and we may cautiously ponder as a potential parallel to the lost apologetics of the Kievan community the recently recovered fragment of a Byzantine Jewish ‘book’ of about 1300. That work, written in a Hebrew interspersed with Greek words for Christian concepts, is ‘while properly polemical . . . reasonable and conciliatory’. Conceding to Christians that ‘the Lord of Hosts and the Holy Trinity’ of the two faiths may be identical and, perhaps, treating the ‘New Law’ with some benevolence, it still argues against the divinity of Jesus of Nazareth and maintains, with reasonable accuracy about Christian doctrine, that the Incarnation of Christ must be judged pointless since even the Law and the Prophets maintain that a sinner who repents, whether Jew or gentile, will be forgiven. ‘And by this you shall manifestly know that Jesus is *not* the Son of God as you believe!’<sup>31</sup>

<sup>27</sup> On the 1113 ‘pogrom’, see *GWAC*, ii. 106–16; cf. J. D. Klier, *Russians, Jews, and the Pogroms of 1881–1882* (Cambridge, 2011), 59, and V. Ya. Petrukhin, ‘Rus’ i vsi yazytsi’: *Aspekty istoricheskikh vzaimosvyazei. Istoriko-arkheologicheskie ocherki* (Moscow, 2011), 296–7.

<sup>28</sup> On Tatishchev, see now A. Tolochko, ‘Istoriya Rossiiskaya’ *Vasiliya Tatishcheva: Istochniki i izvestiya* (Moscow, 2005).

<sup>29</sup> *GWAC*, ii. 23.

<sup>30</sup> See M. Taube, ‘The Fifteenth-Century Ruthenian Translations from Hebrew and the Heresy of the Judaizers: Is There a Connection?’, in V. V. Ivanov and J. Verkholtantsev (eds.), *Speculum Slaviae Orientalis: Muscovy, Ruthenia and Lithuania in the Late Middle Ages* (Moscow, 2005), 202, quoting R. Moses’ *Shoshan sodot*; Pereswetoff-Morath, ‘Whereby We Know that It Is the Last Time’, 12–14.

<sup>31</sup> N. R. M. de Lange, ‘A Fragment of Byzantine Anti-Christian Polemic’, *Journal of Jewish Studies*, 41/1 (1990), 96, 99.

Though such works would probably have been unknown to Orthodox literati, the infrequent Slav readers of Nicholas of Lyra's previously mentioned thirteenth-century treatise, cumbersomely translated in 1501, would have learnt at least a little of the Talmud and other rabbinical writings. The learned Franciscan Hebraist thus recommends for anyone who wishes to dispute with the Jews the *Targum Jonathan* with its useful elucidations in Aramaic ('that translation is useful for disputations with the Jews'), and also warns that Jewish scholars may in addition to the Hebrew Bible and the Targum have access to, and cite, the Septuagint. Even more noteworthy, Nicholas quotes extracts from a writing which is obviously of the *Toledot* tradition—'ot i[isu]sa nazaryanina ro[zh]d[e]stvĕ' (translating *De Iesu Nasareni generatione*)—on Jesus working magic by the Tetragrammaton. The explicit mention of the Talmud appears to be the first in East Slavonic writing, and the reader learns in astonishment that it is counted more authentic among the Jews even than the Church Fathers by the Christians. Nicholas informs the reader that Jews are brought up to hate Christ 'and curse the Christian Law and the worshippers of Christ every day in their synagogues'.<sup>32</sup> Jews as depicted in translated Byzantine disputations also occasionally produce 'their books',<sup>33</sup> but these would no doubt have been interpreted by the Rus reader as books of the Old Testament (for which *zhidovskiya knigy*, 'the Jewish books', though retaining some ambiguity, was, to a considerable extent, a technical term). In the mid-seventeenth century, the collection of the Supraśl Monastery in Podlachia held some relevant literature, but it had then been a Uniate house for half a century, and its library reflected the interests of Catholic theologians.<sup>34</sup>

Hebrew scholars were lacking among both Kievan and, later, Muscovite scholars, as surviving examples of Old Testament onomastica reveal. Rus Jews, we may suppose, would probably have been similarly artless when it came to the higher levels of Church Slavonic linguistic and literary culture, since to master these they would have had to attend church or to frequent monastic libraries and, arguably, be trained by elder Christian scribes. Only in the last two centuries here treated is there evidence of some very broken Church Slavonic among Jewish scholars and of some kind of literary collaboration.<sup>35</sup>

Slav readers of Byzantine works would still catch an echo of such possibly genuine Jewish retorts as 'Do you say that he who was begotten of Joseph will come to judge the world? Bless me, what an aberration!',<sup>36</sup> or claims that the Greek version of the Old Testament misrepresents the Hebrew original as regards messianic contentions

<sup>32</sup> Quotations from E. S. Fedorova, *Traktat Nikolaya de Liry 'Probatio adventus Christi' i ego perevod na tserkovnoslavyanskii yazyk kontsa XV veka*, 2 vols. (Moscow, 1999), i. 43, 45, 125, 147.

<sup>33</sup> Peresvetov-Murat, "'Adonai, zabludikhom!'", 63–4.

<sup>34</sup> Cf. the inventories in L. L. Shchavinskaya, *Literaturnaya kul'tura belorusov Podlyash'ya XV–XIX vv.: Knizhnye sobraniya Suprasl'skogo Blagoveshchenskogo monastyrya* (Minsk, 1998), 136, 144.

<sup>35</sup> See Taube, 'Jewish-Christian Collaboration'.

<sup>36</sup> Quotation from *Life of Gregentius: Rossiiskaya gosudarstvennaya biblioteka*, Moscow, sobr. TSL, no. 772, fo. 35<sup>r</sup>.

(such as, in the *Dialogue of Timothy and Aquila*, the well-known dispute on the Hebrew *almah*, ‘young woman’, as against Greek *parthénos*, ‘virgin’, of Isa. 7: 14), or references to Jesus as, for example, ‘the crucified one’. (Allegations of Jesus’ bastardy—*mamzerut*—are rare in Slavonic texts (but see below), even though in anger the Jews of translated disputational texts often cry out *mamzer!*, ‘mixling’, ‘bastard’.)

### CHRISTIAN HOMILETICS

A Christian work which has often been cited in this connection is the *Sermon on Law and Grace* by the Kievan metropolitan Hilarion (mid-eleventh century). While not a primarily anti-Judaic work, it does contain many anti-Jewish elements, and the frequent references to it in works on Rus anti-Judaism/Russian antisemitism<sup>37</sup> demand a closer look at it.

Hilarion’s sermon is a stunning piece of verbal art, even though its thematic originality has at times been myopically exaggerated.<sup>38</sup> In accordance with older exegetical tradition, beginning with Paul (Gal. 4),<sup>39</sup> the part of the sermon that is usually apostrophized in Jewish historiography constitutes a three-tiered (or three-stage) series of typologies. Here, ultimately, the Old Testament story of the disinheritance of Hagar and Ishmael of Genesis 16–21 (Stage I) is conceived to parallel and, in a sense, to ‘prove’ the disinheritance of Israel by the Lord and the Christians’ coming into their inheritance (Stage II). The ‘New People’ supersedes the ‘Old’; the ‘Truth’—the ‘Shadow’; and ‘Grace’ supersedes ‘Law’. Historically, at this stage, the sermonist sees a parallel to Ishmael’s ‘mocking’ of Isaac in the oppression by the Jerusalem Jews (or, in fact, rather by the original Jerusalem church!) of uncircumcised Christians. It is a signal fact that, throughout the sermon, Hilarion uses the scriptural term *iudēi* for ‘Jews’.

In a third typological stage, Hilarion attempts to establish the place of the newly baptized Rus in this scheme and, thus, in God’s plan for humanity. He explains that the Rus have entered the elect, the family of Christian peoples, and on several occasions when he speaks of the contemporary situation he no longer describes the ‘Old People’ in terms of Jews but in terms of an ‘us’ who used to be pagan idolaters with shrines or idols (*kapishcha*), sacrificing each other to demons<sup>40</sup>—a fact which has

<sup>37</sup> e.g. V. Rossman, *Russian Intellectual Antisemitism in the Post-Communist Era* (Lincoln, Nebr., and London, 2002), 197.

<sup>38</sup> A recent work which in an interesting manner analyses the sermon within the tradition of *literary* anti-Judaic texts and firmly places it within a context of young Rus Christians pleading for an equal standing with the ‘older’ Christians of Byzantium is S. Temchin, ‘Slovo o zakone i blagodati kievskogo mitropolita Ilariona i rannekhristsianskaya polemika’, *Ruthenia*, 7 (2007), 30–40.

<sup>39</sup> See, on the commonality of the tradition, Dahan, *Les Intellectuels chrétiens et les juifs au Moyen Âge*, scriptural index.

<sup>40</sup> K. K. Akentyev, “Slovo o zakone i blagodati” Ilariona Kievskogo: Drevneishaya versiya po spisku GIM Sin. 591’, in id. (ed.), *Istoki i posledstviya: Vizantiiskoe nasledie na Rusi. Sbornik statei k 70-letiyu chlena-korrespondenta RAN I. P. Medvedeva* (St Petersburg, 2005), 137; available online at <[http://byzantinorossica.org.ru/ser\\_br\\_v3.html](http://byzantinorossica.org.ru/ser_br_v3.html)>.

been lost on many readers looking for Kievan Jewish realia. In effect, Hilarion's treatment of Jews closely follows such known exponents of older tradition as a popular translated paschal homily by pseudo-Epiphanius, which similarly juxtaposes Jews and Christians, Grace and Law, and Sun and Shadow. Similarly, whether or not Hilarion's sermon was originally a paschal homily, which is a moot point, it draws on common Christian paschal exegetics. Rather than telling us anything more of his view of Judaism than the self-evident fact that the sermonist assumed a supersessionist theology in his view of the Old Israel (that is, Christians have taken over the historical role of the Jews, superseding them in God's plan and in his love, as the new covenant supersedes the older ones), the text could, and probably would, have been written whether or not there were Jews in Kievan Rus.

Yet, for all his supersessionism, Hilarion holds 'the Law', and even circumcision, in higher esteem than do many less refined theologians, as a precondition for Grace:

For who is so great as our God? He is the one that doeth wonders; He is the one that established the Law in preparation for Truth and Grace, so that humankind might decline the deities of idolatry, and might incline to belief in the one God; so that, *cleansed with the Law and with circumcision like a fouled vessel cleansed with water*, humankind might receive the milk of Grace and Baptism.<sup>41</sup>

Enthralled by his potent typologies, he nonetheless has Grace exclaim to the Lord, on the second typological stage (i.e. on the early Church): 'Cast out the Jews and their Law! Scatter them among the nations! For what communion is there between the shadow and the Truth, between Jewry and Christianity?'<sup>42</sup>

It has been a received truth for many earlier generations of scholars that Hilarion's accusations that the Jews were blasphemous give away an intimate knowledge of live anti-Christian polemics, to the point of speculation that the metropolitan might have been a Tauric *slavyano-ross* taken to Rus after the break-down of Khazaria and 'thus' quite familiar with all manner of Jewish outrageousness. However, the blasphemies cited (of which the most offensive was that Jesus of Nazareth was born out of wedlock) were well known indeed to Christian literati from depictions of Jews as arch-heretics. They may have been borrowed almost verbatim by Hilarion from the apocryphal *Gospel of Nicodemus* or from some other source dependent upon it. Hilarion states, 'And yet they called him a deceiver, one born of fornication, who casts out devils by Beelzebul [*oni zhe narekosha. sego lesti tsa. (i otu bluda rozhdena) i o velizhvulě běsy izgonyashcha*]',<sup>43</sup> which we may compare with *Nicodemus's*

<sup>41</sup> Akentyev, "Slovo o zakone i blagodati", 123; translation from *Sermons and Rhetoric of Kievan Rus'*, trans. and intro. S. Franklin (Cambridge, Mass., 1991), 4, emphasis added; the last word of the translation has been emended from 'Truth' in accordance with Akentyev's edition.

<sup>42</sup> Akentyev, "Slovo o zakone i blagodati", 127; *Sermons and Rhetoric of Kievan Rus'*, trans. Franklin, 7. Cf. 2 Cor. 6: 15.

<sup>43</sup> Akentyev, "Slovo o zakone i blagodati", 134; *Sermons and Rhetoric of Kievan Rus'*, trans. Franklin, 12. Cf. Matt. 12: 24, 27: 63; John 8: 41, also 8: 19.

‘Answering, the Jews said to him, “Did we not say that he was a mage and that he cast out devils by Beelzebul, prince of demons? . . . For we know that he is born of fornication [*otŭ bluda rozhdenuŭ*].”’<sup>44</sup> A small number of other Fathers, known in Slavonic translation, similarly repeat such allegations of Jews, and the scandal these words would have roused, had they been uttered in actual debate, is evinced by the fact that the word ‘fornication’ has even been erased or crossed out in early manuscripts both of Hilarion’s sermon and of the *Gospel of Nicodemus*.<sup>45</sup>

We meet with similar pseudo-Jewish outrageousness, though in a more exclusively biblical context, in, for example, a *Sermon for Easter Sunday* ascribed to the twelfth-century homilist Cyril of Turov: ‘The bird has flown, but these foolish ones keep watch over an empty nest: Christ is risen, yet the priests and the Pharisees bribe [or, tell] the watchmen, ordering them to conceal Christ’s resurrection. O woe unto thee, nation of sinners!’<sup>46</sup> or, much later, in Spyridon of Kiev’s late fifteenth-century *Sermon for Pentecost*: ‘You bribed the guards with much gold and vouchsafed us a greater miracle as you wished to hide away the Resurrection of Christ, sealing the stone with a watch’ (cf. Matt. 28: 12–15).<sup>47</sup> It is in fact in the sermons traditionally ascribed to Cyril of Turov that we most frequently find denigrations—or, rather, confirmations of the common pitch-black image—of New Testament Jews. It should be noted, however, that these are exclusively found in his texts for Holy Week, which draw much on liturgical texts, promoting the myth that Jesus was put to death by ‘the Jews’ as a people. It is interesting and vital to note that, as with Hilarion’s sermon, the main textual source for Cyril’s anti-Judaism was not even works *adversus Iudaeos* but the manifold texts in which the Jewish theme was, as in Cyril himself, corollary. The sermonist picked it up from the very sermons from which he learned the art of preaching. And it resulted, at the same time, from the very techniques which he simultaneously learned to master. The reader may note that there are in the quotation from Spyridon traces of a tradition where the Jews not so much fail to grasp the Christian truth (that Jesus has risen as the Messiah) as constitute, in Cecil Roth’s term, ‘deliberate unbelievers’. This is only rarely encountered in East Slav texts, however (for example in the *Sermon on Heavenly Powers and on Why Man was Created*, attributed to Abraham of Smolensk, early thirteenth century),<sup>48</sup> and it may be questioned whether an average reader would have thought much about its incompatibility with the more common image.

<sup>44</sup> For details, see *GWAC*, i. 273.

<sup>45</sup> *GWAC*, i. 273–6.

<sup>46</sup> See A. I. Pereswetoff-Morath, ‘A Shadow of the Good Spell: On Jews and Anti-Judaism in the World and Work of Kirill of Turov’, in I. Lunde (ed.), *Kirill of Turov: Bishop, Preacher, Hymnographer* (Bergen, 2000), 58. The quotation is given from *Sermons and Rhetoric of Kievan Rus’*, trans. Franklin, 105.

<sup>47</sup> *GWAC*, i. 95–6; A. A. Turilov, ‘Zabytoe sochinenie mitropolita Savvy-Spiridona litovskogo perioda ego tvorchestva’, in *Slavyane i ikh sosedi*, vii: *Mezhkonfessional’nye svyazi v stranakh Tsentral’noi, Vostochnoi i Yugo-Vostochnoi Evropy v XV–XVII vekakh* (Moscow, 1999), 121–36.

<sup>48</sup> See S. P. Shevyrev’s edition in *Izvēstiya Imperatorskoi akademii nauk po otděleniyu russkago yazyka i slovesnosti*, 9/3 (1861), 186; cf. Peresvetov–Murat, “‘Adonai, zabludikhom!’”, 79–80.

A more furious anti-Judaic homiletic tradition, which at times borders on the antisemitic and conveys images of a post-biblical Jewry, is found in six translated homilies titled *Against the Jews* by the venerated and widely read John Chrysostom (the fact that Chrysostom's direct target had been Judaizing Christians would have been largely lost on East Slav readers a millennium later). An Old Bulgarian translation of one of these sermons was known in Kievan Rus from early times in the florilegium *Chrysorrhoeas* (*Zlatostrui*), while the classic collection of six sermons became known only in the late fourteenth century in the Middle Bulgarian florilegium *Margaritai* ('Pearls'; Slavonic, *Margarit(e)*), and only modern scholarly legend makes them stir up pogroms in ancient Kiev.<sup>49</sup> The book remained widely read among the East Slavs into early modern times. Chrysostom was by no means the only representative of this line of preaching known in translation to the Orthodox Slavs, but he was by far the most influential. While single Chrysostomic images may be detected from time to time in East Slavonic anti-Judaica, no direct imitations or followers are known. Other imported sermons on Judaism range in tone from the virulent attacks of John Chrysostom to works that are, in A. Lukyn Williams's memorable phrase, rather 'comparable to a prize essay'.<sup>50</sup>

In the late Middle Ages, Muscovite homiletics deteriorated significantly, becoming a rather rare thing. Sermons turned into turgid, highly compilatory digressions. Proportions, and readability, were then in better hands with several Ruthenian preachers, educated in Byzantium, such as the fifteenth-century metropolitans Spyridon and Gregory Tsamblak of Kiev. We have already chanced upon the uncommonly harsh language of the former, which at times almost suggests encounters with actual living Jews. The homiletic legacy of the latter was admired throughout the East Slav lands (even though the appointment of Gregory himself was thought by many to have been uncanonical), and a small number of his sermons, especially on paschal themes, have had a *i na iuděya* ('and against the Jew(s)') added to their titles. Here again, however, the treatment is very traditional, and the Jewish 'subjects' are entirely biblical.

## BAPTISM, I

Closely connected to questions of inter-faith contacts and polemics are, of course, those of baptism and conversion. It is possible that there were cases of conversion to Judaism among the pre-eleventh-century pagan East Slavs and, perhaps, the Scandinavian Rus. (Some believable etymological conjectures regarding the names of certain signatories of the 'Kievan Letter' might possibly suggest a Slav element in the Kievan *kahal*, but several scholars have pointed out, with good reason, various problems with this document.<sup>51</sup>) Still, the official baptism of Rus in the late tenth

<sup>49</sup> *GWAC*, i. 71–83.

<sup>50</sup> Cited by de Lange, 'Fragment of Byzantine Anti-Christian Polemic', 92.

<sup>51</sup> See e.g. A. Kulik, 'Judeo-Greek Legacy in Medieval Rus', *Viator*, 39/1 (2008), 53–4, with references; A. Poppe, 'Khazarian Hebrew Documents of the Tenth Century', *Polin*, 3 (1988), 335–42.

century and the stern view on Judaism which was imported to Rus within a generation would quickly have precluded any large-scale conversions of representatives of the dominant Christian culture, even though the first centuries might have witnessed some syncretism in places. It is not my task here to pronounce on the debated question of the degree of medieval Jewish proselytization in Europe as a whole, but it is absolutely certain that there were more than single cases. The non-proselytizing character of Judaism has often been exaggerated, and different medieval Jewries regarded conversion quite differently.<sup>52</sup> It is easier to imagine that the dominant religion might have engulfed some peripheral members of the Jewish communities, but there is no specific evidence even of this, and the history of the Jewish diaspora on other territories belies any mass conversions.

Orthodox high theology, following St Paul and certain Church Fathers, argued that the voluntary conversion of 'all Jews' to Christianity was built into history as part of God's plan for the world and would usher in the Second Coming of Jesus the Messiah. The presence of Jews must therefore be acquiesced in, and forced baptisms were to be avoided. In medieval Rus, this was evidently not a widely recognized tenet. As a general rule, the mere mention of 'the Jews' in religious literature turned on images of irredeemability and the ultimate consumption of the said Jews by the Eternal Flame. This version was affirmed by, for example, glimpses of Jews in icons of the Last Judgement. Nevertheless, the doctrine of the final salvation of the Jews had its occasional proponents, as had the belief of some Fathers that even repenting demons might be redeemed. We glimpse furthermore throughout the period a recognition of the fact that Jesus had himself been circumcised and had been raised a Law-observing Jew, just like the apostles and a number of saints (whether representatives of the earliest church or later converts). We also find the idea that all who had kept to the Law before the Incarnation of Christ had been, in the eyes of God, 'righteous'. Now, the Jewishness of the Apostles and the Jerusalem community could occasionally be construed as putting later Jews to shame; compare the shame (*sramota*) of the Jews when judged by 'their brothers, the Apostles' at the end of time in the monk Sabbas's late fifteenth-century epistle *Against Jews and Heretics*.<sup>53</sup>

Yet the possibility that Jews might be baptized held occasional fascination for the Orthodox, at least in the late Middle Ages. (Could, perhaps, even the alleged disputations of Theodosius in Kievan times be viewed in this light?) The 'miracle' of the conversion of the Jewish physician Joseph by the Church Father Basil the Great

<sup>52</sup> See e.g. C. Roth, 'Additional Note A: Conversion to Judaism in the Dark Ages', in id. (ed.), *The World History of the Jewish People*, 2nd ser.: *Medieval Period*, ii: *The Dark Ages* (Tel Aviv, 1966), 390; B. Blumenkranz, 'Jewish Proselytization', *ibid.* 84–8 and nn.; id., *Juifs et chrétiens dans le monde occidental, 430–1096* (Paris and The Hague, 1960), ch. 2. With more specific relevance for Rus, see P. B. Golden, 'Khazaria and Judaism', *Archivum Eurasiae Medii Aevi*, 3 (1983), 133; cf. K. A. Brook, *The Jews of Khazaria*, 2nd edn. (Lanham, Md., 2006), 257–72 (appendix D); B. Z. Wacholder, 'Cases of Proselytizing in the Tosafist Reponsa', *Jewish Quarterly Review*, 51 (1960–1), 288–315.

<sup>53</sup> 'Poslanie inoka Savvy na zhidov i eretikov: S predisloviem S. A. Bëlokurova', *Chteniya v Obshchestvë istorii i drevnostei rossiiskikh pri Moskovskom universitetë*, 1902, bk. iii, pt. 2, p. 5.

was often depicted in sixteenth-century Muscovy, and later was remembered by the so-called trans-Volgan elders defending clemency with regard to heretics (who argued that St Basil ‘made him a true Christian instead of a Jew, and instead of a wolf a true lamb in the flock of Christ’).<sup>54</sup> Here, the grim, voracious wolves, well known to Orthodox Slavs from depictions of Jews in imported homiletics and paschal liturgical texts, might in an instant be turned into true lambs of the Christian flock! (Compare the exhortation in a pre-thirteenth-century South Slavonic text with limited circulation in Rus and Muscovy, the *Addresses to a Jew on the Incarnation of the Son of God*: ‘Similarly wilt thou, O Jew, if thou art baptized and believest in the crucified Jesus, be a son of God.’<sup>55</sup>) We should not, then, be surprised that, in the late fifteenth century, Gennadius of Novgorod, first ‘inquisitor’ of the Novgorodian heresy that he suspected to be ‘Judaizing’, felt free to dine with Danilo, a Kievan Jewish convert to Christianity, although the latter had quite recently been unclean (see further below).

#### FIFTEENTH-CENTURY DEVELOPMENTS

Still, by the mid-fifteenth century something has changed in East Slavonic anti-Judaica, and we do not yet know exactly what. Pending further research, only a very sketchy image may be attempted. As a preamble we should recall that fifteenth-century manuscripts *overall*, no matter the text or genre, have come down to us in much larger number than earlier documents. Without close study, then, the growing ‘popularity’ of a particular text in the fifteenth century onwards *may* be considered an artefact of the source situation.

##### *The North-West*

In order to specify the characteristics of this ‘new situation’, we begin with works emanating apparently from north-west Rus.<sup>56</sup>

First, a number of works the importation of which cannot at present be connected with any particular events or trends, and which earlier had a modest dissemination, suddenly emerged in considerable numbers of manuscripts in the last quarter of the fifteenth century, especially in the 1490s (this is not quite an unusual situation in Russian manuscript history). This is the case with, for example, the *Jerusalem Disputation*, the *Life of Gregentius*, and, to some extent, the *Teachings of Jacob*. Apparently, all three were somehow used by the Orthodox heresimachs apart from merely being quoted; their dissemination may even partly have been due to recommendations from anti-heretical circles. At the same time, the dissemination of the *Interpreted Palaia* and the *Full Chronographical Palaia* appears to have gained momentum. It is possible that we should add here the heightened

<sup>54</sup> See Peresvetov-Murat, “‘Adonai, zabludikhom!’”, 83.

<sup>55</sup> *Izbornik*, ed. Wątróbska, 184.

<sup>56</sup> On the specific texts, see *GWAC*, vol. i.



interest in the *Life of Constantine the Philosopher* and texts concerned with his disputations.

More conspicuously, some traditional works were put to new use. A case in point is Hilarion's *Sermon on Law and Grace* which had earlier been disseminated mainly as a work on Prince Vladimir of Kiev. The Ladoga monk Sabbas incorporated long, unprocessed excerpts from the sermon, mixed with even longer excerpts from the *Interpreted Palaia*, in his *Epistle against Jews and Heretics* from 1488; and the anonymous creator of the so-called *Interpreted Sermon on Law and Grace*, probably working c.1480–1510 in a north-western region, recasts the sermon thoroughly and eccentrically, adding addresses to the Jews and quoting extensively from the *Sayings of the Holy Prophets*. The latter work, known in full Muscovite copies only from about the 1520s, certainly circulated at this time in Muscovy: apart from its being used for the *Interpreted Sermon on Law and Grace*, we find an extract of it titled *Against the Jews on the Coming of Christ, that [He] was born in the Flesh by the Virgin Mary* (incidentally, a dogma which the Novgorod 'Judaistically philosophizing' heretics were known to contest).

This brings us to a final point. At the turn of the fifteenth century there appeared a small number of extracts from previously known texts but in which the words 'against the Jew(s)' were now added to the title. It seems quite certain that there was heightened interest in such texts and that they were occasionally transmitted together. Although the addition of the phrase 'against the Jew(s)' was not infrequently made in Slavonic text traditions of various translated theological works, we have here two or three instances in which new titles have been created, as it were, around these very words in order to characterize new, especially interesting extracts. (Might the similar addition to the title of some branch of the *Interpreted Palaia* also have been made at this time?) None of the mentioned texts were disseminated very widely, however.<sup>57</sup>

### *The South-West*

The dissemination of ideas and texts between Ruthenia and north-west Rus was comparatively lively. Manuscript evidence suggests an earlier Ruthenian upsurge of anti-Judaica, partly of the very same texts, one or two generations earlier than in the north-west. Not least, the two areas were linked by a notable interest in the *Sayings of the Holy Prophets* and a few related works.

What is especially conspicuous is that this literary movement, if indeed it was a movement, took its beginning in Ruthenia at the turn of the fourteenth century (at least before c.1411). Here, a textual community appeared to be reworking older texts with a view, among other things, to exploring information on the predicted end of the world in 1492 and on the role in its coming about of a Jewish anti-Messiah or Antichrist of the tribe of Dan. They knew him as Ermolay (i.e. Hermolaos, or Armilus, known in Slavonic from the *Teachings of Jacob*) or Mashia(a)kh/Mashika

<sup>57</sup> See *ibid.* 239–40.

(from the Hebrew *mashiah*, ‘Messiah’). This first becomes clear from a Ruthenian redaction of the *Life of Andrew the Fool*, which, however, also used a now lost anti-Judaic compilation. Whereas the more or less direct information on this process came exclusively from Christian texts, it appears that within a generation or so, by the mid-century, some cultural exchange had occurred with Jewish communities in Ruthenia and had given rise to yet another generation of texts. In the most likely scenario, the two upsurges of this tradition coincided with two peaks of translating activity connected with representatives of the Jewish community. The mid-century was a time when Jewish as well as Christian communities awaited the apocalypse, and it comes as no surprise that some cross-fertilization of ideas may have occurred. A missionary movement within the Kievan Jewish community, which was recently hypothesized,<sup>58</sup> might then have been countered by an analogous Christian movement. Of prime interest here is a group of short acrostic texts, a cycle of polemical so-called *azbuki tolkovyya*, devotional alphabets, closely connected with these earlier texts and with the *Sayings of the Holy Prophets*. They, too, envisage the coming of Ermolay–Mashiakh and appear to be part of an attempt to bring baptism to the Jews. Particularly interesting is the very use of the alphabetical and acrostic principle in these texts, along with wordings such as

A sixth abecedary, also against you. Before God gave you the letters; disclosing in the words of the alphabet [?? (the syntax is opaque)] all wisdom in matters heavenly and earthly, knowing that you would be rejected and that He must call a new people, us; he arranged the letters of the alphabet from the beginning of the world and to the future end. Tell me which word was devised for what purpose and how their augury was fulfilled! Listen to the Lord Himself interpreting this for you!<sup>59</sup>

Kievan Jewish scholars are likely to have been well aware of traditions such as the tenth-century Italo-Byzantine astrologer (and writer of acrostics!) Shabbetai Donnolo’s expansion of the mystic treatise *Sefer yetsirah*, in which the letters of the Hebrew alphabet, the *otiyot hayesod* (‘foundation letters’), along with the numbers, together tell the story of the universe.<sup>60</sup> One may compare the documented interest taken in the Kievan *kahal* in Jewish Provençal and Byzantine literature (not least astronomy/astrology)<sup>61</sup> and the documented use, in Moses of Kiev, of acrostic techniques.<sup>62</sup> An

<sup>58</sup> Taube, ‘Fifteenth-Century Ruthenian Translations’; for the entire paragraph, see Pereswetoff-Morath, ‘Whereby We Know that It Is the Last Time’. Fascinating new light is now being shed on Jewish–Christian cultural communication in Ruthenia by the discovery of a Cyrillic manual of Hebrew hailing from the fifteenth-century Grand Duchy of Lithuania, possibly from Kiev. See S. Temchin, ‘Kirillicheskii rukopisnyi uchebnik drevneevreiskogo yazyka (XVI v.): Publikatsiya i obshchaya kharakteristika pamyatnika’, in V. Meiliūnaite and N. Morozova (eds.), *Naujausi kalbu ir kultūru tyrimai* (Vilnius, 2012), 137–80.

<sup>59</sup> Pereswetoff-Morath, ‘Whereby We Know that It Is the Last Time’, 85–6.

<sup>60</sup> A. Sharf, *The Universe of Shabbetai Donnolo* (Warminster, 1976), 25 ff.

<sup>61</sup> See Attias, *Le Commentaire biblique*, 89 (on R. Moses Hagoleh); Temchin, ‘Skhariya i Skorina’ (on Zechariah Hakohen).

<sup>62</sup> See Pereswetoff-Morath, ‘Whereby We Know that It Is the Last Time’, 81–92; cf., again cautiously, Gardette, ‘Judaeo-Provençal Astronomy’.

awareness of this may have passed to the Ruthenian community interested in Jews and the end-time. (It should be pointed out that a Ruthenian origin of the Slavonic poems, though likely, is as yet conjectural.)

The other side of the coin—another reaction to we-know-not-yet-exactly-what—might be the already cited uncommonly vivid *Sermon for Pentecost against the Jews*, written in the 1470s by the metropolitan Spyridon/Sabbas, preached in Lithuanian Pūnė, which in its pathos, though perhaps not its concrete images, suggests a rare personal involvement with the subject. It is uncertain, however, to what extent its author, who had recently arrived from Constantinople, would have been up to date in his knowledge of Ruthenian developments.<sup>63</sup> It is noteworthy, though, that the Greek metropolitan of Kiev, Photius, writing as early as 1415, had complained, in an epistle to the Orthodox of the Grand Duchy, ‘shame unto the Latins and the Jews, and the Lithuanians and the Tatars; and they make a mockery of us and an insult in front of those that live around us’.<sup>64</sup> The constellation of nations or denominations, which is so characteristic of Ruthenia, is believable in the new locale and, obviously, very far from any Greek *lieu commun*. The simple statement is as remote from the ancient Hilarion of Kiev and Cyril of Turov, and is at least partly a reaction to a physical world. This may be true for Spyridon’s sermon too.

## BAPTISM, II

The early translation of the *Teachings of Jacob the Newly Baptized Jew*—which enjoyed particular popularity among the East Slavs, and especially, I believe, in Ruthenia starting in the very early fifteenth century—has some specific East Slavonic additions, inserted no later than the mid-sixteenth century. Among other examples, we read the words, ‘The Jews banned the Saviour from their hearts, but when they turn and bemoan their sins I will comfort them.’<sup>65</sup> Are we, then, here too witnessing a heightened tendency, peculiar to late medieval East Slavdom (to wit, Ruthenia), to evangelize the Jews or at least to accept their baptism?

If the passage indeed originated in Ruthenia, this would doubtless be an important fact. This is the time and place for our main pieces of evidence for early Jewish-Orthodox cultural contacts in the East Slav lands but also for the earliest documented conversions of Jews to Orthodox Christianity in pre-Romanov Russia. A number of translated texts *adversus Iudaeos* which reaffirmed the ‘baptizability’ of Jews and the possibility of conducting religious debates with them had, as we have just seen, been recently imported or reassessed. It was the last age: the Christian majority and, at least, prominent members of the Kievan *kahal* expected the arrival of the Messiah (and perhaps an anti-Messiah) around 1492. The conversion of the

<sup>63</sup> See *GWAC*, i, esp. 96–9.

<sup>64</sup> Fotii, mitropolit Kievskii i vseya Rusi, *Sochineniya: Kniga glagolemaya Fotios* (Moscow, 2005), 123.

<sup>65</sup> Quoted from *Velikiya Minei Chetii, sobrannyya vserossiiskim mitropolitom Makariem*, xii: *Dekabr*, dni 18–23, 1454–5. Other early manuscripts follow the Greek original.

opposing camp was of considerable importance and a matter of some urgency. I repeat that it has been credibly hypothesized that a quaint Jewish ‘mission to the Slavs’ was in its making among some Kievan Jews, and there is evidence of a parallel nexus of Christian polemical texts evincing interest in the Jewish ‘anti-Messiah’. Also, in some cases, difficult though they are to assess, these texts express concerns over the need to baptize the Jews (and may at the same time arguably betray some knowledge of internal Jewish cultural processes). We read in the prologue to another of the *tolkovyya azbuki*,

For as the world was already going towards its end, He rejected you and summoned us. Discharging you in countless numbers, He destroyed you through Titus. From the captivity by Titus and until now have you been enslaved to us. Learn then, infidel, that there has since been neither good nor any deliverance for thee; and unless thou cleanse thy soul in the baptism of the New Testament thou hast indeed perished for all eternity.<sup>66</sup>

The mid-century Moscow metropolitan Jonah (recognized pastor of Ruthenia too, at least for the better part of the 1450s), along with the Muscovite Grand Duke, condoned the conversion of Jews, if we are to believe the testimony of the baptized Jew Theodore in his *Epistle on the Baptism and the Orthodox Faith*, written, conspicuously, at some point around the 1450s to his ‘race and comrades, Israel and thy comrades, and to the entire Jewish race’ (the present writer does not believe this to be falsification/provocation by a contemporary Christian Slav). Theodore resorts to the doctrine that the righteous of the Old Testament were redeemed by the post-Resurrection Descent of Christ into Hades and that living Jews might follow the example of the author, Theodore, and be similarly saved. Like the author of the abecedarian poem quoted above (is there a closer connection?), Theodore turns to frightening images of the impending Judgement and to comforting notes of salvation in Christ, claiming that the Jews will suffer a fate worse than that of swine and dogs, which have no souls: intractable Jews will suffer everlasting torment, whilst the animals, once dead, will merely disintegrate. Theodore claims to have been well-to-do and literate (presumably he is referring to Hebrew): ‘I am no youth but a grown man, and I am literate [*gramotu znayu*].’ It appears that he was a Ruthenian, though this cannot be stated with certainty.<sup>67</sup>

It is hardly a coincidence that we can reconstruct some literary connections between Orthodox Christians and Jews in the contemporaneous translating activity from Hebrew in Ruthenia, but a full integration of the evidence from these diverse fields, which has here been brought together impressionistically, is a task for future scholarship. Evidently, the movement of members of the Jewish community towards Christianity was as repulsive to former co-religionists as was the (in part only perceived?) Judaizing of Christians to the official Christian heresimachs of the turn of the century. As the above-mentioned baptized Kievan Jew (and merchant?)

<sup>66</sup> Quoted from Pereswetoff-Morath, ‘Whereby We Know that It Is the Last Time’, 90.

<sup>67</sup> *GWAC*, i. 209–12.

Danilo told Archbishop Gennadius in about 1490, ‘We arranged to set out from Kiev to Moscow, but, said he, the Jews began to growl at me: “You dog! Where are you preparing to go?”’<sup>68</sup>

Individual cases of Jewish converts who reached the high level of state officials in grand ducal Lithuania show that they could, in principle, be granted equal rights, more or less, with ‘born Christians’. And while Ivan IV’s views on baptizing Jews are problematic, we know of instances in the first half of the seventeenth century when more or less voluntary converts were granted generous state support in Muscovy.<sup>69</sup> They were referred to as neophytes (*novokreshchenye*) long after their baptism, possibly all their lives, as were, generally, baptized Muslim Tatars in Muscovite service. Arguably, the formulae of abjuration which were read prior to the baptism proper were aimed, as they had been in Byzantium, at a clean break with, and a forceful public denigration of, one’s former religion along with a solemn oath as regards the heartfelt need to convert.<sup>70</sup>

The fictitious ‘disputational’ texts known to the East Slavs depicted the creation of some pious and very convincing converts from Judaism but also vaguely hinted at the insincerity and faithlessness of others.<sup>71</sup> The question whether elements of force might be ordinarily used when conversions took place in the medieval East Slav lands is as yet unanswerable. So is the question whether East Slav proponents of theological anti-Judaism might have *directly* called for violence to be used against Jews. As we have seen, however, this is not very probable, at least not before the anti-heretical excesses of Gennadius of Novgorod and Joseph of Volok.

On the whole it will be noted that evidence of the effervescence and burgeoning of new—or regurgitated—ideas, even as they pertained to Jews, may be found in both Muscovy and Ruthenia. We do not know at this point how to interpret this fact: whether there was mainly an interest in *texts* on the eastern side of the border or if there was something else too. Settled Jews can hardly be posited there, but the cited cases of baptized Ruthenian Jews on the east side of the border (Theodore even counting the Grand Duke of Moscow as his sovereign) may stimulate future searches deeper beneath the surface. Obviously there were, despite the difficult life negotiations which preceded and followed on baptism, significant advantages to converting, not only for ambitious Ruthenian males (such as John/Abraham Ezofovich, with time vice-treasurer of the Grand Duchy and owner of

<sup>68</sup> N. A. Kazakova and Ya. S. Lurye, *Antifeodal’nye ereticheskie dvizheniya na Rusi XIV–nachala XVI v.* (Moscow and Leningrad, 1955), 377.

<sup>69</sup> D. Feldman and A. Kononova, “‘B’et chelom litovskaya polonyanka zhidovka novokreshchena. . .’: Dokumenty XVII v. o sud’be kreshchenoi evreiki Melan’i i ee sem’i”, *Vestnik Evreiskogo universiteta*, 10 (28) (2005), 305–34.

<sup>70</sup> See A. Zanemonets, ‘Otrechenie ot iudaizma v vizantiiskoi kul’ture’, in O. V. Belova et al. (eds.), *Svoi ili chuzhoi? Evrei i slavyane glazami drug druga. Sbornik statei* (Moscow, 2003), 15–22. I have not had access to the Old Slavonic translation of a ‘Ceremony for Receiving Jews’ apparently published at Sofia in 1987 in a posthumous volume by V. N. Beneshevich.

<sup>71</sup> Peresvetov–Murat, “‘Adonai, zabludikhom!’”, *passim*.

the magnificent Slavonic *Kievan Psalter*). Some generations later, the Ruthenian Karaite Isaac ben Abraham Troki (1533–94) does not mention with even a single word the Lithuanian case when he writes

After the expulsion of the Jews from England, France, Spain, and Germany, unheard of cruelties ensued, the description of which excites the utmost horror in every breast, while, on the other hand, the countries in which the Jews were left unmolested, bore the most undeniable proofs of civilisation, and obtained by providential retribution the enjoyment of prosperity.<sup>72</sup>

Yet at the same time, there would, after 1495, probably have been a never quite placated fear of expulsions and repression, in Ruthenia as in Muscovy, a fear which converts could leave behind them for good.

#### DISPUTATION ENACTED?

The apologetic, partly even polemical, *Hizuk emunah* ('Bulwark of Faith') of Isaac of Troki would upon its translation into Latin in the seventeenth century become widely read and debated throughout Europe, making an impression even on Voltaire. Troki's text is a critique of the New Testament, with which the author was well acquainted (probably in a Polish translation), and it focuses on the unfulfilment of messianic prophecies in Jesus of Nazareth as well as on inconsistencies in Christian practice as compared with the *ipsissima verba* of Jesus. The *Hizuk emunah* was written in response to polemical writings of Catholic and Protestant scholars, but its author did not really enter into dialogue with the Orthodox Slavs; his scarce citations of Orthodox collocutors appear to be merely rhetorical, and the Orthodox themselves are literary straw men.<sup>73</sup> The book was probably never known among Christians in pre-Petrine Russia, for whom its circulation in Hebrew manuscript would have presented an insurmountable obstacle (whereas a Latin version would have been understandable, but only to a precious few). It should not be excluded, however, that its arguments and acquaintance with the Christian Bible may have exerted an influence on Jewish scholars in eastern Ruthenia and on their dealings with Christian East Slavs. Such a view as is expressed in Isaac's preface is therefore still worth reproducing in this connection as an authentic voice:<sup>74</sup>

Persecutions arising from religious hatred were heaped upon the children of my faith in all quarters of the globe, and were ever increasing in acrimony, not less in consequence of the low state of knowledge possessed by the Jews in matters of theological controversy than by the confused and mistaken notions which Christians had formed of Judaism. But it is absolutely imperative on man to be at all times prepared to repel any attack made on his belief. In conformity with this observation, our sages have recorded their opinion in the following

<sup>72</sup> Isaac Troki, *Faith Strengthened*, trans. Mocatta, 218.

<sup>73</sup> Pereswetoff-Morath, 'Whereby We Know that It Is the Last Time', 96–7.

<sup>74</sup> Albeit here only in the translator's 'Abstract from the author's preface': Isaac Troki, *Faith Strengthened*, trans. Mocatta, pp. xix–xx.

axiom:—‘Man ought assiduously to study his own faith, and be competent to give a proper reply to his antagonists’, more particularly when we consider that, in the majority of cases, the opposition to our doctrines rests on the misinterpretation of those Scriptures of which we alone are the legitimate heirs and expounders.

As a polemical tool, the *Hizuk emunah* is in a different league from most Slavonic disputational texts and is vastly superior to almost everything available at the time to Orthodox clergy: it is cogently reasoned and aimed at an actual, pertinent reality—albeit in large part only a *textual* reality (and here it resembles the Christian polemics). Whereas there is a biblical monumentality to some of the Slavonic works, such as the *Interpreted Palaia*, these still barely stand comparison with Isaac’s work. In particular, for all their addresses to ‘a Jew’, they are marked out by supreme monologicity. If at all applied in polemics—and it has been my contention here that works such as these were not primarily thus intended—they might have been somewhat helpful in *suppressing*, but neither in *countering* on a face-to-face basis nor, still less, in *persuading* an opponent. There were tools among the imported works which might have helped a potential Rus polemicist, but these would still have been difficult to make practical use of. From, for example, the *Jerusalem Disputation* the polemicist would learn some tricks of the trade: ‘Ask him this and this. If he cannot answer, then say this . . .’. But did any East Slav theologian follow them? For Muscovy, furthermore, it is probable that the question of following such pieces of advice would have remained academic: there were, after all, extremely few Jews nearby.

The works were continuously read, nevertheless. Use was found for them, without disputations ever being enacted. If, in fifteenth- and sixteenth-century Muscovy, the immediate need had arisen to compile truly helpful tools in order to confront real Judaists, the material, though yet crude, would have been at hand. So would the brains and, I believe, the skills, though yet untempered and unprepared to counter a man like Troki. There would have been a Joseph of Volog or a Daniel of Moscow or, the self-evident candidate, the erudite and ardent polemicist Michael Triboles, known in Russia as Maxim the Greek.

#### MUSCOVY AND THE IVANS

In fifteenth-century Muscovy, visiting Jews still ran comparatively small risk of expulsion or of suffering physical assault for religious reasons. The conspicuously liberal-minded Ivan III admitted a Jewish emissary from Crimea in the early 1470s; in 1474–86 he had a Jew look to his Caffan business; in 1487 he invited a Jewish prince (as he thought) to Moscow with promises of great honours, though in fact the man was not a Jew; his foreign traders reported dealings with Kievan Jewish traders and with Jewish minor civil servants as they went from Caffa to Ruthenia in 1488;<sup>75</sup> in 1490 the Grand Duke had a Jewish physician from Italy, magister Leon, in his service and allowed him to treat his family. True, Leon’s attempt at healing a

<sup>75</sup> *Sbornik Imperatorskago russkago istoricheskago obshchestva*, xxxv (St Petersburg, 1892), 10.

young prince, uncle of the still unborn Ivan IV, ‘the Terrible’, failed and he suffered capital punishment.<sup>76</sup> This was the fate of many royal physicians in pre-modern Europe, not only Jewish ones, though at the end of the day the doctor’s origins may have come to the fore as the bereft tried to come to terms with what had happened. The excellent reputation of Jewish physicians could still be tainted by their religion.<sup>77</sup>

At this time, the arsenal of European Renaissance stereotypes of the Jew was still more or less unknown to the East Slavs, but a generation later, in the person of Ivan IV, we first find Judaeophobe sentiments that certainly cross the border into the phantasmagorical, chimerical, and plainly antisemitic. There was, at the turn of the century, a certain sharpening of the tone in religious treatments of the Jews, such as in Joseph of Volok (‘The Enlightener’), the Karelian Sabbas the Monk, and the work of anti-Metropolitan Spyridon of Kiev—who might possibly be identified as Sabbas.<sup>78</sup> Even after this, anti-heretical tendencies may still have played a role—for the heresimach movement certainly boosted the use and copying of works *adversus Iudaeos*—but this is, in my view, only too easily exaggerated since, in the anti-heretical use of anti-Judaica, we also occasionally detect a *playing down* of Jewish properties.<sup>79</sup> Yet Joseph of Volok, an avid reader of such literature, alluding to the *Life of Gregentius*, although speaking of the proper treatment of heretics, was happy to cite the example of how ‘the orthodox emperor Heraclius issued a decree for the entire realm: if a Jew will not be baptised, let him be killed. Likewise king Abraham of Himyar ordered the execution of Jews who would not be baptised.’<sup>80</sup> Contrast the reverse argument from the trans-Volgan elders above.

Otherwise, views on heretics and Jews should not be confused when it comes to practical action. Even though in Orthodox heresiological writings Judaism could be viewed as one of four arch-heresies, an *ultima Thule* of heresy, Jews were, in practice and in other theology than heresiological, rather more accepted than heretics and more willingly allowed to live in one’s midst than were heretics. The seemingly paradoxical situation might then arise where heretics were calumniated for being like Jews, whereas, in actual fact, a Jew might be much more readily accepted than the heretic. Apart from illustrating the general human tendency to hate the apostate more than the common adversary, this situation had support in high theology, since, as we have seen, for the very learned, Israel was to be saved in the end and until then bear witness to the Christian truth.

It is a fact known from several testimonies that unreformed Jews were not allowed in mid-sixteenth-century Muscovy, yet it is as firmly documented that recently they *had* been. Unfortunately we know very little as to the date and character of the actual act of barring. Apparently there were several versions, or legends, in circulation even in the times of Ivan IV as to why this had come about, and

<sup>76</sup> See *GWAC*, ii. 22, with references.

<sup>77</sup> See e.g. Sharf, *Universe of Shabbetai Donnolo*, 114.

<sup>78</sup> But contrast Dmitriev, ‘Joseph de Volokolamsk était-il antisémite?’

<sup>79</sup> On this, see *GWAC*, i. 241–4; cf. *GWAC*, ii. 102–3, and Pereswetoff-Morath, “‘Simulacra of Hatred’”, 631–43.

<sup>80</sup> See *GWAC*, i. 242–3.



although some kind of barring was already at hand in the 1520s this seems not to have been much observed. A more binding one was obviously enforced by Ivan IV, possibly around 1550. His views on Jews, which may have had roots in family history (see magister Leon above) and were definitely aggravated by his singular psyche, may in the end have been instrumental in informing a new official secular attitude towards Jews in Muscovy.<sup>81</sup> Simultaneously, a kind of piously aggressive legend, which had only occasionally been known earlier as integral parts of larger, translated works, was now gradually imported both from the West and from the Christian East, preparing the ground for Western Renaissance-style narratives with new, secular, stereotypes of the Jew, which entered seventeenth-century Muscovy with a new influx of profane literature.<sup>82</sup>

### ON DEVELOPMENTS IN RUTHENIA UP TO 1569

From the second half of the sixteenth century, when the cross-fertilization of occidental and oriental trends intensified in the Polish Commonwealth (*Rzeczpospolita*) following the swirl of ideas of the Renaissance, Reformation, and Counter-Reformation, that situation began to change on Ruthenian soil too. It was consummated, however, only in the seventeenth century. (Simultaneously, after the Lublin Union of 1569, a more thoroughgoing Jewish colonization of Ruthenia came to change the picture of Jewish–Christian relations.<sup>83</sup>) Up to this point, the main current of anti-Judaic literature remained much the same as before, dominated by Byzantine texts that had reached these lands in the fourteenth–fifteenth centuries.<sup>84</sup> Now, even the traditions of pre-apocalyptic texts, which were developed with some urgency in the Orthodox fifteenth century, begin to fade out of view. Some remained in circulation, however, and resulted in a new compilation, the *Distinct Speech to the Jews under Which There Are Short Sayings from All the Prophets*, which was appended as a further ‘aid’ to an older Byzantine disputational text in a codex

<sup>81</sup> See in more detail Peresvetov–Murat, ‘Khristianskii antiudaizm’, 438–44; there also on the case of Maxim the Greek and the drowning of Jews following the reduction of Polotsk in 1563. Cf., apart from the literature quoted there, J. V. Haney, *From Italy to Muscovy: The Life and Works of Maxim the Greek* (Munich, 1973), 129, 132–4.

<sup>82</sup> e.g. the ‘Tale of the merchant Grigory and of how his wife wished to kill him with the cooperation of a Jew’, in D. S. Likhachev et al. (eds.), *Biblioteka literatury drevnei Rusi*, xv: *XVII vek* (St Petersburg, 2006), 105–7.

<sup>83</sup> The following is mainly a digest from B. Serov, ‘Les Juifs et le judaïsme dans les écrits polémiques des Slaves orientaux de la *Rzeczpospolita* (seconde moitié du XVI<sup>e</sup>–XVII<sup>e</sup> siècle)’, *XVII<sup>e</sup> siècle*, 220 (2003), 501–14; id., ‘Predstavleniya o evreyakh i iudaizme v ukrainsko-belorusskoi propovedi i polemike XVI v.’, in G. F. Matveev (ed.), *Ivan Aleksandrovich Voronkov—professor-slavist Moskovskogo universiteta: Materialy nauchnykh chtenii, posvyashchennykh 80-letiyu so dnya rozhdeniya I. A. Voronkova* (Moscow, 2001), 58–85; cf. also M. V. Dmitriev, ‘Terrain à explorer: Antijudaïsme, philojudaïsme, anti-sémite dans les sociétés de rite grec avant le XVIII<sup>e</sup> siècle (en guise de conclusion)’, in Dmitriev, Tollet, and Teiro (eds.), *Les Chrétiens et les juifs*, 355 ff.

<sup>84</sup> Serov, ‘Les Juifs et le judaïsme’, 502–3.

from the Supraśl Monastery of the Annunciation near Białystok in the late 1570s. (This house was, to all appearances, a Ruthenian centre for polemical Orthodox literature.<sup>85</sup>) It is quite possible that this was also the period when the *Jerusalem Disputation* was re-edited into a more vernacular Ruthenian.<sup>86</sup>

As for newly composed Ruthenian texts proper, there were virtually none before the very end of the sixteenth century. Jews loom very large, though, as always, in polemical tracts against Protestants and Catholics, both of whom are likened to Jews and given Jewish attributes. This is the case, for example, in the epistles of the *starets* Artemy, a refugee abbot from Muscovy, or in works by the priest Vasily of Ostrog.<sup>87</sup> Under the pen of a Ruthenian man of letters such as the Vilna preacher Stefan Zizany (*Sermons on the Antichrist*, 1596), the anti-Judaic eschatological topoi of a work such as Cyril of Jerusalem's fifteenth catechetical lecture are even reinterpreted and redirected at Catholics and Protestants, particularly at the Pope.<sup>88</sup> It is instructive to see how a text which had been read anti-Judaically in pre-1492 Ruthenia was now defused along with, it would appear, the fear of a theological Jewish opponent. Yet a number of exegetical works commenting on books of the Bible (from a point of view, even the *Distinct Speech* might be counted among them) were written from the traditional supersessionalist angle (interpreted Psalters, 'moralizing Gospels' (*pouchitel' nye evangeliya*), etc.). Apart from filling the constant need to fortify the weak in spirit and to work on the ever-important explaining of the balance between Old and New, Jew and Christian, use may arguably have been made of them in disputes with Jews as well as with 'Judaizing' Protestants.<sup>89</sup>

At the very end of our period, as an unexpected finding by Boris Serov may show, the antisemitic myths from western Europe may have silently entered even the religious musings of Orthodox theologians, thus pointing forward in a new direction. In a Ruthenian polemical florilegium from the 1560s, we read of the Passover as, arguably, a parody of the Eucharist and thus, possibly, echoing the desecration of the host, well known from the European Middle Ages, where 'again' the Jews 'sacrifice, torment, and cut' the Lamb.<sup>90</sup> Unfortunately, the ancient author does not care to expand this much. While the short passage may suggest an early trickle of occidental anti-Judaica in oriental literature, however, and while it may

<sup>85</sup> See Pereswetoff-Morath, 'Whereby We Know that It Is the Last Time', 98–9.

<sup>86</sup> See A. I. Pereswetoff-Morath, "'And was Jerusalem builded here . . .?'" On the Textual History of the Slavonic *Jerusalem Disputation*', *Scando-Slavica*, 47 (2001), 19–38.

<sup>87</sup> Otherwise, except for the *Distinct Speech*, Serov lists only *Of Christian Piety: An Answer to the Jews* (1593) by Meletius Pegas: Serov, 'Les Juifs et le judaïsme', 504. Cf. T. A. Oparina, 'La Polémique anti-juive en Russie au XVII<sup>e</sup> siècle', in Dmitriev, Tollet, and Teiro (eds.), *Les Chrétiens et les juifs*, 169–70.

<sup>88</sup> On which see T. A. Oparina, *Ivan Nasedka i polemicheskoe bogoslovie kievskoi mitropolii* (Novosibirsk, 1998), 330 ff. and ch. 4.

<sup>89</sup> Serov, 'Les Juifs et le judaïsme', 504–5; id., 'Predstavleniya o evreyakh i iudaizme'.

<sup>90</sup> Serov, 'Predstavleniya o evreyakh i iudaizme', 72; id., 'Les Juifs et le judaïsme', 509. Cf., on the first known accusations of the blood libel on East Slav soil (1564), although in a Podlachian mixed Catholic–Orthodox community, id., 'Predstavleniya o evreyakh i iudaizme', 83.

constitute a very early exponent of chimerical myths of the Jew, it still stands pretty much on its own. Throughout the sixteenth century it is very rare to find any knowledge even of such a central concept as the Talmud, which still speaks against much factual theological confrontation with Jews. Known of as a fact to the few Slav readers of Nicholas of Lyra, whom we noted above, and mentioned probably by the Polotsk scholar Franciscus Skarina in the early sixteenth century as one of the books written in Chaldean (i.e. Aramaic), ‘the Talmud [*talmud*’], which is to say an interpretation of the Law [*tolkovanie zakona*],<sup>91</sup> was ‘exposed’ and expanded upon only in Ioaniky Galyatovsky’s *The True Messiah* of 1669.<sup>92</sup> But that universe would be very different from the one treated in this survey.

<sup>91</sup> I. E. Evseev, *Tolkovaniya na knigu proroka Daniila v drevne-slavyanskoi i starinnoi russkoi pis'mennosti* (Moscow, 1905), 44.

<sup>92</sup> Serov, ‘Les Juifs et le judaïsme’, 511–12; id., ‘Obraz evreev v sochinenii I. Galyatovskogo “Messiya pravdivyi”’, in R. M. Kaplanov, V. V. Mochalova, and L. A. Chudkova (eds.), *Materialy Shestoi Ezhegodnoi mezhdunarodnoi mezhdistsiplinarnoi konferentsii po iudatke*, iii: *Evreiskaya kul'tura i kul'turnye kontakty* (Moscow, 1999), 100–14.

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# Jews, Orthodox, and Uniates in the Ruthenian Lands

JUDITH KALIK

THE CULTURAL FRAMEWORKS of early modern eastern Europe, long before national states took form in this region, are difficult to define. On the one hand, modern Ukraine was divided from the mid-seventeenth century between the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth, and particularly the Polish part of this dual state, and Muscovite Russia. On the other hand, the eastern parts of the Commonwealth, conventionally referred to as Ruthenia, included parts of present-day Ukraine and Belarus, and any attempt to separate these areas along modern political boundaries would be incorrect. The designation ‘Ruthenian lands’ that is used in this chapter includes all of Ukraine, both Polish and Russian, and Belarus. These were peripheral regions, subjected to constant political rivalry. Because these regions had multi-national and multi-religious populations, political conflicts naturally took the form of religious polemics, as in the early modern age religion served as a central channel for the expression not only of religious feelings but also of national and political identity.

Relations between the Orthodox Church and the Jews in the eastern parts of the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth were decisive in creating living conditions for Jews and in determining their relations with the non-Jewish majority, in the Commonwealth itself and in the Russian empire during the post-partition period.<sup>1</sup> The majority of the local non-Jewish population belonged to this church, and also the majority of the Jewish population had concentrated in these regions during the early modern age.

For this reason, religious polemical literature flourished to an unusual extent, especially in the age of the Union of Brest. The Orthodox Church was the majority

<sup>1</sup> The main studies on this subject are M. V. Dmitriev, ‘Terrain à explorer: Antijudaïsme, philo-judaïsme, antisémitisme dans les sociétés de rite grec avant le XVIII<sup>e</sup> siècle (en guise de conclusion)’, in M. Dmitriev, D. Tollet, and E. Teiro (eds.), *Les Chrétiens et les juifs dans les sociétés de rites grec et latin: Approche comparative. Actes du colloque organisé les 14–15 juin 1999 à la Maison des sciences de l’homme, Paris* (Paris, 2003), 339–66; J. Kalik, ‘The Orthodox Church and the Jews in the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth’, *Jewish History*, 17 (2003), 229–37; ead., ‘Pravoslavnaya tserkov’ i evrei v Rechi Pospolitoi’, in A. Kulik (ed.), *Istoriya evreiskogo naroda v Rossii, i: Ot drevnosti do rannego novogo vremeni* (Moscow and Jerusalem, 2010), 267–81 (Hebrew version: ‘Hakenesiyah hapravoslaviv ve-hayehudim bemamleket polin-lita’, in A. Kulik (ed.), *Toledot yehudei rusyah, i: mimei kedem ad ha’et hahadashah hamukdemet* (Jerusalem, 2010), 222–32).

denomination, but in 1596 it split into two. Part of the church entered into a union with Rome, creating the so-called Uniate or Greek Catholic Church, which held great influence in the region. After the union, the significance of the Orthodox Church declined, and the majority of the noble patrons of the Jews were either Catholics or Protestants. However, Orthodox relations with Jews followed the same pattern as those of the Uniates and Roman Catholics. In fact, probably because of the similarity in the institutional and economic structure of the three churches, the forms of contact between Jews and Uniates, Roman Catholics, and Greek Orthodox were practically identical, though not developed to the same degree. This is demonstrated by the rulings of synods, the pastoral letters of bishops, polemical literature, and so on.<sup>2</sup> The present study focuses on the relations between Jews, Orthodox, and Uniates since the adherents of these two churches came from the same ethnic groups (Ukrainians and Belarusians) and shared ritual practices and a similar liturgy.

The most important types of economic relations between Jews and the three churches demonstrate a clearly uniform pattern.<sup>3</sup> The most widespread types of contact were related to the enormous debts accumulated by the Jewish communities and councils to these churches during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.<sup>4</sup> These debts constituted about nine-tenths of all loans taken by Jewish communities in that period, and about 80 per cent of these came from the Roman Catholic Church. The total amount reached hundreds of thousands of Polish zlotys. What made the loans so attractive and worthwhile to the communities was the fact that the interest (which was usually set at an annual rate of 7 per cent) was the lowest available and always fell short of the inflation rate. Furthermore, the interest on loans from the Church was calculated on capital alone and all the instalments were equal. In other words, the interest was not cumulative but constant. Therefore, the real value of the amount to be repaid diminished rapidly all the time.

There were three types of Jewish debt to the churches: direct; debts bequeathed to the Church by nobles in their wills to finance memorial prayers; and donations that nobles made to the Church consisting of loan revenues from Jews. Practically all loans were in the form of the so-called *myderkaf*—the purchase of revenue from a mortgaged property (usually an urban house), so that until repayment of the

<sup>2</sup> For a comparison of the churches, see J. Kalik, 'The Jews and the Various Churches of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth', in H. Łaskiewicz (ed.), *Churches and Confessions in East Central Europe in Early Modern Times* (Lublin, 1999), 140–52; ead., 'Hayehudim ukhnesiyot notsriyot shonot bemamlekhet polin-lita: ifyun defusei mafa'im vehashva'ah', in R. Margolin (ed.), *Divrei hakongres ha'olami ha-12 lemada'ei hayahadut*, division B: *Toledot am yisra'el* (Jerusalem, 2000), 103–9.

<sup>3</sup> On economic relations between Jews and the Catholic Church, see J. Kalik, 'Economic Relations between the Catholic Church and the Jews in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in the 17th–18th Centuries', *Gal-ed*, 23 (2012), 15–36.

<sup>4</sup> On this subject, see J. Kalik, 'Patterns of Contacts between the Catholic Church and the Jews in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth: The Jewish Debts', in A. Teller (ed.), *Studies in the History of the Jews in Old Poland in Honor of Jacob Goldberg* (Jerusalem, 1998), 102–22.

capital was made, the creditor received the 'revenues' (particularly rent) that he might have expected to receive had the property remained in his possession.<sup>5</sup> The ecclesiastical creditors of the Jews were often known Judaeophobic hierarchs, such as Feodosi Wasylewicz (Teodozy Wasilewicz), the Orthodox bishop of Belarus, or Waclaw Hieronim Sierakowski, the Catholic bishop of Przemyśl,<sup>6</sup> whose economic interest in the well-being of their Jewish debtors for uninterrupted flow of cash usually prevailed over their ideological position and restrained their anti-Jewish legislation. Both Orthodox and Uniate churches often failed to collect Jewish debts, primarily because of the protection that magnates gave their Jews, especially in these cases. Thus, Feodosi Wasylewicz wrote to Bogusław Radziwiłł on 4 October 1699 that he had to go to Kraków (presumably to attend the session of the Sejm there) in order to find justice in a matter of 120 grzywny owed to him by the Jews of Słuck, which he had not received despite all his appeals to the town's lord, Prince Radziwiłł. He asked Radziwiłł to treat him, a Christian cleric, with the same degree of respect and good will with which he said he treated the Jews of his estate.<sup>7</sup>

Jews also had to contribute other payments to the Roman Catholic, Uniate, and Greek Orthodox churches. These were the *kozubalec*;<sup>8</sup> payments for cemeteries; and the so-called *pro tolerantia* payments, which were meant to compensate a local priest for tithes which would have been paid by members of the Christian population whose place had been taken by Jews. There were also other forms of compensation to local priests for various damages. Jewish leaseholders were also forbidden to sell vodka on Sundays and major Christian holidays (Christmas, Corpus Christi, and others). It is worth noting that all such payments generally appear in Jewish communal records as standing expenses. Thanks to the magnates, Jews, especially those on private estates, were able to avoid these payments. Thus, the court of Brest registered a complaint made in 1680 by an Orthodox priest from Grodzisk, Jakub Jasiński, against Lejzer Józefowicz. The priest claimed that on 3 March of that year, Józefowicz had been driving his wagon near the church in Grodzisk. Two boys, pupils of the priest, had gone out of the church and began to demand a *kozubalec* for paper, as was the custom. The *kozubalec* that Józefowicz gave them was in the form of heavy blows to the neck ('począł im dawać kozubalec . . . po szyi'). Jasiński, who was ill at the time, went out into the street to ask Józefowicz, 'Why are you beating my boys?' In response, Józefowicz cursed him and called him a 'son of a whore'. When Jasiński remonstrated, Józefowicz jumped down from his wagon, threw the

<sup>5</sup> On this form of loan, see J. Kalik, 'Haḥkadah, viderkauf bepe'ilutam hakalkalit shel yehudei mamlekheth polin-lita', in R. Aaronsohn and S. Stampfer (eds.), *Yazamut yehudit be'et haḥadashah, mizrah eiropah ve'erets yisra'el* (Jerusalem, 2000), 25–47.

<sup>6</sup> J. Ataman, *W. H. Sierakowski i jego rządy w diecezji przemyskiej* (Warsaw, 1936), 284–5.

<sup>7</sup> *Arkheograficheskii sbornik dokumentov, otnosyashchikhsya k istorii Severo-Zapadnoi Rusi*, vii (Vilna, 1870), 148–9.

<sup>8</sup> The *kozubalec* (*kozubales*, *kozubal*) was one of the most ancient taxes that Jews were obliged to pay in favour of various institutions, including the Church. In the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth it was diverted to the Church alone, and especially to the needs of student priests.

priest to the ground, tore his clothes, and began to kick him. Only when the priest began to cry out did passers-by come to save him.<sup>9</sup>

In accord with the general situation in the Polish economy, Jewish contacts with the Roman Catholic, Uniate, and Greek Orthodox churches were characterized by a steady expansion of leaseholds of both seigneurial rights and taxes, such as tithes and liturgy taxes, but the leasehold of *propinacja* (propination rights, i.e. the exclusive right to manufacture, distribute, and sell alcoholic beverages) was the most widespread. This was very common on bishops' and monastic estates as well as on the lands of rural priests. However, the number of Jewish leaseholds on church property was far lower than on noble and royal estates. The reason for this is made obvious in the numerous and constantly repeated prohibitions of such leaseholds.

The fact that many churches, convents, and other ecclesiastical institutions were situated on noble estates and thus came into intensive contact with the lord's Jewish leaseholders (*arendarze*) played an important role in relations between clerics and Jews. Jewish leaseholders often collected taxes from the local church, and sometimes transferred donations and other payments from the nobility to the church. The bishop of Belarus, Jerzy Koniski, complained in a letter to Radziwiłł on 4 February 1762 (it is not clear whether it was addressed to Michał Kazimierz or to the latter's son) that it was unjust to subject the *parochus* (parish priest) in Pupowiec to a Jewish leaseholder in matters of *propinacja* and milling. He then mentioned that a new Jewish leaseholder had come to the *plebania* (priest's house) and asked the *parochus* whether he had any vodka in his house. The honest *parochus* had shown him a quart meant for his own consumption; in response, the Jewish leaseholder turned the house upside down, though he did not discover anything. He later returned to the *plebania* accompanied by Cossacks (in fact, armed servants of Radziwiłł dressed as Cossacks), confiscated all of the *pleban's* property, and even sealed the church (*cerkiew*). The bishop asked Radziwiłł for the sake of God to restrain his Jewish leaseholder.<sup>10</sup> In Słuck too, Orthodox priests were attacked by soldiers called in by Jewish leaseholders in order to prevent the importation of smuggled vodka into town.<sup>11</sup>

These documents, as well as many similar ones that I have found, raise what seems to be the only issue that has ever been discussed in research dealing with relations between the Orthodox Church and the Jews—namely, whether or not Jews leased Orthodox churches and could thus seal them at will. This theme was picked up by a number of antisemitic historians at the turn of the twentieth century and provoked strong protests, particularly from Jewish historians such as Ilya Galant.<sup>12</sup> There do seem to be recorded cases in which Jewish leaseholders did seal Orthodox

<sup>9</sup> *Akty, izdawaemye Vilenskojy kommissiey dlya razbora drevnikh aktov*, xxix: *Akty o evreyakh* (Vilna, 1902), 72–3 (no. 55).

<sup>10</sup> Archiwum Główne Akt Dawnych, Warsaw, Archiwum Radziwiłłowskie, V, 7132, 5–7.

<sup>11</sup> *Regesty i nadpisi: Svod materialov dlya istorii evreev v Rossii (80 g.—1800 g.)*, 3 vols. (St Petersburg, 1899–1913), iii. 89 (no. 2036).

<sup>12</sup> I. Galant, 'Arendovali li evrei pravoslavnye tserkvi na Ukraine?', *Evreiskaya starina*, 1 (1909), 81–9.



churches as a sanction against the violation of *propinacja* rights or the prohibition on fishing in the lord's river, or for the non-payment of taxes by a priest. Correspondingly, synagogues were sealed by representatives of the Roman Catholic, Uniate, and Greek Orthodox churches when Jews failed to pay the interest they owed on their *wyderkaf* loans. It should be noted that the sealing of a church was not always in the Jews' interest. As Adam Teller has observed, Jewish leaseholders in Romanów Ruski complained to Radziwiłł in 1755 that the local Orthodox church had been sealed owing to a financial issue (not involving Jews); as a result, local peasants had to transfer weddings, baptisms, and funerals to other towns, causing serious financial damage to Jews because of the sudden fall in liquor sales. The Jewish petitioners therefore begged their lord to reopen the church.<sup>13</sup>

Priests, monks, and other clerics were often regular customers of Jewish-owned taverns and inns; their drinking habits sometimes caused trouble.<sup>14</sup> An example is noted in the memoirs of Solomon Maimon, who wrote that the Orthodox priest 'spent most of his time at the inn, where he drank spirits with his parishioners, the peasants, and always let his liquor be put down to his account, without any intention of paying'.<sup>15</sup> To evade his debts, the wicked priest initiated a blood libel, which eventually led Maimon's grandfather to lose his leasehold.<sup>16</sup>

As a rule, Jews did not live in ecclesiastical towns, but entered them only for the purpose of trade. However, in ecclesiastical *jurydyki* (zones under the jurisdiction of an ecclesiastical authority and independent of municipal laws) owned by both the Greek Catholic and Greek Orthodox churches, Jews not only engaged in the liquor trade but also bought property and settled permanently. Ecclesiastical institutions in these zones rented, leased, and sold houses, apartments, and plots to Jews. A very common arrangement was the long-term rental of plots to Jews, who built their houses on these plots and paid rent (*czynsz*) to the Church. Most of the Jewish urban houses and synagogues were built on church property. The reasons for this are not clear, but most probably Jews preferred to settle in ecclesiastical *jurydyki* since there they would not be subject to municipal jurisdictions, and the Church preferred to deal with Jews because they could provide collective assurances for the payment of their rent.

In a blatant contradiction, on the one hand Jews were prohibited from living in ecclesiastical towns, and on the other hand, the Church made considerable efforts to attract them to settle in its *jurydyki* in secular towns. These efforts included certain 'privileges' granted to small groups of Jews settled on church land. For example, in 1597 the Uniate bishop of Włodzimierz and Brest granted Lejzer

<sup>13</sup> A. Teller, *Kesef, ko'ah vehashpa'ah: hayehudim be'ahuzot beit radzivil belita bame'ah ha-18* (Jerusalem, 2006), 140.

<sup>14</sup> See also J. Kalik, 'The Inn as a Focal Point for Jewish Relations with the Catholic Church in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth', in W. Moskovich and I. Fijałkowska-Janiak (eds.), *Jews and Slavs*, xxi: *Jews, Poles and Russians* (Jerusalem and Gdańsk, 2008), 381-90.

<sup>15</sup> *The Autobiography of Solomon Maimon*, trans. J. C. Murray (London, 1954), 20.

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.* 20-2. See, for similar examples, Kalik, 'Orthodox Church and the Jews', 233-4.

Irszowicz, Jakub Czyrlicz, Lewko Moszkowicz, and Szmojło Izraelewicz a licence to build houses and to live on church grounds if they paid an annual rent of 16 zlotys.<sup>17</sup> Again, on 6 July 1683 the Basilian (Uniate) abbot of Minsk rented a plot of land to Józef Izraelewicz. Although the plot was situated between the church and the Bernardine nunnery, Izraelewicz was allowed to put up a wall with a gate, or any other type of construction.<sup>18</sup>

Although Jews were officially prohibited from living in ecclesiastical *jurydyki*, the practice of renting and buying houses there was so widespread that the Jewish communities found it necessary to legislate their own restrictive regulations. Thus, we read in the regulations of the Jewish community of Włodawa:

Since according to the law [*prawo*] of the duke it is forbidden to live in the *jurydyki* [*yaradkis*] belonging either to the Catholic convent [*kloster*] or to the Orthodox Church [*cerkiew*], our community should not live in these areas. According to earlier regulations, no man of our people should buy foreign land, but there are men who purchase real estate for them in *yaradkis*, and they want to live there openly. Therefore, it was agreed in the entire assembly . . . that from today no man or woman from our community who has already bought or has not yet bought [property] shall not live there openly, and those who live there must immediately leave their apartments.<sup>19</sup>

A privilege was even granted to Jews living in a Uniate ecclesiastical *jurydyka* at Pińsk by the bishop of Pińsk, Pachomiusz Orański, on 29 January 1640. This privilege was entered by the Jews into the minutes of the castle court, and was confirmed by Antoni Sielawa, the metropolitan of Kiev, Galicia, and all Ruthenia. According to this privilege, Jews were entitled to buy houses in the *jurydyka*, as well as to sell them to other Jews and to leave such property to their heirs.<sup>20</sup>

Synodal rulings of the Orthodox Church indicate direct Catholic influence. The regulations were often standard, intended to segregate Jews, and included prohibitions on employing Christian servants, on Christians buying food from Jews, and, of course, on sexual intercourse between Jews and non-Jews.<sup>21</sup> Orthodox prelates such as Feodosi Wasylewicz also repeated these rulings on an individual basis.<sup>22</sup> However, the restrictions were often flouted. Jews were defended at times by Polish

<sup>17</sup> *Regesty i nadpisi*, i. 328 (no. 709).

<sup>18</sup> *Akty, izdawaemye Vilenskoyu kommissieyu dlya razbora drevnikh aktov*, xxix. 135–6 (no. 86). For similar contracts, see also *ibid.* 170–1 (no. 117), 171–2 (no. 118).

<sup>19</sup> The document is from the beginning of the nineteenth century, but it reflects the earlier practice. See B. D. Weinryb, *Texts and Studies in the Communal History of Polish Jewry* (New York, 1950), 222–3 (no. 5).

<sup>20</sup> *Akty, izdawaemye Vilenskoyu kommissieyu dlya razbora drevnikh aktov*, xxviii: *Akty o evreyakh* (Vilna, 1901), 176–8 (no. 141).

<sup>21</sup> On the Orthodox synods in Ukraine, see A. Pokrovsky, 'O soborakh Yugo-Zapadnoi Rusi XV–XVII vekov', *Bogoslovskii vestnik*, 1906, no. 9, pp. 108–51. For Catholic synodal legislation concerning Jews, see J. Kalik, 'Jews in Catholic Ecclesiastic Legislation in the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth', *Kwartalnik Historii Żydów*, 209 (2004), 26–39.

<sup>22</sup> Archiwum Główne Akt Dawnych, Archiwum Radziwiłłowskie, VIII, 74 (1669).

magnates interested in furthering the activities of their Jewish leaseholders. Additional protection for Jews living on private estates came from lesser nobles who were leaseholders of villages or estates comprising several villages. The Orthodox parish priest of Andrzejewo, for example, complained in 1647 to the urban court of Łuck that when, in accordance with the regulations of the Orthodox Church Synod of 1640 at Kiev,<sup>23</sup> he prohibited his parishioners from buying meat from Jews, the leaseholder of the village, Baniewski, had him tried in the magnate's court. The court ruled that he had to compensate the Jew for losses caused by the prohibition. The noble leaseholder also ordered the priest to pay 30 zlotys to the magnate's treasury. When the priest refused to pay, the noble leaseholder sealed the church, blocking all religious activity there for two weeks. Later, as an eyewitness also swore, the noble sacked the priest's house, desecrated icons of the Virgin and the Apostles, whom he called 'donkeys and dogs', and threatened to kill the priest himself. The priest then accused the noble of being a secret Arian, thus explaining his support for Jews.<sup>24</sup> The accusation of Arianism, used here by the Orthodox priest, was typical of Polish Catholics and Orthodox alike at this time, who said that the religion of the Arian sect (Socinians or Unitarians) was similar to Judaism. Thus, the pioneer of the Orthodox anti-Protestant polemic, the elder Artemy (*starets Artemii*) of Muscovite origin living in Sluck, called the 'Arians' 'uncircumcised Jews',<sup>25</sup> using the same expression as his contemporary Alfonso Pisani, a Jesuit in Kalisz ('Judei sine circumcissione').<sup>26</sup>

With regard to religious polemics proper, by contrast, Catholics took positions that distinguished them from the Uniates and the Orthodox in their attitude towards Jews,<sup>27</sup> based on different cultic practices observed by the Eastern and Western churches and differences in their interpretation of Jewish halakhah. The Catholics claimed, for instance, that the Last Supper was the Jewish Passover *seder*, and therefore that unleavened bread (*matzah*) should be used for the rite of communion, while both the Orthodox and the Uniates defended their traditional view that the Last Supper occurred before the Passover, and that the leavened bread should symbolize the body of Christ. This disagreement led both sides to hold meticulous discussions about Jewish halakhic rules in the religious polemic between them, especially before and after the Union of Brest. The differences between the Eastern and Western rite go back to a contradiction in the New Testament itself: according to the Synoptic Gospels (Matthew, Mark, and Luke), the Last Supper

<sup>23</sup> *Deyaniya Kievskogo sobora 1640 goda, po rasskazu Kassiana Sakovicha*, in *Pamyatniki polemicheskoi literatury v Zapadnoi Rusi* (hereafter *PPLZR*), 3 vols. (Russkaya istoricheskaya biblioteka 4, 7, 19) (St Petersburg, 1878–1903), i. 21–48.

<sup>24</sup> *Arkhiv Yugo-Zapadnoi Rossii*, pt. 1, vol. vi (iev, 1883), 811–13.

<sup>25</sup> *Starets Artemy, Poslanie Ivanu Zaretskomu*, in *PPLZR*, i. 1280.

<sup>26</sup> M. Wiszniewski, *Historia literatury polskiej*, ix–x (Kraków, 1857), 91.

<sup>27</sup> On Catholic polemic, see J. Kalik, 'The Attitudes towards the Jews in the Christian Polemic Literature in Poland in the 16th–18th Centuries', in W. Moskovich and I. Fijałkowska-Janiak (eds.), *Jews and Slavs*, xi: *Jewish–Polish and Jewish–Russian Contacts* (Jerusalem and Gdańsk, 2003), 58–78.

took place on Passover eve, but according to the Gospel of John, Jesus Christ was crucified on Passover eve, symbolizing the sacrificial lamb. Since neither church was ready to admit the contradiction in the Holy Scripture, as early as the mid-eleventh century on the eve of the great schism, Leo, the metropolitan of Ochrida, wrote a polemical tractate titled *On the Unleavened Bread* (*Peri tōn azymōn*), in which he claimed that the Last Supper of the Synoptic Gospels also took place before Passover, since according to Luke 22: 8 Jesus sends Peter and John to Jerusalem in advance in order to purchase the sacrificial lamb, but according to the Mosaic Law (Exodus 12: 3) this should be done on 10 Nisan.<sup>28</sup> All polemicists of the age of the Union of Brest, both its opponents, such as Vasily of Ostrog,<sup>29</sup> and its supporters, repeat this argument, and a special chapter of the Act of the Union was even dedicated to this matter.<sup>30</sup> Of course, the eleventh-century cleric was unaware that the Mishnah defines this commandment as the ‘Passover of Egypt’ (*pesah mitsrayim*), as opposed to the ‘Passover of Generations’ (*pesah dorot*) practised in the Second Temple period (*Pesahim* 9: 5), since the very existence of the Mishnah and the Talmud was ‘discovered’ in western Europe only in the mid-twelfth century. It is significant, however, that Orthodox and Uniate polemicists were still ignorant about this ‘discovery’ at the end of the sixteenth century.

The second point of disagreement between the East and the West was in determining how to calculate the date of Easter. This controversy intensified with the Gregorian reform of 1582, when the calendar was advanced by ten days, a reform adopted by the Catholic Church but rejected by the Orthodox. Both churches celebrated Easter on the first Sunday following the first full moon after the vernal equinox, which occurred on 21 March; but after the reform, the equinox as reckoned by the Orthodox now fell on 31 March from the Catholic point of view. Hence, the Catholic Easter could sometimes coincide with the Jewish Passover, while the Orthodox Easter lagged behind Passover. Therefore, the Orthodox and Uniate polemicists alike claimed that the Roman Catholics transgressed the ruling of the Council of Nicaea of 325 that prohibited celebration of Easter on 14 Nisan—the so-called Quartodeciman heresy. Roman Catholics, on their part, claimed that the Orthodox calculation of the date of Easter was directly linked with the Jewish calendar, which was also prohibited by the same Council of Nicaea. Though the last accusation is incorrect, as it was based on an erroneous interpretation of Byzantine theologian John Zonaras’s passage stating that ‘their [i.e. Jewish] non-festal feast [i.e. Passover] must come first and then our Pascha should follow’,<sup>31</sup> some Catholic polemicists claimed that Orthodox priests consulted rabbis in order to determine

<sup>28</sup> *Poslanie L’va, mitropolita ruskogo*, in *Pamyatniki drevne-russkogo kanonicheskogo prava*, ii/1 (Russkaya istoricheskaya biblioteka 36) (Petrograd, 1920), 74–101.

<sup>29</sup> Vasily Ostrozhsky, *O edinoi istinnoi pravoslavnoi vėrė i o svyatoi sobornoi apostolskoj tserkvi, otkudu nachalo prinyala, i kako povsyudu rasprostresya*, in *PPLZR*, ii. 633–8.

<sup>30</sup> *Uniya grekov s kostelom rimskim*, *ibid.* 139–50.

<sup>31</sup> Peter L’Huillier, *The Church of the Ancient Councils: The Disciplinary Work of the First Four Ecumenical Councils* (Crestwood, NY, 1996), 25.

their Easter date. Thus, Jan Broscius (Brożek) of Kurzelów wrote in his *First Apology for the Roman Common Calendar*, published in Kraków in 1641: ‘There was a case with the Russian priests and their hierarchs, when they came to speak with the Jews about Easter, as far as I understand because they believed that the Jews calculate the time of the Pascha better than the Christians.’<sup>32</sup>

As we have seen, Orthodox and Uniates were in agreement regarding the nature of the consecrated bread and the date of Easter, but Jews figured in a bitter polemic between them over the issue of the Union of Brest. In 1597 a book titled *Apokrisis* (‘Answer’) appeared in Vilna, first in Polish and then in Ruthenian. Its author called himself Christopher Philalethes (Greek ‘friend of truth’).<sup>33</sup> This text was an Orthodox response to a book by the famous Polish preacher Piotr Skarga in favour of the Union of Brest.<sup>34</sup> A Uniate response also appeared in 1599, under the pen name of Philotheos (Greek ‘friend of God’), titled *Antirrhisis* (‘Counter-Response’).<sup>35</sup> Its author was Peter Arkoudios, a Greek convert to Catholicism and a Jesuit. Since he knew neither Polish nor Ruthenian, he wrote this tractate in Latin, and it was translated into Polish and Ruthenian by Ipaty Poty (Pociej), the future Uniate metropolitan of Kiev. Arkoudios claimed that the author of *Apokrisis* was in fact a Calvinist pretending to be Orthodox, but the writer did not disclose his name. In 1781 the Polish writer Ignacy Stebelski identified the author of *Apokrisis* as Krzysztof Broński, a Calvinist member of the literary circle of Prince Constantine of Ostrog.<sup>36</sup> In 1912, however, a Polish scholar, Józef Tretiak, proposed that the author was Marcin Broniewski, a famous Calvinist writer from Kraków.<sup>37</sup> In any case, the Protestant, especially Calvinist, influence is conspicuous in this composition. Such unlikely Calvinist–Orthodox co-operation against the Union of Brest became possible because of the common interest of religious minorities in preserving the religious tolerance of the sixteenth-century Commonwealth, which was crumbling under attacks by the Catholic counter-reformation. Calvinist and Orthodox nobles even formed a common confederation at Vilna in 1599. This co-operation was, however, uneasy for both sides, and for this reason the polemicists of the age decided to hide their true identities.

Jews are mentioned in *Apokrisis* in a context typical of Protestant religious polemic. Thus, speaking about the Council of Trent, which proclaimed the beginning of the Catholic counter-reformation, Philalethes says, ‘more than one Jew is concealed in those statutes’ (‘ne odin sya Zhid v tykh ukhvalakh kryet’) <sup>38</sup>. He also quotes the Babylonian Talmud, in a free rephrasing: ‘Simple Jews are not allowed to argue in complicated matters with gentiles; they can only answer, “We do not

<sup>32</sup> Jan Broscyusz [Broscius], *Apologia pierwsza kalendarza rzymskiego powszechnego* (Kraków, 1641).

<sup>33</sup> Khrystofor Filalet [Philalethes], *Apokrisis*, in *PPLZR*, ii. 1003–1820.

<sup>34</sup> Piotr Skarga, *Beresteiskii sobor i oborona ego*, *ibid.* 939–1002.

<sup>35</sup> Filofey [Philotheus], *Antirrhisis; ili, Apologiya protiv Khrystofora Filaleta*, in *PPLZR*, iii. 477–982.

<sup>36</sup> Ignacy Stebelski, *Dwa wielkie światła na horyzoncie połockim z cieniów zakonnych powstające* (Vilna, 1781).

<sup>37</sup> J. Tretiak, *Piotr Skarga w dziejach i literaturze Unii Brzeskiej* (Kraków, 1912).

<sup>38</sup> Filalet, *Apokrisis*, in *PPLZR*, ii. 1173–4.

understand these matters; only our rabbis can answer you.”<sup>39</sup> The argument is purely Protestant, since the author opposes the idea of the intermediate position of the priest, which he attributes also to the Jews. This does not make sense for the Orthodox polemic against the union with Rome, as the Orthodox and Catholic positions on this question were identical. The attribution of this typically Protestant argument to the Orthodox became possible only in the specific circumstances of the Union of Brest, when the majority of the Orthodox hierarchs, including all the bishops and many priests, accepted the Union, while the laic Orthodox brotherhoods remained the only firm guardians of the ‘true faith’. These brotherhoods, to a certain extent, could be presented as Orthodox correspondents to the idealized Protestant communities of believers.

The use of the Talmud for Christian propaganda is no less problematic. As we have seen, the Talmud remained practically unknown to Orthodox polemicists, but it was widely used by Catholic and especially Protestant writers. The paraphrased passage noted above is taken from the Babylonian *Sanhedrin*: ‘Said Rabbi Nachman: “Who is able to answer to the *minim* [i.e. Christians] as Rabbi Idit, let him answer, but who is not, let him not answer.”’<sup>40</sup> The passage about the angel Metatron follows as an example of such a difficult question. Metatron is often presented in Jewish–Christian polemics as a Jewish parallel to the figure of God the Son, one component of the Christian Holy Trinity. This was, in fact, precisely why this talmudic passage was translated into Latin in the so-called ‘Paris files’, the collection of talmudic passages translated for the famous Paris trial of the Talmud in 1242. This translation was used also by Raymond Martin (Ramón Martí) in his *Pugio fidei* (‘Dagger of Faith’), whence it found its way to numerous polemical compositions, including *Apokrisis*. However, *Pugio fidei* remained unknown in the Orthodox East, and no quotation from it is attested in any Orthodox polemical composition.

Jews are mentioned in the *Antirrhisis* too, surprisingly (if its author was a foreigner) in a typically Polish context. According to this tractate, the Orthodox make the claim that Catholic priests serve (as do Jews) as agents of Polish landlords in Ruthenian villages. The author refutes this idea: he confirms that Jews really do serve in this capacity, but the comparison with Catholic priests, he claims, is utterly inaccurate.<sup>41</sup> The argument reflects, of course, the realities of the Polish colonization of Ukraine, when Jewish leaseholders of Polish magnates often served as the sole representatives of the landlord in a village. Their alleged equation with Catholic priests is interesting: it probably means that Polish priests were seen in the eyes of Ukrainian peasants as spiritual heralds of the expansion of the *folmark* system and the enserfment of peasants.<sup>42</sup> This alleged co-operation between Poles and Jews was explored also in another Uniate pamphlet, *The Ruthenian; or, A Report of a Conversation of Two*

<sup>39</sup> Filalet, *Apokrisis*, in *PPLZR*, ii. 1251–2.

<sup>40</sup> ‘Amar rabi nahman: hai man deyada la’ahadurei laminim kerav idit lihadar ve’i lo shelo lihadar’: BT *San.* 38b.

<sup>41</sup> Filofey, *Antirrhisis*, in *PPLZR*, iii. 685–6.

<sup>42</sup> *Folmarki* were grain-producing estates worked through the corvée labour of serfs.

*Ruthenians, the Schismatic with the Uniate*, published by Kaspar Tomasz Skupieński in 1634.<sup>43</sup> The 'Schismatic' claims there that the Poles allow Tatars, Armenians, and Jews to build their mosques, churches, and synagogues freely, but prohibit the building of Greek Orthodox churches. The 'Uniate' answers that the Jews have privileges which should be honoured, and they build synagogues at their own expense, but the 'schismatics' try to take control of the Uniate churches. Another reference to Jews and their relations with the local Ruthenian population appears in a polemic opposing the Union of Brest, *On the One Faith*, by Vasily of Ostrog: 'Not only the Jews, but also some Christians should be blamed since they befriend the Jews, who as God-killers should be wanderers, but they appoint them instead as lords above their subjects, and thus the Christian people who were redeemed with Christ's blood become enslaved to the Jews through selling their estates to them.'<sup>44</sup>

Catholic and Orthodox opinion also diverged over two closely connected subjects: the Sabbatian movement and kabbalah. In sharp contrast to an almost complete lack of interest in the Sabbatian and even Frankist movements shown by Catholics, the Orthodox paid surprising attention to these internal Jewish affairs. The roots of this interest lay in the fierce polemic between Catholics and Orthodox at the time of the Union of Brest, regarding the Orthodox claim that the Pope was the Antichrist. A special concluding chapter of the Act of the Union itself is dedicated to this curious matter.<sup>45</sup> The Uniates claimed that the Antichrist is the messiah expected by the Jews, and since the Jews themselves agreed that he is yet to come, he could not be the Pope. The Uniates adopted a simple syllogism: if the Antichrist is the messiah expected by the Jews, and the Jews do not believe that the Pope is their messiah, the Pope could not possibly be the Antichrist:

Also there is a true sign of the coming of the Antichrist, that the Jews will accept the Antichrist as their messiah . . . And thus if the Jews have to accept this true Antichrist as messiah, show me, which pope have the Jews accepted as their messiah? . . . Then it is true also that this Antichrist should be born from the Jewish people, as St Jerome clearly writes. For the Jews, who always believed and still claim now that the Messiah will come from their people, would never accept an alien as their Messiah . . . But it is true that no pope ever was born from the Jews.<sup>46</sup>

When Sabbatai Zevi claimed to be such a Jewish messiah several decades later, the Orthodox, of course, used this in their anti-Catholic polemic.

A work by Joanicjusz Galatowski published in 1669, *Mesia pravdivyi*, occupied a central place in Orthodox polemical compositions that ventured into Jewish topics.<sup>47</sup>

<sup>43</sup> K. T. Skupieński, *Rusin; albo, Relatia rozmowy dwóch Rusinów, Schismatyka z Unitem, o rozmnożeniu wiary Katholickiej, o Patryarchacie Cargrodzkim, o Schizmatach, o Soborach, o Uniey y chrzcie Rusi, o wolnościach Duchowieństwa Ruskiego y insze miscellanea* (Warsaw, 1634).

<sup>44</sup> Vasily Ostrozhsky, *O edinoi istinnoi pravoslavnoi věřě*, in *PPLZR*, ii. 884.

<sup>45</sup> *Uniya grekov s kostelom rimskim*, in *PPLZR*, ii. 145–68.

<sup>46</sup> *Ibid.* 158–60.

<sup>47</sup> Ioanniky Galyatovsky [Joanicjusz Galatowski], *Mesia pravdivyi Iisus Khristos, syn bozhii ot pochatku světa prez vsě věki lyudem ot Boga obětsannyi* (Kiev, 1669).

Western Catholic influence is notable in this book. As a starting point, Galatowski mentions two typically anti-Jewish compositions: the letter of Rabbi Samuel the Moroccan and the letter of the convert Michael, widely circulated in the West from the Middle Ages. Most of the argument is also fairly traditional in its concentration on the messianic nature of Christ: Galatowski cites twenty-four signs proving the veracity of this claim. However, the author's interest in the figure of Sabbatai Zevi is unique to this composition and clearly refers to the controversy with the Uniates on the nature of the Antichrist half a century earlier. The conversion of Sabbatai Zevi to Islam was also of great interest for Galatowski, who in 1683 published another book, dedicated to the anti-Islamic polemic,<sup>48</sup> in which, in order to explain Jewish influence on Islam, he claimed that the mother of Muhammad was Jewish. Galatowski's *Mesia prawdivyi* also contains the first Orthodox reference to the blood libel, citing the same story that served as background to Shakespeare's *Merchant of Venice*, which, according to Galatowski, was set in Muslim Constantinople. The first case of a blood libel in the Orthodox context occurred in 1690 in Białystok, much later than in western Europe, and clearly under Catholic influence. The Catholic or Uniate response to *Mesia prawdivyi* appeared in an anonymous pamphlet, *Epistle to the Galatians*,<sup>49</sup> whose author wrote mockingly that as a result of Jewish rumours about miracles of the false messiah, some Christians had begun to panic and to try and prove to themselves that Jesus Christ was indeed the true messiah. One of them—Galatowski himself—had gone so far as to travel through the Ruthenian and Lithuanian lands to collect material to that effect among Jews, and had then published a book based entirely upon his conversations with Jews.

The attitudes towards kabbalah were contrary: Catholics from the beginning of the eighteenth century expressed a growing interest in it, as they considered it to be a link between Judaism and Christianity,<sup>50</sup> while the Orthodox held a negative view. Kabbalah was introduced into the Christian–Jewish polemic by German Protestant Pietists, who adopted it as a tool in their attempts to convert Jews.<sup>51</sup> This same approach was used in the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth by local Catholic clerics. The growing effort to convert Jews reflected the widespread belief, among both Protestants and Catholics, that mass conversion of the Jews—the so-called ‘Jacob’s return’—was a necessary step towards the Second Coming. This belief never penetrated the Orthodox Church. The Orthodox Afanasy Filipovich wrote in his diary in 1646 that he had seen many Jewish kabbalistic books (*knigi* . . .

<sup>48</sup> Joanicjusz Galatowski, *Alkoran machometów nauką heretycką y żydowską y pogańską napelniony: Od koheletha chrystusowego rosproszony y zgladzony* (Czerniów, 1683).

<sup>49</sup> *List do Galatów* (n.p, n.d.). See M. Wiszniewski, *Historia literatury polskiej*, viii (Kraków, 1851), 394–5.

<sup>50</sup> On this subject, see J. Kalik, ‘Christian Kabbala and Polish Jews: Attitudes of the Church to Jewish Conversion and the Idea of “Jacob’s Return” in the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth’, *Kwartalnik Historii Żydów*, 212 (2004), 492–501.

<sup>51</sup> See *W poszukiwaniu żydowskich kryptochrześcijan: Dzienniki ewangelickich misjonarzy z ich wędrówek po Rzeczypospolitej w latach 1730–1747*, ed. J. Doktor (Warsaw, 1999).



*chornoknizhskie*) in Kraków and Raków, texts that should be forbidden in a Christian country.<sup>52</sup> His reference to Raków is of particular interest, since it was the site of a renowned Arian printing house and theological academy until 1638.

For the Orthodox Church in the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth, the issue of conversion took a different nature. Orthodox clerics were mostly disturbed by the constant influx of Jewish converts across the Russian border. These were Jews who converted to the Orthodox faith while residing in Muscovite territory, where a Jewish presence was technically illegal. Bishop Wasylewicz often complained to the secular authorities that converts reaching the safe haven on the Polish side of the border not only relinquished Orthodoxy and returned to Judaism, but also caused the conversion to Judaism of their Orthodox relatives with whom they had intermarried in Muscovy.<sup>53</sup>

As a matter of fact, conversions of Jews to Christianity or Christians to Judaism because of mixed marriages took place from time to time in the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth itself.<sup>54</sup> On 21 August 1669, for example, the Greek Uniate priests of Brest filed a complaint against the Jewish communities of Kobryń and Brest, accusing them of having enticed a woman to reconvert to Judaism. A certain Podorożski, burgher of Kobryń, had married the woman, Judith, who was the daughter of Shmuilo, a former Jewish leaseholder of the priest Wierzejski. Judith had been baptized under the name Anastasia. However, according to Podorożski's claim, her father and other Jews persuaded her to flee her husband, and in doing so she abandoned her son but took with her money, silver, dresses, linen, and other property amounting to 2,000 zlotys. Podorożski asked for assistance to retrieve his wife, whose whereabouts was unknown, and to compensate him for the loss of his property. Their marriage, in the end, was dissolved.<sup>55</sup> A Cossack also could be quite an attractive mate for a Jewish woman. Thus, in 1697 a certain Leibowicz, himself Jewish, complained in court that his Jewish maid Genia had fled with Khorol, a Cossack captain, taking with her some of her master's money and other property.<sup>56</sup>

On 21 October 1748 Michał Krojer filed a complaint with the court of Mohylew accusing Abraham Michalewicz and Paraska Daniłowna of unlawful union. On 8 November the defendants made the following statements, which deserve to be quoted in full:

<sup>52</sup> Afanasy Filippovich, *Diariush*, in *PPLZR*, i. 134.

<sup>53</sup> *Arkheograficheskii sbornik dokumentov, odnosyashchikhsya k istorii Severo-Zapadnoi Rusi*, vii. 148; see also J. Kalik, 'Evreiskoe prisutstvie v Rossii v XVI–XVIII vv.', in Kulik (ed.), *Istoriya evreiskogo naroda v Rossii*, i. 328–9 (Hebrew version: 'Hanokhehut hayehudit berusyah bame'ot ha-16–18', in Kulik (ed.), *Toledot yehudei rusyah*, i. 265–6).

<sup>54</sup> On this subject, see J. Kalik, 'Fusion versus Alienation—Erotic Attraction, Sex and Love between Jews and Christians in the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth', in Y. Kleinmann (ed.), *Kommunikation durch symbolische Akte: Religiöse Heterogenität und politische Herrschaft in Polen-Litauen* (Leipzig, 2010), 157–70.

<sup>55</sup> *Regesty i nadpisi*, i. 488–9 (no. 1076).

<sup>56</sup> *Ibid.* ii. 95 (no. 1298).

My name is Abraham Michalewicz. I was born in Połock, where I had a wife named Gisia Jankelewna from Dzisna, whom I left a day after our wedding because of her insanity. I then came to Dubrowka to the estate of squire Mison, where I was hired by his leaseholder Leib as a sub-leaseholder. There I met a maid, Paraska, and in 1743 we began to live together and lived for a year and a half until she became pregnant. We left Dubrowka and she gave birth to a girl in a nearby field, who died after an hour. We buried her in the field and went to Uszaczy, and from Uszaczy to Kamienny, and from there to Czaszniki. On the way, when we went through villages, she did not speak with anyone, pretending to be mute. Thus we came to the estate of squire Krojer at Wendoroż, where Paraska accepted our Jewish faith with the help of the Jew Herszko and his wife, who taught her Jewish prayers and the observance of the sabbath. This Herszko and his wife are squire Krojer's leaseholders in Wendoroż, and since then Paraska has observed the Jewish holidays, and went to school [synagogue] at Kniażycy. I myself had originally promised to become a Catholic, but later I left the decision to her—whether to remain in her faith or to accept the Jewish one. Afterwards we began to teach her the Jewish prayers, and we promised not to abandon each other, but we were not married.<sup>57</sup>

Paraska next testified as follows:

I am of Russian faith, but not pious, being a Uniate. I served Leib, squire Mison's leaseholder in Dubrowka, for three years and remained a virgin until the Jew Abraham came to the village and remained there as a brewer. When I became pregnant by him, we left Dubrowka and I gave birth in a field. Initially, I thought that the girl was dead, but then we saw that she was alive, but we threw her into the grave and left. We walked about a mile and then we stopped in the forest, where Abraham ordered me to keep silent and to pretend to be mute. When we came to Wendoroż, he remained there as a brewer for the Jew Hersz, the leaseholder of squire Krojer, and there he converted me to the Jewish faith, saying that no one would accept me if I remained in our faith. He told me not to praise our God and not to cross myself, but to praise the Jewish God, and when I accepted the Jewish faith, Abraham himself cut my hair, and from then I observed all their holidays together with them and I ate with them on Wednesdays and Fridays [*sic*]. The Jew Hersz and his wife Sesia, the leaseholders of squire Krojer, knew this, since the latter taught me the Jewish prayers and sabbath observance herself, and later I also went to the Jewish school at Kniażycy.<sup>58</sup>

Since the suspicion of murder of their daughter arose out of the contradiction in the defendants' testimonies, the attorney for the prosecution, Ciapiński, demanded a second hearing. Both defendants were brought again for testimony and repeated their statements, but Abraham confirmed that their daughter had been born alive and that they had thrown her into the grave.

Ciapiński demanded the death penalty by burning at the stake for both, quoting the Magdeburg Law: 'There cannot be a marriage between a Jew and a Christian, and if they have married, their union shall be regarded as an unlawful connubium; a Jew cannot convert a Christian to his sect, and if he has converted him, he shall be punished by the sword' (pt. 1, fo. 51), and the *Sachsenspiegel*, paragraphs 7, 8,

<sup>57</sup> *Regesty i nadpisi*, iii. 56 (no. 1957).

<sup>58</sup> *Ibid.* 56–7.

and 11: '(7) If a Jew distresses a Jewish convert, or harms him, or pushes him, he shall be burnt together with his companions; (8) the Jew shall do nothing blasphemous against the Christian faith; (11) a Jew has no right to convert a Christian to his faith, and if he has done so, this is a capital offence' (fo. 533).<sup>59</sup>

The court of Mohylew found both defendants guilty and condemned Abraham, as the main perpetrator, to be burnt alive at the usual site for such punishment, on the Vilna highway. Paraska Daniłowna was condemned to be beheaded. However, Abraham expressed his wish to be baptized. After the baptism, the verdict was changed, and his penalty was converted to beheading. The sentence was carried out on 30 December 1748.<sup>60</sup>

This dry judicial account reveals an incredible story of human suffering and the deaths of two simple people, who literally lost their lives for the sake of love. Several important points deserve special attention as a background to this story:

(1) The protagonists came from the same social milieu of servants. (2) Abraham's first unlucky marriage was arranged in a traditional way through a negotiator (*shadkhan*). (3) The choice of faith was decided mainly for reasons of livelihood: a married male Jew could easily find a job as a brewer, but a married Christian woman could hardly be hired as a maid. (4) The couple remained unmarried since the formal conversion to Judaism (*giyur*) was never completed, either for fear of persecution within the Jewish community, or simply for lack of time. In any case, the Jewish community was aware of the situation, as it accepted Paraska into the synagogue. (5) The court's severe verdict far surpassed the requirements of the law quoted by the prosecution. Though leaving a baby to die seems shocking to us today, this was a most common practice in the early modern age, and such cases usually ended in public flagellation. Conversion to Judaism, a capital offence under the Magdeburg Law, meant decapitation, not burning, and, besides, a formal conversion never took place.

As we have seen, the relations between the Orthodox and Uniate majority and the Jews in the Ruthenian lands of the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth varied in a wide range of patterns: from mutual love and friendship to outbursts of mutual violence. The Catholic influence on Orthodox and especially on Uniate attitudes towards Jews was considerable there, and, to a certain extent, the Polish–Lithuanian Orthodox Church served as a channel of transmission of Western Catholic influence to the Muscovite Orthodox Church. Thus, the economic ties of Catholics, Orthodox, and Uniates with Jews were practically indistinguishable there. But although there are basic similarities in the relations that Jews had with the Catholic, Uniate, and Orthodox churches, some differences may be observed. These include the role of Jews in the religious polemic of Orthodox and Uniates against each other and of both of them against the Western Roman rite, on the one hand, and their role in frequent acts of mutual violence, on the other.<sup>61</sup> This violence was a function of

<sup>59</sup> Ibid. 57.

<sup>60</sup> Ibid. 57–8.

<sup>61</sup> See also M. Nadav, 'Alimut hadadit bein yehudim velo-yehudim belita ad 1648', *Gal-ed*, 7–8 (1985), 41–56.

the confidence that Jewish leaseholders felt in the protection afforded them by local lords and magnates. This self-confidence of Jews living on the estates of the Polish magnates, combined with the humiliated position of the Orthodox Church in the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth, particularly after the Union of Brest in 1596, contributed to the frequent deterioration of economic conflicts with the Orthodox into violence. Similar incidents did not usually deteriorate in this way in relations with the other churches, and even with the Orthodox Church on royal estates, where settlement of conflicts was generally reached through a formal compromise. Mutual acts of violence between Jews and the Orthodox clergy occurred even more frequently than between Jews and burghers, though the relations with them too were also characterized by high levels of violence because of intense economic competition. This violence reached an unprecedented scale during the Cossack uprising of 1648–9. The generally hostile relations between Jews and the Orthodox Church heavily influenced the position of Jews in the Russian empire after the partitions of Poland, when the Orthodox Church suddenly became the dominant denomination.

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# Jews in Russian Travel Narratives of the Early Nineteenth Century

TARAS KOZNARSKY

THIS ESSAY CHARTS representations of Jews in the south-western region of the Russian empire (in what is predominantly Ukraine today, but was then within the Pale of Settlement) as found in the genre of the literary travelogue. The five works analysed here reflect the distinct aesthetic principles, ideological agendas, and generic designs of their authors: Vladimir Izmailov's 'A Journey to Southern Russia' (1800–2),<sup>1</sup> Ivan Dolgorukov's 'Distant Tambourines Have a Glorious Sound; or, My Trip Somewhere in 1810' (1869) and 'A Journey to Kiev in 1817' (1870);<sup>2</sup> Aleksey Levshin's 'Letters from Little Russia' (1816);<sup>3</sup> and Andrey Glagolev's 'Notes of a Russian Traveller' (1837, describing a trip made in 1823–7).<sup>4</sup> While depicting the day-to-day realities of travel, all five travelogues at the same time reveal the workings of stereotypes that colour the authors' perceptions of 'the Jewish Other'. An examination of the travellers' depictions of Jews demonstrates how their experience of the Jewish Other affects the structuring of their literary selves, as they rely on the one hand on individual experience and personal subjectivity, and on the other on the tropes of collective common sense, stereotypes of the Other, and shared knowledge (historical, devotional, national). Thus, this essay is intended to shed light on how Russian cultural and national identity of the early nineteenth century was contextualized in the imperial south (which was at the same time an imperial domestic realm, exotic terrain, and frontier zone) and how the authors' identities were shaped by and enacted in their encounters with Jews, whom they regarded as the epitome of otherness.

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<sup>1</sup> Vladimir Izmailov, *Puteshestvie v poludennuyu Rossiyu*, 4 vols. (Moscow, 1800–2).

<sup>2</sup> Ivan Dolgoruky [Dolgorukov], 'Slavny bubny za gorami; ili, Puteshestvie moe koe-kuda 1810 goda', in *Chteniya v Imperatorskom obshchestve istorii i drevnostei rossiiskikh*, 1869, nos. 2–3; id., 'Puteshestvie v Kiev v 1817 godu', *ibid.*, 1870, no. 2. Prince Ivan Dolgorukov/Dolgoruky was of ancient noble lineage; both forms of his name were reflected in publications during his lifetime, and both variants can be found in scholarship. Dolgorukov represents a more common form for a Russian last name (and appears somewhat more old-fashioned and private), and it is the form that I use throughout this essay.

<sup>3</sup> Aleksey Levshin, *Pis'ma iz Malorossii* (Kharkiv, 1816).

<sup>4</sup> Andrey Glagolev, *Zapiski russkogo puteshestvennika, A. Glagoleva, s 1823 po 1827 god*, 4 vols. (St Petersburg, 1837).

## CHARTING THE OTHER, FORGING A SELF

Why travelogues? In the first decades of the nineteenth century, in the footsteps of Karamzin's celebrated *Pis'ma russkogo puteshestvennika* ('Letters of a Russian Traveller', 1797–1801), Russian intellectuals and literati adopted the genre of the literary travelogue as a vehicle for self-authentication—that is, for establishing the validity of one's voice, sensibilities, and individual agency vis-à-vis societal norms and institutions.<sup>5</sup> In its generic format and epistemological prerequisites, the travelogue fused its authors' personal experiences with culturally determined poses and literary clichés. Given that the text of a travelogue is influenced by conventions, context, and the aims of a particular work (e.g. reflection on foreign or domestic travel, preoccupation with individual self-styling, or 'objective' generalization, etc.), literary travelogues provide a fascinating avenue for studying the ways empirical material is filtered through the traveller, who observes, consumes, and partakes in 'reality'. This entanglement of the traveller–cultural agent in the process of the styling and forging of self thus generates tensions between the assumed authenticity of experience, its inevitable artificiality, and the desire for legitimacy. These tensions result in ambiguities, discrepancies, and contradictions—the study of which reveals the mechanics of the making of the self as contingent on the making of the Other.<sup>6</sup>

The late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries witnessed purposeful, persistent attempts by the Russian government, social elites, intellectuals, and literati to come to grips with the vast multi-ethnic empire in administrative, political, cultural, and even civilizational terms.<sup>7</sup> Russian travellers were drawn to the imperial outskirts, and came to see their identities in contrast to Western civilization. Travellers began to define themselves within the spectrum of places, landscapes, and 'tribes' that the Russian empire had absorbed through dramatic expansion in the south and west in the course of the eighteenth century. Pre-dating post-Napoleonic ambitions and the Romantic craving for a so-called 'national physiognomy', Russian travellers eagerly explored the expanses of their *otechestvo* (fatherland) as a way of legitimizing the empire and Russia's special cultural agency enabled by the imperial order.

Inevitably, these explorations brought forth issues of national identity.<sup>8</sup> The

<sup>5</sup> See Andreas Schönle's discussion of Russian travelogues in his *Authenticity and Fiction in the Russian Literary Journey, 1790–1840* (Cambridge, Mass., 2000).

<sup>6</sup> Ibid. 11–13, 204–9.

<sup>7</sup> On Russian imperial expansion, see A. Kappeler, *The Russian Empire: A Multiethnic History*, trans. A. Clayton (Harlow, 2001), esp. 60–167. On the shaping of modern Russian identity, see V. Tolz, *Russia* (New York, 2001), esp. 69–81, 132–47, 155–74, 191–6. On Russians' uneasy attitudes towards the West, see Liah Greenfeld on 'reconnaissance' in her *Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity* (Cambridge, Mass., 1993), 227–35, 250–61 (although she tends to view the process of shaping the Russian nation almost entirely through the prism of *ressentiment* vis-à-vis the West and underplays the complexity of internal processes in the Russian empire).

<sup>8</sup> See S. Dickinson, *Breaking Ground: Travel and National Culture in Russia from Peter I to the Era of Pushkin* (Amsterdam and New York, 2006), 17. Dickinson's observation that the cultural descriptions and contrasts that are invariable elements of travel writing make it ideally suited for discussions of national culture and identity is valid for narratives of both foreign and domestic travel.

south-western area of the Russian empire—the former Ukrainian Hetmanate, the territories absorbed through the partitions of Poland, and the Crimea—offered particularly rich rewards, a Russian imperial version of the European Grand Tour. The geographical axis of Kiev–Poltava–Crimea offered the traveller not only a catalogue of varied local colour, but also a lofty imperial teleology that encapsulated the origins and (fantasized) destinations of the great empire.<sup>9</sup> Kiev thus epitomized the ancient dynastic capital and cradle of Russian Orthodoxy; Poltava, the cradle of Russian glory and, indeed, of the empire itself; and Crimea, a link to the classical past and Byzantine grandeur, proof of the colonizing vigour of the empire, and even the fantasy of a future Constantinople.<sup>10</sup> Therefore, as we shall see, the personal experiences of Russian (domestic) travellers and their literary self-making also invoked a broader spectrum of ideological agendas, national ambitions, and cultural desiderata.

The tendencies described above comprise the literary, cultural, and ideological context that defines the emergence and placement of Jews in Russian literary travelogues from the first decades of the nineteenth century. In the process of shaping the literary subjectivity of Russian travellers, the Jewish Other emerges as a litmus test of self-making and a powerful catalyst for generating discrepancies between individual perception, collective expectations, and common wisdom. Conversely, in the authors' search for cultural agency, legitimacy, and national distinction, the Jewish Other stands as a sharp foil to imagined (desired) Russianness. The positive criteria for national definition are devalued and even subverted when applied to Jews: antiquity without authority (i.e. historical obstinacy); tradition without organicity (i.e. superstition); cohesion without loyalty (i.e. tribalism); and distinctiveness without distinction.<sup>11</sup> The constituent elements of the stereotype of the Jew, developed in Europe for centuries as part of general mechanisms of stereotyping that defined the making of identities in cultural imaginations and popular wisdoms, were received and amplified in the Russian imperial-cum-national culture.<sup>12</sup> Moreover, with the

<sup>9</sup> On the significance of the Russian 'discovery' of Ukraine through travel in the first decades of the nineteenth century and on the Russian south as a version of the Grand Tour, see O. P. Tolochko, 'Kyievo-rus'ka spadshchyna v istorychnii dumtsi Ukrayiny pochatku XIX st.', in V. F. Verstyuk, V. M. Horobets, and O. P. Tolochko, *Ukrayina i Rosiya v istorychnii retrospektyvi, i: Ukrayins'ki proekty v Rosiis' kii imperiyi* (Kiev, 2004), esp. 266–310. Harsha Ram's notion of the imperial sublime is most certainly applicable to Crimea and Ukraine (especially Poltava and Kiev); see his *The Imperial Sublime: A Russian Poetics of Empire* (Madison, 2003).

<sup>10</sup> See L. Wolff, *Inventing Eastern Europe: The Map of Civilization on the Mind of the Enlightenment* (Stanford, Calif., 1996), esp. 126–43. On Russian southern projects and texts, see A. Zorin, *Kormya dvuglavogo orla . . . : Literatura i gosudarstvennaya ideologiya v Rossii v poslednei treti XVIII–pervoi treti XIX veka* (Moscow, 2001), 33–156.

<sup>11</sup> See the anonymous sketch 'Pol'skie evrei', *Biblioteka dlya chteniya*, 28 (1838), as an example of the forging of an ethnographic and cultural profile ('physiognomy') of Jews living in the Russian empire.

<sup>12</sup> On mechanisms of national and ethnic stereotyping, see M. Beller and J. Leerssen (eds.), *Imagology: The Cultural Construction and Literary Representation of National Characters. A Critical Survey* (Amsterdam and New York, 2007), and J. Leerssen, 'The Rhetoric of National Character: A Programmatic Survey', *Poetics Today*, 21/2 (2000), 267–92.

acquisition of territories of the former Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth, the substantial demographic presence of Jews in the empire complicated issues of loyalty and identity—particularly in areas where demographically, socially, and culturally asymmetrical populations, such as Poles, Ukrainians (Little Russians), Jews, Russians, and other minorities, competed for privileged positions in the imperial taxonomy of nations and peoples.<sup>13</sup> With these points in mind, we shall now turn to the travel narratives.

#### VLADIMIR IZMAILOV: THE LIMITS OF SYMPATHETIC IMAGINATION

Among the earliest Russian travelogues about the imperial south, Petr Shalikov's *Puteshestvie v Malorossiyu* ('Journey to Little Russia', 1805) and Vladimir Izmailov's *Puteshestvie v poludennuyu Rossiyu* have been examined as sentimentalist appropriations of Ukraine.<sup>14</sup> Yet if Shalikov was preoccupied with the mapping of his own sensations as he moved along the pleasant natural and social landscape of Ukraine, Izmailov aspired to discover Ukraine not only as a resort of southern natural and cultural amenities and entertainments, but also as a portal to Russian history and the locus of his own mythopoetic engagement with it.<sup>15</sup> While their itineraries overlap (both Shalikov and Izmailov visited Poltava and the vicinity of Kiev), Shalikov's travelogue purposefully eschews geographical and cultural specificity. In contrast, Izmailov (whose itinerary was more extensive) is keen to register specific places, historical monuments, and cultural differences. Izmailov, with his broader aims, adopts a discerning approach that registers the Jews he encounters, ranging from a biblical trope (where he fantasizes about settling in the southern region with his love, 'the new Sarah, mother of the new Israel's')<sup>16</sup> to general observations and personal encounters.

Izmailov's attitude towards Jews is positive (as is his overall stance towards the observed realm of southern Russia). Even where he disapproves of commercial activity, he does not rush to bring in ethnic stereotypes. For example, he describes Odessa as a commercial centre where everyone is a merchant, constantly running to the stock exchange and thinking only of profits and lacking a sense of community (*obshchezhitie*). For Izmailov, this is a peculiarity of the place and is not linked to the ethnicities comprising Odessa: there would no doubt have been Greeks, Italians,

<sup>13</sup> See Andreas Kappeler's observations on the workings of Russian imperial identity in 'Mazepintsy, Malorossy, Khokhly: Ukrainians in the Ethnic Hierarchy of the Russian Empire', in A. Kappeler et al. (eds.), *Culture, Nation, and Identity: The Ukrainian–Russian Encounter, 1600–1945* (Edmonton and Toronto, 2003), 162–81. For an overview of the Jewish question, see A. Miller, 'Imperiya Romanovykh i evrei', in id., *Imperiya Romanovykh i natsionalizm: Esse po metodologii istoricheskogo issledovaniya* (Moscow, 2006), esp. 96–122.

<sup>14</sup> See Schönle, *Authenticity and Fiction*, 88–98, 111–22; Tolochko, 'Kyyevo-rus'ka spadshchyna', 279–82.

<sup>15</sup> See Schönle, *Authenticity and Fiction*, 113–16.

<sup>16</sup> Izmailov, *Puteshestvie v poludennuyu Rossiyu*, i. 64.



and Jews. He neutrally describes the strategies of a rich landowner, ‘a keen economist who had acquired significant capital’, to bring in colonizers and to provide houses for ‘the Jews who have settled here and pay him rent, and conduct various sales, in which he also participates’.<sup>17</sup> In Poltava, where Izmailov takes note of the Jewish population apart from the Little Russian and Cossack majority, he contrasts the two groups to the advantage of the former: the Jews ‘are capable, despite people’s hatred, of enriching themselves by permissible means [*nazhivat’sya pozvolitel’nyimi sredstvami i byt’ bogatymi*]. What can’t be achieved through intellect [*um*] and industry [*trudolyubie*]! The Cossacks, in contrast, live in idleness, their lives poor and coarse.’<sup>18</sup> By registering the animosity of the inhabitants of Poltava towards the Jews and distancing himself from it, he demonstrates his position as a rational and enlightened gentleman. In his disapproval of such animosity, he is on the side of progress and tolerance, which he associates with the legacy of Catherine the Great.<sup>19</sup> His subjectivity and agency are aligned with the imperial vertical of power that structures his orientation in the social reality, his perspective, and his identity. This position allows him to mediate between his immersion in and consumption of the southern natural and cultural landscapes and his distance from what he sees as the uncultivated periphery. His position also allows him to elevate himself over the observed realm, as the traveller assimilates the symbolic capital into the framework of the empire, whether by engaging with Kiev’s historical legacy or the pleasures of the southern landscape, or in admiring evidence of imperial industry. In such cultural and ideological structuring of the traveller’s subjectivity, his tolerance serves as legitimization both of the traveller’s self and of imperial power (visual, descriptive, classificatory), understood as benevolent and civilizing.

