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The Bureaucracy, Police, and Army in Twentieth-Century Ukraine: A Comparative Quantitative Study

STEPHEN VELYCHENKO

> "The more the state expands, the more liberty diminishes."
>
> Jean-Jacques Rousseau

> "Bureaucracy is not an obstacle to democracy but an inevitable complement to it."
>
> Joseph Schumpeter

The Unstudied Legacy

Ukrainian national historiography rarely mentions the subject of tsarist or Soviet government institutions, and then usually only notes their role as instruments of repression. In its subdiscipline devoted to "the history of state and law," Soviet Marxist historiography treated the Soviet administration more favorably than its tsarist precursor, but the presentation tended to be descriptive and the analysis of statistical data focused on issues related to the Communist Party. This neglect may be explained by the ideological assumptions of each of these schools of thought, and by the fact that after 1800 Ukrainians under Russian rule were unable to take major decisions concerning themselves as there was no "Ukrainian government." The subject of bureaucracy was made unattractive to historians and others by the negative portrayal of administrators (*chinovniki*) in Russian and Ukrainian literature, by the image of Russian-ruled Eurasia as a country overwhelmed by clerks, soldiers, and police, and by unpleasant daily experiences with officials.[1] Many undoubtedly shared the opinion of the scholar and writer Ivan Nechui-Levyts'kyi:

> And when they [tsarist officials] choose one of our Ukrainians for a higher administrative position, then it is one whose scrupulousness, obsequiousness, policing, and russificatory zeal outdoes that of even the most committed [follower of Mikhail] Katkov. So eager is he to make a career, that his brow sweats at the thought of it . . . These fellow countrymen are even worse than the foreign russifiers [who come here from] Russia and other Slavic countries.[2]

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After 1991, younger researchers in Ukraine and abroad began to study the country's bureaucracy critically, but scholars interested in Ukrainian political, social, and cultural history have yet to incorporate the subject of public administration into their work.[3] This omission is unfortunate. In the past and in the present, in Ukraine, much like everywhere else, the presence or absence of bureaucracy influenced development. In modern public life bureaucracy occupies a central role as the arm of government that implements decisions and faces citizens daily in routine affairs. Historically, as Alexis de Tocqueville observed, bureaucracy has an immutability that transcends political changes.

One result of the neglect of the subject—notwithstanding the opinion expressed by Nechui-Levyts'kyi—is ignorance of the role of Ukrainians *in government*, both in central institutions and in their own local administration. In 1897 at least 40 percent of all government administrators in the 8 tsarist Ukrainian provinces, and as many as 60 percent of zemstvo, city duma, and village council personnel, declared Ukrainian their native language. The presence of an unknown number of Russian-speaking Ukrainians, moreover, means that the actual percentage share of Ukrainians in local administration was probably more than 50 percent. The proportion of "Little Russian" administrators relative to the percentage of Ukrainian-speaking "Little Russian" educated urban males and nobles, meanwhile, was sufficiently large to suggest that before 1917 Ukrainians were more willing to take government jobs than were Russians in Ukraine.[4] In 1926 Ukrainians accounted for an average of 50 percent of all administrators, at least 57 percent of the regular police, and 44 percent of the secret police in their republic. By the 1970s, Ukrainians constituted the majority of their republic's administrative personnel at the top as well as the bottom of the hierarchy.[5] By comparison, in French Indo-China and British-ruled India before World War II, 68 percent and 75 percent of local administrators, respectively, mostly at the bottom rungs, were natives rather than outsiders.[6] Since the nominally "dominated" Ukrainians were part of the government that ruled them, and lived in a society where that government was the major, if not only, employer, it seems evident that the issues of their participation in tsarist and Soviet institutions and their impact on these institutions and on the larger society are ones that should not remain ignored.

