



Nationalities Papers: The Journal of Nationalism and Ethnicity

Publication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information:

<http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/cnap20>

Primary language of communication as a secondary indicator of national identity: The Ukrainian parliamentary and presidential elections of 1994 and the “manifesto of the Ukrainian intelligentsia” of 1995

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Published online: 19 Oct 2007.

To cite this article: Yaroslav Bilinsky (1996) Primary language of communication as a secondary indicator of national identity: The Ukrainian parliamentary and presidential elections of 1994 and the “manifesto of the Ukrainian intelligentsia” of 1995 , Nationalities Papers: The Journal of Nationalism and Ethnicity, 24:4, 661-678, DOI: [10.1080/00905999608408476](https://doi.org/10.1080/00905999608408476)

To link to this article: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00905999608408476>

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**PRIMARY LANGUAGE OF COMMUNICATION AS A
SECONDARY INDICATOR OF NATIONAL IDENTITY:
THE UKRAINIAN PARLIAMENTARY AND
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS OF 1994 AND THE
“MANIFESTO OF THE UKRAINIAN INTELLIGENTSIA”
OF 1995***

Yaroslav Bilinsky

I

In a famous article during the Soviet period, Walker Connor once asked, rhetorically:

The Ukrainians, as a method of asserting their non-Russian identity, wage their campaign for national survival largely in terms of their right to employ the Ukrainian, rather than the Russian, tongue in all oral and written matters. But would not the Ukrainian nation (that is, a popular consciousness of being Ukrainian) be likely to persist even if the language were totally replaced by Russian, just as the Irish nation has persisted after the virtual disappearance of Gaelic, despite pre-1920 slogans that described Gaelic and Irish identity as inseparable? Is the language the essential element of the Ukrainian nation, or is it merely a minor element which ... has been elevated to *the symbol* of the nation in its struggle for continued viability?¹ [Emphasis in the original]

Ukraine, alas, has never been an island. On the contrary, it is contiguous to Russia and some eleven million ethnic Russians, almost one-quarter of the total population of Ukraine, have made it their home.

For better or for worse, the fates of Ukraine and Russia have been interwoven for over three centuries, and part of the joint Russo-Ukrainian heritage has been extensive linguistic assimilation. Consequently, the indicator of a so-called native language among self-declared ethnic Ukrainians (*ridna mova* in Ukrainian, or *rodnoy yazyk* in Russian) according to the last Soviet population census of 1989—which, in reality, is an indicator not of native language but of the primary language of communication—is important as a *rough* secondary indicator of national identity. This appears in the fairly clear-cut presidential elections of 1994 and the far murkier and still incomplete parliamentary elections of 1994–1996(?). The “Manifesto of the Ukrainian Intelligentsia” of 1995 is a somewhat unusual protest which bears on the future status of the Ukrainian language and culture and also on power relations in today’s Ukraine.

Can there be a truly independent Ukraine without increased use of the Ukrainian language, as there is an Ireland without the predominant use of Gaelic? The pessimistic answer seems to be no. Ukrainian language is, alas, more than a minor element elevated to the symbol of the nation. It is, rather, the most tangibly differentiating characteristic of Ukrainians *vis-à-vis* the Russians. As Dominique Arel put it in a slightly different context, "Language politics is the politics of threatened identity."² That is not to say that a truly independent Ukraine is impossible until in all provinces the numbers of Ukrainophones become identical with those of self-declared ethnic Ukrainians. On the other hand, a vision of a peaceful multiethnic Ukraine akin to Switzerland is not realistic. There are mountains in Ukraine, but they are not high enough and, to boot, they are in the wrong place. Above all, the Ukrainian nation as a continued historic community is not so strongly established as the multiethnic state of Switzerland. The elections of 1994 are a shocking indication of Ukraine's fragility as an independent state.

In essence, in electing Leonid D. Kuchma on 10 July 1994, president of the country by a relatively pronounced but not overwhelming majority of Ukrainians (14 million or 52.1%, vs 12.1 million or 45.1% votes cast for his predecessor Leonid M. Kravchuk), Ukrainians opted for a more decisive politician and administrator. Kuchma may prove more skillful in leading the country through the exceedingly painful market reforms than were Kravchuk and his associates, of whom, incidentally, in 1992–1993, Kuchma had been one. To date, President Kuchma has been tactful enough to address both the Supreme Council (Ukraine's parliament) and, above all, the representatives of the Ukrainian diaspora, in Ukrainian, which until recently had not been his primary language of communication (although he is an ethnic Ukrainian born in a village in the northern Chernihiv province). President Kuchma has also firmly rejected the provocative Russian demand for the introduction of double citizenship in the new comprehensive treaty of friendship with Russia. Had he yielded to Russian demands, a legal, administrative and political nightmare would have been created. By implication, introduction of double citizenship for about a quarter of the Ukrainian population would also have signaled to all that newly independent Ukraine considers herself as a kind of dependent of Russia.

At the same time, President Kuchma has served notice on the Supreme Council that he is preparing legislation for making Russian a so-called official language, which, transparently, will undercut the position of Ukrainian as the state language and will probably stop the low-key Ukrainization of schools. This began after independence and, at the beginning of the 1993–1994 school year, has led to 54.3% of all elementary and secondary school children being taught in Ukrainian, up from 49.3% in 1991–1992. Meanwhile, Russian-language education was being reduced from 50.0% in 1991–1992 to 44.9% in 1993–1994.³

At the time of writing (February 1996), the legislation about raising the status of Russian has apparently been shelved. But, already in the fall of 1995, President

Kuchma's administration had been subject to exceedingly sharp attacks in the "Manifesto of the Ukrainian Intelligentsia."

In mid-1994, President Kuchma also gave the distinct impression that he was still trying to define Ukraine's position in the "Eurasian economic and cultural space to which she has belonged in the historical past." Obviously, there have been strong economic ties between the Russia and Ukraine, but more than economics appears to be involved in President Kuchma's conception. He said in his inaugural address, "We are linked with the countries—the former republics of the Union—with traditional scientific, cultural, informational and even familial ties."⁴ Exactly what President Kuchma meant by this warm reference to the former Soviet Union and, implicitly, to its leading republic, Russia, will, no doubt, become clearer as times goes on. In contrast, at least on the surface, the west Ukrainian-born former President Kravchuk had a clearer conception of why and how to move his country out of Eurasia and into Europe.

