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The Size of the Imperial Russian Bureaucracy and Army in Comparative Perspective

The Modern State: Bigger and Better?

As monarchs expanded their power they replaced venal office holders and local elites with salaried officials who administered directly on their behalf. Government bureaucracies then became "effective" to the degree that they could penetrate towns and villages, regulate relations and use resources in specific ways. This growth of an "infrastructural" ability to control or coordinate society via central institutions must not be confused with despotism or tyranny, nor did the increased ability of the state to centralize, nationalize, and standardize social life within its territories necessarily increase or reduce despotic or dictatorial power.[1] The territory within which this development occurred is called a "national state" if the inhabitants of annexed regions, as citizens subject to a single centralized bureaucracy, eventually came to accept the power of distant rulers as legitimate authority. Some use the term "empire" to refer to polities in which local populations did not develop such a loyalty, while others note that countries are empires if they have no single bureaucracy and citizenship.[2] Among important qualitative variables underlying this state and empire-building were levels of literacy, professional training and work habits. Among the quantifiable variables such as the methods and speed of information transmission and processing, was the size of central bureaucracy and the army.

Opinions over when territorial expansion should be considered "state-building" and when it should be considered "colonialism" differ, as they do over whether or not peripheral regions were "colonies" and the degree to which "colonial modernization" promoted modernity. No less contentious are opinions concerning the expansion of government functions and increases in staffing levels that have been going on since the seventeenth century within national states.

On one side, advocates and contemporary "statebuilding" literature note that big governments are a necessary condition of modernity. In western Europe, against a backdrop of rising Per Capita income, independent courts and judiciaries, and administration based on legal expertise and procedural knowledge, bigger governments brought citizenship, social services, and enforcement of standards. Larger central bureaucracies, the argument continues, made implementation more likely, fostered impersonal-formal attitudes towards authority, and among the middle and upper classes, and later the lower classes, the notion that interests were to be pursued "bureaucratically" – institutionally via rule of law and due process.[3] The

[1] M. MANN The Sources of Social Power. Cambridge, MA 1986. Vol. 2, pp. 59–61, 358–510.

[2] Britain attempted but failed to establish a single imperial bureaucracy in the eighteenth century. Spain succeeded but never granted citizenship to all its subjects. M. DOYLE Empires. Cornell 1986; O. HINTZE The Formation of States and Constitutional Development, in: The Historical Essays of Otto Hintze. New York 1975, pp. 161–165; S. E. FINER State Building, State Boundaries and Border Control, in: Social Science Information No. 4–5 (August-October 1974) pp. 79–126; M. HECHTER Internal Colonialism: The Celtic Fringe in British National Development. Berkeley 1975, p. 60–64.

[3] C. TILLY The Contentious French. Cambridge, MA 1986; IDEM Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990–1990. Oxford 1990; IDEM Popular Contention in Great Britain 1758–1834. Cambridge, MA 1995 and T. ERTMAN Birth of the Leviathan. Cambridge 1997 are detailed comparative studies

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national states destroyed political, economic and cultural localism and successfully disseminated single national identities. They promoted democracy and prosperity because they had to function alongside well-defined private sectors providing alternative sources of employment and services, the rule of law, and representative institutions. After workers and propertyless became an object of administration in the nineteenth century their initial attitudes towards modern big government ranged from mistrust to indifference. But their sense that this new authority was unjustified was tempered by an increasing dependency upon government brought on by the socio-economic decline of the family. In their colonies, by contrast, European governments had few personnel and the relationships between ruler and ruled were immediate, personal, clientist and paternalist-authoritarian rather than democratic. Afraid of violence and dependent on consent, isolated local officials had to rule through collaborators and win acquiescence by routinely exercising restraint and applying the sanctions of colonial law; they preferred not to threaten or use force.[4] Judgements about the role of colonial administrations have shifted from justifying them as an absolute good, to a balanced view of their benefits and shortcomings.[5] On the other side of the debate about the role of the modern national state, critics like Montesquieu, Mill, and Marx condemned its interventionist bureaucracy as an externally imposed tyranny, while Tocqueville deplored bureaucracies as instruments of a subjugation willingly accepted by people more concerned with private pleasures and interests than the public good. In this tradition, radical critics of colonialism condemned colonial administrations as lynchpins in a system of repression and exploitation.

The Case of Imperial Russia

It was the critical rather than the favourable opinions about bureaucracy that had the greater influence on European popular opinion thanks to writers like Dickens and Balzac. In the Russian empire Gogol's *Inspector General* and *Dead Souls*, alongside Saltykov-Shchedrin's *History of a Town* became the best known of a number of works that created a lingering image of the country among educated Russians and non-Russians alike as a place overwhelmed by too many bureaucrats. The "anti-imperialist" or "anti-colonialist" trend of thought found in most western European countries had no counterpart in Russia.

Historians, however, now describe Imperial Russia as "undergoverned."[6] Although undefined in the specialist literature, and untranslatable into Russian, this term includes the idea

illustrating how "bargaining" – violent and peaceful – between rulers and subjects over taxes and duties produced new rights and protective institutions alongside bigger more centralized bureaucracies in western European countries. See also J. S. MIGDAL Strong States and Weak Societies. Princeton 1988.

[4] The "colonial state" has begun to be studied as a socio-political subject only recently and I am unaware of works discussing the implications and legacies of its size. B. BERMAN Control and Crisis in Colonial Kenya. The Dialectics of Domination. London 1990. The similarity between the methods used by tsarist governors and British District Officers in Kenya to assert their authority is striking: Ibid., pp. 204–08; R.G. ROBBINS The Tsar's Viceroys. Ithaca 1987.

[5] On the interpretations and mixed legacy of colonial rule see: N. ETHERINGTON Theories of Imperialism: War, Conquest and Capital. London 1984; D. K. FIELDHOUSE The West and the Third World. Oxford 1999; B. WAITES Europe and the Third World. New York 1999.

[6] H. ROGGER Russia in the Age of Modernization and Revolution. New York 1983, p. 49; G. L. FREEZE (ed.) Russia. A History. Oxford 1997, p. ix; B. MIRONOV A Social History of Imperial Russia 1700–1917. 2 vols. Boulder, CO 2000. Vol. 2, p. 150. Foreigners at the time usually saw Russia's administrative problems in qualitative terms: C. P. DUPONT-WHITE L'individu et l'état. Paris 1857; D. M. WALLACE Russia. 2nd ed. London 1912, p. 382. O. HOETZSCH Rußland. Berlin 1915, p. 270 was perhaps the first to note "undergovernment" and S. F. STARR Decentralization and Self-Government in Russia 1830–1870. Princeton, NJ 1972, pp. 26–49 seems to have been the first to draw the attention of English language readers to the problem.

that a government which has successfully monopolized the use of physical violence does not have enough administrators Per Capita to carry out policies effectively and efficiently. From this perspective a unique attribute of the tsarist bureaucracy was not its bigness or pathologies but its smallness.