Another subject that has been overlooked is the size of tsarist and Soviet administrations in Ukraine. As a result of this "blank spot," the prevailing literary image of Russian-ruled Eurasia as a place with an excessive number of bureaucrats remained unquestioned after the collapse of the USSR. This image, in turn, lent credibility to foreign neo-liberal analysts who advised international organizations to fund non-government organizations in order to bolster "civil society," and urged the post-Soviet Ukrainian government to reduce the size of its administration—just as North American and European governments had been doing in the 1980s and 1990s.[7] Critics were encouraged by the recommendations, although as of 2000 Kyiv had not downsized its bureaucracy.[8]

The findings of modern English-language histories of Russia and the more perceptive political studies on post-1991 Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, however, suggest that Ukraine, like Poland, should hire more administrators.[9] These studies describe Russian-ruled Eurasia and Ukraine as "undergoverned." Undefined in the specialist literature, and untranslatable into Ukrainian, this term embraces the idea that a government that has successfully monopolized the use of physical violence is unable to carry out policies effectively and efficiently because it does not have enough administrators. From this perspective, it was the small size of the bureaucracy, rather than its enormity or pathologies, that made the tsarist and then Soviet governments appreciably different from others before 1991, and which now hinders state-building in independent Ukraine.

This claim of undergovernment was not based on systematic research. Historians who made it did not distinguish between Russia and its borderlands, and they used it primarily in reference to the tsarist period. Political analysts who described post-1991 Ukraine in these terms without supporting historical data begged the questions of how a place commonly believed to always have had too many bureaucrats could suddenly not have enough of them, and how the "big government" that they advocated, commonly thought to be inimical to free enterprise, was supposed to have nurtured markets and property rights in European national states.

Bureaucracy is the best tool humans possess to accomplish collective tasks, and, as the number of tasks and problems increases, it seems rational to appropriately enlarge the number of people organized to cope with them. Some have pointed to a tendency for per capita government employment to increase with rises in per capita income.[10] Yet there comes a point when organizations become more of a problem than a solution. Jeremy Bentham invented a "felicific calculus" to determine how to maximize the happiness of each person in a given country. However, no one has yet devised a similar formula—which would consider such factors as wealth, objectives, and degrees of voluntary compliance and public activism, as well as total population—to calculate when a society has the optimal number of administrators it needs.[11] Any attempt to determine "undergovernment," consequently, must be made in a comparative context and with the awareness that the phenomenon is only partly related to per capita government staffing levels.

This paper offers a preliminary quantitative study of administrative staffing levels in Ukraine in light of recent scholarship that depicts "big government" as an aspect of modernity. Specifically, it will compare aggregate totals of central government administrators in tsarist and Soviet Ukraine with totals elsewhere in tsarist Russia and the USSR, and in selected European national states and empires. The paper also attempts to compare the size of armies and police forces, and thereby place issues of militarization, force, and terror in a statistical perspective. The comparison focuses upon four countries with which educated Ukrainians and Russians have compared themselves since the eighteenth

century, despite socio-economic and political differences: France, Germany, Britain, and Austria. Passing reference will also be made to Spain, Japan, and Poland. Figures presented for those countries that ruled empires will specify whether or not the calculations of per capita central government and military staffing levels include colonial possessions.

Methodological Problems and Sources

The eight tsarist provinces that became the Ukrainian SSR in 1922[12] will be compared with five groups of regions: first, the aforementioned European countries; second, the colonial territories of British India, French North Africa and Indo-China, Spanish Morocco, and Japanese-ruled Korea; and third, "Great Russia," for which this paper will give two sets of figures. One set will refer to ten central tsarist Russian provinces representing industrial and agricultural zones that later became part of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic (RSFSR), and which had roughly the same population as the Ukrainian provinces.[13] The other set of figures will refer to the RSFSR as defined in 1922, but excluding Siberia. To avoid counting Imperial and all-Union personnel based in St. Petersburg and Moscow into "Russian" government totals, calculations will exclude St. Petersburg province during the tsarist period and Moscow province during the Soviet period. The fourth group consists of the five Transcaucasian provinces that became the Armenian, Georgian, and Azerbaijani SSRs.[14] The fifth encompasses the five Asian provinces that later became parts of the Kazakh and Uzbek republics.[15]