II

With regard to the parliamentary elections, they started on 27 March 1994, but have not yet filled the Supreme Council as of 24 December 1995. The absolutely last run-off elections are now planned for April 1996, or more than two years after their beginning! Between December 1994 and December 1995, the run-off elections were suspended through lack of funds—and, probably, for lack of energy on the part of the long-suffering Ukrainian electorate. As of today (February 1996), the parliament is still thirty-two deputies short of full capacity (450).⁵

If there can be a rational explanation for this political disaster, it might be as follows: in signing the unusually restrictive and cumbersome electoral law for parliament on 18 November 1993, President Kravchuk may have secretly hoped that the second ballot of the elections would not produce a valid "constitutional," or two-thirds, majority of 301 deputies, thus, giving him an opportunity to request extraordinary powers and postponing the already scheduled presidential elections until late 1995. This assumption, however, did not prove correct. On 10 April 1994, on the second ballot, a constitutional majority of 338 was obtained and the presidential elections took place, with two ballots on 26 June and 10 July, which Kravchuk lost.

The second possible explanation for that unusually demanding electoral law was the desire of the leftist majority in the 1990 parliament to discredit the democratic electoral process in Ukraine. In contrast, the electoral law in Russia, patterned on that in Germany, was also complex; it produced a lower house (the Duma) which proved difficult to handle by the Executive, but at least it produced a full complement of legislatures in one day, on 12 December 1993.

For all these reasons, the Ukrainian parliamentary elections are an analyst's nightmare. The best comprehensive analysis by Dominique Arel and Andrew Wilson

is based on the incomplete but constitutional and operative Supreme Council of 338 deputies who were elected on 10 April 1994, and who began working in May of 1994.⁶ Still, it does not even attempt to disaggregate the results by provinces, as shown below.

In brief, according to official data on party affiliation of that first working parliament in Ukraine, it contained a total of 118 Leftists (including 86 Communists), 9 Liberals, 33 National Democrats, and 7 Radical or extreme Ukrainian Nationalists, plus one deputy with unconfirmed status (first temporarily, but now apparently permanently blocked from attending parliament). In a body of 338 deputies, this produced a minority of 168 officially party-oriented deputies, compared with a majority of 170 non-affiliated deputies who were formally independent—a totally absurd situation, except for the fact that most parties had lost their credibility in the eyes of the electorate. Arel and Wilson are correct in suggesting that, as of 10 April 1994, a more realistic distribution would have given a total of 48 true independents out of a total of 338, not 170 out of 338. According to their estimates and redistribution, the real Leftist bloc included 147 deputies: 86 Communists, as before; 26 Socialists, as contrasted with 14 officially admitted Socialists; and 35 from the Agrarian Party of Ukraine, of whom 18 were official. The real group of Liberal Reformers, the majority of whom are for closer cooperation with Russia, numbered 49, not 9 as officially stated. (The biggest difference was the attribution of 38 Independents.) National Democrats, who are in favor of market reforms and greater political democracy, but also want greater independence from Russia, numbered 80, not 33 as officially listed (the greatest change was made by the attribution to the National Democrats of 30 so-called Independents, presumably different Independents from those attributed to the Liberal Reformers). Finally, the radical or extreme Ukrainian Nationalists—murky on economic reform, negative on democracy, but passionate defenders of Ukrainian independence—obtained 12 deputies, not the 7 officially acknowledged.⁷

Extrapolating from the earlier Arel–Wilson breakdown in order to take into account newly elected deputies, one can estimate the *maximum* strength of the Leftist factions at 156, or somewhat over one-third of the total; that of Liberal Reformers, who tend to advocate closer economic and political ties with Russia, at 51; that of Ukrainian National Democrats (including *Rukh*, pro-reform, but anti-Russian) at 86 (a little over one-fifth of the total); that of extreme radical Ukrainian nationalists at 12; and that of non-party and probably also Independents at 113 (about one-quarter of the total).

The Communist Party of Ukraine, which was legalized in two stages in March and June 1993, is not only opposed to market reforms, but wants to have, at the very least, extensive political autonomy for its stronghold, the Donbass, and, at the most, aspires to two things: a restoration of all the properties that had been taken from the party in August 1991 when it was outlawed by decision of the Presidium of the Supreme Council in a decree signed by then Supreme Council Chairman Kravchuk,

and a reconstitution of the old Soviet Union. The Communist Party has also overtly allied itself with Russophone groups on the Left and those right of center. It is strongly supporting making Russian the official language of Ukraine. According to some public opinion polls before the elections, the Communists were not supposed to be that strong, but they emerged dramatically throughout eastern Ukraine, most notably in the Donbass.⁸ To give the Communists their due, their deputies were the only ones who did not hide behind the Independent label. The position of other Leftists, of the Socialists and Agrarians, is not so outspoken as that of Communists, but the majority of them would favor Russian as an official language. On the other hand, the leader of the Socialist Party and newly elected Chairman of the Supreme Soviet, Oleksandr Moroz, played a crucial role in late August 1991 in siding immediately with Kravchuk, Lukyanenko and other National Democrats, thereby convincing Yeltsin's visiting delegation, led by Russian Vice-President Aleksandr Rutskoy, that the Ukrainian Supreme Council's Act of Independence was more than just a temper tantrum.

In the fall of 1995, a group of Centrist and National Democratic inclined scholars and deputies, of whom the best known is the lawyer and present Minister of Justice of Ukraine, Serhiy Holovaty, listed the official fractions in the Ukrainian Supreme Council as they were in mid-1995. By and large, with one exception, the analysis of Holovaty and associates confirms the strong discipline on the Left and the fractiousness in the Center and in the National Democratic Group. The Party "Fraction" or Caucus of "Communists of Ukraine for Social Justice and Rule by the People" contained 87 deputies, of whom all but four were formal members of the Communist Party. The four that were not were all formal "non-Party" deputies. The Socialist Party Caucus had a total of 26 deputies, if the Speaker of the Parliament, Socialist leader Oleksander Moroz, is included. Of those 26, fourteen were formal members of the Socialist Party, six were formally "non-Party," five were formal Communists, and one was an Agrarian. The exception to the rule of strong Party discipline on the Left—and also a political success for the Kuchma administration—has been the split among the Agrarians into left-leaning "Agrarians of Ukraine," with a total of 29 deputies, including Deputy-Speaker Oleksander Tkachenko, and center-leaning "Agrarians for Reforms," (a total of 27). Of the Left-Agrarians, twelve are formal members of the Agrarian Party, the rest being "non-Party;" whereas the Reform Agrarians include six formal members of the Agrarian Party, one formal member of the Crimean Economic Revival Party, the rest are "non-Party." The total number of declared Leftists would thus include, as of mid-1995, 142 deputies (a little under one-third), with 27 Reform-Agrarians possibly moving into the Center for good.

The older Liberal Center consists of the "Inter-Regional Deputies' Group," the "Center Group," and the "Reformers' Group." The "Inter-Regional Group" of 29 deputies stands closest to President Kuchma politically: all but six deputies are formally "non-Party," but of those six, four belong formally to the so-called Labor Party (which has nothing in common with the better known British Labour Party).