Yet this consensus about "undergovernment" is not based on systematic research, nor is this phenomenon related to broader issues of empire/state-building, development, and policies towards non-Russians. Those who mentioned the subject did so tangentially; usually to illustrate how a shortage of bureaucrats limited the theoretical omnipotence of the tsar. They used random figures, did not clearly identify who were government officials, regarded Imperial Russia as a national state rather than an empire and did not distinguish between "Great Russia" and its non-Russian possessions.[7] Those who have attempted to explain Russian politics and public life in terms of the relationship between staffing levels, governmental effectiveness in routine affairs, and political culture found in "state building" literature, meanwhile, lay themselves open to charges of "eurocentrism;" as much as it was only in western Europe that large central government bureaucracy played a decisive role in the creation of modern democracy. In a country with too few central administrators, runs this argument, integration will lag, decisions will be implemented slowly, and services will be few. In reaction, corruption, unpredictability, clientism, petitioning, extra-procedural intervention, bribery and influence peddling figure as important alternative methods of getting things done – and as palliatives making despotism bearable. According to this line of reasoning, notions of impersonal, regular due process, systematization and trust, could not take root in Russia, because its government, unlike those of constitutional monarchies with their relatively larger bureaucracies, was too small to make decisions in routine affairs as fast, predictably and effectively as they were. Administrative arbitrariness and languor, the argument continues, alienated people from public institutions, and forced them to use dubious methods in pursuit of routine matters, instead of motivating them to think in terms of the public good on an institutional level. Demanding and getting special exemption, attention or favour from a bribed or petitioned official, for instance, not only ran contrary to moral instincts but demeaned the notion of due process, the prestige of bureaucrats, and undermined the systematization and legalization necessary for effective administration.[8] Finally, historians also have drawn attention to how Russian ruled Eurasia's huge size and small governmental bureaucracy meant that part-time amateurs, both conscripted and voluntary, performed a host of public duties at the local level well into the twentieth century. While some stress this activity was neither professional, democratic or bureaucratic and caused more problems than it solved, others see it as the basis of a civil society.[9]

[7] The most important specialist studies on the Russian bureaucracy ignored the issue of size. The two standard books are: W. PINTNER, D. ROWNEY (eds.) Russian Officialdom: The Bureaucratization of Russian Society. Chapel Hill 1980; E. AMBURGER Geschichte der Behördenorganisation Rußlands von Peter dem Großen bis 1917. Leiden 1966.

[8] M. RAEFF Understanding Imperial Russia. New York 1984; A. M. VERNER The Crisis of the Russian Autocracy. Princeton, NJ 1990, pp. 48–56; P. GATRELL Economic Culture, Economic Policy and Economic Growth in Russia 1861–1914, in: Cahiers du Monde Russe 36 (Janvier–Juin 1995) no. 1–2, pp. 37–52, here pp. 39, 49; W. DIFRANCEISCO, Z. GITELMAN Soviet Political Culture and Modes of Covert Influence, in: A. J. HEIDENHEIMER, M. JOHNSTON, V. T. LEVINE (eds.) Political Corruption. A Handbook. New Brunswick 1989, pp. 467–89.

[9] MIRONOV A Social History, vol. 2, pp. 148–53 juxtaposes this "public administration" to the state administration and claims that because it was the numerically larger of the two, by the end of the century civil society was becoming stronger in imperial Russia. T. S. PEARSON Russian Officialdom in Crisis: Autocracy and Local Self-Government 1861–1905. New York 1989; K. MATSUZATO The

This paper is a quantitative study that addresses some of these shortcomings. It lists aggregate totals of central government administrators, soldiers and police in the tsarist empire, alongside totals in selected western European national states and empires, and confirms that indeed there were fewer central bureaucrats and soldiers Per Capita in the Russian empire than in European national states. More interestingly, it suggests that Great Russia probably had more officials than did individual European overseas colonies but fewer than some of its non-Russian borderlands.

Problems, Methods, and Sources

Bureaucracy is the best tool humans possess to accomplish collective tasks and as the number of tasks increases it seems rational to proportionately increase the number of people organized to cope with them.[10] Yet there comes a point when organizations become more of a problem than a solution. Jeremy Bentham invented a "felicific calculus" to determine how to maximize the happiness of each person in a country. But no one has yet devised a similar formula to calculate the optimal number of administrators a society might need. Since the concept of undergovernment, consequently, only makes sense in a comparative context, the only way to determine whether the tsarist government was "too big" or "too small," is to compare its staffing level with those of other governments. This paper, accordingly, will focus on France, Germany, Britain, and Austria; four countries with which educated Russians since the eighteenth century have habitually compared themselves, despite political, socio-economic and cultural differences. Passing reference will also be made to Spain, and Japan. This paper reviews governmental size in early-modern times and then focuses on the 1890s. It is based on the 1897 Russian census whose totals can be compared with the contemporary western European data because it incorporated occupational categories set by the International Institute of Statistics. Using these Russian figures I calculated my statistics to correspond as close as possible to the correlated data on public sector employment compiled in *State Economy and Society in Western Europe 1815–1975. A Data Handbook in Two Volumes*. Additional population and army totals were taken from *The Statesman's Year-Book*.

Since all the examined countries ruled empires calculations of Per Capita central government and military staffing levels in this paper will distinguish between the metropole and its colonial possessions. Non-Russian territories in the tsarist empire will be compared with British ruled India, Spanish Marocco, French Africa and Indo-China, while the empire itself will be divided into five sample areas. The first comprises a representative sample of ten industrial and agrarian Russian provinces that in 1922 became part of the RSFSR – and to avoid counting imperial personnel into these "Great Russian" totals, this area will exclude St. Petersburg province.[11] The second area comprises the eight "Little Russian" provinces that became the Ukrainian SSR.[12] The third is the five Transcaucausian provinces that became the Armenian, Georgian and Azeri SSRs,[13] the fourth includes the five Asian Provinces that later

Concept of 'Space' in Russian History-Regionalization from the Later Imperial Period to the Present, in: T. HARA, K. MATSUZATO (eds.) Empire and Society. Sapporo 1997, pp. 184–87.

[10] Why governments get bigger is discussed in: P. S. HELLER, A. A. TAIT Government Employment and Pay. Some International Comparisons. Washington 1983, pp. 15, 35; W. MEYER Limits to Bureaucratic Growth. New York 1985; H. FEIGENBAUM, J. HENIG, C. HAMNET Shrinking the State. Cambridge 1998, pp. 14–35.