These divisions, which correspond to national borders, follow the current trend in scholarship to view the tsarist empire and Soviet Union as places with an "imperialist" Great Russian metropole and "colonized" non-Russian periphery. It should be noted, however, that it was only on the eve of World War I that educated Ukrainians began to imagine their national territory as a "Russian colony" and that no more than two of thirty Ukrainian political parties between 1895 and 1919 included "anti-colonialist" ideas in their manifestos. Ukrainians seemed to have been more disposed to think of their relations with Russia in imperial-colonial terms only later during the 1980s: in 1989–1991, eight of the existing thirteen Ukrainian parties referred to the Ukrainian republic's "colonial" status in their manifestos.[16] For their part, educated Russians before the Bolshevik Revolution imagined "Russia" as a country that "colonized itself" rather than another territory, and did not elaborate an "anti-imperialist" or "anti-colonialist" trend in Russian thought. They did not consider themselves "imperialist" and would have differed about where to draw the line between the "Russian metropole" and the non-Russian "periphery." Such individuals began to regard the resettlement of Slavic peasants to the east as a "colonization" of the sort that Western Europe was undertaking overseas only at the turn of the century. Neither this term nor "colony," however, was used in reference to their "Little Russian" provinces.[17] In the USSR national and administrative borders

coincided. Statistics were broken down accordingly and Russians did not consider Soviet or tsarist Ukraine a "colony." After 1991, the idea that the USSR was an empire began to figure in Russian scholarly literature, but historians did not regard Ukraine as one of its colonies and drew attention to its ambiguous status under tsars as well as commissars.[18]

This paper covers the period of the twentieth century, but the main focus is on the decades between 1897 and 1939. The published data for that period permits a comparison of tsarist/Soviet official figures with the data on government administrators in the other selected countries at roughly the same time. Changed postwar Soviet occupational categories make similar comparisons of staffing levels in Ukraine between 1945 and 2000 with earlier Soviet levels and with those of other countries more problematic. Therefore, the postwar figures, in light of prewar ratios of population to administrators, can only suggest trends. The major sources used for Ukraine were the censuses of 1897, 1926, 1937, and 1939. From these I calculated totals and ratios (rounded to the nearest whole number) to correspond as close as possible to the correlated data on public sector employment found in Peter Flora and Jens Albers, *State, Economy, and Society in Western Europe, 1815–1975. A Data Handbook in Two Volumes*. Population and army totals were also taken from the relevant volumes of *The Statesman's Year Book.* For the 1980s and 1990s I used *Narodnoe khozaistvo,* an annual compilation published separately for the USSR and each individual Soviet republic.

Cross-national comparison entails the determination of which groups of officials may be compared with one another—a problem compounded by the different words used to identify "bureaucrats" and "administrators" in statistics. Categories such as *fonctionnaire, Beamte, sluzhbovtsi (sluzhashchie)*, and "clerk" were often imprecise and referred to different people at different times. For the purposes of this initial investigation, I have attempted to count personnel in general administration (executive and judicial branches). In the industrially advanced countries, this control group would fall within the rubric of "public sector white-collar employees with administrative responsibilities"—here including secretarial and clerical staff but not teachers, school administrators, transport, post and telegraph personnel, servants, and caretakers.[19] Because the very possibility of identifying a single such category comparable across time and space is doubtful, this paper can only claim to reveal approximate comparative magnitudes.

Another problem in trying to compare the size of governments revolves around the presence or absence of non-government administrators in private organizations and voluntary associations. These organizations—numerous, and often important and large in Western Europe as well as in the overseas colonies—both relieved the government of various tasks and prompted it to undertake others. Because they were few in tsarist Russia and non-existent after 1929 in the USSR, however, jobs or functions normally considered "private" in Western Europe were often in the public sector in Ukraine. For this reason, the