In Ukraine, the "Labor" party is really a party of factory directors, of whom Kuchma had been a prominent one. The "Center Group" of 31, all non-Party, includes some former ministers of ex-President Kravchuk, one of whom, Roman Shepek, has continued to serve President Kuchma as Minister of Economics. The "Reformers' Group" of 36 has a sprinkling of well-known politicians such as Holovaty, Oleksandr Yemets and Volodymyr Lanovy, of whom only the first has joined the Kuchma team. Somewhat right of the true center are the 31 deputies of the "Unity Group," all from eastern and southern Ukraine. The Ukrainian National Democrats, almost exclusively from western and central Ukraine, are split into two equal deputies' groups: the 29 persons'-strong Caucus of the People's *Rukh* of Ukraine (Vyacheslav Chornovil, formally registered *Rukh* members, and a handful of non-Party sympathizers), and the 29 persons'-strong "Statehood Group" (mostly Ukrainian Republicans, with a smattering of other Party members, including two radical Ukrainian nationalists from the Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists). Other radical nationalists are mostly found in the "Non-Fraction" Fraction of 20 deputies; but this fraction also includes former President Kravchuk (formally non-Party) and former Chairman of the Ukrainian Republican Party Levko Lukyanenko, formally listed as Ukrainian Republican. Unlike the Communist and Socialist Left, the Liberal Center and the National Democrats are truly a fractious lot.⁹

In the main table (Table 1), which is presented to back up my hypothesis, I have drawn parallels between the number of Ukrainophones and Russophones, the presidential elections of 1991 and 1994, and the incomplete parliamentary elections through 24 December 1995. The second table on the number of children being educated in Ukrainian and Russian at the beginning of the 1993–1994 school year (Table 2) is meant to reinforce the picture of certain provinces constituting a battle-ground for the once dominant Russophones against strong Ukrainian independence.

Both tables show that there is a correlation between the success of the presidential candidate perceived to be more nationalist (Vyacheslav Chornovil in 1991 and Kravchuk in 1994) and the number of Ukrainophones. For instance, in robustly Ukrainian Galicia—whether in terms of the relative number of self-declared Ukrainians or their speaking almost exclusively Ukrainian—and in the Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk and Ternopil provinces, Chornovil in 1991 got, respectively, 75.9, 67.1 and 57.5% of the vote, and in 1994 Kravchuk received 93.8, 94.5 and 94.8%. Conversely, in the two very populous eastern provinces of Donetsk: Chornovil in 1991 received 9.7% and Kravchuk in 1994 obtained 18.5%, and in Luhansk they received 9.9 and 10.1%, respectively. The two Donbass provinces are also very low on Ukrainization of education: in 1993–94, only 4.9% of the schoolchildren were taught in Ukrainian in Donetsk province, and only 8.4% in Luhansk, even though the total Russophone population was about 64% in the former (not 95), and 62% in the latter (not 92). Solchanyk may be right in saying that in the adoption of language it

is the relative number of ethnic Russians living in the cities that is decisive.¹⁰ But linguistic policy can surely accelerate the normal demographic processes.

The case of the relatively populous Crimea is, of course, a special one, the peninsula having served as an all-Soviet playground and retirement home for very patriotic Russians, including military families. Ethnic Ukrainians in the Crimea are a minority of 25.8%, but the number of Ukrainophones is a minority of 13.5%; yet, supposedly, only 0.1% of the Crimean schoolchildren in 1993–1994 received instruction in Ukrainian. What does this signify? False statistics or an absence of Ukrainophones?

III

In the fall of 1995, the pro-Russian or “Eurasian” course in President Kuchma’s administration was openly challenged by the “Manifesto of the Ukrainian Intelligentsia” of October 1995 and the one-day “Congress of the Ukrainian Intelligentsia” of 11 November 1995, which left behind a number of resolutions and an organizational structure by that name. Even more important in the long run may have been some political infighting at the very top of the Ukrainian government. It pitted against each other the staffs of President Kuchma and Prime Minister Yevhen Marchuk—and, possibly, the two principals themselves. While the confrontation between the National Democratic Ukrainian intelligentsia and a certain group in the President’s apparatus ostensibly involved the rights of Ukrainian language in schools, in the administration, in the press and on television, much more was involved, namely, the solidification of political independence *vis-à-vis* Russia as opposed to a *de facto* return to political autonomy, or even to the ideas of August–December 1991, against the ideas of the “Declaration of State Sovereignty of Ukraine” of July 1990 within a newly reconstituted Russian Union. Though Prime Minister Marchuk did not publicly associate himself with the Ukrainian intelligentsia, there are some clear indications that he is opposed to the Eurasian tendency within President Kuchma’s entourage.

As expected, the long-winded “Manifesto” of October deplored that only three percent of books published in Ukraine now were in the Ukrainian language, that Ukrainian-language kindergartens and schools were again being converted back to the Russian language (no details were given either in the Manifesto nor in the follow-up discussions at the Congress in November). Surprisingly, however, there were very far-reaching and sharply worded critiques, which constitute the gist of the protest: “We, as representatives of the Ukrainian intelligentsia, declare: with the exception of the 1930s, when the Bolsheviks exterminated practically all the leaders of our culture, science and technology, and destroyed one-third of the Ukrainian nation, there has never been a similar de-Ukrainization of Ukraine. ... Ukrainian patriots are being squeezed out of the army and are being dismissed from work. In

personnel politics everything is being done to achieve a 'critical mass' of Ukrainophobes in the state apparatus, incidentally as advised by the strategists of Russian nationalism. ... In essence, ethnic purges are already being conducted against Ukrainians in Ukraine."¹¹

As announced in the Manifesto, a "Congress of the Ukrainian Intelligentsia" was to be called for 11 November 1995. It was an impressive assembly, laden with symbolism. About two and a half thousand delegates and invited guests participated. The formal organizers of the Congress were the Writers' Union of Ukraine, the *Prosvita* [Enlightenment] Association for the Advancement of the Ukrainian Language, the patriotic Association "Ukraine," political parties of the National Democratic and "national-patriotic" profile, that is, moderate and radical Ukrainian nationalists.¹²

The audience faced a moving patriotic emblem: three candles superimposed upon the traditional emblem of Ukraine, the trident. The first candle bore the year 1654, the year of the Pereyaslav Treaty between Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky and Tsar Alexei I of Russia, which led to the controversial Union of Pereyaslav. The middle candle bore the year 1917, when Ukraine tried to become independent, and the third candle the year 1991, the year of the successful Declaration of Independence, which had been confirmed in the popular referendum of 1 December 1991. Two additional symbolic features, one obvious and the other not, were, however, well understood by many of the delegates and guests. The light of the first two candles had been extinguished by bullets, while the third candle, of 1991, was still burning, but was placed in the cross-hairs of a gun. Finally, the Congress of the Ukrainian Intelligentsia met in the International Center for Culture and the Arts, still popularly known as the "October" Palace, where, in the basement in the 1930s, Stalin's NKVD had interrogated and shot the leaders of the Ukrainian intelligentsia.