During a day trip with friends near Kherson, Izmailov comes across a synagogue that arouses his curiosity. The group requests permission to view the house of worship, and in doing so, they are guided by ‘all the respect a man must have for the faith of another fellow human’.<sup>20</sup> The caretaker, initially wary, lets them in (no service was being held at the time) and responds to their questions about the purpose and meaning of various elements of this house of worship. Their thanks are reciprocated by the caretaker, who expresses gratitude that they have not come to criticize or deride his practices (which, as he admits, happens often): “‘Ah, sirs! God is God everywhere, in all temples and all hearts. Contempt for religion is shameful for any human . . .” These words of an intelligent Jew are remarkable. Ah! Why [do we encounter] such a striking truth from the lips of a Jew and not always in a Christian heart!’<sup>21</sup> Izmailov’s open-mindedness can be contextualized in terms of the imperial policies of the time: in 1800, the recent absorption of a large Jewish

<sup>17</sup> Ibid. 397.

<sup>18</sup> Ibid. 256. This particular instance does not define his overall attitude towards the Little Russians, the nation he explores on other occasions (e.g. pp. 55–62).

<sup>19</sup> See Izmailov’s praise of tolerance towards the Jews as associated with Catherine II and Paul I, *ibid.* 184–5.

<sup>20</sup> Ibid. 387.

<sup>21</sup> Ibid. 388–9.

population into the Russian empire was still perceived by the administration as positive, an experiment marked by an inconsistent mixture of emancipatory, assimilatory, and oppressive measures—before the more drastic policies that were to follow.<sup>22</sup> Thus, Izmailov's attitudes about Jews reflect both universal norms of enlightened sensibilities and elements of imperial policies.

The tension between the subject's cultivated enlightenment and anxiety towards the Other becomes evident in Izmailov's description of Kiev. He approaches the city with fantasies of pilgrimage and explores its holy sites and historical monuments (in more than ten letters—chapters, by far the largest geographical—thematic block of *Puteshestvie*), before turning his attention to contemporary secular Kiev. In letter 33, he focuses on Jews in the city:

Perhaps nowhere in Russia are there so many Jews as in Kiev. One encounters them on the streets; streets are lined with their houses, houses are full of them, yet they settled here in such multitudes only two years ago.

They are timid, as everywhere else in the world. A Jew takes his hat off to everyone, and a Christian exhibits benevolence if he responds politely towards this politeness. Common people berate them.

'You crucified Christ, you impious Judas!', one officer said in my presence at a town gate to a Jew who came to ask for a permit. The poor Jew did not dare answer, paying with patience and humility for the crime of his remotest ancestor.

However, they live affluently, practising various crafts; their faces reflect an overall intelligent countenance, and among them, women are stately and beautiful.<sup>23</sup>

In this passage, the subject, aligned with the values of enlightenment, distances himself from the superstitious and ignoble 'common man' (the police officer belongs to this category), yet his self-alignment with universal values nonetheless brings forth vestiges of stereotypical Jews (that reside within European/universal 'common wisdom'), affecting his horizon of expectations. For example, consider the striking and rapidly risen 'multitude' of Jews in Kiev, filling streets and houses: Izmailov's phrasing betrays amazement at the proliferation of the Other. How numerous would Jews have been in this town of roughly twenty thousand at the time of Izmailov's visit? While the influx of Jews to Kiev has been linked to the famous Kontrakty Fair (transferred from Dubno in 1797), they numbered approximately seven hundred at the time.<sup>24</sup> I would argue that this number can be classified as a 'multitude' (*mnozhestvo*) only in terms of the Other (that is, one would not likely write about multitudes of Ukrainian peasants in Poltava or Russian

<sup>22</sup> See Miller, 'Imperiya Romanovykh i evrei', 104–11. The legal and administrative measures were at the time especially encouraging in the recently colonized southern region of the empire (Kherson belonged to New Russia province). For a detailed discussion of the Jewish question in the early nineteenth century, John Klier's monograph *Russia Gathers Her Jews* remains indispensable: see *Rossiya sobiraet svoikh evreev: Proiskhozhdenie evreiskogo voprosa v Rossii, 1772–1825*, rev. and expanded Russian edn. (Moscow and Jerusalem, 2000). <sup>23</sup> Izmailov, *Puteshestvie v poludennuyu Rossiyu*, i. 183–4.

<sup>24</sup> See N. Meir, *Kiev, Jewish Metropolis: A History, 1859–1914* (Bloomington, Ind., 2010), 24.

merchants in Tula). This trope of an intensified presence, on the one hand, may reflect the particular social niche occupied by Jewish ‘factors’ (personal assistants or contractors), petty salesmen, and craftsmen, where public self-advertisement was necessary and competition fierce. Yet on the other hand, Izmailov’s description of specific Kievan Jews was undoubtedly influenced by the discursive tradition of ‘the Jews’ as Other, epitomized by their cultural (clothes and appearance, albeit not mentioned by Izmailov) and social (occupational) differences.<sup>25</sup> Thus, even as the traveller strives for an enlightened positive generalization (positioned against the common man’s prejudice), he cannot help but engage in the Western discourse and its mechanisms of stereotyping. Euphemistic phrasing only underscores these mechanisms: the reference to timidity is an attempt to ameliorate the stereotype of Jewish fearfulness while at the same time locating this ‘knowledge’ in the repertory of universal common knowledge (‘as everywhere else in the world’). Equally revealing is Izmailov’s sympathy for a denigrated Jew tempered with reference to the crime of his distant ancestor.

The patching together in Izmailov’s travelogue of authentic (truthful) personal experience with literary strategies of self-making and cultural conventions leads to what Judith Page defines as ‘imperfect sympathy’—that is, discrepancy in representing the Other generated by the subject’s desire for a sympathetic ideal, a desire to overcome ambivalence in encountering the Other, and the subject’s limitations that arise from cultural stereotypes, ideological orientation, and personal prejudice.<sup>26</sup> Izmailov’s personal encounters in a rural setting of Poltava region provide insights into the workings of his sympathetic imagination, and we may examine his encounters as stylized, culturally prefabricated, and theatrically controlled rituals with directed purposes and outcomes of symbolic exchange. Having conversed with an enlightened peasant woman (*prosveshchennaya krest’yanka*) on the advantages of rustic simplicity, the traveller visits a Jew who had recently settled from Poland: ‘When I arrived, he was reading a book; many other books lay around, and his face indicated [he was] a very intelligent man.’<sup>27</sup> The narration reveals a structured progression of imagination: from the rustic pleasures of the domestic pastoral to the pleasures of rustic (if not ‘Rousseauistic’) wisdom. In his encounter with a Jew, Izmailov seeks an authentic balance of word (books) and action (simple life). Thus the traveller ‘dared to peek into a book that he was reading: it was a Hebrew Bible. “I envy you that you can read in the language in which the Bible was written”, I said in German. “You have a translation”, he replied.’<sup>28</sup> Encountering someone who is reading the Bible in Hebrew resonates with Izmailov’s quest for authenticity, and

<sup>25</sup> For an extensive discussion of this discourse of ‘the Jews’ in the Western and Russian traditions, see Leonid Livak’s recent monograph *The Jewish Persona in the European Imagination: A Case of Russian Literature* (Stanford, Calif., 2010), esp. 27–101. See also M. Vaiskopf [Weisskopf], *Pokryvalo Moiseya: Evreiskaya tema v epokhu romantizma* (Moscow and Jerusalem, 2008), esp. 139–73.

<sup>26</sup> J. W. Page, *Imperfect Sympathies: Jews and Judaism in British Romantic Literature and Culture* (New York, 2004), 2–3 and *passim*.

<sup>27</sup> Izmailov, *Puteshestvie v poludennuyu Rossiyu*, i. 74–5.

<sup>28</sup> *Ibid.* 75.

the traveller launches into a long-winded exhortation about the value of the original in such a sacred text. He adds: 'I wanted to continue: a certain sacred fire was lit in my chest, but my estimable rabbi did not partake in my feelings and began to talk about something else. I didn't want to lose my fire, ended the conversation, and left him to stroll by myself with the remains of my feelings and thoughts.'<sup>29</sup> The traveller withdraws when he encounters the Jew's reluctance to partake in his exhibition of virtue and structuring of his experience as universal. Are we to say that the Jew exhibited a 'lack of sympathy', of responsiveness? Possibly, or perhaps Izmailov's universalist roudades about the Bible were a bit much for his collocutor at a time of quiet reading. Regardless, having retreated to a more controlled environment (of strolling alone), the discouraged traveller somehow arrives at a different topic, thinking about 'those madmen who dared to attack religion, and finally, recalling that Jew, known in the world of learning, who wrote a system of atheism . . . I wished Spinoza wasn't an atheist and that atheists didn't exist in the world'.<sup>30</sup> Thus, the traveller's ambivalent retreat from the dwelling of a learned Jew is mirrored by an ambivalent and unexpected detour in thought. In this passage, we see a perhaps subconsciously structured retaliation for the failure to achieve a controlled discourse of sympathy, leading the subject to embark on the topic of godlessness. In other words, the unwillingness of the 'estimable rabbi' to indulge in the proposed ritual leads the traveller to extend metonymically his narration of the encounter with the learned Jew into the topic of mad faithlessness, capping it with 'that Jew' Baruch Spinoza—a contrast to his double, 'this Jew'. The qualities of learning, authority, and authenticity previously granted to the partaker of the planned encounter, the learned Jew, are withdrawn and questioned. However enlightened the traveller, however benevolent the imperial stance with which he associates himself, the very discourses of enlightenment and empire that form his hierarchy of values and dispositions entangle and impede his progress along the ambivalent path of sympathy.

#### IVAN DOLGORUKOV: THE STRUCTURE OF PERCEPTION

Like Izmailov, Prince Ivan Dolgorukov was born and educated in Moscow. He had an intermittent state career, and a reasonable (if not first-rate) literary reputation, largely based on his poetry, written in the classicist mould. Dolgorukov left behind a massive corpus of autobiographical writing: travelogues of Kiev (1810 and 1817) and Nizhny Novgorod (1813) along with other (obsessive) autobiographical projects, such as 'Povest' o rozhdenii moem, proiskhozhdenii i vsei zhizni' ('The Tale of my Birth, Origin, and Entire Life'; 1788–1818) and 'Kapishche moego serdtsa; ili, Slovar' vsekh tekh lits, s koimi ya byl v raznykh otnosheniyakh v techenie moei zhizni' ('The Temple of my Heart; or, A Dictionary of All Those Persons, with Whom I Have Been in Various Relationships in the Course of my Life'; 1818).<sup>31</sup>

<sup>29</sup> Izmailov, *Puteshestvie v poludennuyu Rossiyu*, i. 76.

<sup>30</sup> Ibid. 76–7.

<sup>31</sup> On Dolgorukov, see *Russkie pisateli, 1800–1917: Biograficheskii slovar'*, ii (Moscow, 1992),

A descendant of an ancient noble clan shunned after the demise of Peter II, Dolgorukov used these autobiographical works as tools of psychological and symbolic compensation for the political misfortunes that had befallen his family. He composed his travelogue to Kiev and Odessa beginning in 1810, when he was governor of Vladimir province. His itinerary was a private matter: he visits his daughter and son-in-law in Sloboda, Ukraine (Kharkiv region), continues south to Odessa, and then goes to Kiev to visit the grave of his grandmother at the Florovsky Monastery, where she had been a nun. The personal nature of his literary journey (not planned for publication) allowed for some frank opinions and critical remarks that would otherwise have been suppressed or censored, and for the narrator's familiar tone (his intended audience was his close circle and descendants). At the same time, the text is shaped with great attention to literary conventions: it is meant to entertain and enlighten his readers. While Izmailov's travelogue takes the form of a numbered sequence of letters (as a means of maintaining intimacy, immediacy, and the authenticity of his experience and communication with his readers), Dolgorukov's work is divided into chapters. The authenticity of the travelogue as the memoir of a writer is reinforced by its manifest literariness. The text abounds with digressions, aphoristically phrased observations, quotations, and poems of Dolgorukov's own making that complement his experience. For example, he supplements his description of meeting the former queen of Georgia with a poem that transforms the transient experience into a permanent literary artefact. On several occasions, he visits bookshops and expresses pleasure in finding volumes of his collected works. Thus, through this travelogue, in the midst of the different, even foreign, realms he crosses, the biographical, human Dolgorukov meets himself—in the form of a literary figure. Through this interplay, Dolgorukov's life and literature authenticate each other in the space of 'somewhere' away from home.

The overarching theme of Dolgorukov's literary journey is reflected in its title: 'Slavny bubny za gorami; ili, Puteshestvie moe koe-kuda 1810 goda'. Sara Dickinson aptly renders this title as 'Distant Tambourines Have a Glorious Sound',<sup>32</sup> albeit omitting the second clause: 'or, My Trip Somewhere in 1810'. The phrase 'distant tambourines' is an idiom referring to the experience of being lured far from home only to discover that the allure of distant marvels is but illusion and that one can find true happiness only in one's native realm. Dolgorukov's travelogue implies a contrast between 'fancy' Western trips (to Paris, as the author mentions) and domestic

149–51. The two last-mentioned texts remained in manuscript form for decades after Dolgorukov's death and were first published in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Recently they appeared in complete form in solid scholarly editions: *Povest' o rozhdenii moem, proiskhozhdenii i vsei zhizni, pisannaya mnoi samim i nachataya v Moskve 1788-go goda v avguste mesyatse, na 25-om godu ot rozhdeniia moego*, ed. N. V. Kuznetsova and M. O. Meltsin, 2 vols. (St Petersburg, 2004–5), and *Kapishche moego serdtsa; ili, Slovar' vsekh tekhn lits, s koimi ya byl v raznykh otnosheniyakh v techenie moei zhizni*, ed. V. I. Korovin (Moscow, 1997).

<sup>32</sup> Dickinson, *Breaking Ground*, 106.

travel—the latter more frugal but no less entertaining an excursion, as Dickinson points out.<sup>33</sup> Yet this domestic travel reveals more than a simple contrast between Russia and the West. Given that in the course of his trip Dolgorukov discovers ‘otherness’ in spades within the space of the imperial south, ‘the distant tambourines’ apply to Russia itself. In several frank digressions, he clearly differentiates between *rodina*, the native land (motherland), and *otechestvo*, fatherland, the greater dynastic and civic body of the Russian empire, artificial to him.<sup>34</sup> Through the experience of interior travel, Dolgorukov realizes that he feels at home only in Russia proper, while Ukraine emerges as a curiously alien territory that at the same time occupies the role of the historical and spiritual cradle of Russia in the popular imagination and, for Dolgorukov personally, a place of dear family connections (it is where his daughter resides and the grave of his grandmother lies).

The otherness of Ukraine is triangulated between a number of powerful vectors, alien elements that are foils to Dolgorukov’s Russian identity and that, in several important cases, remain disturbingly inassimilable. The triangle of otherness is formed by Ukrainian, Polish, and Jewish presences in the natural, social, and cultural landscape of the imperial south. The Ukrainian presence and its perplexing effect on the traveller emerge through his perception of historical, natural, and cultural boundaries—both empirically experienced and culturally preconceived. Thus, on his way to Kharkiv, Dolgorukov registers a change in the geographical-cultural scenery: he notices ancient burial mounds along the road, whitewashed huts, and melons that grow in the open air. Into this southern landscape, Ukrainian peasants (*khokhly*) appear.<sup>35</sup> However, all this ‘empirical’ detail is prefaced in Dolgorukov by a historical clause (i.e. a symbolic imagined boundary): upon entering the limits of Ukraine, ‘Pan Khmelnytsky and Mazepa began to come to mind.’<sup>36</sup> This phrasing, in turn, delimits Ukraine itself by framing it, on the one hand, with Khmelnytsky’s deed of adjoining the Cossack Hetmanate to Muscovy, and on the unavoidable other hand, with the high treason of the Hetman Mazepa, the Judas-like villain to Peter the Great. In other words, this phrase constructs Ukraine in

<sup>33</sup> Dickinson, *Breaking Ground*, 105.

<sup>34</sup> See Leonid Gorizontov on the notion of ‘Russia proper’ formed in the nineteenth century, in his ‘The “Great Circle” of Interior Russia: Representations of the Imperial Center in the Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries’, in J. Burbank, M. von Hagen, and A. Remnev (eds.), *Russian Empire: Space, People, Power, 1700–1930* (Bloomington, Ind., 2007), esp. 68–76. Dolgorukov’s distinctions are most succinctly expressed in ‘Slavny bubny za gorami’, 64, and ‘Puteshestvie v Kiev v 1817 godu’, 55: ‘Can I really feel sure that I am in my fatherland [*otechestvo*] when I travel in Ukraine, in Kurland, or in Vyatka? No, all is alien to me beyond the realm where I was born.’

<sup>35</sup> The word *khokhol* is a Russian ethnic label for a Ukrainian, referring to the custom of Ukrainian Cossacks and peasants of cropping a man’s hair and leaving just a lock (*khokhol*) on the top of the head. It belongs to a repertory of ethnic stereotypes that shaped the mutual popular perceptions of Ukrainians and Russians in their historic and cultural encounters throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. On this, see my ‘*My, moskali . . . : On Gogol, Ethnic Stereotyping, and Ukrainian–Russian Cultural Reciprocity in the 1830s–1840s*’, forthcoming.

<sup>36</sup> Dolgorukov, ‘Slavny bubny za gorami’, 46.

essence as a medley of loyalty and treachery, Russia's own and menacing Other.<sup>37</sup> This briefly evoked troubling legacy does not cast a pall over the experience of Dolgorukov, for whom the course of history had relegated the troubles of the past to the realm of lingering anecdotes and stereotypes. Hence, Ukrainian natural and ethnographic differences are shaped by Dolgorukov at times as pleasantly colourful details, at times ironically, and at times as nuisances or deficiencies. Of these latter, the traveller finds most vexing the distinct character of the Ukrainian vernacular. While the Ukrainian educated elites were fully integrated into the ranks of the Russian gentry and conversant in the same discourse as Dolgorukov (after all, his daughter married one of them), the *khokhly* remained incomprehensible to him. He considered himself to be in his homeland only in so far as he was able to understand the common people, and hence admitted: 'here I considered myself to be already in a foreign land' ('zdes' uzhe ya pochital sebya v chuzhikh krayakh').<sup>38</sup>

Dolgorukov describes the Polish presence in Ukraine in historical and political terms. On a road from Kharkiv to Poltava, he discerns Polish-style and Little Russian taverns, suggesting a link between the lands of Ukraine and the past centuries of Polish supremacy; he calls Kiev province a 'patch of old Poland'.<sup>39</sup> If a Polish presence in the form of occasional remnants of the past or the polite manners of Polish society (e.g. graceful dancing) appears as amusing or demi-exotic, the social and political power of the Polish elites alarms him, especially in the second travelogue of 1817. Referring to Polish involvement with the French during the Napoleonic wars, Dolgorukov writes disapprovingly of the unwillingness of the Polish gentry to learn Russian and of the dominance of the Polish language in the administrative and legal spheres. Suspecting continued Polish enmity towards their Russian conquerors, he suggests that 'Russia should always keep a knife hidden under her shirt [*za pazukhoi*] against this nation', whose character he defines by inconstancy (a stereotype usually applied to the French) and flattery.<sup>40</sup>

While the Ukrainian ethnic and vernacular Other occasionally irritates Dolgorukov and Polish linguistic and political alienation disturbs him, the presence of the Jews, side by side with Ukrainians and Poles, elicits a range of responses. In this private document, he gives free rein to his bluntly negative opinions of the Jews (in contrast to Izmailov)—in fact, most of his observations on Ukraine are critical. The manifest literary aspects of the travelogue lead to cultural generalizations (stereotyping) and even dramatizations of his discourse on Jews. The overall concern of his text is to show how the experience of otherness during a domestic trip leads to a greater appreciation of one's own homeland. The Jews in his writing are critical to this experience and are connected to their Ukrainian and Polish counterparts. Yet

<sup>37</sup> I discuss the role of Mazepa in cultural stereotyping and mimicry in detail elsewhere: T. Koznarsky, 'Obsessions with Mazepa', in S. Plokyh (ed.), *Poltava 1709: The Battle and the Myth* (Cambridge, Mass., 2012), 569–615, esp. 571–80.

<sup>38</sup> Dolgorukov, 'Slavny bubny za gorami', 64. Thus, on his trip he was thrilled to meet and converse with a Russian peasant from the Moscow area, a 'bgoroditskii muzhik': see pp. 90–1.

<sup>39</sup> *Ibid.* 56, 209.

<sup>40</sup> Dolgorukov, 'Puteshestvie v Kiev v 1817 godu', 87–91, 150–2.

Dolgorukov's depiction of Jews is different from his rendering of Ukrainian ethnic and Polish political Others: Jewish otherness in his text is devoid of the ethnographic and historical organic specificity found in his descriptions of Ukrainians or the political and social influence of Poles. Jewish otherness is manifested in the travelogue predominantly as socio-economic and in terms of absolute cultural and religious otherness—and both of these shape the author's perceptions, aims, epistemological grounding, and discursive strategies employed to feature Jews.

Dolgorukov's first reference to Jews occurs in Poltava: they 'begin to acquaint themselves with you: I don't recommend leaving anything by an open window'.<sup>41</sup> This oblique characterization of the Jews as petty thieves reveals the optical presets of Dolgorukov's exploration of the Jewish Other. Earlier in the travelogue, he describes an event of petty urban theft in Belgorod (Kursk region): a gold snuff-box was stolen from a companion when left on a windowsill.<sup>42</sup> There were no Jews to mention in Belgorod. Now in Poltava, he links the Jews that live in the town to thievery. Why? How does the fact of Jews living in Poltava make the city more dangerous for Dolgorukov, so that a traveller should be more alert? Had Dolgorukov's company encountered a Jewish trader or had any actual incident in Poltava taken place that Dolgorukov did not include? Has he transferred the Belgorod experience to Poltava, relying on tropes of 'common wisdom' (i.e. stereotypes)?

A more extensive description of the Jewish Other first occurs in Dolgorukov's examination of Kremenchuk (southern Poltava province). Describing charitable establishments, he mentions a special hospital for Jewish patients, which is followed by a moralizing digression that is a curious mixture of ethno-cultural stereotyping and pragmatic information:

For the Jews, there is a special hospital. These people are the same everywhere: filthy, shameful, and disgusting. I refer to the Jews of the lowest rungs: what is more repulsive in nature! It's a pity they are humans! Medical assistance to them and their decent upkeep is a sign of sensitivity that proves the philosophy of our age to be founded not on errors alone. And so it is: isn't a Jew a human being? Leave aside his superstitions, his absurdities, and even his deceit. Let us remember that he is also our neighbour, and when he is suffering, let's open a compassionate heart for him. This is how the local administrator thought . . . This building cost the public purse up to eighty thousand . . . Interior furnishings and beds were provided through the sponsorship of the landowner Ponomarev. It's better to pay for medicine for a sick Jew than to have an honest Christian squander it during an illegal game in a pub.<sup>43</sup>

Whereas in the Poltava passage Dolgorukov comments on Jews without reference to an actual encounter, his Kremenchuk passage is prompted by his examination of charitable institutions. In contrast to his description of a Christian/common hospital, Dolgorukov's comments on the Jewish hospital reflect denigrating generalized tenets of 'facts' of common knowledge (e.g. 'these people are the same *everywhere*').

<sup>41</sup> Dolgorukov, 'Slavny bubny za gorami', 67.

<sup>42</sup> Ibid. 38.

<sup>43</sup> Ibid. 94–5.



Moreover, this 'reported' (reiterated) common knowledge is not so much challenged as it is foiled by the virtues of the enlightened imperial administration that extends its benevolent hand to people regarded as lower specimens of humanity. Thus, the need for the administration's sanctioned path of 'decent upkeep' of the Jews actually underscores the latter's 'inherent filthiness'. Note that Dolgorukov does not remark upon a lack of sanitation in the hospital. In other words, the extension of administrative sympathetic vision and wisdom to the lower rungs of humanity legitimizes and elevates this administration: Jews remain the same as everywhere, yet the imperial government's humane treatment of them demonstrates Christian virtues. This notion of virtue is continued in the moralizing final sentence about charity as a corrective for the foibles of Christians. In this passage, Dolgorukov dialogically combines the horizons of a common man-traveller-observer with the perspective of an administrator aligned with imperial power (as the governor of Vladimir province, he allies himself with the wisdom of the Kremenchuk administration). The resulting 'dialectics' of this treatment of the Jews (both discursive, by Dolgorukov, and administrative, by the imperial powers) seem to be suggested in his report about a 'manufacturing school for the Jews: here Jewish weavers teach their skills to juveniles, and themselves produce thick fabric on state machines'—an example of a state-sponsored integration programme that allows Jews to enter the productive imperial industry (in contrast to Jews' thieving, i.e. parasitic, ways in Poltava).<sup>44</sup>

These two examples serve as an appropriate point for further consideration of the nature and structuring of Dolgorukov's perception and representation of Jews. As we observe in these instances, the empirical perceptions of the traveller encountering Jewish reality along his itinerary become 'hijacked' by the tropes of 'common knowledge' and stereotypes. Thus, if Dolgorukov might, or rather must, have observed Jews in Poltava and Kremenchuk, his actual experience (and most of his narrative reflects observed realia with a considerable degree of specificity and judgement) is replaced by generalizations about 'the Jews' coming from exterior sources, that of shared 'common knowledge'. Through this common knowledge, Jews are thematized according to the structures of the stereotype of the Jew as the ultimate socio-economic and cultural Other (to a Russian, a Christian, or a universal man of reason), essentializing such qualities as thieving/cheating/extortion, parasitism/greed/immorality, and filth.<sup>45</sup> Thus, Dolgorukov's perception of the Jews and his tools of representation were set prior to any actual encounter. Hence, his encounters with them often do not constitute 'events' but rather fixtures of discourse

<sup>44</sup> Ibid. 95.

<sup>45</sup> For a detailed discussion of the stereotyping of Jews and their dehumanization in the cultural imagination, see Livak, *Jewish Persona in the European Imagination*; on romantic literary clichés, see Weisskopf, *Pokryvalo Moiseya*, 201–85; and for comparative purposes, see F. Felsenstein, *Anti-Semitic Stereotypes: A Paradigm of Otherness in English Popular Culture, 1660–1830* (Baltimore and London, 1995), and E. Rosenberg, *From Shylock to Svengali: Jewish Stereotypes in English Fiction* (Stanford, Calif., 1960).

attached to the geographical and socio-demographic setting of Ukraine. In the example of the Kremenchuk hospital, we see how a fixed stereotype of ‘the Jews’ served as a jumping-off point to endorse the tenets of imperial and Christian virtues.

Let me elaborate upon this subject. A traveller or tourist, by nature, runs a gamut of risks—being taken advantage of and subjected to misfortunes, deprived of comfort—all for the pay-off of an authentic, intense exploration. Dolgorukov suffers the pitfalls of travel on various occasions. In Borzna, where he cannot find lodging, a Christian host takes advantage of him by charging such an exorbitant rate for a miserable hut that ‘even the Jews were surprised by this expensiveness’. In Korenaya near Kursk, the presumably Russian owner of a china shop hands Dolgorukov a cup with a broken-off handle and insists that it was Dolgorukov who broke the cup.<sup>46</sup> In the vicinity of Yelysavethrad (Elizavetgrad), a Ukrainian Orthodox priest fools Dolgorukov with his hospitality: after a hearty lunch, he hands him, under the pretence of piety, a list of the members of Dolgorukov’s entire company with suggested amounts for donations.<sup>47</sup> He encounters filth in some Ukrainian villages; he marvels at the homeliness of Ukrainian peasants when observing a wedding.<sup>48</sup> He reports an incident when a thieving soldier (recruited a few years earlier from a Ukrainian village) killed a Catholic priest and wounded a Jew (victims of the theft) when they tried to take back the stolen goods.<sup>49</sup> Dolgorukov reports each of these instances as an *event* or *incident*, and draws conclusions about certain types of people and the vices encountered. However, in dealing with Jews, Dolgorukov comes with preset ‘knowledge’ so that his generalizations or conclusions frame the occurrences and precede the events (where there are any). Hence, Jews often appear in Dolgorukov as a unanimous and anonymous group, a collective that matches a collection of stereotypes: they are ‘this cunning and idle people’; ‘one should always be wary of them on the road . . . they use their sharp minds to deceive: don’t trust them in anything!’; ‘it is unbelievable that such a vile and leprous people . . . should be pleasing to God’.<sup>50</sup> They are also a large-scale nuisance, as in Dolgorukov’s Kherson ‘witticism’: ‘There are throngs of Jews and mosquitoes, so you are either bumping into the former or killing the latter.’<sup>51</sup> Jews figure as a sign of decline from imagined jollier times in Ukraine: now ‘Jews deceive, *khokhly* drink, and instead of harmony, one witnesses shouting and brawling’.<sup>52</sup>

This tendency is significant both in terms of grasping the pernicious mechanisms of stereotyping and in understanding how these mechanisms factor in the shaping of the traveller’s identity itself. After all, Dolgorukov’s text was undertaken as a semi-

<sup>46</sup> Dolgorukov, ‘Slavny bubny za gorami’, 30–1.

<sup>47</sup> Ibid. 100–1.

<sup>48</sup> See his more ‘cranky’ remarks on Ukrainians and Ukraine in ‘Puteshestvie v Kiev v 1817 godu’, 30–1, 161–2.

<sup>49</sup> Ibid. 149–50.

<sup>50</sup> Dolgorukov, ‘Slavny bubny za gorami’, 234–5, 143. The last of these comments implies that, by contrast, the Karaite Jews might be indeed the original people of Israel, as the writer suggests that they are in every way superior to ‘the ordinary Jews . . . who loaf about Russia’.

<sup>51</sup> Ibid. 195, stereotypical notions of ‘blood-sucking’ and pest-like qualities.

<sup>52</sup> Dolgorukov, ‘Puteshestvie v Kiev v 1817 godu’, 85.

private document serving to validate his life and individual experience for posterity, as an example for future generations. His identity and exploration of selfhood is set against the background of the realm of the Other. Within this realm of otherness, he rediscovers that which is his own (be it a volume of his works in a bookshop, his grandmother's grave, or spiritual and historical landmarks of Kiev). His identity is thus poised to emerge fully upon return to his homeland. However, in this process of individuation (departure) and reconnection with his roots, Dolgorukov engages in a peculiar manipulation of cultural and ideological decorum, withdrawing from it to allow for unapologetically critical opinions of places, mores, and people, and reinstating it when he seeks to legitimize the collective roots of his identity—as an enlightened nobleman and a Russian patriot. It is significant that in this second mode, both the tropes of enlightenment and the tenets of Russianness (ethnicity, national character, Orthodoxy) have a strong pre-emptive effect upon his encounter with and reporting of Jews. In other words, when dealing with Jews, Dolgorukov acts not as an individual but as a vehicle of collective identity and 'common knowledge'.

### *Structures of Experience and Fixtures of Empathy*

The discursive tropes and forms we examined above define Dolgorukov's perspective on and representations of Jews. However, his two travelogues, despite recycling stereotypes, also include a range of empirical detail on the occupations, customs, and social stratification of Jews in Ukraine that can serve as a source for reconstructing realia of Jewish life in imperial Russia. These are found, for example, in his descriptions of a synagogue and learned Jews in Odessa, the trade in luxury goods in Zlatopol, Uman's Jewish social and cultural landscape, a Jewish wedding in Nizhyn, and sabbath near Bohuslav. Moreover, as the traveller progresses along his itinerary (Kharkiv–Poltava–Odessa–Kiev), his Jewish encounters become more frequent, specific, and personal, and in Kiev province, when staying in Uman, he directly engages with a number of Jewish inhabitants. This progression further entangles his reports in the interplay of empirical perception and stereotypes, in which the expansion of the subject's experience and horizons is tempered by intensified prejudice.

If in Poltava, Kremenchuk, and Kherson Dolgorukov presents Jews from an epistemological distance, in Odessa he investigates them more 'in person'. In this section, after exploring the offerings of the imperial south (climate and food) and meeting with some high-ranking persons (among them the duc de Richelieu), Dolgorukov then tours houses of worship and describes a synagogue and Jewish religious practices. To avoid a lengthy quotation, I shall segment Dolgorukov's description into smaller thematic blocks.

The traveller's observations betray the same (in fact, intensified) set of stereotypes noted in his description of Kremenchuk, posited before any experience unfolds: 'The Jews have their synagogue: it's all as filthy and vile as its worshippers.'<sup>53</sup>

<sup>53</sup> Dolgorukov, 'Slavny bubny za gorami', 146: 'Zhidy takzhe imeyut svoyu Sinagogu: v nei stol'ko zhe nechisto vse i gnusno, skol'ko sramen i rod poklonnikov.'

The filth and vileness of the synagogue is not a literal description of the state of its floor but qualifies Judaism as anti-spiritual, ungodly, incomprehensible, and barbaric.<sup>54</sup> Not surprisingly, what follows serves to confirm his already stated definition of Jewish ritual as pre-modern, incomprehensible, and barbaric:

I came too late, the service was over. They come to pray every day; there were still a few lazy Jews there. Having wrapped their heads in large white blankets . . . they glorified God by their books. Jews are all literate: there is not a single one of them who has not been able to read the Decalogue from his juvenile years and who has not been taught, in a straight or crooked way, their law. At school, in front of their carved ark, they read psalms, singing them in most wild ways, even noticeably trying to avoid any harmony of tones . . . and to forestall distractions of thoughts, they incessantly grimace and make various ugly contortions.<sup>55</sup>

The strict adherence to faith (daily prayers) is described with no hint of a Jewish connection to virtue or piety; on the contrary, those still remaining in the synagogue are rendered as 'lazy' (that is, Dolgorukov shows a stereotypical notion of idleness). The information about the high level of literacy among Jews is equally ambiguous: whereas literacy is usually associated with progress and enlightenment,<sup>56</sup> in the case of Jews, *their* literacy is a means of maintaining anachronistic customs and obstinate rituals. Dolgorukov reports that Jews are 'great enthusiasts of religious books, buying them in great quantities . . . One of their compatriots, a Jew from among the number of those who traverse creation, cheating all without exception, brought from Poland a cart loaded with Jewish books, and what do you think?—they almost sold out in my presence.'<sup>57</sup> Hence, for Dolgorukov, even in the realm of books, Jews are materialistic speculators. Similarly, Jewish religious ritual is framed as a deviation from and distortion of spirituality and natural (dignified) human demeanour (singing wildly, grimacing). In dismissing the Jewish religion and literacy, Dolgorukov manipulates what is incomprehensible to him, compensating for this incomprehensibility with the ready mechanisms of stereotyping. As an Orthodox Christian, Dolgorukov shares the legacy of the Old Testament (such as psalms), which may make Jewish religious practices ever more threatening, 'strange', and 'barbaric' to him.

In commenting on representatives of the Jewish community, Dolgorukov fuses stereotypes with eighteenth-century paradigms of racial cataloguing. His description of his visit to the synagogue is marked not so much by communication as by a 'reading' by an outsider equipped with ethnic clichés legitimized by Western

<sup>54</sup> See Livak, *Jewish Persona in the European Imagination*, 27–54.

<sup>55</sup> Dolgorukov, 'Slavny bubny za gorami', 146.

<sup>56</sup> In the Russian empire of the first decades of the nineteenth century, literacy rates can be approximated at about 5 per cent of the total population of roughly fifty million. See the literacy rate approximations and assessment of the size of the literary audience in Russia of the 1820s–1830s in A. Reitblat, 'Daite nam pishchu v otechestvennoi literature, i my otkazhemsya ot inostrannoi (Formirovanie chitatel'skoi auditorii)', in id., *Kak Pushkin vyshel v genii: Istoriko-sotsiologicheskie ocherki o knizhnoi kul'ture Pushkin-skoi epokhi* (Moscow, 2001), 14–15.

<sup>57</sup> Dolgorukov, 'Slavny bubny za gorami', 146–7.

enlightenment (in contrast to Izmailov's report): 'Their rabbi, according to his countenance, is a most worthless man, and his eyes promise neither sense nor wisdom. And the *kahal* head (as their judge is called), by his facial features and extrusions of his skull [*po . . . vypuklostyam cherepa*], to agree with the observations of Lavater and Haller, must be a swindler.'<sup>58</sup>

Let us recapitulate this close-up encounter: Dolgorukov's visit to the synagogue in Odessa is produced in his travelogue not as an attempt to learn about the Other but to classify it as utterly alien, thus to confirm religious and ethnic stereotypes ingrained in the popular imagination of the time. Throughout the entire encounter, Dolgorukov forgoes communication for a one-way 'translation' in which meaning comes preset from the outside of experience. Moreover, Dolgorukov's report on the Odessa synagogue is the antipode of Izmailov's tolerant sentimentalist curiosity in Kherson, reaching a most extreme tone and degree of devaluation. This extreme of negation is triggered by his encounter with two most important aspects of Jewish life that he witnessed: religion (as ritual and institution) and community (with its own structure and hierarchy). Remarkably and logically, then, these two specific empirical (and 'normal', 'cultured', or 'cultural' in their own ways) aspects of Jewish life trigger the traveller's most concerted (if subconscious) efforts to override it with stereotypical qualifications, and reduce and return the Jews to the *déjà-vu* multitude of specimens and vices. In this process, Jewish religious institutions, literacy, and social organization must be diminished and voided of meaning.<sup>59</sup>

While in Kremenchuk and Odessa, Dolgorukov observed Jews from the position of the observer-outsider. In Kiev province, or right-bank Ukraine, however, he comes in direct contact with them. Approaching Kiev from the south, Dolgorukov leaves the steppe zone and is pleased to find himself in a more varied landscape. He registers the boundary he has crossed as geographical and historical: 'Overall, one may become lost in contemplation of this patch of old Poland . . . Settlements are quite splendid. The Jews trade everywhere and swarm like bees in beehives. Labourers in the fields harvest the offerings of nature.'<sup>60</sup> The traveller's vision is shaped by the expectation and confirmation of the Ukrainian pastoral setting. He forms an attractive picture, comparing Jews and their activities to bees, symbols of productivity who complement the agricultural work. In this varied natural and social landscape, the Jewish taverns blend into a theatrical setting: 'In the fields [peasants] are collecting the harvest and singing, and the Jewish taverns at the crossings attract, with the smell of *horilka* (spirits), travellers and passers-by: it's always busy in them.'<sup>61</sup>

<sup>58</sup> Ibid. 146.

<sup>59</sup> Compare Dolgorukov's report, *ibid.* 216, on a Uniate service he observed with pleasure in Uman (albeit at the end he felt strange and disapproved of the admixture of Catholic elements in the Orthodox rite). His critical assessment of the Uniate rite as neither one thing nor another ('*ni to, ni se*') does not approach his rabid commentary on the Odessa Jews. <sup>60</sup> Ibid. 209.

<sup>61</sup> Ibid. 213. Contrast this to the locus of a Jewish tavern and the image of the Jew-proprietor, as discussed in M. Opalski, *The Jewish Tavern-Keeper and his Tavern in Nineteenth-Century Polish Literature* (Jerusalem, 1986), 11–51.

Dolgorukov notices that the inhabitants of many towns are ‘Jews and Cossacks’. He observes that Uman ‘is filled with Jews; *khokhly* are numerous, too. You rarely notice a Russian or a Pole.’<sup>62</sup> This is crucial for our understanding of Dolgorukov’s structuring and handling of his Uman experiences. In this town, belonging to the huge Potocki estates and inhabited mostly by Jews, Dolgorukov has to stay and function for several days amidst ‘the Other’: he seeks accommodation and services from Jewish proprietors, craftsmen, money-changers, and factors. His experience in Uman reveals that fierce competition is part of the socio-economic environment of Jewish life as well as their social stratification: Dolgorukov encounters rich merchants (he was provided room and board by a rich Jew with a large family), street vendors, ragged dealers, and middling shopkeepers. In Uman, he sees Jewish life in a variety of settings: domestic/private (the family of his hosts), public, commercial, and religious. He is compelled to adjust his preconceptions as he communicates and deals with individuals. Even when he complains of being overcharged for a suit he ordered, his experience with the tailor is narrated with a sense of humorous resignation. Paying three gold coins for the suit, way too much, Dolgorukov reports:

I made a bit of noise, and the Jew, to soften my displeasure and to trap me another way, admitted, briefly and clearly, that he had charged an extra half (50 per cent). ‘But whom should I charge?’, he added. ‘Our own don’t give such a chance. You are travelling on your own volition, spending money on this and that: why not throw an extra coin in my purse? Isn’t everything that you pay for while travelling extra [above the necessary]? Had you been staying at home, no one would have been able to take anything from you.’ That’s right! Thank you, Jew, for your truthfulness; at least you weren’t a phoney about it, so here, have your money.<sup>63</sup>

While Dolgorukov has not abandoned his stereotypes and formulae of common knowledge, his narrative becomes more complex, shifting amidst the strategies of self-presentation, conventions of representing the Other, ideological agendas, and genuine entanglement with subjective experience. In Uman, amidst the Jewish reality, indeed Jewish predominance, Dolgorukov differentiates between individuals and grants the Other the possibility of selfhood. However burdened by stereotypes, his experience points beyond them, into the subjectivity of the Other. Let us be clear: Dolgorukov is not thrilled to be overcharged. In fact, he had designed his trip to minimize expenditure (he is not rich and cannot, as he wrote, afford Paris); he travels as a gentleman striving to avoid paying as a tourist (in one instance, as a gesture of thanks to a noble family who has put him up, he makes a gift of a volume of his works bought in a local bookshop). While he does not express it directly in his travelogue, he seems to follow an itinerary in which his status as a provincial governor and nobleman offers him free hospitality among fellow gentry-men, or where his family, friends, and friends of relatives could provide accommodation. The words of the Jewish tailor in Uman remind him of what he is—a tourist, and thus

<sup>62</sup> Dolgorukov, ‘Slavny bubny za gorami’, 217.

<sup>63</sup> *Ibid.* 218.

someone who can expect to pay accordingly, contributing revenue to those who provide services to travellers.

Individual interactions with Jews do not cure Dolgorukov of his dependence on stereotypes. However, his desire for authenticity leads him to moments of empathy. In the altogether foreign terrain of Uman (his administrative position is of little use, and he does not feel like socializing with the officers of the Hussar regiment stationed there), he channels his curiosity to explore local phenomena. The town does not impress him. His visits to houses of worship generate a few comments on the Orthodox church (not particularly impressive), the Uniate liturgy (impressive singing, aberrant rites), an imposing Catholic church, and a synagogue (where the rite of circumcision strikes him as barbaric and meaningless). However, that same day, he also witnesses another solemn celebration in the synagogue that touches his sensibilities as a resonant universal symbol:

The Jews fasted and commemorated the ravaging of the temple in Jerusalem. They call this fast the destruction of Jerusalem, and it lasts an entire day: they are not supposed to eat until sunset, they don't put on any footwear, and gather at the synagogue . . . Here, they bemoan their temple, grieve, sing dolefully 'The Lament of Jeremiah' . . . Nowhere else is love of the fatherland expressed with such power as in the following beautiful verse: 'If I forget thee, O Jerusalem.' However despicable the current position of the Jews, their rites, and their gatherings, nonetheless I could not help but be touched seeing a small group of people who had come to lament their fatherland, their church, their land—and being driven from everywhere, visited by God's wrath, deprived of altar, censer, or sacrificial offering. In this touching moment, I forgot all the biases of the mind, and, by the heart's urging alone, saw in the last Jew my brother in humanity.<sup>64</sup>

For Dolgorukov, travel is a means of exploration and confirmation of belonging to his native land and nation (Russia, *rodina*), and he is attuned to signs of patriotic feelings even amidst the Other. Through experiencing the lament of the Jews for Jerusalem and through his heart's capacity to extend and to transcend biases, he overcomes the limitations of his mind and experiences a sympathetic emotional connection to the Other. In fact, Dolgorukov re-establishes his own authenticity through this sympathetic gesture, the identification with the Other. Perhaps in the Jewish lament he encounters a reflection of his own longing for home, and this convergence of the two nostalgic longings symbolically brings the traveller and the empathetically perceived Other closer to the universal realm of the human spirit.<sup>65</sup>

<sup>64</sup> Ibid. 220.

<sup>65</sup> I suspect Dolgorukov's empathetic stance can also be connected to the not-so-far-removed demise of the Dolgorukovs from power and the misfortunes that befell his parents and grandparents. On his way back home, he cries as he passes through the small village of Volynskoe that used to belong to his father and which he remembers from childhood: 'with this patch of land, my poor but always honest father lost his last property and home . . . not through his own fault, but through misfortune': *ibid.* 349–50. On the notion of sympathetic imagination towards the Other as a prerequisite of moral goodness, see Page, *Imperfect Sympathies*, 2–3.

Dolgorukov's path of sympathy towards Jews reaches its peak in the section of the travelogue that follows the destruction of Jerusalem and his unflattering general description of the Jews of Uman. After he is touched by the Jewish lament, Dolgorukov discovers a fine human being in the midst of the othering environment of Uman. While staying at the house of the rich Jewish merchant Gurovich,<sup>66</sup> Dolgorukov meets the latter's 24-year-old son and they spend several evenings conversing in French. Dolgorukov is struck not only by the young man's level of education (received at home), knowledge of German, French, and Russian, and general passion for reading and learning, but also by his grounded and keen thinking and, moreover, the qualities of his heart (moral values). To convey these impressions, Dolgorukov provides a record of his conversation with the young Gurovich, translated into Russian. It is a remarkable locus of interaction, in which the voice—reflecting subjectivity and sensibility—is given to the Other within Dolgorukov's personal document. The context and format of this conversation are meant to authenticate the traveller's discovery of the higher humanity in the Other; it is an example of a sympathetic encounter reportedly recorded in the traveller's notebook just after it had taken place. One can speculate as to how complete or close to 'reality' this section may be, but the exchange between Dolgorukov and Gurovich (the former posing questions, the latter responding) reveals a protocol guided by both emotion and the cultural 'logic' of Russian–Jewish contact.

Dolgorukov poses his first question: 'What is missing? What do you need to be happy?' Gurovich replies that he wishes the government would forbid Jews from wearing 'our clownish costume, as it stamps us with shame and dishonour'. In the opinion of young maskilim, the outer manifestations of Jewish otherness have a powerfully detrimental effect upon the Jewish community:

One who is despised loses his spirit and self-respect, falls back on weakness. This is why our people today are so shameful, obtuse, and ignorant. Everyone who sees me in my skullcap points his finger, saying 'There's a Jew!', and I am too human just to shrug off this unjust disgrace that always closes doors in front of me and alienates me from the world.<sup>67</sup>

When Dolgorukov enquires why Gurovich cannot simply choose to change his way of dress, he replies that he would rather suffer denigration from the Christians than cause his old mother grief. Such tenderness towards one's mother provokes an emotional outpouring from Dolgorukov: 'Are there many among our Orthodox brethren who feel and think this way? I forgot at this moment that he was a Jew, jumped towards him, and kissed him.'<sup>68</sup>

Let us summarize the shifts and interconnections that come together as a mechanism of catharsis in this exchange, a 'forgetting' of otherness and an involuntary

<sup>66</sup> I transliterate 'Gurovich' from Russian rather than approximating a Polish or German rendering of this name.

<sup>67</sup> Dolgorukov, 'Slavny bubny za gorami', 221–2. Most likely, these strong opinions were shaped by Gurovich's exposure to the modernized Jewish communities in Leipzig and areas of Prussia he had visited on business.

<sup>68</sup> Ibid. 222.



outpouring of love. It has a particular progression, almost a 'protocol': the question of what is missing in order for one to be happy prompts the notion of the suffering and denigration of the Other (the stigma of appearances and obstinacy of tradition, which also points to the dominance of visual perception as a mode of defining the identity of the Other). This personal and national stigma then leads to the topic of filial sensitivity (acceptance of a stigma of collective selfhood in order to prevent a mother's suffering), mirrored by Dolgorukov's fatherly affection. In short, it is a path from one heart, through the tenets of collective bonds, to the heart of another.

The second area of enquiry again begins with the heart's pleasures: 'Do you like reading?' And again, the personal strivings of a young Jew for self-enlightenment are contrasted with the collective tenets of tradition. Gurovich admits not only to being familiar with the New Testament but to his desire to translate it into Hebrew (for which his compatriots consider him a heretic). He sees it as a task that would bring aesthetic and moral benefits to his community (rather than conversion): 'It is in our power to believe the Gospels or not, but it is always pleasing to savour fine literature. It's time to burn our Talmud, which is nothing but a book filled with follies that have completely deformed the true law of Moses. Let them leave us only his books in their inviolable shape: his rules are best for us.'<sup>69</sup>

As with the first exchange, the love of reading leads to the topic of tradition and the Haskalah movement that included modernization and return to the 'original' law, highlighting the tension between the individual and the community. In this sense, Dolgorukov's eagerness to extend sympathy towards the Other is further conditioned by the fact that within his community of Jewish Others, Gurovich occupies the role of the Other from within, as someone who is critical of his community and who is eager to reform it. This double-otherness and critical perception of one's own group allows Dolgorukov to transcend his limitations and prejudices towards Jews; in Gurovich he sees an individual both conditioned by the collective and challenging its limitations (not unlike Dolgorukov's often critical attitudes towards Russian society, while he remained firmly patriotic).

The last area of enquiry is the question: 'Do you like Christians? [*Nravyatsya li vam Khristiyane?*]' Gurovich avoids affectation or insincerity (which Dolgorukov would have registered): he might have enjoyed the New Testament on aesthetic or even moral grounds, but he does not pretend to like those who impose otherness upon him and his people. Instead, he (carefully) speaks about their necessity: 'Without them, we cannot get by. We would perish in Palestine, if we were driven there. When we celebrate the sabbath, we cannot even extinguish a fire in a house without the help of Christians.'<sup>70</sup>

Then the conversation, or rather the series of guided monologues, returns to the topic of Haskalah and the modernizing reforms Gurovich hopes the government will administer. Dolgorukov thus summarizes his overall impression of Gurovich as the epitome of cultivation and loyalty to his people:

<sup>69</sup> Ibid.

<sup>70</sup> Ibid. 223.

This is what he was like, the son of the Jew, our proprietor. He has read much, enriched his memory with various historical events, and is capable in a conversation of applying his learning to the point. He never oversteps the limit, is always modest, polite, not compliant in bargaining, and doesn't lose count. I have rarely seen such a cultivated man in Jewish garb. It's a pity that the superstitions of his kin stand in his way on the path to better circumstances. He passionately loves his people, and is a fervent advocate of what would benefit them, and it seems is ready to sacrifice his life to further the prosperity of his people.<sup>71</sup>

Throughout this exchange, Dolgorukov and Gurovich find common ground in the universal realm of human aspiration—the realm of sympathetic imagination—that transcends the notions of belonging to a particular group and Otherness. However, this realm is not completely stripped of stereotypes, as these manifest themselves in the agonistic structure of the dialogue prompted by Dolgorukov's questions that, in a nutshell, constitute the protocol of Russian–Jewish encounters. In the pathos of Gurovich's hopes for modernization and enlightened love of his people, Dolgorukov encounters an exemplary person, causing him to forgo his reliance on common knowledge, prejudice, or even disgust with the Jewish Other that he expresses elsewhere. This experience, however, remains unique in Dolgorukov's account; its singularity is underscored by the author's address to his readers, telling them that if they visit Gurovich when travelling through Uman, as he would urge them to do, 'you will certainly be satisfied with him'.<sup>72</sup>

The Uman section of Dolgorukov's travelogue is indeed crucial for our understanding of how he structures his experience and his self vis-à-vis the Jewish Other. In Kremenchuk and other places along the way to Odessa, Dolgorukov observed Jews from a social and cultural distance. He saw them as presences or multitudes (there are too many of them)—precisely as the *marginalized* group amidst the 'normal' Russian imperial south. The irritatingly incomprehensible *khokhly* (an ethnographic fixture and linguistic deviation) or untrustworthy Poles (a political deviation) are peculiar yet still inherent, if not organic, elements of Dolgorukov's Russian *otechestvo*, absorbable into the traveller's epistemological system of coordinates, the former by virtue of historical tradition, the latter by virtue of their social position, their cultivation (close to that of Dolgorukov's own), and their subordination in the imperial order. When commenting on positive or negative aspects of his trip, Dolgorukov oscillates between adherence to and withdrawal from the rules of literary and ideological decorum, yet he does so within collective bonds of his identity as a high-ranking administrator, a private Russian citizen, a member of the educated elite, and *un homme d'esprit*. His Russianness is put in relief through his exploration of the Russian south and its peculiarities. Yet when he encounters Jews, collective stereotypes precondition his perceptions and preclude his constructions of experience: however uncomfortable or even strange the traveller might feel in the southern expanses of his fatherland, it is the Jews that are the ultimate outsiders within Dolgorukov's realm of experience. This ultimate otherness is precipitated by

<sup>71</sup> Dolgorukov, 'Slavny bubny za gorami', 223.

<sup>72</sup> Ibid. 224.

the essentialized elements of Jewishness that are antithetical to Dolgorukov's own identity: their socio-economic 'peculiarity' (they are neither noblemen nor common people/peasants; they are profit-driven, which is alien to the honour-driven activities and aspirations of a nobleman)<sup>73</sup> and their civilizational 'peculiarity' (religion, clothing, and other identifying features).

Thus, when examining the provincial town of Kremenchuk and surveying a Jewish hospital, Dolgorukov adopts the self-styled role of inspector, an authority who is aligned with the imperial hierarchy, illuminating its own legitimacy and its ameliorating benevolent impact upon the Other. Similarly, when exploring the growing port of Odessa with its various foreign elements, Dolgorukov sees in the city a locus of imperial colonization, expansiveness, cosmopolitanism, and industry. Strolling there, taking note of stone buildings, visiting various institutions, pondering the qualities of the southern climate, shopping, rubbing shoulders with elites, and even enjoying the favourable attention of the mayor, the duc de Richelieu—all this contrasts with, confirms, and flatters Dolgorukov's own social and cultural identity while further showcasing the city as a vivid, exotic, yet organic component of his *otechestvo*. In the midst of Odessa's prolific colourful foreign elements (including the Karaite Jews), the traveller denies Russian Jews a modicum of civilizational value, precisely because they are *not* foreign enough to stand for a foreign cultural difference.<sup>74</sup> If in Odessa various 'foreigners' were becoming the insiders, Dolgorukov's close-up experience of Odessa Jews denies them such a possibility. They are the domestic and inner Other—not foreigners, but inherently outsiders within the imperial body. Their distinct elements of social and cultural (religious) organization generate Dolgorukov's intensely saturated vocabulary of othering and denigration (which includes, remarkably, references to Swiss intellectual 'authorities'!<sup>75</sup>) because they suggest resistance to the default mechanisms of marginalization associated with them in the shared cultural imagination.

Uman upsets Dolgorukov's default position. To maintain the authenticity of his status as an enlightened and open-minded traveller, he embarks on exploring the Other by immersing himself in the environment of the Other. Through his quest

<sup>73</sup> Note, for example, his disapproving comments about those noblemen who apply themselves to commerce, when he refers to the landowner Turchaninov involved in the grain trade: 'having left him with the Jews to figure out his Odessa grain operations, we returned home': 'Puteshestvie v Kiev v 1817 godu', 88; see also pp. 85–7. Dolgorukov admits his very poor understanding of commerce: *ibid.*

<sup>74</sup> Dolgorukov's report on the 'Karaite Jews, emigrants from Constantinople' in whose shops he bought tobacco and perfumes is revealing and worth quoting here: 'I cannot in any possible way compare these Jews with the ordinary Jews, known to us all, who loaf about Russia [*koi ploshchad' Russkuyu topchut*]: these are much cleaner and behave more attractively. It isn't repulsive to be in the same place with them. Someone made a comment about them: aren't they the descendants of those Jews who were the beloved Israel? For it is unbelievable that such a vile and leprous people as the Jews we now see in Europe should be pleasing to God. I almost agreed with him, or at least wished that he weren't mistaken': 'Slavny bubny za gorami', 143. On the idiom *toptat' ploshchad'*, see V. Dal, *Tolkovyii slovar' zhivogo velikorusskogo yazyka* (Moscow, 1978–80), s.v. *ploshchad'*.

<sup>75</sup> i.e. Albrecht von Haller's and Johann Kaspar Lavater's physiognomic and anatomical classifications.

for sympathy, he discovers his self in the Other: he achieves this while observing the ritual commemoration of the destruction of the temple in Jerusalem and in his conversations with Gurovich, where the Other's subjectivity is revealed. These experiences lead Dolgorukov towards an emotional and even cognitive breakdown, a cathartic union with the Jewish Other that overrides his deeply rooted store of stereotypes. At the same time, Dolgorukov's progression of cathartic empathetic encounter recalls, as a cultural shadow, these same tropes of common knowledge. This experience remains singular in Dolgorukov's journey; upon the continuation of his trip, he readjusts his optics to the 'normal' default position for perceiving the Other.

ALEKSEY LEVSHIN AND ANDREY GLAGOLEV:  
TRAVEL, ETHNICITY, AND NATIONAL IDENTITY

Both Aleksey Levshin's *Pis'ma iz Malorossii* and Andrey Glagolev's *Zapiski russkogo puteshestvennika* were shaped within the context of post-Napoleonic ferment in which ideas of Russian distinctiveness, national character, and imperial zeal (and its cultural manifestations) preoccupied writers and intellectuals. These ideas were adapted to the tasks and conditions of the Russian cultural environment and heralded the Romantic zeitgeist. Russian Romantic writings of the time (both essays and works of fiction) are deeply preoccupied with the search for Russian cultural and national distinctiveness or physiognomy. This quest was contingent upon 'the Other', indeed a range of foreign and domestic Others. By grappling with the various tribes and peoples who inhabited the vast empire, Russian literati attempted to define the elusive (at least in terms of distinct positive representation) contours of Russianness: from Orest Somov's pioneering tract on Romantic poetry (1824) all the way into the 1830s, through the reception of Gogol's Ukrainian stories and Gogol's own lofty summation of Pushkin (1835) as the embodiment of Russianness. Thus the identities of literary subjects, narrators, and travellers were produced at the fraught intersection between their strivings for individual experience and longing for collective sources of identity—the virtual world of history, tradition, common knowledge, and cultural cliché.

For Izmailov and Dolgorukov, travel narratives were a means of authenticating personal experience by embedding it in space, in the natural, social, and cultural landscape of the imperial south. In turn, for Levshin and Glagolev, exploration of the imperial south was conceived as a purposeful and culturally informed charting of the origins (historical, spiritual) of their fatherland—as an exploration and confirmation of the collective bonds of their identity, aimed at instructing their compatriots about their fatherland. In contrast to Izmailov, who in an epigraph refers to his writings as a 'collection of sensations, sentiments, and ideas',<sup>76</sup> Levshin

<sup>76</sup> See Izmailov, *Puteshestvie v poludennuyu Rossiyu*, title page; the epigraph is from Dupaty's *Sentimental Letters on Italy*.

declares in his preface: ‘Russian ancient history long ago triggered my desire to see Little Russia, famous for numerous great events. It is inexcusable for a Russian citizen [*Rossiyaninu*], I thought, not to visit Kiev, not to see Poltava—and so I hurried to explore the monuments of the glory of our ancestors.’<sup>77</sup> Hence, Levshin’s travelogue approaches a guidebook in design, even though it is presented as a sequence of letters and occasionally reveals (and is conscious of) vestiges of sentimentalist writing, focusing on historical landmarks and salient geographical descriptions. He often furnishes his observations with historical and literary quotations and footnotes, as well as with geographical detail (i.e. blending his experience within the framework of collective cultural horizons). When he exhibits his feelings, they are often shaped as exemplary—as pathos about the fields of Poltava, or righteous indignation against Mazepa at the site of Kochubey’s execution.<sup>78</sup> In fact, Levshin makes an ironic apology that indicates his subscription to a (newer) literary framework that eschews personal sentiment.<sup>79</sup> It is remarkable that when he published this book, he was an 18-year-old student at Kharkiv University.<sup>80</sup>

Examining Little Russia as ‘the cradle of our fatherland’, Levshin connects monuments and traces of antiquity to a range of historical sources, from the *Primary Chronicle*, to Tatishchev and Voltaire, and so on. In his geographical observations, he connects the historical significance of a place to the qualities of Ukraine’s natural setting and the character of its inhabitants, noting that Little Russians (Ukrainians) are descendants of the same ancestors as the Russians. He takes time to observe and converse with a 96-year-old Cossack warrior, and sketches the ways of life, national character, language, and dialectal groupings of Ukrainians (structured as an objective and comprehensive ethnographic and physiognomic description).

Since Levshin’s text is intended to describe Ukraine as the cradle of the Russian empire, the traveller registers few distractions from his historical and geographical tour. Unlike Dolgorukov, he remains focused, and in his travelogue, the Other is introduced when its presence contributes to the travelogue’s main designs. Perhaps not surprisingly (for both social and cultural reasons: he is not a nobleman/statesman of Dolgorukov’s pedigree, and his aim was to experience the sources of *otechestvo*), he makes no mention of Poles in Kiev.<sup>81</sup> He does encounter the Other in this ancient capital, however, predominantly in the form of Jewish street vendors. In his first letter written from Kiev, Levshin conveys their manner of speaking:

<sup>77</sup> Levshin, *Pis’ma iz Malorossii*, preface, unpaginated.

<sup>78</sup> *Ibid.* 7–10, 14.

<sup>79</sup> ‘I apologize! I forget that you included me on the list of travellers who are forbidden to express their feelings’: *ibid.* 10.

<sup>80</sup> A good overview of Levshin’s biography and works is available in *Russkie pisateli, 1800–1917: Biograficheskii slovar’*, iii (Moscow, 1994), 307–8.

<sup>81</sup> Moreover, he did not explore right-bank Ukraine (where Polish elites predominated), limiting himself to historical Little Russia, i.e. the territory of the Cossack Hetmanate. In the concluding pages of his work he gives a general demographic description: ‘Inhabitants of Little Russia, aside from natural Little Russians, include Greeks, Jews, Armenians, and Germans; and the population approaches three million’: Levshin, *Pis’ma iz Malorossii*, 199.

'Dze ne nadobno li vam zolotykh veshchei? . . . Dze prikazhete li kuda skhodit' ili chego syskat'?' [Are you interested in something gold? Would you like me to run an errand or have me find anything for you?]', shouted ten Jews one after another, who came to us ten minutes after our arrival. They circled me for a long time, and I found it necessary to buy from them a few copper items put forth as golden . . . Several roubles liberated us from them.<sup>82</sup>

In contrasting this mundane moment with the spirituality of the Kievan monuments he has come to explore, Levshin posits the actual provincial town against the lofty and symbolically loaded historical and virtual city—the text of Kiev in the shaping of which Levshin partakes. He provides an overview of Ukrainian Jews in a section on the Chernihiv area, which he passes through on his way from Kiev. The traveller's stop at a Jewish inn serves as a pretext for him to describe Jews as an element of Little Russia:

A man wearing a long, black silk jacket, shoes, and black skullcap hangs around us. It is a Jew, the innkeeper. He bows, almost crawls near us offering his services. He also hangs around nearly every farmer, in order to find a chance to cheat him. By the way, let me point out that the Jews, who were expelled from Russia several times, have found a comfortable refuge for themselves in Little Russia.<sup>83</sup>

The movement of Levshin's discourse from specific observations to qualification, explanation of motivations, and generalization, while opposite to the structure of Dolgorukov's comments, nonetheless similarly reveals the workings of the mechanisms of 'common knowledge'. In a passage in which he characterizes Jews, Levshin does not cite a source for his knowledge (a stereotype beyond his immediate empirical grasp, coming from a shared common perception of the Jews in Ukraine as cultural Other and economic competitor). In his description, Levshin briefly writes on the Jews' socio-economic position, combining 'facts' and stereotypes, characterizing their 'takeover' in the former Hetmanate of small-scale trades 'that provide occasions to deceive common people'; their impact as innkeepers, wine tradesmen, money-changers, and factors; and their unclean domestic life. However, Levshin is neutral about the Jewish religion (which he presents as outside his immediate experience), pointing to the Jews' steadfast dedication and rigour in maintaining their rites.<sup>84</sup>

Most remarkably though, while Levshin relies on common knowledge in his description of the Jews, in his quest for authenticity and objectivity he also reaches for balance, and discusses common opinions:

<sup>82</sup> Levshin, *Pis'ma iz Malorossii*, 90–1. Levshin's interest in the ethnography of speech (dialect, accent) is a harbinger of the Romantic explorations of national character that were to flourish in the late 1820s–early 1830s. For example, aside from Somov and Gogol, Petr Golota's four-volume novel *Mazepa: Istoricheskii roman, vzyatyi iz narodnykh predanii* (Moscow, 1832) mimics the accent of a Jewish character, and includes extensive transcribed passages in Ukrainian vernacular and approximated Belarusian.

<sup>83</sup> Levshin, *Pis'ma iz Malorossii*, 150–1.

<sup>84</sup> *Ibid.* 151–3. He describes the position of the *rezak* (kosher butcher) who maintains the sanitary level of beef as a 'splendid institution' (*prekrasnoe ustanovlenie*): *ibid.* 153.

There is no need to tell you that Jews are smart, crafty, pushy, and enterprising. Everyone knows this, and everyone scolds them for this. However, only a rare person notices virtuous traits in them, the most laudable of which are their inclination towards friendship and the help which they provide to their poorest compatriots. This people [*narod*] is made for service. No one could better appreciate their usefulness than travellers, for whom the Jews for the smallest price exhaust all possible efforts.<sup>85</sup>

Unlike Izmailov and Dolgorukov, Levshin's sympathetic gesture towards the Jewish Other is produced not within the realm of personal encounter (his description of a tavern-keeper is far from sympathetic) but from within the realm of an abstract critical reflection that examines the collective opinion and subjects Jews to scrutiny, advancing counter-observations.<sup>86</sup> In the context of the patriotic optimism of Levshin's work, the Jews of Ukraine/Little Russia can be seen as agents of the realm's future progress and prosperity (which the traveller outlines at the end of his text). Moreover, it is interesting that Levshin neutrally reports on elements of Jewish religious traditions. His position does not refute the centuries-long Christian tradition that demonized Jews (the source of stereotypical baggage attached to cultural constructions), but suggests the possibility of more neutral/objective contexts in which the process of constructing the self and the Other could be advanced without religious undercurrents.<sup>87</sup>

Levshin's inclusion and countering of the tropes of common knowledge pre-date the Russian Romantic eagerness to construct experiences and characters 'physiognomically' (with typified cultural and national features), in which ethno-cultural stereotypes are treated as givens and common knowledge itself is heralded as an inalienable vessel of organic national experience and even wisdom.<sup>88</sup> Andrey Glagolev, on the other hand, operated within the mindset of official nationalism (as Benedict Anderson puts it, 'willed merger of nation and dynastic empire'<sup>89</sup>), so that these tropes of common knowledge become internalized mechanisms that define his identity and structure his perception of reality and representation of travel.

<sup>85</sup> Ibid. 153–4.

<sup>86</sup> Recall Joep Leerssen's observation that throughout history, ethnic stereotypes can and do mutate. However, in their mutations, stereotypes tend to oscillate between the confirmation and negation of the same set of features that a stereotype has cemented in the popular imagination. Hence, notions of Jewish helpfulness or loyalty may contain, as a cultural shadow and memory, stereotypical notions of predatory materialism and perfidy. See Leerssen, 'Rhetoric of National Character', esp. 279–80, on the general workings of national stereotypes, as well as the useful compendium by Beller and Leerssen (eds.), *Imagology*.

<sup>87</sup> The role of the religious Other is played in Levshin by the Old Believers. His description of their sects and ways of life in Chernihiv province immediately follows his section on the Jews: see *Pis'ma iz Malorossii*, 154–77.

<sup>88</sup> See e.g. Ivan Snegirev's compendium *Russkie v svoikh poslovitsakh: Rassuzhdeniya i issledovaniya o russkikh poslovitsakh i pogovorkakh*, 4 vols. (Moscow, 1831–4); for his survey of ethnic sayings, see *ibid.* iv. 162–84.

<sup>89</sup> B. Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (London and New York, 1993), 86.

In *Zapiski russkogo puteshestvennika* Glagolev pursues a patriotic task: to travel from Moscow to the West in order to reaffirm his bond to Russia and compare a gallery of other nations with his *otechestvo*.<sup>90</sup> While styled almost as a 'rêtake' of Karamzin's famous model, Glagolev's tour of western Europe is set in motion with his farewell to the Moscow panorama from Poklonnaya Hill, a paean to the phoenix-like city, holy for all Russians: 'a guarantor of our customs and mores, as a living monument of patriotic valour, as a pledge to the holiness of our faith . . . Divine Providence itself protects Moscow with its shield.'<sup>91</sup> This patriotic stance defines the identity of the traveller, his purpose, itinerary, and point of view and the dynamics of self-representation vis-à-vis observed reality. From a vantage point that fuses the visual, virtual (historical), and spiritual (Orthodox) panoramas, Glagolev pre-sets and pre-empts his experience of otherness with a quasi-dialogic address: 'You dreamers, foreign politicians! Do you want to get a taste of the loftiness of such feelings? Then travel to Moscow in your thoughts to the time when she, in danger . . . was the first to put forth her sacrifices.'<sup>92</sup> This peculiar gesture proposes a symbolic exchange: while Glagolev sets out to the West, he invites the collectively imagined authority of the West to experience the ecstasy of Russianness. He shapes his subjectivity as a vessel of collective pathos for Russia, on the one hand, and a collective *ressentiment* towards the West, on the other. These attitudes determine the 'progress' of the traveller from Moscow westward, via Tula, Poltava, Kiev, and Zhytomyr, crossing the boundary into the Habsburg empire's Galicia near Brody.

The axis of the domestic portion of Glagolev's itinerary consolidates the historical continuity of Moscow and the Russian imperial south and the symbolic connection between Moscow and Kiev. As with Levshin, the authenticity and objectivity of the traveller's position and experience are conveyed by descriptions complemented by statistical data, historical references, and quotations. Hence, his personal experience is saturated with virtual reality: these statistical, historical, and cultural references (to specific sources and books or to collective tradition) serve as the main authenticating mechanism of his text and of his construction of the self—perhaps even to a stronger degree than in Levshin. Furthermore, both Levshin's and Glagolev's travel narratives serve to confirm the authority and veracity of their common cultural base. Thus, unlike those of Izmailov and Dolgorukov, the two later travelogues create a peculiar epistemological circle: as Russians, their cultural baggage authenticates their experience, making it 'recognizable' and significant to themselves and their audiences; likewise, their travel experiences serve to validate the shared cultural baggage.

If Levshin's itinerary was determined by his destination (Ukraine perceived as the cradle of the Russian empire and envisioned as its future haven of industry and prosperity), Glagolev's trip is structured as an exploration of the Other in order to

<sup>90</sup> For an overview of Glagolev's life and oeuvre, see *Russkie pisateli, 1800–1917: Biograficheskii slovar'*, i (Moscow, 1989), 570–1.

<sup>91</sup> Glagolev, *Zapiski russkogo puteshestvennika*, i, 3.

<sup>92</sup> *Ibid.* 4.



elevate the position of Russia to a higher rung in the hierarchy of nations and cultures. Along this itinerary, the further he progresses to the West, the more otherness he encounters. This otherness, he professes, is corrosively present within the body of Russian society itself. Thus, when describing the benefits of the Poltava Institute for Noble Ladies, he remarks on the deficiencies of the private education of provincial gentry, both in Russia proper and in Ukraine, entrusted to French teachers who cannot find acclaim in Moscow or St Petersburg owing to their lack of education or their questionable morals: 'From the hands of such mentors, like gold from the hands of Jews, necessarily emerge noble ladies with the true value of their talents diminished, with empty flashes of wit and inconstant lightness of the heart.'<sup>93</sup> This is the first reference to Jews in Glagolev's narrative, before he actually reports on any encounter with them—and they are, not surprisingly, a fixture of stereotyping. Interestingly, 'Jews' in this rendering are linked with another pernicious Other, 'the French': the latter debase the tender souls of provincial noble young ladies much as the former devalue golden coins by deceit (the trope of shaving off gold dust from coins).<sup>94</sup>

This 'introductory' representation of Jews in Glagolev suggests a particular mechanism by which he structures his experience and his literary self, determining not only how he 'sees' the Other, but also where and when. Hence, in Kiev he focuses on the city's holy aspects (Orthodox institutions and historical monuments), emplacing his knowledge of Russian historical narrative onto the observed objects (landscape, monasteries, churches). He partakes in and depicts the celebration of Easter at the Cave Monastery of Kiev; within the framework of his travels, this episode creates the effect of a pilgrimage, a confirmation and pledge of his identity: 'I was most eager to see the triumph of the Orthodox Russian faith where it was born and garnered fame.'<sup>95</sup> Not surprisingly, then, the 'actual' city, the mundane reality of Kiev, with its ethnic diversity (instantly manifested in Izmailov's and Levshin's texts in descriptions of encounters with Jewish street vendors and agents), is not registered by Glagolev, or is bracketed out as distracting from his mission. He must have encountered a Jewish presence—after all, the expulsion of the Jews from Kiev was decreed after his trip, in 1827, and was not actually implemented until 1835.<sup>96</sup>

However, the Jews are registered further along Glagolev's itinerary, as he approaches the Russian boundary with the West and the western frontier within the

<sup>93</sup> Ibid. 69.

<sup>94</sup> See Weisskopf, *Pokryvalo Moiseya*, 152–3, on this stereotype and its connection to perceptions of circumcision, i.e. the connection between Jewish love for money/monetary machinations and deviant religion. In Russian, both circumcision and the shaving of gold are denoted by the same word, *obrezanie*.

<sup>95</sup> Glagolev, *Zapiski russkogo puteshestvennika*, i. 100.

<sup>96</sup> Could Easter timing have had anything to do with this? But then, *all* the mundane/secular aspects of Kiev's reality are omitted in Glagolev. In his perception and description of the city he prefigures the Kiev of Andrey Muravyev's cycle of travelogues—pilgrimages—explorations of the holy places of Russia.

empire. Here, his sequencing of descriptions of places, his chain of spatio-cultural vignettes, connected by an itinerary both real and virtual (a traveller's progress into and amidst the Other), shifts towards the Jews. In Zhytomyr, Glagolev claims to have acquired 'my first idea of the Jews, who for more than two hours tested my patience with their incessant offering of their services and goods'.<sup>97</sup> In Berdychiv, demographically dominated by Jews, Glagolev sees 'a never-ending flea market of Jews [*vechno tolkuchim rynkom Evreev*]', where peculiarly dressed 'dishevelled men' spend all their time at the market square smoking pipes, and the women, 'whether at home or on the street, whether sitting or walking, perpetually knit stockings'.<sup>98</sup> These initial visual impressions of the Other are instantly transferred to the realm of generalizations, which provide Glagolev with ready tools for describing his encounter and interpreting behaviour:

The Jews approach every Russian with noticeable anxiety, measuring him from head to toe with their darting eyes and trying instantly to grasp his character, inclinations, whims, and, most importantly, his financial means. 'Who are you? From where? Where [are you going] and for what purpose?' The knowledge of these commonplaces is a prerequisite . . . for filling his pocket.<sup>99</sup>

Having examined Berdychiv with the help of a Jewish agent-factor, Glagolev decides to return to Zhytomyr, even though the route from Kiev via Berdychiv is the most direct way to the border. This 'route of Jewish operation' and Jewish demographic predominance frightens the traveller 'with the hunger, thirst, and sleepless nights usually encountered in slovenly taverns', so he decides to travel along the governmental postal route, through Kremyanets and Pochayiv.<sup>100</sup> In Pochayiv, he visits the renowned Orthodox monastery, a site of miraculous appearances of the Virgin Mary and of numerous miraculous healings and, after such healings, of conversions of those who benefited: 'Catholics, Lutherans, and even Jews'.<sup>101</sup>

Significantly, Glagolev includes a general descriptive section on the Jews just before he crosses the boundary into Galicia in the Habsburg empire. Within the framework of his travel, Jews represent otherness within the body of the Russian empire and just outside it (in Brody, he sees himself as if in Judaea), thus symbolizing a cultural, indeed civilizational, frontier between the Russian empire and the West. Unlike his travel sections, Glagolev's section on Jews strives towards neutral description and detached classification. He defines them as a middle class (merchants and urban-dwellers) of Russia's western frontier, where elites are Polish, and low classes/peasants, Russian; Glagolev does not differentiate between Ukrainians and Russians. He traces their eastern and western origins, the three main groupings of Russian Jews, outlines some of their religious rites, and lists their population in Russia at more than one million, with more than a thousand *kahals* and 4,481 syn-

<sup>97</sup> Glagolev, *Zapiski russkogo puteshestvennika*, i. 106.

<sup>98</sup> Ibid. 107.

<sup>99</sup> Ibid. 107–8.

<sup>100</sup> Ibid. 110. Once more, in Glagolev it is very noticeable that the writer documents not so much his physical/empirical travel as his movement and progress along his itinerary.

<sup>101</sup> Ibid. 120.

agogues.<sup>102</sup> However, when Glagolev attempts a physiognomic sketch of the Jews, the working of 'the Jews' becomes obvious, as is their placement in the taxonomy of peoples of the Russian empire:

Black hair with long, as if purposely curled locks, and small, incessantly twirling eyes are the last remnants of the eastern physiognomy of the Jews; yet their constitution is skinny, their cheeks pale, and on their narrow foreheads, the traces of misfortunes they have suffered and their dominant passions are visible. What a contrast male Jews are to their women and girls, almost always distinguished by shapely figures and harmonious facial features! Their large eyes are shaded by thick black brows, their nose is Asian, their cheeks fresh and ruddy, their white necks encircled with large necklaces, luxurious bosoms . . . and their theatrical head-dress resembles a diadem recalling their descent from the daughters of Zion.<sup>103</sup>

Here we observe a fusion of salient visual detail (locks) with classificatory generalization (including racial: 'Asian nose'), stereotypes (as if he is able to read the wrinkles on their foreheads), and fantasy (women who combined orientalized languor and biblical features).<sup>104</sup> Glagolev's (conventional) emphasis on Asiatic features exhibits not only an orientaling (objectifying) desire on the part of his Russian subject vis-à-vis the Other, but also his placement of Jews along the lowest axis of the imperial taxonomy of nations and tribes, that of non-Slavonic, non-Christian aliens (*inorodtsy*).<sup>105</sup> Having described elements of Jewish dwellings (with a reference to Asiatic architecture), Glagolev summarizes with a stereotypical classification of an 'idle' people involved in trade (including contraband), who shun 'productive industries' and are constantly on the move in their pursuits. He completes his portraiture with a curious attempt to explain the historical roots of the stereotypical moral deficiencies of Jews and a Russian civilizing mission towards them:

Gold is the main idol of a Jew. He is ready to renounce the law of Moses and bow to the calf if it is made of gold. Moreover, with the name 'Jew' we involuntarily connect the notion of a shrewd mind, secretive nature, and duplicitous heart. These low qualities, without doubt, result from political denigration to which they have been subjected by the common opinion of the nations. However, we may hope that . . . the government's care about the upbringing of their children will, with time, have an impact on the improvement of morals in their communities.<sup>106</sup>

<sup>102</sup> I have not established Glagolev's sources (he does not provide any references in this section). Evdokim Zhablovsky's *Rossiiskaya statistika* (St Petersburg, 1832) lists the number of Jewish inhabitants of the Russian empire as 700,000. I suspect this information was added by Glagolev after his trip, when he worked in the Department of Education in St Petersburg, preparing his travel notes for publication.

<sup>103</sup> Glagolev, *Zapiski russkogo puteshestvennika*, i. 129.

<sup>104</sup> On some of these stereotypes, see Weisskopf, *Pokryvalo Moiseya*, 224, 232. Cf. the sketch 'Pol'skie evrei' cited in n. 11 above. Cf. also the insightful exploration of the orientalizing of the Jews in the European imagination and iconography in I. D. Kalmar, 'Jesus Did Not Wear a Turban: Orientalism, the Jews and Christian Art', in I. D. Kalmar and D. J. Penslar (eds.), *Orientalism and the Jews* (Waltham, Mass., 1995), 3–31.

<sup>105</sup> On this taxonomy, see Kappeler, 'Mazepintsy, Malorossy, Khokhly'.

<sup>106</sup> Glagolev, *Zapiski russkogo puteshestvennika*, i. 132–3.

Glagolev concludes his section on Jews by looping back to stereotypes—perceptions that ‘verify’ his treatment by the alignment of his collective Russian identity (his ‘we’) with the notion of universal knowledge (‘common opinion of the nations’) regarding the Jewish Other. Conversely, his treatment confirms these ‘wisdoms’, and confirms the agency of the Russian government as benevolent and civilizing (i.e. as civilized as any Western nation). In this context, the traveller laying bare the mechanisms of stereotyping is not inclined to submit them to scrutiny (as he does with Western stereotypes vis-à-vis Russia, and is sensitive to such cases!). Even his reference to the involuntary and supranational nature of the stereotypes does not trigger any doubt or reflection (as we saw in Levshin).

Glagolev’s travel narrative incorporates personal experience, rhetorical gestures, information outside his immediate observation, the virtual historical realm, literary clichés, and common stereotypes. The result is a syncretic if not seamless product, where Romantic sensibilities and patriotic zeal determine the structure of both his vision and his itinerary. Interestingly, Glagolev’s general section on Jews, coming shortly after his sketch of Berdychiv, is immediately followed by his description of crossing the boundary and entering the Habsburg empire and the predominantly Jewish towns of Galicia. This entrance is shaped with overt literariness, the inner ironies of which probably eluded Glagolev: ‘Sensitive travellers! If you need to go abroad, don’t go through Radziwiłłów. The cruel Jews will not only prevent your heart from crying, they won’t let you shed even one tear.’ What deep misfortune had befallen Glagolev upon crossing the boundary?, the reader might ask. It seems that, in arranging for a ride to town, he is shocked by the aggressive approach of the Jewish ‘cabbies’ who compete for his business:

As soon as the [customs office] gave the order to let me in, ten Jews attacked my suitcase, like some prey, pulled it in different directions . . . started quarrelling and shoving one another. Finally, they grabbed me, placed me in a covered cart, and asked for a few coins. And now I had fallen into the hands of the Jews! [My] factor Moshka . . . the driver Jew, and a third drunk Jew who sat in for the company—they took me all alone through the forest, over tree stumps, over logs.<sup>107</sup>

The narrator’s expectation of the reader’s sympathy is unintentionally thwarted by the discrepancy between his emotional pathos and the mundane situation he encountered. Moreover, surrounded by Jews, Glagolev perceives himself as a helpless innocent in the hands of cruel henchmen, subconsciously imitating and approximating the crucifixion of Christ! This approximation (certainly not conscious, as it would verge on sacrilege to compare himself in any serious way to Christ) is further confirmed in Glagolev’s general impression of Brody:

It seems to me that I have ended up in Judaea. Jews in the yard, on the porch, and in the corridor. The door to my room is incessantly opening and closing. Some offer items of gold, others pester with their fabrics and textiles, still others bring tobacco and pipes. You refuse,

<sup>107</sup> Glagolev, *Zapiski russkogo puteshestvennika*, i. 134–5.

they don't listen; you get angry, they smile; drive them away, they bow and thank you . . . In a word, only at ten in the evening was I able to regain my senses and freely dream about my travels.<sup>108</sup>

In this telling section, Glagolev's fantasy of his first day outside Russia (already forecast by his progressively more intensive immersion into the otherness epitomized by the Jews, as he moves westward) positions him in an imaginary Judaea, the inverted picture of the Holy Land. This inverted pilgrimage serves to highlight the Orthodox steadfastness and integrity of his identity in the midst of the rampant Other. I would argue that this experience then serves as an intensive antidote to the more sophisticated (and sophisticatedly masked) otherness of the West, which the traveller is set to explore and defy on behalf of his *otechestvo*. This hypothesis is supported by the fact that in his travelogue, Glagolev describes a synagogue (neutrally, as a tourist focusing on architectural and interior details) only when he is in the 'Judaea' of Galician Brody—not 'seeing' any while he is on the territory of the Russian empire (in predominantly Jewish Berdychiv, he describes a Catholic monastery).

In the sections of Glagolev's travelogue analysed above, we see a mechanism of belletrization at work that transforms him into a hero of a virtual and intensified national and Christian text, ordering his perception of self and place, and defining the sequence of his experience of the Other. Once again, I see this as a sign of the Romantic transformation of the genre of the travelogue—when empirical reporting, cultural clichés, journalistic, belletristic, devotional, and quasi-intellectual (ethnographic, culturally descriptive) discourses are combined into a syncretic whole that contains its own breakdown. In other words, the subject of experience and narration, striving for authenticity and self-legitimization, jeopardizes his own authenticity because of his unwillingness or inability to differentiate between individual experience and collective attitudes and by his attempt to sustain an ideological perspective and emotional tenor. Both in personal narrative and the descriptive sections of the work, the infusion of cultural and literary clichés devoid of irony (i.e. the ability to distance and re-evaluate the subject's perspective) undermines the subject's authority.<sup>109</sup>

Glagolev's text, in addition to suggesting the growing anachronism of the old literary genre of the travelogue in the 1830s (resulting in the belletrization of travel narratives while giving way to popular journalistic and guidebook forms), epitomizes a particular trend of Romantic culture in the Russian empire: the process of the fashioning of a literary self by Russian Romantic literati was contingent on the process of defining and shaping a Russian national physiognomy, which itself was predicated on articulations of the Other or Others. The element of national specificity or character (corresponding to 'nationality' in Count Uvarov's triad of autocracy,

<sup>108</sup> Ibid. 136.

<sup>109</sup> On belletrization and irony in Russian travelogues of the 1830s, see Schönle, *Authenticity and Fiction*, 159–202, 208–12.

Orthodoxy, and nationality) became a dominant criterion for evaluating literary works, for both writers and readers. The conscious desire to grasp the physiognomy of Little Russia is evident in Levshin and is subordinated to his exploration of this territory as an authentic source and inalienable complement for Russian identity (history, nationality), despite linguistic and ethnographic differences between Ukrainians and Russians. His examination of the groups of Others (Jews and Old Believers) serves as a foil to his construction of Little Russianness, and his descriptions of these Others are shaped as physiognomic constructs, as attempts at generalized overviews charged with essentializing impulses and dependent on popular stereotypes. In Glagolev, we observed how his immersion into the West with the purpose of affirming Russia's superiority is preceded by deliberately structured encounters with otherness within the body of the Russian empire, epitomized by the Jews. As Glagolev extols the virtues of his *otechestvo* and charts the landmarks of Russianness (Moscow, Poltava, Kiev), he also embarks on an essentializing description of the Jews, shaping their ethno-cultural physiognomy according to their function in his pilgrim's progress: a portal into otherness.

#### CONCLUSION

This examination of early nineteenth-century Russian travelogues about the imperial south has shown these texts to be both reflections of their authors' personal experiences and cultural scripts adopted in the shaping of identity, traversing the natural, social, and ethno-cultural landscape of Ukraine. This terrain served as a portal into the historical and cultural sources of Russianness, and a contact zone with the Other, played, in various configurations, by Jews, Poles, and Ukrainians. The degree of otherness assigned to these groups varies in the five works investigated here and depends on the genre, audience, and cultural agenda of each author. Invariably, though, the travellers' Jewish encounters generated the most sustained discourses of otherness. In the framing/making of the Jewish Other, the travellers fused their personal experiences with stereotypes and tropes of 'common knowledge', which filtered the travellers' perceptions, structured their itineraries, and defined their individual aspirations, collective bonds, and epistemological tenets. Thus, while travelogues report about the life of the Jews in the Pale in the first decades of the nineteenth century and contain some of the earliest literary representations of Jews in Russian letters, they should also be read as an important source of Russian society's perceptions of the Jews, with full awareness of the mechanisms of filtering and stereotyping. The writers' patching together from personal experiences and common stereotypes mirrors the processes in which they designed their literary selves from individual and collective sources, from emotions, external (virtual) cultural sources, reactions, enactments, and poses. The representation of Jews is especially telling in Ivan Dolgorukov, since unlike the other works, his text was conceived as a private document, recording his itinerary through the imperial

south with the greatest specificity and from a position that allowed for a significant degree of freedom in expressing personal opinions. His dependence on common stereotypes when encountering and reporting on Jews not only reveals how stereotypes guided his perception (much more so than in the cases of other Others), but also indicates the intensity of antisemitic sentiment in the private sphere (as some of his language would have most likely been toned down had he prepared his travelogue for publication).

Of the five travelogues, the earliest, Vladimir Izmailov's sentimentalist *Puteshestvie v poludennuyu Rossiyu*, presents the most sympathetic attitude towards Jews. This sympathy suggests not only Izmailov's openness but also his indebtedness to a sentimental culture of subjective feeling, expectation of moral goodness in men, and civilizational optimism.<sup>110</sup> Izmailov's general predisposition towards the south he charts is thoroughly positive, and his depictions of Jews cleave to this track. Yet it is remarkable that he distances himself from local antisemitic attitudes he registers in Kiev. Generally speaking, in pre-Romantic Russian literature, representations of Jews are relatively rare. Before the Romantic desiderata of cultural specificity, local colour, and national physiognomy, fictional representations of ethnicity and ethnic Others did not strive for the degree of ethno-cultural profiling that we encounter in Romantic writings. This profiling—construction of national identities/physiognomies (by contrasting self and Others)—is further expanded through Romantic interest in cultural description and historical narratives where Russians, Cossacks, Poles, Jews, Tatars, and others were commonly essentialized and contrasted. There might be just a decade between Fedor Glinka's tale 'Zinovii Bogdan Khmel'nitskii; ili, Osvobozhdennaya Malorossiia' ('Zinovy Bogdan Khmelnytsky; or, Little Russia Liberated'; 1819) and Petr Golota's sequence of historical novels on Mazepa, Khmelnytsky, and Nalyvaiko (1832–4), yet the authors are culturally worlds apart in shaping their characters, events, and settings: the former operates in a highly stylized and culturally abstract world of heroes with grand gestures and overblown emotions, the latter saturates his world with ethno-cultural specificity (from ethnographic detail to imitations of vernacular and dialect), and moreover shapes his characters so that their national profiles explain and motivate their behaviour (e.g. Polish magnates, Jesuits, Jews, Ukrainians)—hence, building characters on national stereotypes.<sup>111</sup>

<sup>110</sup> A similarly positive attitude towards foreigners and ethnic Others is displayed, for example, in Pavel Sumarokov's *Puteshestvie po vsemu Krymu i Bessarabii v 1799 godu* (Moscow, 1800). He describes positively his encounters with Turks, Germans, Swedes, Tatars, and Karaite Jews (the diversity of inhabitants only adds to his sense of marvel at the expansiveness of the empire). Sumarokov remarks on the Jews ensuring quality trading in Zlatopol (p. 2) and being occupied with various crafts in Uman (p. 237), and neutrally compares the customs of Jews and Karaites (pp. 143–5).

<sup>111</sup> These examples can be extended: Vasyl Narizhny's sympathetic treatment of Jews in *Rossiiskii Zhi'l'blaz* (1814) and *Bursak* (1824) can be contrasted with the intensely stereotypical takes found in Nikolay Gogol, for example in *Taras Bul'ba* (1835), and Faddey Bulgarin, for example in *Ivan Ivanovich Vyzhigin* (1829) and *Mazepa* (1833–4).

Given their preoccupation with issues of national physiognomy, the Russian Romantic literati were especially eager to synthesize and essentialize the qualities of ethno-cultural groups, be they Russians, Ukrainians, Poles, or Jews. We have examined these mechanisms in the travelogues of Levshin and especially Glagolev. A further general observation may be advanced here: with their preoccupation with national physiognomy, writers of the Romantic period tend to use antisemitic clichés more commonly than seems to be the case in Western Romanticism.<sup>112</sup> The growth of official nationalism in the Russian empire (based on Uvarov's triad) as an ideological underpinning of the cultural process further marginalized the Jews on ethno-cultural and religious grounds, sometimes pushing 'otherness' to national enmity. Examination of these literary travelogues provides insights into how the reality of life in the Pale of Settlement in the Russian empire became hijacked by 'common knowledge' of 'the Jews' as used in cultural and ideological constructions of Russianness (contingent upon a complementary repertory of Others), informing the literary representations of Jews throughout the nineteenth century.

<sup>112</sup> See W. Galperin, 'Romanticism and/or Antisemitism', in B. Cheyette (ed.), *Between 'Race' and Culture: Representations of 'the Jew' in English and American Literature* (Stanford, Calif., 1996), 16–26. Russian Romantic writing seems to be less ambivalent, i.e. 'alternately anti- and philosemitic' (p. 20), in its treatment of the Jews, as Mikhail Weisskopf's recent monograph amply demonstrates: Weisskopf, *Pokryvalo Moiseya*.



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# Between Nation and Class

## *Nataliya Kobrynska's Jewish Characters*

AMELIA GLASER

IN AN ISSUE OF the Lviv-based *Literaturno-naukovyi vistnyk* dated 1900, Nataliya Kobrynska published a short story she had written ten years earlier, titled 'Zhydivs'ka dytyna' ('The Jewish Child').<sup>1</sup> Even without the ethnic marker in the title, it would have been clear to any Ukrainian reader that the 11-year-old protagonist, Hinda Rozental, is Jewish. We learn in the first paragraph that the girl's father 'dealt in oxen; he bought cattle from the peasants at the market, then sold them to bigger dealers'.<sup>2</sup> 'Gesheft', Kobrynska writes, inserting the Yiddish word for business, 'ishov dobre' ('went well').<sup>3</sup> The protagonist's family has attained the merchant's dream, having 'built a house in the middle of the small shtetl's marketplace'.<sup>4</sup> Kobrynska's inclusion of Jewish characters in several works of fiction merits further attention, for they help to illustrate a tendency, among Ukrainian socialists, to view inter-ethnic interactions along the lines of class, rather than ethnicity. Kobrynska, writing in the heightened political climate of late-Habsburg Galicia, creates in Hinda a Jewish female character who is, like many of her Ukrainian counterparts, trapped within the rigid boundaries of an ethnically determined professional and economic role in Galicia.

Nataliya Kobrynska (1855–1920), a Galician writer and socialist thinker, is most often remembered for having promoted women's writing and scholarship in Ukrainian. The daughter and young widow of Uniate priests, she moved to Vienna in 1882, where her father, Ivan Ozarkevych, was serving in the parliament. There she became active in the Ukrainian socialist movement, *Sich*, and began publishing her work. Her public involvement in women's issues and Ukrainian national concerns, as well as her own identification with a Ukrainian clerical class, gave Kobrynska a heightened awareness of the nuances of group identity in Galicia at the end of the Habsburg empire. Characters such as Hinda Rozental help us to understand better the benefits and drawbacks of a class-based approach to multi-ethnicity. Kobrynska is, on the one hand, sympathetic to Hinda's entrapment within her merchant class.

<sup>1</sup> N. Kobrynska, 'Zhydivs'ka dytyna', *Literaturno-naukovyi vistnyk*, 9/3 (1900), 4–17. References below are to the edition in N. I. Kobrynska, *Vybrani tvory* (Kiev, 1958). It has been translated as 'The Dealer's Child', in *Warm the Children, O Sun: Selected Prose Fiction*, trans. R. Franko, ed. S. Morris (Saskatoon, 2000).

<sup>2</sup> Kobrynska, 'Zhydivs'ka dytyna', 187; trans. mine.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*; trans. mine.

On the other hand, by creating Jewish characters to model this class-based critique of society, Kobrynska reduces the Jews of Galicia to representatives of class, whereas her Ukrainian characters negotiate a more complex network involving their class, religion, and culture.

Past scholarship on Kobrynska is limited, and treatment of the Jewish themes in her work is particularly sparse. Martha Bohachevsky-Chomiak, one of the few scholars who has addressed the relationship between Ukrainian and Jewish women in Galicia, has observed that Kobrynska 'did not directly address the Jewish issue, primarily because the major problem for the Galicians were the Poles who Polonized the Jews and tried to Polonize Ukrainians'.<sup>5</sup> Kobrynska, however, knew enough Yiddish to insert it into her fiction and often places Jewish characters in her literary landscape. She hired a Jewish secretary, a decision that Bohachevsky-Chomiak suggests may have been a statement of philosemitism aimed at some of Kobrynska's Ukrainian colleagues, and 'at times sheltered Jewish orphans in her home'.<sup>6</sup> Myroslav Shkandrij observes that 'Kobrynska's Jews either speak fluent Ukrainian, or the reader is notified that they speak Yiddish. There is no dialogue marked by accent.'<sup>7</sup> Indeed, although Kobrynska tends to assign her Jewish characters stereotypically exploitative roles in their local Galician economies, she also shows a degree of sensitivity towards Jewish subjects that is not often present in earlier Ukrainian literature. It is this sensitivity that makes her an ideal case study for understanding the changing perception of Jews within a multi-ethnic milieu.

#### A MERCHANT CHILD IN MULTI-ETHNIC GALICIA

In 'Zhydivs'ka dytyna', Kobrynska's character develops merchant sensibilities via nurture rather than nature. Nonetheless, Hinda has learned her capitalist instinct from both sides of her family. When Hinda's father 'went to buy cattle from the peasants, [Hinda's mother] bought chickens, geese, and eggs from their wives, and sold them to the townspeople'.<sup>8</sup> Hinda, the best in her class at school, is an equally astute student of her parents' mode of survival. She jealously saves up the *kreitsary* (Austrian kreuzer coins) her father occasionally gives her. When, tormented by desire, she purchases a basket of candied berries, she is scarred by their eventual decomposition: the proverbial miser, she does not eat the fruit, but watches it slowly rot in its hiding place, a process that 'tore her soul'.<sup>9</sup> Her inability to accept this inevitable decomposition of capital is Hinda's tragic flaw: a Jewish dealer, the reader is moved to conclude, understands an object's price, but not its value. Grieving for her lost fruit, Hinda amasses more wealth by precociously entering the *shmate-*

<sup>5</sup> M. Bohachevsky-Chomiak, 'Jewish and Ukrainian Women: A Double Minority', in P. J. Potichnyj and H. Aster (eds.), *Ukrainian-Jewish Relations in Historical Perspective*, 2nd edn. (Edmonton, 1990), 363.

<sup>6</sup> Ibid.

<sup>7</sup> M. Shkandrij, *Jews in Ukrainian Literature: Representation and Identity* (New Haven, 2009), 69.

<sup>8</sup> Kobrynska, 'Zhydivs'ka dytyna', 187; trans., 'The Dealer's Child', 42.

<sup>9</sup> Kobrynska, 'Zhydivs'ka dytyna', 188; trans. mine.

trade, buying up a lot of 'old hairpins, combs, worn gloves, dirty lace, wrinkled flowers, and the like'.<sup>10</sup> She resells these to her friends, and her mother encourages her efforts. Her mother's 'heart trembled with joy when she heard how wisely Hinda praised the goods, and how well she bargained'.<sup>11</sup> When Hinda needs a new hat for the sabbath, her mother tells her to 'Buy one for yourself whenever you want; you have your own money'.<sup>12</sup>

In Hinda, Kobrynska offers a portrait of what might be called in Yiddish a young *mark-yidene* (market-Jewess). In traditional Jewish society, it was often the woman who took care of the family's financial welfare by tending a shop or stand, while her husband studied Torah. The poorest women would trade produce or sundries in the open marketplace.<sup>13</sup> It was the Jewish woman who came into frequent contact through trade with non-Jewish women. As a vendor or merchant, she clearly occupied the world of trade, rather than the traditional Jewish world of Torah and prayer. Moreover, whereas Jewish men were marked by their clothing, and spent much of their time in prayer, Jewish women, to the Ukrainian observer, more closely approximated Ukrainian women. Kobrynska's concern for the social role of women in the region may be what led her to concentrate on Jewish women's unique place within Galician society. Moreover, Jewish and Ukrainian women had the potential of forming friendships and alliances, meeting as they did in marketplaces and often speaking each other's languages.<sup>14</sup> Kobrynska's Jewish characters, and especially Jewish women, suggest the beginning of an approach to the relationship between Ukrainians and Jews that highlights economic and political circumstance over religious and cultural stereotypes. However, Kobrynska's focus on the Jewish woman as dealer also makes it easier to focus on class, rather than on the broader aspects of religion and culture particular to the Jews of Galicia. The focus on class was also a growing trend among Galician thinkers, and was inextricably bound up in Ukrainian national identity in Habsburg Galicia.

The historical events that gave rise to eastern Galicia's identity politics in the 1880s and 1890s involved a century of changes. Although a detailed discussion of

<sup>10</sup> Ibid. 190; trans., 'The Dealer's Child', 45.

<sup>11</sup> Kobrynska, 'Zhydivs'ka dytyna', 190; trans., 'The Dealer's Child', 45.

<sup>12</sup> Kobrynska, 'Zhydivs'ka dytyna', 191; trans. mine.

<sup>13</sup> This division of gender roles came under increasing critique in the late tsarist empire. In an article dated 1909, the literary critic Sara Rabinovich wrote: 'So as better to free the Jew from material cares, traditional Judaism, more often and wilfully than not, called upon women for the practice of trade . . . for the wife concern for material good lay at the bazaar, for the husband—service to material good was in the Torah': S. Rabinovich, 'Zhizn' torgovykh i trudyashchikhsya klassov v izobrazhenii Peretsa', *Evreiskii mir*, May 1909, pp. 69–79, and June 1909, pp. 49–59; quotation at p. 51. I have discussed the *mark-yidene*, and have cited Sara Rabinovich's article, elsewhere: A. Glaser, 'The Merchant at the Threshold: Rashel Khin, Osip Mandelstam, and the Poetics of Apostasy', in S. E. Jelen, M. P. Kramer, and L. S. Lerner (eds.), *Modern Jewish Literatures: Intersections and Boundaries* (Philadelphia, 2010), 69.

<sup>14</sup> As Martha Bohachevsky-Chomiak has commented, 'Jewish and Ukrainian women frequently came into individual contact with one another, but neither group looked at the relationship in any systematic fashion': Bohachevsky-Chomiak, 'Jewish and Ukrainian Women', 357.

the uprisings of the early and mid-nineteenth century is beyond the purview of this chapter, let us recall that Galicia, the region that now lies between what is now central Ukraine, Poland, and Hungary, was not only extraordinarily diverse, but also experienced a series of complex geopolitical changes after its annexation by the Habsburg empire in 1772.<sup>15</sup> For the next hundred years, Poles, Ukrainians, and Jews, among other groups, of varying religious, cultural, and professional sensibilities attempted to position their own identities within the kingdom. These were the years that saw the Napoleonic wars and the Polish uprisings of 1846 and 1848.<sup>16</sup> As Leila Everett notes, 'In addition to the severe economic problems plaguing the province, Galicia was torn by a series of national conflicts which involved the three major ethnic groups inhabiting the area—the Poles, Ukrainians and the Jews—comprising respectively, 46 percent, 41 percent and 11 percent of the total population.'<sup>17</sup> The emperor's relationship to his subjects varied with the shifting political climate; he sometimes gave freedoms with one hand and took them away with the other. In the late nineteenth century, Franz Joseph von Habsburg pushed for a limited democracy in Galicia that would cut across social groups. Timothy Snyder has called the emperor's attempt to maintain a multi-ethnic empire a 'great and unprecedented experiment'.<sup>18</sup> This meant, among other things, that, to use Paul Magocsi's words, 'One could be simultaneously a Ukrainian patriot and a loyal Habsburg subject. The combination turned out to be mutually advantageous.'<sup>19</sup> The Habsburgs' institutionalization of national pluralism included support of national minorities and the increased movement towards fostering a limited democracy. This democratization meant that the ethnic and economic demographics of the region had clear political consequences. The Jews, who were, for much of this period, restricted from owning land, had effectively provided a middle class within the nineteenth-century Galician economy.<sup>20</sup> The more acculturated Galician Jews initially identified with the imperial power, speak-

<sup>15</sup> The annexation doubled the Jewish population of the Habsburg empire. William McCagg writes: 'In the Bohemian Lands in the 1780s there were about 70,000 Jews and in Hungary about 80,000, but in Galicia just after the occupation the Austrian authorities actually registered 171,851, and in 1785 they counted 215,447. According to modern estimates, the Jews probably comprised about 9 per cent of the population in the new kingdom as a whole': W. O. McCagg Jr, *A History of Habsburg Jews, 1670–1918* (Bloomington, Ind., 1989), 27.

<sup>16</sup> For a good overview of the effects of the 1848 laws and subsequent Polish rebellions, and the effects on Galicia's Jews, see *ibid.* 120–2, and Y. Hrytsak, 'Historical Memory and Regional Identity among Galicia's Ukrainians', in C. Hann and P. R. Magocsi (eds.), *Galicia: A Multicultural Land* (Toronto, 2005), 193.

<sup>17</sup> L. P. Everett, 'The Rise of Jewish National Politics in Galicia, 1905–1907', in A. S. Markovits and F. E. Sysyn (eds.), *Nationbuilding and the Politics of Nationalism: Essays on Austrian Galicia* (Cambridge, Mass, 1982), 149.

<sup>18</sup> T. Snyder, *The Red Prince: The Secret Lives of a Habsburg Archduke* (New York, 2008), 22.

<sup>19</sup> P. R. Magocsi, *The Roots of Ukrainian Nationalism: Galicia as Ukraine's Piedmont* (Toronto, 2002), 82.

<sup>20</sup> According to Leila Everett, 'Economically [Jews in Galicia] still performed the traditional role of the middle class in a backward agrarian economy. Some Jews were also employed in age-old administrative tasks, representing the interests of the Polish landlord vis-à-vis Ruthenian or Polish peasants': Everett, 'Rise of Jewish National Politics in Galicia', 154.

ing and writing in German. This changed when power was given to the Poles. The subsequent increase in Jews' use of the Polish language was an important benefit to the Polish Galicians, who, in claiming Jews as Polish-speakers, were now able to claim a political majority.<sup>21</sup>

In the late nineteenth century, Jews and Ukrainians shared the experience of imperial subjugation, having both lived long as subjects of larger empires.<sup>22</sup> Not unlike the identity of assimilated Jews, whose cultural allegiances tended to reflect the state or empire in which they resided, Ukrainian national identity in the late nineteenth century could have gone in a number of directions. As Yaroslav Hrytsak reminds us, Galician Ukrainians could have justified identifying themselves as Ruthenians or as Galician–Volhynian Ukrainians, or they could have aligned themselves with other Ukrainians across the Russian–Habsburg border, with Russians (based on the old Slavophilic tradition), and in some cases even with Poles.<sup>23</sup> The distinction between nation and class was, among late nineteenth-century Galician Ukrainians, somewhat murky. As John–Paul Himka has shown, the national movement became popular in the countryside only in the last third of the nineteenth century, whereas before the 1860s ‘the peasantry was engaged in a socio-economic struggle that only briefly and tenuously acquired a national character’.<sup>24</sup> Moreover, other national groups were easily conflated with class: ‘To an East European peasant, the word Jew was almost synonymous with the word shopkeeper.’<sup>25</sup> To illustrate the overlap between Jews and shopkeepers in the minds of their non-Jewish neighbours, Himka offers the example of a woman in Hungary who instructed her son, ‘Pista, go to the Jew; not to the Jew who is a Jew, but to the new shop.’<sup>26</sup> When

<sup>21</sup> According to McCagg, ‘Indeed, because the vast majority of the Galician Jews at census time now reported their language as Polish, the Poles were indebted to them for their statistical 58 per cent of the crownland population’: McCagg, *History of Habsburg Jews*, 183.

<sup>22</sup> As Jaroslav Pelensky notes, ‘In the Jewish case, as in the Ukrainian, the problems of historical consciousness and national ideology have played an extremely important role, because for extended periods of time both peoples did not inhabit national states of their own, but lived as extraterritorial or intraterritorial populaces within the frameworks of other states or empires’: J. Pelensky, ‘The Cossack Insurrections in Jewish–Ukrainian Relations’, in Potichnyj and Aster (eds.), *Ukrainian–Jewish Relations in Historical Perspective*, 31.

<sup>23</sup> According to Hrytsak, ‘The national question in Galicia evolved as a by-product of Austrian–Polish rivalry’: Hrytsak, ‘Historical Memory and Regional Identity among Galicia’s Ukrainians’, 191, 193. Knysh, in her biography of Kobrynska, discusses the importance of these multiple trends on Kobrynska’s political activities: I. Knysh, *Smoloskyp u temryavi: Nataliya Kobrynska i ukrayins’kyi zhinochyi rukh* (Winnipeg, 1957), 38.

<sup>24</sup> J.–P. Himka, *Galician Villagers and the Ukrainian National Movement in the Nineteenth Century* (Basingstoke, 1988), 204.

<sup>25</sup> J.–P. Himka, ‘Ukrainian–Jewish Antagonism in the Galician Countryside during the Late Nineteenth Century’, in Potichnyj and Aster (eds.), *Ukrainian–Jewish Relations in Historical Perspective*, 131. Himka goes on to write: ‘The economic antagonism between Jews and Ukrainians had its roots deep in the feudal era, when Ukrainians were, broadly speaking, serfs, and Jews were representatives of merchants’ and usurers’ capital as well as middlemen between noble and peasant’: *ibid.* 148.

<sup>26</sup> *Ibid.* 131–2.

approaching literary representations of 'nation' and 'class' in late Habsburg Galicia, it is important to bear in mind the fluidity of these concepts as categories in the popular imagination. Ukrainian socialist intellectuals combined and exchanged these categories as befitted their own purposes in their critique of the social structure in Galicia.

The variety of Ukrainian nationalism that Kobrynska came to embrace was a Ukrainian populist socialism under the leadership of the Geneva-based exiled political theorist Mykhailo Drahomanov (1841–95). The socialists' concern about class undoubtedly removed an element of religious anti-Judaism from the Ukrainians' conversation about Jews. However, perceived economic competition had been a deeply ingrained element of Ukrainian–Jewish antagonism since the early feudal period, a time when Ukrainian peasants worked Polish nobles' land and Jews often served as middlemen between the two, whether as bankers or as merchants.<sup>27</sup> The socialists' shift from a religion- or ethnicity-based approach to Jewish–Ukrainian relations to a class-based one inevitably built upon old stereotypes of the Jewish middleman. Because the Ukrainian national revival that took place in the late nineteenth century developed largely in opposition to Polish culture, Ukrainian writers, moreover, often linked Jews unfavourably to Poles, particularly in the initial stages of the movement, which developed in the early 1870s. Moshe Mishkinsky, writing of the transformation among Ukrainian socialists from viewing Jews as exploiters to seeking solidarity with them, demonstrates that in a series of propaganda pamphlets distributed in the 1870s in Vienna, Ukrainian socialists targeted Jews and Polish landlords.<sup>28</sup> In Mishkinsky's formulation,

The Ukrainian socialists' version of the structure of the Ukrainian people was that it was fundamentally classless. On that basis the relationship with the environment was conceived mainly within the framework of the agrarian relationship between the exploited working Ukrainian people and its exploiters. Accordingly, economic exploitation and national oppression almost paralleled each other. That outlook also nourished the view of the Jews as an exploiting people on the other side of the fence.<sup>29</sup>

There was, of course, significant disparity among different Ukrainian intellectuals' writings about Jews. Moreover, as Mishkinsky has shown, by the 1880s there was already far greater subtlety in portrayals of Jews within Ukrainian propaganda than there had previously been. Drahomanov, who, as Myroslav Shkandrij has put it,

<sup>27</sup> Himka, 'Ukrainian–Jewish Antagonism', 148.

<sup>28</sup> One such pamphlet from 1875, a Ukrainian rendition of Vasily Varzar's Russian-language *Khitraya mekhanika* ('Astute Mechanism'), a diatribe against various enemies of the people, adds Jews to the list only in the Ukrainian translation. 'Here the word "Jews" was written in a way that implied that they represented a class of their own': M. Mishkinsky, 'The Attitudes of the Ukrainian Socialists to Jewish Problems in the 1870s', in Potichnyj and Aster (eds.), *Ukrainian–Jewish Relations in Historical Perspective*, 60.

<sup>29</sup> *Ibid.* 66. Mishkinsky suggests that Russian Bakuninist populism may have been partially responsible for spreading the concept of 'Jewish exploitation': *ibid.*

tended to view Jews as 'part of the capitalist system that exploited the masses', nonetheless argued insistently that the Jews should be granted civil rights and the status of a national group.<sup>30</sup>

George Grabowicz has described a similar shift in Ukrainian literary depictions of Jews, from the generally negative 'stereotypical' mode of the early nineteenth century to a far more positive 'realistic' mode by the early twentieth century. In this later phase, 'the Jew is an object of interest in his own right', be it positive or negative.<sup>31</sup> An increased attention, among socialists, to class in this later phase clearly contributed to more positive literary depictions. Rather than opting for hyperbolic images of Jews as ethnic and religious types, writers were beginning to portray empathetic Jewish characters that are simply trapped in an unhealthy economic network. Notwithstanding increasingly sympathetic portrayals of Jews among Ukrainian intellectuals, the socialists' view of Ukrainians as classless peasants and Jews as representatives of a merchant class established Jews as unwitting perpetrators of an unequal social system. At best, if given equal rights as a nation, Jews might have hope of changing.<sup>32</sup> Thus, the literature that appeared at this time must be read with an eye both to the progressive intentions of the socialists and to the oversights inherent in categorizing Jews as a class.

The most influential Ukrainian Galician writer at the time was Ivan Franko (1856–1916), whose political activism combined socialism with a radical Ukrainian nationalism. Franko's criticism of the Jewish role in Galicia's economy has remained an enigma to scholars. On the one hand, he spoke eloquently against antisemitism, particularly in his article 'Semityzm i antysemityzm w Galicji' (1887).<sup>33</sup> According to Hrytsak, 'The main reason for the mass pogroms appeared to Franko to be economic motives surrounding the "demoralizing superiority of Jewish capital and exploitation".'<sup>34</sup> On the other hand, Jews, whether portrayed sympathetically or negatively, clearly represent a problematic class structure within Franko's literary landscape. This is especially apparent in works such as his novella *Boa Constrictor* (1878), in which the main character, Herman Goldkramer, is a Jew who has grown from an impoverished child into a heartless oil baron. The Jews who appear on the

<sup>30</sup> Shkandrij, *Jews in Ukrainian Literature*, 51; see also Mishkinsky, 'Attitudes of the Ukrainian Socialists to Jewish Problems', 66.

<sup>31</sup> It is worth noting that Kobrynska's fiction is not yet fully part of a Soviet-identified class-conscious ideology (or, as Grabowicz has called it, the 'political-ethical' phase in Ukrainian portrayals of Jews): G. Grabowicz, 'The Jewish Theme in Nineteenth- and Early Twentieth-Century Ukrainian Literature', in Potichnyj and Aster (eds.), *Ukrainian-Jewish Relations in Historical Perspective*, 329, 334.

<sup>32</sup> As Mishkinsky puts it, in the 1870s, 'The visual field of the Ukrainian socialists . . . excluded obvious elements of the social scene such as the national and civil oppression of the Jews, class distinctions among them, Jewish poverty . . . and the Jews' rights to exist as a group with a religious-ethnic identity of its own.' He notes, however, that by the late 1870s, this view was changing. Mishkinsky, 'Attitudes of the Ukrainian Socialists to Jewish Problems', 68.

<sup>33</sup> For a thorough discussion of Franko's treatment of Jews, and an examination of past research on the topic, see Ya. Hrytsak, *Prorok u svoji vitchyzni: Franko ta ioho spil'nota, 1856–1886* (Kiev, 2006), 337–63.

<sup>34</sup> *Ibid.* 352.

margins of Franko's stories exist as part of his social landscape of Galicia, often serving only to remind the reader of a class structure that alienates the Ukrainian peasant. For example, in his 'Dobryi zarobok' ('Good Earnings'; 1881), Franko describes a Ukrainian peasant who, despite his attempts to feed his family by crafting and selling wooden brooms, is forced to part with more money than he has in order to pay his taxes. The state is the cause of the peasant's troubles. However, the first customer mentioned in the story is a Jewish woman (*zhydivka*), who skilfully bargains him down. Later, arriving in the provincial centre together with his wife and one hundred freshly crafted brooms, the peasant is ridiculed by the town's Jews:

When we arrive in town, all the Jews stare at us in surprise. They had never seen someone carrying such enormous bundles before. 'Listen, mister', they laugh after us, 'where did you sell your horses, that you have to carry your own sticks?' 'Mister, mister', shout others, 'who did you buy a whole birch forest from? Or did you and the old lady bring a whole forest to sell in town? How much do you want for a birch forest?'<sup>35</sup>

Selling comes naturally to Franko's Jews, who assume that if a peasant is on foot, he must have sold his horses, and if he is carrying so much wood, he must be selling a forest. Disregarding, for a moment, the expected caricature of the Jewish merchant, we must note that through the Jews' offer to buy a birch forest, Franko is subtly calling attention to the Jews' actual inability to buy a parcel of land. In this taunting exchange, the author draws attention to both the buyer's and the seller's inability actually to control a parcel of Galician land or pursue a livelihood.<sup>36</sup> The Jews' enjoyment of the peasant's awkwardness prefigures the latter's failure to satisfy the state by paying his taxes. These marginal Jewish characters are not responsible for the main character's downfall. However, Franko's Jewish characters, as proverbial marketplace creatures, point to the economic hopelessness of the Ukrainian peasant. Franko often portrays antisemitic Ukrainian characters, but their prejudices are almost always based on economic circumstances. For these Galician Ukrainian characters, Jews represent not an ethnic group but a class. While this kind of portrayal may have weakened old arguments for religious anti-Judaism, the perception of Jews as a distinctly economic threat created a material justification for antisemitism that did little to bridge the gap between Jews and Ukrainians.

### KOBYRNSKA'S JEWS: FROM CARICATURES TO CHARACTERS

Franko exerted an important influence on Kobrynska, and she shared his concern for the political and economic welfare of Galician Ukrainians. In her representations of Jews, however, we see a departure from Franko's social landscape, and this is particularly evident in her depictions of Jewish women. Rather than portraying Jewish characters as standard exemplars of a dysfunctional economic system,

<sup>35</sup> 'Dobryi zarobok', in I. Franko, *Zibrannya tvoriv*, xv, ed. P. I. Kolesnyk (Kiev, 1978), 233.

<sup>36</sup> Pelensky, 'Cossack Insurrections in Jewish-Ukrainian Relations', 31.



Kobrynska offers Jewish characters who are clearly struggling to stay afloat, and with whom their Ukrainian counterparts might strike an alliance, if only circumstances were different. In her story 'Yanova' (1884), for example, an elderly, illiterate Ukrainian peasant attempts to visit her son. A Jewish woman points her to the correct train, but the two are parted in the crowd. The Ukrainian woman recounts the situation: 'I was so overcome with worry that I didn't hear the train arrive; if it hadn't been for my Jewish woman, I would have been left behind. I wanted to travel with her, but the man who was telling people where to sit wouldn't hear of it; he packed me off in one direction, and the Jewess in another.'<sup>37</sup> In this scene, Kobrynska exposes the artificial divisions that hamper potential economic and political alliances between ethnic groups. Had the conductor not separated the two strangers, Yanova would not have subsequently disembarked at the wrong station, been robbed of her ticket, and wandered, hungry and confused, through an unfamiliar town at night. However, this fictional scene, though fleeting in the context of the story, suggests a lost opportunity for a relationship between Ukrainian and Jewish women in Habsburg Galicia. The scene mirrors a popular belief among Ukrainian socialists in the 1880s: Ukrainians and Jews find themselves at odds not because of innate beliefs or deeply ingrained cultural differences, but because of their differences in class.