idea of "total public employment" is of little use when trying to compare central government staffing levels in Russian-ruled Eurasia with those of countries further west. Valid comparisons must either exclude from tsarist/Soviet totals those who performed similar functions as employees of private European organizations, the approach adopted in this paper, or include this private group into European country totals. Calculations from the pre-Revolution period must moreover consider a sizable group of officials that, after the 1860s, in practice worked outside the central government bureaucracy at the local level in towns and villages, but was paid by the state and was employed within a system that made no distinction in law between central and local government and self-government. As part-government, part-private employee, and part-volunteer, this group could be categorized as local administrators, but it had no organizational equivalent in Western Europe. Accordingly, this paper recognizes them as a group but excludes them from all totals. For the Soviet period, the matter of state-owned economic enterprises presents an additional difficulty. This paper could have included them into calculations because, unlike their counterparts in liberal welfare states—and in contrast to private corporations—Soviet ministries had socio-political as well as purely economic tasks. However, in the interests of methodological consistency, state-owned enterprises are excluded unless specified otherwise. Economic ministries were not part of the political administrative system, and their functions before 1939 in Europe were still undertaken for the most part by private corporate bureaucracies. No attempt will be made to determine staffing levels of local operational offices because of the difficulty in obtaining data on identifiable organizational units, nor will "local" officials be included in calculations unless specified otherwise. [20]

Finally, alongside methodological difficulties and differences in census categories, the lack of statistics, or skewed and inaccurate statistics make comparative examination of government staffing levels difficult. Even for France, a country with good records, historians of administration have noted that it is impossible to know the exact number of bureaucrats for any year before 1945 and that estimates of totals in the nineteenth century vary by as much as 115,000.[21]

The Turn of the Twentieth Century

At the beginning of the twentieth century, the approximate per capita distribution of government administrators to population in the major European countries possibly averaged 1:155 (excluding Russia). The per capita distribution of police was 1:690 (including prison guards) in Britain, 1:1,469 in Germany, and 1:1,965 in France. [22]

TABLE 1. TOTAL POPULATION, ADMINISTRATORS, GDP AND GNP PER CAPITA IN ca. 1910

	Population	Administrators	Ratio	GDP GNP ($)
BRITAIN	40,831,000	335,495	1:122	4,612 1,302
British Empire	397,000,000	?	?	?
FRANCE	38,822,000	284,240	1:137	3,137 883
French Empire	80,822,000	?	?	?
GERMANY	64,926,000	397,800	1:163	3,449 958
German Empire	80,000,000	?	?	?
JAPAN	50,000,000	?	1,251	?
Japanese Empire	66,000,000	?	?	? ?
AUSTRIA*	28,572,000	227,482	1:198	? 810
Austria-Hungary	50,000,000	?	?	? 728
RUSSIA	65,000,000	?	?	? ?
Russian Empire	170,902,000	[a] 187,266 [b] 252,870	[a] 1:914 [b] 1:676	1,218 398

* Includes Austria proper and 20 million people living in the six Slavic provinces of the Austrian portion of the territories of the Dual Monarchy.

Source: See n. 22.

The 1897 Imperial Russian census classified "administration, court, and police" in Category 1, but 10 percent of these were "courtiers" (*pridvornye chiny i vobshche sluzhashchie pri dvorakh*), diplomats, servants, porters, and watchmen, while 47 percent were police and firefighters.[23] Accordingly, the figures given in Tables 2 and 3 below only count actual administrators: 43 percent of Category 1 at the Imperial level, in central Russia, and tsarist

Ukraine; 40 percent in Transcaucasia, 42 percent in Central Asia, and 45 percent in the Polish provinces. In the cities, only 49 percent of Category 1 were administrators (47 per cent in Central Asia), while 40 percent were police and firefighters. Category 2, "Social and Estate Service," included all personnel associated with zemstvo, city dumas, and village councils, and 13 percent of these were identified at the Imperial level as elected and/or full-time officials—10 percent for the 50 provinces west of the Urals. Category 4, "Armed Forces," included a small group of naval and civilian personnel (2–4 percent), which, given the insignificant number, I have excluded from the personnel totals at the Imperial (but not provincial) level.[24]

TABLE 2. IMPERIAL RUSSIA: POPULATION, ADMINISTRATORS, AND TROOPS IN 1897

	Population	Administrators	Ratio	Troops
Total	124,543,372	95,099	1:1,311	1,096,649
Urban	15,499,926	82,321	1:188	828,469

Source: See n. 23.