[11] Kostroma, Novgorod, Nizhegorod, Penza, Riazan, Samara, Tambov, Tula, Viatka, Moskva. For simplicity, provincial names will be given in transliterated Russian.

[12] Kiev, Volyn, Podolia, Chernigov, Poltava, Kharkov, Ekaterinoslav, Kherson.

[13] Erivan, Tiflis, Kutais, Elizavetpol, Baku.

became parts of the Kazakh and Uzbek Republics.[14] The ten Polish provinces (*privislianskiia gubernii*) comprise the fifth area. These divisions based on national borders are in accord with the current trend in scholarship to view the tsarist empire as a place with an "imperialist" "Great Russian" metropole that "colonized" a non-Russian periphery. During the period under study, however, educated Russians did not consider themselves "imperialist" and they would have differed about where the "Russian metropole" ended and the non-Russian "periphery" began. They began to regard the resettlement of Slavic peasants to the east as a "colonization" of the sort that western Europe was doing overseas only at the turn of the century, and never used this term or "colony" in reference to the western borderlands. Earlier, educated Russians imagined "Russia" as a country that "colonized itself" rather than somewhere else.[15]

Besides the colonial dimension, the presence or absence of non-governmental administrators in business organizations and voluntary public associations in all the examined countries must be considered when making calculations. Numerous, often important and large in western Europe as well as overseas colonies, these organizations both relieved the government of various tasks and prompted it to undertake others. But since there were few "private bureaucracies" in tsarist Russia, jobs or functions normally considered private further west were often governmental in Russia.[16] Valid comparisons, therefore, must either exclude from Russian totals those who performed functions similar to those of employees in private European organizations, as this paper does, or, include private employees into European totals. Calculations must also take into account a sizable group of people who after the 1860s worked outside the central tsarist bureaucracy at the local level in towns and villages in practice, yet were paid by the state and worked within a system that made no distinction in law between central and local government and self-government. As part-governmental, part-private employee and part-volunteer, this group could be categorized as local administrators, but had no organizational equivalent in western Europe or its colonies. This paper, accordingly, notes its existence but does not include it into totals.[17]

A final problem in any cross-national comparison of governments stems from the different words that statisticians used to identify bureaucrats and administrators. Categories like *fonctionnaire, Beamte, sluzhashchie*, and "clerk," were imprecise and referred to the different people at different times. In an attempt to keep the examination within manageable limits and isolate a single category roughly comparable across time and space this paper counts as "administrators" full-time personnel in general central administration (executive and judicial

[14] Uralsk, Turgai, Akmolinsk, Semipalatinsk, Samarkand.

[15] W. SUNDERLAND The 'Colonization Question': Visions of Colonization in Late Imperial Russia, in: JBfGOE 48 (2000) pp. 210–232, here p. 212. The tsarist empire, it should be noted, became a nationally "Russian" empire only in the middle of the nineteenth century. H. SETON-WATSON The New Imperialism. Chester Springs, PA 1961, p. 23.

[16] R. TORSTENDAHL Bureaucratisation in Northwestern Europe 1880–1985. London 1991; N. B. WEISMANN Reform inTsarist Russia. New Brunswick 1981, pp. 16–17, 222.

[17] Russia, like France, Germany, Italy, and Britain spent over 50% of its budget on central government (military, justice, and administration) but, unlike them, allotted much less (8%) to local government. Tsarist local personnel also comprised a smaller percentage of total administrative personnel than was the case further west where they averaged 40% or more of personnel at the turn of the century. To my best knowledge, no one has determined whether these differences would remain if imperial totals were added to the European national-state totals. R. ROSE From Government at the Centre to Nationwide Government, in: Y. MENY (ed.) Centre-Periphery Relations in Western Europe. London 1985, pp. 17; A. P. POGREBINSKII Gosudarstvennye finansy tsarskoi Rossii v epokhu imperializma. Moskva 1968, p. 29; GATRELL Economic Culture p. 40.

branches). In western countries this control group would fall within the rubric of public sector white-collar employees with administrative responsibilities – here including secretarial and clerical staff but not teachers, school administrators, transport, post and telegraph personnel.[18]

Alongside methodological difficulties and differences in census categories, no statistics, or skewered and inaccurate statistics make comparative examination of staffing levels problematical. Even for France, a country with good records, historians of administration have noted that it is impossible to know the exact number of bureaucrats for any year before 1945 and that estimates of totals in the nineteenth century vary by as much as 115 000.[19] Accordingly, the totals and ratios given below – rounded-off to the nearest whole-number – must be treated only as approximations that help us determine comparative magnitudes.

Some Preliminary Comparisons

Very unreliable pre-nineteenth-century figures reveal the tsarist central administration probably became understaffed relative to its closest western neighbours only after 1789 – although a larger territory meant that central officials in Great Russia both before and after were spread thinner than their European counterparts. Whether or not tsarist administrators were also spread more thinly throughout their empire than were their counterparts in European empires, is unknown. In any case, early-modern foreign accounts characterizing tsarist government as despotic or tyrannical do not mention an ubiquitous officialdom.[20] Sir Robert Dallington in his *The View of Fraunce* (1604) thought France, where officials were "as thicke as the grasse hoppers in Aegypt," was Europe's most governed country. As far as may be determined the ratio of all officials to population in 1560s France was perhaps 1:400; a figure that includes *officiers* – those who bought or inherited office and used it to pursue private interests rather than the king's business whenever it suited them. If we count only an estimated 1500 centrally-appointed royal officials as administrators their Per Capita distribution would be 1:10 000. That same decade Britain had approximately 1200 central administrators: one for every 4000 persons.[21] Perhaps because *officiers* were relatively independent of the king, and even French governors (*intendant)* were able to settle in their provinces and bequeath their office to sons, Sir Robert did not deem France a tyranny, while many of his contemporaries and, until recently most historians, thought that Henry VIII's centralization had made Tudor England a despotism.[22] In 1690s Russia (est. pop. 9 722 000) 2739 central administrators would have given the country an approximate Per Capita distribution (1:3549)

[18] P. FLORA (ed.) State Economy and Society in Western Europe 1815–1975. A Data Handbook in Two Volumes. Frankfurt 1983. Vol. 1, p. 193. See also: C. L. TAYLOR (ed.) Why Governments Grow. Measuring Public Sector Size. Beverly Hills 1983; C. T. GOODSELL The Case for Bureaucracy. A Public Administration Polemic. Chatham, NJ 1983, pp. 110–16; R. CLEM (ed.) Research Guide to the Russian and Soviet Censuses. Ithaca 1986; A. BLUM Naitre, Vivre et Mourir en URSS: 1917–1991. Paris 1994, pp. 60–62.