Kobrynska's portrayal of Jews as unwitting products of their economic and social circumstances exemplifies her attempt to sort out the relationships among nation, class, and gender. For this reason she is generally considered to be more sympathetic to Jews than some of her contemporaries. Myroslav Shkandrij remarks of Kobrynska's novella *Yadzya i Katrusya* ('Yadzya and Katrusya'; 1890), 'all ethnic-national descriptions are neutral . . . A Jewish foreman and a Jewish orendar who lends out seed grain at a high interest rate are mentioned, but this is done in a tone that accepts tension in any business or employer-labor interaction.'<sup>38</sup> Indeed, Kobrynska's Jewish characters may be merely unwitting representatives of an exploitative class. However, they have little interest in giving up their economic practices in favour of political solidarity.

Let us note that Kobrynska is concerned with class when writing about Ukrainian, as well as Jewish, characters. In *Zadlya kusnyka khliba* ('For a Crust of Bread'; 1884), a novella Franko would later praise as Kobrynska's best,<sup>39</sup> she describes a clerical family who, destitute after the death of the breadwinning father, is no longer supported by its former creditors. Among other degradations, the family is forced to sell its horse to Abramko, a Jew. "May God strike you down!" old Anna muttered. "To give only fifty *levy* for such a horse! The deceased would not have parted

<sup>37</sup> Kobrynska, 'Yanova', in *Vybrani tvory*, 95; translation from 'Yanova', in *The Spirit of the Times: Selected Prose Fiction*, trans. R. Franko, ed. S. Morris (Saskatoon, 1998), 275.

<sup>38</sup> Shkandrij, *Jews in Ukrainian Literature*, 69.

<sup>39</sup> Franko made this assertion in 1910. Olena Kysilevska, in 1930, would call this a founding text in Ukrainian women's understanding of women's rights: Knysh, *Smoloskyp u temryavi*, 35.

with it for even a hundred *levy*. The cursed Jews would suck out all the Christian blood—to the very last drop!’<sup>40</sup> Although Anna’s outrage may be antisemitic, her prejudices are based on economic circumstance. The curses she utters against the Jew give the reader evidence of strict social dividing lines that can harm any group. Anna’s daughter Halya is subsequently humiliated by a series of broken engagements. She comes to understand her own social entrapment intimately, and recognizes it when, upon observing a group of peasant girls, she ‘felt a pang of regret that her mother had not dressed her like a peasant girl, that she had not sent her to dances and to work in the fields . . . She would not have known the deceptions of lords, who know more about counting money than about love.’<sup>41</sup> Later, however, upon witnessing a peasant abusing his wife, ‘Shivers ran up and down poor Halya’s spine, and all her thoughts about the better fate of village women turned into fear and loathing.’<sup>42</sup> Desperate over her grim prospects for the future, Halya chooses suicide over marrying Antin, a teacher whose lack of means would put an end to her deeply ingrained upper-class aspirations: ‘Marrying a teacher would mean lowering her status; more importantly, it would mean never improving her financial position and abandoning everything to which she had grown accustomed—everything that made her happy.’<sup>43</sup>

Not unlike Halya, who sees her mother’s desperation, and realizes she is trapped within a Ukrainian clerical class, Hinda in ‘Zhydivs’ka dytyna’ develops her capitalist sensibilities in response to her mother’s trade practices. Hinda’s mother saves money by dressing her children in worn-out clothing ‘until she managed to buy some used clothing from the lords in town’.<sup>44</sup> Hinda’s mother, it would appear, is the perfect exploiter of social barriers, taking advantage of the peasants’ lack of mobility to make a profit on their wares by selling them to, presumably, other Jews. By showing the perpetuation of class from parent to child, Kobrynska effectively likens the inheritance of class allegiance to the inheritance of national allegiance. Written in Ukrainian, ‘Zhydivs’ka dytyna’, like *Zadlya kusnyka khliba*, targeted educated Ukrainian women who were already prepared to believe in a Jewish female propensity towards trade, and thus were ripe to condemn what appears to be a capitalist world view bereft of true group solidarity. The young Jewish merchant, then, can be read as a foil against which the educated Ukrainian woman might create her own socialist voice. The story, a warning against the foolishness of a clever salesperson, describes what the reader may assume to be a class of unhappy dealers, urged on less by necessity than by narrow horizons defined by bargaining and moneymaking.

The story’s denouement consists of Hinda’s trip to a neighbouring town, where she settles for a ‘white hat with red poppies, because it looked nice and was the least

<sup>40</sup> Kobrynska, *Zadlya kusnyka khliba*, in *Vybrani tvory*, 47; translation from ‘For a Crust of Bread’, in *For a Crust of Bread: Selected Prose Fiction*, trans. R. Franko, ed. S. Morris (Saskatoon, 2000), 38.

<sup>41</sup> Kobrynska, *Zadlya kusnyka khliba*, 65; trans., ‘For a Crust of Bread’, 58.

<sup>42</sup> Kobrynska, *Zadlya kusnyka khliba*, 65; trans., ‘For a Crust of Bread’, 58–9.

<sup>43</sup> Kobrynska, *Zadlya kusnyka khliba*, 57–8; trans., ‘For a Crust of Bread’, 50.

<sup>44</sup> Kobrynska, ‘Zhydivs’ka dytyna’, 187; trans., ‘The Dealer’s Child’, 42.

expensive'.<sup>45</sup> She must part with more of her hard-earned money for a ride back to her shtetl, but when Hinda is home and dons her new hat, she makes a stunning impression. The story ends when, having attracted the attention of a rich woman, the hard-earned hat is sold for a net profit of five *kreitsary*, half the price of the long-lost fruit basket. Hinda must suppress her girlish desire for beauty and taste (as seen in the candied fruit and fruit-adorned hat) in order to continue in her quest for wealth. The aesthetic (a pretty hat) and even the spiritual (adorning oneself on the sabbath) give way to the relentless greed that, Kobrynska suggests, controls Hinda's merchant class. Dressing in ragged clothing and giving up her carefully purchased hat, she appears to waste her education and good taste on a compulsion to travel from town to town, buying and reselling, even at the tender age of 11. Hinda everywhere reflects her social class and chosen profession. Notably, Kobrynska does not look down on Judaism or Jewish culture as such. Rather, her criticism calls attention to the emptiness of economic gain as an end in itself, a danger to which anyone might succumb, but to which Hinda, with her merchant upbringing, is particularly susceptible. Hinda's story can be read as a warning against the pitfalls of the accumulation of wealth. Indeed, in later editions, the title was changed from 'Zhydivs'ka dytyna' ('The Jewish Child') to 'Kupets'ka dytyna' ('The Merchant's Child'). Nevertheless, by removing all traces of Jewish culture and replacing them with class, Kobrynska allows merchants as a class to stand in for the Jews as a whole.

For the most part, Kobrynska's Jewish characters, like those in Franko's fiction, are reflections of a flawed system. Whereas Jews play key roles as merchants in these stories, Jewish cultural or religious themes are usually no more than incidental. A notable exception is found in the inclusion of two folk songs, cited in a heavily Germanized Yiddish, sung by a fellow passenger on Hinda's return trip to her shtetl at the end of 'Zhydivs'ka dytyna'. One of the songs tells of a non-Jewish peasant who enters a tavern: 'Es kimt ein Bauer in's Wirthaus aran . . . Schafit sich dort a Glesele Wein' ('A gentile comes into a tavern . . . he drinks down a glass of wine'), and bears the refrain 'Oy, oy, oy! Shiker ist a Goy' ('Oy, oy, oy! A gentile is a drunk').<sup>46</sup> The song adds an element of authentic Jewish flavour to Kobrynska's story, but the choice of song fits her message: Jews, who view Ukrainians as drunken patrons of the (presumably Jewish) tavern, have no immediate incentive to bridge the social gap separating the two groups. Hinda may be a more sympathetic character than most of the Jews who appear in Ukrainian literature at the time. Nonetheless, the story, together with these fragments from Jewish folklore, suggests that the Jews of Galicia have no incentive to give up their economic interests in favour of political solidarity.

Kobrynska's 'Vyborets'' ('The Elector'), a story dedicated to Ivan Franko (and containing one of Franko's most important themes—the frustrations involved in

<sup>45</sup> Kobrynska, 'Zhydivs'ka dytyna', 192; trans., 'The Dealer's Child', 48.

<sup>46</sup> Kobrynska, 'Zhydivs'ka dytyna', 196; trans., 'The Dealer's Child', 48. Note that Kobrynska's version is a highly Germanized rendition of the Yiddish folk song. The lines should read, 'Geyt a goy in shenkl arayn, in shenkl arayn . . . trinkt er dort a gut glezl vayn . . . Oy, shiker iz a goy.'

establishing Ukrainian representation), appeared in 1889, a crucial year of victory for the Ukrainians of Galicia, who gained parliamentary representation then.<sup>47</sup> A rural priest and neighbouring peasants lobby Yakym, a peasant chosen to be an elector, to cast his vote for the Ukrainian candidate, while the town's chief offers money in exchange for a vote for the Polish candidate. The peasant initially sees little distinction between the two candidates, both of whom are lords, and therefore must represent the same social interests. In a conversation with his wife, Yakym attempts to convey his new-found understanding of representation and identity:

'Outsiders have ruled over us and taken advantage of us long enough! We need our own man now!'

'But you said he's a lord of some kind!'

'It doesn't matter that he's a lord if he's a good Ukrainian.'

'Do you mean to say that a lord can be Ukrainian?' Yakymykhya asked with great interest.

'What a thing to say! If he couldn't be, he wouldn't be.'

Yakymykhya shrugged her shoulders. Yakym had not succeeded in explaining it to her, and he barely understood it himself. But at least his mind could not be compared to that of a woman.<sup>48</sup>

Yakym may be unprepared to answer his wife's questions about the relationship of class to national identity, but he successfully steps across class lines to embrace his nation, which he does in a heroic refusal of the chief's bribe. Kobrynska's Jews, however, are more interested in wealth than in social progress. After the momentous election of a Ukrainian representative, 'The Jews, as if they were losing their minds from happiness, began shouting: "Hurrah!" Among them, the electors could spot those who had only recently been chasing after them from the [Polish] lord from Kivkovets, inviting them to eat their head-cheese and sausage.'<sup>49</sup> Class can be transcended in favour of national solidarity, but the Jews, lacking a place in the national future of Galicia, are still defined by their class interests. Politically disenfranchised as a nation, the Jews in this story will cast their lots with the winning party.

## CONCLUSION

Although the portrayal of Jews as turncoats bears an unsettling resemblance to later Soviet accusations that Jews were 'rootless cosmopolitans', it is important to recognize that in 1889 Kobrynska is allowing for a future in which Jews might be per-

<sup>47</sup> Timothy Snyder writes: 'After the Ukrainian representation in the Austrian Reichsrat (parliament) dropped from seventeen to three after the 1879 elections, much of the Greek Catholic elite saw the sense of reaching out to the peasantry. Some of them drew the further conclusion that the local vernacular, the Ukrainian language, was the best means to this end. In 1889, electoral success demonstrated the political utility of the Ukrainian language': T. Snyder, *The Reconstruction of Nations: Poland, Ukraine, Lithuania, Belarus, 1569-1999* (New Haven, 2003), 124.

<sup>48</sup> Kobrynska, 'Vyborets', in *Vybrani tvory*, 113; translation from 'The Elector', in *Spirit of the Times*, trans. Franko, ed. Morris, 295.

<sup>49</sup> Kobrynska, 'Vyborets', 123; trans., 'The Elector', 306.

suaded to support the Ukrainian cause. The belief in the possibility of an alliance was one of the positive aspects of the growing tendency to represent Jews as a class, rather than as a nation apart. Increasing numbers of Jewish writers and intellectuals, including Kobrynska, sought economic, rather than national, explanations for inter-ethnic relations in the Ukrainian territories.<sup>50</sup> Viewed as they were for their economic function in the Habsburg empire, Jews in multicultural Galicia were less at risk of violence fanned by religious or cultural antagonism than they would have been a few miles to the east. In Ukrainian Galicia, while there certainly was antisemitism, there were no major episodes of mass violence against Jews in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries as there were in the neighbouring regions within the Russian empire or Polish Galicia.<sup>51</sup> However, the movement to translate cultural and religious distinctions into class differences meant stripping Jews of their claim to self-determinacy as a group. Kobrynska's Jewish characters may be trapped within their economic roles, but they serve as enigmatic reminders of a group lacking its own national claims to the territory, whose allegiances, far more than those of Kobrynska's Ukrainian characters, could therefore be purchased for the right price.

<sup>50</sup> One particularly interesting example is Ivan Kulyk, a Ukrainian Jewish writer who associated class struggle with the Ukrainian national cause. According to Yohanan Petrovsky-Shtern, 'He viewed Ukrainian as the language of anticolonialist struggle and Marxism. His Ukrainian helped him identify his life experience as the manifestation of class struggle': Y. Petrovsky-Shtern, *The Anti-Imperial Choice: The Making of the Ukrainian Jew* (New Haven, 2009), 78.

<sup>51</sup> Himka credits the Ukrainian national movement with what he views to have been a healthy 'politicization of Ukrainian-Jewish conflict': 'The national movement taught peasants to struggle against the Jews by forming educational and economic institutions in the villages and by boycotting Jewish economic enterprises. This was not only a more civilized method of struggle than pogroms, but . . . more effective': Himka, 'Ukrainian-Jewish Antagonism', 148.

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# The Jewish Formations of Western Ukraine in the Civil War

YAROSLAV TYNCHENKO

IN POLITICAL AND CULTURAL TERMS, the Jews of the Habsburg empire were much more Europeanized than their Russian counterparts. After the 1782 Edict of Toleration of Joseph II, the process of rapid modernization changed the profile of the state, homogenized its ethnic groups, established German as the standard language, introduced German secular education, and subjected Jews to the state bureaucracy. By the 1860s, the Jews had already begun integrating themselves into the fabric of society on various levels. They preferred elementary German schools and gymnasia to elementary Jewish schools (*heders*), became university students, and joined the ranks of functionaries, scholars, politicians, and cultural figures in the ethnically diverse imperial society. Even the growth of nationalism and the transformation of the Habsburg empire into the dual Austro-Hungarian empire did not bring about the rejection and marginalization of Jews as happened in Russia.

This meant, first of all, that a far greater proportion of Jews had completed a state-based secular education in Austria-Hungary than in Russia, and, second, that the political orientation of Austro-Hungarian Jewry was quite different from that of the Russian Jews. In the Russian empire the majority of politically active Jews espoused different types of socialism, a much smaller percentage of them turning to Zionism (although the strength of a general sympathy for Jewish nationalism on a cultural level is difficult to evaluate statistically), whereas the Austro-Hungarian Jews were clearly divided into ‘nationalists’ (broader than just Zionists) and ‘Austrians’ (or, subsequently, ‘Poles’ and ‘Germans’)—in other words, those who sought to secure the political rights of, and representation for, the Jewish people as a distinct national minority and those who believed that it was better to integrate, on the basis of equal rights, with other major nationalities in Austro-Hungarian (or, subsequently, Polish) society. Those in favour of integration included the broad Jewish masses—the lower strata of the towns and shtetls, who were well aware of Marxism but, because of their economic status, relatively immune to it.

This is a revised chapter from an unfinished book entitled ‘Evreiskie vooruzhennye formirovaniya v grazhdanskoi voine, 1917–1920’ (‘Jewish Armed Formations in the Civil War, 1917–1920’). A Russian version of it has previously appeared as ‘Evreiskie formirovaniya Zapadnoi Ukrainy: Grazhdanskaya voina’, *Yehupets*, 13 (2004), 259–75.

The Austrian Zionists, who had a hard time rallying people around their slogans owing to the enormous pressure exerted by the assimilationists ('Poles'), were dissatisfied with the way in which the cabinet in Vienna arranged the electoral districts and favoured the 'assimilationists' among the Jews. For that reason, in a political sense the Galician Zionists in 1906–7 allied themselves in a bloc with the representatives of the nationalities in Austria-Hungary that were considered the most backward, in cultural and economic terms, and above all with the Ruthenians (as the Galicians—western Ukrainians—were called at the time). This circumstance was also determined by the fact that the majority of Austria-Hungary's Jews lived in eastern Galicia, where they comprised more than half of the urban population.

The Ukrainians of the Austro-Hungarian empire were mostly rural. Among the urban population of eastern Galicia, Ukrainians comprised a total of only 13 per cent (Jews made up more than 50 per cent, Germans 7 per cent, and the remainder were mostly Poles). If they lived in towns, Ukrainians frequently belonged to the lower strata. Only a very small percentage of Ukrainians had completed secondary school or university, and even then the education of the Ukrainian intelligentsia (who were small in numbers by comparison with other nationalities in the empire) was of a down-to-earth, practical nature, mainly aimed at satisfying the needs of the countryside. The most popular professions among young Ukrainians were teaching, forestry, and medicine, and the most successful became lawyers, for which a perfect mastery of at least two foreign languages, German and Polish, was required. The most unpopular occupations were considered to be trading and military service.

It was precisely because of the lower pace of urbanization of the Ukrainians that Galician peasants seeking the services of lawyers, physicians, and, of course, trading intermediaries and merchants were forced to turn to members of other nationalities, of whom many were Jews. Because of that, from the time that eastern Galicia became part of the Austrian monarchy, Jews and Ukrainians found themselves within a single economic framework. Once the questions of political representation in the Austrian parliament came to the fore at the beginning of the twentieth century, it seemed natural for them to resist Polish pressure as a single political front. In the period from 1907 to 1911, Jewish and Ukrainian deputies were loyal allies in the Austrian parliament, and during elections Ukrainian political activists agitated the voters in districts densely populated by Jews to cast their ballots for the Zionist candidates, whereas in electoral districts with a considerable Ukrainian population the Zionist activists called for Jews to vote for the representatives of the Ukrainian national minority parties.

With the outbreak of the First World War, practically all Jews with higher education who had been drafted into the Austrian army were promoted to officer rank. There is abundant evidence in Austrian sources that they performed well in combat—and, once again, cheek by jowl with Ukrainians. As is well known, the Austrian army was recruited on a territorial basis, and since the Jews lived chiefly in



eastern Galicia, they ended up in regiments that were between 60 and 90 per cent Ukrainian. Very often the commanders of these regiments, battalions, and companies were Germans, Czechs, and Poles, while the junior officers were Ukrainians and Jews. Naturally, their identical military status and a common everyday background brought them even closer together. Thus, when the West Ukrainian People's Republic (Zakhidno-Ukrayins'ka Narodna Respublika; ZUNR) was proclaimed at the end of 1918, among the new nation states that were beginning to form on the ruins of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, a significant number of educated Jews openly championed it.

Nevertheless, it should be noted that this helping hand was extended to the Ukrainians predominantly by the Zionists, who up until this time had had especially many supporters among Jews who were serving in the Austro-Hungarian army (and wearing the same uniform as the Ukrainians!). The overwhelming majority of Jews who had once held pro-Austrian views, as well as the lower strata in the shtetls, adopted a neutral attitude to the ZUNR's struggle against the Poles, who, in turn, sought political control over the territory of what was considered either western Ukraine or eastern Galicia.

Some of those Austrians who had identified themselves with the Poles came out on the side of the Polish army, against the Ukrainians. In the main, these were either Jews who were natives of western Galicia and who sought integration into the predominant Polish milieu, or *pilsudczycy*, Jews who had served in Polish legions during the First World War. It is known that at least one Jewish detachment ('Adam's Children') fought on the Polish side.

#### THE JEWISH MILITIA ON THE TERRITORY OF THE ZUNR

In October 1918 the countries of the Quadruple Alliance (the Central Powers) suffered a shattering defeat on the fronts. The Austro-Hungarian empire and its army broke apart into national units, and Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, and other republics were formed. Naturally, the Ukrainians did not remain on the sidelines, having resolved to take power into their own hands in their land, eastern Galicia. The only problem was posed by the towns of the region, which were mostly inhabited by Jews and Poles. The latter, in particular, predominated in some western Ukrainian towns, above all in Lviv. As of November 1918, Poles comprised more than 60 per cent of the population of Lviv, and Jews made up 30 per cent. But the distance of Lviv from Poland and the multitude of Ukrainian villages that surrounded it offered the Ukrainians every chance of capturing the city.

On the eve of the revolution, bilingual—Ukrainian and Yiddish—leaflets were printed in a number of towns, calling for the overthrow of the Austrian government. During the revolution the Zionists ousted the 'Austrians' from all posts and positions, and in the ZUNR they obtained a number of guaranteed rights and freedoms as well as their share of power. In reserve units stationed on the territory

of eastern Galicia, Ukrainian officers were convinced that their Jewish comrades in arms would not oppose the revolution. Furthermore, there were plans for the immediate creation of a Jewish militia. Such militia units came into being in, for example, the 9th Infantry Regiment in Peremyshl and in Ternopil.

In certain shtetls where there were no garrisons, a Jewish militia was created out of demobilized Jewish soldiers (e.g. in Pidvolochysk). The militia was subordinated to Ukrainian military commanders, but did not take part in combat actions.

### THE LVIV JEWISH MILITIA

On the eve of the revolution in Lviv, the city that would become the arena of fierce battles between Ukrainians and Poles, a Jewish Captain Waldman from the gendarmerie in Vienna arrived in the city. The Vienna-based Zionist circles had delegated to him the task of organizing a Jewish militia and Zionist authorities.

Early on the morning of 1 November 1918 Ukrainian units of the Austrian garrison occupied the city centre and all strategic points in Lviv, and hung the blue and yellow Ukrainian flag on City Hall. All soldiers of other nationalities were either interned or else they announced their strict neutrality. Jewish soldiers and officers rushed to the city centre, to the Jewish neighbourhoods where, under Waldman's leadership, a meeting took place concerning the positions of the Zionists and 'Austrians' in the emerging situation, and the formation of a militia. However, the views of the 'Austrians' were not particularly heeded: they were simply removed from all posts and replaced by Zionists.

The Ukrainian military command informed the Zionists that a revolution had taken place in Lviv and that for the time being they could not be answerable for Jewish lives and property. For the protection of their neighbourhoods, Jews were advised to organize a militia, which would prevent both Polish and Ukrainian troops from entering their territory. Owing to the fact that the central Jewish neighbourhoods happened to be almost exactly on the line of the Ukrainian–Polish front, many militiamen were required for their protection. According to some sources, the Jewish detachment that was formed on the morning of 1 November included no more than 200 men under the command of a Lieutenant Eisler; other sources indicate 300 men, of which 200 were armed with guns and commanded by the same Eisler, but holding the rank of captain.<sup>1</sup> The likelihood is, however, that Eisler was in fact a lieutenant, first because he is mentioned with this rank in two or three other sources, and secondly because he had until recently been a student, and could scarcely have risen to the rank of captain in the Austrian army in that period of service.

Five permanent posts were designated for the Jewish militia from which to defend its neighbourhoods: near the Reform Synagogue on Stary Rynok Square (in

<sup>1</sup> V. Melamed, *Evrei vo L'vove (XIII–pervaya polovina XX veka): Sobytiya, obshchestvo, lyudi* (Lviv, 1994), 134.

the very centre of Lviv); at the synagogue located on Bozhnytsya Street (today Syanska Street); at 25 Żółkiewski Street; at 25 Blyakharska Street (today I. Fedorov Street); and at 13 Riznytska Street (today S. Nalyvaiko Street).<sup>2</sup>

The Jewish militia was completely outfitted and armed by the Ukrainian authorities. A Ukrainian officer who took part in the revolution in Lviv recalled the following:

I should also mention the Jewish militia that was formed with the permission of the General Ukrainian Military Committee to maintain order in the Jewish areas. Its distinguishing mark was an armband on the left sleeve with a Zionist emblem, and wherever possible it was supposed to patrol together with the Ukrainian [militia]. Bearing an appropriate note, they [the Jewish volunteers] were dispatched to Lieutenant M-k, where they received uniforms, and they went off to their positions, so to speak, but there was no support or assistance from them—they were not visible on the streets.<sup>3</sup>

Indeed, no Jewish patrols were seen on the streets, as they did not come out beyond the perimeter of their neighbourhoods. As regards assistance, on the other hand, the Poles later accused the Jewish militia, not without justification, of providing armed support to Ukrainian units, and corroboration for this is found in Ukrainian sources. Moreover, the militia commander himself, Lieutenant Eisler, was killed in skirmishes with the Poles during the final days of the battle for Lviv.

From the very outset, the fight for Lviv did not shape up well for the Ukrainians. The local Polish population mounted desperate resistance, and when Polish troops began arriving from western Galicia, the situation took a dismal turn for the Ukrainians.

Beginning as early as 1 November 1918, Jewish representatives sought, as a contingency measure, to obtain recognition of their neutrality from the Polish command. A few days later, when the first Polish troops arrived, the resolution of this issue became more than crucial, but it was only on 9 November that an agreement as to the Jewish militia's neutrality was signed by the Polish command in Lviv and by the Jewish representatives. Even then, however, armed clashes between Jews and Poles did not cease. The head of the defence of Lviv, Colonel Czesław Mączyński, wrote:

I know of only one serious incident—the capture of the barracks of the 95th [i.e. 15th—Ya.T.] Infantry Regiment—and several minor episodes in which the conduct of the Jewish militia was such as befits neutral troops. But I also know of a large number of incidents in which this same Jewish militia opened fire with rifles and even machine guns on our Polish army patrols and larger detachments, and I know of a case in which such conduct had the appearance of serious support for an attack being made by the Ukrainians (on 14 November).

<sup>2</sup> O. Wasser, 'Rola Żydów w czasie listopadowej obrony Lwowa w 1918 r.', in *Obrona Lwowa: 1–22 listopada 1918*, 3 vols., ed. A. Leinwand (Warsaw, 1991), ii. 837–9.

<sup>3</sup> I. I-ky, 'Spomyny lvivs'kykh Padolystovykh dнів 1918 roku', *Ukrayins'kyi skytalets'* (Liberec), 1920, no. 1, pp. 10–11.

But I know of no cases . . . in which this same Jewish militia opened fire anywhere on Ukrainian patrols or detachments, which often took short cuts through the Jewish quarter.<sup>4</sup>

During the night of 21–22 November 1918 the Ukrainian units, under pressure from the Poles, were forced to abandon Lviv. Departing with them were a few Jewish militiamen, for the most part former officers of the Austrian army, who had taken a liking to the military art. The Jewish militia decided to remain in the city, but it was attacked straight away by the Poles. The pretext for the attack was that a militiaman had supposedly fired on a Polish artillery battery as it was moving past a Jewish neighbourhood. In response, the battery was dismounted from its carriages, and it immediately fired a few rounds at Jewish houses.<sup>5</sup> This confrontation served as a signal for the Poles to disarm the Lviv Jewish militia and arrest its commanders. After the Ukrainian troops withdrew from Lviv, a pogrom began in the poor Jewish sidestreets of the city suburbs, which lasted from 21 to 23 November. According to Jewish historians, seventy-three people were killed in the pogrom and 463 were wounded.<sup>6</sup> The subsequent fate of the Jewish militia was that some individual militiamen who were residents of Lviv joined the Ukrainian forces, but those organizers of the militia who remained in the city were arrested and thrown into jail. Detachments from other towns tried to maintain their neutrality and helped the Ukrainian authorities, but after the arrival of the Poles they were as a rule disarmed and dispersed.

In his memoirs Czesław Mączyński writes thus about the fate of the Lviv militia:

From the reports of our units and the statements of captured Ukrainians, we knew about the various small detachments of the former Lviv Jewish militia that had besieged Lviv together with the Ukrainians; we also knew about several Jewish officers who commanded various units of the Ukrainian army during the fighting for Lviv. One of them, the commander of a Ukrainian battery, fervently pounded the 6th sector of Lviv and probably fired several thousand shells at it. During our May offensive several of them were captured.<sup>7</sup>

Mączyński exaggerates when he writes about thousands of shells, ‘small detachments of the . . . Jewish militia’, and the Jewish commander of a Ukrainian battery. According to Ukrainian sources, during the entire siege of Lviv batteries were commanded either by Ukrainians or by Germans. There were no Jews among them, nor any detachments of the Lviv militia. However, individual Jewish officers had indeed remained in the Ukrainian army and were captured during the Poles’ May offensive. Here is what a Ukrainian officer recalls about the Jewish militia of Lviv:

One of the last days of November was appointed for the funerals of the Jewish victims. The coffins were carried by Jews, former officers of the Austrian army. With great solemnity they carried a coffin in which lay a half-charred Jewish Torah. The sympathies of all the Jews

<sup>4</sup> C. Mączyński, ‘O stanowisku żydów w czasie walk listopadowych’, in *Obrona Lwowa*, ed. Leinwand, ii. 819.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.* 820.

<sup>6</sup> Melamed, *Evrei vo L'vove*, 135.

<sup>7</sup> Mączyński, ‘O stanowisku żydów’, 820.

were on our side. It must be acknowledged that straight away the Jews took an attitude of allied neutrality towards our struggle. Their Jewish army, the militia, armed by our authorities, did truly protect the Jewish quarter conscientiously, and there were thus no actions of any kind targeting the Jewish population. Every now and then on Tereska Street or Hazova Street Jewish militiamen exchanged fire with Polish fighters. During one of these skirmishes the commander of the Jewish militia, a lieutenant acquaintance of mine, was killed. The Jews were citizens very loyal to us, and they often helped our young state or army as much as was possible and necessary. I know of a couple of my acquaintances, Jewish students, who shortly after those funerals crossed the front and fought in the ranks of the UHA [Ukrayins'ka Halyts'ka Armiya; Ukrainian Galician Army]. One of them became a cornet, and he was captured by the Poles during the fighting near Belz or Rava.<sup>8</sup>

### THE TROOPS OF THE JEWISH PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC

After the Ukrainian forces withdrew from Lviv, the battle for the city continued on its outskirts. Even five months later Lviv was still under a tight siege. The Poles were moving more and more troops to the front, including Haller's divisions, which had been formed in France. In May 1919 they went on the offensive, repelled the UHA from the city, and then drove it towards the river Zbruch, the border with eastern Ukraine. The army had no choice but to retreat, as by this time it had scarcely any shells and cartridges; its troops had nothing to defend themselves with.

On 2 June 1919 Ukrainian units abandoned Ternopil, the provisional capital of the ZUNR. In these difficult conditions it became crucial to seek out allies, reserves, and funds for the purchase of weapons. The Jews of eastern Galicia, and especially the wealthy residents of Ternopil, frequently provided money to the young republic. There now arose the question of the mass engagement of Jews on the side of the ZUNR, including their enlistment into the ranks of the UHA. After all, at this time, out of eastern Galicia's population of 9 million there were 1.85 million Jews (and 6 million Ukrainians), a significant proportion of whom could join the UHA and fight against the Poles alongside the Ukrainians, on an equal footing. But, in order to ensure this 'equal footing', the government of the ZUNR and representatives of Jewish circles drafted a plan to proclaim a Jewish People's Republic on the territory of the ZUNR, enjoying rights of national-personal autonomy. In the original text it was styled as the Zhydivs'ka Narodna Respublika (ZhNR). However, this plan was never carried through, for the sole reason that the UHA soon had to withdraw from eastern Galicia, and proclaiming a Jewish republic outside its boundaries would have been, first of all, politically incorrect, and secondly, dangerous: the Poles would without delay have taken repressive measures against the Jewish population.

As part of the plan to proclaim a Jewish People's Republic in May 1919, Jewish units and subunits began to be formed within the UHA. Today three such units are known, though the existence of some other small Jewish subunits may be surmised.

<sup>8</sup> F.O.Sh., 'Lystopad 1918 r.', *Litopys Chervonoyi Kalyny* (Lviv), 1937, no. 11, p. 21.

The first attempt to create a Jewish unit was begun as early as mid-May, drawing on Jews who were already serving in various formations of the UHA. However, owing to the extremely small number of Jews in the army (sources point to some 200 or 300 Jews in the entire 50,000-strong UHA, the majority of whom were medics), to begin with only one Jewish Ukrainian unit was created—the Mounted Machine Gun Company (Kinna Skorostril'na Sotnya) of the 4th Zolochiv Brigade, which was commanded by Platoon Leader Salko Rotenberg.

In mid-June 1919, following the Ukrainian army's counteroffensive and the recapture of part of the territory of the ZUNR, at least two other Jewish units were created, the Jewish Shock Battalion (Zhydivs'kyi Proboyevyi Kurin') of the 1st Corps of the UHA—the largest of the Jewish units—and the Jewish Detachment of the 11th Stryi Brigade of the UHA. However, the continuing formation of Jewish units proved impossible, because a month later, in mid-July, under Polish pressure the UHA ultimately abandoned the territory of eastern Galicia.

Several interesting articles have been devoted to the Jewish Shock Battalion,<sup>9</sup> and the other formations are the subject of one or two pieces of memoir writing, but there is virtually no archival information on any of them. In any event, none of these formations was large (despite the utterly mythical number of Jews that some historians unjustifiably claim to have belonged to the UHA), and some Ukrainians served in them as well as Jews. In the following sections I deal with the main Jewish units in more detail.

#### ROTENBERG'S MOUNTED MACHINE GUN COMPANY

The 4th Zolochiv Brigade of the UHA contained more Jews than any other unit. More than half of the brigade's medical personnel were Jews, as were several dozen machine gunners and rank-and-file fighters, and also the commander of one of the rifle companies, Salko Rotenberg, a former officer of the Jewish militia. A machine gunner, he was ordered in the second half of May to form the Mounted Machine Gun Company of the 4th Brigade, into which he gathered all the Jews. The company ended up being a 50–50 mix of Jews and Ukrainians. The Ukrainian memoirist Stepan Haiduchok recalled the following about Rotenberg and the formation of the company:

A mounted machine gun company—was there such a company in every brigade of the UHA? Most likely not. But there was one in the 4th Zolochiv Brigade as early as May 1919.

Colonel Khmelyk arrived to assume his duties as brigade commander, took a look round, and got down to organizing one in his stubborn and insistent way.

Two-wheeled carts, horses, and machine guns appeared, and several days later a new fighting unit was born in the brigade.

Salko was appointed its commander.

Was he a Jew?

<sup>9</sup> See nn. 12, 13, and 18 below.

Yes, Salko Rotenberg was a Jew, but, you know, a Ukrainian Jew. In the winter he was wounded and returned to the brigade. No matter how many pure-blooded Ukrainians were wounded, they were all afraid of ending up in the brigade . . .

The second in the company was Platoon Leader Mykhailiv. It's very likely that he'd been seriously wounded in the head back in the Great War. I can't say for sure.

Ah, what a wonderful combat unit that company was!

The machine gun personnel were mounted on horses, and there were eight machine guns on two-wheeled carts. Each two-wheeled cart had one horse. Several two-wheeled carts carried the cartridges. How easy it is to command a unit like that in combat, retreating or attacking!

And didn't the boys love their commanders!

Did you ever see them on a march?

At the front [of the column] are musicians, organized by the commander. Two violins are playing, and some other kind of instrument. The men's broad chests swell with the smooth strains of a marching song.<sup>10</sup>

It is eminently clear that the musicians were Jews: the violin was an instrument that was quite foreign to Ukrainian soldiers. Indeed, the choice of musical instrument for the Jewish Ukrainian unit is not without originality. Rotenberg's thinking probably went along these lines: the Ukrainians have the kobza, the Scots have the bagpipes, and the Poles, Austrians, Germans, and Russians have trumpets and kettledrums. And the Jews, well, they have the violin.

Salko Rotenberg's Mounted Machine Gun Company fought courageously against the Poles, and after the march to eastern Ukraine, against the Bolsheviks. According to the second-ranking officer in the company, Platoon Leader Volodymyr Mykhailiv, the fighting against the Reds for Korosten was particularly tough: the company suffered severe losses, and after the retreat from the town it was most likely disbanded. Even the company's three musicians were killed, as well as Rotenberg himself, who, while covering the retreat of the remnants of his company on 4 September 1919, took a bullet in the face: it knocked out his teeth and lodged in his neck. Seriously wounded, Rotenberg was sent to Zhytomyr, then to Proskuriv, and from there to Kamyanets-Podilsky. According to rumours, the valorous platoon leader died there of blood poisoning.<sup>11</sup>

## THE JEWISH SHOCK BATTALION

During the retreat of the UHA in May 1919 the Jewish militia remained in its areas, in order not to anger the Poles, and was disarmed by the occupiers. However, this had little impact on the extremely negative attitude of the Polish command to the Jewish population. Thus, after the capture of Ternopil the occupying authorities arrested all the 'traitorous' Jews who had been aiding the ZUNR. In addition,

<sup>10</sup> S. Haiduchok, 'Kinna skorostril'na sotnya', *Litopys Chervonoyi Kalyny*, 1930, no. 2, p. 16.

<sup>11</sup> V. Mykhailiv, 'Sal'ts'o Rotenberg', *Ukrayins'kyi skytalets'* (Josefov), 1922, no. 12, pp. 6-7; Haiduchok, 'Kinna skorostril'na sotnya', 16.

practically all the local leaders of the Zionist movement were imprisoned, and some of the most active ones were shot. Difficult times were also in store for the civilian population of Ternopil.

A couple of weeks later, on 16 June 1919, Ukrainian forces retook Ternopil. According to people's recollections, the Jewish population greeted the Ukrainian troops with flowers. Solomon Lyainberg, the commander of the Ternopil Jewish Militia, which had been formed back in November 1918, a former lieutenant with the 15th Infantry Regiment, arrived at the headquarters of the 1st Corps of the UHA with a proposal to form a separate Jewish unit. The corps commander, Colonel Mykytka, was personally acquainted with Lyainberg, as they had both served in the Austro-Hungarian army; in fact, many Ukrainian officers had served with Lyainberg in the 15th Regiment, which was stationed in Lviv prior to the events of November 1918. Lyainberg had made a name for himself when he was the head of the Ternopil Jewish Militia. In addition, the formation of Jewish units now corresponded to the political aspirations of the ZUNR leadership. For that very reason, almost immediately after the capture of Ternopil the Jewish Shock Battalion began to be formed within a small Ukrainian detachment, a group led by Lieutenant Vovk.

Lieutenant Vovk recalled its formation:

At that very time [after the retaking of Ternopil—Ya. T.] many Jewish intellectuals began joining Ukrainian units, burning with a thirst for revenge against the Poles for their inhumane humiliations, and probably also because they had felt on their skins the difference between Polish rule, which before then had been unknown to them, and the eight-month-long Ukrainian rule that had preceded it. The corps adjutant, Captain Hnatovych, ordered me, as the group commander, to set about organizing, together with Lieutenant Lyainberg, a Jewish unit within my group. In order not to create a separate administrative unit, it was decided to organize it as part of my group, which had horses, carts, a supply of cartridges, weapons, several dozen fighters, and about ten Ukrainian officers. And, indeed, within a few days so many Jewish officers appeared that the command of the 1st Galician Corps transferred the command of my former unit to Lieutenant Lyainberg, and I was appointed as his assistant. This unit was now called the 'Jewish Shock Battalion' of the 1st Galician Corps. The officer staff of this group was composed mostly of Jews. But few rank-and-file soldiers came forward. On the other hand, there were many Ukrainian volunteers, who, after the Poles retreated, began to join the army en masse.

To enable the Jewish Shock Battalion to complete its training in peace, it was deployed to Ostapye, because the second retreat of our army had already begun. At that time several Ukrainian officers were seconded to the Jewish Shock Battalion, for example, Lieutenant Lashchukevych, to whose command one of the companies was transferred; the leadership of another company had been assigned earlier to Platoon Leader Domanytsky.<sup>12</sup>

A former officer and historian of this Jewish battalion, Lieutenant Nakhman H-r, wrote a semi-fictionalized account of the unit's formation, in which he clearly

<sup>12</sup> P. Vovk, 'Poyasnennya', *Ukrayins'kyi skytalets'* (Liberec), 1921, no. 5, pp. 21–3.



inflated its numbers. His article about the battalion in *Ukrayins'kyi skytalets'*<sup>13</sup> is replete with pompous phrases lacking in substance. The first part of the article contains no information whatsoever about the history of the battalion's formation, except in its final paragraph, and indeed the facts given there were corrected and supplemented in the very next issue by Lieutenant Vovk, whose clarification has been quoted above.

Nakhman H-r writes:

The battalion was administratively independent, but in operational terms it was directly subordinate to the command of the 1st Corps, from which it received uniforms, food, forage, money, weapons, officers, junior officers, and riflemen for reinforcements, although these were all in short supply in the Corps itself. Administratively, this battalion had its own supply system and draft commission, and owing to the conditions that the Poles had created, it quickly reached 1,200 men, including instructors and officers who were seconded to Lieutenant Lyainberg. It had four companies of 220 men each, one machine gun company with eight machine guns and 500 cartridges for each, one cavalry platoon, one sapper platoon, a platoon of telephone operators, and a radio station run by Lieutenant Lyainberg, who was an electrician by profession and had assembled it single-handedly. After brief but intensive training, this unit, formed as a shock battalion, was merged with the 1st Corps of the Ukrainian Galician Army.<sup>14</sup>

The size of the battalion as indicated by Nakhman H-r is highly doubtful. It is possible that its complement was indeed supposed to be 1,200 men, including its own cavalry unit. Perhaps, at the beginning of its existence, owing to the mass enlistment of young Ukrainians, it even reached this figure. But in mid-July 1919, when the UHA began to retreat behind the river Zbruch, large numbers of fighting men abandoned its ranks, primarily those young people who had enlisted in the army after the recapture of Ternopil. For that reason, it even became necessary to disband several brigades of the UHA. As for the Jewish Battalion, it is doubtful if more than 500 soldiers—Jews and Ukrainians alike—crossed the Zbruch. (Otherwise, if it had had 1,200 men, it would simply have been turned into a regiment or even a brigade. Furthermore, this figure is not supported by the UHA's deployment lists in my possession.)

In the second part of his article Lieutenant H-r provides, not without superfluous posturing, an account of the service history and fate of the Jewish battalion after the UHA's retreat:

On 14 July 1919, by order of the command of the 1st Corps, the Jewish Shock Battalion was temporarily subordinated to the 21st Brigade, which was then stationed in the north, on the main highway from Ternopil to Pidvolochysk, and it waged a desperate struggle against the Poles, who were trying to encircle this brigade. After a short period of time, owing to the difficult situation at the front, Lieutenant Lyainberg was urgently summoned by

<sup>13</sup> Nakhman H-r, 'Peredistoriya i istoriya Zhydivs'koho proboyevoho kurinya I korpusa UHA', *Ukrains'kyi skytalets'* (Liberec), 1921, no. 4, pp. 17–21, and 1921, no. 5, pp. 17–21.

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*, 1921, no. 4, p. 21.

the brigade's command, and he proceeded at a quick march with the Jewish Shock Battalion from Ostapye to Maly Khodachkiv, and from there to the village of Kolodiyivka. By order of the 21st Brigade he occupied the area between the Ternopil–Pidvolochysk highway and the village of Kolodiyivka, as well as the village itself, thereby covering from the north and west the brigade's retreat in the direction of the town of Skalat. These changes at the front were observed by the Poles, and with decisive attacks they undertook an attempt to break through to this area, so that after occupying the line along the Zbruch they might then cut off by surprise the path of retreat beyond the river. In the event of success, this idea of the crafty Lyakh<sup>15</sup> would have been fatal for the entire Galician army, government, and our dearest dreams. But the Shock Battalion, under Lieutenant Lyainberg's personal leadership, not only brought the Polish plans to naught with a decisiveness worthy of all praise, shattering the considerable Lyakh forces, but also inflicted painful losses on them.

Shortly after receiving a new order, the battalion took up station in the vicinity of Skalat, where its advance-guard units fought a number of victorious battles, having occupied the area between the village of Mednytsya<sup>16</sup> and Sary Skalat and thus covering the 21st Brigade's retreat. When, under heavy pressure from the enemy, even the 9th Brigade, which until then had been deployed to the left of the village of Mednytsya, began to falter and retreat in the direction of the Zbruch, the Shock Battalion became the advance guard, and at 3 a.m. on 15 July it entered the town of Skalat. That same day, at 7 p.m., the Shock Battalion received an order from the command to retreat at a quick march through Horodnytsya and Ostapye to the vicinity of Vikno, and soundly fortify its position there. After arriving in this hilly area at 2 a.m., Lieutenant Lyainberg without delay ordered his troops to occupy the Hrymailiv railway station and the edge of the forest located south of the town. The battalion held on to these natural positions until 10 a.m. on 16 July, and then, after receiving an order to continue retreating, it departed from the above-mentioned places and occupied the vicinity of the town of Tovste. As the advance guard, it was also supposed to engage in combat the forward sub-units of those masses of Lyakhs who were already concentrated in a fist-like formation in order to strike a decisive blow at the Ukrainian liberation army. At the same time the commanders of the 21st and 9th Brigades began to muster the people who had scattered during the hurricane-force Lyakh fire and to prepare for crossing the Zbruch during the night.

From the south-western side, i.e. from Kopychyntsi and Husyatyn, the Lyakhs tried to foil the plans of our command—to go around our positions with their large force of cavalry and dislodge our units by means of surprise attacks. Owing to this, the Shock Battalion received an order from its brigade to leave the vicinity of Tovste, occupy the vicinity of Trybukhivtsi, and make every effort to try and hold this position in order to secure our troops' retreat from the west and south. Lieutenant Lyainberg, having been attacked in the former position by considerable Lyakh forces, left behind a strong covering force with four machine guns. At 10 p.m. on 16 July he marched on Trybukhivtsi, along with the infantry and the remaining machine guns, occupying its northern and western sides. After receiving a telephone message, now from the left bank of the Zbruch, reporting that the entire personnel of the 21st and 9th Brigades, along with transport convoys and artillery, had already crossed the river, the lieutenant ordered the machine guns left behind in Tovste to retreat. These instructions were most timely: at 6 a.m. on 17 July the battalion received a report that the Poles were

<sup>15</sup> The Ukrainian word *lyakh* ('Pole') is a derogatory colloquialism (the neutral word is *polyak*).

<sup>16</sup> i.e. Medyn, north of Pidvolochysk.

advancing along the Trybukhivtsi–Husyatyn highway and trying to capture the only crossing across the Zbruch in this sector. Lieutenant Lyainberg quickly occupied the Husyatyn–Trybukhivtsi highway, at the same time dispatching his subunits to occupy the ferry crossing in Trybukhivtsi. This position was occupied by Lieutenant Mazyar and his 4th Company, and two machine guns. Before long, the Lyakhs began advancing towards the crossing, and despite the heroic defence he mounted in face of the swarms of enemies, and his attempts to break through to his battalion, Lieutenant Mazyar and his entire company were captured by the Lyakhs.

Through its heroic conduct and the able leadership of its commander, the Jewish Shock Battalion thus ensured the retreat of the 21st and 9th Brigades, which, as a result, did not suffer losses of personnel or weapons.

At 2 p.m. on 17 July the command of the Shock Battalion received an order from the 21st Brigade to withdraw immediately beyond the Zbruch, destroying the bridge behind it. After carrying out this order, the battalion joined up with the 21st Brigade and was deployed to its right flank. Together with the brigade, the battalion reached the town of Smotrych, and from there the vicinity of Dunayivtsi, where for the first time it clashed with the Bolsheviks. After some initial artillery fire, the battalion switched from lateral protection of the right wing to frontal protection, and after completing a thorough reconnaissance, it occupied a line from the village of Chankiv in the north-west to the village of Zastavna and the hills in the north-east. This was on 24 July. During nocturnal raids the Shock Battalion smashed the strong Bolshevik pickets and took prisoners.

The Bolsheviks, alarmed by the opponent's vigorous activities, began to retreat the next day, i.e. 26 July. Observing this, the command of the 21st Brigade ordered the Shock Battalion to remain on the right wing and pursue the enemy energetically. During this pursuit the brigade reached the villages of Solobkivtsi and Zinkiv, and by the end of 31 July—the vicinity of the village of Mykhalpil, which was still in the hands of a powerful Bolshevik advance guard. On 3 August, following a heated exchange of fire by the reconnaissance, the Shock Battalion went on the offensive: it captured Mykhalpil and took nearly the entire Bolshevik garrison prisoner. As a result of this successful operation, the 21st Brigade and the Jewish Shock Battalion rested for two days in Mykhalpil.

On 6 August the 21st Brigade continued its northward march and occupied the village of Bohdanivtsi. The Jewish Shock Battalion once again fought on the right flank. Upon learning that the Bolsheviks had fortified their positions north-east of the town of Medzhybizh, the battalion turned eastward and occupied the villages of Holoskiv and Kopachivka without a fight. Here the Jewish Shock Battalion again assisted in successful combat operations. On 10 August the Bolsheviks, who were much weakened by the fighting, retreated in great panic from their former positions and rushed to the north-west, towards Starokostyantyniv. The 21st Brigade and the Jewish Shock Battalion set out in pursuit of the enemy troops, halting only in the village of Verkhivtsi, not far from Proskuriv. There the battalion commander received an order from the command of the 1st Corps of the UHA to head for the village of Luka Barska, where the corps headquarters was stationed. The reason for this order was that, in the foregoing battles, the battalion had not only distinguished itself, it had also suffered considerable losses; and besides, it had been seconded to the 21st Brigade only temporarily. In Luka Barska the battalion provided protection for the Staff of the 1st Corps of the UHA.

Shortly afterwards, the Shock Battalion departed with the corps headquarters to Brayiliv, and from there to Vinnytsya, where it protected the city and carried out garrison functions. After our troops' important victories at Kalynivka and Berdychiv and after the occupation of these towns, the battalion, along with the Staff of the 1st Corps, headed straight for Berdychiv, where they continued to carry out the same functions. On 28 August, after the capture of Kozyatyn and Fastiv, the battalion went to Fastiv with the corps headquarters. Here the battalion was seconded to the command of the 6th Brigade, with which it took part in the Kiev offensive. Acting as the brigade's advance guard, the battalion was the first to reach the suburbs of Kiev—Svyatoshyno station, which it occupied and held until the UHA's general withdrawal from Kiev. After leaving Svyatoshyno, the Shock Battalion secured the withdrawal of the 6th Brigade across the river Irpin. After joining up with the 6th Brigade beyond the Irpin, the battalion retreated with it to Fastiv, Popilnya, Kozyatyn, all the way to Berdychiv. There, by order of the command of the 1st Corps, the battalion was seconded to the headquarters in Berdychiv.

As a result of their humaneness and exemplary conduct in Berdychiv, the battalion enjoyed immense popularity among the population, and the battalion commander, Lieutenant Lyainberg, was granted permission by the municipal administration to carry out a mobilization of Jewish youths. The command of the 1st Corps allowed the battalion to carry out the mobilization, also giving it time to rest and reorganize. Thanks to these circumstances, the battalion was replenished with Jewish and Ukrainian volunteers. During the retreat from Berdychiv in October 1919 the battalion went to Kozyatyn with the corps.

But the merciless angel of death—louse-borne typhus and relapsing fever—ferociously decimated the ranks of those idealists who fought for a better fate and freedom for their families, who were groaning under both Lyakh oppression and the Muscovite yoke—the fate and freedom of the Jewish and Ukrainian peoples. The harvest of death was a rich one. Two-thirds of the Jewish Shock Battalion, two-thirds of the sons of that oppressed people which the oppressors had declared free on 24 April 1920 in San Remo, departed with honour, glory, and good repute to the land where neither hatred, nor envy, nor malice are known . . . may the earth rest lightly on their graves! . . . Only a small handful of this battalion, a handful of loyal Ukrainian sons, fighters of the ZUNR, was placed at the disposal of the Supreme Command of the UHA in Vinnytsya, where for some time it carried out punitive functions in the city. After its ranks thinned out even more, the Supreme Command of the Galician Army was forced to disband the battalion and assign the remaining fighting men to other units.<sup>17</sup>

The soldiers of the Jewish Shock Battalion experienced a variety of fates. In early 1920 some of them reached Odessa, from where they departed to Palestine, along with the surviving fighters of the Odessa Jewish Detachment.<sup>18</sup> The majority of the Jews who had served in the battalion either remained in eastern Ukraine or, like Lieutenant Lyainberg, soon returned to Polish-occupied Ternopil. For several of them, including Lyainberg, this turned out to be a fateful decision. In 1920 Solomon Lyainberg, the organizer and commander of the Jewish Shock Battalion, was tortured to death by the Poles in Ternopil jail.

<sup>17</sup> Nakhman H-r, 'Peredistoriya i istoriya Zhydivs'koho proboyevoho kurinya', 1921, no. 5, pp. 17–21.

<sup>18</sup> 'Zhydy v UHA', in *Kalendar-al' manakh Chervonoyi Kalyny na 1922 r.* (Lviv, 1921), 132.

### THE JEWISH QUESTION IN THE UHA

In addition to Platoon Leader Rotenberg's Mounted Machine Gun Company and Lieutenant Lyainberg's Jewish Shock Battalion, there was at least one other Jewish formation in the UHA (although the possibility is not excluded that there were others). However, it did not exist for long and did not distinguish itself. This was the Jewish Detachment of the 11th Stryi Brigade of the UHA.

The detachment was formed in mid-June 1919 out of all the Jewish soldiers of the 11th Brigade, as well as volunteers who were mobilized during the anti-Polish counteroffensive. The detachment numbered around seventy men; its backbone consisted of messengers, telephone operators, and other non-combatant elements. Owing to the lack of Jewish officers in the brigade, the commander of the detachment was a non-commissioned officer. On 18 July 1919 the detachment was assigned its first truly important combat mission: to go round behind a small forest where the Poles were hunkered down, and after a frontal attack by Ukrainian troops, to prevent the enemy from escaping. The Ukrainian units attacked and the Poles began to flee, running smack into the Jewish detachment—which scattered.<sup>19</sup> Since most of its soldiers had dispersed, in the aftermath of the battle no efforts were undertaken to restore the Jewish detachment.

It was only during the Ukrainian forces' June counteroffensive that a small influx of Jewish volunteers to the UHA was recorded. In mid-July 1919, by contrast, when the army began to retreat over the Zbruch to eastern Ukraine, the overwhelming majority of the volunteers—and above all the Jews—scattered to their homes.

During the initial battles in eastern Ukraine the UHA encountered Jews of a different type: Russian Jews, who were captivated with socialist ideas. The Galician soldiers were genuinely amazed by the presence of large numbers of Jews in Red units, with whom they clashed in southern Ukraine: the International, Bessarabian, and 45th Riflemen Divisions. From about 17 July to 31 August 1919—from the time of the march through eastern Ukraine—the UHA's attitude to the Russian Jews changed from one marked by good will to one of hostile neutrality. It should not be forgotten that the UHA had never engaged in any looting or confiscations, its troops always paid for what they took, and, furthermore, they were not involved in a single Jewish pogrom.

But the Galician soldiers were filled with indignation most of all by the fact that, on the morning of 31 August, when they were entering Kiev, which had been abandoned by the Red forces, they were fired on by local Jews. It should be emphasized that the Galicians always regarded Kiev in much the same way as the Jews revere Jerusalem or the Muslims Mecca. This helps to explain the extreme bitterness that the Galician soldiers felt towards the local Jewish population. From that time onwards, even though the UHA did not carry out pogroms, it kept as far as possible from the Jews of eastern Ukraine.

<sup>19</sup> H.H., 'Bii 11 bryhady pid Cherchem', *Litopys Chervonoyi Kalyny*, 1931, no. 11, p. 19.

Overall, during the entire period of existence of the UHA, scarcely more than 2,000 Jews served in its ranks, and this figure includes the influx of volunteers in late June and early July 1919. The overwhelming majority of them served in three Jewish formations and as medical personnel. In some brigades, especially the larger ones, there were two to four Jews among the officers, but very few among the rank and file.

*Translated from the Russian by Marta D. Olynyk*

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# Jewish Themes in Volodymyr Vynnychenko's Writing

MYKOLA IV. SOROKA

VOLODYMYR VYNNYCHENKO (1880–1951), the prominent Ukrainian writer and politician, addressed Jewish issues extensively in his writing. Some of his works were even translated into Yiddish and aroused discussion in Jewish circles.<sup>1</sup> As a political leader of the Ukrainian revolution in 1917–20, Vynnychenko contributed to the establishment of the short-lived Jewish autonomous structure and resigned as a co-chair of the Directory after its turn to the right and its involvement in pogroms. Nonetheless, his stance on Jewish issues has not been studied properly and is more complex than is apparent. This essay is the first attempt to analyse the topic in a separate article. Here, I discuss his literary works that contain Jewish themes—in particular *Dyzharmoniya* ('Disharmony'; 1906), 'Talisman' ('The Talisman'; 1913), *Mizh dvokh syl* ('Between Two Powers'; 1919), *Pisnya Izrayilya (Kol-Nidre)* ('The Song of Israel'; 1922)—and also refer to his journalism, political pamphlets, and diaries. Since he was actively involved in both literature and politics, which were closely intertwined, it will be effective to look at a number of sources relevant to both his writing and his involvement in politics.

Jewish themes are quite evident in Vynnychenko's writing, and many scholars have touched upon this phenomenon cursorily.<sup>2</sup> George Grabowicz has paid special attention to Jewish themes in Ukrainian literature in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, outlining a historical evolution from 'literary perceptions' to 'literary relations' and proposing three basic modalities of their portrayals of Jews:

<sup>1</sup> Among the translated works were two stories, 'Fed'ko-khalamydnyk' (*Fedke khalemitnik*, Kiev, 1926) and 'Babusyn podarunok' (*Der bobes matone*, Kharkiv, 1929), and two novels, *Chesnist' z soboyu* (*Erlikh tsu zun aleyu*, New York, 1926) and *Zapysky kyrpatoho Mefistofelya (Ksavim fun kirpate mefistofl)*, Kharkiv, 1929). Professor Dov Sadan, of the Hebrew University in Jerusalem, reviewed Vynnychenko's play *Prorok in Bamah*, 15 (1962), 42–50.

<sup>2</sup> O. D. Hnidan and L. S. Demyanivska, *Volodymyr Vynnychenko: Zhyttya, diyal'nist', tvorchist'* (Kiev, 1996); L. Z. Moroz, 'Sto rivnotsinnykh pravd': *Paradoksy dramaturhiyi V. Vynnychenka* (Kiev, 1994); V. Panchenko, 'Tvorchist' Volodymyra Vynnychenka 1902–1920 rr. u henetychnykh i typolohichnykh zv'yazkakh z yevropeiskymy literaturamy', Ph.D. diss. (Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv, 1998), available at <<http://www.library.kr.ua/books/panchenko/>>; M. Soroka, 'Etnichni konflikty u dramy "Pisnya Izrayilya" ("Kol-Nidre")', in L. Zaleska Onyshkevych et al. (eds.), *Volodymyr Vynnychenko: U poshukakh estetychnoyi, osobystoyi i suspil'noyi harmoniyyi. Zbirnyk stattei* (New York, 2004), 88–99.

stereotypical; social-moralizing (or 'realistic'); and political-ethical.<sup>3</sup> He refers briefly to Vynnychenko, characterizing *Dyzharmoniya* as 'a programmatic work on the Jewish question' in the sense that Vynnychenko, as well as the writer Hnat Khotkevych, made it clear that 'volens nolens the Jew and the Ukrainian intelligentsia, the progressive forces, are allied'.<sup>4</sup> More to the point, Myroslav Shkandrij's recently published *Jews in Ukrainian Literature: Representation and Identity* has broadly conceptualized the scholarly issue of the Jewish theme in Ukrainian literature; his book will remain a major study.<sup>5</sup> Shkandrij looks at works from historical times to the present and challenges the traditional paradigm of Jewish representation mainly in negative terms, offering an alternative, more sympathetic portrayal of Jews in a broad historical and literary context. A number of other studies, mainly taking a historical perspective, also approach the complexity of Jewish-Ukrainian relations, the Russian imperial discourse, and issues of identity, modernity, and national liberation movements, including works by Vasily Lvov-Rogachevsky,<sup>6</sup> Joshua Kunitz,<sup>7</sup> Henry Abramson,<sup>8</sup> Israel Kleiner,<sup>9</sup> Kenneth B. Moss,<sup>10</sup> and Yuri Slezkine,<sup>11</sup> and a volume edited by Peter J. Potichnyj and Howard Aster.<sup>12</sup>

Labelling Vynnychenko a philosemite is quite arbitrary, since to some degree this term may also be applied to any socialist or liberal of the time who might have been preoccupied with the plight of Jews. In contrast to many, however, Vynnychenko had a somewhat distinct view of the Jewish people: 'If humanity will at some point achieve the ideal of international brotherhood and eliminate state borders, then the role of Jews in implementing this situation will have to be especially recognized.'<sup>13</sup> In what many politicians and ordinary people saw as a threat of the Other and a way of justifying the Other's 'transgressions', Vynnychenko considered which features might be advantageous for finding understanding among people and for the progress of civilization. Speculation that he was under the influence of his Jewish wife, Rosalia Lifshyts, cannot be taken seriously,<sup>14</sup> as he never emphasized her Jew-

<sup>3</sup> G. Grabowicz, 'The Jewish Theme in Nineteenth- and Early Twentieth-Century Ukrainian Literature', in P. J. Potichnyj and H. Aster (eds.), *Ukrainian-Jewish Relations in Historical Perspective*, 3rd edn. (Edmonton, 2010), 329.

<sup>4</sup> Ibid. 340.

<sup>5</sup> M. Shkandrij, *Jews in Ukrainian Literature: Representation and Identity* (New Haven, 2009).

<sup>6</sup> V. Lvov-Rogachevsky, *A History of Russian Jewish Literature*, ed. and trans. A. Levin (Ann Arbor, 1979).

<sup>7</sup> J. Kunitz, *Russian Literature and the Jew: A Sociological Inquiry into the Nature and Origin of Literary Patterns* (New York, 1929).

<sup>8</sup> H. Abramson, *A Prayer for the Government: Ukrainians and Jews in Revolutionary Times, 1917-1920* (Cambridge, Mass., 1999).

<sup>9</sup> I. Kleiner, *From Nationalism to Universalism: Vladimir (Ze'ev) Zhabotinsky and the Ukrainian Question* (Edmonton, 2000).

<sup>10</sup> K. B. Moss, *Jewish Renaissance in the Russian Revolution* (Cambridge, Mass., 2009).

<sup>11</sup> Y. Slezkine, *The Jewish Century* (Princeton, 2004).

<sup>12</sup> Potichnyj and Aster (eds.), *Ukrainian-Jewish Relations in Historical Perspective*.

<sup>13</sup> V. Vynnychenko, 'Yevreis'ke pytannya na Ukrayini', *Suchasnist'*, 1992, no. 8, p. 116; the article was originally published in *Nova Ukrayina*, 1923, nos. 7-8, pp. 20-31.

<sup>14</sup> See e.g. Z. Knysh, 'Vynnychenko chy Petlyura?', in id., *Tak pero pyshe: Vybrani statti* (Toronto, 1965), 178.



ishness and valued her above all as his closest friend and a beloved woman.<sup>15</sup> More profoundly, Vynnychenko should be approached as a consistent humanist, a champion of the ideal of universal brotherhood, and a representative of a stateless nation who was quite sensitive to national injustice and who shared that feeling with people from other subjugated national groups.

As a writer, Vynnychenko was among those who widely addressed Jewish themes in Ukrainian literature at the time of crucial social, political, and cultural upheavals which proceeded and followed the 1917 revolution in the Russian empire. To grasp Vynnychenko's interest in Jewish matters, one should approach him not only as a writer but also as a revolutionary and moralist. Having joined the revolutionary movement in 1902, soon after he had entered the faculty of law at Kiev University, he realized that no social revolution could succeed without revolution in people's minds and without an undermining of established traditions that appear obsolete in the age of modernity. The negative and superstitious view of the Jewish people, which had been fermenting for centuries and was supported by the state apparatus, was one of those traditions which, in his mind, had to be eliminated. Vynnychenko's world view at this stage was marked by a combination of various popular ideas and ideologies of the time—Marxism, Nietzscheanism, Bergsonianism, and Modernism—which found their way abundantly into his literary works.<sup>16</sup> The writer's search for the revolutionary ideal brought him to the concept of 'honesty with oneself', articulated in his scandalous novel *Chesnist' z soboyu* ('Honesty with Oneself'; 1910) and his article 'Pro moral' panuyuchykh i moral' pryhnoblenykh' ('About the Morality of Exploiters and Exploited'; published in *Nash holos*, 1911). This idealistic concept defined harmonious correspondence of thoughts and actions so that one might avoid psychological divisions and suffering, and, if applied to society at large, could stave off social and national conflicts. The most popular contemporary writer in Ukrainian literature before the 1917 revolution, Vynnychenko also managed to invade 'prohibited zones' and brought to the fore a number of other issues which had revolutionary significance for the burgeoning Ukrainian society: prostitution, love, marriage, family, and human instincts.

In this context, Jewish issues provided a promising direction for Vynnychenko's literary career, letting him portray the life of a significant stratum of Ukrainian society and present the complexity of the 'national question' in the Russian empire, and served as one more opportunity to provoke discussion about moral dilemmas and revolutionary changes in modern society. Significantly, the Jewish theme was addressed in Vynnychenko's first play, *Dyzharmoniya*, which he wrote in prison. The work depicts the revolutionary upheaval leading to the tsar's manifesto of

<sup>15</sup> They lived happily in their civil marriage from 1911 to 1951. Being displaced in emigration, Vynnychenko once commented about Rosalia, 'My home is wherever she is': unpublished 'Shchodennyk', 22 Nov. 1931: Vynnychenko Archive, Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences in the US, New York.

<sup>16</sup> These questions were addressed in Panchenko, 'Tvorchist' Volodymyra Vynnychenka'. Vynnychenko's world view from a social and political perspective was analysed in I. L. Rudnytsky, 'Volodymyr Vynnychenko in the Light of his Political Writing', in B. Rubchak (ed.), *Studies in Ukrainian Literature* (New York, 1986), 251–74.

17 October 1905, which sought to transform the Russian empire into a constitutional monarchy. A group of revolutionaries called for a meeting on the eve of the manifesto, to encourage people to continue their struggle against the tsarist regime. This resulted in an anti-Jewish pogrom organized by the notorious Black Hundred and pro-government forces, as well as in the arrest of revolutionaries.

The play conveys an essentially realistic portrayal of the pogrom, showing the atmosphere within various groups (revolutionaries, peasants, workers, government clerks) and the mechanisms of the pogrom and forces behind it. The fact that the pogrom was orchestrated by the tsarist government becomes clear in the text from the fact that it occurred simultaneously in a number of cities of the empire: Gomel, Minsk, Berdychiv, and Kishinev.<sup>17</sup> Antisemitic propaganda targeted déclassé and illiterate elements who could be easily bribed with small amounts of money, a glass of spirits, or a snack, and was provoked by statements that Jews were to blame for all problems. A government clerk is outraged when pogrom leaders, already bribed, demand more money and he has to concede. Even little boys are involved: they are paid by policemen to sell anti-Jewish proclamations right on the streets.<sup>18</sup>

Antisemitism in the play is explained by prejudice, dark instincts, and the activities of secret-service agents and monarchist forces, who masterfully manipulate and nurture certain social groups. When visitors to a tea house known as a gathering place for monarchists observe that it is *dymokraty* (democrats) who cause unrest in society, a *bosyak* (omnipresent hooligan) channels their outrage against the Jews, who allegedly want to ‘overthrow our tsar and enthrone their own’.<sup>19</sup> The discussion then evokes popular religion-based stereotypes about the Jewish people, including their ‘sin’ of crucifying the heavenly tsar (so why should they be afraid of the earthly tsar?), the comparison of them with the devil (who, in contrast, is powerless before the sign of the cross), their use of Christian blood for supposedly baking Jewish matzah, and their alleged pursuit of witchcraft (‘witches have been always killed’).

This indignation towards Jews extends also to the economic realm. To provoke the public, the ‘omnipresent hooligan’ suggests that the new manifesto would allow peasants to receive land, but that landowners and Jews oppose this and thus are rebelling against the tsar. Moreover, he argues, the Jews have already established their economic dominance (‘all the stores and all the riches are in Jewish hands’). ‘What is left for us? How to overcome our misfortune?’, he asks rhetorically. An anticipated response comes from a peasant: ‘How do they even dare to rebel?! And they don’t want to give us land?! . . . So . . . so . . . annihilate them!’<sup>20</sup> Equating Jews first with revolutionaries and then with landowners was a clear attempt to make them scapegoats for the critical situation in the empire.

And there is no reason to worry about the safety of pogromists, the government clerk assures them, as soldiers will be monitoring ‘order’.<sup>21</sup> In order to avoid political speculations, however, he is cautious about involving the police directly, as Petro

<sup>17</sup> V. Vynnychenko, *Dyzharmoniya*, 2nd edn. (Kiev, 1907), 155.

<sup>18</sup> Ibid. 20.

<sup>19</sup> Ibid. 61.

<sup>20</sup> Ibid. 90.

<sup>21</sup> Ibid. 64.

Iosypovych, the owner of the tea house, proposes ('Why not? We stand for the tsar . . . for the truth'). The pogrom should unfold naturally, as if coming directly from the people.<sup>22</sup> The whole operation would also have to take ritualistic form; people should attend church to pray for the tsar and then wear banners at demonstrations.

But are the revolutionaries themselves immune to established traditions and myths, including antisemitism? In this respect, *Dyzharmoniya* signifies Vynnychenko's move from the realistic observations of everyday life in his short stories of 1902–6 to the more intellectually intense world of ideas in his dramas and novels, in which he tries to answer this question. The play was one of the first attempts at a critical view of the revolution in the Russian imperial discourse, and the first of Vynnychenko's attempts to conceptualize a modern revolutionary ideal of a human being and a human relationship. Disharmony is seen as an imbalance between social and inner life, the collective and personal, and body and spirit, which would lead to inconsistency, split personality, and suffering. Hrytsko Polyachenko, a character in the work recently released from the prison, questions the moral purity of his fellow revolutionaries:

We are extremely disharmonious. We develop our mind but not our soul . . . Sure, ethics must exist! Our mind should be in harmony with blood, nerves, and body . . . I am sure that everyone looking inside himself could sometimes be frightened. Why? We are progressive people, we are fighters for truth and good, and we must be honest and exemplary. But we, like all other people, go to brothels, visit restaurants, make intrigues, gossip, lie, and envy.<sup>23</sup>

Antisemitism and attitudes to Jews, as Vynnychenko implies, may be another litmus test, or another 'moral laboratory' for revolutionaries and society at large.<sup>24</sup>

Among his revolutionaries, Lea, a young Jewish woman, seems to be the most adversely affected; she eventually suffers a split in her identity. At the beginning she seems to enjoy every drop of her life and is preoccupied with revolutionary changes. 'It's nice to live, Olha! It's extremely nice to live now! Everything is bubbling, shaking, and growing', she tells her fellow revolutionary Olha Polyachenko, who is divided between allegiance to her ailing husband Hrytsko and a latent physical passion for the strong Martyn. Lea does not care much about her ethnic background. She disregards any 'Zionist claims' which the Jewish community wants to impose on her and aspires to contribute to the whole society: 'What kind of a Jew am I first and foremost? [A Jew] because my father and mother are Jewish? But I don't know either the Jewish language or life, I know nothing. I grew up among Ukrainians and lived with them . . . so I am more a Ukrainian!' At this point she takes a universalist position, which, surprisingly, fits the Ukrainian rather than the Russian *univer-sum*. 'I don't recognize any national duties. Let nationalists deal with this. I want to

<sup>22</sup> Ibid. 65.

<sup>23</sup> Ibid. 36–7.

<sup>24</sup> The critic Danylo Struk described Vynnychenko's plays as a 'moral laboratory' in which he conducts experiments with human types and situations and tests certain ideas, projecting possible consequences and provoking the audience into discussion: D. H. Struk, 'Vynnychenko's Moral Laboratory', in Rubchak (ed.), *Studies in Ukrainian Literature*, 275–88.

live and do my best to help progress. This is my duty!’<sup>25</sup> By letting Lea articulate her voice through a Ukrainian prism, Vynnychenko was attempting to undermine the dominant imperial discourse, which had always tended to present all Russians as modern and universal in contrast to local and provincial.

However, after witnessing the pogrom and, in particular, the death of a little child, Lea suddenly feels herself Jewish in solidarity with her compatriots and wants to quit her membership of the party. ‘Shame on myself . . . that I could trust gentiles . . . and couldn’t feel what all Jews except me feel! I am a Jew, a Jew! . . . I realized that when they were dragging me along the ground holding my hair . . . I realized that . . .’<sup>26</sup> There are Nietzschean overtones to the awareness that gradually permeates her, that Jews, regardless of their social status, will always be persecuted until they become strong.<sup>27</sup> As Lea’s case attests, the pogrom was a turning point for widespread mobilization among Jews and for solidifying their national identity. Nietzschean views are consistently articulated by her boyfriend Martyn (‘Everyone is afraid of and respects a strong liar and derides and disrespects the weak’). Both seem to find solidarity in exercising power and strong will in the opposition of the Jewish and Ukrainian peoples to the powerful Russian empire.

Significantly, after the pogrom Lea is afraid of staying in the house of an Orthodox family.<sup>28</sup> At this point, she even provokingly questions the future loyalty of her socialist colleagues, who may transform into antisemites.<sup>29</sup> Her rage is now directed not only against the Russian imperial regime but also against local Ukrainians who participated in the pogrom. She even switches from speaking Ukrainian to Russian, symbolizing not pro-Russian sympathies but her emotional protest.

The play suggests that one reason why some Ukrainian social groups joined the pogrom was their weak national identity and the possibility that the regime could exploit this. Their identification as *rus’ki*<sup>30</sup> and Orthodox people, institutionalized by the empire, remained strong despite the consistent efforts of the intelligentsia to emancipate them. This split in identity even transcended family lines (e.g. Martyn versus his brother Petro Iosypovych), foreshadowing future civil conflicts. During an arrest, a police officer identifies the revolutionaries as Russians, although they identify themselves as Ukrainians. ‘Well . . . Little Russians, then . . . So, Russians, Little Russians—it’s all the same’, responds the officer, and then, ironically, agrees to write down that they are Ukrainians, a term used by the authorities to label members of Ukrainian political parties.<sup>31</sup>

Overall, in the early period of monarchist reaction in 1906, Vynnychenko was not as pessimistic as he became with his later novels, such as *Rivnovaha* (‘Equilibrium’; 1912), *Zapovit bat’kiv* (‘Testament of our Forefathers’; 1913), *Po-svii* (‘For One’s

<sup>25</sup> Vynnychenko, *Dyzharmoniya*, 19.

<sup>26</sup> *Ibid.* 167.

<sup>27</sup> *Ibid.* 155–6.

<sup>28</sup> *Ibid.* 171.

<sup>29</sup> *Ibid.* 169.

<sup>30</sup> The adjective *rus’kyi*, originally referring to the medieval state of Kievan Rus, was used in the Russian imperial discourse to solidify an imperial identity consisting of three East Slavonic ‘tribes’—Russian, Ukrainian, and Belarusian.

<sup>31</sup> Vynnychenko, *Dyzharmoniya*, 191.

Own'; 1913), and *Bozhky* ('Small Gods'; 1914). The ending of the play opens up hope for the normalization of Jewish–Ukrainian relationships. Arrested by the police, Lea and her fellow revolutionaries experience solidarity again in their opposition to the tsarist regime. This predicament also encourages Lea to confess to Martyn that she loves him and would look forward to their reunion after possible imprisonment or exile. On a personal level, the play emphasizes normal human relationships between Jews and Ukrainians and the overcoming of religious and cultural obstacles. Lea appears to be more positive with her energy and wholeheartedness and is closest to Vynnychenko's ideal of a harmonious person. The Ukrainian Olha is Lea's opposite, with her psychological division, lack of resolution, and even hypocrisy. In Vynnychenko's later novel *Chesnist' z soboyu*, a similar character, Vira Kyselska, commits suicide because of her internal disharmony.

It is also significant that no one declares that Jews must be baptized if they marry Christians. In this sense, *Dyzharmoniya* could be a pivotal play in Ukrainian literature, reflecting a new reality and treating Jews as equal partners, unlike Ivan Tohobochny's drama *Zhydivka-vykhrestka*, in which a Jewish girl, Sarah, abandons her religion to marry a Christian boy, but later commits suicide after he returns to a former lover. Vynnychenko, in fact, introduces a new type of character, a socialist and revolutionary who is either hostile or indifferent to all religions. Shkandrij's argument that Vynnychenko himself 'was not hostile to Judaism or Christianity'<sup>32</sup> is incorrect, as Vynnychenko constantly, in a thoroughly Marxist vein, considered Christianity and all other religions as obsolete traditions and obstacles to social progress. This negative attitude was more clearly pronounced in his later works, particularly in his unpublished philosophical treatise 'Konkordyzm' ('Concordism'; 1938–48).<sup>33</sup> He and Rosalia lived their life in a civil marriage.

Since Jewish political parties in Ukraine before 1917 were quite indifferent, or even hostile, to the Ukrainian movement, Vynnychenko takes this opportunity to seek their co-operation, as shown through the character of Lea. Vynnychenko, along with other Ukrainian and Jewish intellectuals such as Mykhailo Hrushevsky, Yevhen Chykalenko, Vladimir Jabotinsky, Solomon Goldelman, and Arnold Margolin, was well aware of the potential of Jewish–Ukrainian solidarity as a means to undermine the autocratic regime and obtain their national rights. The most prominent among them, Jabotinsky, actively collaborated in Ukrainian periodicals such as *Ukrainskie vesti* and *Ukrainskaya zhizn'* and noted a common social atmosphere in which Jewish and Ukrainian political activists grew up with shared objectives of national liberation and struggle against antisemitism.<sup>34</sup> After the pogroms of 1905–6, this need for co-operation became even more apparent.

One reason for Vynnychenko's attention to Jewish themes was a sense of national victimization and humiliation, shared by national groups in the Russian empire

<sup>32</sup> Shkandrij, *Jews in Ukrainian Literature*, 118.

<sup>33</sup> All his unpublished works are in the Vynnychenko Archive at the Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences in the US, New York.

<sup>34</sup> See Kleiner, *From Nationalism to Universalism*.

seeking to break imperial shackles. Vynnychenko reveals how this problem found its way into literary representations of national characters in Russian literature that helped to sustain imperial arrogance and ethnic stereotypes. To undermine this stereotype, he published an open letter to Russian writers, first published in the journal *Ukrainskaya zhizn'* and simultaneously in the St Petersburg newspaper *Den'*, which was reprinted several times and aroused heated debate.<sup>35</sup>

Vynnychenko, in particular, points to stereotypical representations of *khokhly*<sup>36</sup> in contemporary Russian literature. This stereotype, in his opinion, was derived from Nikolay Gogol's description of Ukrainian characters. Vynnychenko believes that little has changed since:

Always and everywhere a *khokhol* is a little bit silly, cunning, lazy, melancholic, and sometimes good-natured. Nothing can be learned from these stories about other human characteristics of *khokhly*. There are more than thirty million of them, and all that is described is their inflexibility and narrowness. Every character is a mentally challenged fool, or a silly lazybones, or a lazy swindler. And very rarely could there be a dull-witted, sentimental, and good-natured simpleton like the *khokhol* in Maxim Gorky's work.<sup>37</sup>

In revealing the imperial framework, Vynnychenko also shows how it was applied to other national groups who were misrepresented in Russian literature: Jews, Armenians, and Germans. As with the portrayals of Ukrainians, its main characteristics are clichés and stereotypes, hardly corresponding to reality:

A Jew, an Armenian, a *khokhol*, a German, or a representative of any other nationality have to have their unique 'national profile' in anecdotes. And of course, this has to be a profile which will make listeners laugh and be proud of their own 'national profile'. This is what the anecdote is about. It certainly says nothing about artistic truth and the creative analysis of such characters.<sup>38</sup>

This biased representation of Jews was also derived from Russian literary patterns which drew encouragement from government violence. Jabotinsky gives us examples of such attitudes in the works of Alexander Pushkin (*Skupoi rytsar'*), Turgenev ('Zhid'), Chekhov ('Tina'), Nekrasov (*Sovremenniki*), and Dostoevsky (his journalistic articles).<sup>39</sup> Though essentially humanistic, nineteenth-century Russian literature remained quite antisemitic, even as representations of Jews in Europe had become more positive.<sup>40</sup> Gorky, along with other Russian writers

<sup>35</sup> V. Vynnychenko, 'Otkrytoe pis'mo k russkim pisatelyam', *Ukrainskaya zhizn'*, 1913, no. 10. References below are to the reprint in *Slovo i chas*, 2000, no. 7, pp. 46–9.

<sup>36</sup> In Russian, *khokhol* (pl. *khokhly*) is a derogatory word for a Ukrainian, denoting originally a hairstyle common among Cossacks.

<sup>37</sup> Vynnychenko, 'Otkrytoe pis'mo k russkim pisatelyam', 47. Vynnychenko is alluding to Andry Nakhodka, 'a *khokhol* from Kaniv', in Gorky's novel *Mat'*.

<sup>38</sup> Vynnychenko, 'Otkrytoe pis'mo k russkim pisatelyam', 47.

<sup>39</sup> V. Jabotinsky, *Fel' etony*, 3rd edn. (Berlin, 1922), 126–30.

<sup>40</sup> B. Gorev, 'Russian Literature and the Jews', in Lvov-Rogachevsky, *History of Russian Jewish Literature*, 13–31; originally published in 1917.

(e.g. Korolenko, Artsybashev), was characterized by another form of Jewish misrepresentation, identified as 'lachrymose' (Salo W. Baron) or reflecting a 'reign of pity' (Kunitz).<sup>41</sup> A layer of sentimentality in their works is quite visible, producing aversion and pity for Jewish characters rather than more complex characterizations: 'Sweetly lachrymose stories about the "poor" little, "good" little, "honest" little—but "funny" little—Jew. Verily, the liberal Russian writers of the last three decades have shed more tears over the Jew than the Jew has managed to shed over himself. . . . How many didactic, sermonizing stories have been written about the pale, anaemic Jew.'<sup>42</sup> Although, as Shkandrij notes, some Ukrainian writers of the realist school (Bordulyak, Vasylychenko, Levytsky) demonstrated this shortcoming,<sup>43</sup> in general, Ukrainian literature followed quite a European vein and showed sympathy for Jewish cultural emancipation and for seeking national self-assertion (e.g. in works by Ivan Franko, Lesya Ukrayinka, Pavlo Hrabovsky, Mykhailo Starytsky). In Jabotinsky's opinion, Ukrainian literature was much more hospitable in its rendering of Jews and thus indicated solidarity. Hence, the general atmosphere in which Vynnychenko found himself was more pro-European and opposed to the imperial tradition in Russian literature.

No doubt Vynnychenko's commitment to dismissing imperial clichés and to presenting multifaceted and complex individuals encouraged him to produce a broad range of characters—peasants, students, city-dwellers, bourgeois, revolutionaries, and workers. Like other revolutionary writers, he wandered through Ukraine to become better acquainted with various strata of its population, a phenomenon called *khodinnya v narod* (going to the people). Among the misrepresented characters in the imperial discourse were Jews, especially revolutionary Jews; Vynnychenko featured them prominently.

The character of Pinya, an emancipated revolutionary Jew, is depicted in his story 'Talisman'.<sup>44</sup> The work tells how a modest and shy Jewish prisoner is transformed into a brave and responsible leader of a group seeking to escape jail. Despite their supposedly equal status, the writer shows patterns of power relationships among the revolutionaries, imposed by anarchists such as Zaletaev and his group. In this atmosphere, Pinya appears to be the weakest; he is disregarded and mocked. He used to think of himself:

You know what, Pinya, keep quiet! You are the smallest and the worst man in the world, so just keep quiet and smile. It's better. Smile even when you are being offended. If you and the dog Sharyk have a chance to finish the dish—just finish it. There are bigger, richer, and stronger people; there are smaller and weaker. But you, Pinya, are the smallest, the poorest, and the weakest.<sup>45</sup>

<sup>41</sup> Kunitz, *Russian Literature and the Jew*, 107.

<sup>42</sup> *Ibid.* 133.

<sup>43</sup> Shkandrij, *Jews in Ukrainian Literature*, 86.

<sup>44</sup> The story was initially published in Russian translation in V. Vinnichenko [Vynnychenko], *Sobranie sochinenii*, iv (Moscow, 1913). References below are to the edition in V. Vynnychenko, *Krasa i syła: Povisti ta opovidannya* (Kiev, 1989), 664–93.

<sup>45</sup> 'Talisman', 668.

Pinya ignores humiliation and always expresses a good nature. The narrator observes: 'I never noticed on small and freckled Pinya's face outrage, indignation, or even sadness and longing, which usually accompany prisoners. He looked at everything with a timid smile, a bit sweet and a bit good-natured.'<sup>46</sup>

Pinya suddenly changes when he is elected 'elder'. There is an irony in this election, as no one wanted to be voted into a position overburdened with the responsibility to communicate with the prison administration. In contrast to other prisoners, he takes his duties very seriously and works diligently at seeing that prisoners are provided with food, clean conditions, delivery of newspapers, and so on. 'Day by day, a former silly Ivanko, with a humiliated smile and hardly able to refuse anyone, was dying, being replaced by a young prince. Where old Pinya disappeared to, where and when his rebirth began—all this was a mystery. What was clear for us was that the old Pinya was gone, and instead we had a new, careful, restless, and quite skilful elder Pinya.'<sup>47</sup>

Everyone, even former opponents, now recognizes Pinya as an effective leader capable of designing a successful escape. Serdyukov, who is supposed to go first and confront the prison guard, suddenly refuses to place himself at risk, so Pinya, as an elder, takes this role on himself. Vynnychenko does not depict Pinya as a superhero. He idealizes neither him nor the other revolutionaries and masterfully conveys the sense of fear they experience. Nevertheless, Pinya, devoted to his duty and the revolutionary cause, leads the escape and dies while facilitating his colleagues' flight.

Starting with Jewish traits typically found in literary discourse (Pinya is physically weak, defenceless, and awkward), Vynnychenko develops him into a complex character. In doing so he bridges tradition and modernism and sets out what was defined above as his 'programmatic' position in representing Jewish characters. The image of Pinya is also symbolic in that it shows the revival of the most oppressed national group of the Russian empire. Depicting mostly Ukrainians, the writer expresses solidarity with Jews, seeing both groups as persecuted peoples who rebel to destroy the imperial order.

Vynnychenko's solidarity with Jews in their opposition to the Russian empire and his hopes for their eventual support for an independent Ukrainian state seemed justified during the Ukrainian revolution, though for just a short period. Speaking about the role of non-Ukrainian democrats, namely Jews and Poles, in this revolution, he indicates that these two nationalities would be unlikely to support Russian domination in Ukraine. He first stresses the role of Jews, who have no reason to oppose a Ukrainian state:

understanding that in a democratic society the nation that constitutes the majority of the population will be a dominant force, [and] assuming that Ukrainians would soon inevitably end the dominance of the Russians, they [Jews] did not have any reason to oppose Ukrainians and support Russian domination. They accepted the idea of Ukrainian statehood

<sup>46</sup> 'Talisman', 668.

<sup>47</sup> Ibid. 680.



in their consciousness as a fact and as something natural and inevitable, adjusted their own aspirations to it, and recognized themselves absolutely consciously, resolutely, and consistently as citizens of the Ukrainian state, as was stated in the Universal.<sup>48</sup>

Vynnychenko's views echo those that had been promoted energetically from the Jewish side by Jabotinsky and his followers from 1904. The prominent Zionist Joseph Schechtman, for example, wrote in 1917, when mutual sympathy between the two nations had reached its peak:

From the Jewish side, Ukrainian national aspirations met with the natural sympathy that Jewry expresses towards all oppressed elements fighting for liberation. The leading Ukrainian circles, in their turn, had a thoughtful and sympathetic attitude towards the Jewish national movement . . . The Jewish people's national demands . . . undoubtedly correspond to national political attitudes towards national minorities that are now being expressed by a renascent Ukrainianism. A broad path of national co-operation lies before Jews and Ukrainians.<sup>49</sup>

As the first prime minister of the first Ukrainian government, a member of the General Secretariat (1917–18), and co-chair of the Directory (1918–19), Vynnychenko helped establish the Ministry of Jewish Affairs and sought the support of Jewish parties for the Ukrainian cause. However, it was already beyond his authority to stop anti-Jewish rampages in Ukraine after the Bolshevik and White Army invasions that led to the militarization of the Directory. In his well-documented account of the Ukrainian revolution, *Vidrodzhennya natsiyi* ('The Rebirth of a Nation'; 1920), Vynnychenko outlined the main reasons behind the growth of antisemitism: the deep ignorance and superstitions of the masses; political manipulations and the directing of social discontent against Jews; racial differences; the promotion of religious intolerance; the specific professional role of Jews as tradesmen; and economic competition. He claimed that these factors all contributed to fermenting violence in an atmosphere of cultural ignorance, social chaos, and civil war.<sup>50</sup>

Vynnychenko did not elaborate on the pogroms of 1917–21 in his fictional works the play *Mizh dvokh syl* (1919)<sup>51</sup> and the novel *Na toi bik* ('To the Other Side'; written from 1919 onwards, published in 1923), but focused principally on the Russian–Ukrainian conflict and the challenges to a Ukrainian identity torn between social and national choices. In the former, he also introduced the topic of Jewish Bolsheviks, represented by the Bolshevik leader Grinberg. Although there are no references to Grinberg's Jewish origins, one may assume them from his last name, which distinguishes him from the Russian Bolsheviks Semyannikov, Podkopaev, Sinitsyn, and Sorokin. While the Russians in the work reveal their traditional

<sup>48</sup> V. Vynnychenko, *Vidrodzhennya natsiyi*, 3 vols. (Kiev and Vienna, 1920), i. 286. He is referring here to the First Universal, adopted on 26 June 1917.

<sup>49</sup> J. Schechtman, *Evrei i ukraintsy* (Odessa, 1917), 30–1.

<sup>50</sup> Vynnychenko, *Vidrodzhennya natsiyi*, iii. 362–4.

<sup>51</sup> V. Vynnychenko, *Mizh dvokh syl* (Kiev, 1919). The play, an account of the first Bolshevik invasion in early 1918, was written in June 1918 and staged the same year.

chauvinistic perception of Ukrainians and Ukraine, referring to Count Petr Valuev's notorious phrase '[it] never existed, does not exist, and never will exist',<sup>52</sup> Grinberg justifies his Bolshevism from a social and ideological perspective. Although manipulative in his behaviour, he does not express his 'aversion towards all things Ukrainian', as Shkandrij claims.<sup>53</sup> Having grown up in Ukraine, Grinberg shows some kind of loyalty to Ukrainian culture and speaks fluent Ukrainian. As a Bolshevik leader, however, he has to adjust to the dominant Russian language of the Red invaders; hence the role as Russifier that was to nourish antisemitism among Ukrainians. As a Jew, he is not predisposed to Russian imperialism but becomes its tool. On the other hand, his place shows his subordinate and dependent position with regard to the Russians in national terms. Although quite schematic, the image of Grinberg nevertheless leaves some potential for a different scenario under different historical circumstances.

Having emigrated permanently in 1920, Vynnychenko remained interested in the Jewish question and kept his contacts with Jewish circles. While in Germany (1921–5), he attended the Yiddish theatre, seeing performances of works such as *The Dybbuk* by S. An-sky, a play that brought the theatre international recognition.<sup>54</sup> Vynnychenko collaborated with a Jewish publisher and businessman, Solomon Zaltsman, to produce his new play *Pisnya Izrayilya* and to establish the Ukrainfilm studio,<sup>55</sup> he also worked with the Jewish West Ukrainian publisher Yakiv Orenshtein. To reach a Russian-speaking audience, which included many Jewish émigrés from the former Russian empire, he produced a Russian version of 'Talisman' in 1922. Later, in France, the story was accepted for publication in the journal *Europe*.<sup>56</sup>

Politically active in the early 1920s, Vynnychenko contributed articles to the journals *Nova doba* (1920–1) and *Nova Ukrayina* (1922–8), directed mainly against Russian chauvinistic policies in Soviet Ukraine. In this context, he characterized the mistakes of those policies regarding Jewish issues and theorized about the growth of antisemitism in Soviet Ukraine. In his article 'Yevreis'ke pytannya na Ukrayini' ('The Jewish Question in Ukraine'; 1923), in which he referred to Gorky's recent interview with the American press, he argued that antisemitism derived from the critical economic, social, and political situation in the country and was exacerbated by Jews who had been sent to expropriate bread and confiscate churches in Ukrainian villages. Vynnychenko identified the Politburo of the

<sup>52</sup> Vynnychenko, *Mizh dvokh syl*, 117. Petr Valuev, the Minister of Internal Affairs of the Russian empire, issued a circular on 18 July 1863 banning the use of Ukrainian in various categories of publication, including religious and educational literature. His dictum quoted here referred to the existence of the Ukrainian language, but in the context of the play the reference is to the existence of Ukraine itself.

<sup>53</sup> Shkandrij, *Jews in Ukrainian Literature*, 116.

<sup>54</sup> V. Vynnychenko, *Shchodennyk*, ii: 1921–1925, ed. H. Kostyuk (Edmonton and New York, 1983), diary notes for 30 Sept. and 23 Nov. 1921.

<sup>55</sup> *Ibid.*, diary notes for 28 Dec. 1921.

<sup>56</sup> V. Vynnychenko, *Shchodennyk*, iii: 1926–1928, ed. H. Kostyuk (Kiev, Edmonton, and New York, 2010), diary note for 28 Apr. 1927. It is unknown, however, if the story was actually published.

Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party as the main agency for manipulating the Jewish people and creating an atmosphere of antisemitism; he believed this would not solve the problem but would lead to future atrocities. Ukrainian–Jewish enmity was further heightened by the policies that initiated Jewish mass colonization of southern Ukraine and Crimea in 1924. This was a cunning policy of Moscow, whose goals included exacerbating Jewish–Ukrainian relations (following the principle *divide et impera*), undercutting the Zionist movement (which would soon be banned), finding political support among Jews, and stimulating foreign investment in the project.<sup>57</sup> Vynnychenko still encouraged the Ukrainian people to look for ways to work with Jews:

It is in the interest of the Ukrainian people to have friends and collaborators, not enemies, among Jews. The damage brought by some Jewish elements to the Ukrainian national liberation movement by implementing centralizing and Russifying orders from Moscow cannot be undone by hatred, revenge, pogroms, the expulsion of the Jews, or the restriction of their rights, as is demanded by the antisemites. It can be achieved by engaging Jewry in the interests of Ukraine in its state, national, and autonomous manifestations and through accepting them as equals in our common economic, political, and cultural collective.<sup>58</sup>

This interest in the ‘Jewish question’ led Vynnychenko to deal extensively with a Jewish theme in his play *Pisnya Izrayilya (Kol-Nidre)* (1922), another account of the pogroms of 1905. Analyses have questioned why Vynnychenko again addressed the pogroms of that year instead of the recent and more tragic ones that followed the 1917 revolution. From the Soviet point of view, the play was apparently considered outdated or even harmful for building socialism, because it focused on pre-revolutionary events and ignored cardinal post-revolutionary changes.<sup>59</sup> Moreover, it was claimed that after the establishment of the Soviet Union, the national question was on a course to be successfully resolved. The critic Yury Smolych, however, commented on the success of the play as a piece of theatre: ‘It is put together skilfully and effectively for the stage and is 100 per cent in accord with the qualities of this genre, which will ensure 100 per cent ticket sales.’<sup>60</sup> At the same time, Vynnychenko’s recent plays were criticized by the prominent émigré critic and poet Yevhen Malanyuk for their ‘spiritual petrification’; Malanyuk claimed that he did not depart from the socio-psychological drama of the pre-revolutionary period.<sup>61</sup>

Vynnychenko’s focus on a more remote event can be explained by several factors. He did not personally experience the most severe wave of pogroms in 1919, having

<sup>57</sup> The process of Jewish colonization of southern Ukraine and Crimea, as well as the Birobidzhan area in the Far East, was a close focus of the international press, including the Russian, Ukrainian, and Jewish émigré press. See e.g. Kleiner, *From Nationalism to Universalism*, 139–43.

<sup>58</sup> Vynnychenko, ‘Yevreis’ke pytannya na Ukrayini’, 124.

<sup>59</sup> See Yu. Smolych, ‘Novi p’yesy V. Vynnychenka (“Nad”, “Velykyi sekret”, “Kol-Nidre”)’, *Ukrayins’ke literaturoznavstvo*, 57 (1993), 118–33; first published in *Krytyka*, 1929, no. 4.

<sup>60</sup> Smolych, ‘Novi p’yesy V. Vynnychenka’, 131.

<sup>61</sup> See Moroz, ‘*Sto rivnotsinnykh pravd*’, 79.

resigned as a co-chair of the Directory in February of that year and gone temporarily abroad. Feeling nostalgia for the past, he seemed more comfortable speaking about the Jewish problem from a distance and in the context of the Russian empire. Certainly he agreed with many Ukrainian and some Jewish émigrés who did not consider the national question resolved in the Soviet Union.<sup>62</sup> In addition, as emerges from his diary, he counted on the commercial success of his play. In particular, he negotiated with Zaltsman to stage the play in the United States and to produce a film based on it for release by the studio Ukrainfilm, to be staged with another of his works, the novel *Sonyachna mashyna* ('The Solar Machine'; written in 1921–4, published in 1928). These plans did not materialize because of financial problems. After his migration to France in 1925, he also counted on Jewish support to stage it there.<sup>63</sup> At that point in his life, Vynnychenko considered his literary output, especially his plays, an important element of his livelihood.<sup>64</sup> The play was indeed published in 1930 in Ukraine by the Kharkiv publisher Rukh before a ban was imposed in the Soviet Union on all his works.

But despite these factors and despite the Jewish theme of *Pisnyia Izrayilya*, enunciated clearly in the title, the play had broader significance. It is concerned with *bozhky* (idols), and it shows the transformation of revolutionaries into new 'priests' who strive only to take power but fail to change society's foundations. Vynnychenko thought it extremely important to expose such 'idols' as the main obstacle to the progress of civilization. He had conceptualized this idea in his books *Po-svii* (1913) and *Bozhky* (1914), and repeatedly emphasized it in later works.<sup>65</sup> It is in this framework that *Pisnyia Izrayilya* should be analysed. The prejudiced and contemptuous attitude towards Jews and the stereotypical view of them as enemies of Christianity or even as an absolute evil—these prejudices are simply another idol created by mankind. Vynnychenko was aware of the complex relationship between Jews and the Christian world, but he sought to transcend past grievances and tried to build a new relationship on a human basis.

In broad social terms, Vynnychenko analyses the triangular relationship between the Russian empire, Jewry, and Ukraine. He exposes the antisemitic and inhumane

<sup>62</sup> That was, for example, the position of those in national-democratic circles close to the Parisian weekly *Tryzub*, and of Jewish political activists such as Jabotinsky and Margolin, whose negative attitude to how the Jewish question was being solved in the Soviet Union was expressed in articles reprinted in that weekly: V. Jabotinsky, 'Kryms'ka kolonizatsiya', *Tryzub*, 16 Jan. 1927, pp. 7–12 (reprinted from *Jewish Morning Journal*, 4 June 1926); A. Margolin, 'Derzhava Kalinina chy respublika Bragina', *Tryzub*, 3 Apr. 1927, pp. 11–15 (reprinted from *The New Palestine*, 17 Dec. 1926).

<sup>63</sup> Vynnychenko, *Shchodennyk*, ii, diary note for 16 Nov. 1925.

<sup>64</sup> His plays were staged in many European countries. *Brekhnya* ('The Lie'; 1910), for example, had a successful sixty-performance run at the Volksbühne in Berlin, while in Italy it ran for more than 300 performances. *Chorna Pantera i Bilyi Vedmid'* ('The Black Panther and the Polar Bear'; 1911) was made into a German film in 1921.

<sup>65</sup> It was comprehensively addressed in his play *Prorok* ('The Prophet'; 1929), which demonstrated how new ideas, based on the common principles of love, happiness, and truth, were corrupted and transformed into ideological dogmas—reflecting power relations in a society.

basis of the state policies of the Russian empire, which, in order to preserve itself and defeat the powerful revolutionary movement, created an atmosphere conducive to antisemitism and encouraged pogroms. In the play, this policy is represented by Mityakhin, a lawyer and a member of the state Duma. Liberally using menacing phrases (for example, he says he can 'kill with words'), he is an organizer of the staged trial of Leizer Blyumkes, who is accused of killing a Christian boy for ritual purposes and of causing the subsequent pogrom. Vynnychenko reveals Mityakhin as prone to dogma and prejudice, in particular with reference to Jews. Mityakhin cannot grasp why the marshal of the Russian nobility Petro Semenovych Konchynsky has a Jewish tutor, Aron, teaching his 12-year-old son. Responding to a question by the boy's sister, Nata, as to why this matters, he says, 'It matters because we ourselves allow Jews to dominate us, Christians. It means that we could not find a teacher for a Russian nobleman's son and had to come to a Jew. You see why it matters!'<sup>66</sup> Mityakhin is suspicious of Aron even when he converts to Christianity and becomes the famous musician Mykola Leonidovych Blyumsky: 'Sure, the Jewish nation knows how to adapt . . . all the same, a Jew remains in most of them. It does not matter how you clean and baptize them, they still remain loyal to each other. Look how they support each other throughout the world. They look really European and you cannot recognize whether one is American, German, or French.'<sup>67</sup>

Mityakhin not only attacks Jews verbally but also acts against them and involves other people, including the student Pamfilov. Pamfilov appears only in Acts I and IV, but with a significant change. When in Act I Pamfilov plays chess and innocently makes fun of hungry Aron greedily eating his pastries, in Act IV chess is already a childish amusement for Pamfilov. He does not attend classes at the university and is now involved in organizing a pogrom.

In contrast to the reactionary Mityakhin, the marshal of the Russian nobility Petro Konchynsky seems sober-minded and moderate. He does not employ ridicule but tries to explain logically to his daughter Nata why it is unreasonable for her to marry Aron, a Jew:

I still want to believe that you can understand the voice of common sense. Listen to me, Nata, calm down a bit and listen quietly. What do you want? You want to break down ancient traditions and erase differences which have been established for millennia. I and Aron Leizerovych are of different races, cultures, and world views. Maybe he is a good man but he is a stranger to us.<sup>68</sup>

In the end Konchynsky would prefer his daughter's death to the shame of being related to Jews. What would people think? Moreover, he has two other children and needs to think about their futures too. Thus, the idols require a sacrifice: the death of his own child.

<sup>66</sup> V. Vynnychenko, *Pisnya Izrayilya*, in *Blyznyata shche zustrinut'sya: Antolohiya dramaturhiyi ukrayins' koyi diaspori*, ed. L. Zaleska Onyshkevych (Kiev and Lviv, 1997), 59.

<sup>67</sup> *Ibid.* 91.

<sup>68</sup> *Ibid.* 103.

The non-acceptance of Jews by Konchynsky's wife is different. It is not rational but somewhat passive, a consequence of social conventions. Her idols are prejudice and darkness. When her son requests that she give hungry Aron something to eat, she replies spontaneously: 'For God's sake, are you out of your mind?'<sup>69</sup> But her maternal instinct prevails and she agrees to Nata's marriage to Aron when Nata threatens suicide. In a moment, all the idols disappear.

In contrast to *Dyzharmoniya*, in this play Vynnychenko does not reveal the anti-semitism of the lower classes, though one may assume it from Konchynsky's remark: 'Even a doorman could see that this is idiotic: a daughter of the marshal of nobility and a . . . certain Jew.'<sup>70</sup>

In *Pisny Izrayilya*, Vynnychenko questions the traditions and stereotypes not only of the Russian nobility and the Ukrainian masses but also of Jews. The Jewish people's encounter with modernity after they had been restricted to the Pale of Settlement and had had only limited access to broader society was especially painful. It is a shock for Leizer Blyumkes's family to know that their son wishes to marry a gentile. Having convinced themselves that Aron is not sick, they pronounce him insane. Outraged, his father tries to prevent him from taking this reckless step: 'You want to betray your people, faith, and parents, and you, you bastard, want to seduce even us.'<sup>71</sup> Aron tries to defend himself by appealing to humanism: 'I am first of all a human being and want to be a human being! All people can live in brotherhood, without enmity and hatred. I want to live that way. I don't want hatred. I want to be neither Christian nor Jew but only a human being and an artist!'<sup>72</sup> For his father, this is a gulf that cannot be crossed and an untouchable principle that cannot be violated: the son is anathematized and expelled from his house. An insatiable idol has accepted one more sacrifice. Such apostasy for the Blyumkeses is worse than death and creates a wound of family disgrace that cannot be healed. Not surprisingly, Leizer follows the wedding procession of his son with a gun. As in the case of Konchynsky, the father appears to be a priest of an idol. If paternal rationalism conceded to maternal instinct in Nata's family, the will of the male and father cannot be challenged in a Jewish family. Thus, neither Aron's mother nor his sister Mira tries to defend him. Moreover, Mira takes her brother's intention to marry Nata as a blood insult and seeks revenge. But she steps back after she sees Nata refusing to eat for the sake of her love to Aron. An idol wanted another sacrifice but at this time postponed it until the next occasion.

Nata and Aron oppose this dark force, although Nata will soon have to bow before it. A strong personality with an emotional and expansive nature, she pursues personal happiness and thus undermines the foundation on which idols stand: 'So I have to yield to what I consider nonsense?! I have to respect all kinds of superstitions and sacrifice my happiness for them? Never! Let other people suffer, if they don't understand, but I don't want to resign myself to the darkness and stupidity of

<sup>69</sup> Vynnychenko, *Pisny Izrayilya*, 60.

<sup>70</sup> *Ibid.* 104.

<sup>71</sup> *Ibid.* 91.

<sup>72</sup> *Ibid.*

people.<sup>73</sup> Her humanism, however, appears superficial and self-interested. She does support Aron's protest against the faked trial of Leizer Blyumkes. In her opinion, the Jewish Blyumkes has nothing in common with the baptized Mykola Leonidovych Blyumsky. Aron now realizes that Nata and her environment will only accept him if he eradicates all that is Jewish in him: he has been asked to be baptized, change his name, and not play the Jewish melody 'Kol nidrei' (though Nata fell in love with Aron listening to him performing it). Looking at Nata's child, the Konchynskys express concern that the baby may have 'Semitic' features. The old idol of antisemitism is awaiting its sacrifice.

This sacrifice will be Aron. Always hungry, awkward, and modest, he was first the butt of people's laughter, but soon aroused interest through his talent, politeness, and kindness. He views the prospects of his marriage to a Christian girl more realistically than does Nata (its success would be as if a fairy tale); yet having been convinced of Nata's serious intention, he decides to seek his happiness as a human being. Unlike Nata, Aron loses much: he is anathematized and expelled from his family, forced to be baptized, changes his name, and cannot play Jewish music at home. Having made all these sacrifices, Aron eventually rises up to protest against the Konchynskys' anti-humanism in relation to his father. He stands up for his father as a human, not a Jew. But his choice to marry Nata, and his humanism and ideals of the primacy of the individual human being over racial, ethnic, or cultural prejudices, are now shown to have been based on false premises. As in the case of Lea in *Dyzharmoniya*, Jewish identity is awakened in Aron: 'I am a human being with other human beings, but with haters of my people I am a Jew.'<sup>74</sup> The tragedy reaches its apogee after Aron learns from his sister Mira about a new pogrom in which his parents have likely perished. Realizing the hopeless nature of his situation, Aron, while playing 'Kol nidrei', takes poison. An idol has been appeased.

Exploiting a Jewish theme in the period of heated debates on the national question also enabled the raising of the Ukrainian question. This issue remained crucial for Vynnychenko in emigration, since he clearly identified the main threat to Ukraine's independence as Russian imperialism in Bolshevik disguise, rather than the Jews, as some Russian or Ukrainian émigrés would argue. While the struggle for Ukrainian identity and a political voice were clearly presented in *Dyzharmoniya*, in *Pisnyia Izrayilya* they are implicit. The reader is given no clue as to where the events take place and may assume that the setting is in Russia. However, Vynnychenko notes in his initial remarks to the play that the location is one of the largest cities in Ukraine. Yet the word 'Ukraine' occurs just once. But if it does take place in Ukraine, what is Ukrainian here? All the important positions are occupied by Russians: Konchynsky represents high-born nobility, Mityakhin—the current state authorities, Professor Sukhonin—university staff, Pamfilov—students; and only a cursory image of the maidservant Frosya shows that Ukraine is still alive and serves its masters, as the police, and also *rus'ki* people, do.

<sup>73</sup> Ibid. 79.

<sup>74</sup> Ibid. 124.

A new interest in the Jewish theme was sparked in 1926–7 in connection with the assassination of the former head of the Directory Symon Petlyura by the Jewish activist Sholom Schwartzbard on 25 May 1926. The killing was followed by heated debates in the world press. Vynnychenko soon responded to this tragic event with his article ‘Nebezpechni nastroyi’ (‘Dangerous States of Mind’).<sup>75</sup> Shocked by the murder and considering it a crime, he nevertheless warned against further escalation of enmity and revenge from both sides. He already saw that tendency in the attempts of some Ukrainian émigré groups to create a ‘united national front’. In his opinion, the Russian community, both in emigration and in the Soviet Union, was the only side that would benefit from the assassination. It would enable them to present an image of the Ukrainian people as pogromists who do not deserve statehood and arouse the fear of revenge among Jews in Ukraine, who would now oppose the Ukrainian national authorities and seek protection from Moscow. At the same time, Vynnychenko remained critical of the main political centres in the Ukrainian emigration, in which he had been virtually ostracized and barred from any political influence. A consistent Marxist, he never ceased to believe in a future communist society; he believed that all problems would be automatically solved with the fall of capitalism: ‘Social and economic factors, class struggle, and exploitation of men by men always have been and will be the first reason for national conflicts. Only the elimination of social and economic inequality and exploitation and the establishment of a workers’ democracy will bring us to their final and total solution.’<sup>76</sup>

This new attention to the Jewish question may have prompted Vynnychenko to introduce the Jew Naum Abramovych Finkel and his family into his social-political novel *Poklady zolota* (‘The Deposits of Gold’), which he started in the summer of 1926. Like *Mizh dvokh syl*, this new book makes no reference to the characters’ Jewishness. A former banker in pre-revolutionary Ukraine, Finkel is now a ‘miserable emigrant’. Along with a Ukrainian emigrant, Prokip Kruk, who has become a banker in France, he is now involved in a questionable business affair. In a very symbolic way, the novel depicts the tragic fate of people caught up in the turbulent times of the First World War, the 1917 revolution, and emigration, showing their longing for what has been forsaken and the desire to attain happiness and return to the ‘Lost Paradise’ (a working title for the novel). In this light, Finkel’s Jewish background does not have meaning in this text, as he feels comfortable in the Ukrainian émigré milieu, and his daughter Nina is in love with Kruk.

Ukrainianization, or acculturation of Jews, was for Vynnychenko an important factor in strengthening the young Ukrainian statehood. By contrast, Russification was seen as a continuing manifestation of Russian imperialism. He was especially impressed by his meeting in Paris with Soviet Ukrainian representatives of Jewish background, such as the writer Ivan Kulyk, and noted that his former efforts had not been in vain: ‘The “representatives of Ukraine” I met yesterday, who spoke

<sup>75</sup> V. Vynnychenko, ‘Nebezpechni nastroyi’, *Dilo* (Lviv), 25 June 1926, p. 2, and 26 June 1926, p. 2.

<sup>76</sup> *Ibid.*



Ukrainian with their wives, are a positive phenomenon and the result of our struggle. We begot and created these Jews who joined Ukrainian culture and who are now moving it forward. I was glad and proud to look at the results of this struggle.<sup>77</sup>

In *Poklady zolota*, however, he failed to deal with the growing complexities of the Jewish–Ukrainian relationship. In the historical context of rapidly growing enmity between the two groups after Petlyura's assassination, the kind of unity he called for in 'Nebezpechni nastroyi' was clearly an ideal whose realization was far off.

With time, Vynnychenko became disillusioned with politics; he was impatient with émigré squabbles and the impossibility of return. His concentration on literature brought him great success in the 1920s in both Europe and Ukraine. In the 1930s, however, his works were totally proscribed in the Soviet Union, and remained so until perestroika. He was unable to earn a living with his literary work in France, where he stayed until his death in 1951. Disillusioned with the Soviet practice of socialist building and also with the realities of Western capitalism, he felt more a 'citizen of the world' and proposed his own doctrine of 'concordism', aimed at reconciling human life with the inner self, the collective, and nature, and rooted in the universal human desire for happiness. His voice, sometimes naive and idealistic, could hardly be heard in the period in which nationalist ideologies were dominant.

In this context, Vynnychenko's interest in Jewish issues remained sporadic. In his unpublished novel 'Vichnyi imperatyv' ('The Eternal Imperative'; 1936), he created a fictional Jewish journalist Schwarzmann, reflecting a different reality. Largely motivated by Vynnychenko's loneliness and reflections on the relationship between the individual and the collective, the novel provides a retrospective view of European society in the 1930s (as seen by future generations through special equipment that provides accelerated vision), with its intense ideological struggles, totalitarian and nationalist tendencies (communism and fascism), political crises, international espionage, and moral decline. Schwarzmann is an escapee from one totalitarian state, Germany. Along with a Russian escapee from another, the engineer Akimov, he holds the secret to a new powerful weapon, a 'radio gun', and both fall victim to the political intrigues of German, French, and Soviet authorities. These images, like those in Vynnychenko's social-political articles, appear quite schematic and representative of a certain idea rather than of a complex character.

Sensitive to the new realities after Hitler's and Stalin's centralization of power, Vynnychenko might have commented in his diaries and other documents on the Holocaust, the creation of a Jewish state, and other matters of Jewish interest. These materials, however, still remain unpublished and require further research.

Overall, the Jewish theme is quite evident in Vynnychenko's writing, in particular from his early period to the beginning of his final emigration in the 1920s. It was appealing to the writer in so far as the Jewish question was important in the Russian empire and the Soviet Union. It also allowed him to address moral issues of modernity, including antisemitism, which was to serve as a litmus test for social and

<sup>77</sup> Vynnychenko, *Shchodennyk*, iii, diary note for 2 Feb. 1927.

cultural maturity and progress. Even more important for Vynnychenko is that the Jewish theme inevitably raises issues of Ukrainian identity and national liberation, topics which were on his immediate agenda as a writer and politician. By introducing Jewish themes, he explicitly or implicitly addressed the common experience of oppression, victimization, and solidarity of Jews and Ukrainians, as well as the need for further dialogue and ways of peaceful coexistence. Vynnychenko was convinced that in those historical circumstances the main threat to both Ukrainian and Jewish freedom came from Russian imperialism, regardless of its ideological disguises.

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# The 'Jewish Question' in the Ukrainian Nationalist Discourse of the Inter-War Period

TARAS KURYLO

IN APRIL 1941 the Second Congress of the Bandera faction of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (Orhanizatsiia ukraïns'kykh natsionalistiv; OUN) adopted a resolution that read: 'Jews in the USSR constitute the most dedicated underpinning of the ruling Bolshevik regime and the vanguard of Muscovite imperialism in Ukraine.' The Banderites pledged to 'combat Jews as supporters of the Muscovite-Bolshevik regime' but at the same time made Ukrainians 'conscious of the fact that the principal foe is Moscow'.<sup>1</sup> A month later the leadership of the Bandera faction drew up guidelines for its course of action in the event of a future Soviet-German war. The guidelines, entitled 'The Struggle and Activities of the OUN during War-time', envisaged a partial extermination of the Jews and the expulsion or ghettoization of the rest during the initial phase of securing the area and establishing state institutions.<sup>2</sup>

In the summer of 1941, after the outbreak of the Soviet-German war, the Banderites issued several proclamations calling for the destruction of the Jews.<sup>3</sup> The OUN leaders expressed support for 'bringing German methods of exterminat-

I would like to express my gratitude to John-Paul Himka and Per Rudling for their comments, which helped me improve this study.

<sup>1</sup> 'Postanovy II Velykoho Zboru OUN u Krakovi', in *Ukraïns'ke derzhavotvorennia: Akt 30 chervnia 1941. Zbirnyk dokumentiv i materialiv*, ed. O. Dzyuban (Lviv, 2001), 11.

<sup>2</sup> One of the most outspoken parts of the guidelines deals with hostile ethnic groups (i.e. Russians, Poles, Jews) and provides for their 'extermination in the struggle, especially those who defend the regime; deportation of them to their homelands, exterminating chiefly the intelligentsia, which should not be allowed to hold any administrative positions. In general, we make the creation of an intelligentsia impossible, that is, access to schools etc. . . . Leaders are to be destroyed . . . Assimilation of Jews is excluded': 'Borot'ba i diyal'nist' OUN pid chas viiny', in I. Patrylyak, *Viis'kova diyal'nist' OUN(b) u 1940-1942 rokakh* (Kiev, 2004), 485-6. See also K. C. Berkhoff and M. Carynyk, 'The Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and its Attitude toward Germans and Jews: Iaroslav Stets'ko's 1941 *Zhyttiepyś*', *Harvard Ukrainian Studies*, 23/3-4 (1999), 153-4.

<sup>3</sup> 'Vidozva Kraiovoho provodu OUN na MUZ', in *Ukraïns'ke derzhavotvorennia*, ed. Dzyuban, 129; 'Instruktsiia No. 6 kraiovoho providnyka OUN (S. Bandery) na ZUZ I. Klymiva (Ye. Lehendy)', in *OUN v 1941 rotsi: Dokumenty*, 2 vols., ed. O. Veselova et al. (Kiev, 2006), ii. 453.

ing Jewry to Ukraine, barring their assimilation', and for 'adopting any methods that lead to their destruction'.<sup>4</sup> OUN documents and newspapers of this period display a plethora of antisemitic references. There is overwhelming evidence that the OUN-organized Ukrainian militia had become involved in anti-Jewish pogroms and executions before being disbanded by the Nazis in August 1941.<sup>5</sup>

This essay shows that the OUN's anti-Jewish stance was not only an outcome of the alliance with Nazi Germany but also a result of Ukrainian nationalist inter-war political tradition. It examines the 'Jewish question' in nationalist publications in the inter-war period with a view to tracing the development of the anti-Jewish theme, its key elements, and its driving forces. The study focuses on nationalist outlets that had a significant impact on western Ukrainian society and does not pretend to represent a comprehensive investigation of the topic; it analyses the most representative and influential nationalist publications.

I approach a subject which, despite the abundance of available sources, has been largely ignored until recently. The traditional view on the topic maintained in Ukrainian studies was most explicitly expressed in the *Encyclopedia of Ukraine*: 'There has never . . . been a Ukrainian anti-Semitic organization or political party.'<sup>6</sup> The obvious conclusion to be drawn from this statement is that there is no point in studying something that has never existed. Non-Ukrainian scholars were not so categorical. Shimon Redlich examined Dmytro Dontsov's anti-Jewish motifs in his study of Jewish subject matter in the legally operated Ukrainian press in Galicia.<sup>7</sup> Karel Berkhoff and Marco Carynnyk discussed some of the most vehement OUN antisemitic publications of the inter-war period in their analysis of Yaroslav Stetsko's autobiographical sketch.<sup>8</sup>

In independent Ukraine Maksym Hon, in his study of the 'Jewish question' in legally published Ukrainian periodicals, has demonstrated that the concept of 'Judaeo-Bolshevism' made deep inroads in Ukrainian society in the late 1930s and was readily embraced even in moderate circles.<sup>9</sup> Examining the archival records of

<sup>4</sup> Berkhoff and Carynnyk, 'Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists', 171; 'Zi stenohramy konferentsiyi OUN u L'vovi, lypen' 1941 r.', in *Ukrayins'ke derzhavotvorennya*, ed. Dzyuban, 189–90. In nationalist discourse Jews were typically referred to collectively as *zhydystvo*. In quotations here and below, this has been translated as 'Jewry' in an attempt to resonate with the original.

<sup>5</sup> Surprisingly, there has been no major study on this topic, despite considerable scholarly (and political!) interest. J.-P. Himka's unpublished article 'The Lviv Pogrom, 1941' brings together all the available evidence.

<sup>6</sup> V. Kubijovyč (ed.), *Encyclopedia of Ukraine*, i (Toronto, 1984), 85; see also Berkhoff and Carynnyk, 'Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists', 152.

<sup>7</sup> S. Redlich, 'Jewish-Ukrainian Relations in Inter-War Poland as Reflected in Some Ukrainian Publications', *Polin*, 11 (1998), 232–46.

<sup>8</sup> Berkhoff and Carynnyk, 'Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists'.