Ivan Drach's keynote address was rather general, but dignified. An interesting trial balloon was his favorable reference to the conservative Ukrainian political thinker Vyacheslav Lypynsky, with his "class rule" and direct representation of socioeconomic strata such as the intelligentsia.¹³ The discussion, however, was much more pointed. Only two high officials participated in the Congress: the Speaker of the Ukrainian Parliament, Oleksandr Moroz, and the Vice Premier for Cultural Affairs Academician, Ivan Kuras. The Socialist leader Moroz argued for protecting Ukrainian producers from market expansion. His views, however, were not popular; he had offended the Ukrainian patriotic congress by having participated in the celebration of the October Revolution on 7 November 1995. The audience drowned out his words with mock applause; this may have been a tactical blunder because, as Speaker of the Parliament, Moroz wielded considerable political power, an asset which the assembled patriotic intelligentsia lacked. As for Kuras, he tried to put the best possible interpretation on President Kuchma's support for Ukrainian education and publishing. His predecessor in office Academician, Mykola Zhulynsky, by and large, then refuted Kuras's assertions.¹⁴

Ukrainian Language deplored the mechanistic transfer of Western free-market values to both the economy and Ukrainian culture. In his words: "Today's ruin and the lumpen-proletarianization of the population is not so much a socioeconomic phenomenon as a cultural one." He called for state intervention to buttress Ukrainian culture. He also issued an explicit warning against the growth of radical Ukrainian nationalism. Attacking two close political associates of President Kuchma by name, Movchan said, "The offensive of the rational, spiritually impotent [*nemichnoho*] vulgar cosmopolitanism, which is personified by Hrynyov-Tabachnyk, has [in turn] provoked an extreme reaction of radical nationalists. Under these conditions, [our] opposition is very much called for [*prosto neobkhdnyy*]." ¹⁵

In many ways, the use of the term "cosmopolitans" by Movchan and others is unfortunate because in 1948 it had been reserved by Stalin for Soviet Jews whom he had marked for persecution and extermination. But, personalities apart, the pro-Russian policy of the President's entourage did call for a critique. Former Defense Minister Morozov, the son of a Russian father and Ukrainian mother and an indubitable Ukrainian patriot, brought in a welcome dose of self-criticism. He emphasized how the democratic association "Ukraine," which he heads, still had not been able to overcome the party-oriented fragmentation of the Ukrainian National Democrats. In turn, former Ukrainian President Kravchuk also called for a consolidation of patriotic democratic forces. But his concrete proposal was minimal: Kravchuk advocated that both Channels One and Two of Ukrainian television serve as a continuous outlet for leading Ukrainian writers, poets and artists. This was almost begging the question why that practice had not been instituted under his own presidency.

The Congress was briefly addressed also by former Ukrainian President-in-exile Mykola Plavyuk, a leader of the Melnyk wing of the OUN, and by Mrs. Yaroslava Stetsko, Chair of the Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists, which is now represented in Parliament. Mrs. Stetsko is a leader of the more radical Bandera wing of the OUN. Possibly as a counterweight, the Congress listened to the outstanding Jewish Ukrainian poet Moisei Fishbein, who had been a dissident under Brezhnev and had lived and worked in Munich for Radio Liberty. ¹⁶ The final, most memorable detail came in the form of the head of the Writers' Union of Ukraine. Yuriy Mushketyk complained of what he called a paradox: The Ukrainian Ministry for Nationalities and Migration had worked out a project for the development of Russian language and culture in Ukraine, whereas a similar plan for the Ukrainian language and culture was still lacking. ¹⁷

Rather sharply worded towards this end are the three general and twenty-eight detailed Congress resolutions. ¹⁸ The polemical tenor of those resolutions appears in the fourth but last paragraph: "Recently Government circles, and the President in particular, in their attempt to reassure Ukrainian public opinion, have been asserting with increasing frequency that allegedly there are no dangers for our nation, our language and culture. Innumerable facts, however, show that the contrary is true."

The more interesting demands, apart from calls for state subsidies for cinematographers and opera singers, writers and sculptors, are the following: Ukrainian-language schools are to be established proportional to the number of ethnic Ukrainians (Art. 3, para. 10); the government must drop its concept "linguistic regionalization," which *de facto* leads to a division of Ukraine (same article, para. 12); real sovereignty must be established over Ukrainian information space: television channels and radio waves should not be sold off to foreign companies (para. 16); those responsible for teargassing and clubbing the funeral procession of the late Orthodox Patriarch Volodymyr on July 18 1995, have committed an especially grave offense against the Ukrainian people and should be held criminally liable, and the remains of the Patriarch should be buried on the grounds of St. Sophia's Cathedral (para. 22); the free and uncontrolled migration into Ukraine of foreign citizens should be stopped, the issuance of new Ukrainian internal passports should also be suspended, inasmuch as there is no provision in those passports for ethnic nationality, and the doubling of the information in Russian "offends the national dignity of many citizens." Furthermore, a population census should be held in Ukraine at the earliest possible date (para. 24); the government should pursue a policy of national reconciliation, and recognize the rights of all participants in the national liberation struggle of 1941–1945; repression of national patriotic organizations should be stopped forthwith (para. 25); and the deployment of foreign troops in Ukraine should be ended immediately because it runs counter to the policy of neutrality proclaimed by the Parliament, and has caused economic, ecological and moral damage to the state (para. 28).

While most demands are self-explanatory, it should be pointed out that the demand in paragraph 25 has nothing to do with reconciling the different ethnic groups in Ukraine, but is one for the rehabilitation of the veterans of the OUN and the UPA (Ukrainian Insurgent Army) that have been persecuted by the Soviet regime and not yet given equality with the Soviet veterans of the "Great Patriotic War" in an independent Ukraine. This is an acute demand in many patriotic Ukrainian circles, notably in western Ukraine. It should also be noted that in paragraph 10 the number of Ukrainian-language schools is not made dependent on the number of Ukrainophones, as determined in the 1989 population census. If implemented, it would eventually result in a majority of schoolchildren in Ukraine being taught in Ukrainian in every province with the exception of the Crimea. Finally, the sharpness of the reference to government circles and President Kuchma in particular may have been due to the fact that a few days before the Congress of the Ukrainian Intelligentsia, President Kuchma addressed some of the intelligentsia's concerns at the Third All-Ukrainian Plenum of the Unions of Creative Artists of Ukraine.