[19] G. THUILLIER La Bureaucracie en France aux XIXe et XXe Siècles. Paris 1987, pp. X, 8.

[20] F. WILSON Muscovy. Russia Through Foreign Eyes 1553–1900. London 1970.

[21] P. WILLIAMS The Tudor Regime. Oxford 1979, p. 107; P. GOUBERT Louis XIV and Twenty Million Frenchmen. New York 1972, p. 96.

[22] J. A. ARMSTRONG Old-Regime Governors: Bureaucratic and Patrimonial Attributes, in: Comparative Studies in Society and History 14 (1972) no. 1, pp. 2–30.

close to Britain's.[23] In 1722 Peter I reduced staff levels because he thought that compared to Sweden he had more officials than necessary.[24]

In 1750s Prussia the ratio of central administrators to population averaged 1:1500, while Austria and Bohemia by the end of the century (pop. 9 million) averaged 1:1414.[25] As in Russia, at least half of these officials were located in the capital cities which meant that central agents in the provinces were well dispersed and outnumbered by personnel subject in practice, if not theory, to local elites. In France the bankrupt Bourbons had to continue appointing *officiers* (51 000 by the 1790s) rather than hiring administrators. Republican France during the Terror (pop. 28 million) with an estimated 250 000 public employees, which now included earlier non-royal personnel (1:112), presumably had an abnormally large central administrative staff by the standards of the time. After 1799 numbers were reduced and perhaps the 1150 administrators in Haute-Marne (pop. 227 000) better reflected the French norm (1:197).[26] In 1800 England and Wales (pop. 9 million 1801) supported almost 14 000 central officials (1:643).[27]

In 1795 the population of the Russian empire was 36 million and Per Capita income differentials within Europe were minimal. If we assume that an estimated 16 000 central administrators given for that year worked only within the empire's pre-1735 borders (pop. 22 million), it would mean that tsarist staffing levels (1:1375) were similar to those in Austria, Britain and Prussia.[28] Even if we assume that no more than 75% of these administrators (approx. 12 000) were secretarial and clerical staff of non-noble and non-servitor origin who worked within a defined hierarchical system, relatively immune to political interference, subject to rules and procedures,[29] then staffing levels in Great Russia (1:1833) would still be comparable to those of its three neighbours. Without comparable figures on other empires and territories Russia annexed or incorporated after 1735, it is impossible to determine whether the tsarist empire was relatively understaffed.

By the beginning of the twentieth century the Per Capita distribution of central administrators to population in the major national states had expanded dramatically. The Per Capita

[23] IA. E. VODARSKII Naselenie Rossii. Moskva 1977, p. 191; N. F. DEMIDOVA Sluzhilaia biurokratiia v Rossii XVII v. i ee rol' v formirovanii absoliutizma. Moskva 1987, pp. 23, 37.

[24] E. V. ANISIMOV Gosudarstvennye preobrazovaniia i samoderzhavie Petra Velikogo v pervoi chetverti XVIII veka. S.-Peterburg 1997, pp. 215, 220, 238. Anisimov lists 2234 central officials for 1723.

[25] H. C. JOHNSON Frederick the Great and his Officials. New Haven 1975, pp. 17, 58–59, 283–88; C. B. A. BEHRENS Society Government and the Enlightenment. New York 1985, pp. 51; P. G. M. DICKSON Finance and Government Under Maria Theresa 1740–1780. Oxford 1987. Vol. 1, pp. 33, 307–310; IDEM Monarchy and Bureaucracy in Late Eighteenth-century Austria, in: English Historical Review (April 1995) pp. 323–367, here pp. 341–343.

[26] C. H. CHURCH Revolution and Red Tape. The French Ministerial Bureaucracy. Oxford 1981, pp. 95, 169; J. DUPAQUIER [et al.] Histoire de la Population Français. Paris 1988. Vol. 3, pp. 83.

[27] J. BREWER The Sinews of Power. London 1989, pp. 66–85, 104–105; E.W. COHEN The Growth of the British Civil Service. London 1965, pp. 34–35. The majority of officials belonged to the Excise Office. All sinecures in Britain were abolished by 1834.

[28] P. BAIROCH Economics and World History. New York 1993, pp. 102–108; P. A. ZAIONCHKOVSKII Pravitelstvennyi aparat samoderzhavnoi Rossii v XIX v. Moskva 1978, p. 221; V. M. KABUZAN Narodonaselenie Rossii. Moskva 1963, pp. 162–163. It is unclear if Zaionchkovskii includes those posted in the newly incorporated territories and non-Russian personnel left over from pre-incorporation institutions.

[29] J. P. LEDONNE Absolutism and Ruling Class. New York 1991, pp. LX, 55. Before Peter's reforms the higher Russian nobility (*dumnye boiare*) were distinct and separate from higher officials (*dumnye diaki*).

distribution of police was 1:690 (incl. prison guards) in Britain, 1:1469 in Germany, and 1:1965 in France.[30]

Table 1
Total Population, Administrators, GDP and GNP Per Capita c. 1910

	Population	Administrators	Ratios	GDP ($)	GNP ($)
Britain	40 831 000	335 495	1:122	4612	1302
British Empire	397 000 000	?	?	?	?
France	38 822 000	284 240	1:137	3137	883
French Empire	80 822 000	?	?	?	?
Germany	64 926 000	397 800	1:163	3449	958
German Empire	80 000 000	?	?	?	?
Japan	50 000 000	?	?	1251	?
Japanese Empire	66 000 000	?	?	?	?
Austria*	28 572 000	?	?	?	810
Austria-Hungary	50 000 000	227 482	1:198	?	728
Great Russia	65 000 000	?	?	?	?
Russian Empire	170 902 000	[a]187 266 [b]252 870	[a]1:914 [b]1:676	1218	398

* Includes 20 million people living in the six Slavic provinces.
Source: footnotes 30, 31, 32.

[30] FLORA (ed.) State Economy and Society. Vol. 1, pp. 42, 44, 49, 51, 195, 209, 214, 240. I determined the number of central administrators by subtracting given percentages of police from general government totals. Percentages for police in Germany are given only from 1926 when it was 15.8. I assumed 10% for 1910. Higher totals for the listed countries that include postal and rail workers as civil servants are in H. FINER Theory and Practice of Modern Government. Vol. 2, London 1932, p. 1167; figures in MANN Sources, vol. 2, pp. 904–908, yield ratios in 1900 of 1:246 (Britain), 1:91 (France), and 1:88 (Austria). The Statesman's Year-Book. London 1911, pp. XXXIV, 42, 613, 862, 981; D. F. GOOD Austria-Hungary, in: R. SYLLA, G. TONIOLO (eds.) Patterns of European Industrialization. The Nineteenth Century. London 1991, p. 228; A. MADDISON Monitoring the World Economy 1820–1992. Paris 1995, pp. 194–201.