<sup>9</sup> M. Hon, *Iz kryvdoyu na samoti: Ukrayins'ko-yevreis'ki vzayemyny na zakhidno-ukrayins'kykh zemlyakh u skladi Pol'shchi (1935–1939)* (Rivne, 2005); id., 'Yevreis'ke pytannya v Zakhidnii Ukraini naperedodni Druhoyi svitovoyi viiny (za materialamy hromads'ko-politychnoyi periodyky krayu)', *Holokost i suchasnist'*, 2005, no. 1, pp. 9–27.

the Polish police, he established many cases of anti-Jewish violence perpetrated by the OUN before the war, aimed at encouraging the Jews to emigrate. A traditional paradigm has been defended by Volodymyr Vyatrovych, a prolific historian of the OUN and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (Ukrayins'ka povstans'ka armiya), who denied, trivialized, or softened the anti-Jewish proclamations of Ukrainian nationalists.<sup>10</sup> In a similar way Serhy Kvit, the rector of the Kiev-Mohyla Academy, denied Dmytro Dontsov's antisemitism in his well-researched but highly partisan political portrait of the 'father of Ukrainian nationalism'.<sup>11</sup>

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In 1920 a group of Ukrainian officers created the clandestine Ukrainian Military Organization (Ukrayins'ka viis'kova orhanizatsiya; UVO) in Prague to continue the armed struggle against the Polish occupation of eastern Galicia. The UVO carried out numerous assassination attempts on Polish officials and Ukrainians believed guilty of collaboration, as well as bombings of state institutions, sabotage, expropriation attacks, and destruction of the property of Polish landowners, which was all part of a strategy to destabilize the situation and prepare the ground for a large-scale popular uprising. The UVO took a leading part in the establishment of the OUN in 1929. Yevhen Konovalets, the head of the UVO, became the leader of the OUN. The UVO continued to exist for some time after the formation of the OUN, as its military wing. It eventually merged with the OUN without being formally abolished.

Founded in 1927 as the official bulletin of the UVO, the monthly *Surma* ('Trumpet') became its most influential periodical. The first few issues of *Surma* came out in Berlin, but in the following year it moved to the Lithuanian capital Kaunas with the assistance of the Lithuanian government, where it was clandestinely printed in a government-controlled printing house. Most of its issues were edited by Volodymyr Martynets, the OUN's press chief. The technical work was done by Osyf Revyuk. *Surma* was shut down in 1934 under pressure from the Polish government following the assassination of the Polish interior minister Bronisław Pieracki by an OUN cell.<sup>12</sup>

<sup>10</sup> V. Vyatrovych, *Stavlennya OUN do yevreyiv: Formuvannya pozytsiyi na tli katastrofy* (Lviv, 2006). After the book's publication Vyatrovych became an adviser to the director of the Ukrainian Security Service, and later he was appointed director of its archive. His standing gave his works an official status during Yushchenko's presidency. Vyatrovych's approach is criticized in T. Kurylo and I. Khymka [J.-P. Himka], 'Yak OUN stavylasya do yevreyiv? Rozdumy nad knyzhkoyu Volodymyra V'yatrovycha', *Ukrayina moderna*, 13 (2008), 252–66.

<sup>11</sup> S. M. Kvit, *Dmytro Dontsov: Ideolohichnyi portret* (Kiev, 2000), available online at <[www.franko.lviv.ua/faculty/Philol/jaroslav/11/shafa/Doncov.doc](http://www.franko.lviv.ua/faculty/Philol/jaroslav/11/shafa/Doncov.doc)>; see esp. pp. 144–8 (online text).

<sup>12</sup> R. Wysocki, *Organizacja Ukraińskich Nacjonalistów w Polsce w Latach 1929–1939: Geneza, struktura, program, ideologia* (Lublin, 2003), 200–1; V. Martynets, *Ukrayins'ke pidpillya: Vid UVO do OUN* (Winnipeg, 1949), 279.

*Surma* was published in a print run of 8,000 to 10,000 copies. Most of them were smuggled across the Polish border into Galicia. At that time it enjoyed the highest circulation of the entire Ukrainian press in Poland. The authorities could arrest people for possessing the periodical, but this fact only provoked curiosity. Usually tens or even hundreds of people had read every copy before it was destroyed, so the number of people who had read it was far greater than the number of copies published.<sup>13</sup>

*Surma's* *raison d'être* was to spread propaganda for the armed struggle for an independent Ukraine among the broad masses of western Ukrainians. It avoided theoretical questions and concentrated on the revolutionary struggle of the UVO against Poland, the strategy of guerrilla and urban warfare, and the repressive measures of the Polish government. The only article specifically on the 'Jewish question' appeared in an issue of *Surma* in December 1927 in the aftermath of the assassination of Symon Petlyura and the trial at which his assassin had been acquitted.<sup>14</sup> The editorial stated that the 'Paris process' demonstrated the proclivity of Jews to target the weakest:

All Israel has resorted to methods in the defence of Schwarzbard that demonstratively show the Jewish psyche. The whole trial has been carried out in such a way that the late Petlyura and Schwarzbard as individuals were moved to the background, while Ukrainian–Jewish relations were thrust into the foreground.

Why did those big defenders of Schwarzbard . . . forget about the pogroms perpetrated by Polish soldiers against the innocent and unarmed Jews in Lviv? Why has there been no avenger from the people of Israel who would have killed Piłsudski, the leader of the Polish army? This is not in the Jewish character. It is their nature to hit not the strong but the weak, and only when they are sure that this blow will go unpunished and bring them some benefit.<sup>15</sup>

However, after this passage the article changed its tone and offered scope for a Ukrainian–Jewish compromise and co-operation:

It is not our aim to spread antisemitism. There have never been two categories of our citizens, nor shall we ever want to create such a division. We shall consider Jews as citizens equal to us because they will follow their responsibilities as citizens. Our slogan will be 'Equal rights, but also equal responsibilities'.<sup>16</sup>

This was the only article on a Jewish theme that appeared in *Surma*. One reason for this could have been a general lack of interest in the discussion of 'theoretical'

<sup>13</sup> Martynets, *Ukrayins'ke pidpillya*, 279–81.

<sup>14</sup> Symon Petlyura, the leader of the short-lived Ukrainian independent state in 1919–20, was shot dead on 25 May 1926 by Sholom Schwarzbard, a Jewish anarchist and alleged Soviet agent. Schwarzbard claimed he had avenged the deaths of victims of the pogroms perpetrated by Petlyura's forces. He was defended by Henri Torrès, a well-known French Jewish jurist. The jury acquitted Schwarzbard in October 1927. During the trial the Jewish press rallied behind Schwarzbard, while the Ukrainian public demanded a severe sentence for him.

<sup>15</sup> 'Paryzhs'kyi protses', *Surma*, Dec. 1927.

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*

questions in a periodical designed to prepare the broad masses of the population for the armed struggle against Poland. A more important factor, however, was that *Surma* adhered to an earlier tradition, in which the Ukrainian national movement in Galicia tried to win over Jews, or at least ensure their neutrality in the Ukrainian–Polish conflict, rather than consider them overtly hostile.<sup>17</sup>

While *Surma* was created for the mobilization of the masses to fight Polish rule in western Ukraine, *Rozbudova natsiyi* ('The Building of a Nation'), founded in 1927 at the First Conference of Ukrainian Nationalists, was supposed to become the 'ideological laboratory' of the OUN.<sup>18</sup> Because of its status, every point expressed in the pages of this journal was expected to become dogma. Articles published on ideological and programmatic matters were reviewed by the OUN leadership (the Provid) and the ideological commission of the OUN. It was not uncommon for a particular sentence or paragraph to be discussed for weeks or even months before consensus was reached.<sup>19</sup>

Unlike *Surma*, *Rozbudova natsiyi* came out legally in Prague. It reached a print run of 1,200 to 1,500 copies, 500 of which were sent to western Ukraine. The journal was legally distributed there until July 1929 and was smuggled in thereafter.<sup>20</sup> The OUN press chief Volodymyr Martynets was the editor of the journal, and Petro Kozhevnykiv deputized for him in his absence. Like *Surma*, the journal ceased to exist in 1934 after the assassination of Pieracki.

*Rozbudova natsiyi* avoided engaging with Jewish topics during the first year of its existence. The first article explicitly mentioning Jews was 'Russian-Jewish Domination and the Role of Russian Culture in Soviet Ukraine'. Written by V. Bohush, it provided statistical data on the ethnic and social composition of Ukraine, emphasizing the under-representation of Ukrainians in the city and in the key social sectors of the economy and education.<sup>21</sup> Generally neutral in its tone, the article stopped short of any direct accusation of Jews. It was more concerned with the Russian impact and the Russification of Ukraine.

A few months later the journal published Yury Mylyanych's strongly anti-Jewish article 'Jews, Zionism, and Ukraine'.<sup>22</sup> The author claimed that over two million Jews living in Ukraine

constitute an alien and furthermore for the most part hostile body in our national organism. It is impossible to calculate all the harm and acts of foul play [*shkid i pakostei*] that Jews have inflicted on our recent liberation struggle. It has been happening throughout [our] history

<sup>17</sup> By contrast with eastern Ukraine, where the Ukrainian forces of Symon Petlyura carried out numerous anti-Jewish pogroms, in Galicia it was the Polish army that launched pogroms in 1918 and 1919, accusing Jews of supporting Ukrainians.

<sup>18</sup> Wysocki, *Organizacja Ukraińskich Nacjonalistów*, 201.

<sup>19</sup> Martynets, *Ukrayins'ke pidpillya*, 281–3.

<sup>20</sup> Wysocki, *Organizacja Ukraińskich Nacjonalistów*, 201–2.

<sup>21</sup> V. Bohush, 'Rosiiis'ko-zhydivs'ke panuvannya ta rolya rosiis'koyi kul'tury na Radyans'kii Ukrayini', *Rozbudova natsiyi*, 1929, nos. 3–4, pp. 85–92.

<sup>22</sup> Yu. Mylyanych, 'Zhydy, sionizm i Ukrayina', *Rozbudova natsiyi*, 1929, nos. 8–9, pp. 271–6.

and it is happening today. In our struggle with Poland they reinforce the Polish front; in the struggle with Bolshevism they support the Bolsheviks; in the struggle with Russophilism they harbour the most persistent hotbeds of everything Muscovite in Ukraine. They live off the Ukrainian population, but give it nothing of equal political, cultural, or social value in return. Politically they are the enemies of the Ukrainian pro-independence national idea. Culturally they are fomenters of denationalization. Socially, as a group of merchants, they do not make up for even a hundredth of what they receive from the population . . . In addition to a number of external enemies Ukraine also has an internal enemy—Jewry.<sup>23</sup>

The author laments that Ukrainians do not have experts on Jewish matters who could grasp the whole problem, though it is high time to think about the guidelines of Ukrainian policy towards Jews. He outlines some practical alternatives:

How to deal with the Jews? We have over two million of them in Ukraine . . . Should we allow them to further abuse [*halapasuvaty*] the Ukrainian national organism? Assimilate them, drag them into the national organism? . . . Amalgamate with them? Get rid of them in Ukraine? How? Expel them? Where to? It is not that easy either to expel two million people or to get rid of them altogether. Nobody needs them [*tsioho dobra i tak nikhto ne khoche*], everybody is only too happy to get rid of them. On a practical level not a single European Christian nation has managed to solve the Jewish problem in a fully satisfactory sense except the Spaniards. Various methods have been applied . . . however . . . not a single one of them has solved the issue.<sup>24</sup>

The author points out that the Zionist concept of the resettlement of Jews to Palestine would be the best solution, but this idea is becoming less popular among Jews themselves, who would prefer to solve the ‘problem’ by assimilation and internationalism. He sums up: ‘In the struggle against Jewry, which is hostile to us in all respects, we must develop our own system and the means most suitable for us to solve the Jewish question. This problem is difficult and quite ill defined because it has been neglected from the Ukrainian side. But it *must* be solved.’<sup>25</sup>

The article had sinister overtones. It did not rule out the assimilation of Jews as a solution to the ‘Jewish question’, but it left little scope for such an option because of Jewish perfidy. Mylyanych preferred an expulsion of Jews such as had taken place in medieval Spain, the only country credited with solving the ‘problem’, and lamented the fact that there was no place where Jews could be expelled to.

Mylyanych’s attitude towards Jews was not the only one expressed in *Rozbudova natsiyi*. Over a year later Mykola Stsiborsky, a leading theorist of Ukrainian nationalism and the principal deputy leader of the OUN, published ‘Ukrainian Nationalism and Jewry’, in which he advocated a compromise between Ukrainians and Jews.<sup>26</sup> At the beginning of his article Stsiborsky acknowledges that

<sup>23</sup> Mylyanych, ‘Zhydy, sionizm i Ukrayina’, 271.

<sup>24</sup> Ibid.

<sup>25</sup> Ibid. 276; emphasis original.

<sup>26</sup> M. Stsiborsky, ‘Ukrayins’kyi natsionalizm i zhydivstvo’, *Rozbudova natsiyi*, 1930, nos. 11–12, pp. 266–73.



We would have shown the utmost insincerity if we had tried to hide the fact that the attitude of the greater part of Ukrainian society towards Jewry is *negative*. It is true! . . . A negative and quite often hostile attitude towards Jews is widespread in Ukrainian reality. In this regard the views and opinions of our masses coincide, oddly enough, with those of the leading strata.<sup>27</sup>

The author then enumerates the causes of anti-Jewish feeling—the social status of Jews, their alienation, greediness, profiteering [*korystlyvist'*], and materialism. The Russian revolution only strengthened hostile attitudes towards them. Finally, the assassination of Petlyura, the trial in Paris, and the attitude of world Jewry towards the cause of Ukrainian national-state liberation . . . create an even more tense environment, which in many cases should be acknowledged as a state of mutual hatred and of secretly biding one's time to settle the bloody score [*zvesty kryvavi porakhunky*] when an opportunity arises.<sup>28</sup>

The author redirects his criticism at the Ukrainian public, which generally limits itself to the articulation of the negative features of Jews but does not think about the reasons for them. Historical discrimination led to the alienation of Jews and their concentration in the trade sector. It is also a big mistake to hold all Jews guilty of supporting the Bolsheviks, as the Bolshevik revolution brought about the confiscation of Jewish property. Jews were initially indifferent to the Ukrainian national movement, and their attitude changed radically only after the beginning of the pogroms.<sup>29</sup>

The article concludes: 'It is the responsibility of the Ukrainian community to persuade Jewry that a future Ukrainian state does not pose any danger to them . . . We are making an approach to Jewry with undisguised intentions [*vidkryte zaborolo*]. It is their turn to give us an answer.'<sup>30</sup>

In his argumentation Stsiborsky adheres to the same principles as *Surma*. He suggests that the Ukrainian nationalist movement should approach the Jews to enlist their support or at least ensure their neutrality in the struggle against Poland and the Soviet Union. How can we explain the fact that the official OUN organ, which emphasized the almost canonical status of its articles on theoretical and propagandistic issues, published both Stsiborsky's opinions on the 'Jewish question' and those of Yury Mylyanych? One tentative answer is that the OUN at that time did not consider Jewish topics to be of central importance and did not define its own opinion, so some discussion was permitted. Another explanation is to look at the personality of Mykola Stsiborsky. A leading theorist and the principal deputy leader of the OUN, he was also a Czechoslovakian citizen, because of which he was able to be the official publisher of *Rozbudova natsiyi*.<sup>31</sup> His influence could ensure the publication of this article.

<sup>27</sup> Ibid. 267; emphasis original.

<sup>28</sup> Ibid. 268–9.

<sup>29</sup> Ibid. 269–71.

<sup>30</sup> Ibid. 272–3.

<sup>31</sup> Wysocki, *Organizacja Ukraińskich Nacjonalistów*, 202.

In the 1930s Stsiborsky wrote a few brochures, the most important of which was *Natsiokratiya*. It advocated the organization of a future Ukrainian state on principles of authoritarianism, corporatism, and solidarism closely resembling those of Fascist Italy.<sup>32</sup> Stsiborsky abandoned his position towards Jews in the late 1930s, very likely succumbing to pressure from the OUN.<sup>33</sup> In 1938 he advocated the expulsion of ‘alien ethnic elements’ (i.e. Poles, Jews, and Russians) from large Ukrainian cities by the ‘most resolute administrative methods’, and their replacement in a future Ukrainian state by Ukrainians from the countryside.<sup>34</sup> And two years later he stripped Jews of citizenship rights in his draft constitution for a Ukrainian state.<sup>35</sup>

Stsiborsky’s position was that of a minority in the OUN Provid at the time when his article on Jews appeared in *Rozbudova natsiyi*. The next issue of the journal initiated a series of articles written by Oleksandr Mytsyuk, which appeared in every issue for two years and which dismantled every point of Stsiborsky’s approach. A former minister in Symon Petlyura’s Directory government, a professor at the Ukrainian Free University in Prague, and an expert in Ukrainian economic history, Mytsyuk attempted to play the role of expert on the ‘Jewish question’, of the sort that Yury Mylyanych had deplored the lack of. Mytsyuk’s work was a serious intellectual undertaking. Well researched and with an impressive quantity of citations and statistical information, it gave the impression of a balanced academic study. But behind this façade was an exploitation of numerous anti-Jewish myths.

As an economic historian, Mytsyuk focused on the socio-economic position of Jews in his ‘The Agrarianization of the Jewry of Ukraine’, ‘The Jewish Economy during the Age of Liberalism’, ‘The Jewish Economy in Ukraine during the Age of Reaction (1882–1917)’, ‘The Agrarianization of Jewry during the Age of Bolshevism’, and ‘Non-Agrarian Activities of Jews after the World War’.<sup>36</sup> The central idea

<sup>32</sup> Following academic tradition, this study uses ‘fascism’, with lower-case initial, to describe generic fascism, i.e. fascist movements in inter-war Europe, while ‘Fascism’, with capital, refers specifically to Italian Fascism.

<sup>33</sup> The Regional Executive (Kraiova Ekzekutyva) of the OUN in Galicia reproached the Provid at that time for ‘considerable deviations from nationalist ideology and policy’ in *Rozbudova natsiyi*. See K. Pankivsky, *Roky nimets’koyi okupatsiyi, 1941–1944* (Newark, 1965), 144. It may be suspected that Stsiborsky’s article was primarily to blame. It must indeed have sounded foreign to those militant students whose mindset had been shaped by Dmytro Dontsov, and who later formed the Bandera faction of the OUN. This also explains why the journal kept publishing tacit refutations of Stsiborsky’s arguments for the next two years.

<sup>34</sup> M. Stsiborsky, ‘Proiblyemy hospodars’koyi vlasnosti’, in *Na sluzhbi natsiyi* (Paris, 1938), 14.

<sup>35</sup> ‘Proekt Osnovnoho Zakonu (Konstytutsiyi) Ukrayins’koyi derzhavy’, in *OUN v 1941 rotsi*, ed. Veselova et al., i. 216. See also Kurylo and Himka, ‘Yak OUN stavylasya do yevreyiv?’, 255.

<sup>36</sup> O. Mytsyuk, ‘Ahraryzatsiya zhydivstva Ukrayiny’, *Rozbudova natsiyi*, 1931, nos. 1–2, pp. 18–28; nos. 3–4, pp. 70–9; nos. 7–8, pp. 172–81; id., ‘Zhydivs’a ekonomika za doby liberalizmu’, *Rozbudova natsiyi*, 1931, nos. 9–10, pp. 218–30; nos. 11–12, pp. 276–92; id., ‘Zhydivs’ka ekonomika na Ukrayini za doby reaktsiyi (1882–1917)’, *Rozbudova natsiyi*, 1932, nos. 1–2, pp. 13–25; nos. 3–4, pp. 75–86; nos. 5–6, pp. 118–31; id., ‘Ahraryzatsiya zhydivstva za doby bol’shevyzmu’, *Rozbudova natsiyi*, 1933, nos. 7–8, pp. 180–90; nos. 9–10, pp. 226–35; id., ‘Pozaaharna diyal’nist’ zhydiv po svitovii viini’,

of these articles is that Jews are of a parasitic nature. Throughout history all the attempts made by various governments to employ the Jews in agriculture and get them to do hard manual work for the benefit of the whole society had failed. Jews preferred to continue exploiting the common folk, and their activities undermined the fabric of society. In this way Mytsyuk challenged Stsiborsky's claim that the social role adopted by Jews was a consequence of oppression and alienation.

Another two articles complete Mytsyuk's argument. In 'Jewry at the Time of a Historical Turning Point (1917–20)' he talks about the 'Judaization' [*ozhydovlen-nya*] of Europe, arguing that Jews had become the ruling nationality in the Soviet Union and Palestine. Everywhere Jews try to expand or consolidate their dominance in the key sectors and squeeze others out of it. An example of this is higher education.<sup>37</sup> In contrast to Stsiborsky, Mytsyuk argues in 'The Independence of Ukraine and Jewry' that the conflict between the Ukrainian national movement and the Jews was unavoidable because of the differences in their world view.<sup>38</sup> The Ukrainian movement is idealistic, while Jews lean towards a materialism that has culminated in Marxism. Also, the Jews are imbued with 'centralist-Russificatory inertia'. Because of their socio-economic position they are one of the main exponents of a cosmopolitanism that is opposed to the irredentist movements of small nations:

Activity as intermediaries in trade led to the psychology of cosmopolitanism and internationalism among Jewry, making it receptive to both socialist and communist internationalism . . . United and indivisible Russia is for them a kind of International, the boundaries of which it would be preferable to expand on all sides in order to have fewer borders, customs, smuggling expenses, and visa barriers . . . not to be separated, to be under one state roof with one language and not to learn the languages of those small nations that have emerged on the principle of 'self-determination of nations', [which is] disadvantageous for Jews.<sup>39</sup>

Discussing the pogroms, Mytsyuk pointed out the limited number of cases in which the Ukrainian army had taken part in anti-Jewish violence. The command of the Ukrainian army had constantly been combating tendencies towards the instigation of pogroms, and dozens of perpetrators had been executed by court marshal. He concentrated rather on the pogroms carried out by the Russian White Guards. Despite his strong anti-Jewish sentiments, Mytsyuk did not justify Ukrainian participation in the pogroms, attributing them to the enemies of the Ukrainian national movement.

Mytsyuk's attitude towards the Jews did not leave any room for the kind of compromise and co-operation advocated by Stsiborsky. He believed this was simply unrealistic because of the parasitic Jewish character, which the governments of

*Rozbudova natsiyi*, 1933, nos. 11–12, pp. 277–87. He also published these articles in his book *Ahraryzatsiya zhydivstva Ukrayiny na tli zahal'noyi ekonomiky* (Prague, 1933).

<sup>37</sup> O. Mytsyuk, 'Zhydivstvo za doby istorychnoho perelomu (1917–20)', *Rozbudova natsiyi*, 1932, nos. 7–8, pp. 185–96; nos. 9–10, pp. 253–6; nos. 11–12, pp. 296–300.

<sup>38</sup> O. Mytsyuk, 'Samostiinist' Ukrayiny ta zhydivstvo', *Rozbudova natsiyi*, 1933, nos. 3–4, pp. 75–87; nos. 5–6, pp. 130–8.

<sup>39</sup> Mytsyuk, 'Samostiinist' Ukrayiny ta zhydivstvo', *Rozbudova natsiyi*, 1933, nos. 3–4, p. 84.

many countries had failed to amend, and the Jewish opposition to national aspirations as such, especially those of smaller nations. *Rozbudova natsiyi*, whose goal was to become a source of unquestionable truth for the OUN rank and file, published Mytsyuk's articles in every one of its issues for over two years during 1931–3. This fact alone indicates that his views were to be perceived as the official position of the OUN Provid. Later OUN publicists acknowledged Mytsyuk's expertise on the 'Jewish question', citing his works.<sup>40</sup> Not surprisingly, during the German occupation Mytsyuk published several radically antisemitic articles in *Krakivs'ki visti* in 1943, on the 'negative role of Jews in Ukraine, especially in economic life'.<sup>41</sup>

Under pressure from the Polish government in the wake of Pieracki's assassination the Czechoslovakian authorities cracked down on the OUN in the autumn of 1934, prompting the closure of *Rozbudova natsiyi*. Subsequently, the international situation and financial difficulties prevented the OUN from setting up any periodical outside Poland aimed at a western Ukrainian readership. It founded several newspapers and journals in western Europe and North America to further the Ukrainian cause in the international arena and to promote its ideas among the Ukrainian emigrant communities.

The Regional Executive of the OUN in Galicia was dismantled by the police following the assassination of Pieracki, and most of its members were jailed. The OUN stood on the brink of collapse. A new Regional Executive was established with great difficulty. In the second half of the 1930s the OUN gained a new momentum in Galicia and spread its influence to Volhynia. It made several attempts to run a legal newspaper in western Ukraine. All those attempts were short-lived because of closures by the police, seizures, confiscations, the arrest of editors, lack of funds, and the difficulty of maintaining ideological control and censorship by the OUN Provid. In consequence some newspapers were accused of 'opportunism'.<sup>42</sup> There were a few vehemently antisemitic periodicals published at that time in Galicia, notably *Frontom* ('By Means of the Front') and *Avanhard* ('The Vanguard'), although their relation to the OUN is not clear.<sup>43</sup>

A nationalist rival to the OUN, the Front of National Unity (Front natsional'noyi yednosti), emerged in western Ukraine in 1933. Founded by Dmytro Paliyiv, a former leading member of the UVO, it published the periodicals *Peremoha* ('Victory') and *Bat'kivshchyna* ('Fatherland'), which promoted violent antisemitism and openly embraced fascism.

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<sup>40</sup> See V. Martynets, *Zhydivs'ka problema v Ukrayini* (London, 1938).

<sup>41</sup> Kurylo and Himka, 'Yak OUN stavylasya do yevreyiv?', 257; J.-P. Himka, "'Krakivs'ki visti" pro yevreyiv, 1943 rik: Ukrayins'ko-yevreis'ki vidnosyny pid chas Druhoyi svitovoyi viiny', *Filosofs'ka i sotsiologichna dumka*, 1994, nos. 5–6, p. 204.

<sup>42</sup> Wysocki, *Organizacja Ukraińskich Nacjonalistów*, 204–15.

<sup>43</sup> Redlich, 'Jewish-Ukrainian Relations in Inter-War Poland', 245; Wysocki, *Organizacja Ukraińskich Nacjonalistów*, 215; Hon, *Iz kryvdoyu na samoti*, 97–8, 151.

Dmytro Dontsov had a tremendous influence on the mindset of Ukrainian Galicians in the inter-war period, especially the younger generation. More than any other person he was responsible for the emergence and development of Ukrainian radical nationalism.

Dmytro Dontsov was born in the heavily Russified city of Melitopol in southern Ukraine. He joined the Ukrainian Social Democratic Workers' Party (Ukrayins'ka sotsial-demokratychna robitnycha partiya; USDRP) in 1905, and was known there for adhering to orthodox Marxist views. As late as 1910 Dontsov advocated the primacy of class struggle over the national question. A year later he criticized Olena Pchilka's journal *Ridnyi kraj* for its 'antisemitic and religious fog'.<sup>44</sup> In 1913 he left the USDRP, and during the Great War he was the head of the Union for the Liberation of Ukraine (Soyuz vyzvolennya Ukrayiny), which called for the secession of Ukraine from Russia. Dontsov moved to Lviv in 1922, where with the financial help of the UVO he began publishing the monthly *Literaturno-naukovyi vistnyk* ('Literary and Scientific Herald'; *LNV*). In 1933 it re-emerged under the name *Vistnyk* ('The Herald') and continued to come out until the Second World War.

Dontsov and his *LNV/Vistnyk* had a profound impact on Galician Ukrainians, in particular on the younger generation and students, who dominated the Regional Executive of the OUN and later formed the Bandera faction.<sup>45</sup> As the 'ideological father' of Ukrainian nationalism, Dontsov was highly esteemed by the OUN but, despite several offers, he never joined the organization, being supposedly unable to do any team work, and partly also because of his confrontational nature.<sup>46</sup> Likewise, most contributors to *Vistnyk*, including such prominent twentieth-century Ukrainian intellectuals and poets as Oleh Olzhych (Kandyba), Yury Klen (Oswald Burgardt), Olena Teliha, Yevhen Malanyuk, Ulas Samchuk, Yury Lypa, and Bohdan Krawciw (Kravtsiv), were OUN members or in some other way connected with the organization.

His critics and supporters alike agreed on the tremendous impact that Dontsov had on the nationalist movement. Lev Rebet, the leader of the Regional Executive from 1934 till 1938, recalled in his post-war memoirs that young nationalists read *Vistnyk* uncritically and with great enthusiasm 'from cover to cover [*vid doshky do doshky*]'.<sup>47</sup> This point is repeated by other prominent members of the OUN.<sup>48</sup>

<sup>44</sup> V. Levynsky, *Ideoloh ukrayins' koho fashyzmu: Zamitky do ideolohiyi Dmytra Dontsova* (Lviv, 1936), 16–17, 34–5.

<sup>45</sup> Initially the nationalist movement was limited to student circles to such an extent that one of its critics, a leading member of the left-wing Ukrainian Socialist Radical Party (Ukrayins'ka sotsialistychno-radykal'na partiya), wrote that it was 'so amusing that it is always only students who are "nationalists". Once someone stops [being a student], [he] jumps away from the movement': K. Pushkar [K. Kobersky], '*Natsionalizm*': *Krytyka fraz* (Lviv, 1933), 134.

<sup>46</sup> Martynets, *Ukrayins' ke pidpillya*, 228–30; M. Sosnovsky, *Dmytro Dontsov: Politychnyi portret* (New York and Toronto, 1974), 176–7, 198–9.

<sup>47</sup> L. Rebet, *Svitla i tini OUN* (Munich, 1964), 47.

<sup>48</sup> M. Klymyshyn, *V pokhodi do voli, i* (Toronto, 1975), 259; M. Prokop, 'Dmytro Dontsov (1883–1973)', *Suchasnist'*, 1973, no. 5, p. 51.

A disillusioned member wrote after the war that Dontsov in the 1930s ‘was a real soul master of the younger generation’.<sup>49</sup> He shaped the mindset of Stepan Bandera, who for want of a formal education in broad political issues and an unfamiliarity with them became an ‘exemplary and unquestioning preacher of the “Koran” written by Dmytro Dontsov’.<sup>50</sup> Another leader of the Bandera faction, Yaroslav Stetsko, even in his old age stated that he always had been and still remained a follower of Dontsov (*dontsivets*).<sup>51</sup> Mykhailo Sosnovsky, a biographer of Dontsov, concluded in the late 1960s that ‘Ukrainians of the 1930s–1940s, especially those from the western Ukrainian lands, still bear an imprint of the influence of those two journals’.<sup>52</sup>

Despite its influence *LNV* was published in a print run of only 800 to 1,200 copies, and *Vistnyk* reached a circulation of 1,800 in the late 1930s. This was not surprising, since these were elitist journals that appealed mostly to Ukrainian intellectuals in an overwhelmingly peasant society.<sup>53</sup> The following social groups subscribed to *Vistnyk* in 1938: 315 students, 195 teachers, 115 peasants and workers, 105 officials, 100 industrialists and merchants, 90 doctors, 85 engineers, 80 lawyers, 65 priests, and 30 others.<sup>54</sup> Dontsov published his own articles in practically every issue of the journals. He turned *LNV* into a vehicle for his own ideas, and the editorial board ceased to play any significant role;<sup>55</sup> *Vistnyk* became simply a private enterprise of his family.<sup>56</sup> According to his long-time assistant Mykhailo Hikavy, Dontsov personally prepared all the materials for publication, editing them if necessary.<sup>57</sup>

The defeat of the short-lived Ukrainian state of 1917–20 more than any other event shaped Dontsov’s mindset, as that of other Ukrainian nationalists. Dontsov and his followers began to accentuate a radical break with the previous Ukrainian political tradition, with its emphasis on democracy and socialism—‘rotten virtues of the weak’ that led to disaster. Instead, he advocated virtues that he believed had helped more successful nations: will power, resolution, hierarchy, voluntarism, ruthlessness, mercilessness, belligerency, zeal. He saw life as a constant social Darwinistic struggle in which the strong survives and oppresses the weak, and moral laws are irrelevant. In fact, amorality prevails in this struggle in the sense that morality belongs to the stronger. In the 1920s he admired nations and leaders who followed those principles—Fascist Italy, but also the British empire, Japan,

<sup>49</sup> P. Baley, *Fronda Stepana Bandery v OUN 1940 r.* (Las Vegas, 1997), 20.

<sup>50</sup> *Ibid.* 21.

<sup>51</sup> Kvit, *Dmytro Dontsov*, online text, p. 100.

<sup>52</sup> Sosnovsky, *Dmytro Dontsov*, 175. For similar statements, see A. Bedry, ‘Vplyv Dmytra Dontsova na formuvannya OUN’, *Avangard*, 1983, no. 6, pp. 337–42; O. Bahan, *Natsionalizm i natsionalistychnyi rukh: Istoriya ta ideyi* (Drohobych, 1994), 47; H. Svarnyk, ‘Redaktors’ka ta vydavnycha diyal’nist’ Dmytra Dontsova l’vivs’koho periodu (1922–1939)’, *Ukrayina v mynulomu*, 9 (1996), 162.

<sup>53</sup> Sosnovsky, *Dmytro Dontsov*, 181–2. Dontsov’s printing house also produced a quarterly supplement to *Vistnyk*, which had a circulation of 5,000, and books, such as biographies of Hitler and Mussolini, with a typical print run of 3,000.

<sup>54</sup> *Ibid.* 182.

<sup>55</sup> V. Doroshenko, ‘Literaturno-naukovyi vistnyk’, in B. Yasinsky (comp.), *Literaturno-naukovyi vistnyk: Pokazhchyyk zmistu, tom 1–109 (1898–1932)* (Kyiv, 2000).

<sup>56</sup> Sosnovsky, *Dmytro Dontsov*, 177, 180.

<sup>57</sup> M. Hikavy, ‘Den’ doktora Dmytra Dontsova’, *Visnyk OChSU*, 1974, no. 3.

and the United States. In the latter case he was especially impressed by the effective American colonization of the Wild West. He also repeatedly pointed out the efficiency of the Bolsheviks in their large-scale application of brute force, and that the Bolsheviks could be defeated only by the application of their own methods.<sup>58</sup>

The second important component of Dontsov's outlook was his radical anti-Russianness. Despite his Russian education and partly Russian ethnic background (which his critics gleefully exposed again and again), he played a paramount role in bringing a radically anti-Russian component to Galician Ukrainian nationalism. Ukrainian nationalism in Galicia emerged in the process of the struggle with Polish nationalism over the ethnic affiliation of Austrian eastern Galicia. The Polish conquest of eastern Galicia resulting from the Polish-Ukrainian war of 1918-19 only aggravated this conflict, overshadowing the Russian aspect. Indeed, the Ukrainian Galician political scene was dominated by pro-Russian groups until the last decade of the nineteenth century, and those groups preserved a significant influence till the Great War. Although the later Ukrainian national movement in Galicia was not pro-Russian, the West Ukrainian Army did enter into a brief alliance with the Russian nationalist White Guard Army of Denikin in 1919. The Polish threat was seen to be of much greater importance than the Russian one.

Dontsov criticized Galician parochialism, which in his view displayed an inability to see the larger Russian threat for the whole Ukrainian national movement. He avoided anti-Polish rhetoric in his journals, largely because of their legal status and his vulnerability to deportation as a foreigner, but also because for him the Polish threat was of secondary importance to that of Bolshevik Russia. Some Ukrainians suspected him of pro-Polish sentiments, and even of receiving money from the Polish government.<sup>59</sup> During the war he was denounced for allegedly pro-Polish views and had to deal briefly with the Gestapo.<sup>60</sup>

His vision of Russia as the absolute evil was placed in a broader context of the struggle between the West and the East. This was a contest of Oriental chaos, despotism, and passive collectivism versus Occidental will, order, individualism, sense of superiority, and militancy. Bolshevism was the latest manifestation of the Orient and the epitomization of the Russian psyche and culture. The nineteenth-century Russian literary tradition contributed to Bolshevism, so to admire Russian literature was almost tantamount to embracing Bolshevik principles: 'our failure to protest against Pushkin and Tolstoy decapitated us and prepared for the Bolshevik invasion of Muravyev'.<sup>61</sup> At the same time, European literature from Dante to Jack London and Rudyard Kipling was a manifestation of the European spirit. Polish literature no longer belonged to the 'militant West', since it had been tainted by Russian

<sup>58</sup> A. J. Motyl, *The Turn to the Right: The Ideological Origins and Development of Ukrainian Nationalism, 1919-1929* (Boulder, Colo., 1980), 61-85, analyses Dontsov's views in the 1920s.

<sup>59</sup> Yu. Sherekh, 'Skarby, yakymy volodiyemo', *Suchasnist'*, 1993, no. 6, p. 152.

<sup>60</sup> Sosnovsky, *Dmytro Dontsov*, 193.

<sup>61</sup> D. Dontsov, *Patriotyzm* (Lviv, 1936), 36.

influence, but Ukraine was at the forefront of the struggle against the ‘corrupting influence of the Orient’.<sup>62</sup>

Dontsov did not create a comprehensive political doctrine, but rather a mosaic of what he considered the most important.<sup>63</sup> His ‘ethical’ philosophy (with its emphasis on violence, zeal, and amorality) and the paramount Russian Bolshevik threat were two topics that emerged recurrently in his articles in *LNV* and *Vistnyk*, whether discussing Ukrainian or Western history, literature, current political events, or Jews.

*LNV* did not express any opinion on Jews until the assassination of Petlyura, but this event provoked the appearance of anti-Jewish motifs in the Ukrainian press.<sup>64</sup> It also brought Jewish matters to Dontsov’s attention, and anti-Jewish beliefs became a part of his world view. He used the murder of Petlyura to demonstrate the correctness of his ‘ethical’ philosophy:

His [Petlyura’s] mistake lay elsewhere, in that he needlessly brought Jews into his cabinet and gave them various autonomies . . . He wanted to win the support of a cowardly and slavish race by means of concessions . . . when the only task of Ukrainian policy towards them was to break their power in Ukraine and force them into uncompromising loyalty to the Ukrainian idea . . . Petlyura’s ‘pogroms’ . . . [are] a pretext. The point is that Jews are fundamentally hostile to Ukrainian statehood.<sup>65</sup>

He summarizes: ‘history avenges not inhumanity but weakness’.<sup>66</sup> However, Jews are of secondary importance in face of the primal Russian threat:

This murder is an act of revenge by an agent of Russian imperialism on a person that became a symbol of the struggle of the nation against Russian oppression. It does not matter that in this case it was a Jew that became the agent of Russian imperialism. We must and we shall fight against the aspiration of Jewry to play the role of lords in Ukraine, which is inappropriate to them, but we shall break their power no sooner than we break the potency of Russia . . . No other government has taken so many Jews into its service as the Bolsheviks did, and one may expect that the Russians will wash their hands like Pilate and say to the oppressed nations, ‘the Jew is to blame for everything’.

Jews are indeed guilty, terribly guilty, as those who helped to consolidate Russian rule in Ukraine, but—‘the Jew is not to blame for everything’. Russian imperialism is to blame for everything.

Only after the fall of Russia in Ukraine will we be able to settle the Jewish question in our

<sup>62</sup> D. Dontsov, ‘Chy Zakhid?’, *Vistnyk*, 1934, no. 5, pp. 377–86; id., ‘Rosiya chy Yevropa? (Do literaturnoyi krytyky)’, *Literaturno-naukovyi vistnyk* (hereafter *LNV*), 1929, no. 1, pp. 62–79.

<sup>63</sup> His critics pointed out that Dontsov had not explained in his writings how to achieve a Ukrainian state or what action needed to be taken. Hence, despite his scathing criticism of everything Russian, Dontsov was a typical representative of the Russian nihilistic tradition. See Pushkar, ‘*Natsionalizm*’, 18. Dontsov replied to his critics that nationalism is a ‘faith’ that does not need a political programme, and on many occasions referred to Italian Fascism’s lack of a doctrine in the first years of its existence.

<sup>64</sup> S. Redlich, ‘Reflections of the Petliura Affair in the Ukrainian and Jewish Press in Poland’, in *Proceedings of the Tenth World Congress of Jewish Studies*, division B, vol. i (Jerusalem, 1990), 429–33.

<sup>65</sup> D. Dontsov, ‘Symon Petlyura’, *LNV*, 1926, nos. 7–8, p. 326.

<sup>66</sup> Ibid. 328.



land on the basis of the interest of the Ukrainian nation. How it will be done is not known. In any event, we can say from this perspective that after Petlyura's experience, who took seven bullets and whose memory has been abused by the whole Jewish community for his policy regarding Jewish ministers and autonomies . . . one can scarcely find any Ukrainian politician who will follow in his path on Jewish issues.<sup>67</sup>

After the acquittal of Schwarzbard, Dontsov again brings up the Jewish topic: What's the matter? Whence these shrieks? What are the hyenas fretting about? About pogroms . . . What pogroms? There were no pogroms in Ukraine. There was a civil war in which masses of Jews, Muscovites, and Ukrainians died . . . Jews call a pogrom any protest against the Jewish colonization of Ukraine. But Jews chose Ukraine for their messianism because it allowed them to do so.<sup>68</sup>

He concludes again: 'Let us learn several lessons for the future: never give cultural national autonomy to "minorities", as this will end up in Schwarzbards.' At the same time, '[we] shall not resort to pogroms, because that is a socialism of fools'.<sup>69</sup>

A year later Dontsov returned again to the Schwarzbard trial. This time he used it to establish a link between the Jews and Bolshevism, and from then onwards the concept of Judaeo-Bolshevism became deeply ingrained in his consciousness:

An explanation of such a disciplined mobilization as world Jewry has carried out in the defence of the murderer of the *enemy of Russia*, and in defamation of Ukrainian statehood, is very simple . . . The explanation is that today's Russia indirectly *belongs to international Jewry*, with the assistance of a Russian intelligentsia trained by them, educated in a contempt for work, integrity, the 'European bourgeoisie',<sup>70</sup> cleanliness, and physical and moral hygiene.<sup>71</sup>

Jews not only rule Bolshevik Russia, but also receive sadistic pleasure from it: 'Those Ukrainians who have managed by a miracle to escape from a *chrezvychaika* in the Ukrainian land can tell how the Jewish chiefs of *chrezvychaiky* interrogated them with such *sadistic pleasure of power*, indeed *Jewish power*.'<sup>72</sup>

In addition to his own writings, Dontsov started to include in *LNV* articles supporting his view on the 'Jewish question'. The journal published an article by Viktor Zavadsky, in which he argued, without resorting to anti-Jewish motifs, against the 'national-personal' autonomy that the Ukrainian Central Council (Ukrayins'ka tsentral'na rada) had granted to ethnic minorities in 1917–18. A brief comment signed by the 'editor', i.e. Dontsov, was appended to the article:

<sup>67</sup> Ibid. 327–8.

<sup>68</sup> D. Dontsov, 'Memento (Do Paryz'koho protsesu)', *LNV*, 1927, no. 11, p. 264.

<sup>69</sup> Ibid.

<sup>70</sup> Here Dontsov uses Russian words, 'evropeiskago meshchanstva'.

<sup>71</sup> S. Zmunchyllo [D. Dontsov], 'Koly Izrayil' triumfuye', *LNV*, 1928, no. 12, p. 361; emphasis original.

<sup>72</sup> Ibid. 362; emphasis original. The state security organization created by the Bolsheviks in December 1917 was known as the Chrezvychainaya komissiya or Cheka. The colloquialism *chrezvychaika* refers to it or to any of its branches. It was responsible for mass executions and terror during the Civil War.

We have included this piece because it

1. pays heed to the role played by gratitude in the Schwarzbard case;
2. alerts us to the danger of repeating the Central Council's mistakes in the future.<sup>73</sup>

On the subject of the identification of Jews with Bolshevism, the main tenet of inter-war European antisemitism, the journal published an article by the Belgian academic and publicist Charles Saroléa titled 'Bolshevism and the Jews', in which he stated that 'these several Jewish leaders are the rulers of Russia in the same way as 1,500 Anglo-Indian officials are the rulers of India'.<sup>74</sup> The journal also began siding with the Arabs in their conflict with the Jews over Palestine.<sup>75</sup> In one of his articles Dontsov draws parallels between the Jewish resettlement of Palestine and attempts by the Soviet government to move Jews to the countryside and establish an autonomous Jewish region in southern Ukraine:

The Zionists are carrying out the Jewish colonization of a foreign land in Palestine against the expressed will of the native majority, without asking them and having reached agreement only with the power that rules the region, [and] with the government of the Second International. Isn't this the same as Zionism is doing in Ukraine? . . . And just as in Palestine, where the Zionists appeal to British arms, so in Ukraine do they appeal to Russian-Bolshevik arms.<sup>76</sup>

Finally, he hints that the solution to this problem lies in ethnic cleansing:

The colonization of Ukraine by Jewry, carried out without the consent and against the will of the Ukrainian nation, thanks to the bayonets of the Russian government and the millions [of dollars] of New York capitalists—*this colonization will be liquidated without hesitation [bez reshty]*, as the Turks liquidated the Greek colonies [*osadnytstvo*] in their land, and the Greeks did the Turkish ones.<sup>77</sup>

On a few occasions *LNV* also raised the subject of traditional anti-Jewish attitudes. In one of his articles about the depiction of foreign nations in Ukrainian proverbs, S. Narizhny describes the hatred of Jews found in Ukrainian folklore, which treats them as liars no better than animals, and even advocates their extermination. He cites several of these sayings: 'Kill a Jew—that's forty sins off your soul', or 'The Cossack Honta became famous in Ukraine for impaling Jews in a row on top of the fence.' 'The content of these proverbs is abhorrent', the author comments, but 'it reflects the no less abhorrent role that Jews have played in Ukrainian history.'<sup>78</sup>

<sup>73</sup> V. Zavadsky, 'Natsional'no-personal'na avtonomiya', *LNV*, 1928, no. 2, pp. 159–65. Dontsov's ironic use of 'gratitude' alludes to the fact that the Jews, far from being grateful to Petlyura for achieving national-personal autonomy for them, killed him.

<sup>74</sup> C. Saroléa, 'Bol'shevyzm i zhydy', *LNV*, 1926, nos. 7–8, p. 330. The article was, however, rather moderate. It explains the 'Jewish rule of Russia' as a consequence of the discrimination against Jews in tsarist times; it was this, rather than the Jewish character, that turned all Jews into revolutionaries.

<sup>75</sup> I. M. Husseini, 'Nova Palestyna', *LNV*, 1928, no. 2, pp. 166–70; Devius [D. Dontsov], 'Voyuyuchy i sionizm', *LNV*, 1929, no. 10, pp. 915–18.

<sup>76</sup> Devius, 'Voyuyuchy i sionizm', 917–18.

<sup>77</sup> *Ibid.* 918; emphasis original.

<sup>78</sup> S. Narizhny, 'Chuzhi narody v svitli ukraiyin'skykh prykazok', *LNV*, 1929, no. 10, pp. 921–6. In

Anti-Jewish motifs in Ukrainian literature and folklore became a popular topic in the Ukrainian press during the German occupation of 1941–4. This was supposed to demonstrate the irreconcilable nature of Ukrainian–Jewish relations from a historical perspective. This theme, however, did not feature prominently in *LNV* and *Vistnyk*. These journals mentioned in a few articles the negative description of Jews in Taras Shevchenko's poetry, but never went into detail.

*LNV* (till 1933) and *Vistnyk* (1933–9) continued to keep Jewish topics in view, but in the 1930s they integrated them into a global context, which had to do with Dontsov's growing identification with European fascist movements. Dontsov personally translated and published extracts from Hitler's *Mein Kampf* and Mussolini's 'La dottrina del fascismo' (with an introduction by Bohdan Krawciw). His press printed Rostyslav Yendyk's enthusiastic biography of Hitler, which glorified Nazism and described Hitler's confrontation with the 'two enemies of the German nation: Marxism and Jewry', and Mykhailo Ostroverkha's biography of Mussolini.<sup>79</sup> Dontsov reprinted in *Vistnyk* works by Joseph Goebbels, Alfred Rosenberg, Hans Günther, and other ideologues of German National Socialism.<sup>80</sup> He and other contributors to the journal repeatedly cited Hitler, Goebbels, Rosenberg, and Mussolini to prove the correctness of their views. On a few occasions Dontsov indicated that Hitlerism was exactly what *Vistnyk* was promoting.<sup>81</sup> In doing so he was trying to refute the argument of his critics that his ideology had nothing to do with Italian Fascism or German Hitlerism but was a product of the Russian nihilistic tradition.

Dontsov repeatedly targeted opponents of fascism. He began to interpret international events in the 1930s as an all-out fight between the communist/socialist/liberal and the fascist camps. One has to choose one side or the other, as no alternative or halfway policy is possible. Those who are not with fascism are strengthening the other side. Dontsov argued that anti-Bolshevism was the main reason why he and his group supported European fascist movements: 'For us the most important thing in Hitlerism is its testament of resolute struggle against Marxism. It is important that there is at last a regime in Europe that is dealing with *the Bolsheviks in the Bolshevik way* [z bol'shevykamy po bol'shevyts'ky].'<sup>82</sup> Further:

The most terrible news for the Bolsheviks is the rapid rise of fascism in Europe and Ukraine . . . Moscow is using its new tactics in Galicia. Here too the destroyed and dissipated

Ukrainian the sayings read 'Vbyi zhyda—sorok hrihiv z dushi' and 'Proslavyvsya na Ukrayini kozak Honta, shcho sadzhav zhydiv na killya ryadom poverkh plotu'.

<sup>79</sup> B. Mussolini, *Doktryna fashyzmu* (Lviv, 1937); R. Yendyk, *Adolf Hitlyer* (Lviv, 1935); M. Ostroverkha, *Mussolini: Lyudyna i chyn* (Lviv, 1934).

<sup>80</sup> e.g. J. Goebbels, 'Moral' chy moralina?', *Vistnyk*, 1934, no. 3, pp. 183–6; H. Günther, 'Heroyichne nasyt'stvo', *Vistnyk*, 1937, no. 2, pp. 113–18. Yendyk also translated and wrote an introduction to Günther's *Ritter, Tod und Teufel: Der heldische Gedanke*: H. Günther, *Lytsar, smert' i chort: Heroyivs'ka mysl'*, trans. R. Yendyk (Lviv, 1937).

<sup>81</sup> e.g. D. Dontsov, 'Pro baroniv Seredniovichchya i baraniv z baiky', *Vistnyk*, 1936, no. 1, p. 53.

<sup>82</sup> D. Dontsov, 'Sumerk marksyzmu', *Vistnyk*, 1933, no. 4, p. 304; emphasis original.

Bolshevik forces are trying . . . to create . . . a united front of communists, socialists, liberals, radicals, and masons [*masoneriyni*] to destroy the only true enemy of communism—fascism. Those who rally against fascism are working for Bolshevism whether they want to or not.<sup>83</sup>

Fascism is also credited with delivering a decisive blow against a ‘rotten socialist-liberal world permeated by poisonous vapours’.<sup>84</sup> Another reason to support fascism is that it combats ‘those small ethnic groups who—foreigners in a country that had accepted them—dared to dictate [to this country] their socio-political and cultural credo (such as Trotsky, Béla Kun, Szamuely, Eisner, and so on)’.<sup>85</sup>

The Nazi movement’s antisemitism came second out of the top six reasons for *Vistnyk*’s solidarity with Nazism, as indicated in the introduction to Yendyk’s *Adolf Hitler*: ‘For us the [Nazi] movement . . . is of great importance first and foremost because: (1) it has contained the victorious march of communism in Europe . . . [it] has delivered a deadly blow to Marxist doctrine; (2) it has brought onto the agenda the ticklish matter for us of the Jewish question [*drazhlyve dlya nas zhydivs’ke pytannya*].’<sup>86</sup>

It appears that in this period radical antisemitism assumed a central position in Dontsov’s world view. In one way or another he mentioned Jews in the majority of his articles on European politics and culture. Jews appear as the supporters of communism and capitalism, of liberalism and socialism, as a source of European decadence and pornography, and are unmatched in their hypocrisy and intrigue. *Vistnyk* accused Jews of setting Britain, France, and the United States against Nazi Germany, and even talked, referring to the United States, about ‘120 million Aryans over the ocean, under the yoke of Israel’.<sup>87</sup>

Typically Dontsov used Jewish names in a derogatory way, and often used plurals, referring to Jews in general as Trotskys, Blums, Litvinovs, Abramovyches, and so on. He ridiculed those naive Ukrainians who had raised their voices against the persecution of Jews in tsarist times only to receive in return a ‘bloodbath for their nation at the hands of Trotsky, Litvinov, and Zinoviev’.<sup>88</sup> He advocated the principle of collective responsibility. Russians were responsible for having Lenin and Stalin in charge of them, while the ‘Jewish masses’ should be held accountable for the Uritskys, Trotskys, and Yagodas acting in their name.<sup>89</sup> Jews do not have a moral right to rouse indignation at their treatment in Nazi Germany after they have deported masses of Ukrainians to Siberia to facilitate their colonization of Ukraine.<sup>90</sup>

<sup>83</sup> Devius [D. Dontsov], ‘Komintern na novykh reikakh’, *Vistnyk*, 1935, no. 9, pp. 652, 657. See also D. Dontsov, ‘Poputchykam’, *Vistnyk*, 1935, no. 12, pp. 912–21.

<sup>84</sup> Dontsov’s introduction to Ostroverkha, *Mussolini*, 3.

<sup>85</sup> D. Dontsov, ‘Tochka nad “i”’, *Vistnyk*, 1934, no. 10, p. 759.

<sup>86</sup> Yendyk, *Adolf Hitler*, 3. The introduction was signed by the ‘editorial board’ of *Vistnyk*.

<sup>87</sup> R.O., ‘Obludnyky humanitaryzmu’, *Vistnyk*, 1939, no. 1, p. 117. See also Redlich, ‘Jewish–Ukrainian Relations in Inter-War Poland’, 243.

<sup>88</sup> Dontsov, ‘Pro baroniv Seredniovichchya i baraniv z baiky’, 63.

<sup>89</sup> Dontsov, *Patriotyzm*, 37.

<sup>90</sup> Dontsov, ‘Sumerk marksyzmu’, 305.

While in the late 1920s Dontsov stated that cultural autonomy would no longer be granted to 'ungrateful Jews', his rhetoric became much more ferocious in the 1930s. He criticized Ukrainian socialist leaders for a 'halfway policy' during the National Revolution of 1917–20, in which 'not every Jew [was] the enemy, but only such as Béla Kun'.<sup>91</sup> He expressed regret that they had failed to develop a 'fundamental programme for solving the Jewish question in such a way that would make impossible once and for all the appearance of the Trotskys, Kuns, Yagodas, and agents of the Agro-Joint in Ukraine'.<sup>92</sup> Ukrainian leaders were obliged to fight 'worldwide Jewry' and develop this programme 'in order to create a movement similar to Hitlerism'. They had failed to do so, despite the popular belief among the masses that '[granting] equality to this nation *among us* means the whip and the Nagant revolver [aimed] at us in the hands of the Trotskys and Kuns; that they understand freedom for themselves in Ukraine as the forced expulsion of our peasants, as the creation of a second Palestine on our fertile lands with a majority deprived of rights and a privileged minority'.<sup>93</sup>

The topic of the Jewish colonization of Ukraine was raised again and again in the journal. *Vistnyk* went so far as to blame the famine of 1933 (the Holodomor) on Russian Jewish attempts to exterminate the Ukrainians in order to eliminate resistance from them and to free up territory for Jewish colonization.<sup>94</sup>

In late 1938 *Vistnyk* favourably described a 'practical solution' to the 'Jewish question' in Fascist Italy, which was intended to 'take preventive measures against the disease in its initial stage'.<sup>95</sup> In its last issue the journal published an article about Hitler's attitude towards Jews, which concurred with the main Nazi antisemitic tenets, and indicated that in the next number it would describe the 'practical approach of National Socialism to this issue'.<sup>96</sup> The promise was never fulfilled. The war broke out a few days later and *Vistnyk* ceased to exist.

Despite its rabid antisemitism, *Vistnyk* always continued to perceive Jews as a secondary enemy in comparison with Russian Bolsheviki. In one of his articles Dontsov criticized the periodical *Frontom*, which equated Jews with Bolshevism: 'Who needs to present the situation as if there were no Lenins behind the Kagano-viches, no Postyshevs and Zatonkys behind the Zinovievs . . .? Who wants the ideology of Russian imperialism, which is Bolshevism—and the Zinovievs and Litvinovs only serve it—to be made their [the Jews'] exclusive business?'<sup>97</sup>

Dontsov hinted that it was in the best of Russian interests to present the situation as if only Jews were responsible for Bolshevism. He made a similar point in another article two years later:

<sup>91</sup> D. Dontsov, 'Nerozryta mohyla', *Vistnyk*, 1937, no. 4, p. 299.

<sup>92</sup> *Ibid.* 288.

<sup>93</sup> *Ibid.* 288–9, 290; emphasis original.

<sup>94</sup> O. Narizhny, 'Nyshchennya ukrayins'koho narodu holodom', *Vistnyk*, 1933, no. 10, pp. 751–5.

<sup>95</sup> M.O. [M. Ostroverkha], 'Antysemitizm v Italiyi', *Vistnyk*, 1938, no. 10, p. 714.

<sup>96</sup> A.P., 'Zhydivs'ke pytannya i natsional'-sotsyalizm', *Vistnyk*, 1939, no. 9, p. 642.

<sup>97</sup> Stanarel [D. Dontsov], 'Yarema i Yaremy', *Vistnyk*, 1936, no. 10, p. 758.

Naive antisemites, who believe in 'a handful of Jewish usurpers who rule the whole Russian people', who stubbornly analyse Bolshevism by means of a *reductio ad judaicum*, cannot comprehend that the Jew . . . constitutes an effect and not a cause; that he is a parasitic phenomenon of a secondary nature . . . the Babylonian state structure of the 'Russian' type constitutes a perfect paradise for Israel, and that is why world Jewry considers the USSR as its most ideal modification of Russia.<sup>98</sup>

Dontsov and his *Vistnyk* in the 1930s were the most influential promoters of fascist ideas in Ukrainian society.<sup>99</sup> Taking into account his influence and popularity in Ukrainian nationalist circles, Dontsov undoubtedly contributed to the pro-German orientation of the nationalist movement. As one of his critics noted, 'Oh, how widespread the cult of Mussolini, Hitler, and other fascist strongmen is today among Ukrainian student youth! . . . How many little Mussolinis and Hitlers [*Mussolinyat i Hitlyerinyat*] of various kinds have sprung up [*naplodylosya*] in our [land] under the influence of Dontsov's lecturing!'<sup>100</sup> He continued: 'Did he [Dontsov] even stop to think for a minute what discord and ideological devastation he was sowing, especially among our naive student youth?'<sup>101</sup>

It is apparent that in the second half of the 1930s Dontsov and his *Vistnyk* came to favour the adoption of fascist anti-Jewish measures in Ukraine. As with other aspects of his ideology, Dontsov did not offer practical steps towards the 'solution of the Jewish problem', although his emphasis on violence, hatred, fanaticism, collective responsibility, and amorality was supposed to set the general tone of them. On one occasion, *Vistnyk* pointed out that one of the 'pressing problems' was to bring the proportion of Jews in Ukraine (5.4 per cent) down to no more than that in 'Muscovy' (0.5 per cent).<sup>102</sup>

Because of his influence, Dontsov undoubtedly contributed to the radicalization of anti-Jewish discourse in the nationalist movement in the 1930s.<sup>103</sup> His concept of

<sup>98</sup> Zmunchyllo [D. Dontsov], 'Rokovani hodyny', *Vistnyk*, 1938, no. 6, p. 421. See also Redlich, 'Jewish-Ukrainian Relations in Inter-War Poland', 242.

<sup>99</sup> It is important to note that Dontsov's support for Nazi Germany was far from unquestionable. He more than once asserted that the Ukrainians should support Hitler only in so far as his policy would contribute to the establishment of an independent Ukrainian state. In his article 'Addis Ababa and Kiev' Dontsov argued: 'We do not know what Hitler thinks . . . But we know that in 1916 [Germany] *thought* to create a dependent Polish Kingdom, which however turned into an independent Polish state . . . In 1919 Germany *thought* to settle comfortably [*usadovytytsya*] in the Baltic, but against its will created three independent states . . . Therefore, one can *think* one thing, but something totally different turns out': D. Dontsov, 'Adis-Abeba i Kyiv', *Vistnyk*, 1935, no. 11, p. 837; emphasis original. He was also disappointed by the Soviet-German rapprochement in 1939, and in the aftermath of the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact he wrote that 'Hitler will not prevent the growth of a Ukrainian *irredenta* even if he proclaims his total lack of interest in Ukraine': Devius [D. Dontsov], 'Na marhinezi novoho paktu', *Vistnyk*, 1939, no. 9, p. 675. For a similar point, see D. Dontsov, '1937', *Vistnyk*, 1937, no. 1, pp. 62-3.

<sup>100</sup> Levynsky, *Ideoloh ukrayins' koho fashyzmu*, 28.

<sup>101</sup> *Ibid.* 30-1.

<sup>102</sup> 'Z presovoho fil'mu', *Vistnyk*, 1937, no. 3, p. 232.

<sup>103</sup> After the war Dontsov moved to Canada and continued to expound antisemitism. See L. Dymerskaya-Tsigelman and L. Finberg, *Anti-Semitism of the Ukrainian Radical Nationalists: Ideology and Policy* (Jerusalem, 1999), available online at <<http://sicsa.huji.ac.il/14liud.html>>.

Jews as a 'secondary enemy' found its expression in the resolution taken by the Bandera faction of the OUN in April 1941, with which this chapter began.<sup>104</sup> The impact of Dontsov on the nationalist movement was most succinctly summarized by Petro Baley. He asserted that the 'Ten Commandments of the Ukrainian Nationalist', a statement of principles which every OUN member was expected to memorize and adhere to—including such commandments as '(7) Do not hesitate to commit the greatest crime if the good of the cause demands it', '(8) Treat the enemies of your nation with hate or perfidy', and '(10) Aspire to expand the power, riches, and size of the Ukrainian State even by means of enslaving foreigners'—was a 'true translation of Dontsov's political philosophy into simple language'.<sup>105</sup>

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By contrast with Dontsov, *Rozbudova natsiyi*, the official organ of the OUN, was much more ambivalent in the early 1930s about Nazi Germany. A commentary that appeared there straight after Hitler's takeover of power indicated that 'the [Nazi] Party does not wish to see a greater Russia, so it is favourably disposed to the creation of a Ukrainian state, which would weaken Russia and Poland'.<sup>106</sup>

The next year, *Rozbudova natsiyi* published an article by Yevhen Onatsky, an OUN representative in Italy and an enthusiastic supporter of Italian Fascism. He outlined the major differences between Fascism and National Socialism. He criticized the Nazi notion of 'race', which defines nation in terms of 'blood', and is therefore a purely materialistic concept, while for Fascism the 'nation' is a combination of material and especially spiritual bonds:

It is axiomatic for National Socialism that the German race is superior, and even the Latin nations, not to mention the Slavs, are inferior in comparison, although as Aryans they are much superior to other non-Aryan nations . . .

Just as Fascism cannot be imagined without corporativism, neither can National Socialism without racism.<sup>107</sup>

<sup>104</sup> Nationalist commentators continually reiterated other anti-Jewish elements from Dontsov's writings. In 1936 Mykola Nitskevych, a nationalist publicist, repeated Dontsov's ideas as expressed in his 'Symon Petlyura' and 'Memento': 'Under the influence of socialist dreamers and democratic "humanists" the Ukrainian nation has more than once "reached out a fraternal hand" to all elements inhabiting Ukraine—Muscovites, Poles, Jews, and others—without seeking to know their "clan and tribe" [*rodu i plemeni*] . . . We all know what came out of that! Let past experience guide us in the future!': M. Nitskevych, *Do osnovnykh pytan' natsionalizmu* (Paris, 1936), 38.

<sup>105</sup> Baley, *Frona Stepana Bandery*, 20. Typically scholars cite a 'corrected' version of the 'Decalogue', from which the social Darwinist phrases have been removed. On the original version, see also Yu. Boshyk et al. (eds.), *Ukraine during World War II: History and its Aftermath. A Symposium* (Edmonton, 1986), 174. Stepan Lenkavsky, the author of the 'Decalogue', in the explanation of the philosophical foundations of Dontsov's ideology that he wrote for *Rozbudova natsiyi*, mentioned amorality and an idea of nation that 'does not limit the will to power by any ethnographical limits or sickly (ethical) doubts': S. Lenkavsky, 'Filosofichni pidstavky "Natsionalizmu" Dontsova', *Rozbudova natsiyi*, 1928, nos. 7–8, p. 275.

<sup>106</sup> F.Sh., 'Deshcho pro nimets'kyi natsional-sotsializm', *Rozbudova natsiyi*, 1933, nos. 1–2, p. 34.

<sup>107</sup> Ye. Onatsky, 'Ideolohichni i taktychni rozkhodzhennya pomizh fashyzmom i natsional-sotsialyzmom', *Rozbudova natsiyi*, 1934, nos. 5–6, p. 145.

Onatsky re-emphasized his point in the next issue of the periodical. Using quotations from *Mein Kampf*, he pointed out the contemptuous attitude of German National Socialism towards oppressed nations and its treatment of others as 'inferior races'.<sup>108</sup> Onatsky's articles were published at the time of a short-lived German–Polish rapprochement that led to the non-aggression pact signed between the two countries in January 1934. In the course of its renewed co-operation with the authorities in Warsaw, Germany reduced its support for the OUN, and in summer 1934 handed over to the Polish authorities Mykola Lebed, a leading OUN activist involved in the assassination of Pieracki. This was also a time of German–Italian tension over Austria, and Onatsky was a strong admirer of Italian Fascism.

It appears that all reservations towards German Nazism were dropped once the German–Polish rapprochement had evaporated in the second half of the 1930s. In the same way as Dontsov's *Vistnyk*, OUN publications of that period frequently refer to the experiences of National Socialist Germany and Fascist Italy or cite Hitler and Mussolini to prove the validity of their point of view. They closely associate the OUN with the European fascist movements and ideology. This political and ideological alignment was most expressly set out by Yaroslav Orshan, a distinguished OUN ideologue: 'Ukrainian nationalism employs the term "nationalism" in the same sense as German and Italian nationalisms employ the term "national socialism" or "fascism" . . . Nationalisms: fascism, national socialism, Ukrainian nationalism, etc. are different national expressions of the same spirit.'<sup>109</sup>

The OUN's identification with fascism required a theoretical underpinning. This was accomplished by the creation of a Commission for the Study of Fascism in 1939 under the auspices of the Cultural Department of the OUN, headed by Oleh Olzhych. The Commission planned to publish a volume on fascist doctrine in the winter of 1939–40, followed by another one on its historical aspects. World events intervened, and these plans came to naught.<sup>110</sup>

The growing identification of organized Ukrainian nationalism with the European fascist movements went hand in hand with the radicalization of anti-Jewish discourse and the infusion of a racial component. This was especially noticeable in a pamphlet written by Ihor Virly, a self-proclaimed supporter of the 'chauvinistic militant Ukrainian nationalist movement'. He glorified Mussolini and Hitler as the leaders of new European nationalist movements that had stopped the advance of communism: 'On his banners [Hitler] inscribed "Perish, Jew!", because Jewry has been the carrier of the communist virus . . . Soon communists and socialists vanished almost altogether in Germany as they had in Italy; and along with them Jews are vanishing too—the nation that hatches and breeds communism.'<sup>111</sup>

<sup>108</sup> Ye. Onatsky, 'Kul't uspikhu', *Rozbudova natsiyi*, 1934, nos. 7–8, pp. 162–8.

<sup>109</sup> Ya. Orshan, 'Doba natsionalizmu', in *Vavanhardi (Al'manakh)* (Paris(?), 1938), 41. In the same year Orshan republished his article in Paris as a separate edition.

<sup>110</sup> 'Lysty O. Kandyby do Ye. Onats'koho', *Ukrayins'kyi istoryk*, 1985, nos. 1–4, pp. 141–6, and 'Lysty Ye. Onats'koho do O. Kandyby', *ibid.* 149–55.

<sup>111</sup> I. Virly, *Nashi chasy* (Lviv, 1935), 16–17. In the following year Virly again made violently anti-semitic comments in his pamphlet *Za mohutnist'!* (Lviv, 1936).



It was Volodymyr Martynets, a leading OUN ideologue and the former editor of *Rozbudova natsiyi* and *Surma*, who took on the task of incorporating racial thinking into the treatment of the 'Jewish question'. In a chapter of his book *By the Teeth and Claws of the Nation*, appropriately titled 'Should We Care about Racial Purity?', Martynets attempted to outline Ukrainian racial policy 'exclusively from the Ukrainian situation and in the interest of the Ukrainian nation'.<sup>112</sup> A year later he repeated his views on the treatment of Jews in the article 'The Jewish Problem in Ukraine', which first appeared in the brochure *Idea on the Offensive* published by the OUN to commemorate the death of its leader Yevhen Konovalets at the hands of a Soviet agent.<sup>113</sup>

Martynets begins his argumentation with the statement that the Jewish problem is acute throughout the whole world, but there is no single correct solution to it that will be suitable for everyone: some nations are making attempts to 'eliminate Jews from their national and state organism' or expel them from their territory, others are trying to curtail or stop Jewish immigration, still others (Palestinians) are relying on the bomb.<sup>114</sup> The Jewish problem is more serious in Ukraine than elsewhere, including Germany or Italy, because of the sheer number of Jews. Almost one-fifth of all Jews live in Ukraine, a figure 'appalling indeed'.<sup>115</sup> 'Even using the worst methods it is easier to destroy 44,000 Jews [in Italy] than to get it done by the best methods with 3¼ million of them in Ukraine.'<sup>116</sup> Italians only need to 'catch one Jew out of a thousand people', while in Ukraine Jews constitute the majority in many towns. Therefore, the Ukrainian policy towards Jews should be congruent with the struggle to change the ethnic balance of the city and imbue it with a Ukrainian character. Martynets talks about the 'de-judaization' (*vidzhydovlennya*) of the city, which will strengthen the Ukrainian intelligentsia and middle class and make Ukrainians masters in their own land.<sup>117</sup>

What should we do, Martynets asks, if Jews choose assimilation with Ukrainians? He applies racial theory to answer this question. He explains that Ukrainians, as Aryans, belong to a totally different racial group from Jews. Race affects not only physical characteristics but also mental and psychological ones, which are inherited and shared by individuals who belong to the same race. The older a race is the purer and more established it is. When races intermingle, the psychological features of the older race prevail over those of the younger. Because the Jewish race is the oldest and purest in Europe (Jews are the most committed racists), its mixture with the Ukrainian race may lead to the prevalence of Jewish psychological features, which include the lack of a state instinct and the dominance

<sup>112</sup> V. Martynets, *Za zuby i pazuri natsiyi* (Paris, 1937), 95; the Ukrainian title of the chapter is 'Chy dbaty nam pro chystotu rasy?' The pamphlet was originally published in the newspaper *Ukrayins'ke slovo* in Paris.

<sup>113</sup> V. Martynets, 'Zhydivs'ka problyema v Ukrayini', in *Ideya v nastupi* (n.p., 1938). He republished this article as a separate edition: V. Martynets, *Zhydivs'ka problyema v Ukrayini* (London, 1938).

<sup>114</sup> Martynets, *Zhydivs'ka problyema v Ukrayini*, 1.

<sup>115</sup> *Ibid.* 2.

<sup>116</sup> *Ibid.* 22.

<sup>117</sup> *Ibid.* 3.

of blatant internationalism. This mixture would have a very negative effect on the Ukrainian race, which is of a gentle and conciliatory type to such a degree that it 'weakens' or even 'disorganizes' foreign nations. For example, Dostoevsky and Gogol disorganized Russia from inside.<sup>118</sup> Therefore, Ukrainians have even more reasons to bar the assimilation of Jews than do nations with a millennium-long state tradition:

Intermingling with Jews would weaken the already benign and non-aggressive Ukrainian race-nation. The intermingling of the old Jewish race, which possesses international and anti-state leanings, with our gentle and non-aggressive race, which because of several centuries under the yoke does not have a properly developed, high national consciousness and inherited state-creating skills passed on from generation to generation, would produce a very undesirable result.

The need for us to resist the assimilation of Jews is in fact based not on our unwillingness to assimilate Jews, but on our unwillingness to be assimilated by Jews, to get the Jewish spirit under a Ukrainian form. In other words, the exterior Ukrainianization of Jews should not lead to an interior Judaization of Ukrainians, Judaization not only by blood [*krovnoho*], but also psychologically.<sup>119</sup>

In this regard Ukrainians are in a better position than other European nations where Jewish assimilation has made deep inroads. The absence of a historical mixing of the Jewish and Ukrainian nations/races means that Ukrainians will not need to combat the consequences of such a mixture in the way that other Europeans do.

Excluding Jewish assimilation, Martynets advocates the 'all-round isolation of Jews from the Ukrainian nation'.<sup>120</sup> There is no prospect of destroying 3¼ million Ukrainian Jews in the short term. Many nations at various times in history have tried to liquidate Jews by a variety of methods, ranging from assimilation to pogroms, to no avail. However, the total separation of Ukrainians from Jews will undermine the Jewish social base, leading to a decline in their numbers through emigration and a decrease in the birth rate. Therefore, 'neither pogroms nor forcible expulsion are required to reduce the number of Jews. It will be enough to separate from them completely.'<sup>121</sup>

However, the expulsion of Jews was not ruled out. In 'Should We Care about Racial Purity?' Martynets examines the options of expulsion versus assimilation in the treatment of the ethnic minorities of Ukraine: 'Should we for the strength of our nation assimilate a part of the foreign ethnic elements that inundate us on our land? Let's assimilate them! Should we squeeze out [*vytysnuty*] a part of them from our territory? Let's squeeze them out!'<sup>122</sup> Since Jewish assimilation was excluded, it is apparent from this passage that all Jews should be subjected to the 'squeezing out' policy.

<sup>118</sup> Martynets, *Za zuby i pazuri natsiyi*, 136.

<sup>119</sup> Martynets, *Zhydivs'ka problyema v Ukrayini*, 10. <sup>120</sup> Ibid. 14–15.

<sup>121</sup> Ibid. 22. <sup>122</sup> Martynets, *Za zuby i pazuri natsiyi*, 166.

Apparently Martynets envisaged a 'Jewish policy' similar to that of Nazi Germany in the late 1930s. On a practical level it would have included stripping Jews of their citizenship rights, prevention of assimilation, ghettoization, and expulsion. His works demonstrate that the OUN's identification with European fascist movements paved the way to the adoption of the Nazi anti-Jewish discourse and the further radicalization of anti-Jewish motifs in the Ukrainian nationalist movement. Deriving most of his arguments from the writings of other Ukrainian nationalist intellectuals, especially Oleksandr Mytsyuk but also Dmytro Dontsov, Martynets imbued them with racial theory, presenting a full-fledged version of Ukrainian antisemitism.

Martynets's rejection of Jewish assimilation resurfaces several times in OUN sources on the eve of the Soviet–German war and in its first months, including the 'Struggle and Activities of the OUN during Wartime' and Stetsko's autobiographical sketch that have been mentioned above. The repeated rejection of assimilation suggests that a racial component of antisemitism had been wholeheartedly accepted at that time by the OUN. Martynets did not mention partial or complete extermination of the Jews; neither did the Nazis at that time. Prior to the Holocaust the idea of the destruction of a large ethnic group as a solution to an 'ethnic problem' had been epistemologically incomprehensible for radical ideologues. The incomprehensible became the reasonable once the Nazis had initiated the 'final solution'. Luckily for the historical conscience of Ukrainians, the Germans left little scope for the OUN to execute its plans regarding Jews and other ethnic minorities.

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The treatment of the 'Jewish question' in the Ukrainian nationalist movement of the inter-war period underwent a profound transformation. Jewish themes were brought to the fore by the assassination of Petlyura and the subsequent trial of Schwarzbard. There was no consensus, at first, in the nationalist camp regarding the policy towards Jews. Various opinions were expressed, including those that advocated a Ukrainian–Jewish compromise to ensure Jewish co-operation, or at least neutrality, in the Ukrainian–Polish and Ukrainian–Russian Bolshevik conflicts. The idea of a compromise was soon abandoned and Jews became unambiguously perceived as unyielding enemies of the Ukrainian nation. The concept of Judaeo-Bolshevism, borrowed from right-wing European intellectuals, assumed a central position in the Ukrainian anti-Jewish discourse of the 1930s. The growing identification of Ukrainian nationalists with the European fascist movements brought about a radicalization of anti-Jewish motifs in the second half of 1930s and their infusion with a racial component, thus leading to the formation of full-fledged Ukrainian antisemitism. Previous complaints by some commentators about the lack of Ukrainian experts on the 'Jewish problem' led to the emergence of such experts (Mytsyuk, Martynets), who 'scientifically' approached the question. On the eve of the Soviet–German war a well-developed Ukrainian antisemitic tradition was in place, with scarcely concealed murderous intentions. Once the Nazis initiated the

mass extermination of Jews, it is difficult to imagine why the OUN would not look favourably on it or take part in it. The destruction of the Jews promised to solve many problems that the nationalist intellectuals had expressed so much anxiety over.

At the same time, the anti-Jewish line continued to be of secondary importance for the OUN by comparison with the threat from Russian Bolsheviks and from the Poles. It was officially dropped in 1943, when the changing international situation required it, and the 'Jewish problem' was being solved by the Germans.

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# Breaking Taboos

## *The Holodomor and the Holocaust in Ukrainian–Jewish Relations*

MYROSLAV SHKANDRIJ

MANY ASPECTS OF the Holocaust and the Holodomor (the famine of 1932–3) have long been taboo. In Soviet times neither subject was allowed frank discussion. When in 2006 the Ukrainian parliament called the Holodomor an act of genocide and in 2008 the European Parliament declared it a crime against humanity a more open investigation of the tragedies began in the media. As a result, recent educational campaigns around the Holocaust and Holodomor by NGOs in Ukraine have aimed to foster inter-group tolerance. Old narratives have been ‘repaired’ and new ones constructed ever since Soviet textbooks, which failed to mention either event, were thrown out. However, stumbling blocks remain on the path to a fuller accounting and better mutual relations between Jewish and Ukrainian communities.

One such stumbling block is the lack of an inclusive perspective. The opening of many archival holdings in the years following the Soviet Union’s collapse has enabled historians in the West like Norman Davies, Anne Applebaum, Timothy Garton Ash, Timothy Snyder, and Tony Judt to reconceptualize much of twentieth-century European history by devoting particular attention to the countries situated between Germany and Russia.<sup>1</sup> Here, from 1933 to 1945 Hitler and Stalin murdered and starved over 14 million civilians and prisoners of war (Snyder’s figure). Over the twelve-year period that both dictators were in power a long list of appalling mass murders was perpetrated, but Hitler’s murder of 5.7 million Jews and Stalin’s starving of 3.9 million Ukrainians today stand out as the two most heinous.<sup>2</sup> The focus on

<sup>1</sup> See e.g. N. Davies, *Europe: A History* (London, 1997); id., *No Simple Victory: World War II in Europe, 1939–1945* (New York, 2007); A. Applebaum, *Gulag: A History of the Soviet Camps* (London, 2003); T. Garton Ash, *In Europe’s Name: Germany and the Divided Continent* (New York, 1993); T. Snyder, *Bloodlands: Europe between Hitler and Stalin* (New York, 2010); T. Judt, *Postwar: A History of Europe since 1945* (New York, 2005); id., *Reappraisals: Reflections on the Forgotten Twentieth Century* (New York, 2008).

<sup>2</sup> Demographic researchers at Kiev’s Institute of Demography and Social Studies concluded on 30 November 2009 that there were 3.9 million deaths (from starvation and famine-related disease) and 600,000 lost births, giving a total of 4.5 million losses. The information is based on a 2008 study that was subsequently updated: see B. Klid and A. J. Motyl (eds.), *The Holodomor Reader: A Sourcebook on the Famine of 1932–1933 in Ukraine* (Toronto, 2012), 61–2, 78–9. Recent estimates of the number of

both dictators has allowed the suffering of Ukrainians and Jews to be described, along with the appalling tragedies of Poles, Belarusians, and others, as part of a historical-territorial context. New histories have enabled the telling of long-overlooked tragedies and encouraged a review of Jewish–Ukrainian relations.

Hitler's monstrous crimes, and the Holocaust in particular, have been written into history textbooks. For many years following the Second World War Stalin's crimes were not. In Russia in particular he is now again the subject of a cult. Writing in *Ogonek* in 2008, Viktor Erofeev described his reaction to the fact that Stalin was leading in a popular poll to name the nation's most important historical figure. It represented for him a form of masochism:

I know that my view of Stalin will never change; it is final. However, many think that the vast majority of people who love Stalin will stop loving him if they can be fundamentally changed: destroy their ignorance, open their eyes, feed them and teach them to respect people. This is a naive error. One cannot stop loving Stalin if Stalin is a guarantor of our wholeness, a support of our idiocy. A man from a culture incomprehensible to Russians, who came from outside, Stalin did Russia no good. None at all. Everything good that popular opinion has attributed to Stalin, from plentiful living to victory over Germany, is a falsehood. Nonetheless, we are not only Stalin's sons and daughters, but also his historical parents. Only in our land did Stalin put down roots and bear fruit. He is loved because we ourselves are incapable of anything. We need either a Georgian dictator or a Dutch trainer. We do not know how to live. We need the sound of horse bells, vodka, and the lash, because otherwise we lose our sense of identity.<sup>3</sup>

The myth-making aspect of Stalin's portrayal—as the demiurge, the Great Father, the guarantor of unity and hierarchical relations—has returned. For a more rational understanding of the figure to emerge, institutional memory has to change. The state needs to recognize, for example, that the Second World War began in 1939 when Hitler and Stalin invaded and swallowed up the lands and peoples that lay between them. This act was made possible by the Molotov–Ribbentrop pact, which secured Germany's eastern front and guaranteed it a steady supply of Soviet raw materials. The arrangement allowed Hitler to begin his war in western Europe and for Stalin to attack Finland. However, this is not how things are perceived in Russia. Following the Stalinist tradition, Russia marks the beginning of hostilities from the German invasion of 22 June 1941. The Russian term 'Great Patriotic War' serves in practice as a denial of the alliance with Hitler and of the fact that other countries were already at war in 1939–41.

By focusing attention on eastern Europe, contemporary historians have provided comparisons between Hitler and Stalin—until relatively recently a practice that many avoided. That taboo has now been lifted. If anyone still has lingering doubts deaths in Ukraine and the Northern Kuban region, which was heavily populated by Ukrainians, have ranged from 3 to 5 million.

<sup>3</sup> V. Erofeev, 'Pokhvala Stalinu,' *Ogonek*, 14–20 July 2008: <<http://www.ogoniok.com/5055/13>> (translation by the author).

about the inappropriateness of placing Stalin's sadism in the same league of infamy as Hitler's, they might be directed to Ann Applebaum's *Gulag* or Simon Montefiore's *Stalin*.<sup>4</sup> The Holodomor and the Holocaust have become not only topics of research, but symbols of the regimes and abhorrent practices that produced them. There is no implied equivalence of evil in recognizing these two catastrophes. Davies has written: 'The Nazis' "Final Solution" had no parallel. But there were any number of Soviet atrocities, including mass deportations and repressions and man-made famines, that fit the criteria for crimes against humanity.'<sup>5</sup> Nonetheless, there is an expectation that people of all backgrounds will feel moral outrage in contemplating these crimes.

The employment of a wide-angle lens capable of capturing the twelve-year period has brought the Holodomor into the frame and raised the issue of the genocidal nature of Stalin's regime. In his recent *Stalin's Genocides* Norman Naimark describes the *vozhd'* (leader) as a genocidaire, a man who killed systematically and by category: Poles, Ukrainians, Tatars, Chechens, Ingush, and many other groups. These were destroyed as nations. He points out that the categories of 'social' and 'national' overlapped: Poles were seen as foreigners, potential traitors, and spies; Ukrainians as kulaks (individual farmers) and as opponents of Stalin's rule (hence the constant linking of terms: *Petlyurite* kulaks, *Petlyurite* bandits, *Ukrainian* fascists); Tatars, Chechens, and Ingush were accused of collaborating with the Germans as entire peoples and were deported—every man, woman, and child.<sup>6</sup> Like the Holocaust, the Holodomor has deeply marked twentieth-century European history. Some have argued that the word 'classocide' (killing by social class) should be used in describing some of Stalin's crimes and that this term should generate the same kind of opprobrium as the word 'genocide'.<sup>7</sup> But the important point is not terminological; it is the need to feel outrage, to draw lessons from these events so as to understand our time, and to prevent similar horrors in the future.<sup>8</sup>

The two enormous tragedies were linked in the minds of contemporaries. Some individuals witnessed both. Writers have linked the two as symbolic of twentieth-century political evil. Yury Klen's *Popil imperiyi* ('Ashes of Empire') and Dokiya Humenna's *Khreshchatyi yar* ('Khreshchaty Ravine') are examples in Ukrainian literature.<sup>9</sup> Vasily Grossman, a writer of Jewish origin from Ukraine, produced two important novels in Russian that were published in their English translations as *Forever Flowing* and *Life and Fate*.<sup>10</sup> They showed how Soviet citizens from all

<sup>4</sup> Applebaum, *Gulag*; S. S. Montefiore, *Stalin: The Court of the Red Tsar* (London, 2003).

<sup>5</sup> Davies, *No Simple Victory*, 68.

<sup>6</sup> N. M. Naimark, *Stalin's Genocides* (Princeton, 2010), 4–5, 78–9.

<sup>7</sup> Davies, *No Simple Victory*, 66.

<sup>8</sup> On the lack of outrage concerning Stalin's crimes, see Applebaum, *Gulag*, 5–9.

<sup>9</sup> Yu. Klen, *Popil imperiyi* (1947–51), in his *Tvory*, ed. Ye. Malanyuk, 4 vols. (Toronto, 1957), vol. ii; D. Humenna, *Khreshchatyi yar (Kyiv 1941–43): Roman-khronika* (New York, 1956).

<sup>10</sup> V. Grossman, *Forever Flowing*, trans. T. P. Whitney (London, 1972), originally published in Russian in 1970 in Frankfurt am Main; V. Grossman, *Life and Fate*, trans. R. Chandler (London, 1985),

walks of life, including soldiers who fought in the ranks of the Red Army against Hitler, were often aware of the Holodomor and could not help but compare what they saw around them with what they knew of Stalinism. For them there could be no simple story of good and evil, of victory and defeat—the simplified legend that was enshrined in post-war ritual. Grossman's books, when they appeared, brought a sharpened awareness in the West of what it meant to live through the Stalin period. They also helped to correct misconceptions, among them the 'when it began to go wrong' scenario. The horrors of Stalinism did not begin with the great purge of 1936–7. By that time the Holodomor had taken place. Before the Holodomor, collectivization and deportations had killed hundreds of thousands. The concentration camps of the Gulag had already been placed under the control of the OGPU (the Soviet secret police) in 1929. Novelists have also reminded readers that the concentration camps continued into later Soviet times. As the Second World War ended, slave labourers in the Gulag were being worked to death in their greatest numbers. Applebaum estimates that from 1929 to 1953 more than 18 million individuals, in the vast majority innocent people, went through the camps, and another 6 million were exiled to remote regions of Siberia. The death count was in the millions and the camps were at their fullest when Stalin died in 1953.<sup>11</sup> In the 1960s and 1970s they were used to imprison civil rights activists ('dissidents'), of whom a disproportionate number were Jews and Ukrainians.

There have always been voices that deny the legitimacy of juxtaposing the two dictatorships. Some individuals still have trouble accepting the dark side of Stalinism, perhaps because of the inevitable suggestion, as one reviewer of Applebaum's book put it, that police terror 'was embedded in the original DNA of Lenin's creation'.<sup>12</sup> Death camps and execution squads have provided vivid evidence of the brutality and ideological perversity of Nazism. However, in face of the evidence, some observers continued to see the Soviet Union from a salvationist perspective. This attitude dates back to the 1930s, when many western Europeans decided that the stark choice was between communism and fascism. Recent historical and memoir literature has taken aim at this dichotomous picture. It has also challenged historians who in the 1980s ignored the slave empire and chose to focus on the Soviet Union's rapid economic development, urbanization, and popular support. The shift to analysis of the killing machine has opened up a discussion of victims and perpetrators, and turned attention to the experiences of ordinary people.

Another stumbling block to a frank discussion of these two tragedies and to a better understanding of Jewish–Ukrainian relations has been the mistaken perception that Jews overwhelmingly supported Bolshevism. Overall the number of Jews in

originally published in Russian in Lausanne in 1980, based on microfilms smuggled out to the West. The author completed the text in 1960; he died in 1964.

<sup>11</sup> Applebaum, *Gulag*, 517–18.

<sup>12</sup> S. M. Miner, 'The Other Killing Machine', *New York Times Review of Books*, 5 Nov. 2003 (review of Applebaum, *Gulag*).



positions of power within the Soviet Union declined steadily throughout the 1930s. In order to please Hitler, Stalin removed many prominent figures of Jewish origin from his government, including—spectacularly—his foreign minister Maxim Litvinov on 3 May 1939. The participation of Jews in the party and organs of repression was by the time of the German–Soviet war not significantly greater than their percentage in the population. The situation in Ukraine was, however, somewhat different. The secret police chief Nikolay Ezhov, when he travelled to Kiev in February 1938, commented: ‘I have taken a look at the cadres. This is not a Ukrainian NKVD, but Birobidzhan [a reference to the Jewish Autonomous Republic that had been set up] . . . When I set off for Ukraine they told me that there were a lot of Jews working there. Well, they deceived me—there are only Jews working here.’<sup>13</sup> Of the 125 leading figures in the Ukrainian GPU–NKVD in the years 1936–8, Jews constituted 43.2 per cent, Russians 33.6 per cent, Ukrainians 13.6 per cent, and Latvians, Belarusians, Armenians, Moldovans, and others made up the rest.<sup>14</sup> The low number of Ukrainians among the leading cadres of the republic’s secret police, comments Vadym Zolotaryov, ‘to our mind can be explained only by the hidden anti-Ukrainian politics of the Soviet leadership at the time. Although there were many Ukrainians in the NKVD of the Ukrainian SSR, they occupied in the main low-ranking positions.’<sup>15</sup> These figures, it should be noted, already reflect the cadre purges that had been conducted by Genrikh Yagoda, the head of Stalin’s secret police from 1934 to 1936, and then by Ezhov himself. In 1935–6, of the top ninety figures Jews constituted 66.7 per cent, Russians 15.5 per cent, Ukrainians 6.7 per cent. The changes brought about by Ezhov in 1936–8 were therefore an attempt to alter this make-up.<sup>16</sup> The overall number is small, but the image of Jews working in the hated organs of repression has stimulated resentment. The main—and rarely discussed—reason for their over-representation appears to have been their migration to the cities from what until 1914 had been the Pale of Settlement. Desperate for any kind of employment, they were available and prepared to serve the new regime.

The purge of old cadres in the late 1930s can be seen as the prosecution of an anti-Jewish policy. From another perspective the high percentage of Jews can be taken as evidence of an anti-Ukrainian policy (a suspicious attitude towards those who had supported an independent state). There was a third perspective: this particular cohort of Jewish Chekists, who joined at the beginning of the Soviet period, had mainly been recruited in Ukraine. Their replacements were often sent in from Russia, a move that can be seen as anti-Ukrainian. In any case, Stalin had decided

<sup>13</sup> V. Zolotaryov, *Oleksandr Uspens'kyi: Osoba, chas, otochennya* (Kharkiv, 2004), 196.

<sup>14</sup> V. Zolotaryov, ‘Kerivnyi sklad NKVS URSR pid chas “velykoho teroru” (1936–1938 rr.): Sotsial’no-statystychnyi analiz’, *Z arkhiviv VUChK-GPU-NKVD-KGB*, 2009, no. 2 (33), p. 103.

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.* 104.

<sup>16</sup> V. Zolotaryov, ‘Nachal’nyts’kyi sklad NKVS URSR naperedodni “yehzhovshchyny”: Sotsial’no-statystychnyi analiz’, in Yu. Shapoval et al. (eds.), *Ukrayina v dobu ‘Velykoho teroru’ 1936–1938 rr.* (Kiev, 2009), 67.

on a replacement of cadres as a part of the regime's manipulative *divide et impera* practice. Moreover, he knew from earlier experience that a link-up between Jews and Ukrainians spelled trouble for Soviet rule: these communities had legitimate grievances and large diasporas, and could mobilize support. He played them off against one another and kept them divided.<sup>17</sup> It should be pointed out that much of the grain requisitioning and food removal that led to the Holodomor was conducted by locals, although of course the orders came from Moscow and thousands of fanatics were sent in to oversee the operation. Most leading figures in the Ukrainian GPU–NKVD were murdered by Stalin in the late 1930s.

The stereotype of the Jewish communist became prominent in some inter-war Ukrainian literature published in what is now western Ukraine (then Poland's eastern Galicia). There had been no Jews in governmental positions in tsarist Russia. The prominence of some Jews in the Bolshevik leadership after 1917 was therefore disconcerting to many contemporaries. In 1918–21 an image of the Jewish Bolshevik was formed in the popular mind. It was, and still is, exploited by antisemitic currents. Initially, at least, it had some basis in reality. In 1919 Moisey Ravich-Cherkassky, a Jewish leader who went over to the Bolsheviks, wrote that right-bank Ukraine (west of the Dnieper) would never have been conquered by the Red Army without local Jewish support. As many scholars, including Jewish academics, have pointed out, there were many Jews in the Cheka and other repressive organs of Soviet power in Ukraine in the early 1920s. Moreover, following the defeat of the independence movement, as the Ukrainian intelligentsia fled the capital Kiev, Jews escaped to the city to avoid the anarchy in the countryside. By 1921 they were almost a third of the city's population. A relatively literate, predominantly urban group, they were often promoted by the authorities. Many observers interpreted this as evidence that Jews had been the primary beneficiaries of the defeated independent state. The reality, of course, was that most Jews were happy to take any job in the new state (and most jobs were state jobs) in order to avoid the starvation and pogroms that were sweeping the country. Ukrainians, in their turn, were embittered by the presence of invading Russian troops and the loss of independence, and were further chagrined by the presence of large numbers of 'state-building' Jews.

Although politically engaged Jews were a small minority within the Jewish population—both secular and traditional—a number became prominent Marxists and communists in ensuing years. In a series of articles Tony Judt has discussed the careers of figures like Arthur Koestler, who ended his romance with Marxism and

<sup>17</sup> Sometimes leaders of Jewish origin were removed and replaced by Ukrainians, sometimes the reverse. This tactic was used in dealing with the secret police hierarchy in Ukraine whenever mass arrests of particular groups were conducted. Thus, in 1938 after prominent party and GPU–NKVD leaders had been removed as Ukrainian 'nationalists', a leadership change was made and prominent figures of Jewish origin were removed in a campaign against 'Trotskyists, Mensheviks, Bundists, and Zionists': see Zolotaryov, *Oleksandr Uspens'kyi*, 50–61, 125–6, 133–8. A similar tactic was used in dealing with writers in the post-war years: see M. Shkandrij, *Jews in Ukrainian Literature: Representation and Identity* (New Haven, 2009), 169–70.

communist ideology, or Louis Althusser and Eric Hobsbawm, who remained de facto apologists for the worst crimes of Stalinism.<sup>18</sup> It has rarely been pointed out that Koestler and Alexander Weissberg, who broke from the movement, had a Ukrainian connection. They knew about the Holodomor from personal experience and by the late 1930s were unable to keep silent. When they parted in 1933 at the Kharkiv railway station, they convinced each other that it was necessary to ‘keep the banner of the Soviet Union flying high in the West’.<sup>19</sup> Only during his two-year imprisonment from 1937 to 1939 did Weissberg recognize that the famine had for years haunted him as a suppressed, unacknowledged realization. In his memoir *The Accused* he returns to the tragedy many times, repeatedly quoting the figure of 10 or 11 million dead, and castigating his own moral blindness and feeble political rationalizations. Koestler too could not forgive his own myopia and dishonesty. His *Darkness at Noon* is a brilliant account of the moral and political logic that drove communist intellectuals to Soviet apologetics, and the famine haunts his autobiographical *Arrow in the Blue* and *Invisible Writing*. In 1932, while in Kharkiv, then the capital of Ukraine, he saw starving people and convinced himself that they were only ‘kulaks’.<sup>20</sup> Admission of the Holodomor allowed both Koestler and Weissberg to grasp the scale of their delusions and to understand the politics of Stalinism. The fictional protagonists of Grossman and Solzhenitsyn experience similar illuminations and transformations when they face the facts.

The point is that awareness of the Holodomor changes one’s perception of rationalizations—whether utopian or cynical. Koestler put it this way: ‘After the purges, the show trials, the Stalin–Hitler pact and so on, it required a larger and larger blind spot on the retina not to see the obvious.’<sup>21</sup> He publicly admitted the reality and conducted a transformational self-analysis. On the other hand, Sartre’s decision to keep quiet ‘for the good of the cause’, or Walter Duranty’s lies, were deliberate acts of obfuscation. Duranty was probably being blackmailed. ‘A few cases of malnutrition’ were all that he would admit to. He received the Pulitzer Prize for his reporting and never issued an apology.<sup>22</sup> There were also willing dupes like the former French prime minister Édouard Herriot, George Bernard Shaw, and Beatrice and Stanley Webb, who denied the fact that people were starving. Herriot was wined and dined and shown shops full of goods—displays that had been specially prepared and choreographed for his visit, and that disappeared

<sup>18</sup> The articles are reprinted in his *Reappraisals*.

<sup>19</sup> A. Weissberg, *The Accused*, trans. E. Fitzgerald (New York, 1951), 213. It originally appeared in German as *Hexensabbat* (Frankfurt am Main, 1951). It has been translated into French as *L’Accusé* (Paris, 1953) and into Ukrainian as *Kholodna hora* (Kharkiv, 2010).

<sup>20</sup> A. Koestler, *Darkness at Noon*, trans. D. Hardy (London, 1940); id., *Arrow in the Blue: The First Volume of an Autobiography, 1905–31* (1952; New York, 1969), 84–5; id., *The Invisible Writing: The Second Volume of an Autobiography, 1932–40* (1954; New York, 1984), 63–70, 87–91.

<sup>21</sup> Koestler, *Arrow in the Blue*, 336.

<sup>22</sup> See S. J. Taylor, *Stalin’s Apologist: Walter Duranty and the New York Times’s Man in Moscow* (New York, 1990).

immediately afterwards. It is against this background of the Western intellectual's romance with Stalinism and the prolonged campaign of Soviet disinformation that the Ukrainian insistence on full disclosure and fair portrayal should be seen.

However, if the Soviet apologetics of Western intellectuals can be attributed to a misguided desire to keep faith with youthful enthusiasms, or to cling to a utopian creed, Soviet leaders were mostly willing cogs in a machinery of terror. Nonetheless, these figures have to be set against those who broke away and told the story—both Jews like Koestler and Weissberg, and Ukrainians like Victor Kravchenko, the first famous Soviet defector. In his *I Chose Freedom* and *I Chose Justice* the Holodomor is a conversion experience and a driving motivation.<sup>23</sup> In the same period George Orwell's *Animal Farm* (1945) appeared with the power of a revelation. A Ukrainian translation came out in the displaced persons' camps in 1947. The introduction that Orwell wrote for that edition was later translated from Ukrainian for use in the English edition of his complete works. Raphael Lemkin first introduced the term 'genocide' in 1944 in a formulation that is relevant to both the Holocaust and the Holodomor.<sup>24</sup> In 1953, speaking to Ukrainians in New York, he called the famine 'perhaps the classic example of Soviet genocide, its longest and broadest experiment in Russification . . . the destruction of the Ukrainian nation'.<sup>25</sup> Who, however, at the time was prepared to listen to the uncomfortable truth?

Narrating the Holocaust in Ukraine provides its own challenges. Issues of full disclosure, the construction of memorials, and practices of commemoration are now frequently discussed. A vast amount of work still lies ahead, but conferences, publications, and events sponsored by NGOs are being used to educate the public. A fuller internalization of the Holocaust has been posed by aspects of the current discussion concerning the culpability of Ukrainians in the killing of Jews during the Nazi occupation. Here, too, a simplistic two-camp theory has hindered the presentation of events. The romanticization of the national independence struggle (the equivalent of an unthinking 'my country right or wrong' view), like the anti-fascist mantra for communists, has impeded the acceptance of a more nuanced narrative. However, much valuable research into the Second World War and Holocaust in Ukraine has been accomplished. Karel Berkhoff and Amir Weiner have described

<sup>23</sup> V. Kravchenko, *I Chose Freedom: The Personal and Political Life of a Soviet Official* (New York, 1946); id., *I Chose Justice* (1950; New Brunswick, NJ, 1989).

<sup>24</sup> He wrote: 'Generally speaking, genocide does not necessarily mean the immediate destruction of a nation, except when accomplished by mass killings of all members of a nation. It is intended rather to signify a coordinated plan of different actions aiming at the destruction of essential foundations of the life of national groups, with the aim of annihilating the groups themselves. The objectives of such a plan would be disintegration of the political and social institutions, of culture, language, national feelings, religion, and the economic existence of national groups, and the destruction of the personal security, liberty, health, dignity, and even the lives of the individuals belonging to such groups': R. Lemkin, *Axis Rule in Occupied Europe: Laws of Occupation, Analysis of Government, Proposals for Redress* (1944; New York, 1973), 79.

<sup>25</sup> See R. Lemkin, 'Soviet Genocide in Ukraine', in Klid and Motyl (eds.), *Holodomor Reader*, 80.

local participation in the killing of Jews, particularly in Galician towns immediately following the invasion of 22 June 1941.<sup>26</sup> The culpability of members of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (Orhanizatsiya ukrayins'kykh natsionalistiv; OUN) in these killings is now being examined, with particular attention to the deconstruction of victimization and heroization narratives.

But perhaps it did not have to be that way. Before examining this issue, it is useful to glance at the story of co-operation that preceded the war period. It needs to be recalled that Ukraine has a philosemitic tradition, and that there have been bridge-builders from the Jewish to the Ukrainian community. Jews were not viewed with hostility within much of the Ukrainian cultural and political tradition. The Ukrainian People's Republic (Ukrayins'ka Narodna Respublika; UNR) that in January 1918 declared independence was supported by almost the entire population of Ukraine, including almost all Jews. The government granted a national-cultural autonomy to Jews—going further than any other state had done until then—and the policy was widely supported. This development was the result of a rapprochement between Jewish and Ukrainian intellectuals over the previous decades, when both had struggled for civil rights under tsarist rule. Three successive invasions by Red Army forces largely sent from Russia ended the UNR's existence, and Ukraine was plunged into anarchy. The terrible wave of pogroms in 1919 badly damaged Ukrainian–Jewish relations. Throughout this period, however, the UNR consistently supported Jewish national-cultural autonomy, and the disciplined troops under its control, such as the Sichovi Stril'tsi (Sich Sharpshooters Regiment), prevented pogroms wherever they controlled territory. Jewish volunteers served in the republic's army, making up an entire regiment under Jewish command.

This generation had been educated in the philosemitic tradition that dominated Ukrainian intellectual life from the 1890s. Its writers, including figures like Lesya Ukrayinka, Oleksandr Oles, Volodymyr Vynnychenko, Ahatanhel Krymsky, Hnat Khotkevych, Modest Levytsky, Stepan Vasylychenko, and Klym Polishchuk, were strongly pro-Jewish.<sup>27</sup> In the 1920s the Soviet Ukrainian government continued the UNR policy of Ukrainianization (a concession to the powerful national movement), while simultaneously supporting Yiddishization and the development of Jewish institutions—although it should be emphasized that the government in Kharkiv, which was ultimately under Moscow's tutelage and supervision, banned Hebrew, arrested Zionists, and considered Judaism 'the most reactionary of religions'. Nonetheless, the Jewish revival was supported by Kharkiv as a potential ally of Ukrainianization, since it could help to reverse the Russification that was tsarism's legacy. During the 1920s many Jews were in fact drawn into Ukrainianization.<sup>28</sup>

From this perspective the participation of Jews in Soviet institution-building must be seen as a success for the Ukrainian national movement. The 'Ukrainian

<sup>26</sup> K. C. Berkhoff, *Harvest of Despair: Life and Death in Ukraine under Nazi Rule* (Cambridge, Mass., 2004); A. Weiner, *Making Sense of War: The Second World War and the Fate of the Bolshevik Revolution* (Princeton, 2001). <sup>27</sup> Shkandrij, *Jews in Ukrainian Literature*, 83–106. <sup>28</sup> *Ibid.* 107–24.

cultural renaissance' and the 'Jewish revival' were—in spite of their limitations—an enormous contribution to both language communities and to the cultural life of the republic as a whole. In short, during the pre- and post-revolutionary years many Ukrainians and Jews saw eye to eye on a large range of issues. They had both come out of the civil rights movement, the struggle against tsarist autocracy, and had been educated in the European literary mainstream which emphasized the virtues of compassion and understanding. A radical break was introduced by Stalin's first Five-Year Plan and collectivization in 1929, the show trial of the Union for the Liberation of Ukraine (*Spilka vyzvolennya Ukrayiny*; SVU) in 1930, the Holodomor and the curtailment of Ukrainianization in 1933.

These events cast their shadow on inter-war western Ukraine (then south-eastern Poland), where there was a large Jewish community. Officers of the defeated UNR army in emigration created the underground and terrorist OUN in 1929. Throughout most of the 1930s the organization paid little attention to Jews, or their role in an envisioned independent state. Strongly antisemitic currents within the OUN developed after 1937 and some statements made in 1941 by the organization's leaders contributed to the fanning of anti-Jewish hatred during the German invasion. Although the dominant Ukrainian party in Polish-ruled Galicia was the mainstream and democratic Ukrainian National Democratic Alliance (*Ukrayins'ke natsional'no-demokratychnе ob'yednannya*), the collapse of parliamentary governments, indeed of whole states (Austria in 1936, Czechoslovakia in 1938, Poland in 1939), the impotence of the League of Nations, and the policy of appeasement practised by Western powers convinced many young people that the only real law was that of the gun. As already noted, OUN actions during the war, in particular its participation in the pogroms that followed the German invasion, are presently the subject of research. It should be mentioned, however, that the organization's politics and ideology evolved continuously. It split into factions in 1941, and in 1943 it produced a democratic programme. The leadership of the Bandera faction of the OUN, the OUN(b), was arrested immediately after the beginning of the German-Soviet war, when the Nazis realized that the organization could not be controlled and was building its own network. The leaders of the Melnyk faction, the OUN(m), in Kiev were murdered by the Gestapo.

These facts indicate, first, that it would be a mistake to collapse all nationalists (those who supported independence) with Nationalists (OUN members). There were nationalists who detested Nationalists. Secondly, all Nationalists did not think alike. And, thirdly, the anti-Soviet resistance movement in both Ukraine and the Ukrainian diaspora went through a political development, something that has been obscured by Soviet propaganda, which preferred to associate all Ukrainian resistance with the OUN(b). Its secret services had penetrated this organization. Bohdan Stashynsky, the Moscow agent who killed Lev Rebet, a leader of the breakaway democratizing wing of the OUN(b) in 1957, also assassinated Bandera in 1959. The underground Ukrainian Insurgent Army (*Ukrayins'ka povstans'ka armiya*; UPA)

continued fighting into the 1950s. The writings of its leading ideologists, Petro Poltava and Osyp Hornovy, employ the rhetoric of anti-colonialism and national liberation, and contain nothing antisemitic. Nonetheless, the participation of some Ukrainians in the killing of Jews has left a stain on those who fought against the Soviet state. Although Russian archives dealing with the UPA are not available to researchers, the Ukrainian archives dealing with the wartime activities of the OUN and UPA are. Not only are fuller accounts emerging, but much of the documentation is being published or put on line. Researchers can now examine the Soviet definition of all nationalists as Nazi collaborators and antisemites.

As yet, few Russian scholars have discussed Soviet collaboration with Hitler in the years 1939–41. Nonetheless, a discussion of the Holocaust in Ukraine raises the issue of antisemitism's relationship to the broader society and state. A wide-angle lens that takes in the 1930s indicates Soviet antisemitism's pre-war origins. The closing down of all Jewish institutions in the 1930s, the persecution of Judaism, the mass arrests of Zionists, and the banning of Hebrew, were all forms of antisemitism. However, a crucial incubation period occurred during the alliance of the two totalitarianisms throughout 1939–41. No criticism of Germany was permitted in the Soviet Union during the period of the Molotov–Ribbentrop pact. Birthday greetings to Stalin from Hitler and Ribbentrop were printed in *Pravda* on 23 December 1939. The Soviet public was told of the great German–Soviet friendship. Victor Kravchenko wrote:

Not until we saw newsreels and newspaper pictures showing a smiling Stalin shaking hands with von Ribbentrop did we begin to credit the incredible. The swastika and the hammer-and-sickle fluttering side by side in Moscow! And soon thereafter Molotov explaining to us that Fascism was, after all, 'a matter of taste'! Stalin greeting his fellow-dictator with fervent words about their 'friendship sealed in blood'!<sup>29</sup>

Silence on Nazi policy was seen by many as de facto approval of Hitler's policies. The newsreels, photos, speeches, and articles from this period are rarely seen or discussed. Kravchenko continues:

*Professor Matlock* vanished from the cinema screens, along with *The Family Oppenheim* and all other anti-Fascist films. The libraries, similarly, were purged of anti-Fascist literature. Voks, the Society for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries, instantly discovered the wonders of German Kultur. Visiting Moscow on business, I learned that several exhibits of Nazi art, Nazi economic achievements and Nazi military glory were on view or in the process of organization.

The theatres in the capital were developing a great interest in German drama. In fact, everything Germanic was the vogue. A brutal John Bull and an Uncle Sam enthroned on money bags figured in the propaganda, but the Nazis were exempt from such ridicule. Hundreds of German military men and trade officials were in evidence in Moscow hotels and shops. They were busy with the gigantic program of Soviet economic help to Hitler's crusade against the 'degenerate democracies'.<sup>30</sup>

<sup>29</sup> Kravchenko, *I Chose Freedom*, 333.

<sup>30</sup> *Ibid.* 334.

Antisemitism, of course, has different roots and many manifestations. The Soviet version is related to the long-established practice of demonizing and removing whole populations. ‘Counter-revolutionaries’, ‘wreckers’, ‘kulaks’, ‘nationalists’, ‘collaborators’—the list of abusive terms is long—saturated the hate campaigns. Public abuse and demonization became an established practice. It was turned against Jews most dramatically in the ‘anti-cosmopolitan campaign’ that raged during Stalin’s last years and continued after his death. But it had been practised repeatedly throughout Soviet rule, and was used against national groups from the early 1930s. Snyder has written that Stalin was ‘a pioneer in national mass murder’.<sup>31</sup>

The antisemitic brush was continuously used to tar all Ukrainians who protested the fate of their country under Soviet rule. I have told the following anecdote before in a review, but it is pertinent here. In 2006 the Metropolitan Opera in New York put on a performance of Tchaikovsky’s *Mazeppa* by the visiting Mariinsky (Kirov) Opera from St Petersburg. Although the libretto allows the ruler of Ukraine to voice a number of patriotic speeches, the staging made every attempt to demonize this figure, as Russian culture has always done. *Mazepinstvo* is a derogatory word used by Russian chauvinist historians to label any strivings for Ukrainian independence. Even today, three hundred years later, the hetman is still anathematized annually in the Russian Orthodox Church. He is seen as the equivalent of a heretic, traitor, and war criminal for his revolt against Peter the Great and alliance with Charles XII, who was defeated at the Battle of Poltava in 1709. As the curtain rose over a picture of Ukraine under Mazepa’s rule, viewers were astonished to see in the background an enormous photograph of the railway tracks leading to Auschwitz. Some might have been momentarily puzzled by this anachronism, but they immediately grasped the point, which was to link Ukraine, independence, pogroms, war criminals, fascists, and Auschwitz. The trope is so practised that at times no one questions its relationship to reality. The fact that Russian high culture today broadcasts this view of Ukrainian independence appears to be accepted without any questioning of how the imagery is constructed, by whom, or why. Anti-Ukrainianism, like antisemitism, is often a juggling of tropes and metaphors—the linking of antisemitism, nationalism, fascism, spies, etc. in an associative chain. The same technique has been used to discredit or demonize Jews, only there the associative cluster includes a reactionary religion, Zionism, capitalism, American aggression, worldwide conspiracy, and so on.

The full story of Jewish and Ukrainian suffering, which is so powerfully represented by the Holocaust and the Holodomor, needs to be universally recognized and assimilated. The telling opens up space for mutual recognition, understanding, and support among Jews and Ukrainians. It may be that in some cases the construction of a nationalist narrative militates against this. But there is no reason why the story of one victimization should desensitize one to that of another. On the contrary, descriptions of these enormous tragedies should move every thoughtful

<sup>31</sup> Snyder, *Bloodlands*, 89.



person. The telling of each amplifies the message of the other: 'It could have been you' and 'It must never happen again' and 'This, too, is what it has meant to be human.'

Contemporary Ukrainian writers describe Ukrainian and Jewish victimhood and suffering, sometimes combining or interweaving the two narrative strands. To do so is not to suggest that one narrative should in any way diminish the other, or that both narratives ought somehow to share the stage in all instances. (It was Stalin who decreed that all Soviet peoples had suffered equally and forbade the singling out of Jewish suffering. As a result, monuments to those murdered in the Second World War simply noted the number of 'citizens' without specifying their identity, even when the vast majority were Jews.) The important point is to acknowledge the legitimacy of both sufferings. Everyone needs to learn how Jewish life flourished in Ukraine and how it was extinguished in the Shoah. Everyone should also understand the long string of horrors and atrocities in Ukraine that were the result of political terror, engineered famine, world wars, the Gulag, and national persecution. They are only now being revealed in all their fullness—often to an incredulous and resistant public.

Revealing long-suppressed tragedies is not a competing exercise: one story often leads to another. This is the approach taken by Holocaust educators in Ukraine, who make the point that Jews in Ukraine were Ukrainians; their tragic fate should be embraced as 'ours'—precisely what much of Ukrainian literature has done throughout the decades, as the works of the philosemitic writers already mentioned shows. Such an approach does not deny the specificity of the Jewish genocide. It does, however, encourage the development of a conceptual and ethical framework that activates the values of compassion, fairness, and understanding.

Awareness of the Holodomor and the Holocaust provides a dual perspective that can play an important role in challenging the habit of avoiding awkward questions, of remaining enclosed within reassuring morality tales that exclude all complications. To be sure, human beings have much invested in simple stories, which are perhaps necessary for processing streams of complex information. However, the history of this region is not a simple tale, and in any case canonical narratives need to be continually rethought in the light of available information and contradictory viewpoints. One example comes to mind. Eugenia Ginzburg's powerful memoir *Journey into the Whirlwind* opens with this sentence: 'The year 1937 began, to all intents and purposes, at the end of 1934—to be exact, on the first of December.' That was the day on which she was summoned to the local Communist Party office and discovered that Sergey Kirov, Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, had been assassinated. His murder became an excuse for the purges that followed. This is Ginzburg's perspective on her personal hell. Is the reader to assume that everything in the Soviet Union appeared basically fine until her arrest in 1937, and that only retrospectively can one see that things began to go wrong in 1934? The memoir suggests as much. However, her

account shows how arrest and imprisonment forced her gradually to reassess the entire Soviet experience. She slowly reached the realization that those who carried out the purges were all ‘sadists’, who had ‘traveled all the way from the human condition to that of beasts’.<sup>32</sup> Until the moment of her arrest she hardly questioned the party line; she had agreed with all Stalin’s policies. Today’s Ukrainian reader cannot help but feel the unintended irony of her shifting the ‘beginning’ from 1937 to 1934. Somehow she had remained oblivious to the great show trials in Ukraine in 1928 and 1930 (the Shakhty and SVU trials, which set the pattern for the all the later ones), to the mass arrests that accompanied them (tens of thousands of the intelligentsia), and to the Holodomor. In the months that preceded her arrest, her sufferings had been only moral (her word). Ginzburg, like Weissberg and Koestler, and like many others in later decades, did not want to hear what happened before 1934. Like the Holocaust, the Holodomor raises the veil on perpetrators, cover-ups, and disturbing dual standards. Which story is it that we want to tell? The one that begins in 1941? Or 1939? In 1934? Or 1930? Is it wrong to tell one without the other? Of course not. But one should be aware of the other, because then the telling of one’s own story is richer and better informed. The books of Koestler and Weissberg are proof.

In 1946, a year before Primo Levi’s *If This is a Man* appeared, Victor Kravchenko defected to the West and published his *I Chose Freedom* in New York. In an article of November 1947 entitled ‘How Kravchenko was Manufactured’ he was accused by a fictitious ‘Sim Thomas’ of being an American agent, a liar, and a ‘vulgar traitor’. The ‘lying’ concerned the Holodomor and Gulag. In his *I Chose Justice* Kravchenko describes how he sued the communist literary weekly *Les Lettres françaises* for libel and won. The sensational trial took place in Paris. Kravchenko’s witnesses were mostly ordinary people who had lived through the collectivization and famine—their fundamental experience, against which they compared all others. The defendants brought a string of their own witnesses, who included French generals, senators, scholars, and philosophers, as well as prominent individuals sent from the Soviet Union. Their line was to defend the Soviet Union as a liberator and to discredit the testimony of witnesses. The common people were allowed to tell their story of suffering, and Kravchenko explained the misguided logic of Soviet apologists. Unfortunately, the impact on the West was limited. Whereas the Holocaust became the subject of vigorous and extensive scholarship in the 1970s and 1980s, the Soviet Union was still denying the Holodomor in 1983, fifty years after the event. Robert Conquest’s breakthrough book *Harvest of Sorrow* made the topic part of a broader awareness in the West.<sup>33</sup> For half a century this monstrous event was turned against Ukrainians as an example of their ‘fascist’ and ‘nationalist’

<sup>32</sup> E. S. Ginzburg, *Journey into the Whirlwind*, trans. P. Stevenson and M. Hayward (New York and London, 1967), 60.

<sup>33</sup> R. Conquest, *The Harvest of Sorrow: Soviet Collectivization and the Terror-Famine* (New York, 1986).

fantasy. One of the most abject pieces of such propaganda is Douglas Tottle's *Fraud, Famine and Fascism*.<sup>34</sup> A response to *Conquest*, it deploys typical Soviet smear tactics, linking any mention of the famine to fascist conspiracies and diaspora nationalism. The book focuses on misattributed photographs, but fails to mention how many died.

The Holodomor constitutes an important part of twentieth-century history, and not only for Ukrainians. They, after all, were right to keep demanding acknowledgement of the facts, while, as Judt has pointed out, the Sartres and Althusseres and all the brilliant intellectuals who tried to cover up the atrocity 'for the good of the cause' were wrong. Truth, like compassion, cannot be compartmentalized with impunity. Attempts to do so atrophy the capacity for human sympathy, lead to a defective knowledge of history, and produce bad politics.

The real issue facing those who try to tell the tale is perhaps the lack of empathy, the deficit of compassion. Fear of the power in these narratives makes denial an attractive option for the obdurate. Their only alternative is to change the way they think. Thankfully, Holocaust deniers are now an extremist fringe. Holodomor deniers, however, still cling to their simple morality tale. There is a morality tale of sorts, but it is one of government violence: 'forced' collectivization, violent requisitioning, mass murder, and deliberate silence. If awareness of the Holodomor persuades people to rethink the issue of state terror as applied to millions of innocent people in the name of ideology, it will already have accomplished much.

There is one more taboo or stumbling block that could be mentioned. After the war the critic Viktor Petrov wrote that upon reading Knut Hamsun's *Hunger* (1890) he realized that the author knew nothing about famine. Sadly, the Ukrainian intelligentsia were specialists in the subject. Most knew people who had died of it; they recognized the symptoms, the process, and what it took for a regime to perpetrate a massive crime like the terror-famine of 1932–3. They wondered why no one was interested; but they were also aware of the difficulty of telling. As Koestler wrote, 'there is curiously little mention in literature of this elementary physical experience'. He put it down to a 'modesty in civilized man' concerning basic bodily functions.<sup>35</sup> It is also a question of disgust and humiliation. The real facts are horrible to hear, especially those that concern cannibalism. Thousands of files dealing with this evidence have still not been made public: many researchers feel that they are just too painful and shocking. But the story is gradually being told and, as Holocaust survivors know, must be told. Holocaust scholarship has demonstrated how barriers can be overcome and information made available. Books need to be written, monuments erected to both tragedies. The public needs sensitizing to all the issues relating to these tragedies that occurred in large part on the territory of what is now Ukraine.

