5

The Danger of Denial of Languages: An Eastern European-Canadian Comparison

YAROSLAV BILINSKY

Speakers of influential languages may not understand the passionate concerns of the defenders of national languages used by only several million people each (as, for instance, in the three Baltic states) or several dozen million people (in Ukraine itself and in the Ukrainian diaspora). In Canada the insensitivity of English-speaking Canadians (anglophones) to old and new claims of their French-speaking fellow citizens (francophones) led to the establishment of language and immigration policies by the province of Quebec. Advocates of Quebec independence lost in the referendum of 1995, but only narrowly, by about 50.21 per cent against and 49.89 per cent for. Elsewhere in this volume, William F. Mackey aptly calls the result "a virtual tie" (see 38).

Canada has become more flexible over time and is truly democratic, and it will probably survive as a federation. In contrast, the more rigid and authoritarian Soviet Union imploded in 1991. It had veered toward a Russocentric course under Leonid Brezhnev and even afterward under Mikhail Gorbachev. At bottom, after World War II the USSR behaved like the Russian Empire, with a single imperial language.

In his rich historical contribution in chapter 1 of this book, Mackey has pointed out that the conflicts between francophones and anglophones in Canada involved religion and culture, with occasional outbursts of francophobia. The situation finally began changing when the Quebec nationalists gained ascendancy in the 1960s and 1970s. Some Ukrainians still remember the 30 July 1863 secret instruction of the czarist minister of the interior Petr Valuev, who served under the reform-minded czar Alexander II,

---

This chapter is dedicated to the memory of Petro Odarchenko (20 August 1903–12 March 2006), a Ukrainian literary scholar, who survived Soviet exile to Kazakhstan.

"the Liberator." Sharply reacting to the Polish uprising of 1863–64, Valuev banned a Ukrainian translation of the New Testament and all other publications in Ukrainian except belles lettres. He gave the motivation for his ban as follows: "No separate Little Russian [Ukrainian] language has [ever] existed, does exist [now], and can [ever] exist, and the dialect used by the common folk is the very same Russian language, only adulterated by the influence on it of the Polish language ... The all-Russian language is just as understandable for Little Russians as it is for Great Russians [ethnic Russians in the twenty-first century], and even more understandable than the so-called Ukrainian language, presently fabricated for them by certain Little Russians, and in particular the Poles" (cited by Senkus, 1993, 5: 553). Obviously, Valuev hated the Polish and allied Lithuanian insurgents as much as he did the Ukrainophile "separatists."

The pessimists among us will see in Valuev's sweeping ban the seeds of cultural genocide, which under Stalin culminated in full genocide (the *holodomor*, or terror-famine of 1932–33, which was combined with large-scale repression of the Ukrainian formerly rural intelligentsia in the 1930s) (Bilinsky, 1999, 149; 2003, 76).[1] Pessimists see the huge population losses in Ukraine, in both numerical (10 million) and, above all, qualitative terms, as contributing to Russification under Brezhnev's campaign to build a "Soviet people." The legacy of near-genocide and Soviet nation-building also contributed to the somewhat irresolute and vacillating language policies in independent Ukraine under Presidents Leonid Kravchuk (1991–94) and Leonid Kuchma (1994–2004). On the other hand, optimists will point out that the Ukrainian language was banned, not once or twice, but as many as 174 times. It has survived and recently has made some advances in secondary schools and universities.[2]

As for Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, they had been independent states between the two world wars. They were incorporated into the USSR in 1940 as a result of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact of 23 August 1939. All three Baltic states suffered heavy population losses of near-genocidal proportions both during and after World War II. Under the Soviet regime, the traditional ethnic composition of the two smaller states, Latvia and Estonia, was changed the most by planned immigration of ethnic Russians and Russified Belorusians and Ukrainians. Though relatively small in number, the Lithuanians, the Latvians, and above all the Estonians have had a sense of superiority toward Russian language and culture. Estonian is also the furthest removed from Russian, but Latvian and Lithuanian, too, do not belong to the family of Slavic languages, as Ukrainian does.

Map 5.1 The Russian language in the three Baltic states (in percentages)

Зображення захищене авторським правом

SOURCES: CIA map "The Baltic States," Base 802244 (K00112) 6-94, from the Map Division, Morris Library, University of Delaware. Language data for Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania from CIA, 2009, 3, accessed 22 May 2009.

NOTE: For Estonia, the number of Estonian-speakers as a percentage of all those living in the country (67.3 per cent) is followed by the counterpart Russian-language percentage (29.7 per cent). For Latvia, Latvian-speakers (58.2 per cent) are followed by Russian-speakers (37.5 per cent). The same order is observed for Lithuanian-speakers (82.0 per cent) in Lithuania, with the equivalent Russian figure being 8 per cent.

The Soviet incorporation of the Baltic states into the USSR was not recognized by the United States. The Baltic states were subsequently able to leave the Soviet Union completely without joining the pro-Russian Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). Of the former Soviet Baltic republics, it was Lithuania that declared independence first on 11 March 1990.

There are similarities and differences among the three Baltic states and Ukraine with respect to ethnic Russians and Russian-speakers as of July 2009 or, in the case of Ukraine, 1 January 2009. First, ethnic Russians are in a minority in all four countries. Their share of the total population, however, varies from only 6.3 per cent, or 224 thousand, in Lithuania, where they constitute the second-ranking minority after Poles (6.7 per cent, or 238 thousand), to 29.6 per cent (661 thousand) in Latvia. In Estonia the Russian minority is more substantial, amounting to 25.6 per cent (333 thousand) (CIA, 2009).[3] Ukraine, unlike the three Baltic states, is a medium-sized country, with an ethnic Russian minority of 17.3 per cent, or a little under 8 million compared with about 36 million ethnic Ukrainians.[4]

Secondly, especially as shown in map 5.1, the number of Russian-speakers in all four states is greater than the number of ethnic Russians. The main reason for this discrepancy in the three Baltic states is the presence of Russified Belarusians (Byelorussians) and Ukrainians. In Ukraine we find a drop of 14.8 percentage points, equivalent to 5.3 million people, between self-declared ethnic Ukrainians and ethnic Ukrainians who also gave Ukrainian as their native language. The two main reasons for this difference are the Russification policies of the Soviet regime from 1932 through 1991 and the inability of independent Ukrainian governments since 1991 to reverse the results of those policies by determined Ukrainization.

In their major article on the status of Russian, Vida Io. Mikhalchenko and Yulia V. Trushkova (2003, 260–1) acknowledge that Russian is not a world language, but that it "continues to be largely the ethnic language of Russians and the national language of the Russian Federation, the first or second language of the bulk of the population of the Russian Federation and the language of interethnic communication of the CIS." In essence, Russian is a regional language (ibid., 283). But it can also serve as a means of international scholarly communication. At a conference in Germany, I met a Soviet-trained Chinese expert on Ukraine. He spoke neither German nor English, and I did not speak Chinese. So we talked at length in Russian.