In a somewhat preemptive way, President Kuchma chided the intelligentsia for carrying into politics not only a "painful ambition for power, but also a painful sentiment for opposition, attempting to realize its ideas in any way whatsoever, without regard to attitudes in the population and the resources available to the

state.”¹⁹ Kuchma reiterated that he was firmly set on “constructing in Ukraine a civil society.” At the same time, he mentioned that during the celebration of the fourth anniversary of independence, “for the first time, on an official level, we have defined the national [ethnic] idea and have declared that the state shall advance its development and realization.” More concretely, he said, the Ukrainian public was expecting its writers to deliver masterpieces on the level of Shevchenko’s “Epistle to My Dead, Living and Not Yet Born Countrymen,” which, by the way, has a very strong patriotic and anti-Russian subtext, Kuchma also referred to Ivan Franko’s “Moses,” Lesya Ukrainka’s “*Oderzhyma*” (Holy Spirit), Oles Honchar’s “Cathedral” and Lina Kostenko’s “*Marusya Churay*.” Honchar had died in July of 1995. The President made only one reference to a living Ukrainian poet, Lina Kostenko. However, Ms. Kostenko had not associated herself with either the Manifesto or with the Congress. President Kuchma’s selection of poetic models is rather interesting, especially that of Shevchenko’s political testament. Lesser writers could also see in it an implicit criticism of their works. This may explain what lay behind the somewhat intemperate critique of President Kuchma and his administration in the resolutions of the Congress of the Ukrainian Intelligentsia.

In the political background of President Kuchma’s dispute with the more nationalistic Ukrainian intelligentsia was an event which was near sensational. In the fall of 1995, prior to the Congress, a book was published entitled “Ukraine on the Threshold of the Twenty-first Century: A Political Aspect.” As summarized by Victor Basiuk (a political scientist with a degree from Columbia University, currently a Washington consultant in national security policy and a member of a Brookings Institution team that had spent five weeks in Kyiv in November and December 1995 conducting seminars on political and economic reforms for Ukrainian parliamentarians): “The authors of the book were Dmytro Vydrin, adviser to the President, and Dmytro Tabachnyk, the President’s chief of staff. The thesis of the book was that the future of Ukraine lies not in Europe, but in the Eurasian continent, where Ukraine should be ‘a strategic partner’ of Russia.”²⁰ So vociferous were the protests against the book, which became known through advance review copies, that it was formally withdrawn from circulation and, in late December 1995 one of the co-authors, Dmytro Vydrin—but not Dmytro Tabachnyk—resigned from the President’s administration “ostensibly for personal reasons.”

Basiuk also makes the very important point that Prime Minister Yevhen Marchuk, a professional KGB officer, the first chief of the Security Service of Ukraine under President Kravchuk and increasingly an indispensable troubleshooter for both President Kravchuk and President Kuchma, has neither openly sided with the National Democratic Ukrainian intelligentsia, nor has he endorsed what Basiuk calls the “cosmopolitan trend,” or the Eurasian and pro-Russian tendency in President Kuchma’s apparatus. When the President’s apparatus tried to place critics of Marchuk in various ministries subordinated to him as Prime Minister, Marchuk counterattacked politically by letting himself be elected to Parliament with a strong

popular majority of 84% in a district in the Poltava Province. He was tactful enough not to repeat Kuchma's 90% majority in the first stage of the 1994 Parliamentary elections; but 84% is close enough and serves the same political purpose. In Basiuk's words: "Mr. Marchuk's options have broadened to the distinct possibility that he may chair the Parliament and use it as a springboard to the presidency."²¹ As a partial concession, not so much to the Ukrainian intelligentsia as to the political ability of Marchuk, Kuchma defused the crisis by withdrawing the pro-Russian book and dismissing Vydrin, but not Tabachnyk, who remains close to him.

To conclude: predisposition to use Ukrainian in Ukraine is an auxiliary indicator of national identity and national self-assertiveness. From the viewpoint of a supporter of a strong independent Ukraine, the successful presidential and the incomplete parliamentary elections of 1994, which in turn were provoked by the economic and political crisis of 1993, are rather sobering, to say the least. Will there be two Ukraines, as forecast by the CIA? Will Ukraine, after several years, revert back to Little Russia, as desired in Moscow?

There may be a silver lining in the combination of Kuchma's election to the presidency and a strong, but not overwhelming leftist presence in parliament. To bring about the inevitable economic reforms in Ukraine, Kuchma needs the National Democrats from western and central Ukraine, for his prime constituency, the Liberal Reformers, have not done well. So far, to the National Democrats' delight, Kuchma has managed to quiet down the rebellious Crimeans. (His continued negotiations with Russia may have borne fruit, and it helps, of course, that a relative of his was elected Crimean Prime Minister until December 1995 and that the Crimean President Meshkov ran out of political steam only to be unceremoniously, but peacefully, shunted aside.)

Secondly, President Kuchma is ambitious enough not to want to rule over a rump Ukraine, even if this would prove the CIA right. Thirdly, he wants economic cooperation with Russia, including the Russian military-industrial complex. This is like balancing on a slippery slope, but if anybody can bring it off, it might be Kuchma.

But what to make of the Manifesto and the Congress of the Ukrainian Intelligentsia? Are they nothing but an emotional outburst of malcontents who are now out of power, as claimed by a section of the Kyivan Establishment? There *are* certain weaknesses in the movement of the intelligentsia, which is almost patterned on the original *Rukh* of 1989, except that the political tide may now be either running in the opposite direction or not running quite so strongly. The Manifesto was signed by a number of prominent intellectuals and public figures, such as the main organizer Ivan Drach, who had been the first chairman in 1991 of the original *Rukh*; by Vyacheslav Chornovil, his successor as chairman of the new, more party-oriented *Rukh*; by former Minister of Defense General Kostyantyn Morozov; by former Deputy Minister of Education Anatoliy Pohribnyi; by Mushketyk, the present head of the Writers' Union of Ukraine; and by Pavlo Movchan of the *Prosvita* Association. Prominent

among the signatories is the literary scholar Dr. Vyacheslav Bryukhovetsky, who had played a key role in organizing the First Congress of the *Rukh* in Kyiv in 1989, and who is now President of the private Kyivan Mohyla Academy University. However, missing from the signatories are not only the well-known poet Lina Kostenko, but also the poet and political leader Mykola Rudenko, as are the patriarch of the Ukrainian independence movement in the 1960s, the lawyer Levko Lukyanenko, not to speak of former President Leonid Kravchuk, who may have shown a low profile on purpose. Besides Morozov, the Manifesto was not signed by any citizen of Ukraine who is not an ethnic Ukrainian: there was no representation of ethnic Russians, Jews, or Crimean Tatars. Moisei Fishbein did address the Congress but what he said was not publicized. The Congress took place only for a single day. Ideally, some of the subjects ought to have been discussed in the Ukrainian Parliament or, even better, in the corridors of power.