<sup>34</sup> D. Tottle, *Fraud, Famine and Fascism: The Ukrainian Genocide Myth from Hitler to Harvard* (Toronto, 1987).

<sup>35</sup> Koestler, *Arrow in the Blue*, 184.

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# The Ukrainian Nationalist Movement and the Jews

## *Theoretical Reflections on Nationalism, Fascism, Rationality, Primordialism, and History*

ALEXANDER J. MOTYL

THIS STUDY HAS BEEN prompted by the ongoing *Historikerstreit*<sup>1</sup> over the Ukrainian nationalist movement and the fact that one of its leaders, Stepan Bandera, was declared a Hero of Ukraine in early 2010 by former president Viktor Yushchenko.<sup>2</sup> Although an honest and open debate is surely welcome, especially on topics that were neglected by Soviet historiography and distorted by Soviet propaganda, the questionable manner in which this *Historikerstreit* is being conducted is not. In this chapter I therefore focus on concepts, theory, methodology, and the assumptions that underpin them. In particular, after examining the conceptual relationship between nationalism and fascism, I argue that the Ukrainian nationalist movement was a typical national liberation movement whose primary goal was political—to achieve independent statehood for the Ukrainian nation—and not ideological; the movement's political strategy vis-à-vis potential allies fully reflected this priority; Jews and the Jewish question were a secondary, or perhaps even tertiary, consideration within this strategy, and the movement's anti-Jewish attitudes were primarily tactical and situational; the enmity of the movement was primarily directed at Poles and Ukrainian 'turncoats', precisely because the Ukrainian nationalist movement was a national liberation movement; although scholars eschew primordialism in explaining inter-ethnic violence, it is the dominant mode of explanation with respect to Ukrainians and Jews; and although the practice of history should preclude the open promotion of ideology and morality, the latter dominate both in radical critiques and in radical apologias of Ukrainian nationalism.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> The *Historikerstreit*, or historians' debate, took place in Germany in the late 1980s, and concerned Germany's responsibility for the Holocaust and the comparability of German crimes against humanity with Soviet crimes against humanity.

<sup>2</sup> See 'Bandera-OUN debate', in *The Ukraine List (UKL)*, comp. Dominique Arel, no. 441, 16 Feb. 2010: <<http://www.ukrainianstudies.uottawa.ca/pdf/UKL441.pdf>>.

<sup>3</sup> Eric Hobsbawm states that 'no serious historian of nations and nationalism can be a committed

## NATIONALISM AND FASCISM: CONCEPTUAL DISTINCTIONS

I start with three simple, and obvious, conceptual propositions: first, in order to be meaningful, concepts in general, and nationalism and fascism in particular, cannot by definition encompass everything; second, nationalism is not fascism and fascism is not nationalism; and third, establishing the relationship, if any, between any two concepts—and in our case between nationalism and fascism—requires isolating their central defining characteristics and determining whether those characteristics are or are not identical.

With respect to the first proposition, it is a commonplace of conceptual analysis that concepts must, in order to be meaningful, have limited meanings and specific referents. If concepts are ‘stretched’ to encompass everything, they become meaningless and thus useless.<sup>4</sup> If nationalism is defined as encompassing all forms of ‘national identity’—indeed, according to popular parlance, nationalism supposedly includes feelings, attitudes, dispositions, and behaviours involving national identity, chauvinism, racism, and the like—and fascism is defined as encompassing all forms of non-democratic feelings, attitudes, dispositions, and behaviours, then it follows that everyone possessing some form of national identity is a nationalist and everyone who has doubts about democracy is a fascist. In that case, everyone on earth is a nationalist or fascist, and nationalism and fascism become tantamount to life.<sup>5</sup>

With respect to the second proposition, it is a commonplace of conceptual analysis that different concepts must, at least a priori, be assumed to have different meanings and different referents. A conceptual analysis may reveal that they are, in fact, synonyms, but the starting point must be that different things must be defined differently. They may overlap; they may be connected; but they cannot a priori be assumed to be the same. We cannot, therefore, resolve the problem of the relationship between nationalism and fascism by implicitly defining them identically—which is to say, by *assuming* that they are the same. Unsurprisingly, if we do engage in

political nationalist’. Hobsbawm is right, but he does not appear to realize that his comments, if applied consistently, would also preclude unrepentant communists (such as himself) from writing about the working class. See his *Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality* (Cambridge, 1990), 12.

<sup>4</sup> On concept stretching, see G. Sartori, ‘Guidelines for Concept Analysis’, in id. (ed.), *Social Science Concepts: A Systematic Analysis* (Beverly Hills, Calif., 1984), 15–85; id., ‘Concept Misformation in Comparative Politics’, *American Political Science Review*, 64 (1970), 1033–53; id., ‘Comparing and Miscomparing’, *Journal of Theoretical Politics*, 3 (1991), 243–57.

<sup>5</sup> Just such a fate has, unfortunately, befallen the concept of antisemitism, which appears to encompass a vast variety of feelings, attitudes, dispositions, and behaviours—ranging from the ravings of Adolf Hitler to the mutterings of some disgruntled *babushka* to the academic writings of University of Chicago and MIT professors—that in some way concern, or are construed as concerning, all Jews, some Jews, or anybody or anything that happens to be, coincidentally, Jewish. Such a ‘concept of everything’, whose intensions and extensions encompass just about everybody, is meaningless and useless—a twofold tragedy inasmuch as ‘genuine’ antisemitism does indeed exist. Needless to say, concept stretching cannot possibly help the struggle against antisemitism.

this conceptual sleight of hand, we shall quickly ‘prove’ that nationalism and fascism are identical and that all nationalists are fascists and that all fascists are nationalists.

With respect to the third proposition, it is a commonplace of conceptual analysis that concepts have both ‘defining’ and ‘associated’ characteristics. Defining characteristics comprise the core of a definition and, thus, represent what a concept *is*. Associated characteristics are incidental to the definition and may or may not appear, as circumstances dictate. It follows that two concepts may not be assumed to be identical, even, or especially, if their empirical referents ‘look alike’. Real nationalists may ‘look like’ real fascists—or, for that matter, like real communists or real guerrillas or real Americans—but ‘looking alike’ is completely irrelevant to the question of whether nationalism and fascism, or nationalism and communism, or nationalism and Americanism, are or can be defined in the same way. It follows that mimicking a nationalist or a fascist does not make one a nationalist or a fascist. By the same token, co-operating, collaborating, or consorting with nationalists or fascists is not tantamount to being a nationalist or a fascist or to nationalism or fascism.

What, then, are nationalism and fascism? And what is the relationship between them?

Nationalism can be understood either as an ideology or as a movement. If understood as an ideology, nationalism is a set of ideas that argues that, and explains why, a nation should have its own independent state. If understood as a movement, nationalism is a set of organizations or individuals that pursue independent statehood for a nation. Nationalism, in short, is about ‘national liberation’, which is its central defining characteristic.<sup>6</sup> It follows that there can be no nationalist nation states or systems of rule, although there can obviously be chauvinist, racist, or (to use a confusing popular synonym for chauvinist and racist) ‘hyper-nationalist’ nation states or systems of rule.

Fascism can be understood either as an ideology, a system of rule, or a movement. If understood as an ideology, fascism is a set of ideas that explain why a specifically fascist system of rule is optimal for society. If understood as a system of rule, fascism is a peculiar set of expressly authoritarian political institutions that organize a state and its relations with society.<sup>7</sup> If understood as a movement, fascism

<sup>6</sup> For an elaboration of this argument, see A. J. Motyl, *Revolutions, Nations, Empires: Conceptual Limits and Theoretical Possibilities* (New York, 1999), 80–1.

<sup>7</sup> For excellent discussions of fascism, see A. Lyttelton, ‘What Was Fascism?’, *New York Review of Books*, 51/16 (21 Oct. 2004); A. C. Pinto, ‘Back to European Fascism’, *Contemporary European History*, 15/1 (2006), 103–15. For definitions of fascism, see J. J. Linz, ‘Some Notes towards a Comparative Study of Fascism in Sociological Historical Perspective’, in W. Laqueur (ed.), *Fascism: A Reader’s Guide* (Berkeley, 1976), 12–13; R. O. Paxton, *The Anatomy of Fascism* (London, 2004), 218; M. Mann, *Fascists* (Cambridge, 2004), 13; S. G. Payne, *A History of Fascism, 1914–1945* (Madison, 1995), 14; R. Scruton, *A Dictionary of Political Thought* (New York, 1982), 169. I have elsewhere discussed fascism at great length and defined it as ‘a non-democratic, non-socialist political system with a domineering party, a supreme leader, a hyper-masculine leader cult, a hyper-nationalist, statist ideology, and an enthusiastically supportive population’: A. J. Motyl, ‘Russia’s Systemic Transformations since Perestroika: From Totalitarianism to Authoritarianism to Democracy—to Fascism?’, *The Harriman Review*, Mar. 2010, p. 5.

is a set of organizations or individuals that pursue fascism as an ideology or as a system of rule.

Must nationalism have fascist components? The answer is no. The striving for national independence is perfectly compatible with every philosophy, political ideology, culture, and economic theory—except, perhaps, with those that explicitly deny the existence of the nation or the state. Unsurprisingly, nationalist ideologies and movements have spanned the political spectrum, and are found among democrats, liberals, authoritarians, militarists, fascists, communists, capitalists, Catholics, Islamists, Protestants, and Jews. Prior to the First World War, nationalists tended to be socialists; inter-war nationalist movements tended to be influenced by the prevailing fascist ethos; and post-war national liberation struggles tended to be influenced by the prevailing communist ethos—which is simply to say that nationalism is malleable and can adapt itself to a variety of political ideologies, even, as in the nineteenth century, to liberalism.<sup>8</sup>

Must fascism have nationalist components? The answer is no. Fascism, whether ideology, movement, or system of rule, presupposes an independent state and then proposes to reorganize it along specifically fascist lines. Statehood is thus a necessary condition of fascism: genuinely fascist ideologies, movements, and systems of rule can exist if and only if an independent state is already in existence. That state need not be a nation state, which is the goal of nationalism: in that sense, the putative connection between nationalism and fascism is not even mediated by the nation state, but rather by the state. But that, in turn, means that fascism is exactly like liberalism, democracy, authoritarianism, and communism in taking independent statehood as a given and recommending just how it and its relations with society should be structured.

The relationship between nationalism, statehood, and fascism can be illustrated in the following manner, where the arrow points to a goal and the colon signals a precondition:

nationalism → statehood: fascism → authoritarianism

The relationship between nationalism, statehood, and liberalism can be illustrated in the exact same manner:

nationalism → statehood: liberalism → democracy

Note that it would be just as incorrect to conclude from these two illustrations that fascism and liberalism are identical as to conclude that nationalism and fascism or nationalism and liberalism are identical. Only conceptual sleight of hand or conceptual sloppiness could produce either conclusion, or both. On the other hand, it would be quite correct to conclude that nationalism can just as easily have liberal and democratic aspirations as it can have fascist and authoritarian aspirations.

<sup>8</sup> One can even argue, as John Rawls did, that liberalism necessarily entails national liberation: see J. Rawls, *The Law of Peoples* (Cambridge, Mass., 1999).



One final point requires conceptual treatment. If nationalism and fascism are as different as I have suggested, then why do nationalists so often appear to ‘look like’ fascists and why do fascists so often appear to ‘look like’ nationalists? After all, when nationalists and fascists are politically active, they look like political activists—resembling terrorists at one time, union organizers at another time, and communist intellectuals at a third. Indeed, nationalists and fascists also look like human beings, as they do all the things regular human beings do. Why then do we ‘see’ more similarities between nationalists and fascists? I submit that the empirical similarity rests on the conceptual confusions discussed above. We ‘see’ more similarities, not because they are actually empirically present, but because our—incorrect—conceptual predispositions lead us to focus on just those similarities, between just those two categories of political activists, and not on other, even more marked, ones. Once a conceptually coherent conceptual apparatus is employed, empirical similarities appear as just what they are—either as incidental ‘overlappings’ or as associated characteristics, and not as defining characteristics.

#### UKRAINIAN NATIONALISM AS A TYPICALLY NATIONALIST MOVEMENT

Claims that the Ukrainian nationalist movement—defined here as incorporating the Ukrainian Military Organization (Ukrayins’ka viis’kova orhanizatsiya; UVO), the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (Orhanizatsiya ukrayins’kykh natsionalistiv; OUN), and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (Ukrayins’ka povstans’ka armiia; UPA)—was ‘typically fascist’ are, thus, completely off the mark. This is not to say that the Ukrainian nationalist movement was free of fascist elements or that it was liberal, democratic, and without sin. To suggest that this movement was not ‘typically fascist’ is, above all, to state that it possessed, at its definitional core, not the defining characteristics of fascism, but the defining characteristics of nationalism.


My claim that the Ukrainian nationalist movement was a typical national liberation movement rests on four arguments.

First, the one point every single organization and individual in this movement agreed on—from the movement’s inception in the early 1920s, to its demise in Ukraine in the mid-1950s, to its survival in émigré form in subsequent decades—was national liberation and independent statehood. This is clear from official documents, letters, memoirs, interviews, eyewitness accounts, and secondary sources. I submit that this fact—the overwhelming centrality of national independence—necessarily makes the Ukrainian nationalist movement, first and foremost, nationalist.

Second, that movement’s relationship to political ideologies changed continually, proceeding from an apolitical militarism to authoritarianism to fascism to democracy to social democracy. Thus, whereas nationalism was a constant, the political ideology was a variable. The UVO was a collection of patriotically inclined ex-soldiers with little sense of political ideology. The OUN began as a radical youth movement, then morphed into a quasi-authoritarian movement, adopted fascist

elements by the late 1930s and early 1940s, abandoned them by 1943–4, and began acquiring progressively more democratic and social-democratic characteristics in the mid to late 1940s and 1950s. The picture looks even more complex if we consider that the OUN, throughout the 1930s, was divided into the émigré and homeland factions, with the former being more concerned with ideology and the latter more with action. As we would expect, post-Second World War émigré nationalists were divided into liberal, moderate, and authoritarian wings.

The accompanying figure illustrates this ideological change. The heights, depths, and slopes are meant to be only suggestive, and not indicative, of actual heights, depths, and slopes. But the main point of the figure should be clear: that the nationalists' political leanings were arranged along an authoritarian vector, first deviating towards fascism and then towards democracy. That is exactly what we would expect from a typically nationalist movement that had to survive in the underground by adopting authoritarian methods of struggle.



Political leanings of the Ukrainian nationalist movement in Ukraine

It is, of course, perfectly possible that the Ukrainian nationalist movement would have moved towards full fascism had it been permitted to establish an independent state in 1941. It is also perfectly conceivable that the seemingly inexorable upward trajectory shown in the figure would have stopped well short of fascism. There is no way of knowing empirically, because the nationalists were arrested and their short-lived effort at state building was ended. Only a counterfactual experiment resting on already implicit theoretical views could suggest an outcome. Thus, if one already believes that the nationalists were fascists to the core, then fascism is the only imaginable outcome. If, alternatively, one believes that the nationalists were nationalists to the core, then any number of political outcomes, ranging from fascism to liberalism to communism, is conceivable. I suggest that the actual shift in political leanings, as documented by the OUN's Extraordinary Congress in 1943 and a variety of ideological writings, especially by the theorists Petro Poltava and Osyp Hornovy, suggests that political flexibility was at the 'core' of Ukrainian nationalism. A 'fascist to the core' would have remained a fascist to the core, regardless of circumstances.

Third, many of the fascist components of the Ukrainian nationalist movement can be accounted for by the very structure of illegal underground activity. The Ukrainian nationalist movement was a national liberation movement similar in structure, ideology, ethos, and means to other twentieth-century national liberation movements, as in Croatia, Vietnam, Algeria, Ireland, Spain, Israel, and Palestine. All such movements are hierarchical and conspiratorial; all emphasize the primacy of the political in general and the independent state in particular; all are hostile to real and perceived enemies, whether other movements, other nations, or potential turncoats within their own nations; and all employ violence and often terrorism.

These similarities are not accidental, as pursuing the goal of an independent nation state in a world of powerful and hostile nation states is rightfully perceived by existing states as profoundly subversive; movements are thereby forced to adapt accordingly. Although all nationalists develop elaborate ideological rationales for violence, it is important to emphasize that they do so in contexts of state violence—directed at them, of course, but also at all enemies of the state. Nationalists, we should remember, did not invent war, genocide, massacres, or ethnic cleansing. States did, many centuries before nationalists even emerged on the historical stage.

Fourth, the fascist components of the Ukrainian nationalist movement may also be explained by its existence within a ‘tough’, anti-democratic neighbourhood. Inter-war Europe in general and inter-war eastern Europe in particular had very few exemplars of effective liberal democracy. Authoritarianism was the rule, and it would have been well-nigh impossible for an underground nationalist movement to adopt liberal democratic goals under such circumstances. Moreover, authoritarianism and fascism seemed to ‘work’, regenerating and revitalizing struggling societies—so much so, for instance, that even the uncompromising Ukrainian communist Mykola Khvylyovy expressed admiration for the ‘temperament of fascism’.<sup>9</sup>

None of these points gets the Ukrainian nationalists off the hook. There is no doubt that they moved in the direction of fascism and, by the early 1940s, many of them had fully bought into its tenets. That said, they did so precisely because they were nationalists, first and last. Violence, authoritarianism, and conspiracy provided the means of national liberation, while fascism provided a vision of the future Ukrainian nationalist state. While violence, authoritarianism, and conspiracy are intrinsic to underground radical movements—one simply cannot imagine the Ukrainian nationalists without them—fascism was conditionally attractive. If it seemed to suggest the way to go, nationalists embraced it. If it proved not to be the way to go, as the German crackdown on nationalists in mid-1941 seemed to demonstrate, then alternatives had to be found and, more important, *were* found. And they could be found precisely because fascism was not an intrinsic component of the Ukrainian nationalist movement or, for that matter, of any genuine nationalist movement.

<sup>9</sup> M. Khvylyovy, *Sanatoriina zona: Opovidannya, novely, povisti, pamflet* (Kharkiv, 2008), 374.

Seen in this light, the appropriate comparison is not between the Ukrainian nationalists and, say, the Italian fascists, but between the Ukrainian nationalists and the Algerian nationalists in the National Liberation Front, the Palestinian nationalists in the PLO, the Jewish nationalists in the Irgun or the 'Stern Gang', or the Irish nationalists in the Irish Republican Army. All five movements were unconditionally, and unchangeably, committed to national liberation and independent statehood. All had hierarchical structures, glorified violence and vitality, and acknowledged supreme leaders. All committed acts of violence against their perceived national enemies. All committed terrorism. All had authoritarian structures. And, despite having fascist elements, all were—typically nationalist. Roman Shukhevych and Stepan Bandera are rather more like Ahmed Ben Bella, Yasser Arafat, Menachem Begin, Avraham Stern, and Billy McKee, than like Benito Mussolini, Francisco Franco, and Adolf Hitler.

### THE OUN'S POLITICAL STRATEGY

It follows that, for all such movements as well as for the Ukrainian nationalist movement, the political is primary; indeed, the political is the goal that can justify all means. The Ukrainian nationalist movement's relationship with Jews must therefore be understood through the prism of the movement's (and especially the OUN's) political priorities in general and the overriding priority of independent statehood in particular. This is not to say that the OUN was free of antisemitism, a point I discuss below. It *is* to say that the OUN's attitudes towards Jews (and all other nations and ethnic and religious groups) were a function of its larger strategic calculations regarding the attainment of an independent Ukrainian state and the threat to the survival of the Ukrainian nation presented both by Stalinism's assault on the Ukrainian peasantry, intelligentsia, and church and by inter-war Polish policies towards Ukrainians.

I shall employ several very simple game-theoretic models to plot the choices and strategies facing the OUN and Germany on the eve of the war. The games assume that both sides are rational—that they want to maximize their ability to achieve their goals. The goal of Germany is 'to defeat the Soviet Union'; the goal of the OUN is 'to attain an independent state'. The choices facing both sides are to 'co-operate' or to 'fight'. Although I fully understand that neither side was a unitary actor making clear-cut choices (especially after Colonel Yevhen Konovalts's assassination in 1938 by a Soviet agent and the split within the OUN) and am not endorsing game theory or rational choice (quite the contrary, I am a critic of both), a rationalist approach can reveal the underlying strategic *logic* of an interaction and is, thus, worthy of consideration, even by historians with an aversion to such ahistorical devices. The actual calculations are rather less important than their point—that Ukrainian nationalists, like all political actors, were not just dumb brutes responding to eliminationist urges. In all the accompanying illustrations of games, the first

number of each pair designates the ‘payoff’ of a certain choice for the OUN, the second the ‘payoff’ for the other side. All the ‘payoffs’ are my estimates of the relative benefits that would have accrued to both sides as a result of certain actions.

I chose the payoff scores for Game 1 with the following rationale. The OUN benefits enormously (6) from co-operating with a co-operative Germany, as Germany’s attack on the Soviet Union advances Ukrainian statehood. Germany benefits modestly, because the OUN does not have much of a fighting force. The OUN loses enormously (–6) if Germany fights it; the OUN gains nothing (0) if it fights while Germany co-operates. Germany, meanwhile, loses somewhat (–1) if Germany fights the OUN.

		<b>Germany</b>	
		co-operate	fight
<b>OUN</b>	co-operate	6, 1	–6, 0
	fight	0, –1	–6, –1

**GAME 1**

There is no dominant strategy (one that offers a higher payoff regardless of how the other side moves) for either side, and co-operate/co-operate (6, 1) is the equilibrium outcome.

In Game 2, the OUN expects Germany to be defeated by the Soviet Union.

		<b>Germany (expected to lose)</b>	
		co-operate	fight
<b>OUN</b>	co-operate	6, 1	–3, 0
	fight	–3, –1	–6, –1

**GAME 2**

The payoffs for Germany stay the same as in Game 1. However, for the OUN co-operate/co-operate is best (6), as it is premised on Germany’s weakening the Soviet Union and possibly enabling the OUN to establish a state. Fight/fight is worst for the OUN (–6), as it distracts Germany from fighting the Soviet Union and depletes the OUN’s strength. Co-operate/fight results in (–3) for the OUN, as Germany is distracted from the Soviet Union, while the OUN’s strength is relatively conserved. Fight/co-operate is equally disadvantageous for the OUN.

For the OUN, co-operation is the dominant strategy, as it always promises higher payoffs than fighting.

In Game 3, the OUN expects Germany to defeat the Soviet Union.

		Germany (expected to win)	
		co-operate	fight
OUN	co-operate	6, 1	-6, 0
	fight	-6, -1	-3, -1

### GAME 3

Again, co-operate/co-operate is optimal (6) for the OUN. Co-operate/fight is highly disadvantageous (-6) for the OUN, because a hostile Germany that defeats the Soviet Union will crush the OUN. Fight/co-operate is also disadvantageous (-6) for the OUN, as fighting a victorious, even if friendly, Germany is suicidal. Fight/fight is moderately less disadvantageous (-3) for the OUN, possibly enabling it to salvage some of its goal. There is no dominant strategy for either player.

Note that in all three games, co-operate/co-operate makes most sense for both players, promising a big payoff for the OUN and a small one for Germany.

Consider, in contrast, Game 4, between the 'West' and the OUN, where the West's primary goal is 'stability' and the OUN's goal remains attaining an independent state.

		West	
		co-operate	fight
OUN	co-operate	-1, -1	-1, 0
	fight	-0, -1	-1, -1

### GAME 4

The West gains nothing (0) from fighting a co-operative OUN, while losing marginally (-1) from co-operating with a revisionist movement or fighting a hostile OUN. By the same token, the OUN loses marginally (-1) from co-operating with states committed to maintaining stability or from fighting them, and it gains nothing (0) from fighting them if the West co-operates.

In sum, there is no payoff from Game 4 for the OUN—in contrast to a potential six-point payoff from Games 1, 2, and 3.

Note that these four games provide a persuasive rationale for the OUN's strategy towards Germany and the West during and after the Second World War. The OUN's strategic preference was co-operate/co-operate (6) with Germany, regardless of whether Germany was expected to defeat or be defeated by the Soviet Union. When Germany turned against the OUN in mid-1941 (when it was still

expected to defeat the Soviet Union), the OUN's optimal course (–3) was to fight—which it did. When Germany was expected to lose, and began retreating, the optimal course for both was co-operate/co-operate (6, 1)—which they did. In turn, when the OUN began interpreting the West's preferences vis-à-vis the Soviet Union as resembling Game 1, the OUN shifted its strategic alliance to the United States and the United Kingdom.

Using these insights, let us imagine a counterfactual—that not Nazi Germany, but a democratic Germany, had prepared for and unleashed a massive war against the Soviet Union in 1941. My analysis suggests that the Ukrainian nationalists would have acted no differently than in reality and would have sought and established a strategic alliance with a democratic Germany precisely because such an alliance would have made enormous strategic sense. In turn, the 'West' in general and the United States in particular would have regarded the 'Free Ukrainians' as a vital strategic asset, lauded them for their democratic aspirations, overlooked or contextualized their authoritarianism and situational anti-Jewishness, and praised them for their ability to organize, kill collaborators, and engage in terrorism. If victorious, the 'West' would have granted the Free Ukrainians their own state, and whatever human rights violations they might have engaged in would have been explained away as part of the 'business' of war. Finally, today's scholars would be studying a 'typically nationalist movement' that helped win the war and, alas, committed 'some' atrocities along the way.

### JEWES AND THE OUN'S POLITICAL PRIORITIES

If we conceive of Nazi Germany's attitude towards Jews as being tantamount, in Daniel Jonah Goldhagen's phrase, to 'eliminationist antisemitism'<sup>10</sup>—that is, a deeply rooted belief that Jews are intrinsically evil and must therefore be eliminated—then the attitude of most Ukrainian nationalists and the OUN may be termed a 'situational anti-Jewishness'. By this I mean that for most Ukrainian nationalists, Jews were a 'problem', either because they were implicated, or believed to be implicated, in communism and the Soviet leadership or because they were opposed, or were believed to be opposed, to an independent Ukrainian state. Situational anti-Jewishness and eliminationist antisemitism could and often did, as in a Venn diagram, overlap, but were not identical. Eliminationist antisemitism was an all-or-nothing proposition that was both immutable and immune to circumstances. In contrast, situational anti-Jewishness could ebb and flow with the circumstances. When Jews were no longer perceived as a 'problem' in the manner defined above, situational anti-Jewishness could even morph into situational 'pro-Jewishness'.

It is significant that the OUN's political programmes from the period 1939–41 define Jews in just this manner—as a problem. After all, it was at just this time that

<sup>10</sup> D. J. Goldhagen, *Hitler's Willing Executioners: Ordinary Germans and the Holocaust* (New York, 1997), 49–128.

both factions of the OUN were actively co-operating with the German military and counter-intelligence. There would have been no sanctions attached to officially propounding eliminationist antisemitism; indeed, there might have been ample rewards from Berlin. Instead, the tone of OUN documents is nothing like the tone of Nazi ideology, and the space devoted to the 'Jewish question' is strikingly small. Indeed, the resolutions of the Second Great Congress, held in Kraków in April 1941, specifically *cautioned* Ukrainians against anti-Jewish activity—a bizarre statement for allegedly eliminationist antisemites to make just two months before Germany's attack on the Soviet Union.<sup>11</sup>

Two specific behavioural patterns are especially worthy of attention for what they say about OUN perceptions of Jews. First, of the sixty-three actual or attempted assassinations carried out by Ukrainian nationalists in eastern Poland in the inter-war period, only one was directed at a Jew. The ethnic breakdown of the others is as follows: thirty-six Ukrainians, twenty-five Poles and one Russian.<sup>12</sup> Of this number, two communists—one Ukrainian and one Russian—were killed. That is to say, the primary enemies were 'turncoat' Ukrainians and Poles; Russians, communists, and Jews, despite their putative centrality to the Ukrainian nationalist agenda, were actually incidental to nationalist political violence. The then-popular nationalist song 'Death, death to the *lyakhy* [Poles]; death to the Muscovite–Jewish commune' conveys this point quite well. Poles are singled out; communism—and not Russians and Jews per se—then follows.

Second, it is only if one assumes that Ukrainian nationalists were motivated by situational anti-Jewishness that the defection of some two thousand Ukrainian policemen in late 1942 and their subsequent entry into the UPA makes sense. Eliminationist antisemites would have stayed in the *Polizei*, which would have offered them far better opportunities to pursue their agenda than retreat into the underground. By the same token, eliminationist antisemites would not have joined the *Waffen SS* or, like Roman Shukhevych, have left the *Nachtigall Battalion* just as the destruction of Jews was assuming momentum.

Game 5 illustrates these points. It assumes that both Germany and the OUN are motivated exclusively by eliminationist antisemitism. Both sides benefit (6, 2) from co-operation, though the OUN benefits much more, as its capacity to pursue eliminationist antisemitism on its own is significantly smaller than Germany's. The OUN's payoff falls to (3) if it co-operates while Germany fights and gets (0) payoff.

<sup>11</sup> 'The Jews in the USSR are the most faithful prop of the ruling Bolshevik regime and the vanguard of Muscovite imperialism in Ukraine. The Muscovite–Bolshevik government uses the anti-Jewish sentiments of the Ukrainian masses to divert their attention from the true cause of their misfortune and to direct them at a time of upheaval at pogroms against Jews. The Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists combats the Jews as a prop of the Muscovite–Bolshevik regime, while simultaneously making the masses conscious of the fact that Moscow is the principal enemy': see *OUN v svitli postanov Velykykh Zboriv, Konferentsii ta inshykh dokumentiv z borot'by 1929–1955 r.* (Munich, 1955), 36.

<sup>12</sup> A. J. Motyl, 'Ukrainian Nationalist Political Violence in Inter-War Poland', *East European Quarterly*, Mar. 1985, p. 50.



The OUN's payoff is (0) if it fights a co-operative Germany, which still manages to attain some eliminationist goals (1) by co-operating. Neither side benefits from fighting (0, 0).

Note that both sides have a dominant strategy, one that promises a better payoff regardless of how the other side plays—and that is to co-operate. Thus, co-operate/co-operate (6, 2) is the strategy that eliminationist antisemites would have always pursued. And yet, both Germany and the OUN violated the very logic of maximizing putative eliminationist antisemitism by engaging in all three other behaviours, thereby suggesting that the initial assumption of eliminationist antisemitism as being the sole goal is incorrect.

		<b>Germany</b>	
		co-operate	fight
<b>OUN</b>	co-operate	6, 2	3, 0
	fight	0, 1	0, 0

**GAME 5**

Note also that the minuscule payoffs for Germany suggest that the OUN was at best incidental to Berlin's pursuit of eliminationist goals. Although some Ukrainian nationalists, like some Ukrainians, may have contributed to the Holocaust, their contributions, although morally heinous, were practically insignificant. The Holocaust in Ukraine could not have taken place without Nazi Germany's ideological agenda and coercive apparatus and without Nazi Germany's war against the Soviet Union. If the Ukrainian nationalist movement had not existed or had not contributed to anti-Jewish activities, the Holocaust would, I suggest, still have taken place in just the manner that it did. Indeed, Hitler's war against the Soviet Union would have followed the exact same course. In a word, the Ukrainian nationalists, despite their own delusions of grandeur, were bit players in the war and, by extension, in the Holocaust.

**THE UKRAINIAN NATIONALISTS AND THEIR ENEMIES**

None of the above is meant to suggest that Ukrainian nationalists held benign attitudes towards Jews.<sup>13</sup> They did not, and there is ample evidence to suggest that this is the case.<sup>14</sup> But it is also important to recognize that the OUN's primary enemies were Poles and Ukrainian 'turncoats', and not Jews. While Jews may have been perceived as being responsible, together with the Russians, for communism and

<sup>13</sup> V. Vyatrovych, 'Stavlennya OUN do yevreyiv: Formuvannya pozytsiyi na tli katastrofy': <[www.ukrcenter.com/library/read.asp?id=7404&page=1](http://www.ukrcenter.com/library/read.asp?id=7404&page=1)>.

<sup>14</sup> Even if authentic, Yaroslav Stetsko's autobiographical sketch is not, I suggest, of much use here, primarily because a document produced in Nazi Germany *after* interrogation and *before* arrest may not

Soviet power, the reality of the national liberation struggle in Galicia confronted Ukrainian nationalists with ubiquitous everyday examples of Polish opposition to, and turncoat Ukrainian subversion of, Ukrainian nationalism's goals. Poles were the primary obstacle—both theoretically, because it was their state that had to be dismantled for an independent Ukraine to exist; and practically, because they held, or hoped during the war to reacquire, the levers of power in Galicia and Volhynia. Not surprisingly perhaps, nationalist enmity towards Poles, together with a strategic calculation by both sides that strategically important territory had to be seized before the Germans retreated and the Soviets approached, led to the bloodbaths in Volhynia in mid-1943.

Whether termed ethnic cleansing or inter-ethnic strife, the ethnic violence in Volhynia bears comparison not with the state-directed destruction of ethnic groups by Nazi Germany, Ustaša Croatia, or Vichy France, but with the ethnic violence of Algerians against *pieds-noirs* French, of Irish nationalists against the British, of Palestinian nationalists against Israelis, and of Jewish nationalists against Palestinians. In all these instances, nationalists attacked and killed members of nations that held political power or controlled contested territory. Their methods may be despicable—although they are not necessarily more despicable than the horrors of state-generated wars—but they are not just the actions of dumb brutes with no sense of strategic rationality.

Turncoat Ukrainians were the second obstacle for the Ukrainian nationalists, as they threatened to destroy the much-desired national unity from within, thereby being the primary targets of both inter-war and wartime assassinations. Here, too, Ukrainians were acting no differently than Algerian, Irish, Palestinian, Jewish, and many other nationalists, who are always on the lookout for traitors and periodically cleanse their ranks of suspect elements. The opprobrium with which Americans still hold Benedict Arnold indicates just how strong such sentiments can be.

There are no comparably motivated anti-Jewish killings. The pogroms that erupted in many Galician towns in mid-1941 were not the result of strategic calculations driven by eliminationist antisemitic impulses. Instead, situational anti-Jewishness and the breakdown of law and order combined with the traumatic discovery of ten to fifteen thousand massacred Ukrainian political prisoners to produce a wave of 'spontaneous' anti-Jewish violence.<sup>15</sup> To be sure, eliminationist Ukrainian antisemites and Ukrainians who adopted anti-Jewish views in this specific situation must have been implicated, and many of them were no doubt members or sympathizers of the OUN. But, importantly, once the wave passed, the OUN's strategic priorities reasserted themselves and the nationalists reverted to their situ-

be assumed to represent the truthful views of its author. See K. C. Berkhoff and M. Carynyk, 'The Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and its Attitude toward Germans and Jews: Iaroslav Stets'ko's 1941 *Zhyttiepys*', *Harvard Ukrainian Studies*, 23/3-4 (1999), 149-84.

<sup>15</sup> D. V. Vyedyenyeyev and H. S. Bystrukhin, *Mech i tryzub: Rozvidka i kontrrozvidka rukhu ukraïns'kykh natsionalistiv ta UPA (1920-1945)* (Kiev, 2006), 327.

ational anti-Jewishness. Accordingly, an 'Instruction of the Security Service' issued just before the war foresaw the 'neutralization' of Russians, Jews, and Poles 'both individually and as national groups', inasmuch as the OUN's goal was to 'crush in the bud every attempt by foreign elements in Ukraine to assert themselves in any organized fashion'.<sup>16</sup> These are obviously not the sentiments of liberals. But they *are* the sentiments of national liberation movements that oppose all enemies of their nation and fear *organization* more than anything else.

It is perhaps unsurprising that, by 1943–5, situational anti-Jewishness was able, by virtue of the changing circumstances of the struggle and the war, to mutate into something approximating tolerance. Indeed, the fact that the nationalist underground eventually adopted a relatively benign attitude even towards Poles, reaching a quasi-alliance with some underground Polish groups, suggests that attitudes towards Poles were not tantamount to eliminationist chauvinism but to 'situational anti-Polishness'.

#### EXPLAINING INTER-ETHNIC VIOLENCE

I have used Goldhagen's term 'eliminationist antisemitism', even though I strongly believe that it is completely inadequate for making sense of Nazi behaviour.<sup>17</sup> Although it is perfectly possible that eliminationist antisemitic attitudes may exist, Goldhagen endows the term with primordial, transcendent, and thus ahistorical qualities. Many of his critics have pointed this out, and there is no need to rehash their arguments.<sup>18</sup> Suffice to say that primordialism is almost universally rejected as an adequate explanation of ethnic violence.

Instead, students of ethnic violence find explanations not in 'ancient hatreds', but in theories that emphasize structures, emotions, rationality, or organization.<sup>19</sup> Structural approaches focus on the 'objective' relations between and among ethnic groups, emphasizing disparities, or contradictions, in power, wealth, status, and so on. Emotional approaches move from relations between and among groups to the feelings—frustration, anger, aggression, fear, and so on—within individuals and collectivities and to how those feelings may lead to certain forms of behaviour. Rational approaches emphasize utility, profit, advantage, and other such calculations in the behaviour of groups and individuals. Lastly, organizational approaches focus on movements and activists and their ability to mobilize resources, act as ethnic entrepreneurs, and pursue specific goals. Which of these approaches are better and which are worse is hard to say, as all of them can claim successes and failures. The important point for our purposes is that all these theories eschew

<sup>16</sup> Ibid. 155.

<sup>17</sup> See Motyl, *Revolutions, Nations, Empires*, 88–9.

<sup>18</sup> For one of the latest, devastating, criticisms of Goldhagen, see T. Snyder, 'What We Need to Know about the Holocaust', *New York Review of Books*, 57/14 (30 Sept. 2010), 78.

<sup>19</sup> Roger Petersen employs these approaches in his excellent studies *Resistance and Rebellion: Lessons from Eastern Europe* (Cambridge, 2001) and *Understanding Ethnic Violence: Fear, Hatred, and Resentment in Twentieth-Century Eastern Europe* (Cambridge, 2002).

primordialism and the simplistic and simple-minded division of ethnic groups into bad and good.

Ironically, although primordialism has no traction among serious students of inter-ethnic violence, critics of Ukrainian nationalism generally adopt just this kind of explanatory framework. Ukrainians in general and Ukrainian nationalists in particular are simply assumed, first, to be vicious antisemites; second, to be vicious antisemites unalterably, unconditionally, and inevitably; and third, to act on their antisemitism always and everywhere. (The quotidian manifestation of this belief finds expression in the comment that ‘your people killed my people’.) From this point of view, vicious antisemitism defines all of Ukrainian history and all Ukrainian behaviour vis-à-vis Jews, Ukrainian history is a history of primordial antisemitism, and every Ukrainian in this narrative is, and can only be, a villain or a potential villain.<sup>20</sup>

This narrative logic is fully evident in discussions of the ‘*zhydokomuna* myth’ and the ‘Ukrainians as antisemites’ stereotype. I submit that the *zhydokomuna* myth is not a myth, but a *stereotype*. A myth is something that, like unicorns or Aeneas’ sojourn in Hades, has absolutely no basis in reality: we know that unicorns, Aeneas, and Hades do not exist. A stereotype, in contrast, is a logical mistake, but, ironically, one that is not irrational. It is simply not true that there were no Jewish communists or that Jews played no role in the establishment of Soviet power in Ukraine, as a *zhydokomuna* myth would have to insist.<sup>21</sup> Instead, what we have is a typical case of stereotyping, in which more or less accurate observation statements are transformed, by virtue of logical mistakes, into incorrect generalizations.

Stereotypes can take one of two logical forms, the first deductive, the second inductive. On the one hand, deductive stereotypes begin from the proposition that ‘all A are B’ and then mistakenly conclude that it must follow that ‘all B are A’. Thus, the statement ‘all communists are Jews’, even if true, does not imply that ‘all Jews are communists’. ‘All CEOs are men’, even if true, does not imply that ‘all men are power-holders’. ‘All concentration camp heads are Austrians’, even if true, does not imply that ‘all Austrians are antisemites’. ‘All antisemites are Ukrainians’, even if true, does not imply that ‘all Ukrainians are antisemites’. ‘All Nazis are Germans’, even if true, does not imply that ‘all Germans are Nazis’.

On the other hand, inductive stereotypes begin with the proposition that ‘some A are B’ and then mistakenly conclude that ‘all A are B’. Thus, the statement ‘some

<sup>20</sup> The larger issue is, of course, the transformation of antisemitism in general into a mystical trait that, like Hegel’s spirit, can appear, disappear, and reappear at will, ‘infecting’ anybody or everybody, regardless of specific circumstances, attitudes, and behaviours. But that is exactly what one would expect from a concept that has been stretched to such a degree that it can be made to appear ubiquitous. The resultant primordial ascription of antisemitism to, say, individuals of Ukrainian ancestry logically results in the claim that ‘your people killed my people’. In primordial schemes, everyone is innocent, or everyone is guilty, by ascription.

<sup>21</sup> This is the line taken in, for example, Z. Gitelman, ‘The Jewish Presence in the NKVD and its Implications for Ethnic Relations’, and Yu. Shapoval, ‘Jews in the Leadership Organs of the GPU/NKVD of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic during the 1920s and 1930s’, papers delivered at the Ukrainian Jewish Encounter Initiative Meeting at Ditchley Park, 14–16 Dec. 2009.

Jews are communists', even if true, does not imply that 'all Jews are communists'. 'Some men are CEOs', even if true, does not imply that 'all men are power-holders'. 'Some Austrians are concentration camp heads', even if true, does not imply that 'all Austrians are antisemites'. 'Some Ukrainians are antisemites', even if true, does not imply that 'all Ukrainians are antisemites'. 'Some Germans are Nazis', even if true, does not imply that 'all Germans are Nazis'.

Although both forms of stereotyping are obvious logical mistakes, they are not irrational. They serve as means of cognitive ordering and efficiency precisely because they are not unfounded empirically. As we often say, every stereotype has at least a 'kernel' of truth. And the truth is that, while it is not the case that 'all A are B', it usually is the case that 'some A are B' and that fact, for better or for worse, does help us navigate the complexities of reality. Sometimes we do so benignly. Dark clouds do not always signify rain, but if we assume they do and take an umbrella, we will never get wet—although we will always be encumbered with an umbrella. Sometimes we do so less benignly. Used-car dealers may not all be dishonest, but if we assume they are and act accordingly, we will never get cheated—although we may also pass up genuine bargains. And sometimes we do so unjustly. Arabs may not all be terrorists, but if we assume that they are, we will never be attacked by Arab terrorists—although we will massively violate human rights in the process.

Seen in this light, antisemitism, like every form of chauvinism or racism, may be understood as an attempt to reconcile incompatible stereotypes by means of an ascription of some form of evil to the target group. Thus, the two stereotypes—'all communists are Jews' and 'all capitalists are Jews' (both mistakenly derived from the empirical observations 'some communists are Jews' and 'some capitalists are Jews')—can be held simultaneously, as indeed they are by true antisemites, if and only if Jews are defined as intrinsically evil. Anti-Ukrainian racism assumes that Ukrainians are intrinsically brutish and thus necessarily inclined to act as savages, especially when constraints on their behaviour are lifted. In contrast to 'crafty' Jews, 'brutish' Ukrainians are incapable of holding logically incompatible positions. Instead, all they do is kill.<sup>22</sup>

Why then *must* the '*zhydokomuna* myth' be termed a myth in the radical critique of Ukrainian nationalism? Why can it not just be a stereotype? Belief in an obvious falsehood, a myth, logically goes hand in hand with a putatively primordial Ukrainian antisemitism. In contrast, belief in a stereotype would suggest, first, that Ukrainians have the capacity to think (even if illogically) and, second, that there may be some truth to the stereotype. But that element of truth in turn means that the relationship of Jews to Ukrainians may also matter in explaining the Ukrainian relationship to Jews—a possibility that primordialist approaches to Ukrainian–Jewish relations simply cannot countenance.

<sup>22</sup> Unsurprisingly, their memoirs and eyewitness accounts cannot be trusted. Brutes and killers *must* be liars.

Significantly, while the association of Jews with communism must be an empirically preposterous claim and thus a myth, the association of Ukrainians with antisemitism—which is no less of a stereotype than the *zhydokomuna* myth—must be accepted as empirically true. Indeed, the working assumption in most anti-nationalist narratives is that, as a Jewish friend once breezily informed me, ‘all Ukrainians are vicious antisemites’. Clearly, some kind of double standard is at work here. If *zhydokomuna* is a myth, then the Ukrainian as *der ewige Antisemit* must also be a myth. If *zhydokomuna* is a stereotype, then the Ukrainian as the eternal anti-semite must also be a stereotype. Instead, the primordial association of Ukrainians with antisemitism has come to possess the status of an ontological, even if obviously racist, truth.

It may be time for scholars to abandon the extant stereotype of Ukrainians as unthinking, antisemitic brutes—as the quintessential Orientalized Other—if only because primordialist assumptions about Ukrainians and their genetic proclivity to antisemitism (which, according to popular versions, is ‘imbibed with their mothers’ milk’) explode all notions of any possible Ukrainian responsibility or guilt for real or imagined excesses against Jews. After all, sin requires some measure of free will. Since brutes lack the capacity to make choices, and especially moral choices, they can only be pitied, and certainly not condemned or encouraged to apologize or do penance.

#### HISTORY, IDEOLOGY, AND MORALITY

Although history, ideology, and morality all employ narratives based on a logically coherent ordering of chronologically arranged facts, they are not just variants of one another. In telling their stories, historians emphasize complexity, context, and change. They provide a maximally full picture of a variety of interconnected events, individuals, and groups. They situate that picture within some context or contexts. And they appreciate that the picture, the context, and the events, individuals, and groups are continually experiencing change. In contrast to historians, ideologists and moralists eschew complexity, context, and change. They tell simple stories that transcend time and space and brook no change. In that sense, ideology and morality are antithetical to history, while being perfectly compatible with, if not indeed identical to, each other.

Radical critics of the Ukrainian nationalist movement often fall into ideological or moralistic camps.<sup>23</sup> Soviet historians and propagandists were overtly ideological; many of the current crop of radical critics are overtly moralistic.<sup>24</sup> Significantly, their narratives are mirror images of those produced by nationalist apologists:<sup>25</sup>

<sup>23</sup> For a good example, see J.-P. Himka, ‘The Holodomor in the Ukrainian–Jewish Encounter Initiative’, paper delivered at the Ukrainian Jewish Encounter Initiative Meeting at Ditchley Park, 14–16 Dec. 2009: <[http://ualberta.academia.edu/JohnPaulHimka/Papers/492282/The\\_Holodomor\\_in\\_the\\_Ukrainian-Jewish\\_Encounter\\_Initiative](http://ualberta.academia.edu/JohnPaulHimka/Papers/492282/The_Holodomor_in_the_Ukrainian-Jewish_Encounter_Initiative)>.

<sup>24</sup> A typical Soviet critique is K. Dmytruk, *Zhovto-blakytni bankroty* (Kiev, 1982).

<sup>25</sup> The classic nationalist apologist is P. Mirchuk, *Narys istoriyi Orhanizatsiyi Ukrayins'kykh Natsionalistiv* (Munich, 1968).

the same individuals and the same events figure in both kinds of narratives, the only difference being that they are ‘bad’ in the anti-nationalist narrative and ‘good’ in the nationalist narrative.<sup>26</sup> As a result, just as apologists of the Ukrainian nationalist movement produce nationalist (and thus ideological and/or moralistic) narratives that have little in common with genuine history, so, too, radical critics of the Ukrainian nationalist movement produce anti-nationalist (and thus ideological and/or moralistic) narratives that have little in common with genuine history. Both write history without complexity, context, and change. That is, both nationalists and anti-nationalists write *history without history*—which is to say non-history or, perhaps, anti-history.

The following quotation by Keith Gessen, a journalist writing for the *New Yorker*, perfectly captures the spirit, and the letter, of the anti-nationalist, anti-historical narrative:

Yushchenko walked into a firestorm. The O.U.N.–U.P.A. was courageous, stateless, persecuted—and also Fascistic and antisemitic. It offered its services to the Nazis in the fight against ‘Jewish Bolshevism’. Shukhevych, a brave soldier, entered Lviv in 1941 alongside the Wehrmacht. In the next couple of years, the Banderovites, as they were called, patrolled the villages and forests of western Ukraine. Their activities included the ethnic cleansing of the Polish population, so that Ukraine would be for Ukrainians, but, when they came across the few Jews in the area who had survived the work of the Einsatzgruppen and the deportations to the camps, they murdered them, too. This story, in its general outlines, had been known for a long time, but Yushchenko seemed genuinely to believe that it was all old Soviet propaganda.<sup>27</sup>

The problem with Gessen’s narrative, and with other radical anti-nationalist narratives, is that it really *is* based on ‘old Soviet propaganda’, presenting a chronologically ordered series of facts without any concern for complexity, context, or change. The nationalists, according to Gessen’s account, were typically fascist and antisemitic and, as such, did and could only do those things that typical fascist antisemites must do: collaborate and kill Jews. The structure of this kind of narrative is, as I suggest above, identical to that written by nationalist apologists. Both necessarily result in bad history.

In principle, the solution to bad history is simple: after all, *tertium datur*, but only if one looks for it and maintains a level head and even temper. One does not have to be a nationalist or an anti-nationalist scholar. One can write a good history of Ukrainian nationalism that appreciates complexity, context, and change and—*mirabile dictu!*—still is critical of Ukrainian nationalism. One can also write a good history of Ukrainian–Jewish relations that appreciates complexity, context, and change and—*mirabile dictu!*—still eschew primordialist stereotypes about evil/good Jews or good/evil Ukrainians.

<sup>26</sup> See Oleksandr Zaitsev’s excellent analysis ‘Viina mitiv pro viinu v suchasni Ukraini’, *Krytyka*, 2010, nos. 3–4, pp. 16–17.

<sup>27</sup> K. Gessen, ‘The Orange and the Blue’, *New Yorker*, 1 Mar. 2010, p. 34.

Such an approach would avoid both nationalist and anti-nationalist depictions and, instead, present Ukrainian nationalists neither as glorious heroes, who were really philosemites in disguise, nor as savage brutes, who were really nothing but antisemites with eliminationist agendas. Such an approach would provide some sense of the complexity of politics, society, culture, and economics in Ukraine in the inter-war period and during the Second World War; it would provide a context for the developments taking place in Ukraine and within the nationalist movement; and it would accept the reality of change—of nationalists, fascists, Jews, Ukrainians, and everybody else. Such an approach could not ignore the myriad of political forces—Ukrainian, Polish, Jewish, communist, fascist, Soviet, and many others—that defined the reality of Ukraine in general and western Ukraine in particular during the 1920s, 1930s, and 1940s. Such an approach could ignore neither the devastation experienced by Ukraine during the First World War, the Famine of 1933, the Terror of the 1930s, and the Second World War, nor the role therein of Germans, Poles, Jews, Russians, and others, including Ukrainians. Finally, such an approach would avoid the primordialist temptation and acknowledge that no movement, no party, no people, no individual embodies timeless qualities.<sup>28</sup>

Such a genuinely historical approach is much more difficult and much more anxiety-producing than simplistic moralistic or ideological tales. An honest look at Ukrainian violence against Jews and Poles would not, in the spirit of the Soviet distinction between the good *narod* and the bad bourgeoisie, just put the blame on bad nationalists or primordial antisemitism. It would, instead, examine the whole range of issues that theories of inter-ethnic violence emphasize—everything from structures to emotions to rationality to organization. Such an examination would likely find that, in light of the complexity, context, and change in and of those relations, binary morality breaks down, greys dominate over blacks and whites, ideological interpretations of history make little sense, and there are few villains and even fewer heroes on all sides.<sup>29</sup>

A good place to start is Henry Abramson's pithy summary of Ukrainian–Jewish relations:

Students reflecting on the dual genocides that Ukraine endured during the twentieth century cannot avoid the cruel paradigm of Ukrainian–Jewish history, in which each group constructs competing and often mutually exclusive narratives of suffering at the hands of the other. Viewed from afar, the pendulum of abuse and violence seems clear: the Jewish *oren-dars* exploit the Ukrainian peasantry, who exact terrible revenge in 1648–49 and the *Kolivshchyna*; Jewish Russophiles undermine the fledgling Ukrainian state, which is then

<sup>28</sup> Such an approach would also begin to address Timothy Snyder's concern: 'We don't have a history of the Holocaust that is set in the Eastern European lands where the victims died, and that describes the interactions of the German invaders, the Jewish inhabitants, and the peoples among whom the Jews lived': Snyder, 'What We Need to Know about the Holocaust', 76.

<sup>29</sup> The Ukrainian Jewish Encounter Initiative based in Toronto, Canada, appears to be going in this direction.



submerged in the bloody pogroms of 1919. Convinced that the Ukrainian national movement represents a distinct threat both physical and ideological, Jews join the Communist Party, and both engineer and enforce the policies that lead to the Holodomor; Ukrainians retaliate with widespread collaboration with the Nazis in the Holocaust.<sup>30</sup>

The fact of the matter is that both ‘the Ukrainians’ and ‘the Jews’ have been locked, historically, in a set of social, economic, political, and cultural relations that have generated exploitation and violence, on the one hand, and ethnic stereotyping by both sides on the other. There is no need to resort to primordialism, anti-semitism, and racism to explain this tragic relationship. A simple appreciation of the humanity of both Ukrainians and Jews and of their victimization—by ‘history’, by ‘outside forces’, and by each other—suffices to produce a more nuanced, and presumably more correct, understanding of their histories.

Unfortunately, anything like an even-handed, genuinely historical examination is almost impossible under current conditions, which have been aggravated by the openly anti-Ukrainian policies of President Yanukovich’s notorious minister of education and science, Dmytro Tabachnyk.<sup>31</sup> In the battle between apologists and radical critics, every plea for nuance will invariably be made to appear as either a betrayal or, much worse, an apologia for antisemitism. And, of course, once that particular accusation rears its head, all debate comes to an end, in just the manner in which it is intended to come to an end.<sup>32</sup> In circumstances such as these—so wearily reminiscent of the manner in which homosexuals were tarred before gay liberation—simplicity and simple-mindedness will triumph. Those who aspire to understanding should refuse to debate the hotheads and quietly head for the hills—until the storm passes and reasoned discourse becomes possible.

<sup>30</sup> H. Abramson, ‘Holodomor and Holocaust’, *Holodomor Studies*, 2/1 (2010), 131–2. Were this ‘paradigm’ the conventional wisdom, at least among scholars if not among general publics, then Abramson’s desire to refine it, and perhaps even transcend it, would be fully understandable. Unfortunately, this kind of interactive historical narrative, in which Jewish and Ukrainian attitudes and behaviours are assumed to be causally interrelated, is anything but the conventional wisdom. Quite the contrary, the standard approach, as I have tried to suggest in this essay, is primordial, entailing the prescription of intrinsic attitudes that necessarily lead to certain behaviours, regardless of context and regardless of the actions, beliefs, and dispositions of others.

<sup>31</sup> Even the generally cool-headed Timothy Snyder could not resist titling his otherwise nuanced discussion of Bandera and the nationalists ‘A Fascist Hero in Democratic Kiev’. Binaries are always more attractive than conditional assertions (how many people would read an article entitled ‘A Radical Nationalist Hero with Fascist Inclinations in Democratically Unconsolidated Kiev?’), especially as they transform appeals for nuance into seeming apologias of fascism. There’s just no arguing with such titles. See <<http://www.nybooks.com/blogs/nyrblog/2010/feb/24/a-fascist-hero-in-democratic-kiev/>>.

<sup>32</sup> One such radical critic, for instance, has produced the equivalent of a ‘blacklist’ consisting of scholars with different degrees of presumed guilt: M. Carynnyk, ‘Antisemitic Discussions within the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists, 1929–1943’, paper delivered at the Ukrainian Jewish Encounter Initiative Meeting at Ditchley Park, 14–16 Dec. 2009.

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# The Ukrainian Free University and the Jews

NICOLAS SZAFOWAL

THE HISTORY OF Ukrainian–Jewish relations has been complicated by a lack of objective scholarly research into the past, a factor which, regrettably, has laid a heavy hand on the present. There are a number of reasons for this situation, including the desire for self-justification and the quest for a release from responsibility; these account for the unsatisfactory state of research on the relations between two peoples who were stateless, oppressed, and persecuted for centuries. Such a situation spurs, in both a natural and an unnatural way, a quest for ‘those responsible’ for historical wrongs and national tragedies, who all too often have well-known, familiar faces. The one who was ‘responsible’ was the ‘other’, knowledge of whom was consciously avoided and never sought. Instead, the ‘other’ was perceived through the prism of the stereotypes *khlop* (peasant) and *zhyd* (Jew), with their attendant stigmas. Ukrainians and Jews were puppets in the games and calculations of those circles in whose hands lay all power and the fate of these two peoples. The ruling powers exploited them both, not only using them to attain their goals, but also repressing the one by means of the other—which was also one of their objectives. Any kind of ‘dirty work’ entailed by the pursuit of foreign—that is, hostile—political, social, and economic goals was carried out by the very victims of those goals, which exacerbated their unfortunate situation and burdened it with an additional, often needless, weight of hatred and suspicion.

Yet, despite this problematic historical relationship, we also find shining moments of Ukrainian–Jewish co-operation in the twentieth century, in precisely that century in which, for both Ukrainians and Jews, that which seemed impossible

In the preparation of this study, materials were consulted in the Národní archiv, Prague, and the archive of the Ukrainian Free University, Munich. In addition to the works cited in subsequent footnotes, the following are relevant to the topic of this chapter: ‘Z dial’nosty UVU za druhe desyatylyttya isnuvannya (1931–1941)’, *Naukovyi zbirnyk UVU v Prazi*, 3 (Prague, 1942); S. Narizhny, *Ukrayins’ka emihratsiya* (Prague, 1942); I. Mirchuk, ‘Ukrayins’kyi Vil’nyi Universytet’, *Naukovyi zbirnyk UVU*, 5 (Munich, 1948); R. S. Holiat, *Short History of the Ukrainian Free University*, Papers of the Shevchenko Scientific Society 21 (New York, 1964); W. Janiw [V. Yaniv], *Ukrainische Freie Universität: Kurzfassste Geschichte und dokumentarische Ergänzungen* (Munich, 1976); V. Yaniv, ‘Ukrainian Free University’, in D. H. Struk (ed.), *Encyclopedia of Ukraine*, v (Toronto, 1993), 382–4; M. Szafowal and R. Yaremko (eds.), *Universitas Libera Ucrainensis, 1921–2006* (Munich, 2006).

on the basis of historical experience came to pass: the two tragedies—the Holodomor and the Holocaust—that eclipsed all earlier tragedies, bringing with them a threat to national existence itself through mass physical destruction.

The study of Ukrainian–Jewish relations—of the so-called ‘Jewish Brigade’, for example, which fought to the death for Ukraine’s independence, or of the Law on National Autonomy, which Solomon I. Goldelman illuminated so notably<sup>1</sup>—demonstrates that the two peoples did not always live in opposition to or apart from each other. They were also capable of living and acting together in beneficial cooperation—witness, in particular, the Jewish doctors in the ranks of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, or the Righteous among the Nations, at the forefront of whom should be Metropolitan Andrey Sheptytsky, although he still remains unrecognized as such.

The aim of this study is to present certain aspects of Ukrainian–Jewish academic collaboration, based on the example of the Ukrainian Free University (Ukrayins’kyi Vil’nyi Universytet; UVU), which in 2011 celebrated the ninetieth anniversary of its founding in Vienna. This is a novel topic, one that has never before been examined, and I make no claim to provide an exhaustive treatment of such a wide-ranging subject. What I present is, rather, a stimulus to other scholars to initiate and deepen the exploration of this topic.

#### THE HISTORY OF THE UNIVERSITY

The Ukrainian Free University is a unique phenomenon: it is a scholarly institution founded by Ukrainians under émigré conditions. It arose in the course of the quest for academic freedom and objective truth in scholarship. The university’s first rector, Professor Oleksandr Kolessa, expressed his view on the need to found such a university:

Feeling a burning need to organize university studies in our native language for young Ukrainian academics, before whom the hand of the conqueror has closed the gates of universities in their native land, as well as the need to gather Ukrainian scholarly forces abroad, Ukrainian professors, on the initiative of Professor O. Kolessa, had already decided by the end of 1919 to set about creating a Ukrainian free university in Prague.<sup>2</sup>

The founding of a university in Prague encountered serious obstacles. Support for the realization of the plan came from many young academics living at that time in Vienna, and from the Union of Ukrainian Journalists and Writers (Soyuz ukrayins’kykh zhurnalistiv i pys’mennykiv), but with Vienna as the site, not Prague as originally envisaged. The initiative, put forward by a group of scholars headed by professors Oleksandr Kolessa, Ivan Horbachevsky, and Stanyslav Dnistriansky,

<sup>1</sup> S. I. Goldelman, *Zhydivs’ka natsional’na avtonomiya v Ukrayini, 1917–1920* (Munich, 1967).

<sup>2</sup> See ‘Inavguratsiya akademichnoho roku Ukrayins’koho Vil’noho Universytetu dnya 21 zhovtnya 1922 r.’, in *Ukrayins’kyi Vil’nyi Universytet v Prazi, v rokakh 1921–1922* (Prague, 1924), 64.

was backed by the Ukrainian Sociological Institute (Ukrayins'kyi sotsiolohichnyi instytut), under the leadership of Professor Mykhailo Hrushevsky, and the Society of Friends of Ukrainian Education in Vienna (Tovarystvo prykhyl'nykiv ukrayins'koyi osvity u Vidni).

Fundamental differences of opinion about the concept of the future university emerged at the organizing forum held by this initiative group. Kolessa, for example, favoured the founding of a traditional university modelled on those of western Europe, while Hrushevsky, as the prospective rector, proposed a plan for a so-called 'people's university', which would not require academic qualifications for its professors and would not select its students on the basis of academic attainment. When the first concept won the day, Hrushevsky abandoned the project and, together with his institute, refused to collaborate further. After his departure, the remaining leaders began the process of implementing the concept of the Ukrainian Free University—'free' in the sense of 'non-State'—which has withstood the test of time.

### *The Vienna Period: January–October 1921*

The Ukrainian Free University was founded in Vienna, the former capital of the Austro-Hungarian empire and the birthplace of important forces that have driven Ukrainian scholarship and culture throughout the centuries. A modest, if not altogether meagre, material base for the launch of the university's work was provided by the Union of Ukrainian Journalists and Writers, headed by Dr Volodymyr Kushnir. The union took out a bank loan, with the poet Oleksandr Oles's collection of books serving as collateral.

The festive inauguration of the university took place in Vienna on 17 January 1921 in the great hall of the Society of Engineers and Architects. The topic of the first speech, given by Senator Serhy Shelukhyn, is noteworthy. The programme he set out in his address on 'Law, Ethics, Religion, and Justice' left a mark on all subsequent activities of the new institution, and over the years the university was careful to safeguard political and religious freedom while professing universal human values.

Two university sections were created initially: the Faculty of Philosophy and the Faculty of Law and Social Sciences. (This basic structure was expanded only in 2000 by the creation of a third faculty: Ukrainian Studies.) The professors who served as members of the first university senate were Oleksandr Kolessa, rector; Stanyslav Dnistriansky, pro-rector; Volodymyr Starosolsky, dean of the Faculty of Law and Social Sciences; and Ivan Hanytsky, vice-dean of the Faculty of Philosophy and Secretary of the Rectorate (as the university's chancellor was called at the time). Ivan Ohiyenko was elected dean of the Faculty of Philosophy, but he did not, however, come to Vienna, and his position was assigned to Professor Stepan Rudnytsky.

Ninety students, including fifteen women, registered for the first semester at the university; sixty-five of them were in the Faculty of Philosophy and twenty-five in

the Faculty of Law and Social Sciences, and they were taught by twelve professors and three docents. The only doctoral defence that took place during the Vienna period—and the university's last ceremonial occasion before its move from the Austrian capital to Prague—was the habilitation of Dr Ivan Mirchuk, who earned the degree of Docent of Philosophy. The ceremony to award the degree based on his habilitation thesis 'Metageometry and Gnosiology' took place on 22 May 1921. Eventually, this first graduate of the university would play a crucial role in the history of the institution, and at the time of his death in Munich in 1961 he held the position of rector. The university's first publication, *Ryms'ke pravo* ('Roman Law'), by Kost Losky, also appeared in Vienna, and this study launched, in 1921, a long-standing tradition of book publishing by the university, amounting to 652 titles by 2011.<sup>3</sup>

The German- and Czech-language press reacted favourably to the founding of the university and the early stages of its activity, highlighting the fact that the Ukrainian nation was trapped in a situation in which it lacked rights in its own country.

### *The Move from Vienna to Prague*

The hope and promise attendant on the founding of the university in Vienna were not fulfilled. Help from the Ukrainian public was the sole, but inadequate, source of support. Student attendance at lectures was unsatisfactory, and in time it became clear that the majority of Ukrainian university students were in Prague.

On 11 February 1921 the council of the Ukrainian Academic Community in Prague sent a letter to the senate of the UVU, requesting that the university be moved to Prague in order to 'appease the spiritual hunger for lectures covering the range of our language, literature, history, and native culture in general, as well as lectures read in our native language on other branches of human knowledge, a hunger felt by the more than one thousand Ukrainian students who are at present living in the Czechoslovak Republic'.<sup>4</sup>

After the first semester of lectures ended in Vienna, in May 1921 a delegation consisting of Professor O. Kolessa, Senator S. Shelukhyn, and Professor S. Dnistryansky handed a memorandum concerning the university to the president of the Czechoslovak Republic, Tomáš Masaryk. The delegation was received by Dr Jan Nečas, president of the Council of Ministers; Dr Edvard Beneš, Minister of Foreign Affairs; Dr Vavro Šrobár, Minister of Education; and the senate of Charles University in Prague. The request to transfer the university to Prague was granted. A spirit of friendly support and understanding informed the press's attitude to this project.

<sup>3</sup> They are listed in R. Yaremko (comp.), 'Vydannya Ukrayins'koho Vil'noho Universytetu (1921–2011)', in U. Patzke, M. Szafowal, and R. Yaremko (eds.), *Universitas Libera Ucrainensis, 1921–2011* (Munich, 2011), 533–730.

<sup>4</sup> 'Inavguratsiya akademichnoho roku Ukrayins'koho Vil'noho Universytetu dnya 21 zhovtnya 1922 r.', 68.

All preparations for the move to Prague were successfully overseen by Kolessa, who had remained in the Czechoslovak capital. His extraordinary organizational skills, international scholarly renown, and unshakeable faith in the feasibility of the concept behind the creation and existence of the university were among the crucial factors that helped to bring a real miracle to fruition. Kolessa succeeded in creating a positive atmosphere for the university and in securing long-term material assistance.

The Ukrainian Free University was transferred from Vienna to Prague on the basis of resolutions passed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Czechoslovak Republic on 16 September 1921 (no. 291045/21), the Political Department of the President of the Czechoslovak Republic on 30 September 1921 (no. 35319/21), and the Ministry of Education on 5 October 1921 (no. 92477/21), and in accordance with resolutions handed down by the academic senate and individual faculties of Charles University, the oldest university in central Europe.

### *The Prague Period: October 1921–May 1945*

The inauguration of the university in Prague, which took place on 23 October 1921 in the concert hall of the Natural Sciences Institute, was attended by representatives of the Czechoslovak government and the European academic world. The festivities were organized and carried out by young members of the Ukrainian academic community.

The move was associated with a number of internal organizational matters, the most important of which was the change of statute and the expansion of the professorial staff. The structure of the university copied the patterns of other western European universities, with the stipulation that throughout its functioning in Prague the internal organization and relationship between academic self-rule and the student body would be governed by the regulations of Charles University. Ukrainian was established as the language of instruction, with the proviso that lectures could also be conducted in other languages if the senate agreed to these individual exceptions. The university abides by this regulation to the present day.

The first professorial collegium of the Prague period was composed of professors from non-Ukrainian universities, who in turn enlisted new members for the teaching staff, as well as individuals who had made a name for themselves through their scholarly works and knowledge. During the first Prague semester, the Faculty of Philosophy had eight professors and two docents, while the Faculty of Law and Social Sciences had four professors and two docents. By the following semester, the academic staff numbered twenty-one; ten years later, there were thirty-nine.

The students of Charles University had an unrestricted right to attend the UVU, as envisaged by the resolution of the Ministry of Education mentioned above. Tuition was free. The university had the use of lecture halls in the Carolinum and Clementinum buildings of Charles University, as well as the premises of the Natural Sciences Institute at 6 Albertova Street. During the first semester there

were 702 students, including 42 women: 420 in the Faculty of Philosophy and 282 in the Faculty of Law and Social Sciences. In 1923 the number of students rose to a peak of 874.

During its Prague period, the university became the most important centre of Ukrainian émigré academic life. The rector of the UVU was the head of the Ukrainian Academic Committee, which united various Ukrainian scholarly institutions and represented Ukrainian scholarship abroad. The committee was recognized by the International Committee on Intellectual Cooperation at the League of Nations and was a member of the Institute of Intellectual Cooperation in Paris until the Soviet Union joined in 1934. In the period when universities in Soviet Ukraine were closed and replaced by 'institutes of public education' (*instytuty narodnoyi osvity*), the UVU was the sole Ukrainian university in the world.

The university developed dynamically in the 1920s. Although the number of students decreased, this should not be taken to imply that the initial euphoria of its establishment in Prague declined into uneventful academic activity. The university became an established part of the central European academic landscape, and also became universally recognized and accepted as the most important centre of Ukrainian scholarship outside Ukraine. It was also accepted as a partner on an equal footing with academic institutions in Ukraine.

At the beginning of the 1930s, however, the UVU was hit by a serious economic crisis caused by the Czechoslovak government's foreign-policy reorientation towards the Soviet Union and Poland. This led to the restriction of rights enjoyed by Ukrainian political emigrants as well as to the reduction and partial suspension of state grants. During those difficult years, the university was rescued by its rector, Ivan Horbachevsky, a world-renowned scholar and president of the Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences.

The political events on the eve of the Second World War had a disastrous effect on the university, which saw its student body shrink to sixty-one in 1939. In 1938 attempts had been made to move it to Khust, the capital of Carpathian Ukraine, where it would have had the status of a Ukrainian state university. However, the plan was quashed by the Hungarian occupation government. With the creation of the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia, Charles University became a German institution. Despite difficult conditions during the German occupation, a period when Czechs were forbidden to study, the university administration managed to help some of them to complete their studies at the UVU.

In 1941 a substantial number of students arrived from the Generalgouvernement. Thanks to the efforts of Professor Volodymyr Kubiiovych, the head of the Ukrainian Central Committee in Kraków, the university was awarded a certain number of scholarships and some subsidies to continue its scholarly and publishing work. Towards the end of the war, the academic staff numbered twenty professors, ten docents, and three lecturers.

The end of the Prague period coincided with the occupation of the city by Soviet



troops in May 1945. In the previous month the rector of the university, Andry Yakovliv, left Prague for the West with most of the professors and students. Before doing so, however, he handed over the reins of administration to the university's long-time professor Avhustyn Voloshyn, who held an honorary doctorate from the UVU and was the former president of Carpathian Ukraine, and who was in favour of keeping the university in Prague. On 21 May 1945 Voloshyn was arrested in Prague by a SMERSH unit of Soviet counter-intelligence, and on 19 July 1945 he died in Butyrka Prison in Moscow. His wish turned out to be utopian: the university was closed down by the Soviet occupation authorities, individuals who were involved with the institution were arrested, and its property was destroyed, looted, or shipped to the Soviet Union, in particular the personnel files of the academic staff and students, as well as the UVU archives.

### *The University in Munich*

After the Second World War, Bavaria and its capital city of Munich became the main centre of a new wave of émigrés composed of members of both the so-called 'old emigration'—those who had left after the end of the First World War and during the inter-war period, and who had been living in territories that now belonged to the Soviet sphere of influence or were occupied by Soviet troops—and also the 'new emigration', people who had ended up on the territory of Germany during the war, including forced labourers, former camp prisoners, prisoners of war, political refugees, and veterans of various military formations. These people, who hailed from various parts of Ukraine, espoused a variety of religious faiths and political views. Yet all of them were united by the pain of having lost their native land, as well as by the desire to maintain, through their service to the national cause, a living connection to the Ukrainian nation, which was suffering one of the blackest hours in its entire history. Among these émigrés, who considered themselves political victims and representatives of a stateless nation, were many scholars, intellectuals, and artists. Thus, it is no surprise that the process of restoring and continuing the work of the university was launched in this new location and under new circumstances.

The initiative to revive the work of the university was put forward by Professor Vadym Shcherbakivsky, in conjunction with the scholarly associates of the Ukrainian Scientific Institute in Berlin, chief among whom was its former director, Professor Ivan Mirchuk. Organizational preparation was launched in early autumn 1945, and after its completion teaching commenced in the summer semester of 1946.

The new academic staff consisted of professors who had formerly taught in Prague, as well as scholars from various regions of Ukraine who were now living in the West. The contribution of academics from Ukraine's central and eastern regions was considerable. In 1947 the university had forty-four professors, sixteen docents, and eighteen lecturers. The largest number of students—a total of 493 in both faculties—was recorded during the winter semester of 1947/8.

The financial base of the university's work consisted of grants from the funds of the Ukrainian Publishing House, based in Kraków until 1944, and from the Congregation for the Oriental Churches, whose headquarters were at the Vatican; the latter were obtained thanks to the efforts of the Apostolic Visitor for Ukrainian Catholics in Western Europe, Archbishop Ivan Buchko, who was head of the university's board of trustees.

In June 1948 a monetary reform was carried out in the three Western zones of occupation in post-war Germany, out of which soon arose the Federal Republic of Germany within borders that lasted until 1990. A new currency—the Deutschmark—was introduced. In keeping with the reform, every resident obtained an identical sum of money. This step, whose goal was the monetary reorganization of post-war Germany, was decisive for the so-called 'German economic miracle', but it created a desperate financial situation for 'displaced persons', to which category the majority of Ukrainians belonged. Fear of a new armed conflict during the Cold War, the search for opportunities outside Germany, and the opening up of emigration to countries overseas sparked off a mass departure not only of UVU lecturers but also of students. By the early 1950s the number of registered students had decreased significantly, and in 1956 all teaching was suspended.

On 16 September 1950, during the rectorship of Yury Paneiko, the Bavarian State Ministry of Education issued its ministerial directive no. XI 60710, recognizing the Ukrainian Free University as a private university with the right to confer the academic degrees of *Doktor* and *Doktor habilitierter (Dozent)*. These rights were reconfirmed on 28 June 1978 when amendments were introduced into the Bavarian law on higher education.

The university senate directed its efforts towards maintaining academic work even under the conditions of the mass flight of professors and students from the UVU, who emigrated to Canada, the United States, and South America. In time the Institute of Correspondence Teaching (Instytut zaочноho navchannya) was established, and delegacies of the university were founded in Canada, the United States, and France. The year 1957 marked the launch of the journal *Naukovi zapysky Ukrayins'koho Vil'noho Universytetu* ('Scholarly Notes of the Ukrainian Free University'). Simultaneously, the university sought ways to find a secure financial footing.

The turning point in the history of the university was the founding in 1962 of the Association for the Advancement of Ukrainian Studies (Tovarystvo spryannya ukrayins'kii nauksi), which received grants from the Federal Republic of Germany and the Free State of Bavaria for the work of three Ukrainian scholarly institutions in Munich: the Ukrainian Free University, the Shevchenko Scientific Society (Naukove tovarystvo im. Shevchenka), and the Ukrainian Technical and Economic Institute (Ukrayins'kyi tekhnichno-hospodars'kyi instytut). Professors Oleksandr Kulchytsky and Zynovy Sokolyuk did everything possible to help create this umbrella association, which exists to the present day. The German government continued to issue grants until 31 December 1996. The Free State of Bavaria finally

suspended its financial assistance in 2006, believing that it was Ukraine's responsibility to create a financial base for the university.

Thanks to new financing acquired during the term in office of the rector Yury Boiko-Blokhyn, courses resumed during the summer semester of 1965. Winter semester studies were reintroduced into the 1993/4 academic year during the rectorship of Roman Drazhnyovsky, thanks to the initiative of Myroslav Labunka, dean of the Faculty of Philosophy.

In 1968 Professor Volodymyr Yaniv was elected rector of the university, and served an eventful eighteen-year term. Among his many achievements were the restoration and expansion of the teaching faculty (even today most of the professors live outside the university campus); the establishment of contacts with the Ukrainian and non-Ukrainian scholarly worlds; the founding of the Pedagogical Institute (Pedahohichniy instytut), which was headed for twenty-four years by Oleksandra Kysilevska-Tkach; the expansion of the UVU's publishing activities, which were successfully overseen by Hryhory Vaskovych; and the founding of the Institute for the Study of National Problems (Instytut doslidzhennya natsional'nykh problem), under the leadership of Zynovy Sokolyuk.

The Ukrainian community based outside Ukraine continues to provide significant assistance. Despite grants from the German government, the university would not have been able to exist for so many decades without the staunch devotion of numerous activists and generous donors from the Ukrainian community.

In 1948 the Society of Supporters of the Ukrainian Free University (Tovarystvo prykhyl'nykiv Ukrayins'koho Vil'noho Universytetu), originally based in Prague between 1932 and 1937, was revived in Munich. The society expanded overseas and its many branches, among whose members were UVU graduates, organized fundraising campaigns to further the university's work. In 1975 these societies formed the nucleus of the Ukrainian Free University Foundation in the United States, whose efforts to secure a financial base for the UVU are inestimable. In 1973 the Society of Friends of the Ukrainian Free University (Tovarystvo pryateliv Ukrayins'koho Vil'noho Universytetu) was founded in Munich. Today it operates as a local foundation and serves as the legal body responsible for the university. In 1980 the Canadian Foundation for the Ukrainian Free University was founded in Winnipeg.

It was during the rectorship of Professor Bohdan Tsyutsyura that Ukraine's independence was restored on 24 August 1991. The first two students from Ukraine had already arrived at the university during the summer semester of 1990. The acceptance of students from Ukraine presented the university with new challenges, and with the need to implement far-reaching reforms of its planned courses, amongst other things. The first order of the day was to reorganize the Institute for the Study of National Problems as the Research Institute for German-Ukrainian Relations (Doslidnyi instytut nimets'ko-ukrayins'kykh vidnosyn); its first director was Zynovy Sokolyuk.

During Myroslav Labunka's term in office as rector the university's financial base was severely curtailed when grants from the government of the Federal Republic of

Germany were suspended in 1996, as noted earlier. This circumstance had a negative impact on everything but the quality of studies. Cutbacks were carried out in parallel with the reforms that were being introduced into the university, which intensified during the rectorship of Leonid Rudnytsky. In 2000 the Faculty of Ukrainian Studies was created, a new university statute was approved, and new regulations were drawn up in accordance with the Bologna Process for co-ordinating university education within the European Union. The senate continued to consolidate collaboration with Ukrainian and German universities, but these efforts were hampered by the restricted numbers of academic staff and the lack of funds. In 2008 the university acquired new premises and a firm financial base was created.

### THE UNIVERSITY AND JEWS

Before turning to the question of the university's relations with Jews, we must first define the extent of the concept of 'university'. It is not my intention to dwell in length or depth on the various interpretations or understandings of this concept, and I shall restrict myself to the classical definition: *universitas magistrorum et scholarium*, a community of those who teach and those who study. This formula defines the dimensions of links between the university and Jews, and encompasses the following aspects: Jews within the community of UVU lecturers; Jews within the UVU student body; the Jewish question in UVU publications; the Jewish question in publications by UVU lecturers; and Jewish topics in the work of the UVU.

#### *Jews within the Community of UVU Lecturers*

During its first ninety years of existence, the university's teaching faculty hired 415 lecturers, and offered students a total of 5,132 seminars, classes, and tutorials. According to a breakdown by nationality, the teaching staff included Ukrainians, Czechs, Austrians, Germans, and citizens of the United States and Canada. The faculty directory also includes Jews, and one individual of Ukrainian background who always emphasizes his Karaite origins. A comparison of the number of Jewish lecturers with the total number of faculty members over the ninety years indicates that Jews have comprised 2.2 per cent of all teaching personnel.

Six Jews have belonged to the Faculty of Philosophy, holding various teaching positions. Prominent among them were Emmanuel Rais, lecturer in Ukrainian Literature from 1973, and Israel Kleiner, assistant in the Department of Ukrainian History from 1979. The youngest and most junior-ranking Jewish professor is Yohanan Petrovsky-Shtern, appointed in 2009 by the Faculty of Ukrainian Studies as visiting professor in the Department of Philosophy as a specialist on Ukrainian literature.

Three Jews have taught in the Faculty of Law and Social Sciences,<sup>5</sup> among them Lev Yekh, who held the chair of administrative law from 1926, and Moisey Feldman, a guest lecturer who taught modern Ukrainian history in 1991.

<sup>5</sup> It has undergone several changes of name since its foundation in 1921, and from 2000 has been the Faculty of State and Economic Sciences (Fakul'tet derzhavnykh ta ekonomichnykh nauk).

*Jews within the UVU Student Body*

Between the winter semester of 1921/2 and 1938 the university kept accurate statistics about students' nationalities. It should be emphasized that it was as a nationality that Jews were registered, not as adherents of a religious confession, a practice that corresponds interestingly with certain Zionist ideas. The picture revealed by these statistics up to 1930 is summarized in Table 1.

**Table 1.** Jewish students enrolled at the Ukrainian Free University, by semester, 1921–1930

Semester	Total no. of students	Students of 'Jewish nationality'
Winter–summer 1921	90	— <sup>a</sup>
Winter 1921/2	702	26
Summer 1922	568	22
Winter 1922/3	874	4
Summer 1923	654	4
Winter 1923/4	437	7
Summer 1924	382	3
Winter 1924/5	390	2
Summer 1925	276	4
Winter 1925/6	250	2
Summer 1926	251	3
Winter 1926/7	245	3
Summer 1927	194	1
Winter 1927/8	203	3
Summer 1928	162	1
Winter 1928/9	289	28
Summer 1929	253	22
Winter 1929/30	243	31
Summer 1930	253	30
<b>Total</b>	<b>6,716</b>	<b>196</b>

<sup>a</sup> Information about nationality is not available for the opening seminar.

Sources: *Ukrayins'kyi Vil'nyi Universytet v Prazi, v rokakh 1921–1922* (Prague, 1924); *Ukrayins'kyi Vil'nyi Universytet v Prazi v rokakh 1926–1931* (Prague, 1931).

During the ten years from the university's inauguration in January 1921 to the summer of 1930 there were 6,716 registered students, and according to an announcement issued by the chancellery, in the early years some 90–95 per cent of them were Ukrainian. However, this number shrank during the second half of the decade to 70–75 per cent.<sup>6</sup>

By my calculations, during that period Jews made up on average about 2.9 per cent of the entire student body, and the numbers of them recorded each semester

<sup>6</sup> *Ukrayins'kyi Vil'nyi Universytet v Prazi v rokakh 1926–1931* (Prague, 1931), p. xii.

sum to 196. In 1928–30 Jews were the second largest national group after Ukrainians. During the 1930 summer semester they comprised 11.9 per cent of all students.

The following fact is noteworthy: information on the UVU relating to the period 1931–41 was published in Prague during the Nazi occupation.<sup>7</sup> The details of the 1931/2 academic year include the category of ‘Jews’, listed under nationalities. Was this a ‘deliberate oversight’? Of the 240 students who were registered for the winter 1931/2 semester, 43 were Jews (17.9 per cent, the highest percentage of Jewish students in the history of the university). During the summer 1932 semester, when there were altogether 220 students, 26 (11.8 per cent) were Jews. However, in these data published in 1942, for years subsequent to 1931/2 the category of ‘Jews’ disappears and is replaced by ‘Others’. Although it is not possible to state with any certainty that this category served to ‘conceal’ Jews, it is safe to assume so, inasmuch as the category of ‘Others’ in turn disappeared during the 1938/9 academic year, when the state of Czechoslovakia no longer existed.

Confessional statistics were no longer kept after the Second World War; nor does one encounter the category ‘of Jewish nationality’. A perusal of the archives on student affairs for the period 1946–2010 reveals the presence of Israeli citizens or individuals of the Jewish faith who held non-Israeli citizenship. However, their numbers are insignificant: only a dozen or so are listed. The terrible events connected with the insanity of Nazi ideology were reflected even here.

### *The Jewish Question in UVU Publications*

The bibliography of UVU publications compiled and edited by Roman Yaremko<sup>8</sup> includes the following works that have a direct connection to Jews and the Jewish question:

- I. Mirchuk, *Svitohlyad ukrayins' koho narodu: Sproba kharakterystyky* [‘The World Outlook of the Ukrainian People: An Attempt to Characterize It’] (Prague, 1942).
- B. Lewytzkyj, *Die sowjetische Nationalitätenpolitik nach Stalins Tod (1953–1970)* (Munich, 1970).
- I. Klejner, ‘Die jüdisch-ukrainischen Beziehungen: Zum 100. Geburtstag von Volodymyr Žabotynsky’, *Mitteilungen (Arbeits- und Förderungsgemeinschaft der Ukrainischen Wissenschaften)*, 17 (1980), 229–41.
- P. Potichnyj and H. Aster, ‘Modernization and its Impact on Jewish–Ukrainian Relations (c.1050–1068)’, in O. Horbatsch et al. (eds.), *Symbolae in honorem Volodymyri Janiw* (Munich, 1983), 1050–68.
- T. Mackiw, ‘Die Situation der jüdischen Bewohner in den Konflikten um die Ukraine im 17. Jahrhundert’, *Studien zu Nationalitätenfragen*, 2 (1986), 56–69.
- T. Mackiw, review of T. Hunczak, *Symon Petliura and the Jews: A Reappraisal*, in *Jahrbuch der Ukrainekunde* (1987), 360–3.

<sup>7</sup> *Ukrayins'kyi Vil'nyi Universytet v Prazi v rokakh 1931–1941* (Prague, 1942), offprint from *Naukovyi zbirnyk UVU v Prazi*, 3 (Prague, 1942).

<sup>8</sup> Yaremko (comp.), ‘Vydannya Ukrayins' koho Vil'noho Universytetu (1921–2011)’.

- P. Potichnyj, 'Bevölkerung der Ukraine nach Volkszugehörigkeit', *Studien zu Nationalitätenfragen*, 7 (1991), 56–73.
- P. Berko, 'Yevreyi u chas budivnytstva ukrayins'koyi derzhavnosti, 1917–1921' ['Jews during the Period of the Building of Ukrainian Statehood, 1917–1921'], *Naukovyi zbirnyk Ukrayins'koho Vil'noho Universytetu*, 15 (1992), 78–82.

These works reflect the zeitgeist of the periods in which they appeared and do not fully illuminate the complex of Ukrainian–Jewish relations or deal exhaustively with their individual aspects.

### *The Jewish Question in Publications by UVU Lecturers*

Works written by UVU professors and published outside the university can be considered as a separate category of publications on Ukrainian–Jewish relations.

From the Prague period, the articles that Oleksandr Mytsyuk published in *Rozbudova natsiyi*, the official journal of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists, deserve special mention. Mytsyuk, who was born in 1883 in Novooleksandrivka, Ekaterinoslav province, and died in 1943 in Prague, was an economist and sociologist. He belonged to the Revolutionary Ukrainian Party (Revolutsiina ukrayins'ka partiya) and later joined the Ukrainian section of the Social Revolutionaries. During the period of the Directory he was Minister of Internal Affairs, and later held the post of Deputy Minister of the Economy. After emigrating to the West in 1920, he joined the faculty of the UVU in 1922, where he taught Political Economy. During the 1938/9 and 1940/1 academic years he also served as rector of the university.

Mytsyuk's articles on the agrarianization of the Jews of Ukraine were first published in *Rozbudova natsiyi*, beginning in 1931.<sup>9</sup> A series of pieces on the Jewish economy followed in the same periodical,<sup>10</sup> and later articles dealt with the period 1917–20 ('a historical turning point')<sup>11</sup> and with the independence of Ukraine and the Jews<sup>12</sup>—the last of which typifies the entire series. A selection of these articles was also published in book form.<sup>13</sup> Mytsyuk commands a wealth of knowledge and seeks to uncover the causes of and analyse the consequences of Ukrainian–Jewish alienation, citing facts without offering subjective assessments. In other words, his treatment of this question is *sine ira et studio*.

<sup>9</sup> O. Mytsyuk, 'Ahraryzatsiya zhydivstva Ukrayiny', *Rozbudova natsiyi*, 1931, nos. 1–2, pp. 18–28; nos. 3–4, pp. 70–9; nos. 7–8, pp. 172–81; supplemented by O. Mytsyuk, 'Ahraryzatsiya zhydivstva za doby bol'shevyzmu', *Rozbudova natsiyi*, 1933, nos. 7–8, pp. 180–90; nos. 9–10, pp. 226–35.

<sup>10</sup> O. Mytsyuk, 'Zhydivs'a ekonomika za doby liberalizmu', *Rozbudova natsiyi*, 1931, nos. 9–10, pp. 218–30; nos. 11–12, pp. 276–92; id., 'Zhydivs'ka ekonomika na Ukrayini za doby reaktsiyi (1882–1917)', *Rozbudova natsiyi*, 1932, nos. 1–2, pp. 13–25; nos. 3–4, pp. 75–86; nos. 5–6, pp. 118–31.

<sup>11</sup> O. Mytsyuk, 'Zhydivstvo za doby istorychnoho perelomu (1917–20)', *Rozbudova natsiyi*, 1932, nos. 7–8, pp. 185–96; nos. 9–10, pp. 253–6; nos. 11–12, pp. 296–300; 1933, nos. 5–6, pp. 130–8.

<sup>12</sup> O. Mytsyuk, 'Samostiinist' Ukrayiny ta zhydivstvo', *Rozbudova natsiyi*, 1933, nos. 3–4, pp. 75–87; nos. 5–6, pp. 130–8.

<sup>13</sup> O. Mytsyuk, *Ahraryzatsiya zhydivstva Ukrayiny na tli zahal'noyi ekonomiky* (Prague, 1932).

From the Munich period it is important to mention Peter Potichnyj and Howard Aster's fundamental work *Ukrainian–Jewish Relations in Historical Perspective*, published by the Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies,<sup>14</sup> which attests to the interest roused by this topic. Peter Potichnyj was a professor of political science at UVU from 1977 to 1998, later becoming professor emeritus. During the 1995/6 academic year he was dean of the Faculty of Law and Socio-Economic Sciences. Potichnyj and Aster's book is the first and so far only objective analysis of Ukrainian–Jewish relations from a historical perspective. Although it is by no means an exhaustive study, it is regarded as a pioneering work.

### *Jewish Topics in the Work of the UVU*

Jewish topics have been a part of the university's scholarly research work and public lectures. Because of the lack of archival documents pertaining to the Prague period, however, only the Munich period will be discussed here.

The Institute for the Study of National Problems was founded during the 1982/3 academic year under the direction of Professor Zynovy Sokolyuk. A former participant in the Ukrainian Insurgent Army's armed political struggle, Sokolyuk was a professor of administrative law and for many years dean of the Faculty of Law and Socio-Economic Sciences, and he closely followed the development of nationality questions. On his initiative, the university introduced a series of successful measures aimed at establishing Polish–Ukrainian and Ukrainian–Jewish dialogue. His efforts were met with restrained sympathy on the part of Ukrainians, but were completely ignored by Jewish circles. The university archives contain announcements about series of discussion soirées and round tables organized on this topic.

A more thoroughgoing development of research on this subject would have been expedited had there been appropriate funding. However, in early 2000 the university received a bequest from the nationalist journalist Zenovy Knysh, the author of nineteen books.<sup>15</sup> Knysh's gift helped to finance the study and general elaboration of the field of Ukrainian–Jewish problems, and to defray the cost of organizing a number of appearances by the Ukrainian Jewish poet Moisey Fishbein.

Anatoly Pohribny, Professor of Ukrainian Literature and dean of the Faculty of Ukrainian Studies, included in the curriculum a number of seminars on the contributions of Jews to Ukrainian culture, having been awarded a grant by the university senate specifically to research this question. Regrettably, Pohribny died in 2007 without completing his study. However, even after his death Ukrainian–Jewish relations have continued to feature in lectures organized by the university. Among the members of the so-called fourth wave of émigrés from Ukraine are a considerable number of Ukrainian Jews who have settled in Munich, including individuals who have a Ukrainian cultural mien (signifying, in the words of Petrovsky-Shtern, that they have rejected the pro-imperial choice). They follow the programme of

<sup>14</sup> 1st edn. (Edmonton, 1988); 2nd edn (Edmonton, 1990).

<sup>15</sup> Knysh was born in Kolomyya in 1906 and died in Toronto on 14 November 1999.



public lectures organized by the university, although their presence thus far has not led to any concrete moves towards reviving Ukrainian–Jewish dialogue at the UVU.

The work of the Ukrainian Free University may be assessed from various perspectives. As regards its contribution to forging Ukrainian–Jewish co-operation in academia, it may be boldly stated that no other Ukrainian educational and scholarly institution outside Ukraine can boast such a high level of Jewish participation in its past academic activity, or such a high level of Jewish interest in its present one. Thus, we may look towards the future with optimism, as the Ukrainian Free University bears the seed of a Ukrainian–Jewish academic dialogue based on its past experiences.

*Translated from the Ukrainian by Marta D. Olynyk*

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# Imported Violence

## *Carpatho-Ruthenians and Jews* *in Carpatho-Ukraine,* *October 1938–March 1939*

RAZ SEGAL

IVAN OLBRACHT, the Czech writer who spent much of his time during the 1930s in Subcarpathian Rus, described relations between Jews and Carpatho-Ruthenians in his novel *Nikola the Outlaw*:

Through centuries of association the Jews and [Carpatho-]Ruthenians have become used to each other's peculiarities, and religious hatred is foreign to them . . . They see into each other's ritualistic mysteries and religious sorcery just as they see into each other's kitchens and rooms . . . But beware of casting a new idea in their midst, for then at once two types of mind and nervous system will reveal themselves.<sup>1</sup>

This passage constitutes an example of literature's ability not only to capture a sense of reality but also to anticipate why and how it could change. Indeed, as Olbracht was writing this piece, new ideas had already begun to alter the ethnic dynamics between Jews and their neighbours in the region. In this chapter I examine the building blocks of these ideas, which informed the emerging collective identification of Carpatho-Ruthenians after the First World War. This 'type of mind and nervous system' assumed intense political significance during the little-known moment of Carpatho-Ukraine when two different external forces introduced ethnic violence into the area and shattered its social fabric for ever.

By placing the interaction between Jews and Carpatho-Ruthenians in the broader context of inter-ethnic relations in this borderland and the foreign designs and policies that were aimed at it on the eve of the Second World War, this essay searches

My work on this study has benefited greatly from the comments and criticism of the three scholars on my doctoral dissertation committee: Debórah Dwork, Yehuda Bauer, and Antony Polonsky. I also received helpful feedback from Karel Berkhoff, Evgeny Finkel, John-Paul Himka, Natalya Lazar, Paul Robert Magocsi, Jody Russell Manning, Anat Plocker, and Ilana Rosen. Most of these scholars disagree with major parts of my interpretation. Therefore, I express my gratitude for fruitful discussions with them, but I assume all the responsibility for the ideas and analyses offered here.

<sup>1</sup> I. Olbracht, *Nikola the Outlaw*, trans. M. K. Holeček (Evanston, Ill., 2001), 16–17; the book was first published in Czech as *Nikola Šuhaj loupežník* in 1933.

for the elements of a specific case of ‘nationalism’ and ‘antisemitism’. It argues, finally, that these two related terms, which are commonly evoked in the humanities and social sciences, analytically conceal more than they clarify; bypassing them, therefore, facilitates new questions and research avenues, especially about little strips of land in eastern Europe such as Subcarpathian Rus.

### HISTORICAL OVERVIEW

Throughout the history outlined below, Subcarpathian Rus exemplified a typical eastern European quandary: as a consequence of the ethnic and national claims on the region and of the different powers that ruled it, contested versions of the names of its towns and villages have proliferated. My choice of the Ukrainian forms in this chapter derives from my focus on the period of Carpatho-Ukrainian autonomous rule in the eastern part of the region;<sup>2</sup> it serves solely the goal of consistency without expressing any preference for past or present approaches regarding Subcarpathian Rus.<sup>3</sup>

Subcarpathian Rus—today the Transcarpathian (Zakarpatska) oblast in far western Ukraine—is an east European borderland, inhabited by a multi-ethnic and multilingual population (more multi- in the past, but still so today), with a history full of insights about how peripheral, in this case very peripheral, societies face and respond to rapid national, military, economic, and social changes. The region stretches from the Carpathian Mountains—the Polonyna Beskyds and Hutsul Alps—to the south, with its main towns (Uzhhorod, Mukachevo, Berehovo, Sevlyush (Vynohradovo), and Khust) at the foothills, where the Hungarian plain begins. Carpatho-Ruthenians, the majority population in Subcarpathian Rus (about 445,000 people in 1930; 63 per cent), have created extensive debate in the field of Slavonic studies concerning their ethnic identification. Since the second half of the nineteenth century, four competing interpretations have vied for supremacy: Russian, Ukrainian, Carpatho-Ruthenian, and Hungarian.<sup>4</sup> Depending on national orientations, most scholars today see Carpatho-Ruthenians either as Ukrainians or as a separate East Slavonic group. Some Carpatho-Ruthenians still view themselves as Russian. The ethnic mosaic of the region prior to the Second World War consisted, in addition, of Magyars (115,000; 16 per cent) and Jews (100,000; 14 per

<sup>2</sup> On the problems associated with place names in Subcarpathian Rus, see P. R. Magocsi, ‘Mapping Stateless Peoples: The East Slavs of the Carpathians’, *Canadian Slavonic Papers*, 39/3–4 (1997). I use pre- and post-Soviet versions of Ukrainian orthography; namely, I retain the traditional ending *-o* rather than the *-e* used in Soviet orthography.

<sup>3</sup> I follow Paul Robert Magocsi, the foremost specialist on Carpatho-Ruthenian history, in my choice of the name Subcarpathian Rus. While ‘Subcarpathian’ points clearly to the area south of the Carpathian Mountains, the word ‘Rus’ (Русь) captures ‘both the religious and national affiliation of the [Carpatho-Ruthenian] inhabitants’. P. R. Magocsi, *The Shaping of a National Identity: Subcarpathian Rus, 1848–1948* (Cambridge, Mass., 1978), 277–81, quotation at p. 281. However, I have kept other forms of place names as they appear in quotations and titles.

<sup>4</sup> Magocsi, *Shaping of a National Identity*, 105–29.

cent), as well as small numbers of Germans (*Karpatendeutschen*), Romanians, Roma, Czechs, and Slovaks.<sup>5</sup> Coexistence marked inter-ethnic relations, particularly between Jews and Carpatho-Ruthenians, until the inter-war period. This situation, due to the seclusion of the region until after the First World War, and the prominence of local identifications that transcended ethnic and religious divides, changed as Subcarpathian Rus opened to the world around it.

Subcarpathian Rus was situated in the north-eastern corner of the Hungarian half of the Austro-Hungarian empire until the First World War: see Map 1, which shows the north-eastern Hungarian counties of Ung, Bereg, Ugocsa, and Máramaros of Subcarpathian Rus at the beginning of the twentieth century.<sup>6</sup>

Part of the Eastern Front moved back and forth in the region, and fighting went on until 1920 between Romanian, Hungarian, and Czech forces.<sup>7</sup> Eventually the territory became the eastern part of inter-war Czechoslovakia.<sup>8</sup> In the wake of the Munich Pact (September 1938), the Hungarian army occupied the region in two stages, in November 1938 and March 1939; in the interim, between October 1938 and March 1939, the region had an autonomous status as part of the Second Czecho-Slovak Republic. Another occupying force came in March 1944, as the Wehrmacht strolled into Hungary without so much as firing a single shot. Finally, after the Hungarian and German authorities had co-operated enthusiastically in ghettoizing and deporting the region's Jews to Auschwitz in April, May, and June,<sup>9</sup> the Soviet army took the area in October 1944. Within less than a year, in the summer of 1945, it turned into a part of Soviet Ukraine.<sup>10</sup>

The political entity at the centre of this chapter—Carpatho-Ukraine<sup>11</sup>—existed

<sup>5</sup> Z. Czibulka, *Kárpátalja településeinek vallási adatai (1880–1941)* (Budapest, 2000), 16–17.

<sup>6</sup> For a succinct account of the history of the region and its inhabitants until the First World War, see P. R. Magocsi, 'History', in P. R. Magocsi and I. Pop (eds.), *Encyclopedia of Rusyn History and Culture*, rev. and expanded edn. (Toronto, 2005), 185–91.

<sup>7</sup> For the First World War, see P. R. Magocsi, *Historical Atlas of Central Europe* (Seattle, 2002), 121, 123, and map 37 on p. 122. For the fighting in the region after October 1918, see *ibid.* 127 and map 38 on p. 126.

<sup>8</sup> Magocsi, *Shaping of a National Identity*, 76–102.

<sup>9</sup> For research on the deportation and mass murder of Jews from Subcarpathian Rus in the spring and early summer of 1944, see Y. A. Jelinek, *The Carpathian Diaspora: The Jews of Subcarpathian Rus' and Mukachevo, 1848–1948* (New York, 2007), 227–321; R. Segal, *Days of Ruin: The Jews of Munkács during the Holocaust* (Jerusalem, 2013); *id.*, 'The Jews of Huszt between the World Wars and in the Holocaust', *Yalkut Moreshet: Holocaust Documentation and Research*, 4 (2006), 94–106; L. Karsai, 'Jewish Deportations in Carpatho-Ruthenia in 1944', *Acta Historica*, 101 (1995), 37–49; R. L. Braham, 'The Destruction of the Jews of Carpatho-Ruthenia', in *id.* (ed.), *Hungarian-Jewish Studies*, i (New York, 1966); and sections of *id.*, *The Politics of Genocide: The Holocaust in Hungary*, 2 vols. (New York, 1994).

<sup>10</sup> For the Czech version of these events, based on the papers of the Czech delegate in Khust between October 1944 and January 1945, see F. Němec and V. Moudry, *The Soviet Seizure of Subcarpathian Ruthenia* (Westport, Conn., 1981).


<sup>11</sup> The name 'Carpatho-Ukraine', used from the mid-1920s by the Communist Party in Subcarpathian Rus and by local Ukrainian nationalists, possessed no previous history. See I. Pop, 'Carpatho-Ukraine', in Magocsi and Pop (eds.), *Encyclopedia of Rusyn History and Culture*, 61. Even though the official name of the autonomous region remained Subcarpathian Rus, I use 'Carpatho-Ukraine' because

**MAP 1 The Subcarpathian Rus counties (Ung, Ugocsa, Bereg, Máramaros) in north-eastern Hungary, early twentieth century**

Adapted from P. R. Magocsi, *The Shaping of a National Identity: Subcarpathian Rus', 1848-1948* (Cambridge, Mass., 1978), 10.

International boundaries  
 Boundary between Hungarian Kingdom and Austrian provinces  
 County and provincial boundaries  
 Lands inhabited by Carpatho-Ruthenians  
 ○ Cities ○ Towns, villages

0 40 km  
 0 50 miles



between October 1938 and March 1939 as part of the Second Czecho-Slovak Republic, the last phase in the slow and painful demise of inter-war Czechoslovakia. Carpatho-Ukraine grew out of the infamous Munich Pact of 30 September 1938: the recognition of an autonomous Slovakia on 7 October led quickly to an autonomous Subcarpathian Rus four days later; Czechoslovakia had become the federated Czecho-Slovakia.

The first government of autonomous Subcarpathian Rus lasted only sixteen days, until on 26 October the Czech authorities summoned its premier, Andry Brody, to Prague and arrested him for working towards the annexation of the area to Hungary, while minister Shtefan Fentsyk—suspected of serving as a Polish agent—found refuge in the Polish embassy. The Ukrainophile Avhustyn Voloshyn then took over the second cabinet. This signalled the rise of Carpatho-Ukraine. After the First Vienna Award of 2 November deprived the autonomous region of a south-western strip of territory that was transferred to Hungary, it was left with a population of 550,000 people, of whom the vast majority (75 per cent) were Carpatho-Ruthenians (see Map 2).<sup>12</sup> This territorial change also meant that the autonomous government moved from its previous capital in Uzhhorod, now controlled by Hungary, to Khust.

Internal strife and a bankrupt economy rendered Carpatho-Ukraine a failed autonomy at birth,<sup>13</sup> political violence and international intrigues allowed it only a fleeting existence that lasted barely five months. A bitter struggle between Russophiles and Ukrainophiles, as well as internal feuds in the latter camp, combined with political inexperience and incompetence, rendered Carpatho-Ukraine an autonomy that could function only with continuous and firm direction from Prague.<sup>14</sup> As elaborated below, external interference in the affairs of Carpatho-Ukraine became a norm, which eventually brought about its downfall.

the leaders of the autonomous regime employed it in all their proclamations and publications and the government in Prague authorized it as an alternative name.

<sup>12</sup> P. R. Magocsi, *Ukraine: An Illustrated History* (Seattle, 2007), 266. Jews in Carpatho-Ukraine numbered almost 66,000 (12%), Magyars 26,000 (5%), and Czechs and Slovaks 17,500 (3%). See V. Shandor, *Carpatho-Ukraine in the Twentieth Century: A Political and Legal History* (Cambridge, Mass., 1997), 84.

<sup>13</sup> One contemporary commentator wrote that the budget of Carpatho-Ukraine showed a deficit of £2 million: A. Henderson, *Eyewitness in Czecho-Slovakia* (London, 1939), 285. Another source estimated that 'the mere maintenance of the province as a part of the Czech state is now costing the Prague government between \$50,000 and \$100,000 a day': G. F. Kennan, 'Report on Conditions in Ruthenia' (Mar. 1939), in id., *From Prague after Munich: Diplomatic Papers, 1938-1940* (Princeton, 1968), 68-9, quotation at p. 69.

<sup>14</sup> The memoir of Vincent Shandor, who served as the representative of Carpatho-Ukraine in Prague, demonstrates the chaos that prevailed among Carpatho-Ukraine's leading figures. This was most evident in the disorganization that characterized the paramilitary Carpathian Sich and its conflicts with the Khust cabinet. Shandor, *Carpatho-Ukraine in the Twentieth Century*, 165-87. On the carelessness and neglect of the Carpatho-Ukrainian leadership regarding economic issues, see Kennan, 'Report on Conditions in Ruthenia', 65.

### MAP 2 Carpatho-Ukraine, 1938–1939

Adapted from P. R. Magocsi, *A History of Ukraine*, 2nd, rev. and expanded, edn. (Toronto, 2010), 659.



Indeed, seeking to provoke a situation that would seem to impel a Hungarian invasion, the Hungarian government sent special forces known as the Rongyos Gárda, ‘the ragged guard’—hundreds of men—to carry out terror attacks in Carpatho-Ukraine. Polish incursions into the region from the north have received much less mention, but they, too, added to the atmosphere of violence and instability.<sup>15</sup> The paramilitary organization of Carpatho-Ukraine, the Carpathian Sich, in most cases failed to provide security in the face of this situation; in fact, several

<sup>15</sup> Henderson, *Eyewitness in Czecho-Slovakia*, 250–4; Kennan, ‘Report on Conditions in Ruthenia’, 63; A. Stefan, *From Carpatho-Ruthenia to Carpatho-Ukraine* (New York, 1954), 38; Shandor, *Carpatho-Ukraine in the Twentieth Century*, 71–4, 94, 100 n. 60; see also Magocsi, *Shaping of a National Identity*, 239.



hundred armed Carpathian Sich men exacerbated it by terrorizing certain segments of the population, as I will show.

Carpatho-Ukraine could not withstand these internal and external pressures: the end came fast. In mid-January 1939, following clashes between the Hungarian army and Carpathian Sich soldiers in the immediate vicinity of Mukachevo,<sup>16</sup> the Czecho-Slovak government appointed the Czech general Lev Prchala to the cabinet in Khust, the protests of Voloshyn and his associates notwithstanding.<sup>17</sup> In early March, the Czecho-Slovak president Emil Hácha dismissed the Carpatho-Ukrainian government in an atmosphere of impending doom, and fighting between the Czecho-Slovak army in Khust and the Carpathian Sich broke out on 13–14 March.<sup>18</sup> On the 15th, a desperate government sought to turn a troubled autonomy into an improbable state, creating what some contemporary commentators called a ‘republic for a day’.<sup>19</sup> The bloody battles between the Carpathian Sich and the invading Hungarian army—while Prague ordered its forces to pull out of the region—could not save Carpatho-Ukraine; within several days, it had vanished.

#### WHO CARES ABOUT CARPATHO-UKRAINE?

This section first reviews the existing research on Subcarpathian Rus during the Second World War and only then explains the limited scholarship on the period of time I discuss. This statement requires some clarification. Setting the beginnings and ends of periods usually poses problems with no satisfactory solutions. The events examined below happened in the context of Nazi Germany’s aggression in the late 1930s and in the clear shadow of the coming war. While 1 September 1939 marks the beginning of the Second World War, for the people of Subcarpathian Rus the turmoil associated with that global conflict began earlier, in October 1938. For them, nothing substantial changed in the following September. It therefore makes sense to outline the research on wartime Subcarpathian Rus in order to understand the state of the scholarship on the very beginning of that period.

The subject of Subcarpathian Rus during the Second World War has received scant scholarly attention, even though the study of this region offers rich possibilities to explore the dynamics of inter-ethnic relations, tensions, and violence in eastern Europe, specifically between Jews and non-Jews. Scrutiny of Subcarpathian Rus, a borderland region par excellence, also sheds light on the histories of Hungary and Ukraine (as well as on the history of inter-war Czechoslovakia, which lies beyond the confines of this study).

<sup>16</sup> Kennan, ‘Report on Conditions in Ruthenia’, 65; *New York Times*, 7 Jan., 9 Jan., 12 Jan. 1939.

<sup>17</sup> Magocsi, *Shaping of a National Identity*, 243.

<sup>18</sup> For testimonies about this battle between Czech and Carpathian Sich forces, see e.g. Yad Vashem Archives, Jerusalem (hereafter YVA), O.3/8736, testimony of Aharon Golan, p. 9; Z. Manshel (ed.), *Kehilat khust vehasevivah, sefer zikaron* (Rehovot, 2000), 137, 451–2.

<sup>19</sup> M. Winch, *Republic for a Day: An Eye-Witness Account of the Carpatho-Ukraine Incident* (London, 1939); headline of article by Anne O’Hare McCormick in *New York Times*, 17 Mar. 1939.

And yet, Hungarian historiography has by and large avoided analysis of Subcarpathian Rus under Hungarian rule between 1938 and 1944,<sup>20</sup> save for the events of summer 1941.<sup>21</sup> The literature reflects a tendency to concentrate on Budapest as the centre of Hungarian history.<sup>22</sup> With regard to the era of the Second World War in particular, it also (in the main) ascribes mass violence in Hungary to German influences and, after March 1944, to German policies, while portraying pre-1944 mass atrocities as anomalies that prove the rule.<sup>23</sup> Almost all the (limited) scholarship on the mass deportations of summer 1941 adheres to this line of interpretation. While the last few years have seen the publication of several general surveys in Hungarian about the region, they mainly address the post-1945 period and, for the most part, fit into recent academic, public, and political discourses about Magyars who today live in lands formerly ruled by Hungary.<sup>24</sup>

The field of Ukrainian studies in the West has dealt sparingly with Subcarpathian Rus, providing only scattered remarks and information in the large-scale narratives of Ukrainian history.<sup>25</sup> This marginalization no doubt reflects the debate about the ethnic character of Carpatho-Ruthenians: a scholarly disagreement with

<sup>20</sup> Besides several articles and short parts within books, no comprehensive study on the topic exists. See chiefly Karsai, 'Jewish Deportations in Carpatho-Ruthenia in 1944'; Braham, 'Destruction of the Jews of Carpatho-Ruthenia'; and brief parts in Braham, *Politics of Genocide*.

<sup>21</sup> The scholarship concerning the mass deportations of 1941 is limited and contains quite a lot of recurring references. See R. L. Braham, 'The Kamenets Podolsk and Délvidék Massacres: Prelude to the Holocaust in Hungary', *Yad Vashem Studies*, 9 (1973), 133–56; J. Fejes, 'On the History of the Mass Deportations from Carpatho-Ruthenia in 1941', in R. L. Braham and A. Pók (eds.), *The Holocaust in Hungary: Fifty Years Later* (New York, 1997), 305–28; K. Frojimovics, *I Have Been a Stranger in a Strange Land: The Hungarian State and Jewish Refugees in Hungary, 1933–1945* (Jerusalem, 2007), 104–34. These accounts in English rely to a large extent on earlier work in Hungarian: A. Geyer, 'Az első magyarországi deportálás', *Új Élet Naptár, 1960–1961* (Budapest, 1960), 75–82; T. Majsai, 'A kőrösmezei zsidódeportálás 1941-ben', *A Ráday Gyűjtemény Évkönyve*, 4–5 (1984–5), 59–86. See also M. Ormos, *Egy magyar médiavezér: Kozma Miklós*, 2 vols. (Budapest, 2000), who offers a biography of Miklós Kozma, the Hungarian governor (*kormányzóbi biztos*) of Kárpátalja (Subcarpathian Rus) from September 1940 until his death in December 1941.

<sup>22</sup> For a review of this current with regard to the *longue durée* of Hungarian Jewish history, see H. Lupovitch, *Jews at the Crossroads: Tradition and Accommodation during the Golden Age of the Hungarian Nobility, 1729–1878* (New York, 2007). As Lupovitch has noted, this trend reflected the general approach of many Jews in Budapest to Jews elsewhere in Hungary, especially in the north-eastern parts of the country, including Subcarpathian Rus.

<sup>23</sup> Important exceptions to this frame of thought are G. Kádár and Z. Vági, *Self-Financing Genocide: The Gold Train, the Becher Case and the Wealth of Hungarian Jews* (Budapest, 2004); Frojimovics, *I Have Been a Stranger in a Strange Land*.

<sup>24</sup> See, mainly, B. Baranyi (ed.), *Kárpátalja* (Pécs, 2009); Cs. Fedinec and M. Vehes (eds.), *Kárpátalja, 1919–2009: Történelem, politika, kultúra* (Budapest, 2010).

<sup>25</sup> Such is the case, for example, in S. Yekelchik, *Ukraine: Birth of a Modern Nation* (Oxford, 2007); O. Subtelny, *Ukraine: A History*, 3rd edn. (Toronto, 2000). Striking in this regard is the journalistic account of A. Reid, *Borderland: A Journey through the History of Ukraine* (Boulder, Colo., 1999), where no chapter deals with the borderland of Subcarpathian Rus, which receives only the following comment: 'somewhere in the middle of nowhere' (pp. 110–11).

political implications in Ukraine past and present, for it touches upon the viability of the Ukrainian state and contested issues of regional autonomy. These politics, exacerbated by post-Soviet nationalisms, have produced in the last century a large corpus of polemical writing by Ukrainians that has little or no scholarly merit. The most serious research on Subcarpathian Rus, little of which addresses the period of the Second World War, emanates from the Carpatho-Rusyn Research Center.<sup>26</sup>

Finally, sporadic comments about Subcarpathian Rus appear in the scholarship about central and eastern Europe, very rarely adding anything beyond thin descriptions mixed with inaccuracies. Piotr Wandycz's important study *The Price of Freedom* demonstrates the contrast between the potential inherent in studying the region and its neglect. In the introduction to the book he uses the example of Uzhhorod to describe the effects of frequent border changes, but the region all but evaporates in the rest of the text.<sup>27</sup> And Orest Subtelny mistakenly employs 'Transcarpathians', 'Ukrainians', and 'Carpatho-Ukrainians' to refer to Carpatho-Ruthenians,<sup>28</sup> while the first term, in effect, means the people living in Subcarpathian Rus—not only Carpatho-Ruthenians—the two others force labels on Carpatho-Ruthenians that, as mentioned above, still stir controversies.

Only very brief and limited sections in scholarly books and articles address Carpatho-Ukraine, which has otherwise attracted highly biased and polemical accounts.<sup>29</sup> Paul Robert Magocsi, the foremost specialist on the history of Subcarpathian Rus, devotes limited attention to the Carpatho-Ukrainian stage.<sup>30</sup> Yeshayahu Jelinek's account of the history of the Jews in Subcarpathian Rus likewise affords this period of time only a marginal place in the narrative.<sup>31</sup> Livia Rothkirchen hardly treats this topic at all in her comprehensive article on Jewish life in Subcarpathian Rus.<sup>32</sup> Ilana Rosen's literary analyses of survivors' accounts provided by Jews originally from the region barely address the Carpatho-Ukrainian phase.<sup>33</sup> And my contribution on the Jewish community of Khust focuses much more on the time of Hungarian rule in the region followed by German occupation.<sup>34</sup>

<sup>26</sup> See <<http://www.rusynmedia.org/Links/C-RRC/>>.

<sup>27</sup> P. S. Wandycz, *The Price of Freedom: A History of East Central Europe from the Middle Ages to the Present* (London, 2001), 8.

<sup>28</sup> See e.g. Subtelny, *Ukraine*, 248, 334, 448–50, 520.

<sup>29</sup> According to one commentator, 'The political and intellectual climate in post-1991 independent Ukraine, pervaded as it is by a kind of nationalist euphoria, on the one hand, and by the continuing influence of Marxism (mixed at times with post-Communist ideas), on the other, has not encouraged the development of impartial scholarly research . . . A good example of such research are the numerous studies about autonomous Carpatho-Ukraine': I. Pop, 'Historiography', in Magocsi and Pop (eds.), *Encyclopedia of Rusyn History and Culture*, 178.

<sup>30</sup> Magocsi, *Shaping of a National Identity*, 237–46; see also P. R. Magocsi, *A History of Ukraine* (Toronto, 1996), 614–16.

<sup>31</sup> Jelinek, *Carpathian Diaspora*, 236–40.

<sup>32</sup> L. Rothkirchen, 'Deep-Rooted Yet Alien: Some Aspects of the History of the Jews in Subcarpathian Ruthenia', *Yad Vashem Studies*, 12 (1977), 147–91.

<sup>33</sup> See chiefly I. Rosen, 'Be'oshvits takanu bashofar': *yotsei karpatorus mesaprim al hasho'ah* (Jerusalem, 2004).

<sup>34</sup> Segal, 'Jews of Huszt'.

Mary Heimann has observed that ‘The Second Czecho-Slovak Republic, which lasted from 6 October 1938 until 13 March 1939, is usually skipped over in history books in a sentence or two.’<sup>35</sup> While she has posited that ‘The Second Republic shows us what Slovak, [Carpatho-]Ruthenian and Czech variations on the contemporary European themes of antisemitism and Fascism looked like at the time and hints at how they might have developed had Germany and the Second World War not intervened’,<sup>36</sup> her focus lies with the Czech and Slovak cases. In fact, most treatments of inter-war Czechoslovakia devote, at best, several paragraphs to Subcarpathian Rus.<sup>37</sup>

Lastly, several figures who played central roles in Carpatho-Ukraine have written articles and books that promote ideological standpoints of the failed political entity; these works offer little or no scholarly insight.<sup>38</sup>

The available literature provides details of the general events that framed the existence of Carpatho-Ukraine. However, the absence of in-depth analytical attention, combined with ideological assertions, has overshadowed several key issues that the following analysis uncovers. Significantly, no narrative at present explores the intricate web of relations and interactions between the groups that inhabited Carpatho-Ukraine, specifically between Jews and Carpatho-Ruthenians. As I show, a focus on these issues sheds new light on the extent and meanings of nationalism in Carpatho-Ukraine.