Mikhalchenko and Trushkova have admitted that in the USSR "the absolute predominance of Russian in all essential spheres of communication was really unwarranted. It existed at the expense of the national languages" (ibid., 265). Soviet linguistic policy provoked reactions in the Baltic states

and Ukraine to limit the use of Russian. It is true, of course, that "in the USSR, Russian was a language that provided access to professional activity and success in the job market" (ibid., 267). But the most striking observation made by the two Russian scholars repeatedly is that ethnic Russians tend to be monolingual (ibid, 261, 262, 265). In a Quebec publication this fact has been confirmed by two Estonian analysts. Marju Toomsalu and Leeni Simm (1998, 40) summarized the results of various polls about why Russians in Estonia have not learned to speak Estonian: "those polled responded that the idea had never occurred to them and that they did not think that it would ever become a necessity."

In the following pages I will briefly comment on linguistic policies in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, which have been relatively decisive and straightforward, and then examine the essentially postponed linguistic confrontation in Ukraine, relying especially on data from the first post-Soviet population census of 2001.

These linguistic policies are closely related to one another since the Baltic states and Ukraine were all part of the Soviet Union until its demise. Moreover, all these countries are in fairly close geographical proximity to one another, so that leaders in each country are aware of trends in – and impositions from – their neighbours. While the Baltic states and Ukraine all broke away from the Soviet Union, their subsequent domestic and international experiences with language policy have diverged significantly with regard to both their language policy objectives and the results. They have all shared resentment about the Soviet denial of their respective languages, but the expression of this resentment has varied greatly because of the different contexts of each case. A complete comparison would include all the now-independent former Soviet states, which extend as far as China, but a more manageable first cut is to focus on these four neighbouring countries.

There is some continuity in language policy from the Soviet Union to the successor rump state, Russia, in that the tradition of denial of other languages remains strong. However, the more limited ability of Russia to affect events in the now-independent former Soviet states in question has significantly altered the political calculus of influence. Moreover, as the quotation above from the two Russian scholars indicates, there is some recognition in the Russian Federation that the militant Soviet policy of denial of languages was ill-advised. The dividing line nonetheless remains blurred in the post–Cold War era of when Russian Federation assertion of the language rights of Russian-speaking minorities outside the federation is legitimate and when it reflects a long-standing bullying tradition. Ambiguities in the denial of language give added reason to focus on the specific contexts of all these states and their interaction.

What we have then is a comparison involving five related language policy cases over time: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Ukraine, and the Soviet Union/Russia. A sixth case, Canada, involves some interaction with these five, but by and large geographical distance has limited interaction. What is common to all these cases is that some actors were denying languages at different times and to different degrees, while others were asserting minority languages or at least at various times were wanting to assert them when they could. This relatively limited data set with significant variations positions us to add specificity about global and not just regional concern about denial of languages. What kinds of circumstances or contexts lead to confrontations about denial of languages? When and why has denial of languages been susceptible to compromise and accommodation?

In a concluding section, I will first present what I see as the possible lessons learned regarding language policy in Eastern Europe and Russia for their own benefit as well as their applicability to Canada and, secondly, lessons to be learned regarding language policies in Canada and their applicability to Eastern Europe and Russia.

LANGUAGE POLICIES IN THE BALTIC STATES

Lithuania, the largest Baltic state, played a leading role in political opposition, notably against Soviet efforts to suppress the Roman Catholic Church, and also was the first to declare independence. But because the Russian minority in Lithuania was so small (9.4 per cent in 1989, as low as 6.3 per cent in 2007), Lithuania gave these people automatic citizenship and did not restrict their use of Russian. It was the smallest Baltic state, Estonia, that first passed a law, while still under Soviet rule, to limit the inroads of the Russian language. As early as 7 December 1988, the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet overwhelmingly (with 204 ayes, 49 nays, and 4 abstentions) passed a constitutional amendment making Estonian the state language of the republic. The Language Law of the Estonian SSR was approved on 18 January 1989, also with a large majority (204 ayes, 50 nays, 6 abstentions), despite growing objections by Communist politicians in Moscow (Raun, 1995, 517–18).

As best shown in its preamble, the purpose of the 1989 Estonian Language Law was straightforward: to restore Estonian to its pre-eminent position before the Soviet occupation of 1940. To this end, paragraphs one, two, and three spoke of Estonian as the state language of the republic, while paragraph four finally mentioned Russian as being useful for communication within the USSR. The fifth and last paragraph in the preamble promised

not to infringe upon the rights of fellow citizens to develop their native languages (Raun, 1995, 527f).

The comparable law in the Latvian SSR was also passed in 1989, after Latvian had been designated the state language at the end of September 1988 (Hirša, 1998, 91).[5] But there was a significant difference, pointing perhaps to a weaker position of Latvian vis-à-vis Russian in the Soviet republic: the Latvian law was called "the law on *languages*" (Hirša, 1998, 96; emphasis added).

The language situation in Ukraine was more akin to that in Latvia than to the one in Estonia. The Ukrainian SSR language law was passed rather late, on 28 October 1989. Its title was similarly "On *Languages* in the Ukrainian SSR" (emphasis added). Its preamble only timidly mentioned Ukrainian as the state language in paragraph three. Similarly, the law recognized Ukrainian as the state language in article two, not article one, as did the Estonian law. The clear implication from the Ukrainian SSR law was that the predominant language in Ukraine was Russian.[6] Whereas in Estonia and even in Latvia, the republican Communist authorities tended to side with the advocates of the Estonian and Latvian languages in 1988, the Ukrainian nationalists had to wait a year. It was not until September 1989, when the fatally ill Volodymyr Shcherbytsky, who favoured Russian over his native Ukrainian, was dismissed from his key post as first secretary of the Communist Party of Ukraine by Gorbachev, that the Communist government in Kyiv (Kiev) became more receptive to claims for the Ukrainian language. In contrast, the pro-Russian Latvian first party secretary Boris Pugo already had been transferred to Moscow in September 1988.

It is important to bear in mind that during and after World War II, the titular nationalities in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Ukraine suffered heavy population losses, while new ethnic Russian immigrants arrived. The changing balance was seen as particularly threatening in the two smallest republics: Estonia, and Latvia. During World War II, Estonia's population decreased by one-fifth (or about 200,000 people), with about 10 per cent of the population, or more than 80,000, fleeing to the West. An anti-Soviet guerrilla movement during the years 1946–48 led in March 1949 to the punitive deportation of 20,722 people to Siberia. This amounted to the loss of 2.5 per cent of the total republican population. As a consequence of all those shocks, together with centrally directed industrialization, the number of ethnic Estonians in the republic decreased from 94 per cent in 1945 to 61 per cent in 1989. In that year, ethnic Russians accounted for as much as 30.3 per cent of the total population.[7]