Furthermore, the Congress may also have been too divisive and impolitic. The politically able Marchuk seems to have found a common language with the Socialist Speaker of Parliament Oleksandr Moroz, but not with the radical patriots at the Congress. The Congress could thus be interpreted as a politically dangerous demonstration of weakness.

At the same time, the demands of the intelligentsia to advance the Ukrainian language and culture were well founded, even though their proponents were not very skillful in building coalitions with ethnic minorities, as had been the original *Rukh*. As victims of physical and cultural genocide, the Ukrainians could and should insist on being given the benefit of the doubt in their attempt to widen and deepen the majority ethnic basis of new Ukraine, particularly in the circumstance of a very aggressive tendency on the part of the old dominant Russian minority to take over positions of power in the newly independent and not quite consolidated country. To build Ukraine as a non-ethnic based civil society has not worked out. As one young Galician professional woman remarked, "We are hearing now 'Ukraine is ours,' in Russian. And the noon time signal on Kyiv radio for all Ukrainian citizens to set their clocks by is now also transmitted in Russian."

Given the lackluster performance of the fractured National Democratic camp in the 1994 Presidential and Parliamentary elections, it will be a very difficult task to implement the demands of the Congress of the Ukrainian Intelligentsia to shift state-building over to a more ethnic majority basis. Even if President Kuchma were willing to do so, which apparently he is not, there would be numerous traps on the road towards a more Ukrainian Ukraine. If Ukrainization is pursued very aggressively, this would automatically favor the more Ukrainophone citizens from western Ukraine for obtaining jobs, at the expense of the Russophone Ukrainians from the industrially backward Donbass. Quite apart from Eurasians, who have been badly misnamed as cosmopolitans, do ethnic Ukrainians not owe a great debt to politically loyal but not Ukrainophone ethnic Russians, Jews, Crimean Tatars and others? Among these are the Poles in Ukraine, for instance, who have been remarkably

TABLE 1
Parallels between numbers of Ukrainophones and Presidential and Parliament election results

Province	Total population (1989) in thousands									Presidential elections				Parliamentary elections, March 27, 1994 through December 24, 1995
		By self-declared nationality:				By "native" language: Ukrainians				1991		1994		
		Ukrain- ians	Per- cent	Rus- sians	Per- cent	Ukraino- phone	Per- cent	Russo- phone	Per- cent	Percent for		Percent for		
										Kr. ^a	Ch. ^b	Ku. ^c	Kr. ^a	
Cherkasv	1,527.4	1,381.7	90.5	122.3	8.0	1,352.2	97.9	29.3	2.1	67.1	25.0	45.7	50.8	1/12: ^d 2CP, 3Agr, 7nonP ^e
Chernihiv	1,412.8	1,292.1	91.5	96.6	6.8	1,205.8	93.3	86.1	6.7	74.2	12.3	72.3	25.1	0/12: 3CP, 1Agr, 1Lab, 7nonP
Chernivtsi	940.8	666.1	70.8	63.1	6.7	647.8	97.3	17.5	2.6	43.6	42.7	35.3	61.8	0/8: 1SDP, 1R, 1DP, 5nonP
Crimea ^f	2,430.5	625.9	25.8	1,629.5	67.1	328.9	52.6	296.5	47.4	56.7	5.0	89.7	8.9	2/21: 8CP, 1CER, 12nonP ^g
Dnipropetrovsk	3,869.9	2,769.6	71.6	935.7	24.2	2,347.4	84.8	421.8	15.2	69.7	18.2	67.8	29.7	0/34: 1CP, 1S, 3Agr, 1Lab, [1PDR, 25nonP
Donetsk	5,311.8	2,693.4	50.7	2,316.1	43.6	1,603.3	59.5	1,087.5	40.4	71.5	9.7	79.0	18.5	0/47: 22CP, 3S, 1Agr, 1Lab, [1CCong, 19nonP
Ivano-Frankivsk	1,413.2	1,342.9	95.0	57.0	4.0	1,335.1	99.4	7.8	0.6	13.7	67.1	3.9	94.5	0/12: 1UR, 1CUN, 10nonP ^h
Kharkiv	3,174.7	1,993.0	62.8	1,054.2	33.2	1,585.2	79.5	407.6	20.5	60.9	19.7	71.0	26.0	3/25: 6CP, 2S, 1CCong, 16nonP
Kherson	1,237.0	936.9	75.8	249.5	20.2	821.8	87.7	115.0	12.3	70.2	18.1	64.4	32.1	1/10: 5CP, 1S, 1Agr, 3nonP
Khmelnitsky	1,521.6	1,374.7	90.4	88.0	5.8	1,351.6	98.3	23.0	1.7	75.5	15.4	39.3	57.2	1/12: 2S, 1Agr, 1UR, 7nonP, 1CP
Kirovohrad	1,288.0	1,047.0	5.3	144.1	11.7	1,009.4	96.4	37.4	3.6	74.8	13.6	49.7	45.7	0/11: 4CP, 1R, 1DP, 5nonP
Kyiv (Kiev) City	2,572.2	1,863.7	72.5	536.7	20.9	1,467.7	78.8	395.5	21.2	56.1	26.7	35.6	59.7	13/10: 4R, 1UU, 5nonP
Kyiv Province (without City)	1,934.4	1,729.2	89.4	167.9	8.7	1,694.2	98.0	34.9	2.0	66.0	21.2	38.4	58.3	1/16: 1S, 1Agr, 3R, 1UR, 10nonP
Luhansk	2,857.0	1,482.2	51.9	1,278.0	44.8	983.0	66.3	499.0	33.7	76.2	9.9	88.0	10.1	0/25: 16CP, 1S, 8nonP
Lviv	2,727.4	2,464.7	90.4	195.1	7.2	2,437.6	98.9	27.0	1.1	11.6	75.9	3.9	93.8	1/22: 2PDR, 5R, 1UR, 1UCR, [3CUN, 10nonP ⁱ
Mykolayiv	1,328.3	1,003.6	75.6	258.0	19.4	839.5	83.7	163.7	16.3	72.3	15.1	52.8	44.7	1/10: 4CP, 1Agr, 5nonP
Odessa	2,624.2	1,432.7	54.6	719.0	27.4	1,062.6	74.2	368.9	25.8	70.7	12.8	66.8	29.2	2/12: 5CP, 2Agr, 1SDP, 13nonP
Poltava	1,748.7	1,536.6	87.9	179.0	10.2	1,491.3	97.1	45.0	2.9	75.1	13.6	59.2	37.4	0/16: 2CP, 1Agr, 13nonP
Rivne	1,164.2	1,085.7	93.3	53.6	4.6	1,076.3	99.1	9.3	0.9	53.1	25.6	11.0	87.3	0/10: 4R, 2UR, 4nonP
Sumy	1,427.5	1,220.5	85.5	190.1	13.3	1,107.6	90.8	112.7	9.2	72.4	14.7	67.8	28.9	3/10: 3CP, 3S, 1R, 3nonP
Ternopil	1,164.0	1,126.4	96.8	26.6	2.3	1,123.5	99.8	2.8	0.3	16.8	57.5	3.8	94.8	0/10: 2R, 3UR, 1CUN, 4nonP ^j
Transcarpathia	1,245.6	967.7	78.4	49.5	4.0	961.5	98.4	9.3	1.0	58.0	27.6	25.2	70.5	0/10: 1CDP, 9nonP
Vinnitsya	1,920.8	1,757.9	91.5	112.5	5.9	1,725.8	98.2	31.9	1.8	72.3	18.3	42.3	54.3	1/16: 1CP, 15nonP
Volhynia	1,058.4	1,001.3	94.6	46.9	4.4	995.0	99.4	6.3	0.6	51.9	31.4	14.0	83.9	1/8: 1Agr, 1UR, 6nonP
Zaporizhiya	2,074.0	1,308.0	63.1	664.1	32.0	1,007.6	77.0	300.1	23.0	74.7	13.0	70.7	26.8	0/18: 7CP, 1S, 1Agr, 1PDR, 8nonP
Zhytomyr	1,537.6	1,306.1	85.0	121.4	7.9	1,263.7	96.8	42.4	3.3	77.6	14.0	41.6	55.6	1/12: 3CP, 1Agr, 8nonP