This is the place to proffer a few words about the material I use. In addition to sources produced by Carpatho-Ruthenians which figure in the relevant secondary literature, this study makes use of documents of the Hungarian state as well as testimonies of Holocaust survivors from the region. The perspective ‘from below’ of those who lived in Carpatho-Ukraine inserts data and insights crucial to the issue at the centre of the study: relations between Jews and Carpatho-Ruthenians. And as the latter, besides figures in leadership positions, have left almost no record of their experiences at the time, testimonies of Holocaust survivors who address this period serve as invaluable sources. Granted, they usually offer a one-sided picture—and they demonstrate all the well-known and much-discussed methodological pitfalls.<sup>39</sup> But together with existing scholarship on Carpatho-Ukraine, which deals almost

<sup>35</sup> M. Heimann, *Czechoslovakia: The State that Failed* (London, 2009), 87.

<sup>36</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>37</sup> e.g. M. Cornwall and R. J. W. Evans (eds.), *Czechoslovakia in a Nationalist and Fascist Europe, 1918–1948* (New York, 2007), barely notes the existence of the region.

<sup>38</sup> See e.g. Shandor, *Carpatho-Ukraine in the Twentieth Century*; Stefan, *From Carpatho-Ruthenia to Carpatho-Ukraine*. Ivan Pop has commented on this kind of work that it constitutes ‘a kind of amalgam that includes an undifferentiated compilation of historical facts, memoirs by marginal participants in the events of 1938–9, and an apologia by politically motivated publicists’: Pop, ‘Historiography’, 174. The same applies to P. G. Stercho, *Diplomacy of Double Morality: Europe’s Crossroads in Carpatho-Ukraine, 1919–1939* (New York, 1971).

<sup>39</sup> The literature dealing with survivors’ post-war accounts is quite large, and the debate about their utility has largely subsided. C. R. Browning, *Collected Memories: Holocaust History and Postwar Testimony* (Madison, 2003), 37–85, provides a concise and strong argument addressing the significance of these sources.

exclusively with the Carpatho-Ruthenian dimension, and reports and correspondence in Hungarian archives, survivors' accounts not only provide first-hand information on key events but mainly enable a thorough examination of inter-ethnic relations in one small place constrained by external forces and political processes that would change Subcarpathian Rus for ever.

#### CONSPIRACIES FROM ABROAD: ON THE MAKING OF CARPATHO-RUTHENIAN EXPERIENCE

Subcarpathian Rus is a place that took—and still takes—shape in a process of constant interactions between foreign regimes imposed on it and local cultural and political developments.<sup>40</sup> The short-lived Carpatho-Ukraine was the most pronounced example of this history. Caught in the midst of international struggles between visions of expansion and greatness—of Hungarian, Ukrainian, and German nationalists—the region became the object of fantastic dreams and conspiracies of politicians and ideologues from beyond and below the Carpathians. Most of those living there, however, knew nothing about the passions now attached to their homeland; and the dreamers on all sides, for their part, paid very little attention, if any, to those inhabiting that chunk of their designs.

Indeed, no doubt remains today that Nazi Germany cared little about Carpatho-Ukraine and its potential to spur an independent Ukraine.<sup>41</sup> German Foreign Office documents indicate clearly that German policy makers took for granted the eventual demise of this political entity and searched for ways to maximize the advantages it could bring to German plans in the meantime.<sup>42</sup> In other words, they sought ways to pit central and eastern Europeans one against another in order to set the stage for German expansion eastwards. In this scheme, Carpatho-Ukraine could not play any serious role.

While Nazi Germany geared towards war, Hungarian and Ukrainian nationalists planned grand collective futures; for both, Carpatho-Ukraine held importance—as

<sup>40</sup> The exposition of this process, reflected in local leaders' efforts to attain regional autonomy from 1848 until the present, lies beyond the limits of the present study. On autonomy, see P. R. Magocsi and I. Pop, 'Autonomy', in Magocsi and Pop (eds.), *Encyclopedia of Rusyn History and Culture*, 22–3.

<sup>41</sup> A. S. Kotowski, "'Ukrainisches Piemont'?" Die Karpatenukraine am Vorabend des Zweiten Weltkrieges', *Jahrbücher für Osteuropas*, 49 (2001), 69–75; this article draws on the records of the German legation in Khust. See also Subtelny, *Ukraine*, 451.

<sup>42</sup> See telegrams from the German Foreign Office to German embassies in Paris, London, Rome, Warsaw, Washington, Tokyo, Brussels, Belgrade, Bucharest, and Bern, and to the German consulate in Geneva, 10 Oct. 1938; a report from the German embassy in Prague to the German Foreign Office, 23 Oct. 1938; and a report on Carpatho-Ukraine, 12 Nov. 1938: all in YVA, TR.2/JM/2026. These documents address Polish–Hungarian relations, especially with regard to the prospect of a joint Polish–Hungarian border following the Hungarian occupation of Carpatho-Ukraine, and the impact of the friendly stance in Slovakia and Carpatho-Ukraine towards Germany on the position of the Czechoslovak government vis-à-vis Berlin. See also S. D. Kertesz, *Diplomacy in a Whirlpool: Hungary between Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia* (Notre Dame, Ind., 1953), 38–45.

lost lands of a thousand-year Hungarian state, or as the springboard of a future Ukraine that would unite all those perceived as Ukrainians in eastern Europe. Not surprisingly, most Carpatho-Ruthenians harboured quite different notions and feelings about their home towns and villages. The tumultuous months of Carpatho-Ukraine propelled many Carpatho-Ruthenians towards one particular group consciousness. Rogers Brubaker's suggestion regarding research on nationalism, 'nationness as event',<sup>43</sup> captures the essence of this swift formation. During the period of Carpatho-Ukraine, a specific kind of Carpatho-Ruthenian identification with Ukrainian nationalism 'suddenly crystallized'—a collective self-understanding that emerged from those months rather than caused them.<sup>44</sup>

Resistance to foreign domination and concerns about the continued marginalization of Carpatho-Ruthenians in their own homeland constituted the core experience of the 'event'—the hasty birth and destruction of Carpatho-Ukraine. This experience drew on the transition in perceptions of place and time among Carpatho-Ruthenians in the inter-war era. As their world became larger, beyond the mountainous villages where most of them lived, an underprivileged existence in line with the rule of strangers turned into a political problem in need of redress. This experience, whereby daily material distress assumed political content, defined the shifting ways Carpatho-Ruthenians viewed other groups in the region at the time, mostly Jews and Magyars, no longer as neighbours who shared strong attachments to specific localities but as agents of powers that threatened their newly found freedom.<sup>45</sup> Indeed, for many Carpatho-Ruthenians, 'transformative consequences', to use Brubaker's words,<sup>46</sup> affected the relations between them and their Jewish neighbours.

### LOCAL CONFLICTS, IMPORTED VIOLENCE

Subcarpathian Rus presents an anomaly in the study of relations between Jews and their neighbours in eastern Europe, as no substantial anti-Jewish discourse or traditions existed in Carpatho-Ruthenian society prior to the inter-war period.<sup>47</sup> Survivors' testimonies systematically demonstrate this point. Regarding the Máramaros county, which constituted nearly half of Carpatho-Ukraine, 'very friendly' ('gar fraynlikh') encounters defined contacts between Jews and non-Jews, as Rabbi Yekutiel Yehuda Greenwald, son of the famous rabbi Moshe Greenwald of Khust, explains: 'They lived as neighbours for generations; their grandparents and great-grandparents were good friends; the relations between priests and rabbis were very good; everyone respected the belief of the other.'<sup>48</sup> This passage, published imme-

<sup>43</sup> R. Brubaker, *Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe* (Cambridge, 1996), 18–22, quotation at p. 18.

<sup>44</sup> *Ibid.* 19–21.

<sup>45</sup> R. Segal, 'Becoming Bystanders: Carpatho-Ruthenians, Jews, and the Politics of Narcissism in Subcarpathian Rus', in *The Holocaust and Local History*, special issue of *Holocaust Studies: A Journal of Culture and History*, 16/1–2 (2011), 135–8.

<sup>46</sup> Brubaker, *Nationalism Reframed*, 21.

<sup>47</sup> Segal, 'Becoming Bystanders', 132–4.

<sup>48</sup> Rabbi Yekutiel Yehuda Greenwald, *Toyznd yor yidish lebn in ungarn* (New York, 1945), 235.

diately after the Second World War, is especially significant as it addresses connections between Jews and Christian religious leaders in the region, a topic very rarely discussed in either primary or secondary sources. More recent testimonies leave no doubt about the positive nature of relationships between Jews and Carpatho-Ruthenians.

Malkah Baldor from Velyky Bychkiv, a predominantly Carpatho-Ruthenian locality, speaks of ‘very good’ relations with non-Jews, noting the absence of ‘anti-semitism’ there.<sup>49</sup> Clara Ilales remembers that in Belki relationships between Carpatho-Ruthenians and Jews were ‘Good, good, better than between Jews here [in Israel]’.<sup>50</sup> And Benjamin Kaufman recounts that in inter-war Drahovo ‘life with the Carpatho-Ruthenians was beautiful . . . and very good, very friendly’.<sup>51</sup> Aranka Siegal quotes the following words spoken by her grandmother about her Carpatho-Ruthenian neighbours in the small village of Velyki Komyaty: ‘They [Carpatho-Ruthenians] concern themselves more with the land than with borders. They are busy with growing their food, and when their crops fail they blame the lack of rain, not the Jews. Also, we live modestly here. They have nothing to envy us for.’<sup>52</sup> Envy, in fact, stood at the heart of the process that gradually altered this state of affairs during the inter-war period, as anti-Jewish resentments began to swell among Carpatho-Ruthenians who saw Jews co-operating with what they perceived as acts of ‘Czechization’ on the part of Prague.<sup>53</sup>

By the second half of 1938, this emerging tension gained aggressive momentum with the arrival of Ukrainian nationalists—‘imported Ukrainians’, according to one observer<sup>54</sup>—mainly from neighbouring Galicia.<sup>55</sup> It is important to stress, though, that anti-Jewish violence in Carpatho-Ukraine was not the exclusive domain of outsiders. Thus Eva Slomovits, who attended a Carpatho-Ruthenian school and remembered ‘very close’ relations with Carpatho-Ruthenian neighbours, explains: ‘Who were the Sichoveks [Carpathian Sich men]? These were boys from the town . . . they went with my sisters to school.’<sup>56</sup> Ukrainian nationalists from bordering lands, however, predominated among the attackers and made sure to stir

<sup>49</sup> USC Shoah Foundation Institute for Visual History and Education, Los Angeles, testimony of Malkah Baldor, interview no. 26048; she emphasizes the good relations between Jews and non-Jews in her manner of speaking. See also *ibid.*, testimonies of Dina Drezner, 30181 (Hanychi), and Michael Jackson, 26142 (Torun); and the testimonies of Rachel Amit, 16631 (Apsha), and Aharon Rat, 32662 (Velyky Bychkiv), who both also stress the positive atmosphere between Jews and non-Jews.

<sup>50</sup> YVA, testimony of Clara Ilales, O.3/12365, p. 4.

<sup>51</sup> YVA, testimony of Benjamin Kaufman, O.3/12500, p. 5.

<sup>52</sup> A. Siegal, *Upon the Head of the Goat: A Childhood in Hungary, 1939–1944* (London, 1981), 15.

<sup>53</sup> Siegal, ‘Becoming Bystanders’, 135–8, 145.

<sup>54</sup> Kennan, ‘Report on Conditions in Ruthenia’, 64.

<sup>55</sup> Almost all primary and secondary sources note this movement. See e.g. USC Shoah Foundation, testimony of Yafah Rat, 32552 (Velyky Bychkiv); and Henderson, *Eyewitness in Czecho-Slovakia*, 282.

<sup>56</sup> USC Shoah Foundation, testimony of Eva Slomovits, 24130 (Zarichchya); see also Shandor’s reference to ‘[Carpathian] Sich members from the highland villages’: Shandor, *Carpatho-Ukraine in the Twentieth Century*, 175.

emotions. While conflict had already fractured relations between Jews and Carpatho-Ruthenians, violence as response—a novelty in inter-ethnic tension in Subcarpathian Rus—required, indeed, a process of importation from places with a long tradition of anti-Jewish violence.<sup>57</sup>

Thus the lives of Jews in Carpatho-Ukraine became fraught with danger. Rabbi Yehoshua Greenwald of Khust recounts ‘daily anti-Jewish measures’,<sup>58</sup> and some survivors have described spasmodic acts of murder.<sup>59</sup> Many have noted the existence of ‘black lists’ of Jews, whom the Carpathian Sich presumably planned to kill in the last days of Carpatho-Ukraine, in mid-March; while killing occurred only in rare cases, a general state of terror prevailed in the region at the time.<sup>60</sup>

The violence included deportations of Jews from the autonomous territory to the no man’s land on the borders of autonomous Slovakia, Carpatho-Ukraine, and Hungary.<sup>61</sup> Esther Offer’s father was born in Mukachevo, but he lived with his family in Khust. After Mukachevo had become part of Hungary in early November 1938, the Carpatho-Ukrainian authorities expelled the family across the new border; they then made their way to Mukachevo, whence they returned after March 1939.<sup>62</sup> Other families also experienced such enforced journeys.

According to the testimonies, most Jews decided to retreat into their homes, families, and communities as much as possible to weather the storm. Not everyone,

<sup>57</sup> I stress that my argument here acknowledges the complex history of Jewish-Ukrainian relations, in which anti-Jewish positions and violence figured among many other aspects. Nevertheless, episodes of large-scale violence against Jews had erupted in Ukrainian lands, whence many recruits to the Carpathian Sich came. See e.g. H. Abramson, *A Prayer for the Government: Ukrainians and Jews in Revolutionary Times, 1917–1920* (Cambridge, Mass., 1999).

<sup>58</sup> Y. Greenwald, *Hesed yehoshua* (New York, 1948), preface titled ‘Eye of Tear’, 5, accessed through the software ‘The History of the Holocaust in Prefaces to Rabbinical Literature’, developed by the Center for Holocaust Research, Jerusalem College, Israel. See also YVA, testimony of Aharon Golan, O.3/8736, p. 9, where the witness relates cases in which Jews’ beards were cut off and Jews were robbed.

<sup>59</sup> USC Shoah Foundation, testimony of Martin Pearl, 1768 (Hanychi); testimony of Yafah Rat, 32552 (Velyky Bychkiv); testimony of Irene Buchman, 3316 (Belki). In relation to this violence Jelinek mentions, besides Khust, the villages of Bushtyno, Novobarovo, and Nyzhnya Apsha: Jelinek, *Carpathian Diaspora*, 237.

<sup>60</sup> YVA, O.3/8438, testimony of Dov Golani, p. 10; O.3/5603, testimony of Yisrael Rosenfeld, p. 7; O.3/10158, testimony of Henia Moskowitz, p. 2, where the witness speaks of anti-Czech violence as well (on anti-Czech violence in mid-March, see also *New York Times*, 17 Mar. 1939); USC Shoah Foundation, testimony of Rose Gelb, 10374 (Drahovo); testimony of Yosef Fridman, 22182 (Torun). See also the entry on Velyky Bychkiv in S. Y. Gross and Y. Joseph Hacoheh (eds.), *Sefer maramarosh: me’ah veshishim kehilot kedoshot beyishuvan uvehurbanan* (Tel Aviv, 1983), 284.

<sup>61</sup> See Segal, ‘Jews of Huszt’, 86. On the Jews expelled to the no man’s land, see ‘News from All Over the World by the Jewish Telegraphic Agency, New York’, vol. 5 (no. 43), 23 Jan. 1939: YVA, M.72, JM/19.640, reel 22, folder 541, frames 1066–7. Autonomous Slovakia and Hungary also attempted to force some Jews over these borders at the time: see YVA, M.48/6354 (Slovakia), and, in general, D. Dinur, *Perakim betoledot yehudei rusyah hakarpatit: mereshit hityashvutam ad hasho’ah, 1493–1943* (Jerusalem, 1983), 87.

<sup>62</sup> USC Shoah Foundation, testimony of Esther Offer, 21141; see also the testimony of Juri Klein in Manshel (ed.), *Kehilat khust vehasevivah*, 200.



however: Márton Szimkovics of Velyky Berezny, for instance, joined hands with Magyars in the region, who also faced persecutions,<sup>63</sup> against the rioting bands of the Carpathian Sich. He supplied them with rifles, while also conducting ‘reconnaissance work’ in the service of Tivadar Kováts, director of the Hungarian National State Security Committee (Országos Nemzetvédelmi Bizottság).<sup>64</sup> While uncommon, such co-operation further distanced Jews from Carpatho-Ruthenians in an increasingly flammable atmosphere of inter-ethnic tensions.

The conflict between Jews and Carpatho-Ruthenians was real and related to regional contexts, but the violence attached to it in the winter months of 1938–9, carried out by both locals and outsiders, stemmed from beyond the Carpathian Mountains and was rooted in a political culture that spoke in different terms and languages. Another layer of imported violence, that of Hungarian occupying troops, cemented a new degree of animosity that now came to frame subsequent relations between Jews and Carpatho-Ruthenians.

### MARCH 1939: HUNGARIAN FLAGS, CARPATHO-RUTHENIAN CORPSES

As stated above, internal friction characterized the leadership cadre of Carpatho-Ukraine. And contrasting political plans abounded—none of which materialized, however, as much more powerful external forces decided the fate of this Carpathian revolution.

The bloodshed began in a fierce skirmish in Khust on 13–14 March 1939, in which the Czecho-Slovak army quickly subdued Carpathian Sich forces.<sup>65</sup> This minor defeat foretold the debacle that would soon befall Carpatho-Ukraine, as the Czecho-Slovak army retreated from the region, upon orders from Prague, and the Hungarian army joined Hitler in crushing what remained of Czecho-Slovakia.

Jewish witnesses saw Hungarian soldiers killing Carpatho-Ruthenians.<sup>66</sup> Rabbi

<sup>63</sup> e.g. the case of János Szimocskó, town magistrate of Turyi Remety in 1938, who on 3 December of that year petitioned for the ‘annexation of Túrjaremete [Turyi Remety] by Hungary’—a move that landed him in prison for the next three months. See his letter dated 25 May 1941 to Miklós Kozma, the Hungarian governor of the region in 1940–1: Magyar Országos Levéltár (Hungarian National Archives), Budapest (hereafter MOL), K429, cs. 40, 2210. Carpatho-Ruthenians who objected to the Ukrainian-oriented government of Carpatho-Ukraine also faced persecutions, including imprisonment in Dumen, a detention camp near Rakhiv. See Kennan, ‘Report on Conditions in Ruthenia’, 64–5; Magocsi, *Shaping of a National Identity*, 242, 244, 448–9 n. 43, 450 n. 56; see also P. R. Magocsi and I. Pop, ‘Dumen’, in Magocsi and Pop (eds.), *Encyclopedia of Rusyn History and Culture*, 106–7.

<sup>64</sup> Tivadar Kováts to Miklós Kozma, no date, probably Apr. 1941: MOL, K429, cs. 37, 1254; see also a letter from Tivadar Kováts, 27 Mar. 1941: *ibid.* 1255.

<sup>65</sup> Manshel (ed.), *Kehilat khust vehasevivah*, 137, 451–2; Shandor, *Carpatho-Ukraine in the Twentieth Century*, 178–87.

<sup>66</sup> See e.g. YVA, O.3/8438, testimony of Dov Golani, p. 11; O.3/8496, testimony of Irena Naomi-Gross, p. 4; USC Shoah Foundation, testimony of Zelig Komornik, 38620 (Sokirnitsa); testimony of Abraham Himmel, 25962, who mentions Polish forces involved in a massacre in Nyzhni Veretski

Greenwald writes that ‘Hungarian soldiers killed numerous [*am ravv*] Ukrainians’.<sup>67</sup> Aranka Siegal describes the bodies of Carpathian Sich soldiers which she saw floating in the river that ran through her small town.<sup>68</sup> Eva Slomovits remembers that ‘These Sichoveks were rounded up . . . and they killed them, the Hungarians killed these young boys, a lot of them.’<sup>69</sup> Finally, Aharon Rat from Velyky Bychkiv relates the incarceration of Carpathian Sich men in a school in the town, whence ‘every night [for several days] they would take some of them out and kill them in the forest’.<sup>70</sup>

The number of Carpatho-Ruthenian victims remains unknown; while we know of some seventy-five battle casualties among Carpathian Sich soldiers, no data exist to determine the number of combatants and civilians killed after the hostilities—in some places, such as Solotvyno, in arranged executions.<sup>71</sup>

These accounts suggest that the Hungarian army entered Carpatho-Ukraine not only with the goal of a speedy occupation but also in order to create from the very beginning a state of terror for those who would oppose Hungarian domination; chief among those opponents were Ukrainophile forces and their supporters. This assertion finds corroboration in the volume of reports and correspondence about Carpatho-Ruthenians in the papers of Miklós Kozma, who was in charge of the Rongyos Gárda and was the Hungarian governor of the region from September 1940 until his death in December 1941. Especially telling are reports with titles such as ‘the Ruthenian question’, ‘the Ruthenian problem’, or ‘the Ukrainian question in Subcarpathian Rus’.<sup>72</sup> The common thread in these documents concerns the

(today’s Nyzhni Vorota)—not impossible in view of Polish terrorist acts in Carpatho-Ukraine, as mentioned above. See also Pop, ‘Carpatho-Ukraine’, 62, who mentions ‘a bloody tragedy at Krasne Pole near the village of Roskosovo just west of Khust’.

<sup>67</sup> Greenwald, *Hesed yehoshua*, preface titled ‘Eye of Tear’, 5. Rabbi Greenwald uses ‘Ukrainians’ here to refer to Carpatho-Ruthenians.

<sup>68</sup> Siegal, *Upon the Head of the Goat*, 5–6.

<sup>69</sup> USC Shoah Foundation, testimony of Eva Slomovits, 24130 (Zarichchya).

<sup>70</sup> USC Shoah Foundation, testimony of Aharon Rat, 32662 (Velyky Bychkiv).

<sup>71</sup> Magocsi, *Shaping of a National Identity*, 450 n. 60, mentions some estimates of over 4,000. See also Shandor, *Carpatho-Ukraine in the Twentieth Century*, 223, who cites a Czech estimate of around 5,000. One letter from late March 1939 describes ‘Hungarian “mopping up” patrols’: Irving N. Linnell, American Consul General in Prague, to the American Chargé d’Affaires in Berlin, quoted in Kennan, *From Prague after Munich*, 90. On the executions in Solotvyno, see Shandor, *Carpatho-Ukraine in the Twentieth Century*, 189 n. 25, 204. On the execution of another group of Carpathian Sich prisoners, in Velyky Bychkiv, along with two local Carpatho-Ruthenians, see *ibid.* 204–5. Shandor recounts numerous other cases of killings—in Boronyava, Khust, Nyzhni Veretski, Perechyn, Sevlyush, Tyachiv, and Volové (today’s Mizhhirya)—mostly of Carpathian Sich men but also of civilians; he also reports farmers who had seen many corpses in the river Tysa: *ibid.* 221, 228. Shandor relied on accounts of Carpatho-Ruthenians present in the region at the time, and while not all cases or numbers could be verified, the testimonies of Holocaust survivors from the region leave no doubt that the Hungarian occupying forces did indeed perpetrate such acts.

<sup>72</sup> See ‘Vortrag über die russinische Frage’, a speech by Miklós Kozma, 23 May 1939: MOL, K429, cs. 28/3; ‘A ruszin probléma’, 24 Apr. 1939: *ibid.*; ‘Az ukrán kérdés Kárpátalján’, 12 Jan. 1941: *ibid.*, cs. 35, 547.

threat of Ukrainian influence in Subcarpathian Rus, related to anxieties about Bolshevism and the 'danger' of pan-Slavism.<sup>73</sup> The language, replete with references to 'Ukrainian terrorists',<sup>74</sup> leaves no doubt about the gravity attached to these matters in the eyes of the Hungarian authorities. And it also illuminates their actions as they crossed into Carpatho-Ukraine. Many Carpatho-Ruthenians sensed the peril: by the end of 1939, thousands of Carpatho-Ruthenians had fled to east Galicia, then under Soviet occupation.<sup>75</sup>

In light of Jews' suffering during the previous four months, which culminated in the lawlessness of Carpatho-Ukraine's last days, many Jews at first welcomed the Hungarian forces as liberators, and some hurried to brandish Hungarian flags.<sup>76</sup> As advancing Hungarian units made sure that their national colours dominated the landscape,<sup>77</sup> Jews' activities in this regard could only anger their Carpatho-Ruthenian neighbours. Carpatho-Ruthenians had already come to view 'the Jews' as agents of Czech foreign rule, which they increasingly perceived as hostile during the inter-war years. Now exposed to anti-Jewish ideas of Ukrainian nationalists from outside the region, many Carpatho-Ruthenians saw Jews' sympathies towards local Magyars as well as to the Hungarian occupation as another traitorous move against Carpatho-Ruthenian society.

This instance of ethnic violence, even though minor in scale, left its imprint on that part of Subcarpathian Rus. Further, during the war years its impact spread to the rest of the region as well. In a report of the Royal Hungarian Border Area Police Captaincy (Határvidéki rendőrkapitányság) of Ungvár (Uzhhorod) covering the period from June to September 1942, the author discussed the 'secret Ukrainian organization' ('titkos ukránszervezkedés') which had 'spread to almost the whole

<sup>73</sup> 'Vortrag über die russinische Frage', 20–5, 28–30. Nothing, of course, stood further away from Ukrainian nationalists than pan-Slavism. This false perception by the Hungarian authorities drew on Hungarian anxieties that originated in 1849, when Russian army units arrived in the Carpathian region to help quash the Hungarian uprising against Vienna. See Magocsi, *Shaping of a National Identity*, 43–5.

<sup>74</sup> Special report by Kozma, then head of the Hungarian News Agency (Magyar Távirati Iroda), 16 Jan. 1939: MOL, K429, cs. 28/4.

<sup>75</sup> P. R. Magocsi, 'Magyars and Carpatho-Rusyns: On the Seventieth Anniversary of the Founding of Czechoslovakia', *Harvard Ukrainian Studies*, 14/3–4 (1990), 450. Further research is needed in order to provide an estimate of the number of people who chose this course of action throughout the period of the Hungarian occupation of the region.

<sup>76</sup> Yisrael Rosenfeld relates that many Jews hung on their windows anything containing the Hungarian national colours: YVA, O.3/5603, p. 7. For survivors' testimonies that describe Jews' initial reaction to the Hungarian occupation as 'liberation', see e.g. USC Shoah Foundation, testimony of Rose Gelb, 10374 (Drahovo); testimony of Aharon Rat, 32662 (Velyky Bychkiv); testimony of Michael Jackson, 26142 (Torun).

<sup>77</sup> An article in the *New York Times* of 19 Mar. 1939 reported that 'Hungarian painting crews and workmen were following the occupation army. Workmen were removing public signs in the Slovak and Ukrainian languages and replacing them with signs in Hungarian. Painters were splashing Hungarian colors of red, white and green on highway markers. Trucks brought flags to decorate buildings of occupied cities.'

Subcarpathian area . . . especially in the areas of the Huszt, Aknaszlatina, and Szolyva border police branch offices, where there is a significant number of supporters of Ukrainianism'.<sup>78</sup> The author's claim that the Hungarian authorities would soon 'put an end to the dangerous movement' remained empty: a report dated 2 February 1944 of the investigation sub-department of the Hungarian Royal Gendarmerie 8th district mentioned 'the Huszt movement' as decisive in fomenting unrest among Carpatho-Ruthenians in the area of Munkács (Mukachevo).<sup>79</sup> This strength of 'Ukrainianism' shaped the relations between Jews and Carpatho-Ruthenians under Hungarian and German occupations: the schism that had begun to separate them in the inter-war years and that had widened under the Khust regime now turned into full-fledged enmity.<sup>80</sup> In both periods, foreign interventions in the region created a loyalty crisis that drove a wedge between the two groups.

Loyalty, in general, became a decisive element precisely because of the growing strength of Ukrainian identification among Carpatho-Ruthenians. The reports quoted above complicate arguments about the presumed loyalty of most Carpatho-Ruthenians in Carpatho-Ukraine to the federated Czecho-Slovak state.<sup>81</sup> Besides marginalizing the colonial nature of Czech rule in the region between the world wars,<sup>82</sup> these claims minimize, first, the spread of 'Ukrainianism' at the time and, then, its effect on the simmering discontent in Carpatho-Ruthenian society with any kind of foreign domination. At the same time, opposite assertions, according to which the episode of Carpatho-Ukraine 'helped to turn much of the region's population, especially the youth, into nationally conscious Ukrainians',<sup>83</sup> clarify very little. In both accounts, one searches in vain for the ingredients of Ukrainian self-

<sup>78</sup> MOL, K149-1942-6-24860. The Ukrainian versions of the place names in this passage are Khust, Solotvyno, and Svalyava.

<sup>79</sup> MOL, K774-1944.

<sup>80</sup> A full elaboration of this change during the Second World War, marked in the majority of survivors' accounts I have checked, lies beyond the confines of this study. See also Segal, 'Becoming Bystanders', 138-9, 146.

<sup>81</sup> See Magocsi, 'Magyars and Carpatho-Rusyns', 440-1, 450. Magocsi has employed data about the number of Carpatho-Ruthenians in the Czechoslovak army formations in the Soviet Union during the Second World War in order to demonstrate the presumed loyalty of Carpatho-Ruthenians to Czechoslovakia. The figures he cites and later partly revises (see P. R. Magocsi, 'Czechoslovak Army Corps', in Magocsi and Pop (eds.), *Encyclopedia of Rusyn History and Culture*, 82) are based on sources that exclude the accounts of Jews who had served in these military units and who painted a different picture of them. For research taking account of Jews' perspectives, see E. Kulka, *Jews in Svoboda's Army in the Soviet Union: Czechoslovak Jewry's Fight against the Nazis during World War II*, ed. and trans. S. Nahari (Lanham, Md., and Jerusalem, 1987). A full elaboration of this issue, which requires further investigation, remains beyond the scope of this chapter. However, for both Jews and Carpatho-Ruthenians, service in the Czechoslovak forces during the Second World War stemmed from a variety of motives, not least the wish to escape the daily misery of the Gulag camps, whence many recruits came; the inference that joining the Czechoslovak army at the time expressed primarily loyalty to an idea of a Czechoslovak state necessitates, at the very least, research of a substantial amount of personal accounts by Carpatho-Ruthenians.

<sup>82</sup> See Segal, 'Becoming Bystanders', 135-7; see also E. Rusinko, *Straddling Borders: Literature and Identity in Subcarpathian Rus'* (Toronto, 2003), 16-17.

<sup>83</sup> Subtelny, *Ukraine*, 451.

understanding that crystallized—to use Brubaker’s terminology—in the public discourse in Carpatho-Ukraine during those five months.

What characterized this ‘Ukrainianism’? What marked it in the eyes of local leaders? And what meanings of it emerged in Carpatho-Ruthenian society? Clues to these questions exist in events that took place in the region in 1919, another time of political upheaval, with an earlier attempt at local self-rule: the Hutsul Republic. In the immediate aftermath of the Great War, in February 1919 a number of demobilized Carpatho-Ruthenian soldiers, inspired by the short-lived West Ukrainian People’s Republic, founded a tiny state around the town of Yasynya, in the far eastern tip of Subcarpathian Rus. Ruling over 20,000 inhabitants, a government of four with an elected council of forty-two people survived for a bit more than four months, until Romanian units occupied the area.<sup>84</sup> This brief span of time has received very little attention, usually dismissive, but the story of the Hutsul Republic contains several factors that deserve notice and discussion.

First, personal continuities stretched between the Hutsul Republic and Carpatho-Ukraine. Dmytro Klympush from Yasynya, the supreme commander of the Carpathian Sich, had played a central role in the Hutsul Republic. Stepan Klochurak, also from Yasynya, who had led the army and national council of the miniature state in 1919, served as Voloshyn’s secretary and in various ministerial positions in March 1939. And the brothers Yuly and Mykhailo Brashchaiko, who had favoured a path that would include Subcarpathian Rus within the West Ukrainian People’s Republic in 1919, both served in various leadership positions in Carpatho-Ukraine.<sup>85</sup> These men came from different backgrounds, but they saw a common cause in resistance to outside interference in their homeland. Another proclivity united these people too: they varied their political leanings; this, in effect, highlighted their main concern.<sup>86</sup> If considered from the standpoint of creating alliances and identifying threats in the service of overthrowing specific forces understood as hostile and oppressive—and these changed with time—the political fluctuations and manoeuvres of Carpatho-Ruthenian leaders and society seem quite reasonable. Indeed, such positions, and not any grand revolutionary visions, ensured the strength of the Czechoslovak Communist Party in the region during the inter-war years.<sup>87</sup>

The linkage between the Hutsul Republic and Carpatho-Ukraine also helps in understanding Jewish–Carpatho-Ruthenian relations: the anti-Jewish enmity that

<sup>84</sup> Magocsi, *Shaping of a National Identity*, 91, 93; see also L. Horváth, *Hucul Köztársaság, nyugat-ukránok és ideiglenes román megszállás, 1918–1921* (Nyírtelek, 2007), who provides useful maps on pp. 33–6.

<sup>85</sup> See the brief biographical information on these people in Magocsi, *Shaping of a National Identity*, 292–4, 309–10.

<sup>86</sup> Voloshyn is a good example. He supported the pro-Hungarian option in November 1918, but he quickly came to favour Czechoslovakia. In 1938 he became the leader of Carpatho-Ukraine. See Magocsi, *Shaping of a National Identity*, 321–2.

<sup>87</sup> See Z. L. Suda, *Zealots and Rebels: A History of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia* (Stanford, Calif., 1980), 3.

accompanied and followed the existence of Carpatho-Ukraine came after twenty years of evolving resentment between the two groups—and it was related closely to the widespread impatience in Carpatho-Ruthenian society with Prague's colonial practices. No such processes preceded the Hutsul Republic, and, indeed, no inter-ethnic tensions between Jews and Carpatho-Ruthenians marked its existence. Also, unlike Carpatho-Ukraine, the Hutsul Republic failed to attract the serious interest of Ukrainian nationalists from the other side of the Carpathians, which ensured that anti-Jewish violence barely occurred around Yasynya at the time.

And finally, the Hutsul Republic collapsed with no serious bloodshed and soon thereafter became part of Czechoslovakia, a state that, at first, seemed to hold some promise for Carpatho-Ruthenian life owing to post-war settlements in which Czech leaders agreed to grant autonomy to Subcarpathian Rus. Hungarian rule, by contrast, brought with it several days of ethnic violence against Carpatho-Ruthenians—hardly a hopeful beginning.

This brief comparison points to the meanings of 'Ukrainianism' among Carpatho-Ruthenians and to its impact on their relations with Jews. Ideas about freedom and oppression assumed political importance in Carpatho-Ruthenian society in reaction to Czech, Ukrainian, and Hungarian efforts to impose on Subcarpathian Rus new political orders with little consideration for these local sensibilities. In the 1920s and 1930s 'the Jews' became identified with 'Czechization'. Then in 1939 many Jews publicly welcomed Hungarian soldiers in the false hope that they would save them from the hands of the Carpathian Sich. Thus Carpatho-Ruthenian disappointment with Czech rule turned in November 1938 into excited anticipation when political freedom for Carpatho-Ruthenians seemed at hand; Hungarian occupation crushed these hopes. Jews, therefore, became unwilling actors in a process that peaked when Ukrainian identification seemed to hold the most promise for Carpatho-Ruthenians while, at the same time, constituting a serious threat to much stronger powers preparing for unprecedented conflagration.

#### CONCLUSION: MARGINALIZED PLACE, MAJOR INSIGHTS

The problem with small and peripheral places is that they are small and peripheral. They usually remain outside the scope of public and scholarly interest. They rarely serve as scenes for global events, and when that happens, the spotlight shifts rapidly from the periphery back to the centre. Such a place sometimes makes it into a news item, at times even bathing in fifteen seconds of high-tech glory, but very fast—much too fast—the curse of the periphery restores the given region to its seat in oblivion. Below, I summarize why I think this particular periphery, Carpatho-Ukraine, deserves a place at least in the front rows of such neglect.

#### *Local Matters in Regional and Global Perspectives*

The story of Carpatho-Ukraine, at a national, ethnic, and religious crossroads in eastern Europe and during a time of political unrest, sheds light on a turning point

in three related historical narratives: Czech, Hungarian, and Ukrainian. Analysis of Carpatho-Ukraine reveals how German war plans, how the eventual helplessness of Czech authorities to hold on to the region, how Hungarian irredentism and colonialism, and how hopeless dreams of Ukrainophiles brought about the first instances of ethnic violence in Subcarpathian Rus—first between Jews and Carpatho-Ruthenians and then by Hungarian occupiers against Carpatho-Ruthenians. Ethnic strife intensified during the period of Hungarian occupation, as the Hungarian authorities employed mass violence—against Jews, Roma, and Carpatho-Ruthenians—as a political tool with the aim of turning the region into a place with a pronounced Magyar majority.<sup>88</sup> In 1944 the Hungarian authorities enthusiastically planned and implemented the ghettoization and deportation of the Jewish population under German occupation. The antagonism between Jews and Carpatho-Ruthenians, at its height in Carpatho-Ukraine, left a fractured society in the face of this deadly onslaught.

Soviet occupation, and in June 1945 annexation of Subcarpathian Rus to Soviet Ukraine, put an end to both Czech and Hungarian ambitions regarding the region, and it also quickly buried any hope for regional recognition, let alone autonomy. Another imposed rule, this time from Moscow, had begun.<sup>89</sup> While Czech nationalists completely withdrew their attention from the area after 1945, both Hungarian and Carpatho-Ruthenian visions of this contested land linger to this day. The latter are still concerned with the injustices conceived in faraway capitals, Kiev included.

The episode of Carpatho-Ukraine also inserts empirical data into two discussions that reach beyond central and eastern Europe: on nationalism and on relations between Jews and non-Jews. In particular, the analysis presented here challenges some of the concepts that have come to frame scholarly thought on these topics. As I bring this chapter to a close, what follow are merely brief suggestions for new theoretical avenues based on the evidence gleaned from this case study. These require elaboration and depths well beyond the limits of the present investigation, especially as they bespeak a scholarly tendency to seek the complex meanings of established concepts and thus reconfigure and restructure anew intellectual paths of inquiry.

### *Why 'Nationalism'?*

This case study questions the utility of the concept of 'nationalism'. In a similar way to studies that deal with analytical concerns about 'identity',<sup>90</sup> and considering 'nationalism' as a primary form of modern identification, it elucidates the benefits that accrue when substituting general terms for particular descriptions and explanations.

Originality provides a relevant lens through which this essay views its subject

<sup>88</sup> I develop this theme in my doctoral research.

<sup>89</sup> Magocsi, *Shaping of a National Identity*, 250–5.

<sup>90</sup> R. Brubaker and F. Cooper, 'Beyond "Identity"', *Theory and Society*, 29/1 (2000), 1–47.

matter. An issue of contention in the study of ‘nationalism’ concerns the divide between West and East and, concomitantly, between (west) European and non-European (including eastern Europe). The level, if any, of outside influences on national movements in a particular place constitutes one component of this debate.<sup>91</sup> Examining ‘nationalism’ in Carpatho-Ukraine reveals the interplay between local and external trends of feeling, thinking, and acting ‘nationalism’. As illustrated above, threads of thoughts and sentiments grew out of the specific contexts of Subcarpathian Rus; violence, by contrast, came with Ukrainian nationalists from the other side of the Carpathian Mountains. In other words, local contents of collective identification grew out of the historical soil of the region, which then found expression in a pattern of behaviour imported and planted on that terrain.

This interpretation challenges the assertion that most Carpatho-Ruthenians lacked interest in the politics of the region, a view which has become very common among commentators and scholars. Moreover, the image of the vast majority of Carpatho-Ruthenians as backward peasants unaware of the world around them<sup>92</sup> draws upon the very colonial discourses and practices that many of them, in fact, tried to challenge. Here we encounter one merit of saying what we want to say instead of using ‘nationalism’: we learn that concerns such as freedom, which have coloured the struggles of many groups in human history, came to the fore in the case of Carpatho-Ruthenians as well. The use of ‘nationalism’ simply masks this issue, and the added adjective ‘Ukrainian’ elides the regional characteristics of the human interactions examined here. The invented divides of Western Europe and Eastern Europe,<sup>93</sup> it seems, operate in similar fashion in the internal sphere of eastern Europe—namely, by allotting supremacy based on allegations of backwardness tied to a temporal lag in the emergence of national organizations. In the Ukrainian case, specifically, this constructed split continues to serve the arduous task of maintaining the unity of a state composed of strong and diverse regional forces, including those in the Carpathian area.

It is also of importance that many leaders of national movements in the region worked as teachers, and hence during the inter-war years fostered a new generation of Carpatho-Ruthenians from all walks of life who grew up with identifications that transcended the limited time and place of their villages or towns. Yuliyán Revai, for instance, taught in elementary schools in the eastern part of the region after the First World War. He later served (1923–35) as departmental head of the economic

<sup>91</sup> M. Todorova, ‘The Trap of Backwardness: Modernity, Temporality, and the Study of Eastern European Nationalism’, *Slavic Review*, 64/1 (2005), 140–64.

<sup>92</sup> This approach, very common in the literature on Carpatho-Ruthenians, marked the policies of both Czech and Hungarian authorities concerning the region. Hugh Seton-Watson, for example, while dismissing Carpatho-Ukraine in a few sentences, wrote of Ukrainian nationalists speaking to ‘dazed peasants from the mountains, who hardly understood one word in ten’: H. Seton-Watson, *Eastern Europe between the Wars, 1918–1941* (New York, 1967), 395.

<sup>93</sup> See L. Wolff, *Inventing Eastern Europe: The Map of Civilization on the Mind of the Enlightenment* (Stanford, Calif., 1994).



and administration section in the Czechoslovak Ministry of Education in Uzhhorod, before becoming a minister in the Carpatho-Ukrainian cabinet.<sup>94</sup> Avhustyn Shtefan, Carpatho-Ukraine's Minister of Education in March 1939, likewise 'served as the founding director (1922–38) of the Commercial Academy . . . in Mukachevo, which under his leadership became an important center for propagating a Ukrainian national spirit among Subcarpathian youth'.<sup>95</sup>

The correct question, then, is not whether Ukrainian nationalism caught the minds and hearts of many Carpatho-Ruthenians in the inter-war years. The question rather concerns the certain colour of 'Ukrainianism' among Carpatho-Ruthenians—and this topic has received only several words in passing in the existing literature.<sup>96</sup> The present study shows that posing this question, via a shift in perspective that allows for consideration of both internal and external factors in the history of Carpatho-Ukraine, lays bare the connection between central issues and events (foreign dominations, inter-ethnic relations, the emergence of anti-Jewish positions among Carpatho-Ruthenians, and ethnic violence) that heretofore have eluded integrated examination. The resulting analysis, in turn, provides answers that, as I have demonstrated, assist in the investigation of other chapters in the history of Subcarpathian Rus, before and after Carpatho-Ukraine.

### *Relation between Jews and Non-Jews: Beyond Antisemitism*

Another term that fits poorly the story of Carpatho-Ukraine is 'antisemitism'. An absence of an anti-Jewish tradition among Carpatho-Ruthenians, as elaborated above, turns 'antisemitism' into a meaningless word in this case. More generally, David Engel has suggested that scholars should move 'away from a definition of antisemitism',<sup>97</sup> and I have expounded on this issue regarding Subcarpathian Rus elsewhere.<sup>98</sup> This proposal derives from the realization that the generalized term 'antisemitism' blocks in-depth analyses of specific histories and aspects of human behaviour in certain situations. Here I would like to conclude by connecting this line of thought to the recent turn in Holocaust scholarship that situates the persecution and annihilation of Jews during the Second World War in the various contexts of inter-ethnic relations and multi-layered mass violence in the different parts of Europe.<sup>99</sup> In fact, this growing corpus of research undermines the usage of several

<sup>94</sup> I. Pop, 'Revai, Iulian', in Magocsi and Pop (eds.), *Encyclopedia of Rusyn History and Culture*, 414.

<sup>95</sup> I. Pop, 'Shtefan, Avhustyn', in Magocsi and Pop (eds.), *Encyclopedia of Rusyn History and Culture*, 457; see also Magocsi, *Shaping of a National Identity*, 325.

<sup>96</sup> Magocsi, for instance, has stated that 'Because of its pronounced anti-Hungarian stance, the Ukrainophile orientation spread rapidly, especially among the younger generation', but no detailed exposition follows. Magocsi, *Shaping of a National Identity*, 246.

<sup>97</sup> D. Engel, 'Away from a Definition of Antisemitism: An Essay in the Semantics of Historical Description', in J. Cohen and M. Rosman (eds.), *Rethinking European Jewish History* (Oxford, 2009), 30–53.

<sup>98</sup> Segal, 'Becoming Bystanders', 134.

<sup>99</sup> For one of the latest paradigmatic publications in this vein, see D. Bloxham, *The Final Solution: A Genocide* (New York, 2009); see also D. Blatman, *The Death Marches: The Final Phase of Nazi*

concepts that once dotted received wisdom; terms such as ‘bystanders’ and ‘collaboration’—and, indeed, the neat division into perpetrators, victims, and onlookers—obstruct the investigation of social conditions and events that render these classifications rather dubious. As my analysis shows, some Carpatho-Ruthenians in Carpatho-Ukraine acted first as perpetrators only to become victims within several months. And as this took place in a region with no substantial history of long-term inter-ethnic animosities, terms that wrongly put groups on opposite sides of allegedly ongoing conflicts become analytically redundant.

In sum, then, case studies like Carpatho-Ukraine illuminate the conceptual basis for new research directions, offering insights about both the genocide against Jews and other events of mass atrocities with multiple facets of conflict and violence. Thus, a marginal geographical corner opens a window onto the ways the next generation of Holocaust scholars will forgo an almost exclusive focus on Jews and ask new questions that better fit the regional complexities of Europe during the Second World War. This approach concerns the present as well as the past: in an age when the Holocaust has clearly become past,<sup>100</sup> genocide and mass violence still inflict massive suffering and claim millions of lives. The Holocaust will remain relevant in this world mainly because it could inform the emerging field of genocide prediction and prevention; and for that to happen, old paradigms need to make way for new conceptualizations about this focal point of the modern world.

*Genocide*, trans. C. Galai (Cambridge, Mass., 2011). On Ukraine, see K. C. Berkhoff, *Harvest of Despair: Life and Death in Ukraine under Nazi Rule* (Cambridge, Mass., 2004); and on Romania, see V. Solonari, *Purifying the Nation: Population Exchange and Ethnic Cleansing in Nazi-Allied Romania* (Washington, DC, 2010).

<sup>100</sup> A. Confino, ‘A World without Jews: Interpreting the Holocaust’, *German History*, 27/4 (2009), 532–3.

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# Metropolitan Andrey Sheptytsky and the Holocaust

JOHN-PAUL HIMKA

THERE ALREADY EXISTS a rich literature on the theme of Metropolitan Andrey Sheptytsky's response to the Holocaust. Several studies stand out as particularly valuable. Hansjakob Stehle and Shimon Redlich both contributed pieces to the landmark collection on the Galician churchman, Paul R. Magocsi's *Morality and Reality* of 1989. The journalist Stehle's treatment of the subject benefited from his knowledge of the inner workings of the German occupation regime and from interviews with men who had served in it.<sup>1</sup> He was able to situate Sheptytsky's thought and actions in that important context. Redlich, a prominent specialist on the history of east European Jews in the twentieth century and himself a Holocaust survivor from Galicia, was able to interpret the metropolitan's activities against the background of the extermination of the Jewish population under the Nazi occupation.<sup>2</sup> Of great importance is the work of Andrii Krawchuk, who carefully analysed Sheptytsky's thinking about the Holocaust as expressed in his pastoral writings and correspondence.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> H. Stehle, 'Sheptyts'kyi and the German Regime', in P. R. Magocsi (ed.), *Morality and Reality: The Life and Times of Andrei Sheptyts'kyi* (Edmonton, 1989), 125-44. This study is written in a tone favourable to the memory of the metropolitan. Another article by Stehle, in *Die Zeit*, the paper for which he was a correspondent, portrayed the metropolitan as a somewhat unrealistic adventurer: H. Stehle, 'Ein heiliger Abenteuer', *Die Zeit*, 5 July 1985. The World Congress of Free Ukrainians denounced the *Die Zeit* article as 'not only a clear and tendentious blackening of the life and work of the metropolitan, but also a defamation of the Ukrainian people and its history': Sekretariat Svitovoho kongresu vil'nykh ukrayintsiv, 'Nimets'kyi chasopys vede kampaniyu proty beautyfikatsiyi mytropolitya, kazhe SKVU', *Ukrayins'ki visti* (Edmonton), 5 Feb. 1986.

<sup>2</sup> S. Redlich, 'Sheptyts'kyi and the Jews during World War II', in Magocsi (ed.), *Morality and Reality*, 145-62. Later he published an updated version: S. Redlich, 'Metropolitan Andrei Sheptyts'kyi, Ukrainians and Jews during and after the Holocaust', *Holocaust and Genocide Studies*, 5/1 (1990), 39-51.

<sup>3</sup> A. Krawchuk, *Christian Social Ethics in Ukraine: The Legacy of Andrei Sheptytsky* (Edmonton, 1997), 194-248; see also pp. 264-7.

Numerous other works also touch upon this topic. Useful information appears, for example, in Zhanna Kovba's study of Galician Ukrainian reactions to the Holocaust, although the work is too chaotic and one-sided to match the studies cited above.<sup>4</sup> Fr Adam Kubasik's study of Sheptytsky's vision of the Ukrainian nation, state, and church is marred by an uncritical approach to both sources and the Polish past, but is still worth reading.<sup>5</sup> A polemical literature around Sheptytsky and the Holocaust also exists. Redlich has been in the forefront of a movement advocating that Sheptytsky be awarded the title of Righteous among the Nations by Yad Vashem.<sup>6</sup> So far that movement has not been successful. The assessment of Sheptytsky's behaviour during the Holocaust has also been debated in Ukraine.<sup>7</sup>

It is not my purpose to address the assessment controversy. Instead I wish to explore the difficulties that the bishop faced in orienting himself and choosing how to act in the face of the unprecedented evil of the Holocaust. To what Stehle, Redlich, and Krawchuk have discovered, I can add some new sources that were not available to them as well as a different perspective. This is far from the definitive word on Sheptytsky and the Holocaust, however. Liliana Hentosh has been able to view some of the materials held by the Congregation for the Oriental Churches in the Vatican and by the beatification commission for the metropolitan; these will make rich additions to the source base and allow a more detailed examination of the issue. At present, however, these sources are not accessible to scholars. Other Vatican archival collections as well as Polish, Ukrainian, and German archives probably still preserve many illuminating documents that scholars have not yet made use of.<sup>8</sup>

<sup>4</sup> Zh. Kovba, *Ljudyanist' u bezodni pekla: Povedinka mistsevoho naseleennya Skhidnoyi Halychyny v roky 'Ostatochnoho rozv'yazannya yevreis' koho pytannya'* (Kiev, 1998), 121–39.

<sup>5</sup> A. Kubasik, *Arcybiskupa Andrzeja Szeptyckiego wizja ukraińskiego narodu, państwa i cerkwi* (Lviv and Kraków, 1999).

<sup>6</sup> See e.g. S. Redlich, 'Sheptytsky and the Jews', *Jerusalem Post Magazine*, 13 Dec. 1985; S. Redlich, 'Nie bój się, dziecko', *Tygodnik Powszechny*, 18 Nov. 2008: <<http://tygodnik.onet.pl/o,o,17360,1,artykul.html>>; N. C. Gross, 'Who Decides Who Was', *Jerusalem Report*, 6 Mar. 2006; Y. Melman and A. Carmel, 'Righteous Indignation', *Haaretz Magazine*, 7 Oct. 2005. See also T. Snyder, 'He Welcomed the Nazis and Saved Jews', *New York Review of Books Blog*, 21 Dec. 2009: <<http://www.nybooks.com/blogs/nyrblog/2009/dec/21/he-welcomed-the-nazis-and-saved-jews/>>.

<sup>7</sup> B. Dorfman, 'Delo no. 421 (O prisvoenii zvaniya "Pravednika mira" Mitropolitu A. Sheptytskomu)', in *Sed'mye Zaporozhskie evreiskie chteniya* (Zaporizhzhya, 2003), 97–100; R. Mirsky, 'Faktory tolerantnosti kak ob'ekt i sub'ekt v period Kholokosta v Ukraine: Mitropolit Andrei Sheptitskii i ego pravednost'', in *Desyatye Zaporozhskie evreiskie chteniya, 11–12 maya 2006 g.* (Zaporizhzhya, 2006), 47–52; O. Naiman, 'Kholokost u L'vovi i A. Sheptyts'kyi', *ibid.* 53–7; Yu. Lyakhovitsky, 'Sheptitskii: Tochka nad "i"', *Muzeon beit a-shoa bat-yam / Institut izucheniya Katastrofy i politicheskoi istorii*: <<http://www.isracocaust.org/news/17/>>.

<sup>8</sup> Personal communication from Liliana Hentosh to the author.

## THE ANTI-JEWISH VIOLENCE OF JULY 1941

In an interview with the Shoah Foundation,<sup>9</sup> the Jewish Holocaust survivor Mark Tukan related that when the German–Soviet war broke out in 1941, he was at his parents' farm in Podusiv, Peremyshlyany raion, Lviv oblast. He was then about 22 years old. When the Germans marched in, a Ukrainian neighbour brought him two leaflets in the Ukrainian language that were being distributed at that time. In one, he recalled, the leaders of the Ukrainian nationalist movement called upon the Ukrainian people to destroy (*znychyty*) Russians, Jews, Poles, Hungarians, and Romanians. The second leaflet was written by the head of the Greek Catholic Church, Metropolitan Sheptytsky, and it was completely different. Tukan could not recall the part of the leaflet that thanked God for liberating the Ukrainians from the Soviet Union. He knew it was there, but could not recall the exact words. He did remember, however, that Sheptytsky called on his flock to behave in a Christian way and not to harm anyone. At a time when the Germans occupied the land and a pogrom had broken out in Lviv, Tukan considered it courageous to publish such a statement. Sadly, he reflected, the majority listened to the leadership of the Ukrainian nationalists, and only a very small minority listened to the head of the church. The Ukrainian population, he felt, was more willing to kill the Jews than to let them live.<sup>10</sup>

Tukan refers here to two documents well known to historians. Both were issued on 1 July 1941, the day after Germany occupied Lviv and the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (*Orhanizatsiya ukrayins'kykh natsionalistiv*; OUN) proclaimed a Ukrainian state headed by Yaroslav Stetsko. The first document was a leaflet prepared by Ivan Klymiv, who was Supreme Commandant of the Ukrainian National Revolutionary Army (*Ukrayins'ka natsional'na revolyutsiina armiya*) associated with the Stetsko government. The leaflet was pasted around Lviv during the pogrom on 1 July. It contained a passage very similar to what Tukan remembered: 'People! Know this! Moscow, Poland, the Hungarians, Jewry—these are your enemies. Destroy them.'<sup>11</sup> In his pastoral letter of 1 July, Sheptytsky welcomed 'the victorious German army as the liberator from the enemy' and also recognized Stetsko as the head of the Ukrainian government. He added: 'From the government which he has summoned to life we expect wise, just leadership and measures that would take into consideration the needs and welfare of all citizens who inhabit our land, without regard to what faith, nationality, and social stratum they belong to.'<sup>12</sup>

<sup>9</sup> The USC Shoah Foundation Institute for Visual History and Education, Los Angeles, conducted a series of videotaped interviews with Holocaust survivors in 1994–2002. The segments of the interviews are numbered to facilitate referencing particular statements.

<sup>10</sup> USC Shoah Foundation, interview with Mark Tukan, 51758, 124–7.

<sup>11</sup> *Ukrayins'ke derzhavotvorennya: Akt 30 chervony 1941. Zbirnyk dokumentiv i materialiv*, ed. O. Dzyuban (Lviv and Kiev, 2001), 129.

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.* 126.

A Jewish memoir from 1946, describing events in the city of Lviv, also highlighted the contrast between the OUN's and the metropolitan's leaflets: 'On the streets the appeals of Stepan Bandera, the leader of the Ukrainians, were pinned up, calling for murder and conflagration, and near them were those issued by Metropolitan Sheptytsky, calling for calm, opposing the lynching of neighbours and the loss of human feelings.'<sup>13</sup> Another Jewish memoir contrasted the Ukrainian state proclaimed by the Bandera movement, 'a state in which the extermination of the Jews was declared to be the fundamental law and program', with the metropolitan's 'hope that its government would care for the needs of all citizens without discrimination as to religion and nationality'.<sup>14</sup>

Sheptytsky's support for the new state, which only enjoyed a brief, shadowy existence, had come about as the result of a meeting on 30 June 1941 with two OUN representatives, Stetsko and Father Ivan Hrynyokh, the chaplain of Nachtigall, a Ukrainian nationalist battalion in German service. The two nationalists kept important information from Sheptytsky, however, namely that the OUN had split and that the government being set up was under the control of only one of the factions, the Bandera faction. This deception soured Sheptytsky towards the new government.<sup>15</sup> Stehle identified another reason as well for Sheptytsky's alienation: 'The anarchistic eruptions of hate and revenge that occurred in L'viv prior to and during the German entry dampened the Metropolitan's sympathy for OUN.'<sup>16</sup> Stehle seems to be referring to the bloody pogrom unleashed in Lviv in the first days of July, in the immediate aftermath of the proclamation of Stetsko's government.

Sheptytsky was informed of the pogrom by the chief rabbi in Lviv, Dr Ezekiel (Jecheskiel) Lewin, who visited him on 1 July.<sup>17</sup> What transpired at their meeting is not clear, and we have contradictory accounts of it. The rabbi's son Kurt wrote this account in the early 1990s:

He [Rabbi Lewin] was received immediately by the Metropolitan. My father reminded the Metropolitan of the many occasions in which he had declared friendship for Jews dwelling in his diocese. My father stressed that now in this hour of mortal danger he was appealing

<sup>13</sup> K. I. Lewin, *Przeżyłem: Saga Świętego Jura spisana w roku 1946 przez syna rabina Lwowa* (Warsaw, 2006), 65.

<sup>14</sup> J. Schoenfeld, *Holocaust Memoirs: Jews in the Lwów Ghetto, the Janowski Concentration Camp, and as Deportees in Siberia* (Hoboken, NJ, 1985), 46.

<sup>15</sup> Stehle, 'Sheptyts'kyi and the German Regime', 127; Krawchuk, *Christian Social Ethics in Ukraine*, 211 n. 55; M. Khomyak, 'Diyal'nist' Mytropolita Kyr Andriya pid nimets'koyu okupatsiyeyu', *Lohos*, 6/3 (July–Sept. 1955); 214–23, here p. 221; 6/4 (Oct.–Dec. 1955), 292–5; K. Pankivsky, *Vid derzhavy do komitetu* (New York and Toronto, 1957), 50.

<sup>16</sup> Stehle, 'Sheptyts'kyi and the German Regime', 127.

<sup>17</sup> According to D. Kahane, *Lvov Ghetto Diary*, trans. J. Michalowicz (Amherst, Mass., 1990), 7, Rabbi Lewin went to Sheptytsky on the morning of Wednesday, 2 July. But this does not fit the chronology of the pogrom. Other sources indicate 1 July, e.g. Lewin, *Przeżyłem*, 57 (a particularly authoritative source, since this is Rabbi Lewin's son); Yad Vashem Archives, Jerusalem, T-32/50: Gold diary in 'Teka Lwowska', sketch 1, 4.

for assistance in the name of the Lord. The Metropolitan was shocked to learn about the atrocities committed by his people. He promised to intervene at once with the German authorities and to send priests and monks into the street to stop the pogrom. He invited my father to remain at the residence until the city returned to normal. My father replied that his place was with his community and left to return home.<sup>18</sup>

This account must be based on something Kurt Lewin was told afterwards, since the first version of his memoirs, written in 1946, makes it clear that he did not have an opportunity to talk to his father between his departure to St George's Cathedral and his murder later that day.<sup>19</sup> Although I have found no evidence of full-scale intervention by clergy to stop the pogrom, there were definitely cases in which Greek Catholic priests intervened to protect Jews from pogromists. One case comes from an interview Zhanna Kovba conducted in the 1990s with Yu. Yunyk. Ms Yunyk related a story her father had told her about some angry men pushing and shoving three Jews and yelling, 'These are Jewish policemen! Murderers!' This was in the first days of July 1941 on Legionów Street in Lviv. Suddenly a priest came out of a Greek Catholic church and stopped the mob in the name of the cross. Meanwhile, the Jews slipped away.<sup>20</sup> Also, Adolf Folkman and his family were protected from the pogrom by the priest who served in the Ukrainian church next to their home.<sup>21</sup>

Sheptytsky's coadjutor, Iosyf Slipy, in a memoir written in the 1960s, also mentioned the visit of Rabbi Lewin: 'At that time there began persecutions of the Jews and all kinds of retaliations. I had taken Rabbi Lewin to the metropolitan, and, leaving the palace, he met me; he was very satisfied, and said that he would thank God if his children were saved, but he wanted to share the fate of his people.'<sup>22</sup> The memoirs of Alfred Monaster put these words into Rabbi Lewin's mouth as he left the meeting with the metropolitan: 'If there is going to be a pogrom, then let me be the first victim.'<sup>23</sup> According to Rabbi David Kahane, Sheptytsky not only offered Rabbi Lewin a place to stay but promised to write 'a pastoral letter in which he

<sup>18</sup> K. I. Lewin, *A Journey through Illusions* (Santa Barbara, Calif., 1994), 36.

<sup>19</sup> Lewin, *Przeżyłem*, 57, 59.

<sup>20</sup> Kovba, *Lyudyaniś' u bezodni pekla*, 131. Probably the priest came from the Greek Catholic Church of the Transfiguration, which is not far from Legionów Street, today's Prospekt Svobody. There are cases of Greek Catholic priests intervening to prevent pogroms elsewhere than Lviv. Several are listed in A. Weiss, 'Jewish-Ukrainian Relations in Western Ukraine during the Holocaust', in P. J. Potichnyj and H. Aster (eds.), *Ukrainian-Jewish Relations in Historical Perspective* (Edmonton, 1988), 414. See also Krawchuk, *Christian Social Ethics in Ukraine*, 240, and O. Surmach, *Dni kryvavykh svastyk: Hreko-katolyts'ka tserkva v period nimets'koho okupatsiinoho rezhymu v Ukraini (1941-1944 rr.)* (Lviv, 2005), 102-3. The portion of Surmach's book dealing with Sheptytsky's efforts to rescue Jews is available online: O. Surmach, 'Mytropolyt Andrei Sheptyts'kyi u poryatunku yevreyiv pid chas nimets'koyi okupatsiyi', *Nezalezhnyi kul'turolohichniy chasopys 'Yi'* (2005): <<http://www.ji-magazine.lviv.ua/seminary/2005/sem17-11/surmach.htm>>.

<sup>21</sup> S. Szende, *Der letzte Jude aus Polen* (Zürich and New York, 1945), 179.

<sup>22</sup> Bohdan Bociurkiw Memorial Library, Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, Edmonton: I. Slipy, 'Spomyny', typescript (Nettuno, Italy, 1963-4), 91.

<sup>23</sup> Archiwum Żydowskiego Instytutu Historycznego, Warsaw, 302/58, Alfred Monaster, 10.

would warn the Ukrainians against committing murder and looting'.<sup>24</sup> If such a pastoral letter was indeed issued, it has not as yet come to light.

There are two other Jewish survivor accounts of the meeting in which the metropolitan is not portrayed as positively. However, it is not clear whence the survivors received the information they relate. Ryszard Ryndner remembered (his testimony was probably taken in 1945) that Rabbi Lewin went with the lawyer Dr Lajb Landau<sup>25</sup> to ask the archbishop to intervene with the Ukrainian authorities and the militia. 'Sheptytsky gave no grounds for great hopes', but offered to host the rabbi for a few days. The rabbi declined and said: 'I come with God, I go with God.'<sup>26</sup> Another survivor, Edmund Kessler, wrote:

The secular rabbi of the city [i.e. the rabbi of the Progressive synagogue, Lewin], feeling that something unfortunate was afoot, went early in the morning in his liturgical vestments to the head of the Ukrainian Church to ask for help and intervention. Received coolly, indifferently, although a personal acquaintance of the metropolitan, he left resigned to things. The metropolitan had no intention of intervening with the authorities on behalf of the Jews—the matter has an exclusively political character; the metropolitan does not see a moral side to it, nor a religious side. He also thinks there is no reason to calm the Ukrainian population, since that population knows how to maintain tact and moderation, and no one can be responsible for the behaviour of the dregs of society. Embittered and resigned, full of the blackest thoughts, the rabbi went home, meditating on the answer of the prince of the church.<sup>27</sup>

After the audience, Rabbi Lewin returned home and was arrested that same day by Ukrainian militiamen. His son Kurt, who had also been arrested by the militia, witnessed Germans kill him at Brygidky prison. A few days later the rabbi's widow went to Sheptytsky, and returned in a good mood. The metropolitan told her he was searching for her husband and gave her false hope that he might still be alive. He was intervening, he told them, with the Gestapo and Ukrainian militia.<sup>28</sup> According to one well-informed Jewish memoirist, Sheptytsky was told that the Ukrainian clergy should not worry about the Jewish clergy.<sup>29</sup>

What conclusions can we draw from these accounts? The only definite thing is that the metropolitan was informed about the pogrom raging in the city. If he intervened, it must have been orally, since no written trace has come down to us about a public intervention.

There are also indications that Sheptytsky was aware of and subsequently condemned the pogroms and executions that took place in smaller localities through-

<sup>24</sup> Kahane, *Lviv Ghetto Diary*, 7.

<sup>25</sup> Lajb Landau was well known in Ukrainian legal circles in Lviv before the war and served as a liaison between the Judenrat and the Ukrainian National Council in Lviv until the latter was dissolved by the Germans in early March 1942: K. Pankivsky, *Roky nimets'koyi okupatsiyi* (New York and Toronto, 1965), 67.

<sup>26</sup> Archiwum Żydowskiego Instytutu Historycznego, 301/18, 1.

<sup>27</sup> E. Kessler, *Przeżyć Holokaust we Lwowie* (Warsaw, 2007), 36.

<sup>28</sup> Lewin, *Przeżyłem*, 65.

<sup>29</sup> Yad Vashem Archives, T-32/50: Gold diary in 'Teka Lwowska', sketch 1, 4.



out western Ukraine. The clearest is a passage in his pastoral letter 'On Mercy': 'With a profound pain in my heart, with fear for the future of our people, I see how in many communities there live people whose souls and hands are stained with the unnecessarily spilled blood of their neighbours.'<sup>30</sup> This letter dates from June 1942. This was before the attacks on Poles began in the villages, so the murderers 'in many communities' could only have been killing Jews.

Late into 1941 the metropolitan maintained illusions that the Germans might still help the Christian and Ukrainian cause. In a letter to the papal nuncio in Budapest dated 30 August 1941 he expressed the hope that the Germans, who had liberated Galicia from the Bolshevik regime, would defeat atheistic communism once and for all.<sup>31</sup> Late in the year Dr Ludwig Losacker, who headed the civil administration of Galicia, held several confidential meetings with the metropolitan. The metropolitan tried to revive German interest in splitting Russia into a number of independent states, including Ukraine. 'However, the Metropolitan's expectations were reduced drastically when he "heard the shootings from executions even next to his residence"'. Sheptyts'kyi protested against the executions personally to Losacker and to the Galician district governor Karl Lasch when they paid the Metropolitan an official visit.<sup>32</sup> Later Sheptytsky also protested to Lasch's successor, Otto von Wächter.<sup>33</sup> Sheptytsky was moving to a qualitatively different level of horror over what was happening to the Jews under German rule.

The pogroms themselves did not precipitate a public response from Sheptytsky, unlike, say, the conflict between the two OUN factions, which did. The active role played by the OUN Bandera faction in the violence of July 1941 may have influenced the metropolitan's assessment of the factional conflict, but if so, only on some level below the historically documentable surface. Sheptytsky's weak response indicates that he did not take the initial violence against the Jews as seriously as he might have if he had known all that was to follow. We can find an underestimation of the significance of the violence in the letter Sheptytsky wrote to the Budapest nuncio on 30 August 1941. There he mentions the mass murder of Soviet political prisoners perpetrated by the NKVD before the Red Army's retreat from Galicia,<sup>34</sup> but he omits to mention that after the Germans arrived they used the exposition of the corpses to provoke violent excesses against the Jewish population. This omission is typical of Ukrainian nationalist presentations of the national martyrology.

<sup>30</sup> A. Sheptytsky, *Pys'ma-poslannya Mytropolyta Andrey Sheptyts'koho, ChSVV, z chasiv nimets'koyi okupatsiyi*, Biblioteka Lohosu 30 (Yorkton, Sask., 1969), 181.

<sup>31</sup> *Actes et documents du Saint Siège relatifs à la Seconde Guerre mondiale*, iii: *Le Saint Siège et la situation religieuse en Pologne et dans les Pays Baltes, 1939-1945*, ed. P. Blet et al., 2 pts. (Vatican City, 1967), I, 440.

<sup>32</sup> Stehle, 'Sheptyts'kyi and the German Regime', 131-2.

<sup>33</sup> Surmach, *Dni kryvavykh svastyk*, 101.

<sup>34</sup> *Actes et documents*, ed. Blet et al., iii/1, 439. On the NKVD murders, see J. T. Gross, *Revolution from Abroad: The Soviet Conquest of Poland's Western Ukraine and Western Belorussia* (Princeton, 1988), 144-86, and O. Romaniv and I. Fedushchak, *Zakhidnoukrayins'ka trahediya 1941* (Lviv and New York, 2002).

In that same letter he referred to 'the bad example' given to young people under communism by 'communist and Jewish youth who immigrated from Russia'.<sup>35</sup> This suggests that Sheptytsky, like the nationalists, and indeed like many Catholic churchmen in his time, associated Jews with communism, a suggestion reinforced by a conversation Sheptytsky had with the French collaborator René Martel (who used the pseudonym 'Dr Frédéric') in September 1943.<sup>36</sup> Sheptytsky at that time was outspoken in his condemnation of the murder of the Jews and mentioned the case of a young man who confessed to seventy-five murders. Martel replied that he knew that Ukrainians took part in the anti-Jewish actions of that time, but he justified it by saying that the NKVD had killed 18,000 people in the Lviv area and almost all of these NKVD men were Jews. According to Martel, Sheptytsky agreed but still considered the annihilation of the Jews impermissible.<sup>37</sup>

It is also possible that Sheptytsky felt that the pogroms were something anomalous, perpetrated by hoodlums taking advantage of the fluid post-invasion situation to plunder and kill. This would be indicated by the remark reported by Edmund Kessler cited above, that the perpetrators were the dregs of society. This view was widespread both at the time and subsequently.<sup>38</sup>

There were serious obstacles to Sheptytsky's acquiring an objective grasp of the rapidly changing situation in summer 1941. His declining health made it difficult for him to orient himself. His mobility was severely restricted, and he was dependent on his inner circle to keep him informed of events. Furthermore, he was in frequent, almost daily, contact with two German officials, Hans Koch and Alfred Bisanz, whom he regarded as personally trustworthy; they were important sources of information for him.<sup>39</sup>

#### THE SYSTEMATIC MURDER OF JEWS, FEBRUARY/MARCH 1942—JUNE 1943

As late as mid-January 1942, Sheptytsky was protesting only actions of the German regime that affected Ukrainian national goals and was not mentioning the murder of Jews. On 14 January he co-signed a letter with various other Ukrainian leaders, including the head of one of the factions of the OUN, Andry Melnyk, that expressed the chief grievances of Ukrainian political circles: that the Germans would not establish a Ukrainian unit to fight the Bolsheviks, that they had separated the district of Galicia and the Odessa region (Transnistria) from the rest of Ukraine,

<sup>35</sup> *Actes et documents*, ed. Blet et al., iii/1. 438.

<sup>36</sup> The identification of Dr Frédéric as the scholar René Martel was revealed in Pankivsky, *Roky nimets'koyi okupatsiyi*, 413. Martel had been publishing on Ukrainian issues since the mid-1930s.

<sup>37</sup> Mémorial de la Shoah, Paris, Musée, Centre de documentation juive contemporaine, CXLVa-60: Dr Frédéric, 'Abschrift, Übersetzung' of report of 19 Sept. 1943, 4.

<sup>38</sup> I. Khymka [J.-P. Himka], 'Dostovirnist' svidchennya: Relyatsiya Ruzi Vagner pro l'vivs'kyi pohrom vlitku 1941 r.', *Holokost i suchasnist'*, 2/4 (2008), 63.

<sup>39</sup> Personal communication from Liliana Hentosh to the author.

that Ukrainian culture was not being developed in the Reichskommissariat Ukraine, and that the Germans had dissolved the Ukrainian National Council (Ukrayins'ka natsional'na Rada) in Kiev.<sup>40</sup>

Before long, however, the Holocaust became a major issue in the metropolitan's thought and activities. The following documents bear this out:

1. Letter to Himmler of February 1942.<sup>41</sup> (The letter is not extant.)
2. Letter to the clergy and faithful of 27 March 1942 on murder.<sup>42</sup>
3. Letter to Pope Pius XII of 28 March 1942.<sup>43</sup> (The letter seems never to have been sent.<sup>44</sup>)
4. Pastoral letter 'Mary–Mother' of 14–15 April 1942.<sup>45</sup>
5. Pastoral letter 'The Episcopal Jubilee of the Pope' of 17 April 1942.<sup>46</sup>
6. Pastoral letter 'On Mercy' of June 1942.<sup>47</sup>
7. Letter to Pope Pius XII of 29–31 August 1942.<sup>48</sup>
8. Letter to Cardinal Eugène Tisserant of September 1942.<sup>49</sup>
9. Pastoral letter 'Thou Shalt Not Kill' of 21 November 1942.<sup>50</sup>

<sup>40</sup> Original German text in G. Prokoptschuk, *Metropolit Andreas Graf Scheptyckyj: Leben und Wirken des grossen Förderers der Kirchenunion* (Munich, 1967), 272–4. For the dating, see *Ukrayins'ka suspil'no-politychna dumka v 20 stolitti: Dokumenty i materialy*, ed. T. Hunchak [Hunczak] and R. Solchanyk, 3 vols. (n.p., 1983), iii, 47. The Polish ambassador to the Vatican sent a copy to the head of the Oriental Congregation, Cardinal Eugène Tisserant, who thought it was a forgery intended to discredit Sheptytsky: Stehle, 'Sheptyts'kyi and the German Regime', 133.

<sup>41</sup> Pankivsky, *Roky nimets'koyi okupatsiyi*, 29–30; Krawchuk, *Christian Social Ethics in Ukraine*, 233–4; R. Torzecki, *Polacy i Ukraińcy: Sprawa ukraińska w czasie II wojny światowej na terenie Rzeczypospolitej* (Warsaw, 1993), 136; Redlich, 'Metropolitan Andrei Sheptyts'kyi', 45. According to the Polish underground state's Eastern Bureau, Sheptytsky sent a letter to Hitler in February 1942 protesting the murder of the Jews: *Ziemie Wschodnie: Raporty Biura Wschodniego Delegatury Rządu na Kraj, 1943–1944*, ed. M. Adamczyk, J. Gmitruk, and A. Koseski (Warsaw and Pułtusk, 2005), 53. This probably conflates the protest to Himmler, which did indeed concern the murder of the Jews, with the earlier protest to Hitler of 14 January 1942, usually misdated in the literature to February 1942. Soviet intelligence was also aware of Sheptytsky's letter to Himmler; they thought that the letter resulted in the Germans putting the metropolitan under house arrest: *Mytropolyt Andrei Sheptyts'kyi u dokumentakh radyans'kykh orhaniv derzhavnoyi bezpeky (1939–1944 rr.)*, ed. S. Bohunov et al. (Kiev, 2005), 263.

<sup>42</sup> *Mytropolyt Andrei Sheptyts'kyi: Dokumenty i materialy, 1941–1944*, ed. Zh. Kovba (Kiev, 2003), 68.

<sup>43</sup> Rebecca Erbelding, an archivist at the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, Washington, DC (hereafter USHMM), provided me with a copy. The original is housed in the Tsentral'nyi derzhavnyi istorychnyi arkhiv Ukrainy, Lviv, f. 201, op. 1s, spr. 90, fos. 25–6.

<sup>44</sup> It is not included in *Actes et documents*, ed. Blet et al. Sheptytsky's later letter to the pope of 29–31 August 1942 states that hitherto he had refrained from writing to the Holy See lest his letter fall into the wrong hands. In the later letter he repeats content that had already appeared in the letter of 28 March. To my knowledge the letter of 28 March has not been discussed in the scholarship on Sheptytsky.

<sup>45</sup> Sheptytsky, *Pys'ma-poslannya*, 92–100.

<sup>46</sup> *Ibid.* 90–2.

<sup>47</sup> *Ibid.* 165–82.

<sup>48</sup> *Actes et documents*, ed. Blet et al., iii/2, 625–9.

<sup>49</sup> Redlich, 'Metropolitan Andrei Sheptyts'kyi', 46.

<sup>50</sup> Sheptytsky, *Pys'ma-poslannya*, 222–31.

10. 'Rules on the Decree "Concerning the Fifth Commandment"' of late November/early December 1942.<sup>51</sup>
11. Letter to the clergy of 'Peace in the Lord and Blessing' of 26 February 1943.<sup>52</sup>
12. Speech probably of May 1943 at the opening of the Archeparchial Sobor of 1943.<sup>53</sup>
13. Letter to Cardinal Luigi Maglione of 12 June 1943.<sup>54</sup>
14. Conversation with René Martel as reported in the Dr Frédéric memorandum of 19 September 1943.<sup>55</sup>

What accounted for the escalation of Sheptytsky's concern? According to Rabbi Isaac Halevi Herzog, the chief rabbi of Palestine, cited by Sheptytsky's biographer Gregor Prokoptschuk, the protest to Himmler was a response to 'a pogrom against the Jews in Rohatyn that the Germans allowed to happen'. Herzog's testimony went on to say that after this protest 'the entire Ukrainian population . . . helped the persecuted Jews in every possible way',<sup>56</sup> a generalization that is not confirmed in other Jewish survivor testimonies. A Ukrainian newspaper article in 1947 also linked the letter to Himmler with events in Rohatyn.<sup>57</sup> Although what happened in Rohatyn has not been well clarified by historians of the Holocaust in Galicia,<sup>58</sup> it emerges from the content of Sheptytsky's letter that the Germans made use of Ukrainian auxiliary police in an anti-Jewish action.

The documents of late March 1942 appeared in the last stages of the 'March Action' in the Lviv ghetto. At this time about 15,000 Jews were rounded up and deported to death camps. It was also the first action in Lviv in which Ukrainian auxiliary police were directly involved in the round-ups.<sup>59</sup> Sheptytsky's impassioned letter to the pope of August 1942 followed hard on the heels of the 'August Action' in Lviv, in which 40,000 Jews were sent to their death, again with the active participation of the Ukrainian auxiliary police.<sup>60</sup> In June 1943 thousands of the last Lviv Jews were shot by German police units,<sup>61</sup> which would explain why the metropolitan then sent his letter to Cardinal Maglione; the letter informed the cardinal, and

<sup>51</sup> Sheptytsky, *Pys'ma-poslannya*, 257–8.

<sup>52</sup> Provincial Archives of Alberta, Edmonton, Michael Chomiak papers, acc. 85.191, item 53: A. Sheptytsky, 'Myr o Hospodi i blahoslovenstvo', *L'vivs'ki Arkhiyeparkhial'ni Vidomosti*, 6/3–4 (Mar.–Apr. 1943), typescript, fos. 1–2.

<sup>53</sup> Sheptytsky, *Pys'ma-poslannya*, 393–7. I have been unable to date the speech exactly.

<sup>54</sup> *Actes et documents*, ed. Blet et al., iii/2. 811.

<sup>55</sup> Frédéric, 'Abschrift, Übersetzung', 1–5.

<sup>56</sup> Prokoptschuk, *Metropolit Andreas Graf Scheptyckyj*, 288. On Rabbi Herzog, see M. R. Marrus, 'The Vatican and the Custody of Jewish Child Survivors after the Holocaust', *Holocaust and Genocide Studies*, 21/3 (2007), 390. Rabbi Herzog's papers are preserved in the Heichal Shlomo Archive, Jerusalem.

<sup>57</sup> 'Ukrayintsi i zhydy', *Ukrayins'ka trybuna* (Munich), 1 May 1947.

<sup>58</sup> D. Pohl, *Nationalsozialistische Judenverfolgung in Ostgalizien, 1941–1944: Organisation und Durchführung eines staatlichen Massenverbrechens*, 2nd edn. (Munich, 1997), 147 n. 46; Ya. S. Khonigsman, *Katastrofa evreistva Zapadnoi Ukrainy: Evrei Vostochnoi Galitsii, Zapadnoi Volyni, Bukoviny i Zakarpat'ya v 1933–1945 gg.* (Lviv, 1998), 181.

<sup>59</sup> Pohl, *Nationalsozialistische Judenverfolgung in Ostgalizien*, 185–8.

<sup>60</sup> *Ibid.* 216–22.

ultimately the Holy See, that the murders were still continuing. It is therefore clear that Sheptytsky turned his attention to the Holocaust as a response to the escalation of the 'Final Solution' in Galicia, particularly in his own city.

### *The Metropolitan's Statements*

Now I turn to an analysis of the content of the documents listed above. The analysis will proceed chronologically, except that as a particular theme appears in the documents I shall follow it also through later documents.

The lost letter to Himmler was read by Kost Pankivsky, a Ukrainian official collaborating with the German authorities. Alfred Kolf, an official with the Sicherheitsdienst (security service), brought it to Pankivsky. Here is Pankivsky's account of what it said:

Written in a reserved, diplomatic style, in elegant words, the letter was yet extraordinarily sharp in content. The metropolitan wrote that, although he did not make bold to interfere in matters which are conducted by and are the responsibility of the German state administration, as a priest he could not but be pained by the behaviour of the German armed forces and German police with regard to the inhabitants of the land, and primarily with regard to the Jews, and by the maltreatment and execution of people without trial. Therefore he was permitting himself to call attention to this, because he did not know whether these things were actually known in Berlin. Thus, as the head of the Church and the spiritual leader of his faithful, he considered it his obligation to ask that the Ukrainian police, which is composed exclusively of his faithful, not be used in action against the Jews.<sup>62</sup>

The letter was also read by Rabbi David Kahane when he was in hiding at the metropolitan's palace and he also recalled that Sheptytsky asked Himmler to remove Ukrainian policemen from all extermination operations carried out against the Jews.<sup>63</sup> Three other sources also raise the theme of the participation of the Ukrainian police in the massacres. Sheptytsky wrote in both his letters to Pope Pius XII that he tried to prevent Ukrainian youth from joining the police or other organizations in which their souls could be exposed to danger.<sup>64</sup> In his letter to Cardinal Tisserant of September 1942 he also expressed his displeasure at the Germans' use of Ukrainian policemen for 'perverted purposes'. In the course of his conversation with Martel, he stated that he himself had heard the confession of a young man who had killed seventy-five Jews in Lviv in one night.<sup>65</sup>

<sup>61</sup> Ibid. 258.

<sup>62</sup> Pankivsky, *Roky nimets'koyi okupatsiyi*, 30.

<sup>63</sup> Kahane, *Lvov Ghetto Diary*, 139.

<sup>64</sup> For the second letter, see *Actes et documents*, ed. Blet et al., iii/2. 628.

<sup>65</sup> Frédéric, 'Abschrift, Übersetzung', 4. The young man was probably a member of the militia or police. It is important to make a distinction between the militias that were formed by the OUN at the end of June 1941 and that remained active into August 1941 and the Ukrainian auxiliary police under direct German supervision that subsequently replaced them. Redlich, 'Metropolitan Andrei Sheptyts'kyi', 45, writes that the murders committed by the young man must have taken place during the pogrom of early July. I agree with July 1941 as the most likely time for a young Ukrainian to have been able to kill so many Jews in the course of a single night; but it could also have occurred later in the

According to Rabbi Kahane, the letter to Himmler also speculated on the psychological consequences for Ukrainians involved in these murders. In the rabbi's words: 'The ordinary Ukrainian is crude and in the future he would likely do to his countrymen, his brethren, what he had done to the Jews. He becomes inured to murder and it would be difficult for him to unlearn it.'<sup>66</sup> The metropolitan drew a psychological portrait of such a perpetrator in his pastoral letter 'Thou Shalt Not Kill':

The sight of spilt blood calls forth in a person's soul a sensual desire, bound up with cruelty, which seeks satisfaction in dealing out suffering and death to its victims. The thirst for blood can become an uncontrollable passion, which finds the greatest delight in torturing and killing people . . . Crime becomes a necessary daily nourishment, without which [the killer] suffers torment, as though he suffered from some sickness of thirst and hunger which must be quenched.<sup>67</sup>

Earlier, in his letter to the pope of 29–31 August 1942, he had written that the executioners were now habituated to the massacre of Jews, to the murder of thousands of innocent people, to the flow of blood, and to blood lust.<sup>68</sup>

Sheptytsky's text of 27 March 1942 concerned the sin of murder, a leitmotif of his writings in those years. He made it a sin reserved to the ordinary, i.e. to the bishop, in the Lviv archeparchy, a decision he reiterated in his pastoral letter of 21 November 1942, 'Thou Shalt Not Kill',<sup>69</sup> and in his 'Rules on the Decree "Concerning the Fifth Commandment"'. He also mentioned the reservation in his letter to Pius XII of 29–31 August 1942.<sup>70</sup> It may be significant that an earlier condemnation of murder, issued in connection with the factional violence in the OUN, did not yet include the reservation of the sin. It seems likely that the metropolitan felt that more severe measures were now called for. The reservation meant that parish priests did not have the authority to absolve the sin of murder in confession; only Sheptytsky could. Of course, the other effect of reserving the sin of murder was that the bishop would get a much clearer picture of the extent of murder being

month, during the so-called Petlyura days (around 25–26 July). That Sheptytsky himself heard the confession suggests that the confession took place after murder was made a reserved sin on 27 March 1942. The confession could easily have taken place eight or nine months after the crimes were committed, since it was the custom to confess during the Lenten period rather than more frequently. Ivan Patrylyak has expressed doubt that the information about confession was true, as he feels that this would have violated the sacramental seal: I. K. Patrylyak, *Vii's'kova diyal'nist' OUN(B) u 1940–1942 rokakh* (Kiev, 2004), 357. I give credence to Martel's account. For one thing, it was quite common for Catholic clergy at that time to use the generalities of confession to evaluate the state of morality in particular parishes or dioceses. Also, matters discussed in Martel's report can often be corroborated from other sources, even obscure details, for example the Chinese consideration with reference to SS 'Galizien' discussed below.

<sup>66</sup> Kahane, *Lvov Ghetto Diary*, 139.

<sup>67</sup> Sheptytsky, *Pys'ma-poslannya*, 226. I have read 'proklyatoyi' (damned) as a typo for 'prolytoyi' (spilt). Rabbi Kahane read the letter to Himmler at the same time as he read 'Thou Shalt Not Kill', so it is quite possible that he transposed content from the latter to the former.

<sup>68</sup> *Actes et documents*, ed. Blet et al., iii/2. 628.

<sup>69</sup> Sheptytsky, *Pys'ma-poslannya*, 226.

<sup>70</sup> *Actes et documents*, ed. Blet et al., iii/2. 627–8.

committed by the faithful entrusted to his jurisdiction. This undoubtedly was one of the reasons why Sheptytsky reserved that particular sin.

In his text of 27 March 1942, Sheptytsky also called upon the faithful to shun people whom they knew for certain to be murderers. Although he admitted that this was not canonically required, Sheptytsky urged his flock to show murderers 'the disgust and disgrace they deserve' in the hope that this would lead the offending individuals to repentance, to rid themselves of the mark of Cain. He instructed confessors to impose on murderers a penance so onerous that they would recall for the rest of their lives that they had shed innocent human blood. In his pastoral letter 'On Mercy' Sheptytsky wrote that the repetition of the crime of Cain, that is murder, 'must call forth indignation and disgust, and these feelings should be manifested in order to lead the fallen sinner to come to his senses'.<sup>71</sup> In 'Thou Shalt Not Kill' he called upon pastors and faithful to help the unfortunate sinner repent by rebuking him:

By their entire behaviour, through repeated reminders, by avoiding social intercourse with them, by decisively refraining from family ties with them, let them make the murderers understand that they consider them a pestilence and danger for the village. When no one in the village will greet the criminal, and no one will allow him into their house, and no family will marry into a relationship with him, when even in church Christians will not stand next to him, when they will avoid meeting him on the road, when no one will sell him anything or buy anything from him, perhaps then he will have a change of heart and will begin a life of repentance as well as the labour of correction.<sup>72</sup>

In the 'Rules on the Decree "Concerning the Fifth Commandment"' issued shortly after 'Thou Shalt Not Kill' he also encouraged the faithful to avoid murderers in order to lead them to repentance. In his speech of May 1943 at the opening of the Archeparchial Sobor of 1943, Sheptytsky returned to this theme and enriched it by reflections on how people have felt repugnance even for those official executioners who have merely carried out the just laws of the land:

But now we find ourselves in the situation that in many villages we perhaps have people who relate how they have killed their neighbours, and we even meet those who brag that they have no greater pleasure than shedding blood. How do we convert such people and how do we restore health to their human nature?! How do we restrain that cry of spilt blood that cries to heaven for vengeance?!<sup>73</sup>

On 28 March 1942 Sheptytsky wrote a letter to Pope Pius XII about the situation in Galicia under German occupation. Although never sent, it provides further insight into what Sheptytsky was thinking at that time. He informed the Holy Father about the incredible extent of the murders, estimating that up to 130,000 Jews had been killed in Kiev. In his letter to the pope of 29–31 August 1942 he was able to provide more exact information about the Holocaust in Ukraine. He said that the Jews were the Germans' primary victims. Over 200,000 had been killed 'in

<sup>71</sup> Sheptytsky, *Pys'ma-poslannya*, 180.

<sup>72</sup> *Ibid.* 226.

<sup>73</sup> *Ibid.* 396–7.

our little land', i.e. Galicia. There were more victims as the German army moved east. In Kiev, he said, over 30,000 Jews—men, women, and children—were killed in the space of a few days.<sup>74</sup> Such murders had been going on for a year. In his conversation with Martel a year later, he also provided information on the extent of the Holocaust, estimating that 100,000 Jews had been killed in Lviv alone and millions across Ukraine.<sup>75</sup>

An interesting point raised in both letters to the pope is that the Germans were deliberately trying to shift the blame for their murders onto the Ukrainian militias/police. In the letter of 28 March 1942 he wrote that recently the Germans had been trying to displace the responsibility for their murders: they ordered the police to execute hundreds of Jews and then photographed these executions. In Lviv they executed as many as 15,000 Jews, according to the statistics of the Jewish council ('Commune Israélite'). They then forced the authorities of the Jewish council to provide them with official statements that it was the Ukrainians who had massacred the Jews. He included similar information in his letter of 29–31 August. At first, he said, the German authorities were ashamed of their inhuman injustice and tried to get documents that showed that the local inhabitants and the militiamen were responsible for the deaths. But later they began to kill the Jews in full view of the public.<sup>76</sup>

The Holocaust was obviously very much on Sheptytsky's mind in mid-April 1942. In 'Mary–Mother' he wrote how wartime had brought many misfortunes on the people, including hunger and disease. 'But the most terrible of all these plagues', he said, 'is the plague of crimes voluntarily committed by our people.' We stand before God's altar 'with shame and a sense of our own guilt'. A particularly difficult burden for him was consciousness of the 'crimes committed by our faithful'. 'Among our children', he wrote, 'there have been found people who are so foolish and conscienceless that they summon upon the whole nation even heavier divine punishments.' Only the Most Holy Mother of God can help stay God's anger and intercede on behalf of 'those whose hands are stained with blood' that they be granted 'mercy and the grace of repentance'.<sup>77</sup> In 'On Mercy' Sheptytsky wrote of children who had once been a source of pride for their parents, but who had now become 'a heavy cross and a painful source of shame'. 'What a pain for a father to see his son, stained with shedding innocent blood, a son from whom all neighbours and acquaintances turn away in disgust.'<sup>78</sup>

In his pastoral letter 'The Episcopal Jubilee of the Pope' he stressed the importance of love of neighbour, 'all neighbours, all people'. The Christian cannot treat neighbours like Cain treated his brother. 'Christ teaches us to embrace with love all of humanity, including our enemies and those who have injured or injure us.' This love must be 'like the love of Christ—to the point of giving up our life for them,

<sup>74</sup> This refers to the murder of Jews at Baby Yar in September 1941.

<sup>75</sup> Frédéric, 'Abschrift, Übersetzung', 4.

<sup>76</sup> *Actes et documents*, ed. Blet et al., iii/2. 625.

<sup>77</sup> Sheptytsky, *Pys'ma-poslannya*, 92–3.

<sup>78</sup> *Ibid.* 167.



of shedding our blood'.<sup>79</sup> It is difficult not to interpret these words as an encouragement to offer shelter to the persecuted Jewish people in spite of the capital punishment that could result from such an act. This theme found expansion in Sheptytsky's pastoral letter 'On Mercy' of June 1942. 'All the books of the Old and New Testaments tell us about God's mercy towards all of humanity and for individual people.' Every Christian, he wrote, had the obligation to show mercy.<sup>80</sup> Love of neighbour should encompass 'all neighbours'.<sup>81</sup> The following passage undoubtedly refers to the situation of Jews seeking food and shelter from Christians, which was becoming a widespread phenomenon after the liquidation actions began:

The obligation for almsgiving grows with the need of one's neighbour. When this need grows to the extreme, when it's a matter of the life of the neighbour, the Christian is obliged to help him, and not only out of that which is necessary for him to preserve his wellbeing relative to his position. At that time the obligation of love becomes an important obligation, that is, an obligation conditioned by grave sin and the obligation of justice. Whoever finds himself in extreme trouble has a right to seek rescue even from someone else's property, even without the permission of the owner.<sup>82</sup>

He reminded the faithful that the highest level of love is to lay down one's life for another. There are times, Sheptytsky said, when Christians absolutely must carry this out in its literal sense. But all love of neighbour should incorporate that readiness for self-sacrifice.

The Christian's love of neighbour stands in great contrast to 'that true abyss of evil and hatred which is the crime of murder!' Murder is the repetition of the crime of Cain, 'because every neighbour is a brother—is a member of that same human family which grew out of the family of the first man'. Murder is the crime that most distances a person from the Christian love of neighbour and from the Christian conception of life.<sup>83</sup> Murder is the greatest crime, the greatest contradiction of human nature, because death is the greatest evil one human being can inflict upon another. Murder calls for punishment from heaven.<sup>84</sup>

There are a few points in the letter to the pope of 29–31 August that I have still not discussed. One is that Sheptytsky now felt that the Nazis were worse than the Bolsheviks, that their regime was almost diabolical.<sup>85</sup> (He later also told Martel that 'Germany is worse than Bolshevism'.<sup>86</sup>) The Germans had set up a system of lies, deceit, injustice, and pillage, a caricature of all notions of civilization and order. Their egoism had grown to absurd proportions and their national chauvinism had reached a completely insane level. They hated all that was good and beautiful. Where was all this to lead the unfortunate German people?<sup>87</sup> Another point he raised was how helpless he felt in the face of such evil. He had issued pastoral letters against murder, he had made murder a reserved sin, he had tried to discourage

<sup>79</sup> Ibid. 91.

<sup>80</sup> Ibid. 165.

<sup>81</sup> Ibid. 168.

<sup>82</sup> Ibid. 173–4.

<sup>83</sup> Ibid. 179.

<sup>84</sup> Ibid. 180.

<sup>85</sup> *Actes et documents*, ed. Blet et al., iii/2. 625.

<sup>86</sup> Frédéric, 'Abschrift, Übersetzung', 3; translation from Stehle, 'Sheptyts'kyi and the German Regime', 138.

<sup>87</sup> *Actes et documents*, ed. Blet et al., iii/2. 628–9.

youth from entering the militia, and he had protested directly to Himmler. Yet, he said, this was absolutely nothing in comparison with the ever-mounting waves of moral filth engulfing the whole land. A third point reiterated how deeply disturbed he was by the moral collapse in his archeparchy: much blood must be voluntarily shed to expiate the blood shed in the course of these crimes.<sup>88</sup>

Sheptytsky's most celebrated intervention was his pastoral letter 'Thou Shalt Not Kill' of 21 November 1942. Sometimes doubts have been expressed whether this letter was really referring to the mass murder of the Jewish population. As we have seen, however, it continued and elaborated the discourse about murder that appeared in the wake of the March and August actions. Furthermore, although the timing of its release was not directly connected with specific incidents in the unfolding of the Holocaust, it must be remembered that it went through several earlier drafts; hence it should be linked with his responses to the 'August Action'. Redlich has pointed out that the fact that Sheptytsky gave a copy of this letter to Rabbi Kahane to read also indicates that he considered this 'a Jewish-related appeal'.<sup>89</sup> Although Sheptytsky did not (and could not) mention the Jews explicitly, Krawchuk points out that he 'reminded his readers, "real love includes all one's neighbors"', and the manifestation of fraternal love in opposition to homicide was a duty that extended "to every person by virtue of their human nature".<sup>90</sup>

Soon after issuing that pastoral letter, Sheptytsky issued his 'Rules on the Decree "Concerning the Fifth Commandment"'. This gave guidelines on how to deal with the 'numerous facts of murder which our faithful have committed'. He recommended missions and retreats as well as preaching against murder. 'Only the work in solidarity of the entire community can save it from the misfortune of living with criminals.' He followed up with a letter to the clergy, 'Peace in the Lord and Blessing', which stated that these rules he proposed seemed to him to be 'simply nothing in comparison to that which should be proposed'.<sup>91</sup>

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In exploring these writings of Metropolitan Andrey, I have been particularly interested in them as expressions of what he was thinking. His ability to distribute his texts, and thus make his concerns known to the clergy and faithful of his archeparchy, was severely limited by the German authorities. They censored some of his texts in part, others *in toto*. In his letter to Pope Pius XII, Sheptytsky reported

<sup>88</sup> *Actes et documents*, ed. Blet et al., iii/2. 629. As early as 1908 Sheptytsky was close to despair over a political murder, the assassination of the viceroy of Galicia by a Ukrainian student. He was quoted as saying: 'I see that my hand has been too weak. There is nothing else that remains for me to do, except to resign my pastoral dignity, and retreat into a monastery.' L. Wolff, *The Idea of Galicia: History and Fantasy in Habsburg Political Culture* (Stanford, Calif., 2010), 342.

<sup>89</sup> Redlich, 'Metropolitan Andrei Sheptyts'kyi', 46. See also Krawchuk, *Christian Social Ethics in Ukraine*, 242 n. 170.

<sup>90</sup> Krawchuk, *Christian Social Ethics in Ukraine*, 242, citing Sheptytsky, *Pys'ma-poslannya*, 224–5.

<sup>91</sup> Sheptytsky, *Pys'ma-poslannya*, 257–8.

that the authorities had, of course, confiscated his pastoral letters on homicide, but he had been able to relate their contents to the assembled clergy four or five times.<sup>92</sup> Sheptytsky's opposition to murder in general and to the murder of the Jews in particular was widely known in Ukrainian political circles, the Polish underground, and the German administration.

In addition to thinking and writing about the Holocaust, Sheptytsky also himself engaged in the rescue of Jews. After Rabbi Lewin was murdered, Sheptytsky arranged for his two sons, Kurt (Isaac) and Nathan, to stay in Greek Catholic monasteries and in the St George Cathedral complex until Lviv was retaken by the Soviets. He also gave shelter to Rabbi Kahane from May 1943. Altogether, Sheptytsky was directly responsible for saving about a hundred and fifty Jews, mainly children.<sup>93</sup> He also helped Jews obtain 'Aryan' papers. A Jewish survivor, Edward Harvitt, remembers that his mother made an appointment with the metropolitan and was admitted to an audience. Sheptytsky offered to place her son in a convent, but Edward's mother did not want to be separated from him. So instead Sheptytsky arranged for her to obtain papers that improved the small family's chances of survival.<sup>94</sup> Sheptytsky's rescue activities were also relatively well known<sup>95</sup> and served as an example to his clergy and faithful, sometimes inspiring others to help with rescue.<sup>96</sup> One of his priests, Father Emylyan Kovch of Peremyshlyany, was particularly outstanding for his aid to Jews. When Father Kovch was arrested by the Gestapo at the end of 1942, Sheptytsky intervened, albeit unsuccessfully, on his behalf. He died in Majdanek and was beatified by Pope John Paul II in 2001.<sup>97</sup> Father Kovch had been in direct contact with Sheptytsky.<sup>98</sup>

Sheptytsky also sought to engage the Ukrainian Central Committee (Ukrayins'kyi tsentral'nyi komitet) in saving Jewish individuals who had done some service to the Ukrainian people.<sup>99</sup>

#### ANTI-JEWISH COMPONENTS OF SHEPTYTSKY'S WORLD VIEW

It may come as a surprise that for all his condemnation of the Holocaust and efforts to help the Jewish population, he was still to some extent the prisoner of Christian

<sup>92</sup> *Actes et documents*, ed. Blet et al., iii/2. 627.

<sup>93</sup> Redlich, 'Metropolitan Andrei Sheptyts'kyi', 46-7, 51 n. 50. According to Rabbi Kahane, two hundred Jewish children were saved in one major rescue operation: L. Heiman, 'They Saved Jews: Ukrainian Patriots Defied Nazis', *Ukrainian Quarterly*, 17/4 (1961), 328. Kurt Lewin put together a collection of affidavits of Jews rescued by Metropolitan Sheptytsky. It can be found in USHMM, RG 204.609.

<sup>94</sup> USC Shoah Foundation, interview with Edward Harvitt, 44068, 17.

<sup>95</sup> According to 'Ukrayintsi i zhydy', Ukrainians and non-Ukrainians talked about Sheptytsky's protest to Himmler.

<sup>96</sup> Krawchuk, *Christian Social Ethics in Ukraine*, 242-5.

<sup>97</sup> A. M. Kowcz-Baran, *For God's Truth and Human Rights*, trans. E. and A. Baran (Ottawa, 2006), 55-81, 93-4; Kovba, *Lyudyanyist' u bezodni pekla*, 137.

<sup>98</sup> Kowcz-Baran, *For God's Truth*, 58.

<sup>99</sup> Surmach, *Dni kryvavykh svastyk*, 102. The Ukrainian Central Committee, headed by Professor Volodymyr Kubiiovych, was the only officially sanctioned Ukrainian community organization in

anti-Judaism and antisemitism. He felt that the Holocaust was God's will, perhaps punishment for the killing of Jesus Christ. I quote the well-known passage from Rabbi Kahane's memoir:

The metropolitan fell silent for a moment and continued: 'Have you ever thought about it and asked yourself, what is the source of the hatred and savage persecution of the Jewish people from ancient times until the present? What is their origin?' He pointed at the bookshelves, asked me to find the New Testament in Hebrew translation and locate chapter 27, verse 25 in the Gospel according to Matthew: 'It says there "And the whole people answered and said His blood will be on us and on our children." . . .'

At noon the next day Father Hrtzai<sup>100</sup> informed me that the metropolitan wished to see me again that evening . . . The metropolitan motioned to me with his half-paralyzed hand to draw near him and sit in the chair next to him.

'Our conversation yesterday did not let me sleep. I am remorseful and sorry about the content of our conversation. I shouldn't have spoken as I did. In the ongoing ordeal, when the Jewish people bleed to death and sacrifice hundreds of thousands of innocent victims, I should have known better than to touch upon this subject. I knew that such a conversation aggrieved you greatly. I ask you to forgive me. After all I am mortal and for a moment I let myself be distracted.'<sup>101</sup>

Something like this view was shared by many of Sheptytsky's flock. Ukrainians noted the passivity of many Jews in the face of their destruction and ascribed it to their recognition of God's will.<sup>102</sup>

In his letter to the pope of 29–31 August 1942, which condemned so strongly the Nazi persecution of the Jews, the metropolitan also included the following passage:

The only consolation one can have in these terrible times is that nothing comes to us without the will of our Heavenly Father. I think that among the massacred Jews there are many souls who converted to God, because never through the centuries have they been placed in a situation as they are in the present, facing for months on end the possibility of a violent death.<sup>103</sup>

By 'converted to God' it is not necessary to understand conversion to Christianity, although that is one possible interpretation. It seems more likely that Sheptytsky had in mind that secularized Jews were turning to God in the face of death.

In the course of his conversation with Sheptytsky, Martel said that Jews dominated the Soviet secret police and that they were the sworn enemies of Christianity.

Galicia and the rest of German-occupied Poland. It was the primary liaison organization between the Ukrainians and the Germans.

<sup>100</sup> Father Volodymyr Hrytsai was Sheptytsky's secretary.

<sup>101</sup> Kahane, *Lvov Ghetto Diary*, 141–2. There is also an account of this conversation in Heiman, 'They Saved Jews', 330–1.

<sup>102</sup> E. Himka and J.-P. Himka, 'Interviews with Elderly Nationalists in Lviv', paper presented at the Fifth Annual Danyliw Research Seminar on Contemporary Ukrainian Studies, Chair of Ukrainian Studies, University of Ottawa, 29–31 October 2009; see especially the interview with Dariya Polyuha. O. Bartov, 'Eastern Europe as the Site of Genocide', *Journal of Modern History*, 80 (2008), 580.

<sup>103</sup> As translated in Redlich, 'Metropolitan Andrei Sheptyts'kyi', 47.

According to Martel, Sheptytsky agreed with him, but still refused to agree with their destruction.<sup>104</sup>

#### CO-OPERATION WITH THE GERMANS, 1943–1944: THE WAFFEN-SS DIVISION ‘GALIZIEN’

Andrii Krawchuk wrote that the ‘process of ethical discernment took Metropolitan Sheptytsky from a position of qualified accommodation [to the German regime] to outright opposition’.<sup>105</sup> This statement is hard to square with the metropolitan’s support for the establishment of a Ukrainian Waffen-SS division. Krawchuk attempted to resolve the apparent contradiction by stating ‘it is difficult to establish definitively what he thought of the Division’ and pointing out that ‘there is no indication that he ever issued an official statement unequivocally supporting the formation of the unit’.<sup>106</sup> However, the weight of the evidence is that the metropolitan offered low-key support for the division. His coadjutor, Iosyf Slipy, left this account:

When the ‘Halychyna’ Division was being formed, I had to serve a Divine Liturgy for the recruits, taking the place of the metropolitan. Governor Wächter was there, and Father [Vasy] Laba delivered the sermon. After the service Wächter came and thanked me, saying that the Divine Liturgy ‘was an experience for me’. They invited me to the dignitaries’ tribune for the parade, but I didn’t go. But it mattered very much to Wächter that I be there, and therefore he asked about me, but people made some excuse on my behalf. I did not go to the reception either. Already during the organization of the Division and at other events I indicated to the late metropolitan not to engage the Church in Hitlerite pageants, because they [the Hitlerites] would clear out, and later we would have to bear the responsibility, especially since the Bolshevik offensive was moving at a fast rate.<sup>107</sup>

A number of those who have studied this issue have speculated that Sheptytsky’s support for the division was based on his preference for a regular army unit over nationalist partisan formations.<sup>108</sup> An NKGB informer quoted Sheptytsky as telling him exactly that in the summer of 1944: ‘I condemn the actions of the UPA [the Ukrainian Insurgent Army] and the Banderites [the leading faction of the OUN]; I exculpate the Melnykites [the other OUN faction] and the people serving in the division SS “Galizien”’.<sup>109</sup> Sheptytsky told Martel: ‘If the German defeats continue, and there is a period of anarchy and chaos, we will be very happy to have a national army to maintain order and to counteract the worst outrages until regular Soviet troops arrive.’<sup>110</sup>

<sup>104</sup> Frédéric, ‘Abschrift, Übersetzung’, 4.

<sup>105</sup> Krawchuk, *Christian Social Ethics in Ukraine*, 247. <sup>106</sup> Ibid. 265. <sup>107</sup> Slipy, ‘Spomyny’, 97.

<sup>108</sup> Krawchuk, *Christian Social Ethics in Ukraine*, 267. A. A. Zięba (interviewed by P. Zychowicz), ‘Dwie twarze abp. Szeptyckiego’, *Rzeczpospolita*, 29 Nov. 2009; <<http://www.rp.pl/artykul/399004.html>>.

<sup>109</sup> *Mytropolyt Andrei Sheptyts’kyi*, ed. Bohunov et al., 264.

<sup>110</sup> Frédéric, ‘Abschrift, Übersetzung’, 3; translation from Stehle, ‘Sheptyts’kyi and the German Regime’, 138.

Moreover, the metropolitan appointed chaplains to the division, to provide it with Christian guidance.<sup>111</sup>

But other considerations undoubtedly influenced his stance as well. Together with other Ukrainian leaders, he had early on lobbied the Germans to form a Ukrainian unit to fight the Soviets. In the future, it was hoped, the soldiers in German service would form the nucleus of a national army. This thinking induced many Galician Ukrainians to join SS 'Galizien' in 1943 and earlier had led the Bandera movement to urge members to join the Germans' Ukrainian auxiliary police. Although Sheptytsky was opposed to Germany in 1943, even declaring the Soviets to be better, the idea of training a Ukrainian army probably still appealed to the metropolitan, who had himself served in the Austrian cavalry. Also, wild rumours circulated about what the Soviets would do when they reconquered Galicia. The Ukrainian writer Arkady Lyubchenko, himself a racist and antisemite, recorded in his diary on 24 March 1943 the following statement by the metropolitan: 'I have . . . information that the Bolsheviks want to bring the Chinese to fight in their ranks against Europe. If England and America help with military materiel . . . it would not take a special effort for them to send immediately some fifty million people against the Germans. That would be terrible! God only knows how this can end.'<sup>112</sup> This concern with the Chinese also makes its appearance in Sheptytsky's conversation with Martel, in which Sheptytsky expressed the view that the Bolsheviks would rule the world: 'They possess inexhaustible reserves of men, thanks to Asia and the Chinese.'<sup>113</sup> It seems as if Sheptytsky was thinking in stereotypical terms of Europe and Asia.

Sheptytsky was able to work with the Germans, the occupation authorities understood, because he was used to functioning under numerous different regimes. Indeed, Sheptytsky had become metropolitan in Franz Joseph's empire; he was arrested under tsarist Russian occupation during the First World War; when he returned to Galicia afterwards it had become Poland; not two decades passed before he was functioning under the Soviet system; and after just two years he had to deal with the Nazis. This variegated experience had, from the Germans' point of view, its pluses and minuses. Wächter, the head of the Galician occupation government wrote: 'The metropolitan can therefore not be described as either pro-German or anti-German.' Although Wächter considered Sheptytsky unwilling to embrace 'the German sense' of opposition to Bolshevism (i.e. to link it with the Jews), this did not mean he had Bolshevik leanings. He had never called for an uprising against Germany. He neither unequivocally sides with Germany against its enemies nor publicly opposes Germany. In conversations he objects to some 'details', such as 'the form of the Jewish resettlement' (i.e. the murder of the Jews). But 'these petty

<sup>111</sup> The chaplains are examined in A. Silecky, 'Fathers in Uniform: The Greek Catholic Chaplains of the 14th SS Galicia Division (1943-1947)', MA paper (Univ. of Alberta, 2006).

<sup>112</sup> *Shchodennyk Arkadiya Lyubchenka*, ed. Yu. Lutsyky (Lviv, 1999), 130. I am grateful to Taras Kurylo for finding this passage.

<sup>113</sup> Frédéric, 'Abschrift, Übersetzung', 3.

disagreements' are more than compensated for by the metropolitan's help in winning over the Ukrainian populace. He and his clergy, Wächter wrote, had been very helpful. They had supported the SS unit, and they pray for the Führer in the liturgy.<sup>114</sup>

## CONCLUSION

On a few points this study has been able to add little new to the existing literature on Metropolitan Andrey Sheptytsky and the Holocaust. One is the actual rescue operations organized by Sheptytsky and his closest associates. It has relied on what, to date, is the primary scholarly account, that of Shimon Redlich, a rather brief survey. Sheptytsky's rescue efforts require much more scholarly attention, and the whole issue of whether or not he deserves recognition as a Righteous among the Nations needs to be put aside for the work to be fruitful. There is a need for a more systematic analysis, deeper and more imaginative research in archival and testimonial sources, and comparison with similar rescue operations conducted by Roman Catholic and Armenian Catholic clergy and religious in the same and neighbouring regions.<sup>115</sup>

Another point on which this chapter has made no new contribution is on the anti-Jewish components in Sheptytsky's world view. It has not brought to light any statements that have not already been referred to in the literature. Here too, though, there is need for additional research. In particular, it would be useful to examine how his views during the Holocaust compare to views he expressed earlier. It seems that before the Holocaust Sheptytsky did not write anything about Jewish responsibility for the crucifixion of Christ,<sup>116</sup> suggesting that this train of thought emerged because of what he was witnessing and interpreting as a visitation of punishment of cosmic proportions. It would be useful for the contextualization of Sheptytsky's Holocaust thinking to examine such statements as he did make in reference to theological issues around Jews and Judaism. It would also be useful to study Sheptytsky's political thinking about Jews, in particular to gauge how deep his identification of Jews with communists was. As far back as the early twentieth century Sheptytsky identified socialism with Jews,<sup>117</sup> but he refrained from mentioning Jews in his major pastoral letter against communism of 1936. (By contrast,

<sup>114</sup> USHMM, RG 1995.A.1086, reel 5: letter of [Otto von Wächter] Chef des Amtes, General-gouvernement, Gouverneur des Distrikts Galizien to Botschaftsrat Dr. Schumburg, 31 May 1944; original in Derzhavnyi arkhiv L'vivskoyi oblasti, Lviv, f. R-35, op. 1, spr. 45, fos. 1-2.

<sup>115</sup> On Armenian Catholic rescue activities, see S. Azizyan, 'Vyprovuvannya viry: Ryatuvannya yevreyiv ukrayins'kymy ta virmens'kymy dushpastyryamy pid chas Druhoyi svitovoyi viiny', *RISU*, 25 Aug. 2009: <[http://www.risu.org.ua/ua/index/studios/studies\\_of\\_religions/26377/](http://www.risu.org.ua/ua/index/studios/studies_of_religions/26377/)>.

<sup>116</sup> For his 2004 monograph on Sheptytsky's theology, Father Peter Galadza sifted through his theological writings and found nothing on the order of what he said to Rabbi Kahane. Personal communication from Father Peter Galadza to the author.

<sup>117</sup> J.-P. Himka, 'Metropolita Szeptycki wobec zagadnień reformy wyborczej, 1905-1914', in A. A. Zięba (ed.), *Metropolita Andrzej Szeptycki: Studia i materiały* (Kraków, 1994), 147.

in that same year the Polish primate, Cardinal August Hlond, issued a notorious pastoral letter that accused Jews of manifold evils, including leading the communist vanguard.) What was the general attitude towards Jews in the Greek Catholic Church during Sheptytsky's reign as metropolitan? This is a question that has not been researched either. At the one end of the spectrum we have Bishop Ivan Buchko's condemnation of antisemitism in 1936;<sup>118</sup> at the other, Father Irynei Nazarko's article of 1930, a compendium of antisemitic accusations, including even a strong defence of blood libel.<sup>119</sup> In short, what is needed is research into context.

On other points this study has made use of additional sources that confirm or elaborate judgements already well established in the literature. Among these is the fact that early in 1942 Sheptytsky began to protest sharply the Germans' murder of the Jews, protesting directly to the Germans as well as to the highest officials of the Catholic Church. He was particularly concerned about how Ukrainians were being drawn into the destruction process. He came to the conclusion by the summer of 1942 that the Nazis were even worse than the Bolsheviks. He was still able to co-operate with them when it was a matter of the lesser evil (a Waffen-SS division as opposed to unrestrained bands of nationalist youth). He was deeply appalled by murder and feared mightily for the salvation of the flock under his care. Although this study concludes nothing on this theme that differs from Andrii Krawchuk's earlier analysis, it has deliberately quoted Sheptytsky's messages extensively to show more ramifications of his thinking and, indeed, emotions.

One new thing the study has done has been to pay more attention to Sheptytsky's thinking over time, as it responded to phases in the unfolding of the Holocaust and other wartime violence. The Lviv pogrom and other violence in the immediate aftermath of the German invasion caught Sheptytsky by surprise, although instinctively he included in his first pronouncement a call for the new authorities, and in the first place Stetsko's Ukrainian government, to respect the rights of all citizens, regardless of religion and nationality. Called upon to intervene during the Lviv pogrom, Sheptytsky was unable to produce an adequate response, at least not one that has left any trace. He may have thought that the violence was just an outburst provoked by anger at Jewish complicity in Bolshevik crimes and hoped that things would return to normal once the Germans established order.

It is not unusual that he clung to that hope of normalcy for many months in spite of mounting evidence to the contrary. As anyone who has read Jewish testimonies and memoirs of the period can attest, the Jews themselves were hoping the Germans would restore order after the first wave of violence in July. As the Germans engaged in more systematic violence, surviving Jews still kept hoping that each 'action' was the last. So the metropolitan was not the only one who found the Germans' intention to kill all the Jews incredible. But the executions which he

<sup>118</sup> S. Redlich, 'Jewish-Ukrainian Relations in Inter-War Poland as Reflected in Some Ukrainian Publications', *Polin*, 11 (1998), 244 n. 54.

<sup>119</sup> Ir. Nazarko, 'Piznaimo zhydiv!', *Kalyendar Misionarya*, 27 (1930), 54-60.



could hear from his own palace disturbed his peace and his hopes. He complained to German officials who visited him. As his hopes waned, he protested also in writing to Himmler in February 1942. The employment of Ukrainian policemen in the Germans' murderous actions, in Rohatyn and then in the major action in Lviv in March, precipitated a remarkable and unmistakable recognition of and engagement with the Holocaust by the metropolitan. During the March action he drafted a letter to the Vatican and made murder a reserved sin. From this time on, his pastoral letters and other occasional writings returned again and again to the theme of murder. It weighed heavily on his mind; he seemed almost obsessed with it.

As the murder of the Jews progressed, his thinking on murder also grew more ramified. New ideas occurred to him, such as the repugnance shown even to legal executioners. He assiduously gathered information on the murder of the Jews. The letter he sent to the Vatican in August 1942 was much better informed about the Holocaust than the original draft of March 1942. His appreciation of the enormity of the Holocaust was such that he tried to make sense of it as a divine intervention, a punishment of the Jews. Thinking along these same lines appeared also among rabbis during the Holocaust, although they did not link the Jews' transgressions with anything in the Christian narrative.

Among the most frightening things that students of the Holocaust have to confront in their research is the readiness of so many ordinary people to commit monstrous crimes against their fellow human beings as well as the indifference to and even acceptance of this by so many bystanders. It is all too rare to find in the gentile population expressions of such desperate horror at the murder of the Jews as we find in the texts that Sheptytsky produced. Too rarely do we encounter individuals who were doing everything in their power to protest against and stop the orgy of murder. He was a man, and he had his failings and prejudices like all men, but he was a man with a strong conscience, principles, and courage.

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# We Did Not Recognize Our Country

## *The Rise of Antisemitism in Ukraine before and after the Second World War, 1937–1947*

VICTORIA KHITERER

MOST UKRAINIAN JEWS perished in the Holocaust. Those who survived the concentration camps and ghettos, who were evacuated, or who fought at the fronts were astonished by the rise of antisemitism in Ukraine when they returned home. They wrote to the authorities, stating that they could not recognize their cities and towns. Jews faced ubiquitous, open hostility from the gentile population, who refused to return their apartments and belongings, and often insulted and assaulted them. What happened in Ukraine after its liberation from the Nazi occupation? Why did the level of popular antisemitism rise so dramatically? What were the attitudes of local and high authorities to this phenomenon? These and other questions are examined in this chapter.

### BEFORE THE WAR

Antisemitism in Ukraine has deep roots. The first anti-Jewish pogroms occurred in Kiev in the twelfth century, and anti-Jewish violence took place in Ukraine periodically until the end of the civil war of 1918–20. The Bolsheviks declared antisemitism to be a shameful remnant of the tsarist regime and were certain that it would soon disappear from socialist society. In his speech on anti-Jewish pogroms in March 1919, Vladimir Lenin declared that

Only the most ignorant and downtrodden people can believe the lies and slander that are spread about the Jews. This is a survival of ancient feudal times, when the priests burned heretics at the stake, when the peasants lived in slavery, and when the people were crushed and inarticulate. This ancient, feudal ignorance is passing away; the eyes of the people are being opened . . .