The beginning of the century also saw the first published Russian article examining total public employment in the tsarist empire which claimed, in the absence of comparable data, that it probably had more bureaucrats Per Capita than any western European country (1: 292).[31] The author compared Russia and its empire with national states rather than empires, associated public employee with bureaucrat, and thought that an omnipotent tsar effectively ruled his lands through this undesirably huge bureaucracy. Most observers past and present have also equated public employment in Russian ruled Eurasia with bureaucracy in the negative sense of the term, and claimed that since it was so big reducing its size was a first step in any reform. This image persists today and underlies demands within the post-Soviet states for smaller government bureaucracies.

A minority at the turn of the century that included some tsarist ministers, on the other hand, believed that the government suffered from a shortage of personnel which was as serious a problem in administration as multiple subordination, corruption and the lack of a single legal system applicable to all. This seemed to be confirmed by an unpublished 1912 official compilation of civilian central government employees that indicated a Per Capita ratio of 1:676.[32]

Central Bureaucracies

A reexamination of the 1897 Imperial Russian census suggests that the above mentioned 1912 compilation was close to the reality. The census classified "Administration, court and Police" together in Category 1, and of these, 10% were courtiers (*pridvornye chiny i vobshche sluzhaschie pri dvorakh*), diplomats, servants, porters and watchmen, while 47 percent were police and firemen.[33] The figures given in Tables 2 and 3 below, accordingly, count only the actual central administrators: 43% of Category 1 at the imperial level, in Central Russia, and tsarist Ukraine; 40% in the Transcaucausus, 42% in Central Asia and 45% in the Polish provinces. In cities only 49% of Category 1 were administrators (47% in Central Asia), while 40% were police and firemen. Category 4, "Armed Forces," included

[31] N. RUBAKIN Mnogo li Rossii chinovnikov? in: Vestnik Evropy (1910) no. 1 pp. 116–125. Rubakin's total of 435 818 included foreign ministry and court officials, teachers, telegraphists, telephonists, civilian officials in the military, border troops, firemen, and all police forces. ZAIONCHKOVSKII Pravitelstvennyi aparat samoderzhavnoi Rossii p. 31 using ministerial records gives a total of almost 500 000 public employees in 1903.

[32] A. M. ANIFIMOV, A. P. KORELIN (eds.) Rossiia 1913 god Statistiko-dokumentalnyi spravochnik. S.-Peterburg 1995, pp. 265. 252 870 persons here listed on active government service include public employees like teachers as well as administrators, but they are categorized differently than in the census and exclude civilian officials in the military, border troops, firemen and police forces (fig. b in Table 1). If 187 266 are regarded as "central administrators" the ratio would be 1:914 (fig. a). Social restrictions on recruitment into what ministers knew was an understaffed bureaucracy were dropped in 1856. L. F. PISARKOVA Ot Petra I do Nikolaia I: Politika pravitelstva v oblasti formirovaniia biurokratii, in: Otechestvennaiia istoriia (1996) no. 4, pp. 29–42.

[33] Obshchyi svod po Imperii rezultatov razrabotki dannykh pervoi vseobshchyi perepisi naseleniia. S.-Peterburg 1905. Vol. 1, pp. 1, 9, 11; vol. 2, charts 20, 20a. Category I also includes as administrators an unknown number of lawyers and judges. Pervaia vseobshchaia perepis' naseleniia Rossiiskoi imperii 1897 goda. S.-Peterburg 1897–1905, chart no. 21. Ukrainian provinces vols. 8, 13, 16, 32, 33, 41, 46, 47, 48; Transcaucausus vols. 61, 66, 69, 71; Central Asia vols. 81, 83, 84, 87, 88; Russian provinces vols. 10, 18, 23, 25, 26, 30, 35, 36, 42, 44; Polish provinces vol. 51–60. Adding a tiny number of rural dwellers listed as part-time administrators in chart 23 to totals would effect ratios minimally.

a small number of naval and civilian personnel (2–4%) which I have excluded from personnel totals at the imperial, but not provincial levels where their numbers were insignificant.[34]

Table 2
Imperial Russia: Total Population, Administrators, and Troops 1897

	Population	Administrators	Ratios	Troops
Total	124 543 372	95 099	1:1311	1 096 649
Urban	15 499 926	82 321	1:188	828 469

Source: footnote 33

As suggested above, between the 1790s and 1890s the number of administrators in the empire had doubled but they were still relatively few Per Capita at the end of the century and the ratio would not change dramatically if it were to include the Zemstvo, City Duma, and village officials that played an important role in local government. Enumerated within Category 2 as *obshchestvennaia sluzhba* only 13% (13 994) of these 104 808 local men were either full-time or elected – and if they are regarded as 13% of all "administrators" (8% of urban administrators) the imperial Per Capita ratios would fall only slightly (1:890 – urban 1:174). Even adding 55 904 priests to administrator totals in the fifty provinces of European Russia (76 million Orthodox parishioners), would yield a ratio (1:552) still distant from those in western European national states – whose ratios we should remember would also fall if we include local officials into totals; not to mention volunteers and private employees.[35] Whence therefore the image of ubiquitous *chinovniki*?

Part of the answer, as noted above, was the inclination to count as bureaucrats all public employees. Issues of literacy, place and gender might also have been involved. If the number of central administrators is juxtaposed to the group most likely to interact with them, literate men (18 118 430 – 29% of all males), the imperial ratio would be 1:190 – and higher yet in provinces where more than half the men were literate.[36] Authors and readers residing in Moscow province (55% male literacy), for instance, could have easily imagined they lived in a society awash with officials if their province averaged one official for every 142 literate men; a ratio almost ten times bigger than the imperial average. If we count clergy as administrators among male Orthodox parishioners only in European Russia (33% male literacy), we could get a ratio of 1:97. Although such calculations might account for images in Russia, they would still leave the country undergoverned as compared to Western Europe which had higher rates of male literacy and more clergy.

[34] Soldiers, sailors, border-troops, and where possible, civilian employees of the military were excluded from the population totals in an attempt to determine Per Capita ratios accurately.