The losses in Latvia were even worse: by the end of World War II, its population had dropped by about one-third. In one year of Soviet occupation, from June 1940 through June 1941, almost 33,000 Latvians were deported to Russia, including Siberia. On one day alone, 14 June 1941, 15,000 Latvians were deported. In addition, a large number of Latvian army officers were shot, the total of executions in 1940–41 being 1,350. Tens of thousands were then killed during the German occupation. The genocidal Soviet deportations continued after 1945: on 25 March 1949 Stalin deported another 42,000 Latvians. As a result, the proportion of ethnic Latvians in the republic dropped from 73 per cent in 1939 to 52 per cent in 1989. (In 1935 ethnic Latvians had made up as much as 77 per cent of the country's population.) More to the point is the increase of ethnic Russians in Latvia: they numbered 168 thousand, or 8.8 per cent of the total population, in 1935 and as many as 906 thousand, or 34.4 per cent, in 1989.[8]

Data on linguistic assimilation (because of the increasingly larger number of those who gave Russian as their "native language" in the Soviet censuses of 1959, 1970, 1979, and 1989) made the situation even worse. For that reason, after 1991 both Estonia and Latvia combined affirmative citizenship and language policies designed to limit the influence of the strong Russian minority. The re-nationalizing policies in Estonia and Latvia after independence, which at bottom were policies of ethnic and cultural survival, did improve the ethnic balance in the two countries. According to the 2000 census, Estonians accounted for 67.9 per cent and Russians 25.6 per cent of the total population of Estonia. According to US estimates, in 2002 ethnic Latvians constituted 57.7 per cent of the total population of Latvia, a gain of 5.7 per cent for the Latvians and a loss of 4.4 per cent for the Russians.[9] Similarly, in July 2009 there were 882 thousand ethnic Estonians and 333 thousand ethnic Russians in Estonia and 1,288 thousand ethnic Latvians and 661 thousand ethnic Russians in Latvia.

The 1993 and 1995 Estonian laws on citizenship did not give automatic citizenship to all permanent non-Estonian residents, except to those who had been born in Estonia before the Soviet occupation of 1940. Candidates who were not ethnic Estonians had to apply for naturalization, "demonstrate a knowledge of the Estonian Constitution and of the Law of Citizenship itself, in addition to the existing requirements of residency [a minimum of five years] and proficiency in Estonian."[10] In a related development, on 21 November 2001 the Estonian parliament passed the Laws on National and Local Elections, which eliminated the Estonian language requirement for candidates running for office. That requirement had provoked criticism among such international organizations as the Organization for Security

and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the Council of Europe. But in a countermove in the same month, November 2001, a law was passed making Estonian the official language in the national parliament.[11] Altogether, in the 1990s there were about 600,000 foreign residents in Estonia, of whom 355,252 had applied for permanent residency, which is the first step in the naturalization process. By 1997 about 90,000 had been naturalized, of whom 36,500 had to pass a proficiency examination in the Estonian language (Toomsalu and Simm, 1998, 52–3). After a drop in the pace of naturalization in the mid-1990s, "about 114,000 persons were naturalized altogether" in the period from 1992 to 2000.[12]

Defenders of the Russian minority's citizenship rights both inside and outside Estonia had hoped that the European Union would force the Estonian government to make major concessions for the remaining 300,000 non-citizens and also delay Estonia's entry into the EU (Pettai, 1998, 77, incl. note 1). But the historical baggage of Stalinist occupation and contemporary genocidal wars in Chechnya (the first Chechen War was started under Yeltsin in December 1994, the second under Putin as prime minister in September 1999) allowed Estonian diplomacy to score a triple victory. After persuading sympathetic Western states and NGOs to finance certain aspects of their language policy (Toomsalu and Simm, 1998, 50) in return for small Estonian concessions, Estonia, together with Latvia and Lithuania, was accepted into both NATO and the EU in the spring of 2004.

What are the most significant provisions of the Estonian language law of 1995, as amended through the year 2001? While minority languages (notably Russian) can still be used in primary schools, all secondary schools must use the Estonian language by the school year of 2007/08, and 60 per cent of the curriculum, even in private schools, must be in Estonian.[13] In practice, this requirement means that all university education in Estonia will be in the Estonian language. To obtain any worthwhile job, even in the private sector, the candidate must speak and write Estonian. At first, as many as six proficiency levels were established; in 1999 these were collapsed into three. Language proficiency tests and adherence to the spelling of geographical signs and announcements, notices, and advertisements in Estonian are all monitored by a National Language Inspectorate under the Ministry of Education.[14]

There have been complaints, some of which may be justified. For instance, "linguistic requirements are too often used as a mean [*sic*] of unfair competition."[15] The language certification process is very involved and expensive, and a number of fraudulent certificates have been issued. The switch from a six- to a three-level proficiency system in 1999 has invalidated many of those fraudulent certificates, but in practice many candidates had to pass a

second comprehensive examination after the old certificates were scheduled to expire in July 2002, a deadline that was wisely extended to 1 January 2004. Preparation for the elaborate two-day tests for a middle-level certificate is expensive, for which the state pays only a nominal amount; the balance is usually shouldered by the employer or paid out of pocket.

In fairness to the Estonian government, it does take the preservation of the Estonian language and culture seriously. To some Western observers the following sounds like a horror story of ethnic intolerance, but I understand it as a measure of self-preservation. As reported by the US English Foundation Official Language Research: "In 2003, the [Language] Inspectorate tested teachers in nine municipal Russian schools in Tallinn, and Kohtla Järve. Language knowledge of hundreds of them has not reached the necessary standard. All municipal and state schoolteachers (including teachers of the Russian language in Russian schools) should have a 'middle level' proficiency certificate (an advanced level). According to the Baltic News Service, ten teachers were punished by the Inspectorate EEK 2,500 (160 euro) in December."[16] This figure amounted to more than one-half of the average teacher's monthly salary of 4,169 EEK, or 267 euros.

As matters stand, according to the 2000 census, 20 per cent of the population cannot speak Estonian. Minorities make up 46 per cent of the population in Tallinn, 67 per cent in Jöhvi, and 83 per cent in Kohtla Järve. Estonian is the mother tongue of 67 per cent of the population as a whole.

In April 2004 the Estonian Foreign Ministry opposed the demand of Russian residents of Estonia to make Russian a second state language. The ministry in fact liked the idea of signing the Charter on Regional and Minority Languages, since ipso facto it would obviate the possibility of Russian becoming the second state language.[17]

On 26 April 2007 the Estonian government moved a Soviet-era war memorial to a less conspicuous and, to Estonians, less objectionable place in a military cemetery near the centre of Tallinn. This action provoked riots in the Estonian capital and led to unofficial harsh economic sanctions by Russia and a secret "cyberattack" on Estonia, which was probably masterminded from the Kremlin. According to a Reuters article by Patrick Lannin (2008) on the first anniversary of the protest, roughly 147 thousand Russian-speakers had been naturalized. This figure would amount to about 44 per cent of the 337 thousand Russians in Estonia, or an increase of only 33 thousand from the 114 thousand in 2000 (see above, page 187, and note 12). What is dangerous about the slow pace of naturalization is that about 95 thousand, according to Estonian authorities, or about 147 thousand, according to Russia, have taken out Russian citizenship. Some of the Russian-speakers

in Estonia have become disaffected. Lannin quotes Mikhail Stalnukhin, the head of the city council in Narva and a member of the opposition Centre Party: "After April [2007] there is a Cold War ... A year ago I thought we had different histories but a common future. Now I don't think that." This is not an ideal situation for a small democratic country.