Shame on accursed tsarism which tortured and persecuted the Jews. Shame on those who foment hatred towards the Jews, who foment hatred towards other nations.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, trans. of 4th edn., 45 vols. (Moscow, 1972), xxix. 252–3.

However, antisemitism was definitely more persistent than the Bolsheviks expected at the beginning of their rule. It even increased in the 1920s, compared with pre-revolutionary years.<sup>2</sup> This was grass-roots popular antisemitism, which the Bolsheviks saw as a manifestation of counter-revolution. The Department for Agitation and Propaganda (Agitprop) of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) (*Vsesoyuznaya Kommunisticheskaya partiya (bol'shevikov)*; VKP(b)) called a special meeting in December 1926 to introduce measures to curb antisemitism; the department decided to strengthen propaganda and punitive measures and overcome this 'shameful heritage of the past'.<sup>3</sup> In accordance with this decision, Soviet authorities encouraged the press and book publishers to caution against antisemitism. Lyudmila Gatagova writes that in the period 1927–32, fifty-six books were published in the Soviet Union which denounced antisemitism.<sup>4</sup> Although popular antisemitism was not overcome in the Soviet Union, it was suppressed. Antisemites were afraid to attack Jews openly, as the attackers could be blamed for counter-revolutionary activities and would be persecuted as 'enemies of the people'.

In the 1920s and 1930s, Kiev was one of the two largest centres of Soviet Yiddish culture, the other being Minsk. Many prominent Yiddish writers and poets lived in Kiev, for example David Hofshstein, Itzik Fefer, Perets Markish, and David Bergelson. Jewish theatres and clubs, Yiddish schools and Jewish colleges, Jewish departments in institutions of higher education, and Jewish publishing houses and presses operated in the city until the second half of the 1930s.

However, in the late 1930s the Soviet policy towards all national minorities, including Jews, suddenly shifted. Instead of encouraging the development of the various national cultures of the multinational population of the Soviet Union, the authorities decided to emphasize the dominant Russian culture and suppress all others. Jewish culture and education began to be discouraged. Many Jewish Soviet leaders and intellectuals became victims of Stalin's repressions, and Jewish educational, cultural, and scholarly institutions with very few exceptions were closed. However, Jewish specialists could not all be replaced by non-Jews at that time, and thus state antisemitism did not yet develop to its fullest extent.

A typical expression of the official policy at that time towards national minorities was evident in a speech of one of the Soviet leaders, Aleksandr Shlikhter, at the Thirteenth Congress of the Communist Party of Ukraine (*Kommunisticheskaya partiya (bol'shevikov) Ukrainy*; KP(b)U) in May–June 1937. He spoke about 'the ruinous activity of the various nations'.<sup>5</sup> In accordance with the new Soviet policy,

<sup>2</sup> L. S. Gatagova, "Antisemit est' kontrrevolyutsioner . . .": Soveshchanie po vyrabotke mer po bor'be s antisemitizmom pri Agitprope TsK VKP(b)', in O. V. Budnitsky (ed.), *Arkhiv evreiskoi istorii*, iv (Moscow, 2007), 165.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid. 152.

<sup>4</sup> L. S. Gatagova, 'Disput ob antisemitizme (Moskva, dekabr' 1926 g.)', in O. V. Budnitsky (ed.), *Arkhiv evreiskoi istorii*, v (Moscow, 2007), 202.

<sup>5</sup> V. Khiterer, *Dokumenty po evreiskoi istorii XVI–XX vekov v kievskikh arkhivakh* (Moscow and Kiev, 2001), 135–6.

all national cultures except the Russian one were then suppressed. The repression of Jewish culture took place simultaneously with the persecution of Ukrainian and Polish cultures. In the second half of the 1930s the vast majority of Jewish organizations and institutions were closed in Kiev, in Ukraine, and all over the Soviet Union. The administrative staff and members of these organizations were accused of bourgeois nationalism; many of them were executed or imprisoned as enemies of the people. Soviet Jewish culture never recovered from this blow, and Soviet policy later acquired a clear antisemitic character.

Historians continue to debate when state antisemitism commenced in the Soviet Union. Some suggest that it happened in the late 1930s, while others claim that it began a decade later. In fact, the policy of state antisemitism did not develop overnight. The transformation from the policy of internationalism to state antisemitism took more than a decade, and we can indeed see the first signs of state antisemitism in the Soviet Union in the second half of the 1930s. Amir Weiner supports the point of view of Stalin's daughter Svetlana Allilueva, that state antisemitism was reborn in the Soviet Union 'with the expulsion of Trotsky and the extermination during the years of "purges" of old party members, many of whom were Jews'.<sup>6</sup>

In 1937–8 there was a disproportionately high number of Jews among Soviet elite victims of political repression. Stalin and other members of the Politburo personally sanctioned sentences for important 'state criminals' such as Communist Party and government leaders, Soviet functionaries and military commanders, writers, professors, and other intellectuals (the so-called 'Stalin's list'). In the lists of 'important state criminals' submitted by local departments of the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs (*Narodnyi komissariat vnutrennikh del; NKVD*) for approval by members of the Politburo, Jews constituted from one-quarter to more than a half of the 'enemies of the people' in the large Ukrainian cities of Kiev, Odessa, and Dnipropetrovsk, and most of them were sentenced to death.<sup>7</sup> In the first years of the Soviet regime Jews constituted a significant percentage of the Soviet elite, but this representation was never as high as their number among the 'enemies of the people' in the lists provided by the NKVD departments of those cities. Hence, we can assume that among the NKVD personnel there were covert antisemites, who accused Jews of being enemies of the people, and who removed them from important positions.

The Ukrainian NKVD in the summer of 1939 began an inquiry into 'the Jewish nationalist-fascist underground, which has significantly activated its anti-Soviet work at the current time'.<sup>8</sup> The members of the underground, according to a top-secret report of 2 July 1939 by the Vice-Commissar of Internal Affairs of the

<sup>6</sup> A. Weiner, *Making Sense of War: The Second World War and the Fate of the Bolshevik Revolution* (Princeton, 2002), 235.

<sup>7</sup> Arkhiv Prezidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii, Moscow, f. 3, op. 24, d. 409, fos. 5–181.

<sup>8</sup> "Razrabotku antisovetskoi organizatsii prodolzhaem . . .": Evreiskaya intelligentsiya pod nadzorom NKVD', *Yehupets'*, 18 (2009), 214.

Ukrainian SSR, Amayak Kobulov, were the Jewish writers Itsik Fefer, Leib Kvitko, Der Nister (the pen name of Pinchus Kahanovich), Moisey Teif, and others. These writers,

in a circle of like-minded people, openly discuss questions about the need to revive Jewish national culture, which, according to the words of Nister-Kaganovich, is perishing in the USSR, and to provide an independent territory for Jews, because Birobidzhan, as the Jewish writer Goldes claimed in May 1939, was a mistake.

On 8 May in the evening, after the concluding meeting of the Shevchenko Plenum of the Union of Soviet Writers in Kiev, Jewish writers from that city met with Jewish writer-delegates to the plenum at dinner.

Fefer, who gave a speech at the dinner, reported that ‘in recent years, we, the Jewish intelligentsia, have lost many cultural positions: Jewish institutes, newspapers, and schools have been closed’.

At the dinner, the Muscovite Jewish writer Kvitko stated, ‘It is necessary to continue old Jewish traditions in literature, study the history of our people, and create such cultural values as were created by our nation in ancient times.’ . . .

Excluded in 1937 from the VKP(b) for lies about the [Communist] Party and for Trotskyism, the Jewish writer Gildin, a former Menshevik who was outraged at the closure of Jewish schools, raised the question (in the circle of nationalist writers) of the need to organize protests and to demand the reopening of schools, permission for trade unions to use Yiddish as a working language, and the reorganization of the Department of Jewish Literature at the Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR as an independent institute.

The same Gildin spoke also about the need to facilitate the teaching of the Jewish language, literature, and history in Russian and Ukrainian schools where Jewish children were studying.<sup>9</sup>

In August 1939 Kobulov also sent a top-secret report to the head of the NKVD, Lavrenty Beria, detailing the activities of the Jewish Vinchevsky Library in Kiev. He wrote:

Local religious Jews and people of the so-called ‘free professions’ (brokers, traders) and others aged 40 to 60 are the regular readers at this library.

These ‘readers’ pay special attention to the foreign Jewish newspapers *Naye prese*, the newspaper of the People’s Front in Belgium; *Morgn frayzheynt*, the organ of the American Communist Party; and *Der kamf*, the organ of the United Front in Canada, which the library provides for common use.

These papers publish libellous anti-Soviet articles on different pretexts, which the visitors read until the papers become tattered . . .

For example, ‘Stalinism in Russia’ and ‘The Fall of Stalinism’, which calls the enemy of the people Trotsky and the sentenced traitors Tukhachevsky, Bukharin, and others ‘the opposition’ . . .

Foreign newspapers arrive at the Vinchevsky Library (according to information provided by the People’s Commissariat of Education of the Ukrainian SSR) through the Society for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries, ostensibly free of charge, on the initiative of the foreign societies.

<sup>9</sup> “‘Razrabotku antisovetskoi organizatsii prodolzhaem . . .’”, 214–15.

In addition, the Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, the House of Jewish Culture, and the Jewish writer Fefer also subscribe to these newspapers.

Without any doubt the Zionists are actively participating in the work of the library, and we are focusing on this investigation now.<sup>10</sup>

The Ukrainian NKVD collected enough material to start a campaign against 'Jewish nationalists' and to prove their international connections. But perhaps Moscow did not approve of the campaign, because Fefer, Kvitko, and Der Nister were not arrested until a decade later, in 1948, when the affair of the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee (Evreiskii antifashistskii komitet) began. At the same time as they gathered information on 'Jewish nationalists' in Kiev and their connections abroad, the NKVD in Moscow collected similar information about Vyacheslav Molotov's wife Polina Zhemchuzhina (her original name was Perl Karpovskaya). Probably the NKVD planned to combine these materials into one affair against 'Jewish nationalists'.

Polina Zhemchuzhina (1897–1970) was born in the village of Pologi, in Ekaterinoslav province (today Zaporizhzhya oblast, Ukraine), into the family of a Jewish tailor. She joined the VKP(b) in 1918 and served as a propaganda commissar in the Red Army during the Civil War. A clever and ambitious woman, she had a career independent of that of her husband. She worked in various administrative positions at the People's Commissariat of Light Industry and People's Commissariat of the Food Industry, and at the beginning of 1939 was appointed People's Commissar of the Fishing Industry. In the same year, she was elected to the Central Committee of the VKP(b).<sup>11</sup> Stalin was very unhappy with the promotion of Zhemchuzhina, whom he personally could not tolerate. Polina had been a close friend of his late wife Nadezhda Allilueva; in Stalin's opinion she had had a negative influence on his wife. Stalin also believed that the strong-willed and ambitious Polina dominated Molotov, and several times suggested that Molotov divorce her.<sup>12</sup> Lavrenty Beria, who was appointed People's Commissar of Internal Affairs in December 1938, began to gather compromising materials about Zhemchuzhina. The NKVD discovered that Polina corresponded with her sister, who had emigrated to Palestine in 1920. One of Polina's nephews lived in the United States. She spoke Yiddish and patronized the Moscow State Jewish Theatre, often attending its performances.<sup>13</sup>

On 10 August 1939 the Politburo of the Central Committee of the VKP(b) passed a resolution on Zhemchuzhina, which stated: 'Comrade Zhemchuzhina has shown carelessness and imprudence in her connections; owing to this, in Comrade Zhemchuzhina's circle many hostile spying elements have appeared, in consequence of which their espionage work has unintentionally been made easier.'<sup>14</sup> The Politburo decided to relieve Zhemchuzhina of her position as People's Commissar of the Fishing Industry and further investigate her activity. However, the NKVD

<sup>10</sup> Ibid. 271–9.

<sup>11</sup> Zh. Medvedev, *Stalin i evreiskaya problema: Novyi analiz* (Moscow, 2004), 58–9.

<sup>12</sup> Ibid. 57–8.

<sup>13</sup> Ibid. 59.

<sup>14</sup> Ibid. 59–60.

did not continue the campaign against her at that time. She was fired from her position but, like other 'Jewish nationalists', was arrested only a decade later.

After collecting extensive compromising materials on 'Jewish nationalists', why did the NKVD not begin a campaign against them in 1939? Perhaps Soviet leaders were more preoccupied with the impending onset of the Second World War than with 'Jewish nationalists'. They understood that despite the Soviet–German non-aggression pact, war was most likely inevitable. It was not a time to start new political campaigns. The other reason to postpone an anti-Jewish campaign was that Jewish specialists could not yet be replaced by non-Jews. The Soviet Union of the inter-war period had a shortage of educated people, and the educational level of Jews was higher than that of any other nationality. According to the census of 1939, out of every 1,000 Jews, 265 had a high-school education and 57 had advanced to higher levels of education; by comparison, the numbers for Russians were 81 and 6.<sup>15</sup>

Germany's foreign minister, Joachim von Ribbentrop, was pleasantly surprised during his trip to Moscow in August 1939 when Stalin ostensibly claimed that he was 'just waiting for the moment when the USSR would have enough of its own intelligentsia, who would completely end the domination of the leadership by Jews, whom he still needs'.<sup>16</sup>

Before 1939, anti-Nazi propaganda existed in the Soviet Union, and Soviet propagandists specifically blamed the Nazi regime for the persecution of Jews. The situation changed on 3 May 1939, when Stalin removed Maksim Litvinov, who was Jewish, from the position of Commissar of Foreign Affairs, appointing instead the Russian Vyacheslav Molotov, who was simultaneously Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars. Molotov recalled half a century later:

In 1939 when Litvinov was fired and I took his place, Stalin told me, 'Get the Jews out of the commissariat.' Thank God that he said that! You see the Jews were the absolute majority in the management and among the ambassadors. That is not right, of course. Latvians and Jews . . . And they looked down on me when I came there; they mocked the measures I began instituting.<sup>17</sup>

### UKRAINE WITHOUT JEWS

The Nazis and their local collaborators exterminated 1.6 million of the 2.7 million pre-war Jewish population of Ukraine, about 60 per cent of the total. Approximately 100,000 Jews survived Nazi occupation in partisan detachments, in hiding, and in ghettos and concentration camps. More than 900,000 Jews survived as Red Army soldiers or in evacuation.<sup>18</sup>

<sup>15</sup> G. V. Kostyrchenko, *Tainaya politika Stalina: Vlast' i antisemitizm* (Moscow, 2001), 198.

<sup>16</sup> Ibid.

<sup>17</sup> A. Vaksberg, *Stalin against the Jews*, trans. A. W. Bouis (New York, 1994), 83; Kostyrchenko, *Tainaya politika Stalina*, 196.

<sup>18</sup> A. Kruglov, 'Jewish Losses in Ukraine, 1941–44', in R. Brandon and W. Lower (eds.), *The Shoah in Ukraine: History, Testimony, Memorialization* (Bloomington, Ind., 2008), 273.



However, immediately after the liberation of Ukraine scarcely any Jews were present there, as they had not yet returned from the ghettos, evacuation, and the front. This produced an impression that the tragedy was total, that Ukraine had lost its entire Jewish population. This view was expressed by Vasily Grossman in his essay 'Ukraine without Jews', published in the Soviet Yiddish newspaper *Eynikeyt* on 25 November 1943:

There are no Jews in Ukraine. Nowhere—Poltava, Kharkov, Kremenchug, Borispol, Yagotin—in none of the cities, hundreds of towns, or thousands of villages will you see the black, tear-filled eyes of little girls; you will not hear the sad voice of an old woman; you will not see the dark face of a hungry baby.

All is silence. Everything is still. A whole people has been brutally murdered.<sup>19</sup>

Even without Jews, antisemitism flourished in Ukraine. The traditional antisemitism of the locals was intensified by Nazi propaganda. In many locations, the non-Jewish population actively participated in exterminating Jews, betraying hidden Jews to the Nazis, and stealing Jewish property.

The Nazi occupation of Ukrainian regions persisted for some three years, from the summer of 1941. During that entire period, the Nazis spread virulent antisemitic propaganda. The extermination of the Jews in Ukraine did not stop this propaganda and even encouraged further verbal and violent physical attacks on Jews in other places. The propaganda was intended to justify the mass murder of Jews in the eyes of the local gentiles.

The Nazis blamed Jews for all past and current difficulties in the Soviet Union. The Bolshevik regime was identified with Jewish power; Jews were accused by the Nazis of seizing power in the Soviet Union, of destroying historical monuments, of artificially organizing famine in Ukraine during collectivization, of suppressing Ukrainian national culture, and of organizing the mass repression of Christians and ruining Christian religious life. The Nazi military administration of occupied Ukraine spent significant funds and effort spreading this propaganda in the Russian and Ukrainian languages.

During the Nazi occupation of Ukraine, hundreds of antisemitic leaflets were printed and articles and cartoons published in local newspapers and magazines. The Nazis subsidized the establishment and work in Kiev of the Museum-Archive of the Transitional Period, with the goal of 'showing the liberation of Ukraine by the glorious German army from the power of the Yid-Bolshevik rulers'.<sup>20</sup> The museum opened its first exhibition in Podol, the formerly Jewish district of the city, where the majority of Kiev's Jews had lived before the war, on 15 July 1942. A special exhibition was titled 'Kiev in the Years of Yid-Bolshevik Oppression'.<sup>21</sup>

<sup>19</sup> J. and C. Garrard, *The Bones of Berdichev: The Life and Fate of Vasily Grossman* (New York, London, 1996), 170.

<sup>20</sup> Derzhavnyi arkhiv Kyivivs'koyi oblasti, Kiev, f. 2412, op. 1, spr. 29, fos. 3, 6–7.

<sup>21</sup> *Ibid.* 1.

Some of the local Ukrainian intelligentsia collaborated with the Nazis in creating and spreading this antisemitic propaganda.

The extermination of the majority of Jews in Ukraine was a horrifying tragedy for the rest of Jewry and compassionate sympathizers, but was celebrated by local antisemites, who thought that they had finally got rid of the 'Yids', and who benefited from the acquisition of Jews' property and apartments. However, Jews who survived in evacuation, concentration camps, and ghettos began to return to their cities and towns in 1944. Almost everywhere they met with an openly hostile attitude from their gentile neighbours.

### UNWELCOME RETURN HOME

'There is an impression that, by their return, Jews have spoiled the mood of the majority of the Russian population, which was definitely outraged that these aliens from another world were laying claim to the apartments and furniture that they had left behind.' These words (the author of the letter did not sign his full name) were written to Ilya Ehrenburg by a correspondent from Odessa on 22 July 1944.<sup>22</sup> The writer of the letter also said that he was suffocating in an atmosphere poisoned by Nazi propaganda: 'All my friends from the ghetto who have returned to Odessa claim that the Romanian-German infection has penetrated all Soviet institutions.'<sup>23</sup>

In the small Ukrainian town of Nemyriv, the majority of Jews perished during the Nazi occupation, 'whereas the local party officials lived out the war in safety at the rear'.<sup>24</sup> These leaders returned to the liberated town and 'looted Jewish property. When Jews, who had survived the war in villages, forests, and partisans' detachments, returned and asked for their belongings, they were rebuffed . . . Thus, they concluded that the party's policy toward Jews did not differ from that of the Germans.'<sup>25</sup>

In many places, after liberation the surviving Jews were in a desperate and precarious situation. On 29 May 1944 Professor Konstantin Mikhailovich Grodsky wrote from Odessa to Ilya Ehrenburg, saying that 1,500–2,000 surviving Jews needed emergency aid of money and clothes: 'There are children and people 50 to 70 years old, without clothes or money, in the best case living in rooms without furniture!'<sup>26</sup> Ehrenburg replied on 14 June that the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee (of which he was a member) was handling the case and that clothing and money would soon be sent to Odessa.<sup>27</sup> On 24 March 1945 Grodsky sent a second letter to Ehrenburg, stating, 'None of the destitute Jews who returned from the ghetto (mostly intelligentsia), nor the very needy re-evacuated Jews, have received any aid.'<sup>28</sup>

<sup>22</sup> *Sovetskie evrei pishut Il'e Erenburgu, 1943–1966*, ed. M. Altshuler, I. Arad, and Sh. Krakovsky [S. Krakowski] (Jerusalem, 1993), 140. <sup>23</sup> Ibid.

<sup>24</sup> Weiner, *Making Sense of War*, 191. <sup>25</sup> Ibid.

<sup>26</sup> *Sovetskie evrei pishut Il'e Erenburgu*, ed. Altshuler, Arad, and Krakovsky, 138.

<sup>27</sup> Ibid. 139.

<sup>28</sup> Ibid. 197.

On 18 May 1944 the chairman of the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee, the Jewish actor and director of the Moscow State Jewish Theatre Solomon Mikhoels, and the secretary of the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee, Shakhno Epshtein, wrote to Deputy Prime Minister Molotov about the ‘very difficult situation of the Jewish population in the liberated territory and in evacuation’.<sup>29</sup> They specifically said:

Every day we are receiving anxious messages from the liberated territories regarding the very difficult moral and economic situation of Jews who have survived the Nazi extermination. In a number of locations (Berdichev, Mogilev-Podolsky, Balta, Zhmerinka, Vinnitsa, Khmelnik, the village Rafalovka of the Rovno district, and others), many survivors remain on the territory of former ghettos. Their apartments were not returned to them, nor was stolen property identified as theirs. After suffering during the catastrophe, the surviving Jews are not only not receiving the attention they deserve from the local authorities, but the authorities are also sometimes roughly violating Soviet law, doing nothing to provide Soviet living conditions for Jews . . .

The Committee has information that Jewish workers, temporarily evacuated by the Soviet authorities to the rear, are meeting obstacles in their re-evacuation to their native locations. This is occurring despite the fact that among the evacuated there are qualified specialists who could help to reconstruct ruined cities and villages, but are not allowed to return.

Some who have found ways to return to their native places, where their grandparents and great-grandparents lived, have found their houses occupied by new inhabitants who took over during the Nazi period. Those who have returned are therefore left without a roof over their heads. The situation regarding the provision of jobs and financial aid for them has not improved.

It has come to our attention that aid which the Red Cross is receiving from various countries with clothes and food for the evacuated and re-evacuated seldom reaches needy Jews.<sup>30</sup>

Mikhoels and Epshtein asked that the Soviet government take ‘emergency measures to dispel all abnormal attitudes towards surviving Jews in the liberated districts, to normalize their legal status, to return apartments and property, and to provide jobs and emergency financial aid’.<sup>31</sup>

Molotov forwarded this letter to the First Secretary of the KP(b)U, Nikita Khrushchev, with a brief resolution: ‘Please give this your attention and take measures. Comrade Beria, to whom I sent this letter, made the following proposals regarding Ukraine, which I send you.’<sup>32</sup> Beria ‘ordered the Ukrainian Central Committee and government, and Khrushchev personally, to take the necessary measures to assist in the working, housing and domestic arrangements of Jews in the liberated territories “who were subject to particular repressions by the German occupiers (concentration camps, ghettos, etc.)”’.<sup>33</sup> Amir Weiner writes: ‘Beria’s response was a rare official admission of the Jews’ unique fate under the Nazis.’<sup>34</sup>

The security service, the People’s Commissariat for State Security (Narodnyi komissariat gosudarstvennoi bezopasnosti; NKGB), also admitted to a rise in

<sup>29</sup> Tsentral’nyi derzhavnyi arkhiv hromads’kykh ob’yednan’ Ukrayiny, Kiev (hereafter TsDAHOU), f. 1, op. 23, spr. 3851, fo. 3.

<sup>30</sup> Ibid.

<sup>31</sup> Ibid. 4.

<sup>32</sup> Ibid.

<sup>33</sup> Weiner, *Making Sense of War*, 212.

<sup>34</sup> Ibid. 211–12.

popular antisemitism in Ukraine after its liberation. According to a top-secret report by the People's Commissar of the NKGB of Ukraine to Khrushchev titled 'On Antisemitism in Ukraine', dated 13 September 1944, the people of Kiev had called for a pogrom on 22 June 1944 (the third anniversary of the Nazi attack on the Soviet Union) and the local gentile population had attacked and beaten the Jews of Kiev on the streets.<sup>35</sup>

On 5 September 1945 the Vice-Commissar of Internal Affairs of the Ukrainian SSR, I. L. Loburenko, reported to the secretary of the Central Committee of the KP(b)U, Demyan Korotchenko, about the situation leading up to the pogrom in Kiev after NKGB lieutenant Iosif Rozenshtein killed two local antisemites.<sup>36</sup> The events developed as follows. On 4 September 1945, at 5.30 p.m., Rozenshtein, who worked for the NKGB as a radio technician, was returning home from the grocery store dressed in civilian clothes. On his way, he was insulted and beaten up by two drunk local antisemites, Grabar and Melnikov. Some passers-by came to his defence and he was able to get home. He then put on his uniform, took the pistol that he had been granted as an officer of the NKGB, and went to the courtyard of Grabar's mother's house, where Melnikov was also present; Rozenshtein's wife followed him. We can assume that this incident between Rozenshtein and Grabar was not the first, because Rozenshtein knew where Grabar lived. Rozenshtein shot and killed his abusers in the courtyard of Grabar's house. Hearing the screaming of Grabar's mother, a large crowd gathered, shouting antisemitic slogans and severely beating Rozenshtein's wife and a passing Jew named Boris Spektor.<sup>37</sup>

The Kiev police came to the spot where the two antisemites had been killed and attempted to pacify the crowd, but the crowd resisted the authorities, not letting them take away the corpses of the two antisemites and the wounded Spektor and Rozenshtein's wife. Then the mounted police came and restored order. Rozenshtein was immediately arrested and was soon executed by the decision of a military tribunal.<sup>38</sup>

The funeral of the antisemites shot by Rozenshtein, which took place on 7 September 1945, turned into open violence against Kiev's Jews, with some three hundred people participating. The Kiev Jews Kotlyar, Zabrodin, Pesin, and Miloslavsky wrote a letter on 16 October 1945 addressed 'to Comrade I. V. Stalin, Central Committee of the Communist Party; to Comrade Beria, NKVD of the USSR; and to Comrade Pospelov, editor of the newspaper *Pravda*', noting that the funerals had turned into a pogrom:

The funerals were organized in a special way. The coffins were carried through the most populous streets and then the procession went to the Jewish market. This procession was set up by the pogrom-makers. They began to assault the Jews. One hundred Jews were beaten up on this day, thirty-six of them were taken to hospitals in Kiev with serious injuries, and five of them died on the same day.<sup>39</sup>

<sup>35</sup> TsDAHOU, f. 1, op. 23, spr. 1363, fo. 4.

<sup>36</sup> TsDAHOU, f. 1, op. 23, spr. 2366, fos. 10–11.

<sup>37</sup> Ibid.

<sup>38</sup> Ibid. 11.

<sup>39</sup> Ibid. 21.

Solomon Shvarts reported that sixteen Jews were killed during the pogrom in Kiev.<sup>40</sup>

Kotlyar, Zabrodin, Pesin, and Miloslavsky lamented in their letter that they could not recognize their city, 'not only by its appearance, but also because of the existing political situation there'.<sup>41</sup> They said they felt the strong influence of Nazi propaganda:

Everywhere in the capital of Ukraine you can hear the words 'Yid' or 'Let's beat the Yids': in trams, trolleybuses, stores, markets, and even in some Soviet offices.

In a somewhat more latent form it [antisemitism] is present in communist organizations, up to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine.<sup>42</sup>

Ukrainian authorities also reported on the pogrom mood in the city and took measures to reinforce security.<sup>43</sup> As is shown by the secret report of 8 September 1945 of the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the Ukrainian SSR, Vasily Ryasnoy, to the Secretary of the Central Committee of the KP(b)U, Demyan Korotchenko, the local authorities took seriously the threat of an even larger pogrom in Kiev. Ryasnoy wrote: 'Considering the inflamed condition of a certain part of the population of the city due to the spreading of bogus rumours and agitation directed against Jews, we reinforced patrols in the city, moreover giving special attention to the markets and gathering places, and the places of residence of relatives of the murdered Grabar and Melnikov.'<sup>44</sup> It is obvious that, without the measures taken by the Soviet authorities, the anti-Jewish violence in the city would have taken on even larger dimensions.

Unfortunately the Kiev pogrom was not unique. Anti-Jewish violence occurred in other Ukrainian cities and towns, perhaps on a smaller scale. Antisemitic violence was often sparked off by the attempts of Jews to return to their apartments, where they had lived before the war. Even if Jews came to their apartments with court orders, the occupants still refused to move out of them. On 25 August 1944 the Jewish dentist Yuzef Markovich Petelevich attempted to return to his apartment in Dnipropetrovsk, where Pelageya Orlova had settled. Petelevich had a court order giving him the right to the apartment, and Orlova, according to the court's decision, was to be resettled in a less comfortable apartment. During her forced move, which was demanded by 'administrative order', 'Orlova resisted, and at the sound of her screaming, a crowd of about two hundred people gathered, shouting, "Beat the Yids, save Russia!", "Death to the Yids", "Thirty-seven thousand Yids were slaughtered [by the Nazis in Dnipropetrovsk]; we'll kill the rest", etc.'<sup>45</sup>

Then several members of the crowd attacked Petelevich with stones and tried to break into a neighbouring apartment, in which a Jew named Ulanovsky lived: 'Because the apartment was locked, the above-mentioned group of people brought

<sup>40</sup> S. M. Shvarts, *Antisemitizm v Sovetskom Soyuze* (New York, 1952), 196.

<sup>41</sup> TsDAHOU, f. 1, op. 23, spr. 2366, fo. 19.

<sup>42</sup> Ibid. 20.

<sup>43</sup> Ibid. 3-4.

<sup>44</sup> Ibid. 4.

<sup>45</sup> TsDAHOU, f. 1, op. 23, spr. 1363, fo. 5.

an axe, broke the door, and burst into the apartment, where they danced and shouted antisemitic words while setting about smashing the furniture.<sup>46</sup> The Dnipropetrovsk police dispersed the crowd and arrested the three most active pogrom-makers.<sup>47</sup>

In March 1945 the *Bulletin of the Rescue Committee of the Jewish Agency for Palestine* published the testimony of a Ukrainian Jew who had escaped from Kharkiv and the Soviet Union in 1944. He stated:

Ukrainians meet returning Jews with animosity. In the first weeks after the liberation of Kharkov [the city was liberated on 23 August 1943], no Jews dared go into the street at night. The situation improved only after the intervention of the authorities, who reinforced police patrols in the city. There were many cases when Jews were beaten up on the market squares, and in one incident a Jew was killed in the market by a Ukrainian. The police were summoned to the spot of the crime; however, the peasants who were present during the murder began to quarrel with the police; all of them were arrested together with the killer . . .

Returning to their apartments, the Jews received only a small portion of their belongings. When they appealed to the court against the Ukrainians who had possession of their items, other Ukrainians supported the thieves and provided false testimony in the court.

The Ukrainian authorities are infected to a significant extent with antisemitism. Appeals made by Jews are not considered in an appropriate way. When the [Kiev] Commercial Institute returned from Kharkov to Kiev, Jewish professors asked permission to return too. Their request was rejected . . . The Jewish Theatre did not receive permission to return to Kharkov. The radio programme in the Jewish language [Yiddish] was not renewed. The official answer to all complaints by Jews stated that antisemitism, through which the Germans had poisoned the mentality of the population, could be eradicated only gradually.<sup>48</sup>

The Kiev Jews who had written the above-mentioned letter of 16 October 1945 to Stalin, Beria, and Pospelov also blamed the leaders of the Central Committee of the KP(b)U and the Ukrainian government for the antisemitic situation in Kiev and throughout Ukraine. They wrote:

We, communists, citizens of Kiev, the authors of this letter, feel sorry for Ukraine, feel sorry for the leaders of this wonderful republic, who have appeared politically blind and put our native capital city to shame, making it an assemblage of pogrom-makers, Black Hundreds, and rabid nationalists.

Now it will be written into the history of our revolution that in Kiev in the twenty-eighth year since the October Revolution the first anti-Jewish pogrom occurred, something that has not happened since the time of the fall of the tsarist regime.

This is one of the 'achievements' of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of Ukraine and the Council of People's Commissars of Ukraine in the days of victory.

We think that this situation should be brought to an end as soon as possible; otherwise, it can turn into a political scandal with international repercussions. It is no accident that

<sup>46</sup> TsDAHOU, f. 1, op. 23, spr. 1363, fo. 6. <sup>47</sup> Ibid.

<sup>48</sup> Shvarts, *Antisemitizm v Sovetskom Soyuze*, 195–6.

Comrade Manuilsky<sup>49</sup> has already received questions at a press conference in San Francisco about the situation of Jews in Ukraine. You can see that information about what has happened here has leaked abroad. At the present time, many delegations, tourists, writers, and journalists are visiting Ukraine, and among them are many Jews. In communicating with local Jews they will learn the bitter truth about the current situation of Jews in Ukraine.<sup>50</sup>

The Ukrainian authorities were not as politically blind as Jews assumed, but it seems that they could not handle the popular violent antisemitism. The situation got out of their control. The Nazi antisemitic propaganda successfully overlapped with the traditional antisemitism of Ukraine's non-Jewish population. If antisemitism was considered a counter-revolutionary activity before the war and antisemites were afraid to raise their heads, the Nazis changed this attitude by showing the local population that it was possible to kill and humiliate Jews without any punishment. Fear of the repressive Soviet regime disappeared during the war. And immediately upon this disappearance, the traditional slogan of the Black Hundreds—'Beat the Jews, save Russia!'—was revived. Weiner writes, 'Twenty-five years of Soviet rule seemed to have been overwhelmed by only three years of German occupation.'<sup>51</sup>

Antisemites too sent their complaints to the higher Soviet authorities, in which they claimed that Jews occupied too many prestigious positions in Ukraine. In an anonymous letter sent to the Central Committee of the KP(b)U in July 1944, antisemites claimed that Jews had taken over the Kiev Conservatory, pushing out the Ukrainians who had worked there:

The Kiev Conservatory has returned—99% of the Jews who had fled and two-and-a-half Ukrainians. The Jews immediately seized the executive positions: deans, assistant deans, and head of the pedagogical department. Next they arranged good jobs for their cronies and their wives. Because there weren't enough places for all, the Ukrainian teachers and some of the Russians trained in the same conservatory were thrown out.<sup>52</sup>

From the antisemites' point of view, the Ukrainian authorities were extending patronage to the Jews, who were supposedly taking all property and power in Ukraine into their hands. In early 1946, another anonymous letter, originally addressed to the VKP(b) in Moscow, was received by the Central Committee of the KP(b)U.<sup>53</sup> The letter asked:

What is going on here in Ukraine? Now the Jews own all of Ukraine. It is they, with their Jewish snouts, taunting the Russian people in Ukraine. For money, they have bought many

<sup>49</sup> Dmitry Zakharovich Manuilsky (1883–1959), Soviet statesman and party figure, member of the Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR from 1945.

<sup>50</sup> TsDAHOU, f. 1, op. 23, spr. 2366, fos. 29–30.

<sup>51</sup> Weiner, *Making Sense of War*, 193.

<sup>52</sup> M. Altshuler, 'Antisemitism in Ukraine toward the End of World War II', in Z. Gitelman (ed.), *Bitter Legacy: Confronting the Holocaust in the USSR* (Bloomington, Ind., 1997), 80–1.

<sup>53</sup> M. Blackwell, 'Regime City of the First Category: The Experience of the Return of Soviet Power to Kyiv, Ukraine, 1943–1946', Ph.D. diss. (Indiana Univ., 2005), 368.

people, even the leaders of regions and cities of Ukraine. Who sells passports at the market? Jews. Who is trading awards? Jews. Who is killing the Russian people? Jews. Who is throwing people out of their apartments in winter in Kiev? Jews . . .

We are ready to handle any hardship—and for the good of the motherland, we Russians do not mind risking our lives. These parasites, however, need to be destroyed.

Even in Kiev, advertisements are appearing, ‘Beat the Jews, save Russia.’ How can Moscow not have heard about this? What needs to be done?

(1) Exile, to the last man, all Jews to Siberia and then take some Siberians and bring them here so they can taste life.

(2) All institutions in Ukraine, in Kiev, and other big cities, need to be cleansed of Jews and they should be replaced with Russians.<sup>54</sup>

The Russian poet Naum Korzhavin (a pseudonym of Naum Mandel), who lived in Moscow and visited his native Kiev in the summer of 1946, recalled in his memoirs that he met with ‘hard, overwhelming antisemitism, which in such concentration and absolute power I never saw anywhere again’.<sup>55</sup> He said that the apartment crisis in the city catalysed the antisemitism, because Jews had returned to Kiev from evacuation. The antisemitic mood was widespread not only among common people, but also among some Ukrainian intellectuals.<sup>56</sup>

On 21 August 1946 the Ukrainian satirical writer Ostap Vyshnya published in the newspaper *Radyans’ka Ukrayina* a feuilleton titled ‘Allow Me to Make a Mistake’, in which he implied that Jews had lived comfortably in evacuation while the rest of the population had fought on the front. Vyshnya claimed that ‘It was already clear to a certain extent, who fought at the front, and who in Ferghana and Tashkent, who returned as re-builders and restorers, and who traded in beer and soft drinks and won back apartments.’<sup>57</sup> Many Ukrainian Jews were outraged by this article. Several Jewish readers responded with angry letters to the newspaper and to the Central Committee of the KP(b)U.<sup>58</sup> An anonymous correspondent was incredulous: ‘I just cannot understand why an organ of the Central Committee of the KP(b)U allows such things to be printed. Can this really have been done with its permission?’<sup>59</sup>

A resident of Kiev, M. B. Vaslits, responded thus to the feuilleton:

Until the end of the war, I was located in the ranks of the Red Army, fighting on the front . . . In November 1945, I was demobilized. I bring this information about myself in order to underline that the questions I am about to touch on have no immediate relation to me. The city of Kiev to which I returned after the war was unrecognizable to me in some ways . . . The German-Ukrainian fascists sowed their nationalistic hatred especially against the Jews who had started to slowly return from evacuation and from the army. The main accusations amounted to—and amount to still—that Jews did not take part in the war for they were not

<sup>54</sup> Blackwell, ‘Regime City of the First Category’.

<sup>55</sup> N. Korzhavin, *V soblaznakh krovavoi epokhi*, 2 vols. (Moscow, 2006), i. 653.

<sup>56</sup> Ibid. <sup>57</sup> Blackwell, ‘Regime City of the First Category’, 370.

<sup>58</sup> TsDAHOU, f. 1, op. 23, spr. 2812, fos. 1–22; f. 1, op. 41, spr. 15, fo. 169.

<sup>59</sup> TsDAHOU, f. 1, op. 41, spr. 15, fo. 169.



in the Red Army and were saving themselves in Fergana and Tashkent. 'Tashkent' itself became an anti-Soviet word and in part a hooligan one too. Upon coming across a Jew (a participant in the war with medals and other awards), an anti-Semite would mock him with a question such as, 'Where did you buy that award, in Tashkent?' etc. or if he was an invalid of the war, 'So you fell under a tram in Tashkent, eh?' . . . The majority of those who returned on the basis of the law of 5 August 1941 concerning the return of the apartments of military men and families of military men began working on retaking their apartments which in the majority of cases those who had been here with the Germans had succeeded in settling. The effort to evict these settlers has led to the spread of anti-Semitism everywhere and in everything. In our Soviet country, where like nowhere else has been resolved the national question, these manifestations of anti-Semitism are simply intolerable.<sup>60</sup>

The sharp protest of Jewish readers at Vyshnya's feuilleton compelled the Soviet authorities to denounce it. On 29 August 1946 the central organ of the VKP(b) newspaper *Pravda* published 'an article sharply criticizing the tone of Vyshnia's feuilleton. This was an article that *Radians'ka Ukraina* later reprinted on 30 August 1946 before following with its own editorial claiming Vyshnia's work was petty and mistaken.'<sup>61</sup> When *Pravda* and *Radyans'ka Ukrayina* denounced his feuilleton, Vyshnya considered it better to make an apology than to return to Stalin's concentration camps, where he had already spent ten years, from 1933 to 1943, and after a conversation in the Department of Propaganda of the Central Committee of the VKP(b), he wrote an open letter to *Radyans'ka Ukrayina* admitting his mistakes and apologizing to the readers.<sup>62</sup>

Antisemitism in various forms—from covert to violent—prevailed in eastern and western Ukraine in the territories that had been under Soviet rule since the end of the Civil War in 1920 and on the newly acquired territories of western Ukraine taken from Poland in 1939 and Romania in 1940. According to a report by the secretary of the Chernivtsi oblast party committee, Ivan Zelenyuk, to Khrushchev in 1944, 'Jews constitute the majority of the city's population. It is characteristic that many Jews were shot and deported to the concentration camps . . . A substantial part of the Ukrainian population has alien attitudes towards Jews who live in the city. You can often hear: "We will not go to Chernivtsi while Jews are there."<sup>63</sup>

The Soviet authorities were probably considering the mood of the local Ukrainian population when they allowed and encouraged the resettlement of Jews who were former Romanian citizens back to Romania. By the resolutions of the Councils of People's Commissars of the USSR and of the Ukrainian SSR of February 1946, all Jews who did not have Soviet citizenship before 28 June 1940 (i.e. before the annexation of Bukovina by the Soviets) could be 'evacuated' to Romania if they so wished, up to 22 April 1946.<sup>64</sup> Many Jews used this offer of 'repatriation' so

<sup>60</sup> Blackwell, 'Regime City of the First Category', 371.

<sup>61</sup> Ibid.

<sup>62</sup> TsDAHOU, f. 1, op. 23, spr. 2812, fo. 13.

<sup>63</sup> S. Frunchak, 'Commemorating the Future in Post-War Chernivtsi', *East European Politics and Societies*, 24/3 (2010), 461.

<sup>64</sup> TsDAHOU, f. 1, op. 23, spr. 2620, fos. 17–18.

that through Romania they could continue on their way to Palestine.<sup>65</sup> Zelenyuk reported to the Secretary of the Central Committee of the KP(b)U Korotchenko that 16,261 Jews had left for Romania by the deadline.<sup>66</sup> In addition, some Jews who held Polish citizenship before 1939 and found themselves on Soviet territory during the war used their right of repatriation to Poland, as did other Polish citizens after the war.

If the repatriation of thousands of Jews from the western regions of Ukraine helped the Soviet authorities to keep popular antisemitism under control, the situation in the rest of Ukraine was more complicated. More than a million Jewish Soviet citizens who survived the war lived in this area. The local and republican authorities who were afraid of being held responsible by Moscow for street violence and pogroms against Jews tried hard to suppress such activity. As was shown above, the Ukrainian authorities sent police and troops to disperse the pogrom crowds in Kiev, Dnipropetrovsk, and Kharkiv and arrested and interrogated the pogrom-makers. Despite all their efforts, popular antisemitism persisted. In a secret report to Khrushchev of 18 September 1944, the People's Commissar of State Security of Ukraine, Sergey Savchenko, devoted the entire discussion to the rise of anti-semitism in Ukraine. This shows that the Ukrainian security service took the issue quite seriously. Savchenko wrote:

After the liberation of Ukraine, the NKGB of the Ukrainian SSR found acute manifestations of antisemitism in the local population, in almost all cities.

Our organs have admitted that recently in a number of places in the Ukrainian SSR there have been increased anti-Jewish manifestations, in several cases verging towards open riots of the nature of pogroms.<sup>67</sup>

Savchenko said that most of the antisemitic statements were made by people who had lived under the Nazi occupation. He also reported that the directors of some local plants and institutions misunderstood Soviet national policy and, without any justification, refused to employ Jews.<sup>68</sup>

At the same time, Savchenko blamed the increased antisemitism in Ukraine on Jewish provocation. He said that Jews spread rumours about the punishment of Ukrainians for antisemitism, as well as rumours about 'the ostensibly antisemitic politics of the Ukrainian government and personally of Comrade Khrushchev'.<sup>69</sup> Savchenko reported that all manifestations of antisemitism were reviewed by the state security police. Instigators were arrested, as were Jews who spread provocative rumours.

Savchenko also noted the rise of nationalist feelings among Jews. Thus, according to an NKGB informer, a Jew named Khaim Tokar, who before the war had been the editor of a Kiev newspaper, complained that because of antisemitism he could not find work in Kiev. Tokar compared the situations of Jews in the Soviet

<sup>65</sup> M. Mitsel, *Evrei Ukrainy v 1943–1953 gg.: Ocherki dokumentirovannoi istorii* (Kiev, 2004), 72.

<sup>66</sup> TsDAHOU, f. 1, op. 23, spr. 2620, fos. 17–18.

<sup>67</sup> TsDAHOU, f. 1, op. 23, spr. 1363, fo. 1.

<sup>68</sup> Ibid. 1–2.

<sup>69</sup> Ibid. 3.

Union and those in the United States. He mentioned a conversation he had had with the well-known Yiddish poet Itsik Fefer, who had come to Kiev to a convention of the Union of Soviet Writers. Tokar said that when Fefer returned from America he reported that 'Jews in America live much better than in the USSR. There is real democratic freedom.'<sup>70</sup> Fefer ostensibly told Tokar, 'We Jews should have our own state; nothing else will work.'<sup>71</sup>

We do not know if Fefer really did state this to Tokar, who was later arrested and during interrogation denied that Fefer had said anything about a better life for Jews in America. But the fact is that Fefer, as a member of the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee, travelled during the Second World War to the United States, but was later accused by the NKVD of being an American spy, as were other members of the committee. The persecution of the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee lasted from 1948 to 1952 and many of its members were executed.

However, in 1944, before the state's antisemitic campaigns had begun, it seems that the leaders of Ukrainian state security were confused about how to deal with the open appearance of antisemitism. Savchenko reported to Khrushchev that the NKGB punished both antisemites and Jewish Zionists:

We have taken measures to reveal and arrest the enemy agents who provoked the antisemitic incidents and spread the provocative rumours.

Simultaneously, we are uncovering the nationalist Zionist elements among the Jewish population and are interrogating them about their anti-Soviet activity.<sup>72</sup>

The Central Committee of the KP(b)U rejected Savchenko's conclusions about the rise of antisemitism in Ukraine. It conducted its own investigation into the manifestations described in Savchenko's letter, and came to the conclusion that these incidents were of a spontaneous hooligan character and 'do not show the real political-moral mood of the population and cannot be used for making generalizations and drawing conclusions about manifestations of antisemitism among the local population in Ukraine'.<sup>73</sup>

The Central Committee of the KP(b)U denied the rise of antisemitism, called the incidents 'random phenomena', and placed all responsibility for handling them on the Ukrainian NKGB. A secret report of the Investigating Commission of the KP(b)U of 28 October 1944 stated: 'In order to put a decisive end to these incidents, the NKGB should not collect information on these questions but rather react as they arise and inform the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine about them in good time.'<sup>74</sup>

But for the Ukrainian NKGB and other Ukrainian authorities, there was a real problem in determining how to react to this popular antisemitism displayed by significant numbers of Ukraine's non-Jewish population. During the years of Stalin's worst repression, security organs would arrest people one by one, secretly, in the middle of the night. What, however, was to be done with large pogrom

<sup>70</sup> Ibid. 10.

<sup>71</sup> Ibid.

<sup>72</sup> Ibid. 14.

<sup>73</sup> Ibid. 35.

<sup>74</sup> Ibid. 37.

crowds of two or three hundred people, gathered in the city centres of Kiev and Dnipropetrovsk? Arrest all of them? Would this not provoke a larger uprising against the Soviet authorities? Mordechai Altshuler wrote that officials tried not to antagonize the locals: 'The authorities were in fact sensitive to such [i.e. public] opinions and raised obstacles not only to giving Jews prestigious positions, but even for accepting them in workplaces considered to be desirable.'<sup>75</sup> The Soviets also attempted to suppress all expressions of Jewish national consciousness and culture. They believed that such expressions could ignite a new explosion of antisemitism in Ukraine. When the Yiddish poet David Hofshstein returned to Kiev and attempted to organize a memorial meeting at Baby Yar, the authorities forbade such a public meeting, claiming that it might 'provoke antisemitism'.<sup>76</sup> Nikita Khrushchev allegedly said: 'This is Ukraine! And it is not in our interest that the Ukrainians should associate the return of Soviet power with the return of the Jews.'<sup>77</sup>

The Ukrainian authorities tried to limit the re-evacuation of Jews to Ukraine, following the policy of 'fewer Jews, fewer problems with antisemitism'. Lieutenant General of the NKVD Pavel Sudoplatov wrote in his memoirs that he was present in the office of the First Secretary of the Communist Party of Uzbekistan, Usman Yusupov, during a telephone conversation that Yusupov had with Khrushchev in 1947:

Khrushchev complained to him [Yusupov] that Jews evacuated during the war to Tashkent and Samarkand 'are flying to Ukraine like ravens'. In this conversation, which took place in 1947, he [Khrushchev] claimed that he did not have room to accept all of them, because the city [Kiev] was in ruins, and it was necessary to stop this flood; otherwise, pogroms would begin in Kiev.<sup>78</sup>

Obviously Khrushchev was having problems handling the situation regarding antisemitism in Ukraine. Stalin accordingly sent Lazar Kaganovich to Ukraine, who in March 1947 became the First Secretary of the KP(b)U. The official explanation for this change was 'the need to separate the posts of premier and First Secretary of the republic, but criticisms of [Khrushchev's] agricultural performance appeared in the press as well'.<sup>79</sup> Of course, when Stalin sent Kaganovich to Ukraine, the Jewish question was not his main consideration. The agricultural failure and famine in Ukraine in 1946–7 was the main reason for Stalin's dissatisfaction with Khrushchev's performance. The struggle against all kinds of nationalism and chauvinism was a secondary task.<sup>80</sup>

After Kaganovich arrived in Kiev at the end of February 1947, Khrushchev disappeared from public view until September. Khrushchev retained the post of

<sup>75</sup> M. Altshuler, 'Antisemitism in Ukraine toward the End of the Second World War', *Jews in Eastern Europe*, 3 (1993), 46–8.

<sup>76</sup> Altshuler, 'Antisemitism in Ukraine toward the End of World War II', 80.

<sup>77</sup> Mitsel, *Evrei Ukrainy v 1943–1953 gg.*, 27.

<sup>78</sup> *Ibid.* 32.

<sup>79</sup> W. J. Tompson, *Khrushchev: A Political Life* (New York, 1995), 93.

<sup>80</sup> L. M. Kaganovich, *Pamyatnye zapiski rabochego, kommunista-bol'shevika, profsoyuznogo, partiinogo i sovetsko-gosudarstvennogo rabotnika* (Moscow, 1996), 488–9, 492.

Ukrainian premier, but did not participate actively in politics while Kaganovich was in Ukraine.<sup>81</sup> Khrushchev wrote later in his memoirs that he had been ill with pneumonia. However, Khrushchev's biographers suggest that his 'illness' had more to do with politics. Perhaps Khrushchev feared that his dismissal from his position as First Secretary was the beginning of the end of his political career.<sup>82</sup>

Kaganovich proposed a resolution, which was approved by the Central Committee of the KP(b)U, 'on the improvement of ideological-political work with personnel and on the struggle against manifestations of bourgeois-nationalist ideology', stating that nationalist forces in Ukraine use 'the most disgusting weapon of fascist obscurantism—antisemitism'.<sup>83</sup> On 29 May 1947 this document was sent to Stalin.

It is hard to say how successful Kaganovich would have been in suppressing anti-semitism in Ukraine had he stayed longer in his position. His term as First Secretary of the KP(b)U continued only for several months: 'On 15 December 1947 he received the order to transfer his position as the First Secretary of the KP(b)U to Khrushchev and return to Moscow and again take up the position of Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR.'<sup>84</sup>

In the following year, the Soviet Union began the state antisemitic campaign that started with the murder of Mikhoels in January 1948 by direct order of Stalin. In November 1948 the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee was dissolved by the authorities and many of its members were arrested. The struggle against antisemitism was no longer necessary, because the Soviet regime itself adopted antisemitic policies.

Soviet leaders who had earlier discouraged antisemitism began publicly to spread anti-Jewish prejudices to support the state's antisemitic campaign and to fabricate the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee affair and the Jewish 'Doctors' Plot'. Jews became convenient scapegoats for the Soviet government, who blamed them for the country's internal problems and difficulties. The antisemitic mood in the Soviet Union was shared by the Soviet leaders and the general population. Popular anti-semitism was even more dangerous for Jews because it was more violent, while Soviet state antisemitism was disguised under general campaigns directed against certain kinds of 'enemies'.

Thus the policy of state antisemitism and the anti-Jewish campaigns organized by Soviet leaders from 1948 until Stalin's death on 5 March 1953 were in some way a response to and an exploitation of the widely spread antisemitic sentiments among the common people in the aftermath of the Second World War.

<sup>81</sup> Tompson, *Khrushchev*, 93.

<sup>82</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>83</sup> Kostyrchenko, *Tainaya politika Stalina*, 358.

<sup>84</sup> *Ibid.* 361.

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# On the Twenty-Fifth Anniversary of the Murders in Baby Yar

IVAN DZYUBA

## EDITORS' INTRODUCTION

The commemoration on 29 September 1966 of the Jews murdered during the Second World War at Baby Yar (Ukr. Babyn Yar) began as usual. Several hundred Jews carrying flowers and memorial wreaths gathered at the Baby Yar ravine on the outskirts of Kiev. They came to pay tribute to their murdered relatives—and to some 33,000 Kievans of Jewish origin shot dead by the Nazis in late September 1941 and thrown into Baby Yar.

That day, people stood in groups next to a modest granite stele indicating that at this place the fascist invaders had 'executed 100,000 peaceful Soviet citizens'. The authorities, fully aware of the Jewish nature of the event and frowning on what they considered its nationalistic overtones, sent stool-pigeons in civilian dress and had militia and KGB officials lined up around the nearby hills. Years later, after the authorities had ceded to international pressure and established a Soviet-style Baby Yar monument bereft of any Jewish visual or textual references, the commemoration of the Jewish victims hardly changed. The same KGB and militia in civilian dress supervised the public gathering and the same Jews, under strict surveillance, exchanged information about their deceased loved ones, denounced the atrocities of the Nazi regime, and praised the Soviet army.

The unexpected arrival of leading Ukrainian and Russian literati on that September day galvanized those assembled at the monument. The fact that prominent non-Jewish cultural figures had come to commemorate the Jewish victims, a thing that had never happened before, made a strong impression. According to one memoirist, the participants were saying to each other sotto voce: 'they are with us', 'they are for us'. For dozens of national-minded Ukrainian and Jewish activists, this encounter became a moment of Ukrainian–Jewish rapprochement, one which indicated the parallel victimization of the two peoples, their shared fate, and their rejection of the regime's ethnic policy.

One of the guests was Ivan Dzyuba, then a prominent Ukrainian literary figure and nationalist-minded dissident. He gave an improvised keynote speech, which appeared after the event in various copies and was widely circulated in the Ukrain-

ian samizdat, and which is published below in English translation.<sup>1</sup> Addressing the Kievan Jews, Dzyuba outlined the parameters of the Ukrainian–Jewish encounter. He spoke to the shared historical fate of the Ukrainians and the Jews, victims of Russian and Soviet colonialism, enforced denationalization, and Russification. He emphasized the fact that the Soviet anti–Jewish campaigns had coincided with the suppression of Ukrainian revivalism and that the regime had always sought to uproot both Zionism and what it called Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism. Popularizing information that was previously not widely known about the encounter between Ivan Franko, a key Ukrainian writer and poet, and Theodor Herzl, Dzyuba adduced examples of the sympathy shown by important Jewish writers towards the Ukrainians and by the founders of Ukrainian literature towards the Jews. Most of the Jews gathered that day at Baby Yar were very familiar with the stories of long-lasting Ukrainian–Jewish animosity, and the examples which Dzyuba presented were a revelation to them. They did not know that Dzyuba’s speech was permeated with Ze’ev Jabotinsky’s ideas, such as his personalistic vision of the nation and national dignity and his empathy with the Ukrainian people and the Ukrainian cause. This influence was more than just parallel thinking.

In the late 1960s, Dzyuba became widely known for his samizdat political pamphlet *Internationalism or Russification?* In it, he denounced the policy of enforced assimilation of the Ukrainians orchestrated by the communist government and proved that this policy went directly against the Leninist principles of a multinational state. The Kiev-based literary critic Miron Petrovsky recalled his 1966 discussion of Dzyuba’s famous pamphlet with the author. ‘I remember,’ said Petrovsky, I asked Dzyuba, what was the significance of the Marxist jargon of his essay? Was this an attempt to speak to the adversary in his own language or a need to build a conversation within the framework of the endorsed ideology? Dzyuba answered: ‘The former.’ I asked another question: did he develop his analytical methodology by himself or had he relied on sources? Dzyuba answered: ‘There were sources, or to be precise, one source.’ He named it: ‘Jabotinsky.’ I had heard about Jabotinsky but was not familiar with his work. I asked Dzyuba to give me something to read. Dzyuba brought me a volume of Jabotinsky’s *Feuillets*. It was then, in 1966, while talking to Dzyuba about the Ukrainian and Jewish national revivalist movements, that I understood the internationalist character of nationalism.<sup>2</sup>

Dzyuba did not come alone to the Baby Yar site. Most likely it was the Ukrainian writer Borys Antonenko-Davydovych (pseudonym; real name Borys Davydov, 1899–1984) who initiated the appearance of the Ukrainian public figures and brought along Ivan Dzyuba, Viktor Nekrasov, and a group of documentary filmmakers. A participant in the radical left opposition to both the Ukrainian nationalist and Ukrainian communist authorities, Antonenko-Davydovych had fought at

<sup>1</sup> For this edition the editors have used the following version: I. Dzyuba, ‘U 25-ti rokovyny rozstriliv u Babynomu Yaru’, *Yehupets*, 1 (1995), 4–10, which includes an afterword by Dzyuba and an anonymous KGB-commissioned denunciation.

<sup>2</sup> Unpublished memoir in Yohanan Petrovsky-Shtern’s archive.



the front in the Civil War. In the 1920s he emerged as a prolific Ukrainian writer on urban themes, a supporter of Sovietization, and a member of the literary group Lanka (Worker's Unit). Expecting arrest because of his previous political convictions, he moved to Central Asia to hide, but in 1935 he was spotted, arrested, and sent to the Gulag, from which he was released in 1954. Highly regarded among Ukrainian literary figures as one of the very few surviving representatives of what has been called *rozstrilyane vidrodzhennya* ('the executed renaissance'), Antonenko-Davydovych protested governmental attempts to suppress the Ukrainian national revival in the late 1950s and early 1960s. The authorities disrupted his publication activities, turning him into a silent writer for the last fourteen years of his life.

By the time Antonenko-Davydovych brought his and Dzyuba's friend Viktor Nekrasov (1911–87) to the Baby Yar commemoration, Nekrasov had become one of the leading Soviet writers on the Second World War. His novel, *In the Trenches of Stalingrad*, brought him the Stalin Prize, the highest award in the Soviet Union in the 1940s. The book became standard reading for students in Soviet secondary schools. In the 1950s, however, Nekrasov's writing became pronouncedly anti-Stalinist and anti-totalitarian in theme. A Russian-language writer residing in Kiev, Nekrasov became friendly with the liberal and democratic opponents of the regime, distributed samizdat, and signed appeals to the Soviet leaders protesting the arrests of representatives of the Ukrainian intelligentsia, the suppression of the national-democratic movements, and the post-1964 re-Stalinization of the Soviet Union. In 1974, thanks to his family connections, he managed to emigrate to France, where he worked as associate editor of the émigré journal *Kontinent* and was a frequent host on the major western European radio stations such as Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. The Soviet authorities revoked his citizenship for his critical remarks about the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party Leonid Brezhnev.

The 1966 Baby Yar commemoration was recorded on camera—also without the permission of the authorities—by a documentary film group of the Kiev-based Dovzhenko film studio. At the head of that group of film-makers was Gely Snegirev (Hely Snyehiryov, 1927–78), also mentioned in Dzyuba's brief memoir accompanying the translation of his speech. Snegirev was a Russian-language writer and screenwriter who brought a cameraman to film the event. He was a member of the Soviet artistic unions and enjoyed the life of a literary figure in good standing with the authorities before choosing to become one of the leading Kiev-based dissidents and falling from Soviet grace. Later, in the 1970s, persecuted by the Soviet regime for his human rights activism, he was the first in the Soviet Union publicly to reject his Soviet citizenship. After his arrest, Snegirev was the victim of torturous medical treatment in the KGB prison hospital in Kiev. The treatment, in combination with his hunger strike behind bars, led to Snegirev's progressive paralysis and premature death. His autobiographical *Roman-donos* ('Novel-Denunciation'), first published in 2000, provides a detailed and self-mocking account of the life of the dissident intelligentsia in Kiev in the 1960s.

Dzyuba's appearance at Baby Yar cost him dearly. For his public denunciations of the anti-Ukrainian persecutions (in addition to publishing his pamphlet abroad, he also spoke up in a Kiev mainstream cinema before the performance), Dzyuba became the victim of political persecution. In 1974 he was arrested and sentenced for his anti-Soviet activities, but managed to negotiate his public repentance in exchange for the cancellation of his term in prison. His official penitence turned many Ukrainian literati against him, though it also gave him the chance to continue his work as a Ukrainian literary historian and literary critic. After the establishment of Ukrainian political independence in 1991, Dzyuba became minister of culture (1992–4), the director of several major Ukrainian cultural venues, and after 2006, again, an opponent of the pro-Russian political tendencies of the new Ukrainian regime. He published several pieces on Jewish themes, including a preface to the first Ukrainian publication of Jabotinsky's writings and an essay on Vasily Grossman.

The denunciation of Dzyuba by the KGB was orchestrated in 1972 or 1973 in the wake of major persecution of the national revivalist dissidents in Ukraine, which struck a particularly heavy blow against Ukrainian literature, art, and cinema. According to several sources, the denouncer, whose ignominious review appears below after Dzyuba's 'Afterword', was a liberal-minded intellectual in his own right, who was intimidated by the KGB into denouncing Dzyuba and who received in exchange a stable position as professor of philosophy at a major Kiev-based college.

*The Editors*

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THERE ARE SOME THINGS, some tragedies, in the face of which all words are helpless, and about which more can be expressed through silence—the vast silence of thousands of people. Perhaps it would behove us here to make do without words and to think silently about this. But, silence speaks volumes only in those cases where everything that could possibly be said has already been said. When far from everything has been said, when nothing has been said yet, that is when silence becomes the ally of falsehood and non-freedom. Therefore, we speak, and must speak, wherever we can and cannot, taking advantage of any and all occasions, which do not come along that often.

Today I want to say a few words here—a thousandth part of what I am thinking and what I would like to say. I want to address you as people—as my brothers and fellow humans. I want to address you, Jews, as a Ukrainian, as a member of the Ukrainian nation to which I proudly belong.

Babyn Yar is a tragedy of all mankind, but it took place on Ukrainian soil. Therefore, a Ukrainian, like a Jew, does not have the right to forget it. Babyn Yar is our joint tragedy, a tragedy first and foremost of the Jewish and Ukrainian peoples.

This tragedy was brought to our peoples by fascism.

However, it should not be forgotten that fascism does not begin or end with Babyn Yar. Fascism starts from disrespect towards a person and ends in the destruction of a person, in the destruction of entire nations, but not necessarily through the kind of destruction that took place in Babyn Yar.

Let us imagine for one moment that Hitler won, that German fascism was victorious. There is no doubt that they would have created a dazzling and 'flourishing' society that would have achieved economic and technological development, would have wrought all those scholarly and other achievements that we too have attained. And undoubtedly, the voiceless slaves of fascism would eventually have 'conquered' outer space and would be flying to other planets to represent humankind and human civilization. And this regime would have done everything in order to establish its 'truth', so that people would forget the price that was paid for such 'progress', so that history would justify or forget the countless crimes, so that this inhuman society would seem normal to people and even the finest in the world. However, no longer on the ruins of the Bastille but in the defiled places of national tragedies, tamped down by a thick layer of sand and oblivion, would there be an official sign saying, 'Dancing here'. That is why we should judge one society or another not by its superficial technological achievements but by a person's place and importance in it; by how human dignity and human conscience are valued in it.

Today in Babyn Yar we remember not only those who perished here. We remember the millions of Soviet soldiers—our fathers, who gave up their lives in the struggle against fascism. We remember the sacrifices and efforts of millions of Soviet people of all nationalities, who toiled selflessly to attain victory over fascism. We should think about being worthy of their memory, being worthy of the duty that is placed on us by the memory of the countless human sacrifices, hopes, and strivings.

Are we worthy of this memory?—perhaps not, since various forms of misanthropy are finding a place among us, including the one that we call by the worn-out, drearily commonplace but terrible word: antisemitism. Antisemitism is an 'international' phenomenon; it has existed and continues to exist in all societies. Regrettably, our society too is not free of it. Perhaps there would not be anything strange in this: after all, antisemitism is the fruit and fellow-traveller of long-standing lack of culture and of slavery, the first and inevitable product of political despotism, and on the scale of entire societies it is overcome with difficulty and slowly. But what is surprising is that throughout the post-war decades no active struggle was undertaken against it. What is more, sometimes it was artificially stimulated. It seems that people are forgetting Lenin's directives concerning the struggle against antisemitism, just as they are forgetting Lenin's directives about the national development of Ukraine.

In Stalin's time there were unconcealed obvious attempts to play on the mutual prejudices of some Ukrainians and some Jews; attempts that were ostensibly directed against Jewish bourgeois nationalism, Zionism, etc., to hack away at Jewish national culture and, under the guise of combating Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism, to do the same to Ukrainian national culture. These cunningly devised campaigns

caused harm to both peoples and did not foster friendship with each other; they merely added one more distasteful memory to the difficult history of both peoples and to the complex history of their relations.

We must invoke these memories not in order to reopen old wounds, but to heal them once and for all. As a Ukrainian, I am ashamed that, just as in other nations, there is antisemitism in my nation, those reprehensible, unworthy human phenomena called antisemitism.

Within our own milieu we, Ukrainians, should struggle against all kinds of manifestations of antisemitism or disrespect towards Jews, and incomprehension of the Jewish problem.

Within your own milieu you, Jews, should struggle against those who do not respect Ukrainians, the Ukrainian culture, the Ukrainian language; those who unjustly see a secret antisemite in every Ukrainian.

We should eradicate every kind of misanthropy, overcome all types of misunderstanding, and achieve genuine brotherhood with all our vital energy.

It would seem that we, of all people, should understand one another, and that we, of all people, should offer humanity an example of brotherly coexistence. The history of our peoples is so similar in its tragic nature that in the biblical motifs of his poem *Moisei* Ivan Franko portrayed the path of the Ukrainian people garbed in the robes of the Jewish legend, while one of Lesya Ukrayinka's most famous poems about Ukraine's tragedy begins with the words 'And long ago you struggled like Israel . . .'.

The great sons of both our peoples willed us mutual understanding and friendship. The lives of the three greatest Jewish writers, Sholem Aleichem, Isaac Leib Peretz, and Mendele Mokher Seforim, are connected with the Ukrainian soil. They loved this land and taught others how to create goodness in it. The brilliant Jewish journalist Ze'ev (Vladimir) Jabotinsky stood on the side of the Ukrainian nation in his struggle against Russian tsarism and appealed to the Jewish intelligentsia to support the Ukrainian national liberation movement and Ukrainian culture. One of the last civic acts of Taras Shevchenko was his famous stand against the Judaeophobic policies of the tsarist government. Lesya Ukrayinka, Ivan Franko, Borys Hrinchenko, Stepan Vasylchenko, and other distinguished Ukrainian writers were very well acquainted with and had great esteem for the grandeur of Jewish history and the Jewish spirit; they wrote with sincere compassion about the sufferings of the Jewish poor.

Our country's past encompasses not only mutual hostility and distasteful misapprehensions, although there have been many such examples. In the past there are also instances of audacious solidarity and mutual assistance in the struggle for the common ideals of freedom, for a better destiny for our nations.

We, the current generation, should continue this tradition by opposing it to the bad tradition of distrust and unspoken reservations.

Unfortunately, there are various factors that do not foster the taking root and spreading of that noble tradition of solidarity.

Among them is the absence of genuine public attention and openness with regard to national affairs, as a result of which a 'conspiracy of silence' is forming around painful questions. A good example for us here could be the way this issue has been resolved in fraternal socialist Poland. The complex historical relations between the Poles and the Jews are generally known. Today, not a trace is left of the former ill will. What is the 'secret' of this success? First of all, the Poles and the Jews were brought together in friendship by a common misfortune during the Second World War. But we too shared a common misfortune. Second—and this does not exist in our country, unfortunately—in socialist Poland international relations are the subject of scholarly sociological research and public discussion, the focus of constant attention and involvement on the part of the press, literature, and so on. All this creates an atmosphere of good and successful national and international upbringing.

By applying all our energies, we should strive for this kind of active upbringing that is not based on words alone. We cannot ignore the facts of antisemitism, chauvinism, disrespect shown to any nationality, and boorish attitudes to any national culture and national language. There is much boorishness in our country, and with many individuals it starts with the rejection of one's self and one's nationality, culture, and history, even though this rejection is not always voluntary, and a person is not always to blame for it.

The path to genuine—not false—brotherhood does not lie in self-forgetting but in self-knowledge. One should not renounce oneself and adapt to others, but be oneself and respect others. Jews have the right to be Jews; Ukrainians have the right to be Ukrainians in the fullest and profoundest—not merely formal—sense of these words. Let the Jews know Jewish history, Jewish culture, the Jewish language, and be proud of them. Let the Ukrainians know Ukrainian history, the Ukrainian culture, and the Ukrainian language, and be proud of them. Let them be acquainted with each other's history and culture, the history and culture of other peoples; let them learn how to value themselves and others as their brothers.

This is difficult to achieve, but it is better to strive for this than indifferently give it up as a bad job and go with the flow of assimilation and accommodation, from which no good will come; there will be only boorishness, profanity, and concealed misanthropy.

And with all our vital energy we should challenge civilized misanthropy and societal boorishness. For us, nothing is more important than this because, otherwise, social ideals lose all sense.

This is our duty to the millions of victims of despotism; this is our duty to the finest people of the Ukrainian and Jewish peoples, who called for mutual understanding and friendship; this is our duty to the Ukrainian land, on which we must live together. This is our duty to humanity.

AFTERWORD TO THE PUBLICATION OF THE SPEECH AT  
BABY YAR, 29 SEPTEMBER 1966

In the latter half of September 1966, Viktor Platonovich Nekrasov passed a message to me through mutual friends, asking me to come and see him on 29 September before 1 p.m. I guessed what it was about because 29 September was a special day in the life of many Kievans. That day some residents of Kiev, carrying bouquets of flowers and wearing mourning ribbons, were heading to an outlying district of the city, whose name has become sorrowfully known throughout the world as 'Baby Yar'. At the same time, other Kievans were racking their brains about how to prevent the great assembly of the former in this city. A third group of Kievans, on the orders of the second group, were zealously monitoring the first group and, if necessary, were prepared to 'apply measures' with regard to the least cool, calm, and collected individuals among them.

29 September 1966 was not simply the regular anniversary of the beginning of the tragic events that unfolded in Babyn Yar, but its twenty-fifth anniversary—a quarter-century's worth of sorrowful memory not so much expressly forbidden but undesirable, seemingly malicious from the standpoint of the authorities, which was being underscored by the state's energetic labours to change the very topography of Babyn Yar.

At the appointed time I was at the home of Viktor Platonovich, where I also encountered his friends from the Kiev film studio that produced popular science films. Headed by Hely Snyehiryov, they were getting ready to film something: it was expected that on this day there would be more people than usual and, if the authorities did not ban it, at least some semblance of rituality would be bestowed on the event.

When we arrived at Babyn Yar, we were completely amazed by what we saw. All the surrounding hills and hummocks were covered with numerous groups of people, at first uncoordinated—there were thousands and thousands of them. Yet at the same time this leaderless elemental force was as if a single living being. Marks of suffering were frozen on people's faces, and their eyes were not of this world: they were gazing into the depths of time and seeing a horrific picture of what was no more and what would never become the past for them. The shadow of the long-ago horror and a kind of human bewilderment were drifting above Babyn Yar, and the thousands of silent people, caught in petrified perturbation, seemed to be the personified, mute cry of an entire people.

The assembled people stood in silence. But this was a demanding and questioning silence. People wanted to listen, listen; they wanted to hear something important. And when the rumour spread that 'writers had arrived', people rushed over to us and dragged us off in various directions; each of us (we were also joined by Borys Dmytrovych Antonenko-Davydovych, who came on his own initiative) was sur-

rounded by a dense crowd asking us: 'Say something!' We had to improvise, even though the speeches were about a well-known and painful subject . . .

Someone recorded our speeches on a tape recorder, and a few days later they appeared in *samvydav*,<sup>3</sup> which was then taking its first steps. Of course, the 'appropriate instances' once again manifested all their vigilance and 'militance', as they prepared to apply 'edifying' and administrative measures to the guilty parties. The first victims of these fault-finding actions were the staff members of that film studio: the film they had shot was confiscated and they were punished with various administrative fines. My speech at Babyn Yar was included in the 'criminal case' that the KGB was already preparing against me.

REVIEW OF IVAN DZYUBA'S SPEECH AT BABY YAR,  
29 SEPTEMBER 1966

The text of the speech consists of six typewritten pages and begins with the words: 'There are some things, some tragedies . . .' and ends with the words: 'This is our duty to humanity.' In addition to an appeal for friendship between the Ukrainian and Jewish peoples, and the rejection of antisemitism and fascism, the speech also contains a subtext, so to speak, which is aimed at tarnishing our Soviet reality.

On page 1, speaking about the Baby Yar tragedy, which fascism brought us, the author notes meaningfully: 'However, it should not be forgotten that fascism does not begin or end with Babyn Yar. Fascism starts from disrespect towards a person and ends in the destruction of a person, in the destruction of entire nations, but not necessarily through the kind of destruction that took place in Babyn Yar.' After this, the author essentially seeks in a certain way to identify [this] with a description of the existing socialist order in our country. On the one hand, he claims that the conquest of outer space, economic and technological development, and a brilliant and 'flourishing' society could also have been created by Hitler if fascism had triumphed.

Therefore, it is necessary to 'judge one society or another not by its superficial technological achievements but by a person's place and importance in it; by how human dignity and human conscience are valued in it' (p. 2). He then goes on to say that there are such forms of misanthropy as antisemitism among us; that under Stalin an attempt was made to play on the mutual prejudices of Ukrainians and Jews, and after the Second World War the struggle against antisemitism ended; that there is a lack of public attention in our country to national issues; that genuine, active international upbringing is not being implemented.

This subtext infuses the speech with an anti-Soviet orientation.

20 April 1972

*Translated from the Ukrainian by Marta D. Olynyk*

<sup>3</sup> The Ukrainian word corresponding to Russian *samizdat* (Y.P.-S.).

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# Reminiscences about Friends

YURY (ARYE) VUDKA

## EDITORS' INTRODUCTION

Yury (Arye) Vudka, born in 1947 in Dnipropetrovsk, Ukraine, could not get into a local college: the undeclared *numerus clausus* against Jews was stricter in Ukraine than in Russia. Still, he managed to enrol in the Ryazan Institute of Radio and Technology, where he became drawn to the ideas of Zionism and the Prague-type 'Marxism with a human face'. Within a short period of time, Vudka built around him an extensive circle of young Jewish people captivated by Jewish national and religious revivalism (some sources claim there were about three hundred individuals). As a student, the 20-year old Vudka, according to one memoir, wrote a letter to Golda Meir in which he criticized Soviet policy in the Middle East and expressed his desire to settle in Israel.

His further plans for emigration did not get very far. In 1969 Vudka was arrested and sentenced for his Zionist activities, described as a subversive bourgeois nationalist and anti-Soviet propagandist. Vudka served his term in the Perm correction colony and in the Vladimir prison. In the camp, he became close with a number of Ukrainian nationalists, including Yevhen Sverstyuk (b. 1928). Ten years after their first meeting, Vudka wrote the essay about Sverstyuk<sup>1</sup> (part of his larger memoir on the Ukrainian and Jewish inmates of the Gulag) that is reprinted below in translation, which outlines the significance of the Ukrainian–Jewish encounter between imprisoned dissidents.

Sverstyuk was particularly impressed by Vudka's knowledge of the Ukrainian language. In a country where most Jews (and not only Jews) were assimilated into the dominant Russian culture, the ability of a Jew to express himself in fluent, exuberant Ukrainian displayed a clear-cut political message and showed Vudka's unrestricted support for the Ukrainian cause. No wonder that a number of Ukrainian literary figures who shared the same prison-camp canteen with Vudka entrusted him with smuggling their writings out of the Soviet Gulag. Towards that end, Vudka had to memorize hundreds of lines of Ukrainian verse. Once abroad, Vudka put the memorized poetry on paper and subsequently helped to publish it in the collection *Poetry from behind the Barbed Wire: The Word of the Ukrainian Poets Repressed by Moscow*.<sup>2</sup> Sverstyuk portrayed this deed carried out by a Jew in the

<sup>1</sup> Yu. Vudka, 'Spohady pro druziv', *Yehupets'*, 4 (1998), 154–8.

<sup>2</sup> *Poeziya z-za kolyuchykh drotiv: Slovo represovanykh Moskvoyu ukrayins' kykh poetiv* (Munich, 1978).

elevated style of a theologian: 'I think the redeemed texts were not merely saved for posterity. They were redeemed for contemporaneity, too. I think it was a great mission to bring these cultural values through the impermeable [Gulag] corridor where nothing could survive and where non-existence reigned.'

After he was released from the camp, Vudka settled in Israel, where he turned into a fertile thinker and prolific journalist who also continued his writings on Ukrainian culture and the Ukrainian nation-building efforts. In his historiosophical essay *Moskovshchyna*<sup>3</sup> he included a chapter (no. 26) portraying Russian policy towards Ukraine as that of colonization and Russification based, among other things, on the practice of resettling Ukrainians outside the territory of Ukraine, and simultaneously rescinding their right to Ukrainian education. For the Russian 'Big Brother' policy towards Ukraine, Vudka could find no other term but 'ethnocide'.

Several names mentioned in Vudka's essay below require a brief explanation. Leonid Plyushch (b. 1938) was a Kiev-based engineer and dissident. Starting in 1966, he published critical articles in the samizdat. In 1968 he sent letters to the Soviet authorities protesting the persecution of dissidents, and in 1969 he established an unofficial group monitoring human rights in the Soviet Union. Specialists in criminal medicine declared him insane, and from 1973 to 1976 he was subjected to enforced medical treatment in the special KGB psychiatric clinic. Under international pressure, in 1976 he was released and expelled from the Soviet Union. From then on he lived in France, where he was active as a political analyst and literary critic.

Iosif Mendelevich (b. 1947) was arrested in 1970 in connection with the 'Samoletnoe delo' (the 'Aircraft Case'), together with fifteen other Soviet citizens who tried to hijack a small An-2 aircraft (with Mark Dymshits as pilot), cross the border, and ask for political asylum in Sweden. Mendelevich spent eleven years in a prison camp and was released with a number of other inmates in exchange for two Soviet spies captured in the United States. After being welcomed by Ronald Reagan, Mendelevich settled in Israel, where he obtained rabbinic ordination, defended his Ph.D. in Russian Jewish history, and became active as a teacher and a rabbi.

Alla Horskaya (Gorskaya, 1929–70) is known as a leading Ukrainian artist of the 1960s generation. Her art emphasized Ukrainian national dignity and anti-colonialist drive, and her stained glass dedicated to Shevchenko and commissioned by Kiev University was removed (and destroyed) by a university commission, which found it nationalistic and foreign to the Soviet mentality. Involved in the identification of the mass graves of the Stalin regime in and near Kiev, such as the one in Bykivnya, she, together with Ukrainian literati Vasyl Symonenko and Vasyl Stus, was persecuted by the Ukrainian KGB, which most likely orchestrated her brutal murder.

Vasyl Symonenko (1935–63) was one of the most talented Ukrainian poets of the 1960s generation (the *shestydesyatnyky*), whose verse combined high-quality lyricism, a sharp critique of the denationalization of Ukraine and the Ukrainians, and

<sup>3</sup> Yu. Vudka, *Moskovshchyna: Memuarnyi esei*, trans. V. Davydenko (London, 1978).

utopian proclamations of Ukrainian political and cultural sovereignty. Beaten most likely by KGB agents in civilian clothes or by thugs hired by state security, he died several months later as the result of kidney failure.

Mykhailo Lutsyk (b. 1921, still alive in 2007) was a Ukrainian poet, nationalist activist, combatant member of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists, and dissident, who in the 1930s and 1940s spent short terms in Romanian, Polish, and German prisons, then after 1945 spent about thirty years in the Russian Gulag.

Vudka observes of Sverstyuk's trial that 'The prosecutor's surname was Pohorily, the investigator's—Chorny, and the judge's—Dyshlo.' In Ukrainian the three names mean, respectively: Burnt, Black, and Shaft.

*The Editors*

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*Nobility.*

This is the very word that springs to mind when you want to describe Yevhen Sverstyuk.

'You were in prison with him? What a beautiful person!', his friends, now in Israel, told me.

When you begin recalling this, your awareness seems to divide into two parts.

On one side are family, work, the army—an ordinary life in your country. On the other side are barbed wire, prison grates, abuse, misery, and black, snow-covered fir trees instead of palms lit up by the sun.

It is difficult to fuse these two different worlds in one's consciousness. It is as though different people lived in them. Yet it is impossible to rid oneself of one's 'I', which lives in a correction colony at the edge of the world. And one of the most striking impressions from that world is of an angel in hell: Yevhen Sverstyuk. Here he comes, dressed in deliberately bleached camp overalls, in a similarly bleached cap, with clear, intelligent eyes and a bright smile on his lips. The filth does not stick to him, nor is he affected by the madness and greyness, the tedium and the horror, the hatred, malice, and savagery—all that which permeates the very air of that world.

In the black stone coffin of the punishment cell this person creates poems transparent as light and fresh as springtime. He is like a ray of sunshine in an utterly dark night. He writes 'Requiem', dedicated to Horska and Symonenko:

It is easier for me to touch you  
Than the steps on the other side of the wall.

It is easier for him to bond with his dead friends than to betray their memory.

Today the moon is spectrally grey,  
And beneath the moon are only shadows  
And my momentary vision.  
Fly past, O light-winged bird!  
In the fluttering of your wings  
May my youth smile.

It is difficult to believe where and in what conditions such beauty was created. I am glad that I was fortunate enough to rescue such treasures and bring them out into the free world from that hell, where all beauty, goodness, and purity are worth nothing.

Mykhailo Lutsyk has a poem about the things that those who proclaim themselves the benefactors of mankind will leave behind after they're gone: 'only secret trenches of corpses, in which lie the witnesses of suffering and horror'.

But Yevhen will leave behind something completely different: not just the wisdom and beauty that are embodied in his books but a special attitude to life as well:

You stand at prayer with a child,  
Where my legacy glows is honour.  
The minutes of life drop away.  
Only memory. And a white cross.

Here it should be noted that, amidst all that Muscovite madness, dissolution, and base servitude, even the word 'honour' looks like an aggressive and inexplicable white crow. Such a concept does not exist at all for the Soviet heirs of Genghis Khan and Hitler's teachers. But here we have not merely a word, a perception, but a living person who is the embodiment of honour. How can one not hate such a person, how not to jail him, how not to crush him? By his very image such a person is a living reproach and living accusation to all the demons and petty devils of the filthy Muscovite hell. It seems that he was moulded not out of dust, not out of earth, like other mortals, but out of noble marble that suddenly came to life. In the same way, his books too are filled with unearthly spirituality, goodness, and beauty. In his works he reaches those seemingly native heights of his, where national cultural achievement flows into the universal treasure house. It is rare to see a person whose words and actions are merged into such a great whole of noble individuality.

Yevhen was born in the Volhynian village of Siltse, in the district of Horokhiv, the birthplace of Valentyn Moroz; the same area but a different village. There must be something special about the land of Volhynia that produces such people. For the little boy, the village was his entire world, large and enchanting. Yevhen's parents were ordinary peasants, who worked hard and taught their many children how to work. Their normal dream was to buy more land so that each son would have enough for his own farm. But early on they noticed that Yevhen was different from other children. His soul did not cleave to farming, but sought something different, incomprehensible. His father used practically the same words to describe his little boy which many years earlier the young Taras had heard said about himself: he will either become a great person or a great ne'er-do-well.

Life rudely dashed nearly all of the Sverstyuk family's expectations—and destroyed the family. The Muscovite horde arrived, confiscated the land, killed the sons who were defending their country, and sent the rest of the people to concentration camps and collective farms. It was as though the days of the pharaohs had

returned. Today the only ones left of that entire large family are the 90-year-old mother, Yevdokiya Yakivna, who is living a life of poverty on a miserable collective farm, and her eighth son, Yevhen, who is far away in Muscovite slavery . . . But even in the midst of the feral, degenerate, and hostile invaders the boy managed to preserve the purity of his soul and the wings of its aspirations. This soul did not go as a janissary to the demon's power, but devoted itself to serving his nation, rent asunder, and to universal beauty. Yevhen had neither tanks nor planes at his disposal; all he had was a pure soul, brilliant intelligence, and a good word. It was precisely for using this type of 'weapon' that the enemy wrested him from his wife, his mother, and his son, and cast him into the places where socialism is built à la Dante.

The Sverstyuk model is clear-cut proof that there is no other path to universal achievements but the national one. It is only through the national that one can proceed to the universal. If the hopes and torments of your kinsmen, if the rape and murder of the body and soul of your people do not disturb you, do not elicit a natural response, then what can you possibly say to the rest of humanity?

All Sverstyuk would have had to do was renounce his convictions and profane all that is sacred, and he would have been released instantly. But he will never do this.

'Why don't you switch to the Russian language in your works?', he was constantly asked by investigators.

Strange as it may seem, today the great state Russian literature does not have such marvellous artists as Sverstyuk, Stus, Riznykiv—Ukrainian prisoners. For some reason, the Muse and Beauty flow to them, the hounded and the banned, to their hounded language.

Can a colonizer consent to the finest masterpieces being created in the very language that, by their sights, was supposed to perish utterly? And here we have Mordovia, the Ural region, and Siberia filling up with the blossoms of the Ukrainian intelligentsia—and not for the first time, not by a long shot! But the song cannot be buried in any dungeon, behind any wires, in any cement coffin. On the wings of a song the soul of this person flies through the icy, two-metre-thick walls, above fences equipped with foreign electronics, high above the towers, the German shepherds, and the executioners. And it reaches the greater world and moves thousands of hearts on the opposite side of the globe.

Yes, a soul cannot be buried; it is impossible to murder it! One can kill only the body, in which it resides temporarily:

Right next to me, you fell suddenly . . .

Sverstyuk feels that Alla Horska's fate awaits him:

Colours will fade in your eyes,  
The heart will cool down for a second,  
And something will fall, like a bird,  
Down to the very cement.  
You will reappear, all of you,  
And love, now hushed

Will flame up in me  
As stars in the depths . . .

Such lines are born on the very edge between life and death . . .

When Sverstyuk was still living in Kiev, a mathematics lecturer from the Kamyanyets Pedagogical Institute by the name of Dudar asked to spend the night at his home. As Sverstyuk later testified at the trial, Dudar at the time wrote a rough copy of a denunciation against his hospitable host, which, a few years later, formed the basis of the indictments and sentencing of the writer and patriot. This is who is bringing up future educators today . . .

What kind of terrible crimes figured in the denunciation by that nocturnal guest? Dudar claimed that Sverstyuk had talked to him about Russification and the arrests that were taking place in Ukraine, about the benefits of a religious upbringing, about the fact that the Bible is the book of books . . . The hair stands up on your head when you hear about such horrors . . . But Sverstyuk rejected the very possibility of engaging in a thorough and frank discussion with that mysterious, nocturnal monster.

‘Every day there are quite a few beautiful people near me—beautiful both spiritually and physically—obviating the need for me to seek out a conversation with this monster’, Sverstyuk declared during the face-to-face confrontation. ‘What is there to say? If he had asked me about Russification, I would have simply sent him out into the street: go outside and listen to the language that you hear.’

The ‘witness’ became embarrassed and began taking back his testimony. Then the prosecutor interrupted the ‘witness’, and in his stead dictated to the investigator everything that he wanted! The prosecutor’s surname was Pohorily, the investigator’s—Chorny, and the judge’s—Dyshlo.

During the ‘trial’, Dudar said that, despite his Polish background, he did not have any national feelings and was simply a Soviet person, and therefore he condemned Sverstyuk, who a few years earlier had consented to welcome him into his home . . .

After returning to his cell, Sverstyuk could not calm down until, pacing from one wall to the other, he had created a poem in the style of Kotlyarevsky’s *Eneyida*:

*Dudar in Hell*

There Dudar howled like a beast in a cave.  
He crawled barefoot on all fours  
And know that he hopped around on coals.  
The briefcase with rough copies of denunciations  
He clutched to his belly fervently  
And he bared his teeth at the devils . . .

It would be good if the students of the Kamyanyets Pedagogical Institute found out who the respected lecturer Dudar really is.

From the occupiers Sverstyuk got twelve years in concentration camps and Siberian exile just for being a person of conscience and talent. And both the former

and the latter are anti-Soviet phenomena that are liable to the severest punishment. Those torments that a person endures in correction colonies are quite well known today. There is no doubt that for such a sophisticated and sensitive person with a tender, responsive, poetic heart, these torments are tripled. One can only imagine what separation from beloved family and friends alone cost such a person . . .

Sverstyuk loves his nation and is sacrificing himself on its altar. But how wonderfully he finds a common language with the people of other nations! When he and I first met in the Ural region, we instantly felt like old friends. Sverstyuk told me that after he had arrived at the correction colony three years earlier, he was assigned a bed on which my surname was painted. I had already been transported to Vladimir prison.

He translated a poem by the Lithuanian insurgent Jonas Kadzionis, who was sentenced to twenty-five years in the correction colonies, dedicated to a topic understood by all nations: mothers.

I would like to end my account with this as yet unknown translation:

I am sad, mama. Words have fallen mute . . .  
Only your eyes and the singing of prayers . . .  
Only you warmed so many solitary years.  
Your ray glowed in the cold, in death, in the night.  
And from heart to heart I passed on that ray,  
That sacred striving for goodness and beauty,  
Which will endure in ashes, in chaff.  
Only the eternal firmament, only you exist.

*Translated from the Ukrainian by Marta D. Olynyk*

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# The Grains of Ukrainian–Israeli ‘Solidarity’

YEVHEN SVERSTYUK

## EDITORS’ INTRODUCTION

‘The Grains of Ukrainian–Israeli “Solidarity”’, here published for the first time in English translation, is a milestone in modern Ukrainian political thought. Its author, Yevhen Oleksandrovykh Sverstyuk (b. 1928), is a Ukrainian poet, philologist, psychologist, thinker, and teacher of Ukrainian literature, who between 1959 and 1964 was repeatedly removed from the editorial boards of Ukrainian journals for his political convictions as a Ukrainian nationalist. An unemployed literary figure, Sverstyuk had to earn his living as a low-profile editor on a scientific journal on botany. In 1972 the KGB arrested him and sentenced him to seven years’ imprisonment and five years’ ban of residence in major cities for the distribution of samizdat literature, considered in the then Soviet Union to be anti-Soviet propaganda. Once released from the prison camp, Sverstyuk worked from 1979 to 1988 as a carpenter, first in Buryatiya and later in Kiev.

In 1977 Sverstyuk was serving his term in the Perm District prison camp, where he befriended such inmates as Yury (Arye) Vudka, Shimon Grilyus, Mark Dymshits, and Iosif Mendelevich, religious Zionists of dissident stock whom Sverstyuk considered far superior to other denationalized and profoundly Russified Jewish inmates. Sverstyuk’s relations with Vudka grew into a long-lasting dialogue (see Vudka’s memoir on Sverstyuk in this volume of *Polin*). Conversations between the two nationally and religiously oriented individuals inspired the main themes and imagery of Sverstyuk’s essay.

In his essay, Sverstyuk sought to justify the Ukrainian national cause for the Jews and to prove that what he called genuine Ukrainian spirituality was incompatible with antisemitism. Focusing on the shared destiny of Jews and Ukrainians, both of them peoples persecuted on their own land, Sverstyuk then made a groundbreaking parallel between Ukraine and Israel, which he saw as two sought-for political entities of two suffering peoples. To the romanticized image of ancient biblical Israel that Ivan Franko and Lesya Ukrayinka transformed into a symbol of the struggle for Ukrainian statehood, Sverstyuk added something new and no less pivotal for the Ukrainian political experience: the concept of contemporary Israel

with its continual wars for national survival. This parallel and many others became the basis of what Sverstyuk dubbed the *ukrayins'ko-zhydivs'kyi aliyans*, the 'Ukrainian–Jewish alliance'. Ukrainians and Jews, inmates of the Soviet correction colonies, emerged in Sverstyuk's essay as two peoples of dignity, perseverance, and genuine patriotism. For Sverstyuk, the religiously observant Zionists were people of amazing spiritual and cultural breadth. He considered their desire to leave the Soviet Union a defiance of the regime. This stance elevated the national-minded Jews in the eyes of Ukrainian inmates, who saw their Ukraine as a Soviet colony. Sverstyuk's emphasis on the mutually beneficial lessons that Ukrainian nationalists and Zionists could learn from one another transcended the framework of human rights parlance and placed Ukrainian–Jewish rapprochement in a broader post-colonial national-democratic context. Influenced directly by Ivan Dzyuba and indirectly by Ze'ev Jabotinsky, Sverstyuk envisioned the Ukrainian–Jewish dialogue as a conversation between two conscientious, democratically oriented, and independent peoples in control of their own independent countries—thirty years after the establishment of the State of Israel and fifteen years before the declaration of independence of Ukraine.

Smuggled out of the prison camp, Sverstyuk's essay first appeared in the then Munich-based *Suchasnist'*<sup>1</sup> and was later included in a nine-volume anthology of Ukrainian political thought edited by Taras Hunczak and published in Ukrainian.<sup>2</sup> After 1991, Sverstyuk obtained a Ph.D. in philosophy, and became the chief editor of the newspaper *Nasha vira* ('Our Creed') and a leading Ukrainian liberal theologian regularly participating in round tables with Jewish religious and cultural leaders of Ukraine.

*The Editors*

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WE HAVE MANY SACRED PLACES in common; we have experienced many of the same sufferings of bondage and bitterness of history. We share a similar, woeful weakness of seeking our native blood—great names—on the brow of foreign glory and of forgetting about the living blood that flows into the sand. In our land, which is not our own, we are persecuted the same way as were the Jews, who found shelter in a prosperous land where devastation has alighted from time to time. We have little islands of luminous friendship over the cold chaos of alienation. Our sorrowful history has not allowed us to be ourselves in order to assert the ideal of joint action on the level of dignity and mutual assistance. There is no topic more touchy than the psychology of nations and relations among nations, and everyone seeks to steer clear of national egoism and remain closer to ideal slogans. I feel how

<sup>1</sup> Ye. O. Sverstyuk, 'Zerna ukrayins'ko-izrayil's'koyi "solidarnosti"', *Suchasnist'*, 1979, no. 6, pp. 107–13.

<sup>2</sup> *Tysyacha rokiv ukrayins'koyi suspil'no-politychnoyi dumky*, ed. T. Hunczak et al., 9 vols. (Kiev, 2001), viii. 295–301.

easily this sympathy derived from real experience, not temporary political slogans, is formed—this is something more profound that proceeds from national self-awareness on the paths of destiny and shared spiritual wellsprings.

To what degree is the Ukrainian nation involved in such self-realization? To a great degree; the higher the culture and an individual’s national self-awareness, the greater it is. I myself, by far not the finest and most brilliant grain of the Ukrainian nation, have most often encountered among ordinary people simply a lack of understanding of what antisemitism is, to whom and why it has proved useful, an unwillingness to speak about Jews in general. I also encountered cold suspicion: ‘They hate all of us!’ I encountered accusations: ‘The Jews are bound by mutual responsibility.’ I encountered envy of their riches or irony on the level of jokes. Very occasionally I encountered empty theories about Judaeo-Freemasons. I encountered everything that exists among philistines: the deeper you go into the woods, the more logs there are. There everyone accuses everyone else in non-national, international, and intranational terms. I am not prepared to judge whose philistine is better . . . Once you eliminate the filthy sludge, the fact remains that there is a tendency among the Ukrainian people to have issues in common with the Jews and to value Jews more than to pass judgement on their shortcomings. This positive tendency always overcame the enmity that was imposed by [the principle of] ‘divide and rule’. And this is the main factor in our relations. As far as I remember Ukrainians of various ages and upbringing, they have all had a caring attitude towards Israel, despite the daily injections of the radio and press. Deep within us is good will, in our depths there is no hatred, while manifestations of antisemitism are the impulsive moods of dull-witted and downtrodden people who ‘have a quirk’, who direct their negative emotions loyally in whatever direction the government points them. Ukrainians are a toughened, stoic, all-enduring, life-affirming people; the spirit of despair, which is akin to antisemitism (that is the real picture), is alien to them.

I do not know whether there are counter-steps similar to the ones mentioned above on the part of those Jews who have lived or are living among us, and I do not know who owes more to whom. I do not know because all we have is the party’s opportunistic information, which oppresses and belittles our national feelings. They are concealed, they are distorted. In the Ukrainian *samvydav*<sup>3</sup> I have not encountered a single piece of writing with antisemitic overtones. Unfortunately, in the correction colony I heard from my Zionist friends that they had seen samizdat publications with anti-Ukrainian overtones (as a tool for spurring people to leave for Israel). One time, Leonid Plyushch brought the *Protocols of the Elders of Zion* from Moscow, together with an article exposing this falsification. I familiarized myself with it, and then it disappeared somewhere among my papers. The *Protocols* did not have a readership; they were a dead clump of letters and paper.

Meanwhile, a book of Jabotinsky’s articles was widely circulated in Ukrainian

<sup>3</sup> The Ukrainian word corresponding to Russian *samizdat* (Y.P.-S.).

circles—this honest and courageous Jewish word about the burden of history, about debt, about shared duty. It was unfortunate that this book did not take root deeply in the Jewish milieu; it did not enter the Zionist mainstream. And for people who did not like reminders of who they were, this book was simply unpleasant: it awakens, obliges, summons to action, and calls for sacrifices. It was only in the correction colony that I found out that Jabotinsky was a distinguished figure. So, wise Jews speak of their debt and encourage us to reflect on our debt. Unwise individuals accuse us. For in the same way one can accuse a river that breaks through a dam and then carries along in its path both those who are right and those who are wrong. Wise Ukrainians speak with dignity about goodwill; the stupid accuse the Jews of whatever they can. These are not egotistical but serious questions of life about shared, positive capital that lays the foundation of normal, positive development without the aid of fictitious verbal credits for one-day use. I imagine today's Ukrainian–Jewish alliance above all from the moral standpoint—as a return to the riverbed of positive feelings, as a conversation among equals, who have stripped themselves of the foreign raiments of false concealment beneath an alien language, concepts, alien truth, foreign interests, a slippery, alien bridge that seemingly united, but in reality was a butting of heads, and stimulated slyness and cunning. We wish them well; we respect their holy places, their Promised Land; they wish us well, they wish for us to become masters in our own land.

Therefore, we are on the righteous path of dignity, self-respect, and mutual respect. We have the dismal experience of a supervised false friendship, and we know that horses harnessed together, slaves on a plantation, and philistines standing in line for privileges, trust, and reward cannot respect one another; they touch each other with a prickly flank. And we know that only worthy and responsible masters in their own home truly respect each other. In the USSR, the meeting place of people who are nationally and spiritually emancipated and open is the political correction colonies. I think that the Ukrainian–Jewish political alliance, the noteworthy rapprochement between Ukrainians and Zionists in the camps, is rather the age-old, traditional position of the Ukrainians which continued in these colonies; that patriotic openness and absence of compromise were singularly acceptable to the Zionists—straightforward, principled people filled with deep patriotism and idealistic love for their historical and spiritual fatherland, Israel. It must be said that our Zionists behind bars quickly freed themselves of complexes, from the perceptions that the communist environment had imposed on them. Special respect was engendered in me by the spiritual efforts that were made by youths who only once they were behind bars discovered in their hearts the path to their God, whom they had not known in their childhood, to the God of their forefathers, their holy places. This is a road of strict self-limitations, bans; a road, for the superior joy of which it is necessary to pay with suffering. I instantly established close relationships with the religious Zionists, perhaps because they have a broad spiritual spectrum, a more active spiritual quest, a superior sensitivity to spiritual problems. Indefatigable and

energetic, always ready to throw himself into the fray or come to someone’s aid, the always principled Shimon Grilyus kept discovering new spiritual spheres; he loved to share his discoveries, and it was a joy to see how he roused himself in order to be worthy of setting foot in the Promised Land. Arye Vudka appeared in the Perm correction colony very briefly, after Vladimir prison. Modest, intelligent, poetically attuned, and at the same time attentive to everyone, with a constant supply of goodness and friendship, he instantly won himself the sympathy of my countrymen and charmed them with his smooth and mellifluous Ukrainian language. It seemed that everyone felt like saying ‘Our Arye’, and wanted to talk about this young man, who glowed with an appealing smile on the eve of his departure for Israel. And, of course, the spiritually gifted Iosif Mendelevich, a brilliant idealist who constantly felt that he was a particle of the Israeli spirit, history, and destiny. I knew him the longest and had the most interesting conversations with him. I hear him from the neighbouring cell of the PKT [a cell-type facility], singing the Psalms of David in his pure voice and falling silent when the guard yells, ‘Mendelevich, this here is not a synagogue!’ And I remember the parting smile in his light blue eyes: there was a presentiment that we would be scattered. [A remembered conversation:] ‘Whom would you hire for a position [one of yours or one of ours] if ours was obviously gifted?’ ‘That would depend on the job’, I smiled. ‘I would still hire the gifted one.’ ‘And I would not hire someone foreign; let him ply his talents in his own field.’ Eventually, though, I changed my mind: ‘Maybe I too would hire your gifted candidate.’ He clearly abided by the strict requirements and interdictions of his faith. He had the mark of aloofness about him, yet [I had] more in common with him than with those with whom there was ostensibly everything in common. I would like to acquaint him and generally all Zionists with my friends in the great zone. These are all people worthy of respect, starting with their pilot, Mark Dymshits, who, even though he did not manage to pave the way in the air, succeeded along with his crew in paving a historic path of spiritual unification with their fatherland. The Zionists in the correction colonies stand so much higher than their fellow Jews that there is little in common between them. They are very upright people. As with us, no one stands on ceremony with them.

But, in the distance they see the friendly native shores of a new life, while we have been swimming around in circles for decades, we hope without hope, and endure through the efforts of spirit, love, faith. And you don’t have to be a thinker to understand the Jews: they are a singular nation, just as their history is a singular book. The issue is not the banal enumeration of great names. Right now we are witnesses to a miracle: a country that is barely perceptible on the world map, with the population of a large city, occupies a thousand times more space in the consciousness of people, in the daily press, than on any map. Is it not a miracle, in which ten years ago no one would have believed, [that from a country] where—if there is something sacred it is the inviolable borders—people are suddenly leaving with an invitation to Israel? These are facts that uplift the Jews in their own eyes and

belittle the Jewish philistine who continues to dream about a sinecure and a neutral surname.

I did not know about the Jewish problem in my childhood. Jewish children went to school with me. They celebrated the sabbath, and no one had any complaints about them. Problems emerged with the advent of the 'first Soviets' in 1939: we were told that there were no *zhydy*, just *yevreyi*. This placed in a false position both our people, who spoke the old way, and classical literature, in which the word *zhyd* is the name of a nation, which has its analogue in Polish; even the Jews themselves made fun of the privilege of naming themselves in a different way and joked: 'Is this all they've brought us?' My schoolmates experienced this problem more acutely: they were forced to attend school on Saturdays. God alone knows how much little Itsyk, a fifth-grader, who wore sidecurls and prayed and did not even pick up a pen on Saturdays, had to suffer in one year (brave heart, he held the fort alone).

War broke out, and the Jewish problem peered into our eyes through the black muzzles of assault rifles. It was shameful to meet up with our classmates. It was terrifying when some of my father's friends [Jews], who were good friends of our family, fled to our house for a certain time—from the ghetto to the village. It was terrifying and disadvantageous: 'God only knows how things will turn out, but if the Gestapo shows up, it'll be death.' The village was still asleep, chained by horror, and was afraid of hiding its own children, who were being grabbed to work in Germany (no one believed that they would return!). Who could have imagined that within one year cars could reach villages only accompanied by tanks; that in the district centre of Horokhiv [the Germans] would hang fifty villagers from telegraph poles (with the inscription 'bandits') and distribute comical leaflets against the 'Ukrainian-Stalinist nationalists', and that in 1944 these same people of the resistance would be branded as 'Ukrainian-German nationalists'? Here in the correction colony the past is often replayed. What if the occupiers had delayed their horrific crime by only one year? It is clear where those Jewish boys who had shot back with pistols in the ghetto would be. People talk about the loyalty and dignity of those Jews who were in the UPA [Ukrainian Insurgent Army]. One can only imagine what a mighty foundation of solidarity would have been established by this union of the two nations that earlier had simply hoped along these lines: perhaps it is not our turn right now to be the first to be mown down? Ukrainians have a tendency to idealize foreigners who sincerely support our national cause, and they are always ready to pay in kind. Foreigners have pampered us with so little of their attention or even with a simple recognition of our truth . . . One such fact of solidarity cancels out a hundred muddy facts, such as: the surname of the NKVD head was Shtein, and the policeman's surname ended in *-enko*. Because if you switched those surnames, it would be no easier, [never mind that] the second line-up for execution has the illusion of privilege . . . And the vilest element jumps out of it to carry out any kind of service for the government, [especially] in a society whose ideology is oriented on philistines and which itself speaks in the self-serving language of philistines.

In a society affected by a negative principle—fear, which stands on guard for the inviolability of dogmas; hatred, which lies at the foundation of faith in the progressive force of the class struggle; falsehood, which serves as a tool of today’s benefit—in this type of society everything flows on negative emotions. One must have a large reserve of love and spiritual strength in order not to slip through those eternal line-ups down to that well-trodden path of negative emotions and eased explanations-accusations. Where will that reserve of love be found in that village, from which its traditions and faith have been taken away, and which in return has been given slogans and posters; in a city without holy places, without gleaming cultural centres, and without the right for birds of a feather to unite; in that school, where a lifeless standard extinguishes a child’s smile?

With its anti-Ukrainian nature, the current press in the Ukrainian SSR goes so far afield that it would even gladly shift the crime of genocide onto Ukrainians; here and there pop up ‘witnesses’ and ‘documents’ that the dull-witted Jewish philistine will easily take at face value (‘they are writing about themselves’). On the other hand, this press, like the monotonous sleet of autumn, is overlaid by an engineered antisemitic campaign against Israel, in which following the words ‘racism’ and ‘fascism’ you can then simply start berating it, and the denationalized Ukrainian man in the street can nourish himself with these injections of hatred . . . Meanwhile, our own national issues [and] topics are banned, they have been driven with bitterness into semi-consciousness, and they jump out of there with a loyal outburst: ‘It’s all because of them!’ It is sad that this evil role is sometimes also played by those who are called upon to sow what is wise, good, and eternal. In order to please someone ‘upstairs’, they scorn their national nature; they display indifference to it and often creep into a foreign field to do some barking at foreign gods that have been taken down from their pedestals. When he barks, he feels as though he is ‘on top’, and he is afraid to tear off his leash and escape to freedom because there are dog-catchers out there.

A Zionist once told me: ‘Your people may fall into idleness, become drunks, become down-and-outs in daily life; but when one of them decides on a specific course of action, you can even roast him with fire [and he will not abandon this path] . . .’ This is a separate question: whose dog is more of a dog?—but I have no doubt that if they issued a special, free state uniform for informers, in our times our guy would put it on to show that he has ‘authority’.

The ceiling has dropped so low that everything looks caricature-like and pathetic. But I believe that we will lift ourselves up again, and we will survive in those places where nobody would believe we could.

The cold gleam of hope in the 1960s was enough to ensure that small islands of solidarity between Ukrainian and Jewish youths appeared over the grimy, official wisdom. The main thing is to overcome the negative emotional barrier, overpower the negative direction of the information flow; then a healthy current of life will commence.

I perceive a certain phenomenon also in the fact that our national pedagogue [Vasyl] Sukhomlynsky is arguably the most consonant with Janusz Korczak. Ukrainians are inspired by the miracle of Israel's rebirth, the miracle of the endurance of a people which, throughout centuries of persecution, preserved its spirit and brought liberty to a free life.

The voice of L[esya] Ukrayinka rings out: 'And you too, my Ukraine, once struggled like Israel.' And from our hearts echo the words: 'And you will yet rise, like Israel.'

December 1977

In the Perm correction colonies

*Translated from the Ukrainian by Marta D. Olynyk*



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# Ukrainian–Jewish Relations

## *A Twenty-Five-Year Perspective*

HOWARD ASTER and PETER J. POTICHNYJ

THIS ESSAY CANNOT be viewed as more than a personal road map of a very complex subject. We have been involved personally, academically, and culturally in this subject for some decades now and we take particular pleasure in seeing its development and evolution. The bibliography of this field today is enormous and growing quickly. Most satisfying for us is to witness the growth of the field in many languages and the engagement in the field by numerous scholars from many backgrounds, generations, and countries.

Our essay is, necessarily, incomplete and limited by these factors. What we have tried to do is to provide a personal perspective on how we became engaged in the problems of Ukrainian–Jewish relations and how in broad intellectual terms we view its evolution over the past twenty-five years. It is very difficult, of course, to anticipate how intellectual endeavours may evolve in the future. This is particularly difficult with regard to this field, because we are not just dealing with an intellectual, cultural, or historical topic, but the subject is also a pawn in the reapolitik of more than just two nation states, namely Ukraine and Israel. The presence of Russia continues to cast a shadow on the Ukrainian–Jewish relationship with regard not only to its history but also to its contemporary evolution.

### BROACHING A ‘TABOO’ SUBJECT!

Ideas have strange ways of seeping into one’s consciousness and of lodging there and remaining for many years—often for a lifetime. Sir Karl Popper remarked that in one’s lifetime, a big idea may intrigue one and lodge itself in one’s mind at a young age, and the rest of one’s intellectual life remains an elaboration of that big idea.

For both of us, as friends and colleagues, the matrix of Ukrainian–Jewish relations was and remains a big idea. The problem seems to have haunted us through our youth and adolescence and into our mature academic lives. Over a period of many years, as colleagues in the 1970s and early 1980s, our conversations and research on this matter evolved and became focused and, finally, we felt comfortable enough to venture into writing about it.

In 1983 we published a volume entitled *Jewish–Ukrainian Relations: Two Solitudes*, and in the preface we stated: ‘The simple fact is that the topic of Jewish–Ukrainian relations is one of those intellectual problems which has not attracted much research or academic energy.’<sup>1</sup>

We went on to suggest that

When we first approached the topic, we faced a variety of significant problems—the relative paucity of research sources, the incoherence of almost any methodological approach which could provide a focus for research activity, the intellectual skepticism with which our colleagues viewed our efforts in this area, the apparent ossified layers of prejudice and confused meanings which tainted the ability of two researchers, one Ukrainian and one Jewish, to approach this massive problem and finally, the inter-disciplinary skill required to make sense of the topic.<sup>2</sup>

To our surprise, the first edition of the book sold out and we soon received intriguing enquiries provoking us to go deeper into this topic. Little did we know that it was also a minefield.

In 1987, as the book went into a second, revised, edition, we were able to state: ‘In the few years since the publication of our monograph, a range of academic inquiries have been launched into this area. Clearly, the topic is of deep concern and preoccupation mainly to Ukrainian scholars and academics, less so to Jewish scholars and academics. The reasons for this “uneven development” . . . are complex.’<sup>3</sup>

The topic continued to haunt us and clearly it began to haunt other scholars, colleagues, and friends. We boldly concluded that we had to delve deeper into the topic. However, we decided that this time our intellectual adventure would be done not alone, but in collaboration with other colleagues—if we could find them! A conference format appeared to us to be the most likely solution.

We quickly recognized that it would not be easy. But we were totally dedicated to the enterprise and convinced that it was extremely important. Aside from the funding issue, we recognized that we were dealing with an explosive topic where deep wounds would be exposed and explored, where the outcome would not be apparent and the dangers could be immense. Could we find a complement of dedicated scholars and seek the correct balance that is so important in academic discourse? Could we delineate the correct range of topics to undertake this exploration? As we worked towards this conference objective, we found both encouragement and scepticism among many academic colleagues and, yes, we also faced not just our own doubts but also a certain measure of fear.

The conference ‘Jewish–Ukrainian Relations in Historical Perspective’ was held on 17–20 October 1983 at McMaster University in Hamilton, Ontario, and the papers were first published by the Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies in 1988;

<sup>1</sup> H. Aster and P. J. Potichnyj, *Jewish–Ukrainian Relations: Two Solitudes* (Oakville, Ont., 1983), 7.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>3</sup> H. Aster and P. J. Potichnyj, *Jewish–Ukrainian Relations: Two Solitudes*, 2nd, rev., edn. (Oakville, Ont., 1987), p. vi.

they were reissued in 1990, and a third edition appeared in 2010 with a brief new preface and a bibliography.<sup>4</sup>

In the preface to the original volume we stated:

Every idea has its time. Thought that may be unthinkable or heretical to one generation may become commonplace and acceptable to another. At least among intellectuals and in an academic community, one hopes that there is enough courage to take on unusual ideas and to consider them carefully, dispassionately and with self-critical candour. One such idea is Jewish–Ukrainian relations.<sup>5</sup>

It is not coincidental that we dedicated the volume of papers to ‘The late Professor Shmuel Ettinger and Professor Omeljan Pritsak, whose spirit of collaboration permeates this entire volume.’ Both their contributions exude scholarship and a devotion to detail, but also a recognition that the task at hand was not easy. Frank Sysyn captured the spirit of the conference when he concluded his essay by stating that ‘the time has come for specialists in the history of each group to expand their horizons and research in order to provide a better understanding of the complex events’ that constituted the subject of the conference.<sup>6</sup> Shmuel Ettinger also reminded us in the opening sentence of his essay that ‘The assessment of the role of Jews in any of the major developments in European, and particularly East European history is a very difficult task.’ He went on to say, in a typical Ettinger understatement, that he did not perceive the historian’s role as ‘one of sitting in judgment over quarrels of past years’.<sup>7</sup> These same sentiments were expressed by others.

The scope of the conference and the resulting published papers were ambitious and extensive. The topics followed a trajectory from the tenth century until the later years of the twentieth century and included ‘The Early Period’, ‘The National Awakening’, ‘The Revolution and After’, ‘Literary and Social Reflections’, ‘The Holocaust’, and ‘The Contemporary Period’, and even included a section on ‘Jews and Ukrainians in Canada’. There were twenty-five papers presented by scholars from Canada, the United States, and Israel, and by one lonely exiled Ukrainian.

There are only a few of us ‘survivors’ who participated at that conference some thirty years ago. We do not believe, of course, that the departure of so many of our colleagues from the 1983 group had anything to do with a ‘contagion’ from the topic. However, 1983 is a long way back!

It is worth reflecting on and considering the response to the conference and to the publication of the papers in 1988. A couple of reviews will provide us with a

<sup>4</sup> P. J. Potichnyj and H. Aster (eds.), *Ukrainian–Jewish Relations in Historical Perspective* (Edmonton, 1988); 2nd edn. (Edmonton, 1990); 3rd edn. (Edmonton, 2010).

<sup>5</sup> Potichnyj and Aster (eds.), *Ukrainian–Jewish Relations in Historical Perspective* (1988), p. ix.

<sup>6</sup> F. Sysyn, ‘The Jewish Factor in the Khmelnytsky Uprising’, in Potichnyj and Aster (eds.), *Ukrainian–Jewish Relations in Historical Perspective* (1988), 52.

<sup>7</sup> S. Ettinger, ‘Jewish Participation in the Settlement of Ukraine in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries’, in Potichnyj and Aster (eds.), *Ukrainian–Jewish Relations in Historical Perspective* (1988), 23, 24.

sense of the atmospherics surrounding the conference and its participants. According to Robert S. Newman, 'Though the subject may seem dry as dust to some, this conference was loaded with tension. A dialogue among the professors at the end of the volume crackles with the emotions of oppression, mass murder, accusations and counter-accusations; with trying to come to terms with anger, prejudice and misunderstanding.'<sup>8</sup> For Michael Stanislawski, 'This interesting and frustrating volume . . . this collection is particularly afflicted by an extra-scholarly problem: the heavy burden of mutual distrust and enmity between the Ukrainian and Jewish communities . . . some of the most gripping, if painful, reading in this volume.'<sup>9</sup>

For the few of us who remember vividly the conference, these reviews provoke many mixed feelings and emotions. Especially for those whose only access to the original conference is through the reading of the papers, we think it is well worth studying section 7 of the volume, 'Round-Table Discussion'. The atmospherics do come to life!

The charged atmosphere and tensions surrounding the academic conference, we later learned, were also reflected in a wider political context. As we have discovered since the opening of KGB documents from the former Soviet Union, the issue of Ukrainian–Jewish relations was of considerable interest to the KGB and the Soviet political leadership. The evidence indicates that, beginning in 1947, the Soviet political police followed any attempts by Ukrainians and Jews to begin a constructive dialogue with each other, and any meetings or conferences were carefully watched and reported upon to the highest authorities in Moscow.

Here are just a few examples. In a document dated 7 October 1969 sent to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine by Borys Shulzhenko, the Deputy Director of the Ukrainian KGB, various provocative actions and objects are listed, including:

A leaflet in the name of the OUN (Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists) which was prepared and sent to prime minister Pierre Trudeau in Canada requesting that the Province of Manitoba be granted independence. The aim was to cause a 'negative reaction by the Canadian government to any appearances of Ukrainian separatism in Manitoba';

An 'OUN' leaflet in German which criticized the Germans and encouraged Ukrainians 'independently to safeguard Christian-humanitarian traditions' in order to repay Germans for their past offences;

In the name of persons of Jewish nationality living in the Federal Republic of Germany, a leaflet in Yiddish and English calling for revenge on Yaroslav Stetsko for the thousands of innocent victims of genocide was sent to London, New York, and Paris to various OUN(b) newspapers;

<sup>8</sup> R. S. Newman, review at <<http://www.amazon.com/review/RML5B1G6QEUPE>>.

<sup>9</sup> M. Stanislawski, review of P. J. Potichnyj and H. Aster (eds.), *Ukrainian–Jewish Relations in Historical Perspective*, in *Jewish Quarterly Review*, 84/4 (1994), 529.

A leaflet designed to cause greater conflict between the OUN(m) and the OUN(b);<sup>10</sup>  
An anonymous letter supposedly from the OUN(m) to Ukrainian Catholic Bishop Kornylak in Munich requesting him not to celebrate a commemorative service for the late Stepan Bandera (assassinated by the Soviet agent Stashynsky);  
A special brochure disclosing supposed secret decisions of an OUN(b) conference with respect to other nationalist organizations.<sup>11</sup>

A second document, dated 27 December 1973, sent by the head of the Ukrainian KGB, Vitaly Fedorchuk, to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine (and delivered to Volodymyr Shcherbytsky, First Secretary of the Communist Party of Ukraine, on 17 January 1974) is directly pertinent to Jewish–Ukrainian relations. This document states that a special brochure in English entitled ‘Lest We Forget’ was prepared under the supposed authorship of a certain Michael Hanusiak with the aim of ‘inflaming animosity between Ukrainian nationalists and Zionists’. In the United States the League of American Ukrainians, a ‘progressive organization’, together with ‘progressive Jewish activists from New York’ helped in this effort. The brochure became ‘very popular’ and a second edition was prepared. About 25 per cent of the print run was sent to Canada.<sup>12</sup>

In addition, the activities of the Interdepartmental Committee on Communist and East European Affairs (ICCEEA) at McMaster University were carefully monitored. A *Pravda* correspondent by the name of Geivandov was sent as an observer to one ICCEEA conference. In 1974 the Ukrainian magazine *Perets* published a critical article about the ‘Innocent Lambs of McMaster’. No names, however, were mentioned.