[35] Obshchyi svod ... 1897 g. Vol. 2, chart 20a. European Russia accounted for 9661 zemstvo, city and village council officials. On clergy as the spiritual arm of the government and their secular duties, which included violating the sanctity of confession in the name of the state, see G. L. FREEZE The Parish Clergy in Nineteenth-Century Russia. Princeton 1983, pp. 27–36, 63–65, 99, 459–460.

[36] Obshchyi svod ... Prilozhenie k perepisi, chart 21.

Table 3
Population per Administrator by Region

Central Russia	1387
Ukrainian provinces	1642
Central Asia	2038
Transcaucausus	1098
Polish provinces	942

Source: Table 7 below

Like administrators, police were also widely dispersed. In 1900, a 47 866 strong force meant an imperial ratio of 1 to 2595 people – 2152 including an estimated 10 000 Gendarmes. This was close to the French average (1896, 1:2324). In tsarist cities the ratio of patrolmen to civilians (1:700) approached the British national average (1881, 1:738) and was actually higher in the three major tsarist cities. In the countryside, by contrast, the imperial ratio averaged 1:100 000.[37] Outside St. Petersburg and Moscow provinces, Warsaw (1:551), followed by Tiflis province (1:719), had the most administrators, and the Asian province of Turgaisk (1:6563) had the fewest. Central Russia not only appears to have had fewer central officials than any European national state, but also fewer than some of the non-Russian territories. In general, staffing levels both in Great Russia and its borderlands appear to have been similar to those found in European colonies. Ratios in the tsar's European domains were close to those of French Indo-China (1:1063) and Algeria (1:1903). Tsarist central Asia, on the other hand, appears to have had many more officials Per Capita than did French African Colonies (1: 7386) and Indian Provinces under direct British rule (1:8846). The number of natives in local tsarist administration has yet to be determined for the entire empire but in the Polish and Ukrainian provinces, respectively, Polish and Ukrainian speakers comprised at least 50% of administrators.[38] In French Indo-China and British ruled India 68% and 75%, respectively, of local officials were natives.[39]

[37] N. B. WEISMANN Regular Police in Tsarist Russia, in: Russian Review 44 (January 1985) no. 1, pp. 45–68, here p. 47; P. S. SQUIRE The Third Department. Cambridge/UK 1968, pp. 105–107; A. N. MARTINOV Moia sluzhba v otdelnom korpuse zhandarmov. Stanford 1972, p. 7. Gendarmes in Russia were a militarized political police; FLORA (ed.) State Economy and Society. Vol. 1, pp. 49, 51, 209, 240.

[38] Pervaia vseobshchaia perepis'. Vols. 52–60, chart 22; S. VELYCHENKO Identities, Loyalties and Service in Imperial Russia: Who Administered the Borderlands? In: Russian Review 54 (April 1995) no. 2, pp. 188–208. Almost 60% of administrators in the Polish provinces declared themselves Roman Catholic. A. CHWALBA Polacy w służbie moskali. Warszawa, Kraków 1997, p. 236.

[39] Totals of 15 989 officials in Indo-China (1914 pop. 19 million), and 2708 for French Equatorial and West Africa (1914 pop. 20 million) include all public employees: P. BROCHEU, D. HEMERY Indochine. La Colonisation ambigue 1858–1954. Paris 1995, pp. 85; T.E. ENNIS French Policy and Developments in Indochina. Chicago 1936, pp. 72–77; H. BRUNSCHWIG French Expansion and Local Reactions in Black Africa ... 1880–1914, in: H. L. WESSELING (ed.) Expansion and Reaction. Leiden 1978, pp. 122–123. It is not clear if 2891 Algerian officials (1912 pop. 5.5 million) included natives. Annuaire Statistique. Paris 1914. Vol. 23, pp. 263. The Statesman's Year Book. London 1897, pp. 120, 505; The Stateman's Year Book. London 1914, pp. 859, 868. In India (pop. 221 million) the Indian executive

Approximately half of all administrators in Category 1 were urban, while the selected non-Russian regions accounted for 25% of the urban population and 20% of the administrators. Why towns in the Russian provinces of Kostroma and Viatka had the most officials (1:96 and 1:99) is unclear. Viatka, however, was a place of political exile where prisoners were often given government jobs and not fortuitously perhaps, such critics of *chinovniki* as Herzen, Saltykov-Shchedrin and Korolenko all served sentences there. The lowest ratio of administrators to urban population was in Samarkand province (1:636). The ratios for Ukrainian towns (1:234) and Polish towns (1:242) were lower than the imperial, central Russian and Transcaucausian averages (194, 186 and 209 respectively).

Imperial Russia's GDP Per Capita, much lower than France's, Germany's or Britain's, was close to Japan's.[40] But a definitive conclusion about the relationship of poverty to undergovernment must await a comparison of Imperial Russian GDP Per Capita with that of western empires as wholes, or of French, German, Japanese and British figures with that of Great Russia; as well as an examination of the relationship between incomes derived from tsarist territorial expansion and subsequent expenditures in non-Russian regions. In the absence of such data the claim that poverty accounts for the relative smallness of the tsarist bureaucracy is reasonable but unproven – particularly given that in the eighteenth century Great Russia did not seem to have been undergoverned relative to its western neighbours.[41]

Armies

In the nineteenth century the tsars commanded the largest army (incl. border troops) in the world – equaled for a few years during the 1860's only by the American Union Army. But Imperial Russia had fewer troops Per Capita than did Germany or France (excluding colonies); and not many more than Austria-Hungary or France including its colonies (1:124).[42]

and judicial administration employed 25 370 in 1897. B. B. MISRA The Administrative History of India. Bombay 1970, pp. 227–228.

[40] Table 1 above; MADDISON Monitoring pp. 194–201. Portugal, Mexico and Italy had similar levels.

[41] If an imaginary Russian national state made up of the 31 Russian provinces west of the Urals and 9 Siberian Provinces (pop. 63 690 443) could hire 0.7% of its population as administrators, like France, Germany and Britain, it would have had a similar official to population. A Russian national government staffed by the 68 402 officials listed as Russian speakers in the census – 72% of the imperial total – would give a Russian national state about as many officials Per Capita as Algeria (1:931) and point to economic underdevelopment as the fundamental reason of undergovernment. Such counterfactual reasoning, however, makes the unwarranted assumption that a Russian national state would have spent as much as the tsarist government actually did on administration in the central Russian provinces. Table 1 above; FLORA (ed.) State Economy and Society. Vol. 1, pp. 44, 195. Public services might also have remained understaffed. With over 20 million more people than Britain 1902, for instance, our Russia would have had almost 50% less postal employees (35 000 as opposed to 77 000) – assuming that those who declared themselves Russian in 1897 worked in Russia. M. ABRAMOVITZ, V. F. ELIASBERG The Growth of Public Employment in Britain. Princeton, NJ 1957, pp. 37.