As for Latvia, its citizenship law of 16 March 1995, as amended on 6 February 1997 and 22 June 1998, looks like a formidable instrument for the exclusion of non-Latvians.[18] On the surface, it has been very effective. In January 2003, according to the official Latvian Board of Citizenship Affairs, the government had registered 1,791,318 Latvian citizens and 514,298 former immigrants from the USSR, who had been granted permanent residence, "as well as full social and economic rights," but not citizenship as yet. Until 2002, "a little more than 50,000 persons," or only about 9 per cent of the potential total, had become naturalized (Pabriks, 2003, 134) Official statistics also show that in 2003, about three-quarters of the ethnic Latvians (75.6 per cent) were citizens and less than one-fifth of the ethnic Russians (17.9 per cent). In that year, ethnic Latvians numbered almost three-fifths of all permanent residents (59.3 per cent), while Russians numbered a little over one-quarter (28.6 per cent). The third most sizable minority was Poles (they numbered 2.2 per cent among Latvian citizens and 2.5 per cent among all permanent residents).[19]

Three comments explain the slow naturalization of ethnic Russians. First, for reasons of both state and national security, a slow and deliberate naturalization of non-Latvians was intended (Pabriks, 2003, 142; Jubulis, 2001, 212, 367n100). Second, research by Latvian scholars has shown that the accompanying language policy was not so effective (Hirša, 1998, 92–3, 100, 105–49). Third, international pressures have been countered, if with difficulty, as illustrated below.

The two-term Latvian president Dr Vaira Vike-Freiberga, who had taught at a French-language university in the province of Quebec, effectively articulated Latvian citizenship and language policies and also squelched inappropriate comparisons with Canadian language policies.[20] Paradoxically, as the following interview illustrates, after Latvia's major diplomatic triumph of simultaneous accession to both NATO and the EU, advocates of greater freedoms for the Russian minority have acquired a new political weapon because of Latvian membership.[21]

In May 2004, after Latvia joined the EU, President Vike-Freiberga gave an interview to Georgiy Zotov of Moscow's newsmagazine *Argumenty i Fakty* (Arguments and facts). Zotov repeatedly pressed the former Quebec university professor about Russian language rights:

ZOTOV Do you speak French?
VIKE-FREIBERGA Yes of course.
ZOTOV I was certain you do because you lived in Canada. There, 28 per cent of the population are French. Their language, however, is the country's second official language. Here, 30 per cent of the population are Russian, yet there are no plans to make (Russian) an official language.
VIKE-FREIBERGA There is one province in Canada, Quebec, where people only speak French, even though Canada is bilingual. This language needs protection, otherwise it will be supplanted by English. Our problem in Latvia is the influx of Russian speakers and their insufficient loyalty to the country, it is a completely different situation.

Later in the interview, Zotov erroneously asserted that "under EU laws," if a minority accounts for 20 per cent of the population, "its language automatically becomes an official language." Vike-Freiberga turned this comment aside by saying that the situation in Latvia was different because the large post-1940 Russian minority had been the result of "unlawful, brutal, totalitarian foreign occupation."

The heart of the Zotov–Vike-Freiberga exchange is the following:

ZOTOV You know, this is exactly what [Latvian] opposition leaders say: you can throw examples from all over the world at the Latvian authorities, and they will reply every time that these things are possible in other countries but here it is all completely different. What you have is a ready answer.
VIKE-FREIBERGA You see, there are many ideas how this situation can be resolved. There is just one principle, however: *you have to have respect for the heritage of the country you live in. I am sorry to say this, but even after 13 years of independence most Russian school-leavers have problems with Latvian at universities.*
ZOTOV Just as throughout that time they have had problems with Latvian citizenship.
VIKE-FREIBERGA That's because they don't apply for it. I'm surprised by this, but they don't want to be citizens of Latvia. Why not ask them why they behave like this? Why not get rid of passports with the hammer and sickle? Do they hope that Latvia will merge with Russia? It won't happen. *They need to understand that this is an independent country, and become Latvians. If they want to be Russians they can go to Russia, but if they want to be Latvians, we will only welcome that.*[22] (Emphasis added.)

At least in May 2004 the president of Latvia had the last word.

LANGUAGE POLICY IN UKRAINE

Language policy in Ukraine has consisted of the following elements, reflecting mixed results: "soft" Ukrainization of secondary schools; a more determined introduction of Ukrainian into higher educational institutions; a formal, but unsuccessful attempt to give equality to Ukrainian in television and radio programs but not in movie production; and a virtual collapse of Ukrainian-language book and journal publishing.[23]

Some of the effects of language policies in Ukraine can be inferred from the 2001 population census, which included one question on nationality and as many as three questions on language. That census was held on 5 December 2001, almost ten years to the day after voters in Ukraine had approved independence by 90.1 per cent (1 December 1991). Overall, compared with the 12 January 1989 census, Ukraine lost 3.2 million people.[24] There have also been major changes in ethnic composition. In 2001, as in 1989, there were two major nationalities, Russians and Ukrainians. In 2001 they together accounted for 95.1 per cent of the total, the third most numerous nationality being Belarusians (Byelorussians), who numbered only 276 thousand, or 0.6 per cent of the total.[25] For our purposes, we need be concerned only with the interplay between ethnic Ukrainians and ethnic Russians.

The exact wording of the nationality question, number 6, was as follows: "Your ethnic origin [*pokhodzhennya*] (give your nationality [*natsional'nist'*], ethnicity [*narodnist'*] or ethnic group)."[26] Altogether about 37.5 million people declared themselves Ukrainians in 2001, as opposed to around 37.2 million in 1989 (an increase of only 0.3 per cent). But the ethnic share of Ukrainians increased considerably: from 72.7 per cent in 1989 to 77.8 per cent in 2001, a jump of 5.1 per cent. This change was because of the decrease in the number of ethnic Russians, from 11.4 million in 1989 to only 8.3 million in 2001, or from 22.1 per cent of the population to 17.3 per cent.[27]

What about the language situation in Ukraine? The general question in the 2001 census, number 7, referred to "your linguistic characteristics," which was a relatively value-neutral formula. But the general question was broken down into three more emotionally charged sub-questions about (a) one's "mother tongue," or native language, the official Ukrainian website in English using the term "mother tongue"; (b) the respondent's command of Ukrainian; and (c) a "third language" known by the respondent. It is worth noting that the original forms to be filled in by the census-taker contained empty boxes without the names of the languages printed in a certain order; this approach solved the problem illustrated by the favoured placement of French in the French forms of the Canadian census of 2001.