Roman Serbyn reports that our book *Jewish–Ukrainian Relations: Two Solitudes* caught the eye of the Soviet ambassador to Canada, Aleksey Rodionov. In a confidential letter to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine dated 16 April 1984, Rodionov characterized the brochure as an example of the current discussions between ‘the Ukrainian bourgeois–nationalist and Zionist ringleaders and ideologues with the intention of overcoming the traditional discord in the Ukrainian–Jewish community (v ukrainsko–evreiskoi obshchine) and to knock together an alliance with an anti–Soviet agenda’. The ambassador suggested that the booklet be used in Ukrainian educational institutions specializing in ‘criticizing and exposing the theory and practice of Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism and international Zionism’.<sup>13</sup>

The sensitivity to the conference also reached out, as we just recently discovered, to discussions in Israel. It was indicated to Peter Potichnyj by Professor Mordechai

<sup>10</sup> The OUN(b) was the Bandera faction of the OUN, the OUN(m) the Melnyk faction.

<sup>11</sup> Archive of the Komitet gosudarstvennoi bezopasnosti pri Sovete Ministrov Ukrainskoi SSR, f. 16, op. 1, no. 8, d. 2, t. 7.

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*, f. 16, op. 4, no. 2, d. 2, t. 2.

<sup>13</sup> R. Serbyn, ‘Competing Memories of Communist and Nazi Crimes in Ukraine’, *Holodomor Studies*, 1/1 (2009), 7.

Altschuler at the October 2010 Ukrainian–Jewish Encounter Conference in Jerusalem that there was some concern about the possible participation by Israeli scholars in the McMaster conference, most likely because of the ramifications of any dialogue between Ukrainians and Jews in the Soviet Union.

The changing geopolitics of the world over the past decades have had a deep impact on the discourse of Ukrainian–Jewish relations. Times have changed dramatically since the second half of the twentieth century. The Soviet Union is gone, Ukraine is an independent state, Israeli foreign policy now embraces Ukraine, the dynamics of the Jewish and Ukrainian diaspora communities are different today from what they were decades ago. It is worth remembering that not too long ago, attempts at Jewish–Ukrainian talks or dialogue usually took place in the most unlikely of places, in the Gulag or in the diaspora, both the Ukrainian and Jewish diasporas, certainly not in a Jewish or Ukrainian nation state! Or they took place in obscure locations such as university conferences in Canada!

The discourse which we attempted in the early 1980s has clearly widened and deepened. New generations of scholars have become engaged by the topic, new historical research is being conducted based upon the opening of previously embargoed archives, new research tools are being utilized. In addition, the pervasiveness of interdisciplinary approaches has deepened and widened much of the research.

It is vital to recognize the enormous transformations taking place in Ukraine itself and the investment that has been made in the discourse and research on Ukrainian–Jewish relations. There are many institutions with extensive research programmes exploring aspects of Ukrainian–Jewish relations, including Holocaust studies. For example, one can mention the extensive activities of the Tkuma All-Ukrainian Center for Holocaust Studies (Ukrayins'kyi instytut vvychennya Holokostu 'Tkuma') in Dnipropetrovsk and the Ukrainian Center for Holocaust Studies (Ukrayins'kyi tsentr vvychennya istoriyi Holokostu) in Kiev; the fact that between 1991 and 2008 Anatoly Podolsky, Feliks Levitas, Faina Vynokurova, Oleksy Honcharenko, O. Surovtsev, and Nataliya Suhatska wrote dissertations about the Holocaust in Ukraine; the existence of the journal *Yi* edited by Taras Voznyak, and the numerous books edited by him and published in Lviv. It is well worth noting that the history and exploration of Ukrainian–Jewish relations is now being written in Ukrainian and published in Ukraine, not just in English or Russian or Hebrew.

#### COMING TO GRIPS WITH THE PAST

Over the past two decades, there has been a significant growth both of interest in the topic of Ukrainian–Jewish relations and also in the numbers and varieties of approaches that have emerged in this exploration. Many scholars and public figures from many countries are now engaged in this exploration.

One of the scholars who has been persistently engaged in this topic for almost three decades is Leonid Finberg. He argues that Ukrainian–Jewish relations as a

research concern consists of three elements: ‘inter-nationality relations, built up over centuries on the territory of Rus–Ukraine; interstate relations between Ukraine and Israel; the relations between the larger Jewish and Ukrainian diasporic communities—particularly in the USA, Canada, Germany, Latin America, Australia, Poland, and a number of other countries’.<sup>14</sup>

However, Finberg argues that while the topic itself is extensive and very deep, there are enormous gaps and unresearched areas. He asserts that ‘In the history textbooks of schools in the USSR, on which several generations of Soviet people over a span of 50 years were raised, there was no data on the 1000 year history of the Jewish communities, or on the role of Jews in the history of Rus–Russia–Ukraine.’ He goes further and claims that ‘it is completely obvious: Ukrainian–Jewish relations for a long period of time . . . were outside the framework of the social and humanitarian sciences’.<sup>15</sup> Because of this fact, Finberg argues that myths, stereotypes, and misunderstandings permeated the topic of Ukrainian–Jewish relations. Yet he is not pessimistic. He claims that one must begin to unearth those myths, stereotypes, and misunderstandings and he has become a significant individual in and contributor to that process.

To Finberg’s list one may well add another element which stands clearly as a major concern in Ukrainian–Jewish relations, and that is the history of the first fifty years of the twentieth century and, more specifically, of the Holocaust period. This field of research has expanded dramatically in the past few decades.

Anatoly Podolsky has explored this topic and, most significantly, he has done so in the context of contemporary research within Ukraine. In the section of his essay entitled ‘Ukrainian research on the Holocaust’ he asserts that ‘The works of Ukrainian historians who research the Holocaust are largely ignored by official scholarship in Ukraine. At the same time, they have been received with great interest in the West and are frequently cited.’<sup>16</sup>

He goes on to claim that there is a larger problem which appears to be endemic to contemporary Ukrainian research efforts. He defines this problem as ‘the idea of a mono-cultural or even mono-ethnic history of Ukraine, although there is widespread understanding in Ukrainian historiography that Ukraine’s culture and history were also influenced by minorities, including Jews’. Yet, he concludes that ‘in the “official” tomes published by the Academy of Sciences and financed by the state, national minorities, such as the Jews, are not to be found’.<sup>17</sup>

He counterposes this situation in Ukrainian historiography to what is characteristic of European historiography: ‘European historiography follows a multicultural approach. This approach is also widespread in post-socialist countries. In Poland,

<sup>14</sup> L. Finberg, ‘Ukrainian–Jewish Relations: Mythology Substituting for Reality’, *Nezalezhnyi kul’ turolohichnyi chasopys ‘Yi’*, 11 (1997): <<http://www.ji.lviv.ua/pdf/11.pdf>>. <sup>15</sup> Ibid.

<sup>16</sup> A. Podol’s’kyi [Podolsky], ‘A Reluctant Look Back: Jews and the Holocaust in Ukraine’, trans. S. Lang, *Eurozine*, 28 Nov. 2008: <<http://www.eurozine.com/articles/2008-11-28-podolskyi-en.html>>. <sup>17</sup> Ibid.

for example, the most delicate subjects . . . can be discussed . . . This shows that Poland is assuming responsibility for historical remembrance.<sup>18</sup>

Podolsky is very critical of the situation in contemporary Ukraine:

The omission of everything Jewish in official Ukrainian historiography cannot be explained solely by the continued existence of the mono-cultural Soviet approach to history. Ukrainian society seems incapable or unwilling to perceive its national history as a history of various cultures. The ‘other’ tends to be excluded and viewed as something alien. Apparently, it is more comfortable to talk about ‘us’ and ‘others’, for example about ‘our Great Famine’ and about ‘the others’ Holocaust’. A certain narrative is taking shape, in which the Holocaust does not appear.<sup>19</sup>

Podolsky’s very candid and critical assessment is extremely important, yet he does offer us some hope:

Liberal historians in Ukraine and abroad, independent publications, non-government organisations are working to counter this simplification. They clearly understand the Holocaust in Ukraine as an integral part of Ukrainian history. But they are not supported by the state, or only insufficiently so, and therefore have only little influence on public opinion. With the subordination of academia to political interests, Ukrainian historiography as an institution is continuing the Soviet tradition.<sup>20</sup>

Podolsky goes on to provide us many important insights into ‘the Holocaust in the classroom’ in Ukraine and ‘the Holocaust in politics and society’ in contemporary Ukraine. He pessimistically concludes that ‘The overview of research and education policy has already demonstrated that the Ukrainian government has no interest in promoting a discussion of Jewish life and the Holocaust in Ukraine.’ Even more pessimistically, he argues that ‘The way Ukrainian historiography concentrates on the nation-state and the mono-ethnic concept of history is preventing the rest of the world from overcoming stereotypes and prejudices concerning the “anti-Semitic Ukrainians”.’<sup>21</sup>

Is there a way out of or a way forward from this apparent impasse in understanding the Holocaust in Ukraine? Podolsky refers to the German historian Wilfried Jilge:

Perhaps Wilfried Jilge is right to assume that the sum of the different wartime experiences—those of the Ukrainians, Jews, the Crimean Tatars, Poles and others—would serve national consolidation in Ukraine more than official declarations that allow for only one reading of history. Unconnected, isolated histories lead to the expression of memories that are isolated from one another. Each is in and of itself biased . . . The only solution is to accept history responsibly and to promote the exchange and reconciliation of competing narratives.<sup>22</sup>

The problem of the ‘reconciliation of competing narratives’ is further complicated in Ukrainian–Jewish relations because of the word ‘genocide’. Words convey

<sup>18</sup> Podol’s’kyi, ‘Reluctant Look Back’.

<sup>19</sup> Ibid.

<sup>20</sup> Ibid.

<sup>21</sup> Ibid.

<sup>22</sup> Ibid.



compacted meanings and in the context of both Ukrainian and Jewish history certain words are immensely meaningful. One such word, of course, is ‘genocide’. It is worth remembering that the word does not have a very long etymological past, because it was first used in its contemporary meaning by Raphael Lemkin in 1943. Almost single-handedly, Lemkin transformed the understanding and meaning of mass murder based upon ‘hatred towards a racial, religious or social collectivity’ as an international crime and he was able to persuade the prosecutors at the Nuremberg trials to use the word ‘genocide’.<sup>23</sup> His definition of genocide also includes the Holodomor. Norman Naimark tracks and elaborates on the use of the term ‘genocide’ in his recent book,<sup>24</sup> and the culpability of Stalin with regard to the attempt at ‘genocide’ during the Ukrainian famine has now become a significant aspect of Ukraine’s narrative of its own history of the 1930s.

The issue of competing narratives is at the heart of one of the major issues in Ukrainian–Jewish relations as it has evolved over the past few decades. The Holocaust remains a major if not the central issue in the narrative of Jewish history in the twentieth century. Jews have developed that narrative as the epicentre of their collective experience in the twentieth century and they have hitched it to the creation and interpretation of the State of Israel. In addition, the Holocaust is not just a unique historical period but is also the fundamental moral category by which to interpret many inter-ethnic dramas.

Over the past few decades, the emerging central narrative of twentieth-century Ukrainian history is the Holodomor. Roman Serbyn has, indeed, brought the Holodomor and the German–Soviet war together as the great epic and also tragic story of Ukraine in the twentieth century. He asserts that

The most destructive periods in modern Ukrainian history were the Great Famine of the 1930s and the German–Soviet war of the 1940s. Both disasters ravaged the country and destroyed millions of human lives. Stalin’s Communists perpetrated the first calamity. Hitler’s Nazis were responsible for the larger part of the second catastrophe . . . Both regimes elicited fear and hatred and were thoroughly detested by the population, particularly during the waves of mass killings. The crimes were concealed from the outside world and even obscured from that part of the native population that was not directly affected by them . . . Those turbulent and confusing times left deep impressions and conflicting memories.<sup>25</sup>

And Serbyn argues that the Soviets consciously attempted to hide the true nature and extent of the Holodomor from the outside world. It could also be argued that our knowledge of the massive scale of murder and destruction perpetrated during the German–Soviet war has also been obscured or partially hidden until recently. As Serbyn argues, the Holodomor and the German–Soviet war in Ukraine deeply

<sup>23</sup> R. Lemkin, *Qu’est-ce qu’un génocide?* (Monaco, 2008); R. Serbyn, ‘Lemkin’s Conceptualization of the Crime of Genocide and his Analysis of the Ukrainian Genocide’, in *Raphael Lemkin: Soviet Genocide in Ukraine. Article in 28 Languages*, ed. R. Serbyn (Kiev, 2009), 11–20.

<sup>24</sup> N. M. Naimark, *Stalin’s Genocides* (Princeton, 2010).

<sup>25</sup> Serbyn, ‘Competing Memories of Communist and Nazi Crimes in Ukraine’, 9.

affected Ukrainian–Jewish relations and has left a major scar on their inter-ethnic relations and their collective memories.

The issue of the equivalences of the ‘holocausts’ or ‘genocides’ suffered by Jews and Ukrainians has affected Ukrainian–Jewish relations. Serbyn asserts that

research on the Holocaust and diffusion of information about the Jewish genocide rapidly became a priority for the Jewish diaspora and the new Jewish state. By contrast, work on the Holodomor was slow . . . Both genocides had their deniers . . . The main struggle against the negation of the Holocaust took place in the 1970s; by the 1980s historical revisionism regarding Jewish genocide was pretty much discredited in the West. For the Ukrainian diaspora, the most dynamic years were the 1980s when the 50th anniversary of the Holodomor, the Chernobyl’ catastrophe, and the ultimate recognition for the Holocaust galvanized the community into a renewed effort to make its genocide known to the world . . .

Up to the 1980s, Jewish and Ukrainian diasporas explored and publicized their respective genocides in isolation of each other, while competing for the wider public opinion.<sup>26</sup>

Ukrainian–Jewish relations, clearly, were deeply affected by this competition for the sympathy and also the attention of the minds and the hearts of the Western world. Layered on top of this were the efforts to bring war criminals to justice in both Canada and the United States as well as the discussions on the culpability for the Holodomor. The question of language, historical fact and interpretation, and setting the record right increased the stress and exacerbated the possibilities of normalized relations between Ukrainians and Jews.

While Jews seems to have managed to seize proprietary control of the narrative of their own Holocaust and integrated that into the story of Israel, as Serbyn asserts, Ukraine is a country with the unique task of having to integrate into its collective memory not just one, but two genocides committed on its territory . . .

More than half a century has passed since the two most hideous crimes were committed on Ukrainian territory. Most of the survivors are gone and with them personal memories and recollections. What remains is what is being preserved by history, whose vocation is to preserve a truthful image of the past, and by the so-called collective memory, which is not a collection of individual memories, but a social construct made in the image of the collectivity’s interests, and as such is a reflection of its present future goals, [rather] than past successes and failures.<sup>27</sup>

The narrative of Ukrainian–Jewish relations has evolved in another and powerful direction over the past few years. Any history leaves many gaps open, missing links, a need for fuller understanding and deeper documentation. And, as Podolsky and Serbyn and others have shown with regard to Ukrainian–Jewish relations, the 1930s and 1940s remain a critical period in these relations.

Timothy Snyder’s book *Bloodlands* may well be a very significant addition to the discussion of Ukrainian–Jewish relations. Snyder is quite deliberate in what he sets out to achieve. He wants to reconfigure the history of what he calls the ‘bloodlands’,

<sup>26</sup> Serbyn, ‘Competing Memories of Communist and Nazi Crimes in Ukraine’, 14. <sup>27</sup> *Ibid.* 24.

to focus the attention of readers, scholars, and others on this part of the world during the 1930s to the 1950s. But he wants to do more.

He asserts that

For decades, national history—Jewish, Polish, Ukrainian, Belarusian, Russian, Lithuanian, Estonian, Latvian—has resisted the Nazi and Soviet conceptualization of the atrocities. The history of the bloodlands has been preserved, often intelligently and courageously, by dividing the European past into national parts, and then by keeping these parts from touching one another. Yet attention to any single persecuted group, no matter how well executed as history, will fail as an account of what happened in Europe between 1933 and 1945. Perfect knowledge of the Ukrainian past will not produce the causes of the famine. Following the history of Poland is not the best way to understand why so many Poles were killed in the Great Terror. No amount of knowledge of Belarusian history can make sense of the prisoner-of-war camps and the anti-partisan campaigns that killed so many Belarusians. A description of Jewish life can include the Holocaust, but not explain it. Often what happened to one group is intelligible only in light of what happened to the other . . . This study brings the Nazi and Soviet regimes together, and Jewish and European history together, and the national histories together.<sup>28</sup>

Snyder's work forces us to think through the history of Jews and Ukrainians and other peoples in the bloodlands in a more complex and difficult way. The Holocaust, for Snyder, is more than what has been stereotyped in images of concentration camps. He asserts that the vast majority of Hitler's victims, Jews and others, some ten million, died in the killing fields of the bloodlands. They were shot, as Father Patrick Desbois is now able to document in his courageous research, individually. It was a Holocaust by bullets. Death was immediate—no names, no records, no traces. Bodies were thrown into pits and covered up. He also argues not only that Stalin perpetrated the killing of a million people in the Soviet Gulag between 1933 and 1945, but also that another six million people died because of politically induced Soviet famines and the Soviet killing fields. By bringing the Nazi and Soviet regimes together, Snyder forces us to reconsider the very nature of any singular national history during this period, whether it is Jewish, Ukrainian, Polish, or other. The bigger picture allows us to rethink how we are to understand any national history of this period.

Snyder allows us to appreciate more deeply Podolsky's comment that 'Unconnected, isolated histories lead to the expression of memories that are isolated from one another. Each is in and of itself biased . . . The only solution is to accept history responsibly and to promote the exchange and reconciliation of competing narratives.'<sup>29</sup> However, this objective is not easy to achieve, as Snyder reminds us: 'Our contemporary culture of commemoration takes for granted that memory prevents murder. If people died in such large numbers, it is tempting to think, they must have died for something of transcendent value, which can be revealed, developed, and

<sup>28</sup> T. Snyder, *Bloodlands: Europe between Hitler and Stalin* (New York, 2010), pp. xviii–xix.

<sup>29</sup> Podol's'kyi, 'Reluctant Look Back'.

preserved in the right sort of political remembrance.<sup>30</sup> But Snyder recognizes that there is a serious danger in this exercise. He specifically shows that the ‘indulgence in quantitative exaggeration of victimhood’ can be used for nationalistic purposes and not for moral purposes.

He reminds us that

The Nazi and Soviet regimes turned people into numbers, some of which we can only estimate, some of which we can reconstruct with fair precision. It is for us as scholars to seek these numbers and to put them into perspective. It is for us as humanists to turn the numbers back into people. If we cannot do that, then Hitler and Stalin have shaped not only our world, but our humanity.<sup>31</sup>

Another very important piece of the perplexing puzzle of Ukrainian–Jewish relations during the Holocaust period is now being filled in most surprisingly by Father Patrick Desbois and the institute he founded, Yahad—In Unum. Painstakingly and deliberately Desbois and his colleagues are filling in the untold story of the ‘Holocaust by bullets’ in Ukraine. For him, ‘Every village [in Ukraine] is a different crime scene. Every case is particular.’<sup>32</sup> But what is most terrifying in Desbois’s accounts of the story of mass killing in Ukraine, village by village, is his statement ‘I imagine that if we could open all the mass graves we would have to take aerial photographs of the whole of Ukraine. A mass cemetery of anonymous pits into which men, women, and children were thrown. Not a camp but a country of graves.’<sup>33</sup>

Desbois, a Catholic priest, claims that his work in exploring the Holocaust by bullets ‘is primarily an act of justice towards the dead, with the aim of creating awareness of the barbarity and wrong of what occurred, but also of preventing future genocides. Another purpose of my work is to convey the message that, even if decades go by, someone will eventually uncover and get at the roots of a genocide, whoever the perpetrator may be.’<sup>34</sup> The mass cemetery of anonymous graves in Ukraine contains the bodies of Jews, Ukrainians, and others who were victims of the genocides during this period of deliberate madness. Desbois’s powerful message remains: ‘The blood of Abel will not cease crying out to the sky, and will continue to resonate in my conscience. As it is written in the book of Genesis: “The voice of your brother’s blood is crying to me from the ground!”’<sup>35</sup>

#### WE WANT TO KNOW HOW THEY LIVED!

Yehuda Bauer reminds us that we seem to know a lot about the end or demise of Jewish life in European shtetls—‘I know that they died’, he claims. The Holocaust is viewed as the termination of Jewish life in almost all parts of central and eastern Europe. But he also asserts that the task of the historian is more than understand-

<sup>30</sup> Snyder, *Bloodlands*, 401–2.

<sup>31</sup> *Ibid.* 408.

<sup>32</sup> Fr P. Desbois, *The Holocaust by Bullets: A Priest’s Journey to Uncover the Truth behind the Murder of 1.5 Million Jews* (Basingstoke, 2008), 81.

<sup>33</sup> *Ibid.* 178.

<sup>34</sup> *Ibid.* 124.

<sup>35</sup> *Ibid.*

ing the Holocaust: ‘I want to know how they lived.’<sup>36</sup> This is an important imperative with regard to understanding and deepening our appreciation of Ukrainian–Jewish relations. There is an emerging scholarship and literature which is providing us with a vastly more complex and fuller understanding of Ukrainian–Jewish relations over a long historical period.

One can cite many such efforts. Taras Voznyak, for example, edits and publishes a journal in Lviv entitled *Yi* which, in some issues, focuses on the history of Jews in Galicia. The range of topics and the quality of research covered by the essays is very impressive indeed, and the periodical is a great source of information on the cultural history of Jews in this part of Ukraine. The articles include in-depth, historically based research on individuals, institutions, and intellectual currents and take us into the lives and activities of Jews in Galicia over many centuries. One of the 2008 volumes covers topics such as painting, architecture, street life in the Jewish districts of Lviv, and Jewish cemeteries,<sup>37</sup> and a 2007 volume deals with the economic basis of the Jewish communities in Galicia, Jewish craftsmen, Jewish rights in Austria–Hungary, Jews in the Austro–Hungarian army, synagogues, clothing and fashion, the musical culture of the shtetls, Jewish printing and publishing, Jewish philosophy, and more.<sup>38</sup> Voznyak has also produced a very useful guide to the Galician shtetls.<sup>39</sup>

Yohanan Petrovsky–Shtern in an article on Ukrainian literature begins the process of clarifying the contribution of Jews to Ukrainian literature and also of explaining the relationships between Jewish writers who chose to write in Ukrainian and their Ukrainian literary colleagues. He begins by reminding us that

Jewish Ukrainian literary creativity was uncommon: East European Jews generally sought acculturation into powerful imperial societies that had great literary traditions, such as Russia or Germany. Nonetheless, some Jews chose to identify with the colonial society of Ukraine, even though it was routinely represented not only as powerless, stateless, and oppressed, but also as uncivilized and backward. Most of the Jews who established themselves as Ukrainian writers or expressed sympathy for Ukrainian culture made a conscious anti-imperial choice; indeed, a decision by an East European Jew to integrate into Ukrainian culture was particularly striking because Jews for centuries viewed Ukrainians as perpetrators of anti-Jewish massacres, and Ukrainians perceived Jews as sycophantic servants of the Polish gentry, Russian landlords, or, later, the Bolsheviks.<sup>40</sup>

However, the evidence is that creative Jewish writers did begin ‘to turn to Ukrainian literature in the second half of the nineteenth century, at a time when Russian authorities forbade the Ukrainian language in scholarship, education, and

<sup>36</sup> Y. Bauer, *The Death of the Shtetl* (New Haven, 2009), 178.

<sup>37</sup> *Hebreis’kyi L’viv = Nezalezhnyi kul’ turolohichnyi chasopys ‘Yi’*, 51 (2008).

<sup>38</sup> *Hebreis’kyi use-svit Halychyny = Nezalezhnyi kul’ turolohichnyi chasopys ‘Yi’*, 48 (2007).

<sup>39</sup> T. Voznyak, *Shtetly Halychyny: Intelektual’nyi putivnyk* (Lviv, 2010).

<sup>40</sup> Y. Petrovsky–Shtern, ‘Ukrainian Literature’, in *The YIVO Encyclopedia of Jews in Eastern Europe*: <[http://www.yivoencyclopedia.org/article.aspx/Ukrainian\\_Literature](http://www.yivoencyclopedia.org/article.aspx/Ukrainian_Literature)>.

liturgy and perceived Ukrainian literary endeavors as subversive and disloyal'.<sup>41</sup> And Petrovsky-Shtern goes on to trace a continuous succession of Jewish writers who entered into the mainstream of Ukrainian literary life from the nineteenth century and throughout the twentieth. These writers wrote in Ukrainian, they touched on major Ukrainian and also Jewish themes, and they left a major mark in Ukrainian literature. This long literary tradition continues today with Jewish Ukrainian writers such as Moisey Fishbein, Zynovy Antonyuk, Myroslav Marynovych, and Semen Hluzman.

What is true about the role of Jews in Ukrainian literature is also true about Jews in other aspects of Ukrainian cultural life, from music and theatre to art. This exploration is now being undertaken by a wide variety of scholars. Myroslav Shkandrij shows in his pioneering work how Jews have been seen through modern Ukrainian literature and uses evidence found within that literature to challenge the established view that the Ukrainian and Jewish communities were antagonistic towards one another and interacted only when compelled to do so by economic necessity.<sup>42</sup> The result, clearly, will be a more comprehensive and fuller portrait of Ukrainian–Jewish relations over the past centuries. Or, to make the argument in more general terms, the new narrative of Ukrainian–Jewish relations that is now beginning to emerge indicates that there was an inter-cultural reality, complex, no doubt, but a reality nonetheless.

There is also another major thrust now in the study of Ukrainian–Jewish relations and that is the historiographical analysis of Jewish demography in Ukraine over many centuries. Yevhen Nakonechny, the head of the Ukrainian Studies Department at the Vasyl Stefanyk Library of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine in Lviv, has unearthed many intriguing statistics about Jews in Ukraine. He states:

Without a doubt the Jews long ago took a fancy to the Ukrainian lands. How else can we explain the fact that, on the eve of the Second World War, over 3 million Jews lived in the Ukrainian lands, amounting to 20 per cent of the world's Jews? (In 1887 it was even 30 per cent.) Of all the cities in the world, Odessa had the third highest concentration of Jews after New York and Warsaw . . . Here Academician Yefremov's opinion is confirmed: 'Jews, as we know, live in the closest of ties with the Ukrainian people; they are not even neighbours to them in the way that most other peoples are, but form a component part of the population of that land, a land that is for all that Ukrainian' . . . Almost 80 per cent of all tailors in Galicia were Jews. The main occupation of Jews in towns and villages was trade—trade from fixed premises, whether wholesale or retail.<sup>43</sup>

Jews were not only an important part of the economic life of Ukrainian society, but also contributed to the political life of Ukraine, as Nakonechny demonstrates.

<sup>41</sup> Petrovsky-Shtern, 'Ukrainian Literature'.

<sup>42</sup> M. Shkandrij, *Jews in Ukrainian Literature: Representation and Identity* (New Haven, 2009).

<sup>43</sup> Ye. Nakonechny, 'Halychyna v chasy strakhu i pechali', *Postup*, 3 Aug. 1999, p. 9.

The portrait of the fuller and more complex relationships between Ukrainians and Jews is now emerging in other in-depth demographic, economic, and political historiography.

There is, of course, increasing interest also in the possibilities of studying the Jewish community in contemporary Ukraine. Indeed, there is a burgeoning of Jewish communal activities in present-day Ukraine driven by a variety of factors. There is also a significant growth of activity concerning inter-ethnic relations, ranging from academic studies on antisemitism, to philanthropy, to the founding of Holocaust centres, and more.

A valuable study to be noted is Dr Betsy Gidwitz's work 'Jewish Life in Independent Ukraine'.<sup>44</sup> One of the important aspects of her article is the analysis of the demographic situation of the Jewish community in Ukraine today on the basis of reliable data and the work of expert demographers. The estimate is that there are five major centres of Jewish population: Kiev, 60,000–75,000; Dnipropetrovsk, 30,000–40,000; Kharkiv, 20,000–25,000; Odessa, 18,000–22,000; and Donetsk, 10,000–12,000.

Interestingly, Gidwitz asserts that

Perhaps 25,000 Jews remain in small Jewish population centers with fewer than 2,000 Jews. Such population centers are most numerous in western Ukraine, though they exist throughout the country. Almost all smaller Jewish population centers in western Ukraine are former shtetls; some of those in southern and southeastern Ukraine are remnants of Agro-Joint agricultural settlements organized by JDC in the 1920s.<sup>45</sup>

Obviously, there is some dimension of continuity between the past and the present in terms of a Jewish presence in Ukraine.

Gidwitz, as well as Leonid Finberg, Anatoly Podolsky, and others, has analysed the issue of antisemitism in Ukraine today. They have identified the Interregional Academy of Personnel Management (Mizhrehional'na Akademiya upravlinnya personalom; MAUP) as the prime source of the antisemitism that is perpetrated, and there is reason to believe that some of the funding for MAUP's activities comes from Iran and Libya. Finberg has argued, however, on the basis of studies by the Ukrainian sociologists Nataliya Panina and Yevhen Golovakha and their employment of 'measures of intolerance' of Ukrainians towards minority groups, including Jews, that 'toleration of Jews is high'.<sup>46</sup> At the same time, he argues that when one studies the data on the attitude of regional leaders towards the development of national self-government of Russians, Jews, and Crimean Tatars in Ukraine, and specifically the attitude of the inhabitants of Ukraine towards Jewish organizations,

<sup>44</sup> B. Gidwitz, 'Jewish Life in Independent Ukraine: Fifteen Years after the Soviet Collapse', *Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs*, 19 (15 Apr. 2007), 20 (15 May 2007): <<http://jcpa.org/article/jewish-life-in-independent-ukraine-fifteen-years-after-the-soviet-collapse-part-1/>>, <<http://jcpa.org/article/jewish-life-in-independent-ukraine-fifteen-years-after-the-soviet-collapse-part-2/>>.

<sup>45</sup> *Ibid.* 19 (15 Apr. 2007).

<sup>46</sup> Finberg, 'Ukrainian–Jewish Relations'.

the 'measure of intolerance in the attitude towards Jews is sufficiently high'.<sup>47</sup> What is vitally important is to recognize that these sorts of academic studies now fill in a much richer and fuller portrait of inter-ethnic relations in Ukraine not just between Jews and Ukrainians but between other ethnic communities and Ukrainians. As Finberg and others argue, Ukraine and almost every other country in all parts of Europe have an obligation to find 'reasonable accommodation' between the majority community and the minorities present. The hope, of course, is that through an open and educated discussion and a responsible democratic leadership and electorate, such reasonable accommodation can be achieved.

We also now know much more about the Jewish communal infrastructure of contemporary Ukraine. The portrait is provided and fully documented by Gidwitz. There appears to be significant competition and acrimony between the various interests which have established themselves in the Jewish community of contemporary Ukraine, for example between the local Jewish population and the influx of non-Ukrainian Jewish organizations, on questions ranging from the flow of foreign money, to the role of rabbis, to the role of leadership, to the role of philanthropy. The portrait is complex and beset with many difficulties. Gidwitz asserts that

the outlook for indigenous Jewish organizations appears dim. Local Jews lack common goals, leadership skills, resources, and experience. Rabbis are helpful, but they also impose their own agendas on people who are more interested in Jewish culture than in the halachic status of participants. Some outside secular funding sources also introduce agendas that local Jews consider extraneous. Further, few Jewish organizations in the post-Soviet states appear to work well in collaborative endeavors. Distrust, a strong sense of turf, fear of competition, and inexperience in dialogue also contribute to a pessimistic outlook.<sup>48</sup>

In many ways, Gidwitz's conclusions should not be surprising because her portrait of the Jewish community in contemporary Ukraine is a good reflection of many of the tensions and conflicts that beset Jewish communities all around the world.

The Ukrainian–Jewish Encounter, established in Canada only quite recently, is also a highly promising initiative. With the help of conferences it brings together scholars from various fields in order to discuss the interconnections and mutual influences of the Jewish and Ukrainian communities over the centuries of their life together.

## CONCLUSION

This brief essay has tried to provide a 'road map' of Ukrainian–Jewish relations over the past thirty years as we understand it, addressing what we think are the broadest currents or elements in the evolution of our understanding of this relationship. Much has already been achieved. No doubt, much remains to be com-

<sup>47</sup> Finberg, 'Ukrainian–Jewish Relations'.

<sup>48</sup> Gidwitz, 'Jewish Life in Independent Ukraine', *Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs*, 19 (15 Apr. 2007).



pleted in terms of detail and a fuller, richer, and enhanced portrait and narrative of this unique relationship between Ukrainian and Jews.

The increased energy now devoted to the exploration of the cultural interpenetration of Ukrainians and Jews, we believe, is very exciting and promising. While history may, at times, divide people, we also think that culture indeed conjoins people. Watching the human drama unfold within the arts, painting, music, theatre, literature, or whatever, teaches us that something about the human spirit endures even through violence, war, and turmoil. It is here, in these domains, that we believe a new understanding of Ukrainian–Jewish relations can be secured.

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# Yiddish

## *Identity and Language Politics in the Post-Soviet Ukrainian Jewish Community*

VLADIMIR (ZE'EV) KHANIN

THE PHENOMENON of the revival of Jewish national and cultural life and its organizational structure has been highly significant in the post-Soviet environment of the last twenty-odd years. Despite the differing directions taken by the two major dimensions of this process—emigration to Israel and the Western world and attempts to institutionalize Jewish communities in the countries of the former Soviet Union—post-Soviet Jews, no matter where they live today, need to resolve a plethora of problems similar in nature but different in scope. The search for cultural, national, and linguistic identity remains a firm objective.

Most Soviet and post-Soviet Jews can be viewed as a sub-ethnic group of east European Jews who share the same values and fate, despite assimilation, Russification, and cultural estrangement. They possess a national self-consciousness, which has resulted from their locally preserved Jewish cultural heritage, pressure from the socio-political environment, and Jewish ethnic self-identification, rooted in the historical memory of social experience.<sup>1</sup>

It is only natural that in such circumstances the language problem is a key identifying factor. Language is perceived not only as a legitimate means of communication within the Jewish community, but also as an important ethno-national, ethno-cultural, and even ethno-political symbol. Traditionally, important roles in the Jewish east European social and cultural context have been played by Yiddish, Hebrew, and—especially beyond the borders of Russia itself—Russian. The value and importance of each of these languages have changed substantially at various stages of the history of Jews in eastern Europe, under the influence of both internal processes and, to an even greater extent, the external environment. Clearly, the results of such processes have had direct or indirect impacts on contemporary

<sup>1</sup> For details, see V. (Z.) Khanin, 'Between Eurasia and Europe: Jewish Community and Identities in Contemporary Russia and Ukraine', in J. H. Schoeps and O. Glöckner (eds.), *A Road to Nowhere? Jewish Experiences in Unifying Europe* (Leiden, 2011), 63–89; Ts. Gitelman, V. Chervyakov, and V. Shapiro, 'Natsional'noe samosoznanie rossiiskikh evreev: Materialy sotsiologicheskogo issledovaniya, 1997–1998 gg.', *Diaspory*, 2000, no. 3, pp. 52–86, and 2001, no. 1, pp. 210–44; R. Ryvkina, *Evrei v post-sovetskoi Rossii—kto oni? Sotsiologicheskii analiz problem rossiiskogo evreistva* (Moscow, 1996).

cultural and political situations in the Jewish communities of the 'new Russo-Jewish diaspora' established in the countries of the former Soviet republics and beyond their borders.

It is particularly interesting to look at the contemporary role and status of Yiddish. For centuries, Yiddish was the main language of communication and creativity for Jews in eastern Europe. Let us consider the example of Ukraine, where the tradition of Yiddish, as a living national Jewish language, has never been broken despite the hardships and troubles of the past century.

#### THE LANGUAGE AND ETHNICITY OF JEWS IN UKRAINE FROM A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

For the last four centuries, Ukrainian Jewry has been constantly situated in a borderland social and cultural context. Even in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, Yiddish-speaking Jews made up a considerable part of the 'third estate' of Ukraine (then the eastern territories of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth), a class ranked somewhere between the Polish Catholic aristocracy and the Ukrainian-speaking Orthodox peasantry. This situation became more complicated when Ukraine joined the Russian empire as the result of the partitions of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in the eighteenth century. Consequently, local Jews were exposed to growing pressure from Russian (imperial) civil and political culture. In the nineteenth century, the overall picture was further complicated by the crisis of traditional scholarship and the further dissemination of hasidism; by the Haskalah, whose influence gradually increased in the course of the century; and in the last decades of the century and at the beginning of the next, by political movements such as liberalism, Zionism, and various versions of socialism. Each of these movements was a conduit either for the preservation of linguistic values and standards or for the introduction of new ones into the Jewish environment.

These factors resulted in the situation of mass 'dynamic multilingualism' in which Ukrainian Jews found themselves at the beginning of the twentieth century. Even today they remember it. An interesting example of this phenomenon was provided by an elderly Jew, a resident of a former shtetl that is now a district centre in the Zhytomyr region of Ukraine. When answering a question put to him by researchers about the language Jews used in that region on the eve of the First World War, he remarked: 'It depended on who you were talking to. When praying to the Almighty, you would use Hebrew. When talking to your family, you would speak in Yiddish. Ukrainian was used when talking to your [non-Jewish] neighbours, and Russian when addressing the chief of police.'<sup>2</sup>

The various language patterns and values of the period have been traced more clearly in the urban Jewish environment, and particularly among the Jewish elite.

<sup>2</sup> R. Lenchovsky, 'Zhiznennyi put' evreiskoi sem'i v kontekste sovetskoi i post-sovetskoi istorii', 3-4 (paper read at the conference 'Evreiskaya istoriya i kul'tura v Ukraine', Kiev, Aug. 1995).

Russian enjoyed a high status amongst the urban Jewish intelligentsia, who from the perspective of liberal enlightenment strongly supported the idea that Jews should fully integrate into Russian society. For committed Zionists, by contrast, a correspondingly high value was placed on Hebrew, for understandable reasons. Finally, Yiddish was used on the banners of the Jewish socialist parties (for example the General Jewish Labour Union of Poland, Lithuania, and Russia), which had a broad influence on the Jewish proletariat in the cities and on the merchant and artisan sectors in small Jewish towns.<sup>3</sup>

Ideological, political, social, and cultural trends in the Jewish environment in one way or another had to determine their relation to Yiddish, the main cultural and linguistic medium of the broad Jewish masses. As the Russian Jewish poet Simon Frug aptly stated: 'It is an either/or situation. Either we Jews are a nation, in which case the jargon [Yiddish] is not our national language; or the jargon is our national language, but we are not then a nation.'<sup>4</sup> This thought reflected the essential role that Yiddish as an ethno-linguistic element played in the search for national priorities by Jews in eastern Europe. The importance of language as an ethnic and ideological symbol was confirmed by the discussion about Jewish national languages at the well-known Chernivtsi Conference of 1908, at which language became the central theme.

Both the national and the political aspects of this contradictory situation became even more apparent in 1918–20 when the Bolshevik regime was established in Ukraine. In accordance with the principles of the Bolshevik nationalities policy, the communist authorities in Ukraine—as in other Soviet republics—initiated the construction of a 'Jewish Soviet socialist nationality'. According to the official doctrine, it was to have such essential attributes of national life as language, literature, administrative organs, and educational, scientific, and cultural establishments. Within this environment, 'proletarian Yiddish culture' was set in active opposition to Hebrew, 'the language and culture of the Jewish bourgeoisie', and to the material carriers of this culture, against which a struggle was conducted under the direction of the *evseksii* (Jewish sections) that were established within the Communist Party shortly after Soviet authority was imposed in Ukraine. As a result, by the end of the 1920s a strong Zionist movement had been crushed, along with the overwhelming majority of local Jewish social, cultural, educational, and political organizations, as well as numerous religious communities. On top of that, at the beginning of the 1930s the Jewish version of the Soviet 'indigenization' policy (*korenizatsiya*) was replaced by a progressively more palpable trend of Russification ('modernization') of the Jewish population of the former Pale of Settlement.

<sup>3</sup> See F. Levitas and V. Husyev, *Bund v Ukrayini: Mistse v suspil'nomu zhytti (kinets' XIX st.—1921 r.)* (Kiev, 1995); Z. Gitelman, *A Century of Ambivalence: The Jews of Russia and the Soviet Union, 1881 to the Present* (New York, 1988).

<sup>4</sup> Quoted in I. L. Klauzner, 'Eolova arfa (poeziya Fruga)', in S. G. Frug, *Polnoe sobranie sochinenii v trekh tomakh* (Odessa, 1916), vol. i, p. xx.

The remaining non-political 'Yiddishist' organizations ceased to exist with Hitler's genocide of the Jews during the Second World War, and through Stalin's persecutions both before the war and after it. Thus, the bulk of the institutions and Jewish cultural activists, loyal as they were to the authorities, were liquidated at the time of the antisemitic campaigns of 1948–53, primarily by the 'fight against cosmopolitanism' campaign whose foundation was laid by the affair of the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee (*Evreiskii antifashistskii komitet*).<sup>5</sup>

In subsequent years, the policy of the communist authorities in Ukraine with regard to the Jewish population followed, with a certain amount of variation, the all-Union line of antisemitism and anti-Zionism.<sup>6</sup> It oscillated between the complete suppression of any form of organized Jewish activity and a prohibition on leaving the Soviet Union, and at times a more liberal attitude towards certain cultural organizations and Jewish emigration. The activities of the few Jewish religious communities in Ukraine varied correspondingly. These communities existed under the close watch of state officials in charge of religious matters, who by means of the KGB and party organs countered in every way the attempts of Jewish religious organizations to play the role of national communities, a trend especially noticeable in the early post-war years.<sup>7</sup>

In post-war Ukraine, the predominant official line was to reduce the number of national and cultural initiatives to the minimum, an approach usually justified by an alleged 'lack of demand' on the part of the Jewish community. A typical example of this attitude towards Jewish educational institutions in Ukraine is found in a report by the chair of the religious community of Jews in Kiev, Samuil Bardakh, addressed to the plenipotentiary of the Council for the Affairs of Religious Cults. The topic is a conversation with the ambassador of Israel to the Soviet Union, Yosef Avidar: 'The ambassador . . . enquired why we do not have schools for Jews. To this I responded that, in my opinion, there was no need for such schools. Our old people do not need them, and our children live and work alongside the whole Soviet people, and they speak Russian or Ukrainian no worse than they speak Jewish.'<sup>8</sup>

<sup>5</sup> In 1948 the committee was dissolved and its members, prominent activists in the fields of culture and science, were arrested. Most of them were executed in the so-called 'fight against cosmopolitans', which was the first post-war antisemitic campaign in the Soviet Union. For details of the affair of the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee in Ukraine, see V. Prystayko, O. Pshennikov, and Yu. Shapoval, 'Sprava Yevreis'koho antyfashysts'koho komitetu', *Z arkhiviv VUChK-GPU-NKVD-KGB*, 1998, nos. 3–4 (8–9), pp. 6–20, and the documents concerning the persecution of committee members that are published in the same volume, pp. 83–335.

<sup>6</sup> For the documents of this period, see V. Khanin, *Documents on Ukrainian Jewish Identity and Emigration, 1944–1990* (London, 2003).

<sup>7</sup> For details, see V. Khanin, 'Judaism and Organized Jewish Movements in the USSR/CIS after World War II: The Ukrainian Case', *Jewish Political Studies Review*, 11/1–2 (1999), 75–100.

<sup>8</sup> Derzhavnyi arkhiv Kyiviv'skoyi oblasti, Kiev, f. 5, op. 5, spr. 2875, fo. 110. 'Speak Jewish' follows the idiom used in the Russian text, 'govoryat . . . po-evreiski'. It can be understood as implying Yiddish, corresponding to the Yiddish phrase *af yidish*.

The fact that these practices continued to the end of the Soviet era is proved by a document issued by the Department of Agitation and Propaganda of the Communist Party of Ukraine, signed by the head of the department Leonid Kravchuk on 14 September 1983. In his opinion, 'at present the Jewish schools, which have outlived their usefulness historically, would not be able to enrol even a minimal number of students'.<sup>9</sup> In sum, the rich cultural, social, and political tradition of Ukrainian Jewry had for the most part been lost by the early 1960s.<sup>10</sup>

A BACKGROUND FOR FUTURE REVIVAL?  
'OFFICIAL' AND 'UNDERGROUND' YIDDISHISM DURING  
THE COLLAPSE OF THE SOVIET UNION

The communist authorities maintained the legal status of certain Yiddish cultural institutions (for example a magazine, a newspaper, and a handful of theatrical troupes), and correspondingly of the language itself. The party and state organs, however, apprehensive of the possibility, real or supposed, that these organizations could be used for Jewish nationalist activity, treated them with great suspicion. It is no accident that even the slightest attempts by these institutions to overstep the boundaries laid down for them were promptly and brutally suppressed. Of a piece with this was the 'de-Hebraization' of Yiddish initiated by the authorities. It involved changing the spelling of many Yiddish words, and a significant part of the vocabulary of Hebrew origin was replaced by words with Germanic roots.<sup>11</sup> It is important to note that most of the cultural institutions were located in Moscow and therefore were geographically detached from the regions where there was still a significant concentration of native Yiddish-speakers, such as Ukraine.<sup>12</sup>

Basically, there was no opportunity for a non-state Yiddish organization to emerge and grow in any republic. The conditions necessary for the institutionalization (whether formal or informal) of an independent Jewish movement were all but lacking in the Soviet Union. Non-Zionist Yiddish secular nationalism, like any other branch of an independent Jewish movement in Ukraine and the Soviet Union in general, was represented in the post-war years by a few underground and semi-underground activist groups with few members. And even within this limited

<sup>9</sup> Tsentral'nyi derzhavnyi arkhiv hromads'kykh ob'yednan' Ukrayiny, Kiev (hereafter TsDAHOU), f. 1, op. 25, spr. 2720, fo. 35. For the purpose of comparison it may be noted that in contemporary Ukraine, which became independent in 1991 after the collapse of the Soviet Union (and whose first president was none other than Kravchuk), there are sixteen regular and more than seventy Sunday schools for Jews. By my own assessment, the entire range of Jewish education today embraces about a third of all Jewish children of school age.<sup>10</sup> For details, see Gitelman, *Century of Ambivalence*.

<sup>11</sup> On the status and activity of the official institutions of Jewish culture in the Soviet Union, see V. Chernin, 'Institutionalization of Jewish Culture in the USSR, 1960s–1980s', in Y. Ro'i (ed.), *Jews and Jewish Life in Russia and the Soviet Union* (London, 1995), 226–37.

<sup>12</sup> See W. Moskovich, 'Demographic and Institutional Indicators of Yiddish Language Maintenance in the Soviet Union, 1959–1986', *International Journal of the Sociology of Language*, 67 (1987), 135–44.

framework, Yiddishism, as part of the 'culturalist' or even 'legalist' movement,<sup>13</sup> was peripheral to Zionist or even non-official Jewish religious initiatives.

However, one must not overlook the various attempts to unite the 'culturalist-Yiddish' and the 'Zionist-Hebrew' movements. An institutionalized example of this was a Yiddishist Zionist club that met in Moscow, but whose influence was felt in Ukraine too. Members of this group, led by the writer, journalist, and ethnographer Velvl (Vladimir) Chernin, had a shared interest both in the Yiddish language and its culture and in secular or even religious Zionism.<sup>14</sup>

Despite the seeming uniqueness of the phenomenon of 'Yiddish Zionism', it reflected the straightforward tendency of most Ukrainian Jews (and Soviet Jews in general) to realize that it was impossible to institutionalize Jewish national life in the Soviet Union. The political reality of the time could offer Jews only two possible solutions to this situation. The first was to accept their limited legal status as a group, which meant adapting to antisemitic and assimilatory social standards and continuing to exist as a nation that was slowly losing its main forms of national identification. And the other solution was to emigrate—the only way out at that time that would allow them to lead a fulfilling Jewish life in any of its variants: Zionist, culturally secular (Yiddishist), or traditionally religious. In consequence, independently of their adherence to one or other of these national paradigms, for many Jews the hope of emigrating and the struggle to achieve it was the main (and at times the only) manifestation of their national identity. The antisemitism of the authorities and discrimination based on ethnic identity in social, educational, and professional domains were strong motivations for Jews to express their nationalism by trying to emigrate. This movement dominated in Ukraine and other regions of the Soviet Union until the mid-1980s.

#### LANGUAGE AND IDENTITY OF UKRAINIAN JEWS IN THE LATE TWENTIETH CENTURY

In the post-war period, Jewish linguistic and cultural activity existed at the practical level rather than the symbolic level, whether in legal or illegal contexts. During perestroika, however, a new situation arose, when in many parts of the Soviet Union there was an abrupt heightening of ethno-political tensions that had been dormant for decades. As a result, both all-Union and republican authorities were forced to pay more attention to the problems of national minorities. In Ukraine, as far as the political leaders were concerned, Jews were one of the most critical communities in this respect. Jews were the third largest ethnic group in the republic,

<sup>13</sup> As opposed to the Zionists, who saw mass emigration as the only solution to the national problems facing Soviet Jewry, the 'culturalists' (*kul'turniki*) supported the revival and development of Jewish culture in the Soviet Union. The 'legalist' fraction of the culturalists thought that in this matter a limited partnership with the authorities and the 'official' Jewish institutions was possible.

<sup>14</sup> Personal interview with Velvl Chernin conducted by the author (Kiev, July 2000).



after Ukrainians and Russians,<sup>15</sup> and it was precisely the Jewish community, not the twelve-million-strong Russian population, that was the leading ethnic minority, in the full sense of the term, in the republic.

The revival of organized Jewish life in Ukraine that began in the late 1980s was thus soon placed in the context of the national, cultural, and linguistic problems of the republic, which could not fail to encourage the development of political divisions within the Jewish community. And once again the Jewish languages came to symbolize these divisions: in contrast to the situation in the underground era, Yiddish and Hebrew were now on opposite sides of the political watershed in the local Jewish community. And once again, just as at the beginning of the twentieth century, such divisions acquired institutionalized characteristics, becoming important factors in political controversies both within Jewish organizations and among them.

In Ukraine, as in the Soviet Union in general, the process of reviving Jewish culture came from two sources: the official, from the 'top', and the unofficial, the self-organized, from the 'bottom'. The former was nourished by the increasingly powerless communist establishment of late perestroika, which attempted to change the image of the regime and thereby introduce a corrective to its nationalities policy, in particular regarding Jews. No less important for the authorities in Ukraine was an attempt to control the Jewish cultural, memorial, and Zionist organizations that were emerging from both the underground and the semi-underground. The anxiety of the leaders of the then Soviet Ukraine at the liveliness of Jewish activity was already evident in 1987–8.<sup>16</sup> However, the repressive means of countering the rising Jewish movement that were traditional in the Soviet era were no longer applicable in the liberal epoch of perestroika. Likewise, clearly useless for this purpose was the Anti-Zionist Committee of the Soviet Public in Ukraine (*Antisionistskii komitet sovetskoi obshchestvennosti Ukrainy*; AKSOU), which had been founded by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine and the KGB in 1983 on the model of the analogical all-Union organization, and which even then was a travesty of the idea of Jewish representation.<sup>17</sup>

The pragmatic fraction of the communist authorities in Ukraine followed a different path. In 1988–9 its leaders took the initiative of creating Jewish cultural

<sup>15</sup> According to the census of 1989, the Ukrainian Jewish population numbered about 487,000. At that time the 'extended Jewish population' of Ukraine, which comprised those who had the right to make *aliyah* to Israel according to the Israeli Law of Return, was estimated at about one million people. *Natsional'nyi sklad naseleennya Ukrayiny za danymy Vsesoyuznoho perepysu naseleennya 1989 roku*, 2 vols. (Kiev, 1992).

<sup>16</sup> See the document prepared by the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Ukrainian SSR for the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine regarding foreign-policy propaganda and counter-propaganda, 'O rabote MVD po neutralizatsii emigratsionnykh nastroenii', 15 Jan. 1988: TsDAHOU, f. 1, op. 25, spr. 3993, fo. 73.

<sup>17</sup> The directives of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine and the KGB of the Ukrainian SSR on the creation of the AKSOU and its branches in the regions can be found in TsDAHOU, fo. 1, op. 11, spr. 659, fo. 240; and TsDAHOU, Kartoteka postanovlen' Sekretariatu i Politbyuro TsK KPU, 1983, *yacheika* 16, document 264.

societies (JCSs), an idea they had borrowed from the 'legalists' of the Jewish dissident movement of the 1970s and 1980s.<sup>18</sup> The initiative taken by the authorities to establish these official societies was met with enthusiasm by certain groups of local Jewish intelligentsia; for instance, one such group in Kiev consisted of a circle of Jews who had been meeting since the late 1960s to learn Yiddish, study Jewish culture, exchange legally published materials, and discuss the role of the Jews in Soviet history.

The basis of this 'loyalist union' that was taking shape was an idea reminiscent of socialist Jewish culture in the spirit of the ideology of the *evseksii* of the 1920s. Consequently, both the Yiddish language and traditional Jewish culture became symbols of the JCSs, whose leaders were most often selected by party committees, whether from the Jewish elite of the *nomenklatura* (these might be former activists of the anti-Zionist committees, members of state quasi-Jewish organizations, or other 'official Jews') or from members of the Jewish intelligentsia not earmarked as disloyal to the authorities. The role of Yiddish was proclaimed from the tribune of the founding conference of the republican JCS in late November 1989 at the Museum of History in Kiev in a precisely articulated formula: 'The language of Soviet Jews is Yiddish, not Hebrew.'<sup>19</sup>

Yiddish language and culture turned out to be politically in demand again and to be completely legitimized at the level of both fractions of the 'new' establishment ('national Bolshevism' and 'national liberalism'), as a symbol both of the rejection of the former discriminatory policies and of the inclusion of Jews in the process that lay ahead of building the nation state, a 'democratic Ukraine'. At the same time, the anti-Hebrew declarations of the new 'official Yiddishists' reflected the strongly suspicious attitude of the JCS leaders and their official patrons towards the 'Hebrew' structures that were emerging as Jewish religious institutes and Zionist organizations.

This explains why the first version of the charter of the Kiev JCS (November 1988) contained a clause on 'the necessity of fighting against Zionism', a position which also informs the attitude of these activists towards the problem of repatriation. According to information received by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine, when activists of the municipal and republican JCSs in Kiev met with the leaders of the Communist Party of Ukraine in January and February 1990—when the crisis of socialist perestroika had become apparent to almost everyone—the activists 'expressed serious concern at the emigration of Jews to Israel and other Western countries, which had skyrocketed in 1989'. In explaining this disposition to emigrate as a consequence of 'the lack of stability . . . in Ukraine, daily hardships, the threat posed to the life and dignity of the individual by extremist organizations',

<sup>18</sup> On the establishment of the JCSs (in Russian *obshchestva evreiskoi kul'tury*) and their activities in Ukraine during perestroika, see V. Khanin, 'Perestroika and Jewish Cultural Associations in Ukraine, 1987–1991', *Jews in Eastern Europe*, 42 (2000), 5–24.

<sup>19</sup> Testimonies of members of the organizational committee of the conference Igor Kuperberg and Arkady Monastyrsky given in personal interviews conducted by the author (Kiev, Aug. 1997).

the leaders of the JCSs condemned the emigration of Jews as 'an unpatriotic step at this difficult time of perestroika' inasmuch as it 'weakened the economic and intellectual potential of the country'.<sup>20</sup>

However, it would be wrong to argue that the Yiddish language and everything connected with it became the monopoly of the nascent pro-government elite of the Ukrainian Jewish movement. On the contrary, the late 1980s witnessed a rapid growth in Zionist, religious, historical, and memorial activities, alongside independent Yiddish cultural initiatives, manifested in classes, clubs, theatrical troupes, and so on. One such initiative was a 'Jewish amateur collective' that appeared in early 1988 in the Podil district of Kiev. The group, led by Boris Kimmerfeld (the author of a textbook of Yiddish) and Grigory Feller (a teacher of Hebrew and Yiddish), was organized to promote the study of Yiddish, to select and read Yiddish texts, to perform plays in Yiddish, and so on. Yiddish poets, writers, and public activists would join the meetings. As a result, in addition to the twenty or twenty-five active members of this group, a large 'Jewish crowd' interested in Jewish culture formed around it.<sup>21</sup> Such organizations appeared throughout Ukraine in 1988–90.

In some cases, the activists in an independent movement were able to frame their activities within certain allowed 'structures', such as the JCSs, in an effort to realize their cultural initiatives. This is how a group of 'Yiddishists' in Kharkiv formed in 1988 the Club of Friends of the Periodical *Sovetish heymland*, which later became the Society of Activists and Friends of Jewish Culture.<sup>22</sup> In 1989–90, with the support of government authorities the leaders of the above-mentioned Yiddish group in Kiev were able to organize a series of seminars in Ukraine and across the Soviet Union for teachers of Yiddish. Many activists within the Jewish cultural movement shared the opinion of the then deputy chair of the Kiev JCS, Igor Kuperberg, who believed that 'it is pointless to fight against the Jewish Cultural Society; on the contrary, we must take from its structure as much as we can'.<sup>23</sup>

Nevertheless, the Ukrainian party and state organs tried to keep the situation under their control, though by that time the control could be neither universal nor absolute, and indeed the growing economic crisis and ever strengthening political opposition of the late 1980s meant that for the authorities the Jewish question was no longer a priority. Those years did, however, witness an explosion of national self-consciousness among Ukrainian Jews and of a general interest in the ethnic and cultural roots of Jews.

It made sense that it was precisely Yiddish organizations that were then at the centre of public attention. Despite the fact that the census of 1989 showed that just 7.1 per cent of Ukrainian Jews claimed Yiddish to be their native tongue,<sup>24</sup> there

<sup>20</sup> TsDAHOU, f. 1, op. 32, spr. 2770, fos. 58–9.

<sup>21</sup> Personal interview with Boris Kimmerfeld conducted by the author (Har Gilo, Nov. 2000).

<sup>22</sup> Personal interview with Mikhail Averbukh, one of the organizers of the society in Kharkiv, conducted by the author (Ramat Gan, May 1997).

<sup>23</sup> Recording of an interview with Igor Kuperberg, Nov. 1998, quoted in Khanin, 'Perestroika and Jewish Cultural Associations in Ukraine', 16. <sup>24</sup> *Natsional'nyi sklad naselessly Ukrainy*, i. 19.

are grounds for supposing that at least double that number spoke the language in their daily lives. Moreover, almost all of the local Jewish population considered Yiddish—at the level of phrases, idioms, and humour—as a kind of ‘family folklore’, a part of their ethno-cultural background and Jewish identity.

In describing this phenomenon, an interviewee remarked that any concert event with a Jewish theme was guaranteed to be a success. This was also true even of old jokes told in a mixture of Russian and Yiddish.<sup>25</sup> It is no accident that, according to my calculations, the number of people in Ukraine who were learning or simply refreshing their knowledge of Yiddish in 1988–9 in the framework of various public initiatives and projects was from two to two and a half times the number of those studying Hebrew.

However, the first signs of an erosion of this spontaneous ‘folk Yiddishism’ became noticeable in the following year, 1990. The reasons for this lay not only in the ‘conciliatory’ policies of the leaders of most JCSs—something else was of much greater importance: if for many Jews ‘Yiddish’ organizations were the first stage in their search for their Jewish roots, very often the following stage was the idea of emigration.

Without dwelling here on the whole complex of reasons for the explosion of emigration fever among Jews in the Soviet Union, I should mention that the first signs of Jewish national consciousness appeared against the backdrop of the ever more apparent crisis in the perestroika reforms and uncertainty about the prospects of the development of the country. In turn, the wave of emigration that peaked in 1990–1 brought to life national feelings that were latent in a Ukrainian Jewish population that was already in many ways assimilated. Additionally, an important spur in 1990–1 to the mood of emigration was the sudden ‘loss of homeland’—the impending collapse of an ‘internationalized’ country into separate ‘national’ states for Ukrainians, Georgians, Estonians, and Uzbeks. All of this forced many Jews to start thinking seriously about their own national and state identity, promoting Zionism not only among those wanting to emigrate but also among some of those who were staying behind, especially young people.

These tendencies were translated into reality through an enormous growth in the ‘demand’ for Hebrew, and a gradual fading of interest in Yiddish that was in part due to the fact that a great many native speakers of Yiddish were emigrating. According to Ze’ev Elkin, who at that time led the Kharkiv Zionist organization Eli, the number of students enrolled in Hebrew classes there increased from thirty or forty in the summer of 1989 to about 3,000 in the spring of 1990. This was matched by a dramatic decrease in the number of Yiddish classes and students in the city.<sup>26</sup> For example, according to the Jewish press in Kharkiv, fifty students were attending one of the local Yiddish language groups in the autumn of 1989, but by February 1990

<sup>25</sup> I conducted a series of personal interviews with some dozens of former activists of the Jewish national-cultural revival that took place in Ukraine in 1987–91. The interviews were recorded in Kiev, Moscow, Jerusalem, and New York in 1993–2000.

<sup>26</sup> Personal interviews with Ze’ev Elkin conducted by the author (Jerusalem, Mar. 2000, and Kharkiv, July 2000).

only fifteen remained.<sup>27</sup> In a number of cities and smaller towns in central and western Ukraine, Yiddish classes available in the recently formed Jewish Sunday schools were replaced by Hebrew classes, and many teachers of Yiddish were quickly 'retrained' to teach Hebrew by envoys of the Jewish Agency for Israel.<sup>28</sup>

Such a multidirectional approach to the teaching of Hebrew and Jewish tradition resulted in the establishment of a new Jewish elite that was in many respects opposed to the pro-government leadership of the JCSs. The core of this elite consisted of the organizers and teachers of these language courses, for the most part representatives of various generations of the Zionist underground. They had at their disposal significant material and organizational resources, including connections with Israeli, international, and local Jewish organizations. They received and facilitated the activity of envoys of the Jewish Agency and Nativ. They also administered finances, managed the distribution of information about Israel, supplied textbooks, and maintained contact both with the authorities and with the leadership of the 'official' JCSs. These resources allowed the leaders of the teachers' organizations to dictate the rules of the game, and until 1991 to set the overall tone in the unofficial Jewish movement.

#### YIDDISH OR HEBREW? POWER STRUGGLE IN THE JEWISH MOVEMENT

As 1992 approached, the situation changed yet again. Not only had the wave of emigration weakened Yiddish cultural organizations, it had also taken away most of the activists of 'practical Zionism'. The latter had attempted to combine the teaching of Hebrew and the basics of Judaism in the intensive Hebrew classes (*ulpan*s) that they set up in 1988–91, but after they and the majority of their students emigrated in the early 1990s the initiative developed no further. By 1992–3 the 'Jewish national and cultural component' was slowly starting to become separate from the system of Hebrew classes that had initially been created in the framework of the Jewish Sunday schools and had come to serve as a foundation for the development of cultural and educational initiatives by the community.

Consequently, the Hebrew language did not fill the vacuum in local Jewish cultural development. The only place where it enjoyed 'mass' employment was in the *ulpan*s, which in 1993 and 1994 came definitively under the supervision of the Jewish Agency and focused almost exclusively on catering to the needs of those preparing to emigrate. Geared to a quick turnover, the *ulpan*s provided classes in basic Hebrew and offered a minimum of general information before one left for Israel. In many respects the *ulpan*s became 'foreign-language' schools that stood somewhat apart from the communal system of Jewish education.

<sup>27</sup> *Du-siyakh* (Kharkiv), no. 2 (4) (Feb. 1990), 1.

<sup>28</sup> See V. Khanin, 'Revival of Organized Jewish Life in Contemporary Ukraine: Models, Trends, and Prospects, 1987–1998', prepared in the framework of the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs research project 'The Revival of Organized Jewish Life in the Former Soviet Union' (Jerusalem, Feb. 2000), esp. sects. 4 and 5.

Thus, in the framework in which the construction of Jewish communal institutions unfolded in Ukraine in about 1992–3, both Hebrew and Yiddish again ceased to have any significant day-to-day application. The presence of these languages is, however, detectable in three areas: in professional activity, at the level of value systems, and in intra-communal political disputes. In the professional context this is displayed in the activities of a relatively small group consisting of members of the 'functional elites' of the national movement, such as teachers, researchers, writers, translators, theatrical activists, journalists, and community workers. These people, whose interest in Hebrew and Yiddish forms part of their professional activity, often recognize that the product of their work can be used and appreciated by only a small circle of consumers. As far as professional Jewish politicians are concerned, practice has shown that their careers depend more on English—the basic means of communication in the Jewish world and the official language of the largest international Jewish organizations—than on any other language.

For the broad public, the Jewish languages preserve their meaning as symbols of ethno-cultural, national, and political identification. This was demonstrated in particular by a survey conducted by the author among the Jewish population of a number of eastern Ukrainian towns in the autumn of 1993.<sup>29</sup> In reply to the question, which language Jews should speak (and respondents were allowed to choose any number of combinations), 54 per cent indicated Hebrew and 19 per cent Yiddish, but 69 per cent believed that 'it is enough to know and speak the language of the country you live in'. In other words, the practical employment of one or another language was not considered very important by the participants. What mattered more was the ethno-cultural value of its presence.

That the Jewish language problem was purely symbolic for the majority of Jews at that time was indicated by the fact that only 10 per cent of respondents stated that one's sense of belonging to a nation is defined by 'the ability to speak and think in its language'. A total of 39 per cent thought that it was by no means necessary to master one's national language perfectly in order to have a fully developed national consciousness; and 44 per cent suggested that both perspectives were valid. It is significant that—paradoxical though it may seem—the percentage of supporters of national-language use was higher among young people: 22 per cent of those aged 22–28, as against only 8 per cent of those aged over 55. The research conducted by Velvl Chernin and myself in 2003–4 showed that over the course of ten years the situation had barely changed. In a rating of attributes that identify one's belonging to the Jewish people, knowledge of Yiddish was ranked ninth and that of Hebrew fourteenth (the lowest rank of all). The percentages of our Jewish informants who responded in favour of these two attributes were, respectively, about 29 and 15.<sup>30</sup>

<sup>29</sup> The details of the survey are presented in V. Khanin, 'Social Consciousness and the Problem of Identity of Ukrainian Jews', *Contemporary Jewry*, 19 (1998), 120–50.

<sup>30</sup> Z. Khanin and V. Chernin, *Identity, Assimilation and Revival: Ethno-Social Processes among the Jewish Population of the Former Soviet Union* (Ramat Gan, 2007), 43–5.

One might also speculate that the respondents' attitude to the function of Hebrew or Yiddish reflected their orientation towards one or other of the models of cultural revival: either the 'Yiddishist' (or 'parochial'), which focused on the rebirth of local culture, or the so-called 'Israel-centred' revival, which had a 'Hebrew' (or 'blue-and-white') orientation. Our research shows that the first, 'non-Zionist', position was favoured more by the older generation than the younger, and more in western Ukraine than in its eastern part.

However, this disjunction was even more characteristic of the leading elite groups of the Jewish community in Ukraine, among whom it acquired a specifically political character and institutionalization. First and foremost, these two different positions were embodied, respectively, by those at the head of the leading Jewish umbrella associations: the Jewish Council of Ukraine (Evreiskii sovet Ukrainy; ESU) and the Association of Jewish Organizations and Communities of Ukraine (Assotsiatsiya evreiskikh organizatsii i obshchin Ukrainy; AEIOU).

The Jewish Council of Ukraine was founded in October 1992 as the 'political wing' of the JCSs, which had grown almost ineffective, and it inherited their pro-government politics, the ideology of '(post-)Soviet patriotism', and other organizational principles. After Ukraine became independent, the chair of the ESU (and of the republican JCS), Ilya Levitas, spoke about the credo of his organization in the following way: 'We want the problem of the revival and development of our culture to be taken care of by the state, and our cultural organizations to become state organizations.'<sup>31</sup>

Consequently, continuing the ideological tradition of the *evseksii* of the Communist Party of Ukraine of the 1920s, the leaders of this organization consider the Jewish community of the republic as ethno-cultural rather than ethno-national. They proclaim the idea that the Jewish population of Ukraine does not have 'interests that differ from the interests of other parts of Ukrainian society' and that 'Jews are an integral part of the Ukrainian people', and they are hostile to any manifestation of 'Jewish nationalism'.

The other umbrella organization, the Association of Jewish Organizations and Communities of Ukraine, was created by a group of former activists of the underground Jewish movement on 14 January 1991 and registered by the Justice Department of Ukraine on 24 May of that year. It was founded on the base of the Co-ordinating Council of Jewish Organizations of Kiev, which was active in 1989–90 and was already at that time competing with the JCSs. By contrast with the leaders of the ESU, the leaders of the AEIOU consider Ukrainian Jews to be not only a cultural group but first and foremost a national entity. They support the idea of establishing a strong Jewish community that would be loyal to an independent and democratic Ukraine and at the same time would have a sound organizational structure and a clearly expressed Jewish self-awareness. It would be independent of the 'dictatorship' of both the Ukrainian authorities and foreign Jewish organizations.

<sup>31</sup> I. Levitas, 'K evreiskomu renessansu', *Evreiskie vesti*, 1992, no. 1 (7), pp. 2–3.

Both before and after Ukraine achieved independence, the question of the content of the Jewish cultural rebirth was a major factor in the ideological divergences between the leaders of the ESU and the AEOOU. It is evident that the ideological discussions between these politically competing organizations could not ignore such a shining socio-political symbol as the problem of 'linguistic identity'. Indeed, as soon as these structures took shape, the role to be played by the 'Jewish languages' became a topic of discussion, which it has remained up to the present—at times more tensely than at others. As a 'mildly Zionist' organization that has equally supported *aliyah* and Jewish community development in Ukraine, the AEOOU has traditionally preferred Hebrew. Even as far back as the 'Yiddishist' period of the rise of the Jewish culturalist movement in the late 1980s, the future founders of the AEOOU—Iosif Zissels, Igor Kuperberg, Vadim Feldman, Evgeny Fishzon, and others—were actively organizing Hebrew classes, training teachers, and providing textbooks. In contrast to the AEOOU, the position of the ESU was and has remained consistently 'pro-Yiddish'. The non-Zionist approach of the ESU leadership towards language policy in the Jewish community of Ukraine is formulated most precisely in their declaration:

In recent years, Jews have demonstrated a growing interest in their language and culture. A question has arisen as to which language to study: Hebrew, the state language of Israel, or Yiddish, the language of Ukrainian (as well as European and American) Jews. The position of the Jewish Council is as follows: while noting the importance of the Hebrew language, which is firmly rooted in Israel and is one of the languages spoken by Jews, we cannot at the same time quietly watch the Yiddish language die . . . It must become compulsory to study Yiddish in Jewish schools . . . It is important that the state language of Ukrainian Jews should be treated in the same way as the state language of Ukraine.<sup>32</sup>

Both organizations tried to think in practical terms when dealing with education, so important a matter in the sphere of Jewish revival. The AEOOU, acting through the Jewish Pedagogical Centre (Evreiskii pedagogicheskii tseñtr) that it established in 1993, and in collaboration with Israeli and other foreign Jewish organizations (primarily the Jewish Agency and Nativ), concentrated mainly on ensuring the teaching of Hebrew, though it was not unmindful of the existence of Yiddish. The JCSs, by contrast, directed their efforts towards the introduction and development of Yiddish classes. Such initiatives were supported by the Joint Distribution Committee and were better received by Jewish communities in western Ukraine than in the east. As early as 1994–5 there existed Jewish day and Sunday schools in western Ukraine where, alongside Hebrew, Yiddish was also taught, and even in some schools Yiddish only. In eastern Ukraine, such examples were rare: Jewish education would 'begin with Hebrew and most often end with it too'.<sup>33</sup>

<sup>32</sup> 'V Yevreis'kii Radi Ukrayiny', *Evreiskie vesti*, 1997, nos. 23–4, p. 1.

<sup>33</sup> On Jewish education in Ukraine, see V. Khanin, 'Haḥinukh hayehudi ba'ukrainah hamodernit', *Yehudei berit hamo'etsot bama'avar*, 1995, no. 2, pp. 72–84, and V. (Z.) Khanin, 'Introduction: Jewish Education in the CIS and Baltic States at the Crossroads?', in V. (Z.) Khanin et al. (eds.), *Constructing*



This clash of interests was clearly articulated in the Second All-Ukrainian Congress of Jewish Education that took place in Kiev in January 1997 and that, in a sense, was reminiscent of the Chernivtsi Conference of 1908. In his speech, Ilya Levitas read a panegyric to ‘folk Yiddish culture’, and also attacked Zionism. In other speeches, ESU supporters strongly criticized the work of the Jewish Agency and Nativ, which, in the opinion of the orators, ‘because of their corporate interests are unwilling to fund education in Yiddish’. (Be it noted that today they cover no less than 80 per cent of the financial requirements of Jewish education in Ukraine.) In their turn, Iosif Zissels and other leaders of the AEIOU demanded that activities in the sphere of Jewish education be placed in the context both of ‘Zionist values’ and of the ‘practical goals of the development of the Jewish community in Ukraine’.<sup>34</sup>

At the threshold of the new century, however, this discussion moved into the realm of the abstract and symbolic. In many respects the indicators of public interest are the disciplines offered at Jewish Sunday schools, of which there are now about seventy in Ukraine. In a list of almost four hundred teachers working in these schools, I found many teaching Jewish history and tradition and the Hebrew language, and alongside them a fair number teaching music, English, computer science, and even aerobics and Wushu—but only two teachers of Yiddish.

#### CONCLUSION: NEW PROSPECTS

Does all this really mean that Yiddish is dying as a force for Jewish community life in Ukraine and remains only an ethnic and political symbol? Ten years ago the answer to this question appeared to be ‘yes’. In the first decade of Ukraine’s independence, Yiddish was being drained out of everyday life, and most Jews and public activists accepted this situation. Accordingly, most of the Yiddish-sponsoring projects, including those preparing teachers at state pedagogical institutes, were not significantly developed. Events such as seminars and conferences, organized by the ESU through the World Council for Yiddish and Jewish Culture (*Veltrat far yidish un yidisher kultur*), as a rule attracted elderly participants, and for this reason such events were considered by many to have little future.<sup>35</sup>

However, there are at least four conditions which, in suitable circumstances, can extend the life of ‘Ukrainian Yiddishism’. The first condition is demography. The average age of Jews in Ukraine today is about 58. By the most conservative estimates, more than 40 per cent of the Jewish population of the larger regional cities are old-age pensioners; in smaller provincial towns, the fraction is about 70 per cent.

*the National Identity: Jewish Education in Russia Twenty Years after the End of the Cold War* (Jerusalem and Ramat Gan, 2008), 14–23.

<sup>34</sup> These are the personal observations of the author, who was an organizer of and a participant in this congress in Kiev in January 1997.

<sup>35</sup> B. Feldman, ‘Proshchai, mame-lushn’, *Shabat shalom, Ukraina* (Dnipropetrovsk), 1999, no. 1.

In contrast to young people, this group has a lesser ability to migrate and at the same time is more active in community life. For a long time to come, this group can maintain a social structure conducive to various Yiddish activities. This was shown, in particular, by the representative survey carried out by Chernin and myself in 2003, in which more than one-fifth of the respondents in Ukraine stated that they spoke Yiddish either fluently or sufficiently well to communicate in it; another one-fifth indicated that they 'understand the language very well'.<sup>36</sup>

Second, in the last few years there has been a sharp increase of interest in Yiddish as an area of academic activity, which in turn has an influence on the status of the language in the Jewish community throughout the country.

Third, in the late 1990s the decrease in political tension in the Jewish community in Ukraine resulted in the ability of Jewish elites to collaborate with each other in a competitive spirit rather than to be in a state of unreconcilable conflict. This also reduced the political connotations of the question of Hebrew and Yiddish.

Fourth, there is the appearance of religious and secular 'neo-Yiddishism' as an identificatory model—a comparatively new phenomenon of the post-Soviet era. The model is not widely diffused—in general only in the capital cities among a part of the intelligentsia, including those of mixed origins—but it gives Yiddish and its culture an important identificatory role. However, it is typically adopted by young or middle-aged people who have only begun to learn Yiddish as adults. It is more widespread in Ukraine than elsewhere, and it may be compared with the model of neo-Yiddishism that is emerging in the United States (Yugntruf)<sup>37</sup> and other Western countries.

This all serves to show that the discussion of the role of Jewish languages, initiated by Ukrainian Jews a century ago, is still far from reaching a conclusion.

*Translated from the Russian by Natalia Kovaliova*

<sup>36</sup> Z. Khanin and V. Chernin, 'Social and Demographic Aspects of Jewish Assimilation and Preservation of Jewish Identity in the Former Soviet Union', research report, Rappaport Center for Assimilation Research and Strengthening Jewish Vitality, and Jewish Agency for Israel, 2003–4, p. 32.

<sup>37</sup> V. Chernin, 'Major Patterns of Jewish Identity in the Former Soviet Union', in Khanin et al. (eds.), *Constructing the National Identity*, 37–61.

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# ‘A City Not Forgotten: Memories of Jewish Lwów and the Holocaust’

*An Exhibition at the Galicia Jewish Museum,  
Kraków, June 2010–January 2011*

JAKUB NOWAKOWSKI

I remember what it was like to be a small girl in Lwów . . . People called it little ‘Vienna’. It was a city of winding cobblestone streets that reached to majestic churches, and open courtyards bursting with colourful flowers and lovely fountains. It was mostly Polish, with a great many Jews and Ukrainians as well.

K. CHIGER with D. PAISNER  
*The Girl in the Green Sweater*

KNOWN AS LWÓW in Polish, Lemberg in German, Lemberik in Yiddish, and Lviv in Ukrainian, for centuries this was one of the most vibrant, multicultural and multinational cities in eastern Europe. Poles, Jews, Ukrainians, Germans, Russians, Armenians, and others lived and worked, studied, and prayed side by side.

After the partitions of Poland at the end of the eighteenth century, Lwów became part of the Habsburg empire, and was the capital of a newly established province called Galicia. When Galicia was dissolved at the end of the First World War, the city became part of the newly independent Poland, where it rapidly grew to become one of the country’s largest, most modern cities, smaller only than Warsaw and Łódź.

By the 1930s, there were more than 100,000 Jews in Lwów, comprising 30 per cent of the city’s population. There were over forty synagogues and prayer houses, numerous Jewish schools and institutions of higher learning, a popular theatre, and many other Jewish cultural, political, youth, sports, and charitable organizations. There were religious members of the Jewish community—both Orthodox and Reform—as well as Jews who were highly assimilated, considering themselves first and foremost Polish citizens.

Although life for the Jewish community of Lwów was at times disturbed by anti-semitism and anti-Jewish violence—mainly carried out by nationalist sectors of the local Polish and Ukrainian populations—Jewish life still flourished for generations.

When the Second World War broke out in 1939, Kurt Levin was 14 years old and living in Lwów. The son of the city’s progressive rabbi, he and his brother were

the only two of their large family who would survive the Holocaust, hidden in a monastery by the archbishop, high in the mountains surrounding the city. Julian Bussgang, also aged 14, fled Lwów with his family following the outbreak of the war, first to Romania and then on to Palestine, where he joined the Polish Army Corps. Eight-year-old Leszek Allerhand, from one of the city's most famous pre-war families, survived the war with his mother in hiding, moving every few months and in constant fear of discovery. Kristin Keren and her family, like the thousands of other Jews who remained in the city unaware of what would shortly befall them, were forcibly resettled by the Nazis into the Lwów ghetto, but during its liquidation in 1943 managed to escape into the city's sewer system, where they hid until the liberation of the city, some fourteen months later. By the time the war ended, only 1 per cent of the city's Jews were left alive in Lwów, from a community which had numbered over 100,000 before the war. Several thousands more were now scattered across the world. They had survived the starvation, disease, and overcrowding of the ghetto; dramatic experiences of escape, rescue, or hiding; and deportations and concentration camps. They had witnessed the destruction of their family, friends, and the community around them. Their stories are of strength, resistance, chance, and courage. Their stories are ones which have, until now, rarely been told.

'A City Not Forgotten: Memories of Jewish Lwów and the Holocaust', held at the Galicia Jewish Museum in Kraków, is one of the first exhibitions dedicated to Lwów's Jewish history. Charting the lives of individuals who were born and spent the first part of their lives there, it begins in the dynamic, vibrant streets of pre-war Lwów, then follows their fate after the outbreak of the Second World War and the occupation of the city first by the Soviet Union and then by Germany.

Personal stories of these experiences—documented first-hand by the Galicia Jewish Museum, which has created a unique record of testimonies from Lwów—form the narrative basis of 'A City Not Forgotten'. Visitors connect on a personal level with these individual stories, which in turn provide access into the universal lessons of the exhibition. Significantly, the exhibition not only facilitates a more complex understanding of the diverse experiences suffered during the Holocaust—with large numbers of visitors to Kraków having just visited Auschwitz, the 'symbol' and thus representative experience of the Holocaust—but also contextualizes the Holocaust more broadly into the rich Jewish civilization that existed before, and the legacy of which now lives on around the world through survivors and their descendants, as well as in the contemporary Jewish community of present-day Lviv.

The Galicia Jewish Museum is the only museum in the world dedicated to the Jewish history of the Galicia region, and is thus uniquely equipped and located to tell these stories. The museum exists to commemorate the victims of the Holocaust and celebrate the Jewish culture of Galicia, presenting Jewish history from a new perspective.

In just eight years, the Galicia Jewish Museum has become one of Poland's most visited Jewish museums and cultural centres, and is a leading contributor to the

preservation of Jewish life in Poland. Since its opening in 2004, almost 200,000 people—Jewish and non-Jewish, Polish and international, adults, students, children, and families—have visited the museum.

Through exhibitions and cultural events, educational outreach, and community programmes, the museum works to challenge the stereotypes and misconceptions typically associated with the Jewish past in Poland and to educate both Poles and Jews about their own histories, whilst encouraging them to think about the future.

Located in the heart of Kazimierz, the Jewish quarter of Kraków, and used as a mill before the war, today the renovated museum building has a post-industrial, contemporary feel—utilizing glass, metal, and dark woods—while still retaining many of the building's original elements and structure.

At the heart of the museum is the permanent exhibition 'Traces of Memory'. In addition, the museum houses three temporary exhibition galleries, an education room with a media resource centre and film archive, a café, and a Jewish bookstore.

The Galicia Jewish Museum is a member of the Association of European Jewish Museums, the Association of Holocaust Organizations, and the International Council of Museums. In 2009 the museum was selected for inclusion in the first Compass Guide—a listing of Europe's thirty-six most innovative, effective, and sustainable Jewish organizations.<sup>1</sup>

Historically, the focus of the museum has been primarily on western Galicia, those areas of Galicia situated in present-day Poland. 'A City Not Forgotten' is the museum's first major project to commemorate the Jewish history and culture of eastern Galicia, those areas which are now in Ukraine.

The exhibition has been prepared with the assistance of survivors and their families, as well as academic and curatorial consultants both in Ukraine and internationally. The exhibition partner is the Center for Urban History of East Central Europe in Lviv, which was founded in 2004 as a private non-profit organization. In all its activities, be they academic or cultural, the Center strives to adhere to principles of openness (towards what is new), tolerance (with regard to difference and diversity), and responsibility (for the future). It strives to be a part of contemporary Lviv's urban society and public, open to diverse communities and in productive co-operation with public and cultural institutions. As an institute that not only researches the city of the past, but also lives and works in the city of the present, the Center wants to go beyond academic activity to support cultural and other public initiatives, which we see as both valuable and seminal. It wishes to contribute to Lviv becoming a central site for intellectual, academic, and cultural life not only in Ukraine but also in Europe. 'A City Not Forgotten' has been under the academic supervision of centre director Dr Tarik Cyril Amar and project manager Sofia Dyak.

The exhibition's content has also been academically reviewed by Professor Jonathan Webber and Dr Edyta Gawron. Professor Webber is Emeritus UNESCO Professor of Jewish and Interfaith Studies, University of Birmingham, UK, professor

<sup>1</sup> Available online at <[http://www.compasseurope.org/\\_down/Compass\\_Guide.pdf](http://www.compasseurope.org/_down/Compass_Guide.pdf)>.

in the Institute of European Studies, Jagiellonian University, Kraków, and the chair of the board of trustees of the Galicia Jewish Heritage Institute, the British parent charity of the Galicia Jewish Museum. He is the co-author of the permanent exhibition of the Galicia Jewish Museum, 'Traces of Memory', and the author of the exhibition's companion volume, *Rediscovering Traces of Memory*.<sup>2</sup> He is a board or advisory committee member at many different institutions, and a founding member of the International Auschwitz Council. In 1999 he was awarded the Gold Cross of Service by the president of the Republic of Poland for his contribution to Polish-Jewish relations, and in 2009 was honoured by the Polish Ministry of Culture for his services to Polish culture.

Dr Edyta Gawron is head of the Centre for the Study of the History and Culture of the Jews of Kraków, and assistant professor at the department of Jewish Studies, both at the Jagiellonian University, Kraków. She specializes in twentieth-century Polish Jewish history, Holocaust studies, and the post-Holocaust Jewish diaspora. In 2006/7 she held a postdoctoral research scholarship at the Yad Vashem International Institute for Holocaust Research. She is a member of the Commission on the History and Culture of Jews of the Polish Academy of Arts and Sciences in Kraków, and is on the board of the Galicia Jewish Museum.

The exhibition has also been subject to curatorial review by Dr Jill Vexler, a cultural anthropologist who curates exhibitions about cultural identity and social history. Focusing for the last ten years on Holocaust-related content, she was executive director of 'Remembering Luboml: Images of a Jewish Community', a photo-essay of pre-war Jewish life in a Polish village. Subsequently, she curated 'Oświęcim/Oshpitzin/Auschwitz: Portrait of Memories', the permanent exhibition at the Auschwitz Jewish Center, housed in the only surviving synagogue in Oświęcim. She is the curator and project manager of the travelling exhibition 'Letters to Sala', based on an exhibition of archival materials saved by Sala Garncarz, who was imprisoned in Nazi labour camps for five years. Vexler recently curated both the English- and Polish-language versions of 'Pictures of Resistance: The Wartime Photography of Jewish Partisan Faye Schuman' on behalf of the Jewish Partisans Educational Foundation.

'A City Not Forgotten' is under the patronage of the Consulate General of the United States of America in Kraków, and the honorary patronage of the General Consulate of Austria in Kraków and the General Consulate of Ukraine in Kraków. Local media patrons are *Focus Historia* and *Tygodnik Powszechny*.

<sup>2</sup> J. Webber (with photographs by C. Schwarz), *Rediscovering Traces of Memory: The Jewish Heritage of Polish Galicia* (Bloomington, Ind., 2009).

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# Eight Jews in Search of a Grandfather

MYKOLA RYABCHUK

ONE COLD AUTUMN DAY I had occasion to perform the rather unusual role of interpreter for a small group of tourists, who turned out to be even more unusual than I myself was in my newly acquired role. That day eight citizens of Israel, France, and the United States were heading to Chernivtsi on three specially hired buses. I was supposed to take good care of them during this three-day trip, replacing a good female friend of mine who worked for a private tourism company and had suddenly fallen ill. However, the trip turned out to be significantly more interesting than I anticipated.

## A JEWISH FAMILY

All eight of my foreign tourists—who, for some unknown reason, had arrived in this country that is forgotten by God to put themselves to the test in its hotels and restaurants and on its highways, and to experience its ‘traditionally’ courteous service—were not, as I was soon to find out, masochists or even lovers of exotica who flee from the excesses of civilization to areas where there is not even a whiff of such excesses, but from which there is in general quite another whiff. In a certain sense, my tourists had returned to their native land, to the country their ancestors had abandoned more than half a century ago in order, happily, to avoid a whole array of ‘liberations’ which most of us had not managed to avoid. All of them turned out to be members of a single family: five grandsons of the Chernivtsi-based entrepreneur Shmuel Glasberg, and three of their wives, all of whom had scattered throughout the world, but were united by something greater than ordinary family ties—united by the myth of the land which, for their ancestors, had been both a promised land and an apocalyptic one. Family ties could have brought them to any place, Paris, Detroit, or Jerusalem—their home towns—or even Budapest, the birthplace of the wife of one of the Glasberg grandsons, an Israeli, and where they had in fact gathered before heading to Kiev. But they could have been drawn further eastward—to Zhytomyr, to Berdychiv, to Chernivtsi—only by the historical myth, in which I became an involuntary participant.

In the 1920s and 1930s Shmuel Glasberg owned a small but successful company that had been established by his ancestors in the nineteenth century, during the

This essay was originally published in Ukrainian as M. Ryabchuk, ‘Vos’mero yevreyiv u poshukakh didusya’, *Yehupets’*, 4 (1998), 228–38.

reign of Franz Joseph, one of the greatest authorities in their family mythology. There is no question that Franz Joseph was neither a Judaeophile nor a Ukrainophile (as quite a few Polish historians claim): he was the emperor of Austria-Hungary and therefore he cared above all about the empire, which was literally his private property. In contemporary terms, he was a pragmatist: in Galicia he supported the Ruthenians against the Poles, and in Bukovina he supported them against the Romanians; but, at the same time, he did not overstep the mark, and he respected the traditional class system. That is, he made sure that the Ruthenians continued to be hard-working peasants, and that the Poles and Romanians were law-abiding landowners. Among all these subjects, the Jews were the most reliable: unlike the Ruthenians, they did not violate the social hierarchy, and unlike the Poles and the Romanians, they did not subvert the empire with nationalistic separatism and irredentism. The Jews had their own class-based, religious, and cultural autonomy; they had their own businesses; they paid taxes; they enriched the state treasury; and they Germanized themselves enthusiastically, filling the ranks of the imperial bureaucracy. In Vienna, where the Jewish bourgeoisie represented serious competition for the Austrian bourgeoisie, internal Judaeophobia had gradually evolved in the direction of ideologically structured antisemitism, while in the provinces, where there were few Austrian bourgeois, Galician and Bukovinian Jews successfully filled this social niche with the paternalistic support of the Viennese authorities.

In the Glasberg family mythology the Austro-Hungarian period is a kind of golden age, and in those days Bukovina was an oasis of tranquillity amid the anti-Jewish pogroms in neighbouring Russia and the increasingly aggressive antisemitism in western Europe, which was marked by the scandalous Dreyfus affair in France. After the First World War, Austria-Hungary collapsed, Bukovina became Romanian, and the first little clouds, still barely noticeable, began to form over the heads of the Glasbergs of Chernivtsi. In the 1930s these clouds became thicker: the Nazis were victorious in Germany, their sympathizers were becoming noticeably active in Romania, and the crusade against the global 'Jewish commune' was becoming an increasingly more inexorable reality. Shmuel Glasberg perspicaciously sent one of his three daughters to study in France, married off another one in America, and finally departed with his third daughter and his wife to Palestine, which at this time was under the British Mandate. His intuition turned out to be generally correct, but his life in the provinces, where purely human relations were traditionally important and where there was no lack of highly placed Romanian functionaries and even military men among his friends, had markedly weakened Mr Glasberg's vigilance. In 1938 he returned to Romania in order to wrap up all his business affairs, and en route to Chernivtsi, after making a stop at a synagogue in Bucharest, he fell victim to the bloody carnage organized by local Iron Guard fascists. This marked the collapse of the Glasberg dynasty, snapping the last, or at least the main, thread that united them with Bukovina.



## THE CHERNIVTSI ODYSSEY

Of the five grandsons of Shmuel Glasberg, only one, the American, named Jeremy, remembered Chernivtsi, or thought he did. He had last been here fifty-eight years ago as a 7-year-old boy, and of course the air was cleaner then, the water was wetter, the city cosier and cleaner, the pavements were not as broken up, and the streets not as dark (although the latter comparison is perhaps determined not so much by pre-war Chernivtsi as by the orderly university town in Michigan where Jeremy is a professor). Locating the street where the Glasbergs had lived by its former name was not difficult, but it was much harder to find the building according to its description (the numbers had changed). In fact, to this day I am not sure that we found the right building. 'You could have brought us to any little town near Kiev and said that it was Chernivtsi', joked Marc, the Frenchman, a professor of Indology and Bengali specialist, who had grasped the essentially symbolic meaning of our searches, in which the process itself was far more important than the result.

Above the gate fronting the rather large two-storey building that we nevertheless declared to be the Glasberg edifice was a sophisticated monogram fashioned out of the interwoven letters SG. 'I was too young to see that high up', explained Jeremy, who did not remember the monogram, but he seemed to recall the tiled stove in one of the communal apartments that we visited in that building, frightening the occupants. At the local synagogue, evidence of the Habsburg presence turned out to be more significant: their grandfather's name was still on the large memorial plaque listing other founders of the synagogue.

The search for Glasbergs at the Jewish cemetery, as neglected as the neighbouring Eastern Orthodox one, was unsuccessful. But quite a few gravestones bore the modest signature of a distant relative of theirs, a student of architecture and an artist, who later became quite well known and earned a living in this way, a way traditional for many artists. His main competitor in the craft of stonemasonry was one Karl Moskal.<sup>1</sup> I tried as best I could to explain the curious nature of this Ruthenian name, in which the influence of two empires had materialized with weird and wonderful exactness and in a truly symbolic, lapidary manner.

In a certain sense, today's Chernivtsi is both a 'Karl' and a 'Muscovite'—with its odd little streets and buildings from the age of Franz Joseph (as evidenced by the theatre square or, say, the university) and at the same time with the ubiquitous dirt, shabbiness, slovenliness, a kind of ineradicable mark of Sovietness that weighs over all of Ukraine to this day. What kind of impression can one derive from a country where even in the finest hotel (\$120 a night) there is no hot water and the temperature in the unheated rooms in late autumn is 10 degrees Celsius? What kind of impression does one get from a country where a hotel restaurant offers a primitive breakfast for six hryvnyas, consisting of two eggs and 'coffee' resembling swill, and

<sup>1</sup> i.e. Karl the Muscovite. (Translator)

a couple of slices of fried bread at an extra charge to each person of another hryvnya? What kind of impression is made by a country where the devious administration, charging \$120 a night, is not ashamed of hinting that banknotes with marks on them are worth a bit less—or are not accepted at all—and where that same administration is not embarrassed about submitting far-fetched bills for the room-service delivery of fruit that was neither ordered nor consumed?

I taught my foreigners to pronounce the words *haryacha voda* (hot water) syllable by syllable, so that the chambermaids could heat up water for them in pots, and, feeling foolish, I explained that there was a crisis in our country now and there was no water in the entire city. 'But your government probably does not charge the city residents \$120 a night', the foreigners remonstrated. 'Or in new banknotes', someone added amidst the general laughter. 'If there were hot water here', I retorted, 'then this five-star hotel would be called a twenty-star hotel, and you would be charged a thousand a night.'

Fortunately, my Jews had a sense of humour: they read the name of the Hotel Cheremosh the French way, 'chère et moche', meaning expensive and awful, and got a lot of amusement out of it. In general, they cheered me up more than I did them. Judging by everything, they had not expected anything better in this country; obviously, our renowned tourist service had become famous throughout the world a long time ago. Reassuring me, Jean, the French businessman, said: 'You'll see: ten years from now everything will have changed. These state monsters are doomed', he declared, pointing to the gigantic, half-empty hotel, a symbol of discomfort, and to the deserted restaurant, a symbol of Sovietness. 'They will go bankrupt.' 'But there are no bankruptcies in our country!', I exclaimed. 'Production is dropping, the economy is falling apart, and no one is going bankrupt, no one is being fired, and unemployment is nearly at the zero mark.' 'That will change', Jean insisted. 'Remember that wonderful, private little hotel in Kiev or those private restaurants where we had lunch, and where your waiters already know that they work for the client, and not the other way around.'

I was helpless in the face of this French optimism, unclouded by long years of living in our country and not poisoned by information about the level of thinking and the conduct of our oligarchic government.

## BUSINESS

Jean was the only businessman among all of the descendants of Shmuel Glasberg. Before his arrival in Kiev, he had spent some time in Kazakhstan, where he took part in a tender to supply something or other for the Baikonur cosmodrome. He won the tender and he liked Kazakhstan. He praised Almaty and its government, and predicted that the country would become another Asian tiger.

A little earlier Jean had made a successful trip to Iraq, where he sold a couple of dozen electric mills from the German Democratic Republic, which nobody needed

in the new Germany. Apparently, it was Saddam Hussein and Nursultan Nazarbaev's petrodollars that had inspired him to sponsor this exotic trip for his relatives to the land of their forefathers. Thus, the first batch of petrodollars ended up in Ukraine.

Jean is a Frenchman, but officially he is a citizen of Guadeloupe, where, according to him, he has been only once—to obtain his citizenship. Taxes in Guadeloupe are significantly lower than in France; for this same reason, all his companies are registered in Gibraltar. Like a real businessman and the grandson of his grandfather, Jean knows myriad languages, or at least several dozen words in each, including Russian. In my absence he was irreplaceable for his relatives because he was the only one who could make sense of the Cyrillic letters.

Jean's wife was a genuine Thai woman; actually not quite genuine, he explained, because she was also Jewish, but from Thailand. I had never seen any Thai women, let alone Jewish Thai women, so I stared at her with the curiosity of a provincial, trying to spot some kind of Semitic feature in her completely Asian face. She appeared silent, even aloof, like most short-sighted people, gazing romantically somewhere into the distance. She was the only one of the bunch who did not know English, and perhaps that was the main reason for her aloofness during our conversations.

Jean spoke for both of them, and sometimes for all the others. 'Imagine', he said; 'we met at the Sorbonne, and when I found out that her grandfather, like mine, was a timber trader, I realized that we had to get married.'

'But that was completely different timber', I commented, sipping a glass of 'Tysa' brandy.

'Ah!', said Jean, taking a sip of his own. 'But it was sold on the same stock exchanges, to the same clients; Amsterdam, London, Hanover . . . And do you know what she told me? She said that she would, but on condition that I never sell timber! So today I sell everything but timber! Ha, ha, ha!'

'Ukrainians make rotten traders', I said. 'They are an agricultural civilization, a nation of peasants. Jews traditionally filled this niche. And now, goodness knows who's filling it. That's why we're sitting on our backsides—because we don't have our own Jews. In fact, we never had them, because who wants to belong to a peasant nation?'

The brandy was warming our stomachs nicely, and the entire history of Ukrainian–Jewish relations was rising before me in increasingly ideal terms.

'My grandfather operated an honest business', said Jean, who was a bit offended. 'He paid the best price to the Ukrainian peasants who worked for him. He knew the situation. He brought money from Europe, goods, technology . . .'

'The culture of work', I added.

'The culture of work', Jean agreed. 'And the culture of trade. He never cheated anyone. He didn't double-cross. Everyone wanted to do business with him—he behaved honestly.'

'Indeed', I replied. 'And now all our Habsburgs are either in America or in Israel. They're turning the deserts into oases. But with us it's the opposite: we're turning oases into deserts. Aryans.'

'No, I'm serious', said Jean, who was becoming more and more offended. 'My grandfather lived quite modestly; he donated huge sums of money for shelters, schools, even for paving the streets!'

'And now the streets are dirty and in pieces! Buildings are run-down. But Chernivtsi could be a showpiece, a tourist mecca, like Budapest and Prague and Kraków!'

'Kraków was made by Poles first and foremost', said Jean. And Budapest by the Hungarians.'

'Yes', I nodded. 'But they had their Jews. And they learned quite a lot from them.'

'You have to understand', said Jean, who was no longer as offended, but still suspected me of insincerity and irony, 'Jews had to be more dynamic in order to survive. Whoever did not adapt was lost. They had to do the same things as non-Jews but do them a lot better.'

'This is positive, natural selection', I agreed. 'The best of you survived, but among us, it was the worst who survived.'

'I'm serious', Jean said.

'I am too.'

To the very end I think he didn't believe me.

#### UKRAINIAN ANTISEMITISM

From my infrequent encounters abroad with Jews and even more from overseas publications, I knew that in their eyes Ukrainians have a persistent reputation for being antisemites. For the most part, this was the only thing that they knew about Ukraine: the land of the Khmelnytsky era and the haidamaks, of Petlyura and Bandera, a land of perpetual pogroms stretching back three hundred years, and of the zoological hatred felt by the boorish loser for everything that is more capable and successful.

I tried as best I could to explain that neither the Jew nor the Ukrainian were active subjects of history, but passive objects; they were prisoners in the same cell, in which they were constantly being set against one another, yet for most of the time they had lived peaceably, and these years of peaceful coexistence deserve no less attention than the years of truly turbulent and truly catastrophic excesses for the Jews. I explained feebly that Bandera was not a pogromist, and neither was Petlyura, who was sooner a Judaeophile than an antisemite. I explained that it is not at all because of the 'pogroms' that Ukrainians revere Khmelnytsky, just as it is not George Washington's ownership of slaves that makes Americans admire him. I argued that Ukrainian nationalism has nothing at all to do with the pogroms

that took place in the Russian empire in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

They listened to me attentively but, as a rule, stuck to their views. It is more comfortable to live in a world of mass myths, and in this respect Jews differ little from Ukrainians. A guy in California, who had survived the uprising in the Warsaw ghetto, recounted that with his very own eyes he had witnessed Ukrainian soldiers from the SS Galicia Division shooting Jews. I knew that the Galicia Division had been formed a year later, for its first and, as it turned out, last battle, at Brody; I knew that this was a front-line division that did not take part in any punitive operations; I knew that there were no Ukrainian units in the Warsaw ghetto.<sup>2</sup> And as corroboration I could name dozens of scholarly sources on this topic. But my fellow conversationalist was not interested in any proof and merely repeated stubbornly: ‘I saw it with my very own eyes.’

Myths created by eyewitnesses are the most powerful.

With a certain amazement I noted, however, that my visitors did not have any hang-ups to do with ‘genetic’ Ukrainian antisemitism. Two of the Israelis—Hamutal, a professor of modern Hebrew literature, and Shmuel, the owner of a small advertising agency—had heard something about Demjanjuk, who was labelled ‘Ivan the Terrible’ during his trial.<sup>3</sup> However, they considered him a Russian or, rather, a ‘Soviet’. It was only Jeremy, the head of a rather bizarre (by our standards) university department for 60- and 70-year-old students, who demonstrated the entire array of typically American stereotypes. He gazed mistrustfully at the monument to Paul Celan in the city centre, at Sholem Aleichem Street, at the large map of Israel in the Jewish school, and, finally, at the members of a Jewish society that was housed in the former Jewish Home—and traces of slight irritation appeared on his face: don’t snow me under with your propaganda, his expression seemed to say.

He said: ‘I read that your government is deliberately flirting with the Jews and other minorities in order to set them against the Russians.’

‘I don’t know how to read my government’s thoughts, Jeremy’, I said, ‘although I’m afraid that you exaggerate its maliciousness.’

‘You should apologize to the Jews’, he said angrily. ‘And return all their property.’

<sup>2</sup> The Warsaw ghetto uprising took place between late April and early May 1943, and by 16 May all pockets of resistance had been suppressed. Although the announcement of the establishment of the SS Galicia Division was issued on 28 April 1943, the recruitment and selection of those fit for combatant service did not take place until late May and June, and was finalized no earlier than late June or early July. Ryabchuk’s contention that there were no Galicia Division units in the ghetto holds water. (Editors)

<sup>3</sup> John Demjanjuk (born Ivan Mykolaiovych Demyanyuk, 1920–2012), an American Ukrainian, was sentenced to death in Israel in 1988, having been identified as ‘Ivan the Terrible’, a Treblinka concentration camp guard known for his atrocities toward the inmates; the identification was later judged mistaken, and he was acquitted by the Israeli Supreme Court in 1993. Later identified as a guard at the Sobibór and Majdanek concentration camps, he was deported from the United States to stand trial in Germany, where he died before the proceedings were concluded. (Editors)

'I don't owe you any property, Jeremy. But I can apologize if you insist.'

'It's your government that should', he said with emphasis.

'Our government has existed for only five years, and I hope that it has not done anything bad to the Jews.'

'It must apologize on behalf of all its predecessors.'

'It didn't have any predecessors. Before this one there were only foreign governments in our country. I am not against their apologizing—to you and to us, or even against returning some property. For example, my grandfather owned a pair of horses that were requisitioned by the Bolsheviks. And he had nine children. The Bolsheviks starved eight of them to death—and a few million other people. Maybe you've heard about it? It was a kind of small Ukrainian holocaust.'

'Listen, Jerry', Jean interrupted. 'Ukrainians have a great proverb: "Your own shit doesn't stink."'

I looked gratefully at Jean. He is probably a really good businessman.

#### BERDYCHIV

They say that old Berdychiv was once home to 70,000 Jews, more than half of its population. Today it is a typical Soviet district centre with a pathetic Lenin in the square and an even more pathetic little box housing the district party centre, now renamed the State Administration. A few thousand Jews are left in the city, and not many residents of Berdychiv know of their existence. For the majority of them the Jews are part of old, pre-war, and even pre-revolutionary history; a disappearing world recorded by the nostalgic Sholem Aleichem.

Only the fourth passer-by that we asked knew that there was a synagogue in Berdychiv and was able to point the way to it. It was truly in an out-of-the-way, secluded corner; old, tiny, and surrounded by permanent scaffolding. The service had ended, but about a dozen Jews were still in the courtyard: old men in peaked caps, resembling collective-farm machine operators, and similar-looking women with coarse features, of uncertain form and age—it appears that simple Jewish people bear the indelible brand of Sovietness as much as any other people in the territories of the vast USSR.

Greeting them, I said, 'My guests would like to take a look, if possible, at the synagogue and the cemetery. They are all Jews.'

'From America?', a woman asked.

'Two are from America, three are from Israel, and three are from France.'

The woman made a humming sound of approval and, like most people, stared goggle-eyed at the Thai woman, obviously trying to fathom where such bizarre Jews had sprung up—whether in America, in France, or, God forbid, in Israel. After a moment of stupefaction the Jews from Berdychiv threw themselves at my guests with a loud cackle, asking questions and trying to explain in Russian and Yiddish, neither of which languages my guests knew. However, they knew German

(and French and English as well as Hebrew), so contact was established after a fashion.

The woman who had asked me about America was already clutching Jeremy by the sleeve and showing him a picture of her son and his family. 'They're in America', she declared. 'In Brooklyn.' Jeremy wrinkled his forehead and bald spots, screwing up his bespectacled eyes and mumbling something. 'In Brooklyn.' From her shabby handbag she extracted a letter and pointed to the return address. 'They're sending for me.' She looked questioningly into Jeremy's eyes, but he continued to blink in confusion, mumbling, 'Brooklyn . . . good, good . . .'.

'Her children in the US want her to join them', I explained.

'Good, good', Jerry repeated.

'He says that it's a nice place', I translated somewhat freely.

'So, I'm thinking I should leave', said the woman. 'All the young people have gone—some to Kiev, some to America, some to Germany . . . They say that whole streets there are ours, and shops, and absolutely everything . . .' She put the letter and the photograph back in her handbag, was silent for a moment, and then said thoughtfully, 'Maybe I really shall go . . .'.

'She wonders whether it's possible to live at your place', I said.

Jerry shuddered. But, to stop the joke from going too far, I quickly corrected myself: 'Sorry, I mean in your country.'

Relieved, Jerry smiled and nodded happily: 'Yes, yes, of course!'

At this point I stopped translating. 'West is West, and East is East . . .', said Kipling, and he was probably right.

In the meantime, someone had fetched two rabbis from the synagogue, two smartly dressed Americans, who looked more like university professors than clerics, and we headed inside. 'Until the 1960s there was another synagogue here', the older one explained. 'But they closed it. The intelligentsia used to gather there.'

'And now?'

'Now there is a synagogue but no intelligentsia. Everyone is leaving. We're trying to help however we can.'

I unfastened the hood from my jacket and placed it on my head. In the small prayer hall, behind the satin *parokhet*, towered a carved *aron kodesh*. The oriental ornamentation on the walls blended into mysterious inscriptions written in Hebrew letters—or the other way round. The women headed up the creaking stairs to their gallery. An odour of decay and decline hung in the air, as though in a spectral ship that was disappearing inside the earth.

'And why are they all leaving?', Jean asked me. 'Is there a home-grown Zhirinovsky here?'<sup>4</sup>

<sup>4</sup> Vladimir Zhirinovsky (born Vladimir Volfovich Eidelshtein, b. 1946) is the founder and the leader of the Russian Liberal Democratic Party and one of the most controversial members of the Russian Duma, known for his shallow populism, aggressive brawling, and his racist, antisemitic, chauvinistic, and anti-Western public invectives. (Editors)

‘We have our miseries here’, I explained. ‘But, of course, in order to land in America, you have to claim refugee status. And many do. I’ve heard totally fantastic stories about persecutions.’

‘So have I’, said Jean.

‘But I understand them. America is not Israel.’

‘But in a dozen years everything will change’, Jean said. ‘Do you think they’ll come back?’

‘Do you?’

‘If you have the lowest taxes in the world’, Jean said with a laugh.

We left the synagogue.

‘Someone will escort you to the hasidic cemetery’, the older of the rabbis said. ‘We have problems with it. Under the Soviets it was falling apart all by itself, but now its destruction is being helped along. The “new Russians” are building garages for themselves. The local authorities are not opposing this. We’ve appealed to the government.’

‘I always said that capitalism is crueller than communism’, Jean said succinctly.

I countered by saying, ‘In our country we have African capitalism. But communism was no better.’

On the way to the cemetery, where the small gravestones of hasidim, like scrolls of papyrus or small petrified dolls, were hidden amid the weeds, I said: ‘We have a joke about three presidents who were granted an audience with God. The first president, of course, was Clinton. “O God, when will my people finally have a happy life?”, he asked. “In thirty years”, God replied. Clinton burst into tears and left. “And when will my people have a happy life?”, asked Yeltsin. “In three hundred years”, the Lord replied. Yeltsin burst into tears and left. “Well, so when will my people have a happy life?”, asked our president. God burst into tears and left.’

‘You would make a good hasid!’ said Jean, rolling with laughter.

### ‘NEXT YEAR IN JERUSALEM’

We said our goodbyes in Kiev, uttering the traditional Jewish farewell: ‘Next year in Jerusalem.’ At the time I never thought that this ritual formula would literally come true. I gazed enviously at the Glasberg descendants, who were disappearing happily into the elegant little hotel in the Podil district. It seemed that their trip had not tired them out or saddened them. They had enjoyed the Carpathian landscapes and the little river which their mothers-to-be had visited every year for their summer vacations under the supervision of grandfather Shmuel or, more likely, some German governess. They gazed at the walls of Kamyanets-Podilsky and the Metropolitan’s residence, which eventually became Chernivtsi State University; they talked their heads off in snug little restaurants, many of which had recently sprung up all over Ukraine, perhaps many more of them than in Africa. They rejoiced at the exotica that their own money afforded them, and if they encountered



something sad, it reconfirmed the wisdom of their grandfather who had abandoned in good time this country forgotten by God. They had come back from their past, as though from Jurassic Park, back to the future. Meanwhile, I was skidding on the spot in this past, along with the entire country, as though in a bizarre dream, unable to take a single step towards the future.

Everyone has their problems and it is absurd to burden others with them.

Towards the end, when Jean suddenly asked me why nearly all the Jews here speak Russian, I recounted another parable—about my friend, the decent and intelligent Serhy Grosman, who always spoke to me in Ukrainian, but never used this language in public. When I asked him why, he replied very simply and succinctly: ‘You know, I have enough problems with my Jewishness.’

I don’t know if Jean understood what I had said. The whole time he suspected that I was being ironic.

But a few months later, when I was flying to a conference in Jerusalem, I saw in the plane a rather large Jewish family with half a dozen red-haired children, which was returning after a thousand years from one fatherland to another. They were speaking Ukrainian, in the Galician way, the way people speak in Subcarpathia, somewhere in the Sambir or Boryslav areas, and they looked exactly like the Ukrainian peasants who, a hundred years ago, were leaving impoverished Galicia for Canada.

For the first time in my life I felt that these were our Jews—not Russian and not Soviet—and that with them we are truly losing something very important, the importance of which I fear we shall soon be aware of, but shall not comprehend any time soon. A lump rose in my throat and I turned my head to the window, where the shores of the Crimea were disappearing and the Levant, Arabia, and Palestine were beginning; unknown lands between living and dead seas, clumps of time and space, of history and geography, swathes dividing the past and the future, towards the various ages of which we are heading as though on board the same plane.

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*Translated from the Ukrainian by Marta D. Olynyk*

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# A Note on the Names of the Golden Rose Synagogue in Lviv

SERGEY R. KRAVTSOV

THERE ARE MANY QUESTIONS surrounding the name of the synagogue built in the walled city of Lviv in 1582, generally referred to today as the Golden Rose Synagogue (Ukr. 'Zolota Roza', Pol. 'Złota Róża'). This is not the only name by which it was historically known, and it is interesting to consider what these names were and how they came to be used.

Some have suggested that the Golden Rose, which is rather an unusual name for a synagogue, could be a misspelling of the English translation of the Hebrew name by which it was also sometimes known, Turei Zahav (in local Yiddish pronunciation *tire zuhov*), which translates as 'rows of gold', or 'golden rows'. The possibility of such a homophonic connection is interesting but unlikely; why would anyone in Lviv have need to refer to the synagogue by an English name? Another homophonic explanation suggests that Turei Zahav has been misinterpreted as Reize Zahav, that is, the Golden Rose. This theory is inconsistent, since it assumes both that the imaginary interpreter would have been ignorant enough of local history to misunderstand the expression Turei Zahav and knowledgeable enough to be aware of the Golden Rose. There had to be another explanation.

In fact the names Turei Zahav and Golden Rose have very different origins. The name Turei Zahav alludes to the great rabbi of Lviv who was associated with the synagogue in the 1650s and 1660s, R. David ben Shmuel Halevi Segal, author of the halakhic commentary by that name on the *Shulḥan arukh*. An inscription in the gable of the synagogue vestibule recorded this connection: 'hu makom hatefilah shel hataz', literally 'the place where the Taz prayed', 'Taz' being an acronymic reference to the title of his work and how the great rabbi himself came to be known. There is further evidence of the Taz's connection with the synagogue in that the community protected and looked after his grave and respected families who prayed there emphasized their ancestral ties to this revered rabbi.

However, the synagogue pre-dated the Taz's association with it, which explains why it had other names as well. The name Golden Rose relates to a legend connecting the synagogue to the daughter-in-law of its founder, a man called Yitshak ben Nahman, who married off his son Nahman to a young woman by the name of Rose or Rosa, or more formally Roza bat Ya'akov. Because of the legend Rosa's memory

was venerated and she became known locally as ‘the Golden Rose’, or in the local Yiddish pronunciation, ‘di Gildene Royze’; certainly her grave became a place of pilgrimage and prayer for women. The legend of the Golden Rose, first published by Gabriel Suchystaw in 1863,<sup>1</sup> did not mention the synagogue by name, referring to it only as *beit hakeneset* (‘the synagogue’), but the allusion would have been clear to Lviv Jews. The legend seems to be authentic and not a product of nineteenth-century Romanticism, since Suchystaw was a traditional Jew, unaffected by the Haskalah with its new-fangled Romantic ideas. He wrote as follows:

It is written in the records of the Burial Society: the clergy [Heb. *kemarim*, here a reference to Jesuits] captured the synagogue and it remained in their hands for four years and six months, and it was a miracle that they did not defile it. And it happened that a woman [Rosa], great in the eyes of the king and his princes, made a great feast unto the king and all his princes [Esther 2: 18] to gain the king’s advocacy and to restore the crown to its former holiness, to restitute the sanctuary to our hands. And when the Jesuits understood that their case was going to fail and that the Jews would prevail because the woman impressed the king and his princes strongly, they decided nevertheless to occupy the sanctuary and to convert it into a church. When that woman heard this, she wept with a bitter heart before the king and his princes and secured the king’s decree to stop the entire procedure and to bring the case before the court of the king and his princes. And when she came to the archbishop and showed him the king’s decree, and when he had seen the decree, he killed her and cut her into pieces. And she sacrificed her soul in the Name of the Lord. Our sanctuary shall be her monument. The Lord shall avenge her blood, and her merit shall serve all Israel. Amen.<sup>2</sup>

The incident is also known from the famous *Shir ge’ulah* (‘Song of Deliverance’), a penitentiary prayer written by the Taz’s elder brother, R. Yitshak, when the synagogue was recovered in 1609, and pronounced in the synagogue annually on the sabbath after Purim.<sup>3</sup>

The legend was popularized by the assimilated German Jewish writer Natan Samuely, who wrote about it in *Voskhod* in 1896.<sup>4</sup> He did not conflate the Tire Suhov (in his spelling) and the Golden Rose, since he was well versed in both Hebrew and German. However, the legend of the Golden Rose told by Samuely was not a scholarly record of a folk narrative, but rather a popular story ‘from the darkness of the centuries’, as he put it. Unlike Suchystaw, however, who based himself on the records of the Burial Society, Samuely actually mentioned Rose by name as the heroine of the story. This was not his invention, but was rather based on the text of her epitaph:

<sup>1</sup> G. Suchystaw, *Matsevet kodesh*, i (Lviv, 1863). The text is available online at <<http://www.hebrewbooks.org/7021>>.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid. 390 (online pagination).

<sup>3</sup> For the Hebrew text of the ‘Song of Deliverance’, see J. Caro, *Geschichte der Juden in Lemberg von den ältesten Zeiten bis zur Theilung Polens im Jahre 1792 aus Chroniken und archivalischen Quellen* (Kraków, 1894), 152–8. For an English translation by Betsy Rosenberg, see S. R. Kravtsov, *Di Gildene Royze: The Turei Zahav Synagogue in L’viv* (Petersberg, 2011), 63–70.

<sup>4</sup> N. Samuely [Samuely], ‘Iz mraka vekov goroda L’vova’, *Voskhod*, Feb. 1896, pp. 116–17.

Here is buried an honest and prominent woman of substance, Madam Rosa, daughter of Rabbi Jacob, on Tuesday, the fourth day of the month Ethanim [Tishri] [5]398 [22 Sept. 1637]. I mourn her, for there is a great mourning and lamentation [Isaiah 29: 2] in the house of Jacob. His crown has fallen, wisdom is driven from him [Job 6: 13], the branches, cups, and flowers of the pure candlestick are broken [Exodus 25: 31–2]. I never met such a woman among them. Kings saw her and princes bowed themselves unto her [Esther 2: 18; 1 Kings 2: 19]. May her soul be bound up in the bond of life.<sup>5</sup>

The whole story of the synagogue, including its founders, rabbis, and associated legends, was set out by the Polish Jewish historian Majer Bałaban in 1906. He mentions that it was known as the Golden Rose but refers to it principally as the Nachmanowicz Synagogue, according to his positivist historiographical narrative in which the synagogue was named after its founder, Rosa's father-in-law, Yitshak ben Nahman, a name whose Polish form, as confirmed by many archival documents, was Izak Nachmanowicz.<sup>6</sup> The tax records of the eighteenth century called the synagogue Wielka Szkoła Żydowska ('the big Jewish school'), while the *beit midrash* was called Mała Szkoła ('the little school'), and the Old Synagogue Stara Szkołka ('the old school' in diminutive form).<sup>7</sup> In the nineteenth century the names changed: the Old Synagogue was razed and built anew in 1801 and was henceforth known as the Great Synagogue, since the Nachmanowicz Synagogue was much smaller. The status of the new Great Synagogue was established also by the transfer of the rabbinical court—hosted by the Nachmanowicz Synagogue from 1609—to the new building. In the last few years, the Golden Rose synagogue has frequently appeared in the news because of plans, which have aroused strong opposition, to build a luxury hotel on the site.

<sup>5</sup> Caro, *Geschichte*, 161.

<sup>6</sup> M. Bałaban, *Żydzi lwowscy na przełomie XVI i XVII wieku* (Lwów, 1906), *passim*.

<sup>7</sup> R. Mohytych, "'Liktyovy' podatok 1767 roku u L'vovi: Identyfikatsiya zabudovy za suchasnymy adresamy', *Visnyk instytutu 'Ukrzakhidproektrestavratsiya'*, 19 (2009), 31–2.

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