[42] Regular force only. The Statesman's Year Book (1897) pp. 340, 356, 471, 485, 506–526, 545, 532. W. M. PINTNER The Burden of Defence in Imperial Russia, in: Russian Review 43 (July 1984) no. 3, pp. 231–260, here pp. 246–247, does not include European overseas colonial possessions in his comparative calculations.

Table 4
Population per soldier 1890s

Imperial Russia	114
Central Russia	284
Germany	89
France	72
Austria-Hungary	132
United Kingdom	367
Spain	220
Colonial Africa	1715
British India	1009
French Colonies	358
French Indo-China	417
Algeria	102

Source: footnotes 42, 43, 44.

Within the empire regional ratios varied considerably because in view of provisioning problems and inadequate road and rail systems, generals stationed the bulk of the army in the non-Russian borderlands close to potential enemies rather than central Russia. This was in contrast to European overseas empires who kept most of their troops in the home country – close to potential enemies. Britain, exceptionally, stationed 60% of its army overseas, where more than 90% of its empires population lived, but no more than 20% of the French army was stationed overseas, where 52% of the people ruled from Paris lived. Thus, tsarist borderlands had much heavier concentrations of troops than any European African colony, British India, or French colonies. France kept sizable forces in Algeria because of the unrest there, but far fewer in peaceful Indo-China.[43] The Polish territories were particularly heavily garrisoned with Warsaw province counting 1 soldier for every 23 civilians. The ratio was also low in the Georgian provinces, the western Ukrainian provinces of Kiev, Volyn and Podolia (1:82), and in Moscow province (1:88, urban 1:45). Higher ratios in Central Asia, and the Ukrainian provinces of Chernigov, Poltava, Kharkov and Ekaterinoslav (1:269), approximated that of the selected central Russian provinces and were close to those in the UK and Spain.[44]

[43] The Statesman's Year Book (1897) pp. 16, 55, 120, 133, 506–26, 948. British India had 219 601 troops. France had 117 303 troops stationed among its 41 949 800 colonial subjects: 45 542 in Indo-China, 43 529 in Algeria. The African average is derived from totals in the Belgian Congo, British East Africa, Uganda and German East Africa: A. H. M. KIRK-GREENE The Thin White Line: The Size of the British Colonial Service in Africa, in: African Affairs 79 (January 1980) no. 314, pp. 25–44, here p. 40.

[44] Obshchyi svod po Imperii. Vol. 2, chart 20a. Pervaia Vseobshchaia perepis, chart no. 21. Ukrainian provinces vols. 8, 13, 16, 32, 33, 41, 46, 47, 48; Transcaucausus vols. 61, 66, 69, 71; Russian provinces vols. 10, 13, 23, 25, 26, 30, 35, 36, 42, 44. British and Spanish totals exclude colonies; The Statesman's Year Book (1897) pp. 16, 55, 948, 953.

Table 5
Percentage Distribution and Ratio of Population, Administrators, and Troops 1897

	Total Pop. %	Urban Pop. %	Total Admin. %	Urban Admin. %	Troops %	ratio
Central Russia	17	15	16	15	7	1:284
Tsarist Ukraine	18	17	14	14	18	1:113
Central Asia	2.7	2.1	1.7	1.3	1.3	1:242
Tsarist Georgia	1.7	1.8	2.3	1.7	3.5	1:53
Tsarist Poland	7		10.2		22	1:38

Source: footnote 33, Table 3 above.

The presence of relatively few soldiers Per Capita throughout most of the Russian empire provides quantitative evidence reinforcing the claim that tsarist society was not militarized simply because it had a numerically large army.[45] Military spending represented a smaller percentage of the total budget and Imperial Russia also spent less per soldier than did its major neighbours.[46] Russia could not afford to call up all eligible conscripts and with an exemption rate of almost 65%, it trained a smaller proportion of its men than did any other major power.[47] With approximately 4% of its male population aged 20–59 in the army, less males in Imperial Russia were exposed to military life and values than in either France (9%), Britain (7%), Austria (7%), or Germany (6%).[48] Additionally, unless the recruit became a professional officer, he found that much of Russian army life was rather unmilitary. Not until 1903 were all troops finally quartered in barracks isolated from the civilian population, and only after 1906 did soldiers begin to live more militarily as they were relieved of the burden of supplying themselves with their own food and clothing, and working as hired labour to help pay regimental expenses. In the early 1900s 12% of the entire army worked as tailors full-time and as many as 25% of the men at any time in each battalion did chores full-time. A shortage of trained NCOs meant that peasant soldiers were free most of the day to organize

[45] Made by historians who have compared the Russian empire with European national states. It is unknown if data that combined overseas colonial with European figures would also support this conclusion.

[46] W. C. FULLER Civil Military Conflict in Imperial Russia. Princeton 1985, pp. 49–58; D. R. JONES The Soviet Defense Burden Through the Prism of History, in: C. G. JACOBSON (ed.) The Soviet Defence Enigma. Oxford 1987, pp. 162–169.

[47] G. BEST The Militarization of European Society, in: J. R. GILLES (ed.) The Militarization of the Western World. Rutgers 1989, p. 15.

[48] Obshchyi svod. Vol. 1, chart 12; FLORA (ed.) State economoy and society. Vol. 1, p. 251–253. 45% of imperial Russia's 62 477 348 males were aged 20–59. Western European figures included men aged 20–44.

themselves and behave as they did at home. Without their officers, consequently, the tsar's soldiers had no sense of being part of an integrated military machine, nor could they have because this was not their peacetime experience.[49] The officer corps itself was isolated from society. No tsarist patriotic-militarist writers had the stature of a Kipling, educated urban males were not enamored with uniforms, and they did not enthusiastically join reserve military units as did their counterparts in Britain or Germany.[50] In short, males in Imperial Russia appear to have been less influenced by the military and its values than were their counterparts in Western Europe.[51]

Conclusion

This paper has attempted to identify and count a group of full-time personnel in general central political administration roughly comparable across time and space. Although the resulting totals and ratios represent only comparative magnitudes, they suggest that after 1789 Imperial Russia probably had more administrators Per Capita than did European empires. Great Russia, meanwhile, had less administrators Per Capita than European national states, but more than some but not all of the tsar's non-Russian territories. A review of data on the tsarist army confirmed that it was bigger than those of its neighbours only in absolute size, while its Per Capita distribution indicates that Great Russia, which bore much less of a direct military burden than did its western neighbours, also had many fewer troops than did the non-Russian territories.[52] Non-Russian territories probably had more troops and bureaucrats Per Capita than did European overseas colonies, but fewer natives (as defined by language use) in local administration than in British ruled India or French Indo-China and Algeria, where they made up as many as 75% of local officials, mostly at the bottom of the hierarchy.[53]

Table 6
Population per Government Administrator

	c. 1800	c. 1900
Britain	643	122
France	197	137
Germany		163
Austria	1414	198

[49] J. BUSHNELL Peasants in Uniform: The Tsarist Army as a Peasant Society, in: B. EKLOF, S. P. FRANK (eds.) The World of the Russian Peasant. Boston 1990, pp. 101–111.