NOTES FOR TABLE 1:

^a Leonid M. Kravchuk: winner in 1991, loser in 1994

^b Vyacheslav Chornovil: main runner-up in 1991

^c Leonid D. Kuchma: winner in 1994

^d Figure left of slash means number of seats that are still vacant; right of slash—number of elected deputies

^e Abbreviations for parties:

Agr = Agrarian Party

CCong = Civic Congress

CDP = Christian Democratic Party

CER = Crimean Economic Rebirth Party

CP = Communist Party

CUN = Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists

DP = Democratic Party

Lab = Labour Party

nonP = non-Party

PDR = Party of Democratic Rebirth

R = *Rukh*

S = Socialist Party

SDP = Social Democratic Party

UCR = Ukrainian Conservative Republican Party

UNA = Ukrainian National Assembly

UR = Ukrainian Republican Party

^f Includes City of Sevastopol

^g Excludes Communist Party deputy Heorhiy Shevchenko, who was elected to Parliament 10 December 1995 and was found dead of "coal gas" (Carbonmonoxide?) poisoning 28 December 1995

^h Alternative source (Serhiy Holovatyi et alii) shows the following result for Ivano-Frankivsk: 1CDP, 1UR, 1DP, 1CUN, 8nonP

ⁱ Alternatively, for Lviv: 2PDR, 6R, 1UR, 3CUN, 2UNA, 7nonP (Holovatyi et alii)

^j Alternatively, for Ternopil (Province): 3R, 3UR, 1CUN, 1UNA, 2nonP (Holovatyi et alii)

SOURCES:

Columns Total population, By self-declared nationality, and By "native" language

Derzhavnyy Komitet URSR po Statystytsi [Ukrainian SSR State Committee on Statistics], *Naselennya Ukrain's'koi RSR (za danymy Vsesoyuznoho perepysu naselennya 1989 r.* [Population of the Ukrainian SSR, according to the data of the All-Union population census of 1989] (Kyiv, 1991), pp. 174–183. [Percentages double-checked.]

Columns Presidential elections

For 1991: Electoral Commission, official results, as cited in Taras Kuzio & Andrew Wilson, *Ukraine: Perestroika to Independence* (Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies Press, 1994), p. 187.

For 1994: Mizhnarodna Fundatsiya Vyborchikh System [International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES)], *Vybory v Ukraini 1994 roku* [Elections in Ukraine in 1994] (Kyiv, 1994), p. 140. Approved for printing by IFES Kyiv 7 December 1994. In this Column on the left, and Kravchuk the losing column on the right; this has been done in Table 1.

Column Parliamentary elections

Vybory v Ukraini 1994 roku, pp. 28–136, updated, through December 1995, by Marta Kolomayets of the *Ukrainian Weekly's* Kyiv Press Bureau: "Voter apathy shows as only 7 of 45 Parliament seats

NOTES FOR TABLE 1: *continued*

are filled," *Ukrainian Weekly*, Vol. 63, No. 51 (17 December 1995), pp. 1 + 4; "Two more deputies elected in Ukraine," *UW*, 63/52 (24 Dec. 1995), pp. 1 + 18; "Five more deputies are elected," *UW*, 63/53 (31 Dec. 1995), p. 2; and "Newly elected deputy [Heorhiy Shevchenko] found dead," *UW*, Vol. 64, No. 1 (7 January 1996), p. 3.

Slightly different Party data from the elections *before* December 1995 in alternative source—Serhiy Holovaty, Serhiy Kudryashov, Serhiy Odarych, Yuriy Orobets', Mykola Tomenko (Chair) and Vasyl' Yablons'kyi, *Ekslyuzyv vypusk 2: Verkhovna Rada Ukrainy: paradyhmy i paradoksy* [Exclusive issue No. 2: Ukraine's Supreme Council, Paradigms and Paradoxes] (Kyiv, 1995), p. 34.

TABLE 2

Percentage of elementary and secondary schoolchildren being taught
in Ukrainian, beginning of 1993/94 school year

	Education in Ukrainian	Education in Russian
Cherkasy Province	81.5	18.5
Chernihiv	74.0	26.0
Chernivtsi	74.5	9.2
Crimea	0.1	99.7
Dnipropetrovsk	36.6	63.4
Donetsk	4.9	95.1
Ivano-Frankivsk	97.0	2.9
Kharkiv	33.1	66.9
Kherson	57.6	42.4
Khmelnysky	87.3	12.7
Kirovohrad	69.0	31.0
Kyiv (Kiev) City	54.7	45.3
Kyiv Province (without City)	89.7	10.3
Luhansk	8.4	91.6
Lviv	94.6	5.3
Mykolayiv	50.6	49.4
Odessa	29.2	68.7
Poltava	77.5	22.5
Rivne	97.8	2.2
Sumy	55.8	44.2
Ternopil	98.4	1.6
Transcarpathia	83.2	5.2
Vinnitsya	87.4	12.6
Volhynia	96.7	3.3
Zaporizhiya	27.5	72.5
Zhytomyr	82.7	17.3

SOURCE:

Ministerstvo Statystyky Ukrainy [Ukraine, Ministry of Statistics], *Narodne hospodarstvo Ukrainy u 1993 rotsi: Statystychnyy schorrichnyk* [National Economy of Ukraine in 1993; Statistical Yearbook] (Kyiv: "Tekhnika" [Technology Publishers], 1994), p. 384.

supportive of independent Ukrainian statehood, despite all the territorial changes at Polish expense, from 1939 to 1945? That Ukraine cannot be a-national, a-Ukrainian, or even anti-Ukrainian, that there cannot be "a Ukraine without Ukrainians," is self-evident to many Ukrainian patriots. But how to turn Ukrainian national politics around in the midst of economic poverty and outside political challenges is not clear. Unfortunately, neither the truncated parliamentary election of 1994–1996 nor the one-day Congress of the Ukrainian Intelligentsia has shown the path clearly.