Nonetheless, more was involved than concerns about the impartiality of language used in the census. The Ukrainian census was administered under Kuchma, who had changed his official nationality, was bilingual, and in 2001 was leaning toward Russia. This pro-Russian bias was evident in the census in encouraging language transfers toward Russian; note, for instance, the injunction in bold letters that "mother tongue" need not coincide with one's declared nationality. On the other hand, declared speakers of Ukrainian as their native language were given the psychological advantage of not having to prove that they spoke, wrote, and read it really well. This was Kuchma's concession to the pro-Ukrainian language camp. It is also in line with Soviet thinking that ethnicity controls one's "mother tongue."

If the real intention of the 2001 census was to show that there was a majority of Ukrainian citizens whose "mother tongue" – and, by implication, language of use – was Russian, it miscarried. Two-thirds (or 67.5 per cent) of the people opted for Ukrainian. Moreover, the number of citizens with Ukrainian as their native language increased by 2.8 per cent compared with 1989, whereas the number of citizens with Russian as their "mother tongue" dropped by 3.2 per cent. At least outside the south and the east, and definitely outside Crimea, language policy had worked. The census data on "mother tongue" are quickly summarized below, reflecting progress in promoting the Ukrainian language in some parts of the country and lack of progress in others.

Of the ethnic Ukrainians, 85.2 per cent gave Ukrainian as their "mother tongue," and 14.8 per cent gave Russian as their native language. Of the ethnic Russians, as many as 95.6 per cent gave Russian as their "mother tongue," 3.9 per cent gave Ukrainian as their native language, and 0.2 per cent listed a third alternative as their native language. But as with ethnic identifications, there are important regional differences. In the western and central regions, ethnic identity and native language largely coincide. The percentages are in the upper 90s, except for a low of 92.4 per cent in the Sumy region, in which the current Ukrainian president, Viktor Yushchenko, was born. In the solidly ethnic Ukrainian Ternopil' region, 99.9 per cent listed Ukrainian as their "mother tongue." But in the three southern regions outside Crimea, Ukrainian did not fare as well. In the Odesa region, only 71.6 per cent of ethnic Ukrainians chose Ukrainian as their "mother tongue," 28.2 per cent gave Russian, and 0.2 per cent cited some other language. In the same region, the ethnic Russians were practically monolingual, 97.0 per cent opting for Russian. In the southern Kherson region, however, as many as 87.0 per cent ethnic Ukrainians listed Ukrainian as their mother tongue, compared with 91.6 per cent of Russians who opted for the Russian

language. Again, with the exception of Crimea, the Ukrainian language was weakest in the east. In the Donetsk region, only 41.2 per cent of ethnic Ukrainians opted for Ukrainian as their "mother tongue," compared with 58.7 per cent who chose Russian. (The ethnic Russians were practically monolingual, 98.6 per cent giving Russian as their native language.) In the neighbouring Luhans'k region, a bare majority, or 50.4 per cent, of ethnic Ukrainians opted for Ukrainian.

It is in Crimea that Ukrainian fared worst, with only 40.4 per cent of ethnic Ukrainians opting for the Ukrainian "mother tongue" and 59.5 per cent choosing Russian. Ethnic Russians in Crimea were solidly monolingual (99.7 per cent). The city of Sevastopol, with its ethnic Russian majority and predominantly Russophone Ukrainians, has remained a predominantly Russian naval base.[28]

In contrast, the city of Kyiv has changed to become more of a Ukrainian capital. While its total population decreased slightly compared with 1989 (by 0.2 per cent), the absolute number of ethnic Ukrainians increased by 13.3 per cent, and so did their relative share in the population, from 72.5 per cent in 1989 to 82.2 per cent in 2001. The absolute number of ethnic Russians in Kyiv fell by more than one-third (37.1 per cent), and their relative share in the city dropped from 20.9 per cent in 1989 to 13.1 per cent in 2001.

If language data are added, we find that in 2001, 1.8 million of the 2.1 million ethnic Ukrainians in Kyiv (or 85.7 per cent) listed Ukrainian as their "mother tongue," and 299 thousand (14.2 per cent) opted for Russian. Of the 377 thousand ethnic Russians in the capital, 309 thousand (91.7 per cent) gave Russian as their "mother tongue," and close to 27 thousand (7.9 per cent) opted for Ukrainian.[29]

Map 5.2 shows in great detail the geographic distribution of Ukrainian as "mother tongue" versus that of Russian. It should be borne in mind that ethnic Russians were in a 58.3 per cent majority in Crimea, or 1,145 thousand out of a total population of 1,967.3 thousand on 1 January 2009. Ethnic Ukrainians in Crimea numbered 478 thousand (24.3 per cent), and ethnic Crimean Tatars, 236 thousand (12.0 per cent). Ethnic Russians also strongly predominated in Sevastopol. The ethnic Russian majority in Crimea is the result of the genocidal deportation of the Tatars by Stalin in 1944 and their rehabilitation under Gorbachev as late as March 1991.

In all other areas, ethnic Ukrainians were in a majority. Nevertheless, we see from the map that in the east as many as 74.9 per cent of the population of the Donetsk region opted for Russian as their native language, and so did 68.8 per cent in the neighbouring Luhans'k oblast. In the main steel-producing region, Zaporizhzhia, the people split evenly (50.2 per cent Ukrainian, 48.2 per

cent Russian). Somewhat more Ukrainian-speaking is the important industrial Kharkiv region (53.8 per cent versus 44.3 per cent). In the south, the Odesa region split 46.3 per cent Ukrainian versus 41.9 per cent Russian.

In the west, Ukrainian-speakers are in the 90 per cent range. A positive phenomenon, from the viewpoint of Ukrainian politics and culture, is that in the city of Kyiv itself 72.0 per cent opted for Ukrainian and 24.9 per cent for Russian. Furthermore, in the surrounding Kyiv region, in which some of the Kyiv elite may live, as many as 92.3 per cent chose Ukrainian and only 7.2 per cent Russian.

Recent events are troubling. The former Russian head of state and continuing strongman, Vladimir Putin, has manoeuvred effectively to promote Russian interests and the Russian language in Ukraine. These interests were promoted, for example, through the falsified second ballot of the presidential election in November 2004. In April 2008, at the NATO summit in Bucharest, Putin was able to enlist Chancellor Angela Merkel of Germany, among others, to bar Ukraine and Georgia from entering the organization via the Membership Action Plan. This manoeuvre came about after President George W. Bush, during his only state visit to Ukraine from 31 March to 1 April 2008, had voiced his and the United States' strong support for both Ukraine and Georgia being admitted to NATO. The United States and other countries were concerned that this negative outcome reflected Russian influence on European countries dependent on its gas and oil.