[50] P. KENEZ A Profile of the Pre-Revolutionary Officer Corps, in: California Slavic Studies (1973) pp. 121–158, here pp. 152–153; A. K. WILDMAN The End of the Russian Imperial Army. Princeton, NJ 1980. Vol. 1, pp. 38–39.

[51] If a Russian national state, like the empire, had 0.8% of its inhabitants under arms – which was half as many as France, twice as many as Britain, slightly more than Spain, and no more than Germany – it could have had a 509 524 strong army and been militarily equal to Britain, Germany, and France. This Russia would have had fewer troops Per Capita (1:125) than France or Germany, almost as many as Austria-Hungary, and more than Spain, Britain, Japan, and central Russia did in reality.

[52] Insight into nationality policies might be obtained by comparing staffing ratios to taxation, which was higher in the Russian than non-Russian Provinces, and to expenditures which were higher in the non-Russian than Russian provinces; MIRONOV A Social History. Vol. 1, pp. 8–10.

[53] Algerian departements, as much as fourteen times bigger and with up to seven times more inhabitants than their French equivalents, had the same number of administrators. C. COLLOT Les Institutions de l'Algerie durant la periode coloniale 1830–1962. Paris 1987, p. 45.

	c. 1800	c. 1900
French Indo-China		1063
Algeria*		1903
French Equatorial and West Africa *		7386
British India		8846
Imperial Russia	2250	1311
Great Russia / RSFSR	1375	1387
Ukrainian provinces / SSR		1642
Central Asia		2038
Armenian provinces / SSR		1448
Georgian provinces / SSR		948

* all public employees
Source: Table 1, footnotes: 25, 26, 27.

Travelers and oppositionists who imagined an ubiquitous police in imperial Russia had grounds for their belief. As educated urban dwelling foreigners and radicals they probably attracted police attention simply by virtue of who they were – and were more conscious of such attention than the politically passive rural majority. Nonetheless, statistics reveal that tsarist levels of policing in the major cities were similar to those in western Europe. The urban residence of writers critical of *chinovniki* also contributed to the image of an overstaffed government. As inhabitants of cities with unrepresentatively high ratios of administrators to literate males, authors were more conscious of bureaucracy's presence and shortcomings than those who lived in the country and small towns. Interestingly, "bureaucracy" did not figure as a major theme in the national literatures of those non-Russian regions with many administrators Per Capita: the Polish and Transcaucausian provinces.

This paper did not examine the reasons for undergovernment. It suggested, however, that GNP and GDP Per Capita for Great Russia as well as the empire have to be established before poverty can be regarded as a cause of tsarist staff shortages.[54] Similarly, staffing levels in Russia's empire should be compared with those in European overseas empires before generalizing about the relationship of territorial expansion to tsarist staffing levels.

The fact that parliamentary and authoritarian national states both had more central administrators and regular police Per Capita than did Great Russia would confirm that there is no direct relationship between the size of a bureaucracy and police force and the nature of a political system. Nor does there seem to be a relationship between size and the pathologies of bureaucracy. While tsarist ministers despaired about the immorality, unscrupulousness and absurdity of the higher administration surpassing the swindling and nonsense found on provincial and district levels, a French minister in 1912 remarked:

> "You write me sir, that no public service is functioning well in your village – not the distribution of water; [...] the streets infested, [...] an insanitary hospital, typhoid permanently in the lower quarters; schools which scarlatina and croup periodically decimate [...] a ridiculous

[54] This has been done for the Habsburg empire by GOOD Austria-Hungary p. 230 who demonstrated that the Per Capita GNP of the seven German provinces comprising the Austrian metropole ($ 1089) was considerable higher than the imperial average and almost twice that of the two poorest Slavic provinces.

> police force. Nevertheless, the budget is exhausted, and the town is full of functionaries who do not seem inactive. What are they doing? Where does the money go? [...] Calm yourself sir: for all France is in the same fix."[55]

Where big modern governments do differ from smaller pre-industrial ones is in the number of restrictions and procedures that they impose and, because of this, bureaucratization, big governments and "the administered society" are considered undesirable from anti-statist or radical free-market perspectives. Weber claimed they could result in an iron cage, while radicals condemned imperial administrations as tools of immiseration and exploitation. Yet, big European national state bureaucracies were not necessarily inimical to liberty or freedom simply by virtue of their size and duties, in as much as large staffs were needed to offer the modern services that gave citizens more options and choices in life than their great-grandparents had. It is difficult to imagine urbanization, population growth, pensions, mass schooling, or mail delivery, without professionals organized hierarchically and accountable to elected representatives, making predictable decisions according to laws and rules applicable to all.[56] The small size of the Imperial Russian bureaucracy tempered the tsarist autocracy and a dearth of central officials can also help explain the country's slow modernization, its failure to nationalize the Russians, and to russify the non-Russians. A small bureaucracy functioning badly in daily affairs provided little practical stimulus to direct peoples' conscious loyalties beyond the confines of village-kinship-patron linkages towards a supranational identity. Whether or not the relationship between the size of central bureaucracies and the evolution of self-government, national identities, and civil society in dependencies was the same as within metropoles has yet to be examined, as does the relationship of a colonial government's size to its nature and impact. Similarly, whether the part-timers who made up 87% of those who performed public duties at the local level in the absence of hired full-time professionals represented a vibrant civil society practicing self-government, or a remnant of backwardness, remains an open question.

[55] Cited in: H. CHARDON Le pouvoir administratif. Paris 1912, pp. 75–76. T. C. OWEN Entrepreneurship and the Structure of Enterprise in Russia 1800–1880, in: G. GUROFF, F.V. CARSTENSEN (eds.) Entrepreneurship in Imperial Russia and the Soviet Union. Princeton, NJ 1983, p. 83.

[56] A large state centrally regulating society must not be confused with the arbitrary exercise of power over society. A. DOWNS Inside Bureaucracy. Boston 1967, pp. 259-260; M. MANN States, War and Capitalism. Oxford 1988, chapter 1; and D. HELD Democracy and the Global Order. Stanford 1995.