As suggested above, it would appear that the tsarist empire had considerably fewer administrators per capita than the examined European national states. This difference would remain even if the definition of "administrator" is broadened to include zemstvo, city duma, and village officials. Although there was no distinction in law between local, central, and village administration, the census did enumerate these officials separately within Category 2. All the central Russian provinces in our sample had these institutions. By adding their 10,754 full-time and part-time personnel to the administrator total the per capita ratio would change to 1:804. The addition of 55,904 priests to administrator totals in the 50 provinces west of the Urals (76 million Orthodox parishioners) would change the ratio to only 1:552. Both these ratios are still distant from those in Western Europe.[25] Whence, therefore, the image of ubiquitous *chinovniki*?

Part of the answer to this question can be found in the practice of counting all public employees as "bureaucrats." Issues of literacy, place, and gender might also have been involved. If the number of central administrators is juxtaposed to the group most likely to interact with them—literate men (18,118,430, or 29 percent of all males)—the Imperial ratio would fall to 1:190. The per capita distribution of officials to literate males in the three Russian provinces, where more than half the men were literate, would be lower still.[26] Authors and readers residing in Moscow and St. Petersburg provinces (55 percent and 65 percent male literacy, respectively), for instance, could have

easily imagined they lived in a society awash with officials if their provinces averaged 142 or less literate men per administrator, a ratio almost ten times bigger than the Imperial average. This is noteworthy inasmuch as these two provinces were centers of literary creation and publishing, and images produced there were disseminated throughout the empire. If we count clergy as administrators among male Orthodox parishioners, then only in European Russia (33 percent male literacy) could we get a ratio as low as 1:97. Such calculations would still leave the tsarist empire with many fewer administrators than Western Europe, however, because higher rates of male literacy and more clergy there would mean proportionately lower population-administrator ratios than those given in Table 1.

In no Ukrainian region were more than one-third of the men literate. Consequently, it was unlikely, even in the provinces with the highest rates of male literacy, that the ratio of literate men to administrators (1:610 and 1:316 in Kherson and Katerynoslav, respectively) could have served as a basis for the image of ubiquitous bureaucrats. This would suggest that metropolitan-based Russian literature and opinions were more influential in shaping the image of the government among local Ukrainian males than their daily experience.

TABLE 3. POPULATION, TROOPS, AND ADMINISTRATORS BY PROVINCE AND REGION IN 1897

		Total Population	Urban Population	Total Administrators	Urban Administrators	Troops
Ukraine	Kyiv	3,527,208	431,508	2,424	1,991	32,021
	Volhynia	2,939,208	204,406	1,558	1,069	49,793
	Podilia	2,984,615	204,773	1,508	991	33,684
	Chernihiv	2,929,761	205,520	1,397	1,131	5,093
	Poltava	2,766,938	264,292	1,320	1,256	11,193
	Kharkiv	2,477,660	353 594	1,670	1,535	14,656
	Katerynoslav	2,106,398	234,227	1,066	839	7,284
	Kherson	3,094,815	765,800	2,572	2,577*	42,612
	TOTAL	22,190,098	2,664,120	13,515	11,389	19,633
Central Russia						
	Kostroma	1,385,219	92,764	1,120	964	1,796
	Novgorod	1,352,903	80,027	886	724	14,114