US vice-president Joe Biden, during his state visit to Ukraine, said on 21 July 2009, after meeting President Viktor Yushchenko:

> We do not recognize – and I want to reiterate it – any sphere of influence. We do not recognize anyone else's right to dictate to you or any other country what alliances you will seek to belong to or what relationships you – bilateral relationships you have. I reaffirmed to the President what I said in Munich, as I said, in the earliest days of our administration, and it's worth repeating again in a brief statement, and that is – and President Obama, I might add, made it clear in his visit to Moscow this month – *the United States supports Ukraine's sovereignty, independence and freedom, and to make its own choices – its own choices – including what alliances they choose to belong*. We're working, as you know, Mr. President, to reset our relationship with Russia. But I assure you and all the Ukrainian people that it will not come at Ukraine's expense. To the contrary, I believe it can actually benefit Ukraine. *The more substantive relationship we have with Moscow, the more we can defuse the zero-sum thinking about our relations with Russia's neighbors.*[30] (Emphasis added.)

Map 5.2 Ukrainian versus Russian native languages in Ukraine (in percentages)

Зображення захищене авторським правом

SOURCES: CIA map, "Ukraine Administrative Divisions," Base 802141 (R00339) 4-93, from the Map Division, Morris Library, University of Delaware. Language data from "All-Ukrainian population census 2001" website http://www.ukrcensus.gov.ua/results/general/language/... for the Ukrainian version and <http://www.ukrcensus.gov.ua/eng/results/general/language/...> for the English version; accessed 9 and 16 July 2009. The actual population of Ukraine, by administrative divisions, as of 1 January 2009, is available through the same website at http://ukrcensus.gov.ua/eng/news/article;891/; accessed 9 July 2009.

NOTE: The percentages of Ukrainian-speakers in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, the city of Sevastopol', all oblasts, and the city of Kyiv have been presented first; the percentages of Russian-speakers come second. For ease of comparison, the same data presented in map 5.2 for speakers of Ukrainian versus Russian are also given in tabular form by area in the appendix to this chapter, as are comments, in the form of notes, on four particular cases.

With all due respect, given Putin's track record, the last sentence sounds like a counsel of perfection on the part of the United States, though American support of Ukraine's sovereignty is strongly welcomed in Kyiv.

Current Ukrainian domestic politics are best described as "multifactorial gridlock," to adapt a term from modern medicine. There is gridlock between the pro-Russian party of Viktor Yanukovych and the nationalist Ukraine "Orange" coalition headed by Yushchenko. Further blurring the political situation is the defection of Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko from the Orange coalition, while setting her own ambitious agenda, which includes running for the presidency of Ukraine in January 2010. This protracted, fluid political situation has impacted on language policy, with the status of Russian as well as Ukrainian remaining unsettled.

Yushchenko's two predecessors as president procrastinated about the task of building a Ukrainian nation with Ukrainian as the true state language. This inaction was in stark contrast to the approach taken by the presidents of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, all three of whom concentrated on establishing the primacy of their respective languages and cultures. As a result, reliance on Ukrainian has been delayed in publishing, the mass media, and secondary schooling. There also has been a long-term effort to keep Russian as the primary language of communication through recurrent campaigns to have it recognized as "a secondary state language." This restoration of Russian would place Ukrainians and Ukraine at a disadvantage vis-à-vis its European neighbours, because Ukrainians would be deprived of the opportunity to study English as a second language – a true global language, while Russian is only a regional one (Velychenko, 2006).

COMPARISONS WITH CANADA

Quebec's language policy often has been characterized in English-speaking Canada and the United States as radical and destabilizing in both feeding separatism and undermining rights of English-speakers in the province (see, for example, a synthesis of these allegations in the chapter by Jacques Maurais in this volume). Since the 1960s, Quebec's language policy has been quite consistent and successful in promoting French and subordinating the hitherto dominant position of English in the province. This considerable progress in promoting these language policy goals has been achieved through moderate, democratic methods, including respect for rights of English-speakers.

The contrast with Eastern Europe is instructive. The prominence of Russia and the Russian language has been daunting for the relatively tiny

Baltic states both before and after the demise of the Soviet Union. The isolated position of French-speaking Quebec in English-speaking North America also is challenging, but the threat has been less direct and is receding. For example, Canada, including Quebec, freely joined the United States and Mexico in the North American Free Trade Agreement. Pressures and counter-pressures have been more complex in Eastern Europe. The hard-line posture of the Baltic states toward their Russian-language minorities did not prevent them from joining the European Union and NATO, thereby gaining Western allies. At the same time, their pro-Western policy tilt, in addition to their hard line toward Russian-language minorities, has tended to aggravate long-standing tension with these minorities and Russia. Both the Russian-speaking minorities and the Russian Federation are embedded geographically in and around the Baltic states, so this is a high and continuing price to pay for having pursued hard-line language policies and a pro-Western tilt.

While both Quebec and the Baltic states have suffered from denial of language, the latter experienced draconian oppression, as documented above. For the Baltic states, compromise has been especially difficult since, because of the historical legacy, national survival has been regarded as imminently threatened. Quebec has been equally committed to preserving the province's distinctive culture and language, but its language policy has been moderate in being careful to respect rights of the English-speaking minority in the province. Elements of this minority were intransigent and ended up leaving the province, but the remaining minority by and large has been democratically oriented and moderate as well. In addition, the denial of language imposed on Quebec by English-speaking Canada over the centuries was less rigid than its Soviet counterpart, and a subsequent federal policy of bilingualism has in fact encouraged use of French in the country. These distinctive Canadian circumstances encouraged a spirit of compromise to emerge gradually on all sides, while in the Baltic states positions and antagonisms have remained rigid. There is another major difference between the two continents: to Canada, the United States has generally been a good neighbour, while Russia frequently has not acted in a good neighbourly fashion toward the three Baltic states and Ukraine.

A related contrast therefore involves the dominant power and language group in each case: English-speakers in North America (Canada with the United States in the background) and Russian-speakers in Eastern Europe (with the Russian Federation in the background). The chapter by Jurgen Erfurt in this volume shows that the federal government of Canada has moved away from confrontation after initially wanting to deny Quebec's

representation in the international Francophonie. And Pierre Anctil's analysis in this volume shows that both sides in the Canadian language debate have adopted a more conciliatory approach over time while continuing to promote their distinctive interests. If the Baltic states can be faulted for an unnecessarily confrontational approach in denying the rights of a linguistic minority, the Soviet Union and its successor state, the Russian Federation, have tended to be intolerant in language matters as well. While a mutually beneficial federal-provincial dialogue developed in Canada over time, there has been no such counterpart dialogue in Eastern Europe. The deep concern of Russia with Russian-speaking minorities outside the Federation has been accompanied by an assertion of the rights of these groups that threatens to take an overbearing, non-democratic form. The resentment and resulting formidable determination of the very small Baltic states to reverse Soviet and later Russian denial of language should constitute an important lesson for any dominant power contemplating the imposition of its language.