Lastly, but importantly, the very transparent Russian ambitions toward Ukraine and the very heavy-handed Russian policy in Transcaucasia and in Chechnya may still rebound to the benefit of independent Ukraine. As of February 1996, it is becoming obvious that President Kuchma is backing off from the prospect of becoming a vassal to Tsar Boris Grozny, to Tsar Vladimir (Zhirinovsky) the Not-So-Magnificent or, perhaps, to Tsar Alexander (Lebed) the Bold, late of Transdnistria.

NOTES

* A preliminary version of this was presented as a paper at the 19th Annual Meeting of the Mid-Atlantic Slavic Conference, Columbia University, New York, 18 March 1995. I am grateful to the attentively critical audience in New York, and to the Department of Political Science and International Relations (Professor Joseph A. Pika, Chair) who enabled me to participate in the conference.

1. Walker Connor, "Nation-Building or Nation-Destroying?" *World Politics*, Vol. 24, No. 3 (April 1972), pp. 337–338, as cited in Roman Solchanyk, "Language Politics in Ukraine" in Isabelle T. Kreindler, ed., *Sociolinguistic Perspectives on Soviet National Languages: their past, present and future*, in *Contributions to the Sociology of Language*, Vol. 40 (Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter, 1985), p. 57.
2. Dominique Arel, "Language Politics in Independent Ukraine: Towards One or Two State Languages?" *Nationalities Papers*, Vol. 23, No. 3 (September 1995), p. 597. Arel also stresses the linguistic closeness and severe linguistic assimilation of the Ukrainians, which is true, but then goes out on a limb to state that Ukrainian is "at least passively understood by all Russians living in Ukraine" (p. 598). Standard Ukrainian is better understood and spoken by Ukrainian Jews and other, non-dominant ethnic minorities.
3. See Ministerstvo Statystyky Ukrainy [Ukraine, Ministry of Statistics], *Narodne hospodarstvo Ukrainy u 1993 rotsi: Staty-stychnyy shchorichnyk* [National Economy of Ukraine in 1993: Statistical Yearbook] (Kyiv: "Tekhnika" [Technology Publishers], 1994), p. 384. See also Table 2.
4. *Holos Ukrayiny*, 1994, No. 137 (21 July), p. 2.
5. See Table 1.
6. Dominique Arel and Andrew Wilson, "Ukrainian Parliamentary Elections," *RFE/RL Research Report*, Vol. 3, No. 26 (1 July 1994), pp. 6–17.
7. Arel & Wilson, "Ukrainian Parliamentary Elections," pp. 12–13 [box].
8. See, above all, Andrew Wilson, "The Growing Challenge to Kiev from the Donbas," *RFE/RL Research Report*, Vol. 2, No. 33 (20 August 1993), pp. 8–13; also, Monika Jung, "The Donbas Factor in the Ukrainian Elections," *ibid.*, Vol. 3, No. 12 (25 March 1994), pp. 51–56.
9. See Serhiy Holovatyi, Serhiy Kudryashov, Serhiy Odarych, Yuriy Orobets', Mykola Tomenko(chair), and Vasyl' Yablons'kyi, *Eksklyuzyv vypusk 2: Verkhovna Rada Ukrainy; paradyhmy i paradoksy* [Exclusive Issue No. 2: Supreme Council of Ukraine; paradigms

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- and paradoxes] (Kyiv: "Ukrains'ka perspektyva" [Ukrainian Perspective Publishers], 1995), pp. 35–52.
10. Solchanyk, "Language Politics in Ukraine," p. 94.
 11. "Manifest ukrains'koi intelihehtsii" [Manifesto of the Ukrainian Intelligentsia], *Literaturna Ukraina* [henceforth *Lit.U.*], 1995, No. 37–38 (October 12), p. 1.
 12. See the opening address by Ivan Drach, "Obov'yazok pered narodom i Bat'kivshchynoyu" [(Our) Duty before (Our) People and Fatherland], *Lit.U.*, 1995, No. 41–42 (16 November), p. 3, and also the photograph on p. 1.
 13. *Ibid.*, p. 3.
 14. "Shchob ne zhasla svicha: Z Konhresu Ukrains'koi Intelihehtsii" [Lest the Candle Be Extinguished: From the Congress of the Ukrainian Intelligentsia], *Lit.U.*, 1995, No. 43 (23 November), pp. 1–2.
 15. *Ibid.*, p. 2. Volodymyr Hrynyov, born in the Belgorod Province of Russia and an ethnic Russian political leader from Kharkiv, had been a candidate for the presidency of Ukraine in 1991. In 1994, Hrynyov was, with Kuchma, co-leader of the Liberal Interregional Bloc of Deputies, but was barred from entering Parliament. Dr. Dmytro Tabachnyk, a historian, successfully managed Kuchma's Presidential campaign in 1994 and is now serving as President Kuchma's Chief of Staff.
 16. *Ibid.*, p. 2. Unfortunately, the correspondent did not mention what Fishbein said, but merely recorded that he had addressed the Congress. The same overly laconic treatment was given People's Deputy Ihor R. Yukhnovsky, a prominent leader of *Rukh*.
 17. *Ibid.*, p. 2. From other, oral sources, I know that the project had been dated from 1995–2000, making it a veritable "Five-Year Plan."
 18. "Postanova Konhresu Ukrains'koi intelihehtsii" [Decision (made by) the Congress of Ukrainian Intelligentsia], *Lit.U.*, 1995, No. 41–42 (16 November), p. 3.
 19. "Vystup Prezydenta Ukrainy L. D. Kuchmy na III Vseukrains'komu Plenumi Tvorchykh Spilok Myttsiv Ukrainy" [Address of the President of Ukraine L. D. Kuchma to the Third All-Ukrainian Plenum of Unions of Creative Artists of Ukraine], *Lit.U.*, 1995, No. 41–42 (16 November), pp. 1–2. All citations from p. 2.
 20. Victor Basiuk, "News Analysis: will the west lose Ukraine?" *Ukrainian Weekly*, Vol. 64, No. 5 (Sunday 4 February 1996), p. 6.
 21. *Ibid.*