It follows that the unleashing of dangerous forces which results from the denial of languages applies not just to minority languages that are suppressed by a dominant power but also to speakers of a dominant language in a minority situation, such as English-speakers in Quebec and Russian-speakers in Eastern Europe. The case of Quebec has not been without considerable tension, since the gradual change in status of English-speakers in the province from dominant to minority group resulted in an exodus, especially in the early period of Quebec's language policy. However, Quebec has recognized and respected the language rights of the English-speakers who have remained in the province. In Eastern Europe the contemporary relationship between locally dominant titular language groups and minority Russian-language groups tied to the outside great-power patron has tended to be confrontational. Since the demise of the Soviet state, all the successor states selected for study here have become democratic in form, but democratic methods have still not pervaded all domains of the body politic, including language policy. The Western notion of civil society involving compromise and give-and-take between all social groups on all major issues is not deeply embedded.

Ukraine's situation poses additional problems. The Baltic states and Canada (both the federal and provincial governments) share language policies that have been quite persistent in pursuing goals supported by resources. Ukrainian governments have often been ineffective on both fronts, although this chapter has shown that there have been some results in promoting the Ukrainian language. While supporters of Orange Ukraine have their share of the blame for an all-too-often dysfunctional situation, the Russian-speaking

minority and the Russian Federation share blame as well. We return to the lack on all sides of an effective civil society that can articulate and mediate interests in a democratic way.

While the Canadian experience is relatively successful in some important ways, Canada also reflects the limits of language policy, even when supported by relatively consistent goals and resources. The federal policy of bilingualism promotes the equal status of English and French throughout the country, but the status of French is endangered outside New Brunswick and Quebec. Other chapters in this book indicate that Quebec's language policy has not been concerned with reversing this ominous trend until recently. One lesson to be learned is apparently that in some cases the goals and resources supporting language policy must be yoked to a territoriality peopled by a critical mass of language speakers. The main reason why French has remained as a true living official language of Canada is that it has remained predominant in a fairly autonomous Quebec peopled by a French-speaking majority. Quebec authorities have wisely placed prominence on the territorial principle to save their native French from being overwhelmed by English. Yet this policy has tended to separate Quebec from other French-speaking areas in Canada and to accentuate their decline, which has not been prevented by the personality principle of the federal government. Another lesson to be learned is therefore that any language approach has limitations and must be adapted to the specific political realities in place to be successful.

The very same territorial principle, together with some implementing institutions, has successfully and properly been applied in the three Baltic states. In spite of large Russian-speaking minorities, local language groups have remained in the majority in all the Baltic states. Only in the province of Quebec in Canada are French-speakers in a majority, with New Brunswick having a sizable French-speaking minority (about a third). It may be argued that Quebec should have pursued a more all-inclusive policy of promoting French outside as well as within the province, but it is uncertain that this would have worked. What the pages of this volume do attest is that given the right conditions, as in the Baltic states and Quebec, the territorial principle for promoting a language can work. Yet a substantial price has been paid for this approach in each case.

Paradoxes therefore abound. The solution of territoriality has been applied in the Baltic states but at the very high cost of recurring confrontation with the Russian minorities and the Russian Federation. And it is not at all clear how territoriality could be applied in the case of Ukraine, since two separate

and probably autonomous language areas could lead to dismemberment of the country. On the other hand, the personality principle of leaving language choice to the individual has been demonstrated in the case of Ukraine to be open to political manipulation. A mutually satisfactory language solution for Ukraine requires compromise on all sides, while in fact the different language groups and their representative politicians have at important junctures been either rigid or unimaginative or both. Compromise is alive and well in Canada, and it offers a useful lesson for Ukraine.

APPENDIX: SPEAKERS OF UKRAINIAN VERSUS RUSSIAN BY REGION OF UKRAINE (IN PERCENTAGES)

	Ukrainian	*Russian*
Autonomous Republic of Crimea	10.1	77.0
Sevastopol' city (city council)	6.8	90.6
Cherkasy region	92.5	6.7
Chernihiv region	89.0	10.3
Chernivtsi region	75.6	5.3
Dnipropetrovsk region	67.0	32.0
Donetsk region	24.1	74.9
Ivano-Frankivsk region	97.8	1.8
Kharkiv region	53.8	44.3
Kherson region	73.2	24.9
Khmel'nyts'kyi region	95.2	4.1
Kirovohrad region	88.9	3.5
Kyiv region	92.3	7.2
Kyiv city	72.0	24.9
Luhans'k region	30.0	68.8
L'viv region	95.3	3.8
Mykolaiv region	69.2	29.3
Odesa region	46.3	41.9
Poltava region	90.0	9.5
Rivne region	97.0	2.7
Sumy region	84.0	15.6
Ternopil' region	98.3	1.2
Vinnytsia region	94.8	4.7
Volyn' region	97.3	2.5
Zakarpattia (Trans-Carpathian) region	81.0	2.9
Zaporizhzhia region	50.2	48.2
Zhytomyr region	93.0	6.6

NOTE: The percentage of Ukrainian-speakers and Russian-speakers in Kyiv has been calculated by the author from still-incomplete Ukrainian 2001 census data. The exact method is available on request. In Crimea, 11.4 per cent of the population indicated Crimean Tatar as their native language. In the Zakarpattia (Trans-Carpathian) region, 12.7 per cent of the population speak Hungarian and 2.6 per cent Romanian, factors that may explain the low percentage for Russian (2.9 per cent). In the Kirovohrad regon, however, the Russian language figure of 3.5 per cent appears too low. I triple-checked the 2001 census website on 16 July 2009.

NOTES

I would like to thank the following persons, in alphabetical order: Dennis Donahue, statistician with the International Programs Center of the US Census Bureau, for help with 2001 Ukrainian linguistic data, especially on Crimea and the city of Kyiv; Dr Eugene Fedorenko, Learned Secretary of the Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences in the US, Inc., for facilitating my meeting with Academician Professor Petro P. Kononenko, in New York City in June 2006; Academician Professor Dr Petro P. Kononenko, director, Research Institute of Ukrainian Studies, Ministry of Education and Science of Ukraine, for his consultation on educational policies in Ukraine, 11 June 2006; Professor Michael A. Morris for faithfully abbreviating my manuscript after my car accident and for a superb job of linking my piece to Canadian language policies; the reference librarians at the Morris Library, University of Delaware, for assistance with databases on the politics of the Baltic states and the staff of its Map Division for scanning two maps; Professor Joseph A. Pika, Department of Political Science and International Relations, University of Delaware, for advice on presidential politics; and Dr Stephen Rapawy, a former employee of the US Census Bureau, for providing me with samples of the 2001 Ukrainian population census forms and official instructions how to fill them out and for sending me key excerpts from the 2007 Statistical Yearbook of Ukraine.

1 The classic survivors' book is Hryshko, 1983, vii, 1–2. Best known is Conquest, 1986, especially chapter 13.

2 Public lecture, in Ukrainian, by Professor Dr Petro P. Kononenko, "Problemy osvity i movy v protsesi derzhavotvorennya [Problems of education and language in the process of state-building]," Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences in the US, New York, 11 June 2006. I attended his lecture and consulted with him privately afterwards. Kononenko pointed out that in 2005–06, only 19 out of a total of 527 secondary schools in Kyiv taught in Russian and that in the same year as many as 1,810,328 (or 82.1 per cent) of the university students studied in Ukrainian.

3 As in map 5.1 above. The estimated July 2009 population total for Estonia was 1,299,371; for Latvia, 2,231,503; and for Lithuania, 3,555,179.

4 For Ukraine, I have used the actual population total as of 1 January 2009, that is, 46,143.7 thousand. It is easily available as a link on the "All-Ukrainian population census 2001" website <http:ukrcensus.gov.ua/eng/news/article;891>; accessed 9 July 2009.

5 See also "Latvia: Introductory Survey," in *The Europa World Yearbook 2005*, 2: 2635b.

6 "Zakon Ukrainskoi Sovetskoi Sotsialisticheskoi Respubliky O yazykakh v Ukrainskoi SSR [Law of the Ukrainian SSR on the languages in the Ukrainian SSR]," in Fierman, 1995. The original law is in Russian.

7 *US Fed. News* (Washington, DC), 1 July 2005, 12:00 AM EST: "State Department Issues Background Note on Estonia." Lexis-Nexis search. Term: "Capitalism in Estonia."

8 *US Fed. News*, 1 May 2005, 7:25 AM EST: "State Department Issues Background Note on Latvia." Lexis-Nexis search. Term: "Capitalism in Latvia." See also "Latvia: Introductory Survey," in *The Europa World Yearbook 2005*, 2: 2635a. Also table 3.1, "Population of Latvia by ethnic origin: 1934–89 (thousands)," in Melvin, 1995, 32.

9 See chapters on Estonia and Latvia in CIA, 2005.

10 US English Foundation Official Language Research – Estonia, "1. Legislation: Legislation dealing with the use of languages," 3; http://www.us-english.org/foundation/research/olp; accessed 7 June 2006.

11 Ibid., 1. See, however, "Estonia: Introductory Survey," in *The Europa World Yearbook 2005*, 2: 1626a.

12 US English Foundation Official Language Research – Estonia, 3.

13 Ibid., 1.

14 Ibid., 4.

15 Ibid., 2.

16 Ibid., 7–8.

17 Aleksandr Shegedin, *Eurolang News* (Tallinn), 5 April 2004, in US English Foundation Official Language Research – Estonia, 10–11.

18 "Citizenship Law," as translated in 1999 by Ilona Ceica and Ligita Vasennene, of the Riga Graduate School of Law, for the Talkošanas un terminologijas centrs (Translation and terminology centre), *Latvian Law Guide*. Yahoo search for "Current language laws in Latvia," 24 June 2006.

19 "Table 12.1: Latvia's Permanent Residents and Citizens by Ethnic Origin," Pabriks, 2003, 134.

20 She was born on 1 December 1937 in Riga, Latvia. Her parents left Latvia in 1945 and lived as "displaced persons," or World War II refugees, in Germany and then in Morocco and Canada. She studied at the University of Toronto and McGill University in Montreal. Her approval ratings in Latvia have been between 70 and 85 per cent. See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vaira_Vike-Freiberga.

21 Francesca Mereu, "EU Party Defends Russian Speakers," *Moscow Times*, 18 June 2004; BBC Monitoring/.../BBC Monitoring International Reports, 11 August 2004, "Leftist Latvian MEP [member of European Parliament] Defends Actions on Behalf of Russian Speakers," <politika.lv> web site, Riga, in Latvian, 10 August 2004. Lexis-Nexis search. Term: "Russians in Latvia."

22 Georgiy Zotov, interview with Latvian president Vaira Vike-Freiberga, "Latvian President Vaira Vike-Freiberga: 'We want to turn Russians into Latvians,'" *Argumenty i Fakty* [Arguments and facts] (Moscow), no. 19 (11 May 2004),

via BBC Monitoring //.../BBC Monitoring International Reports, 14 May 2004, "Latvian President Defends Her Country's Treatment of its Russian Community." Lexis-Nexis search. Term: "Russians in Latvia."

23 Larysa Masenko, "Movna sytuatsiya Ukraïny [Linguistic situation in Ukraine]" and Volodymyr Pas'ko, "Dolya movy – dolya natsiyi (Do problem derzhavnoyi movy v Ukraïni [Fate of language is the fate of our nation (Concerning the problem of the state language in Ukraine)]," *Yi*, no. 35 (2004): "Mova nimoyi krayiny" (Language of a dumb country). http://www.ji.lviv.ua/n.35 texts/. Masenko is a professional linguist and Pas'ko a medical educator and author of two novels. See, however, the more optimistic evaluation of Petro P. Kononenko, above, page 202, and note 2.

24 Derzhavnyi komitet statystyky Ukraïny (State Statistics Committee of Ukraine), "Vseukrains'kyi perepys naselennya 2001 r. [All-Ukrainian population census of 2001]," 1. Website of State Statistics Committee of Ukraine. For 1989 census, see table "Chislennost' naseleniya [Population count]," in Gosudarstvennyi komitet Ukrainskoi SSR po statistike (Ukrainian SSR State Statistical Committee), *Narodnoe khozaystvo Ukrainskoi* SSR *v 1989 godu: Statisticheskii ezhegodnik* (National economy of the Ukrainian SSR in 1989; Statistical Yearbook) (Kiev: "Tekhnika" [Technology], 1990), 26.

25 State Statistics Committee of Ukraine, All-Ukrainian population census of 2001," English version, General results of the census, National [ethnic] composition of population, 1 of 7.

26 Derzhavnyi komitet statystyky Ukraïny (State Statistics Committee of Ukraine), Vseukrains'kyi perepys naselennya 2001 roku (All-Ukrainian population census of 2001), *Instruktsiya shchodo provedennya vseukrains'koho perepysu naselennya 2001 roku i zapovnennya perepysnoyi dokumentatsiyi* (Instruction concerning the carrying out of the All-Ukrainian population census of 2001 and the filling out of the census documents) (Kyiv, 2001), 25. Source supplied by Dr Stephen Rapawy. The full instructions for handling the sensitive ethnic origin question are, as translated by me, as follows: "Recorded is the nationality (ethnicity), or ethnic background, which is indicated by the respondent himself or herself. The childrens' nationality is determined by their parents. If complications arise with respect to the nationality of children, predominance is given to the nationality of the mother."

27 State Statistics Committee of Ukraine, "All-Ukrainian population census 2001," 1–2; absolute population figures for 1989 from Arel, 1995, 598.

28 State Statistics Committee of Ukraine, "All-Ukrainian population census of 2001," Linguistic composition of the population. The English version does not have language data for the cities of Sevastopol' and Kyiv.

29 The most complete source is Osaulenko, 2003, 209. Source supplied by Dennis Donahue.

30 "Statement by Vice President Biden after meeting with President of Ukraine Viktor Yushchenko" (White House, Office of the Vice President, Washington, DC); "House with Chimaeras," Kyiv, Ukraine, 21 July 2001, in *Action Ukraine Report (AUR)*, no. 938 (23 July 2009, Kyiv, Ukraine), morganw@patriot.net. See Danilova, 2009, A13.