	Nizhnyi Novgorod	1,582,311	140,793	1,344	952	2,463
	Penza	1,467,964	137,452	917	750	2,510
	Riazan	1,792,106	160,018	919	728	10,090
	Samara	2,749,328	157,107	1,355	838	2,008
	Tambov	2,676,864	219,387	1,344	1,022	7,116
	Tula	1,415,174	167,895	925	787	4,282
	Viatka	3,028,942	94,280	1,534	950	1,889
	Moscow	3,441,834	1,109,747	4,720	4,950*	27,338
	TOTAL	20,892,645	2,359,470	15,064	12,665	73,606
Central Asia						
	Samarkand	854,069	129,631	210	204	5,952
	Uralsk	644,089	54,718	196	172	1,032
	Turgai	452,845	19,046	69	58	571
	Akmolinsk	679,202	71,374	938	417	3,406
	Semipala-tinsk	681,835	51,777	212	203	2,755
	TOTAL	3,312,040	326,566	1,625	1,054	13,716
Transcaucasia						
	Elisavetpol	873,644	87,541	624	451	4,771
	Baku	822,433	167,053	808	767	4,283
	TOTAL	1,696,077	254,594	1,432	1,218	9,054
	Tbilisi	1,021,674	204,379	1,421	688	29,358
	Kutaisi	1,048,715	89,835	759	689	9,526
	TOTAL	2,070,389	294,214	2,110	1,377	38,884
	Erevan	817,948	82,725	565	433	11,608
Polish provinces						
	Warsaw	1,931,867	845,243	3,351	—	82,139
	TOTAL	9,931,867	1,991,476	9,721	8,240	238,362

Source: See n. 23.

* These totals likely reflect inapplicable average regional urban percentages. The large populations of Odesa and Moscow meant that police and firefighters probably comprised more than 40 percent and administrators less than 49 percent of the number corresponding to census Category 1 in these provinces.

Of the Ukrainian provinces, Kherson seems to have had the most administrators while Poltava and Chernihiv had the fewest. Outside St. Petersburg and Moscow provinces, Warsaw (1:551), followed by Tbilisi province (1:719), had the most administrators of any province in the empire, and the Asian province of Turgaisk (1:6,563) had the fewest. There were fewer administrators in Ukrainian and Polish towns (1:234 and 1:242, respectively) than in central Russia or in Transcaucasia (186 and 209, respectively).

TABLE 4. POPULATION PER ADMINISTRATOR BY REGION AND PROVINCE IN 1897

Average for Ukrainian provinces	1,642
Kyiv	1,455
Volhynia	1,887
Podilia	1,979
Chernihiv	2,097
Poltava	2,096
Kharkiv	1,484
Katerynoslav	1,976
Kherson	1,203
Central Russia	1,387
Central Asia	2,038
Transcaucasia	1,098
Polish provinces	942

Source: Table 3 above.

Russia, the nominal imperial power, not only appears to have had fewer central administrators than any European national state, but also fewer than some of the non-Russian territories. Staffing levels in Great Russia and some of its borderlands probably approximated those found in European colonies—though Indian provinces under direct British rule, generally regarded as models of good administration, averaged 8,846 persons per official. Ratios in Ukraine appear similar to those in French Indo-China (1:1,063) and Algeria (1:1,903), and even if calculations included zemstvo, duma, and village officials, the Ukrainian average would drop only to 1:1,061.[27]

TABLE 5. TOTAL ZEMSTVO, CITY DUMA, AND VILLAGE COUNCIL PERSONNEL IN UKRAINE IN 1897

Province	Total	Ratio	Ukrainians	Percent
Kyiv	824	1:4,280	1,068	67
Volhynia	771	1:3,812	639	45
Podilia	748	1:3,990	836	58
Chernihiv	756	1:3,875	912	63
Poltava	1,032	1:2,681	1,734	89
Kharkiv	1,274	1:1,945	1,819	74
Katerynoslav	802	1:2,626	863	56
Kherson	1,201	1:2,577	761	33
TOTAL	7,408	1:2,995	8,632	61

Source: See n. 27.

There does not appear to have been an inordinate number of police in the Ukrainian provinces. In 1900, a 47,866-strong force meant an Imperial ratio of 1 to 2,595 people—2,152, if including an estimated 10,000 gendarmes. This was close to the French average (in 1896, 1:2,324) and far from the British (in 1881, 1:738). The ratio (1:700) of patrolmen to civilians in Imperial Russian cities, however, approached the British national average (1881, 1:738), and it was actually higher in St. Petersburg, Moscow, and Kyiv. In the countryside the Imperial ratio was as low as 1:100,000.[28]

TABLE 6. PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF POPULATION, ADMINISTRATORS, AND TROOPS IN 1897

	Total Population	Urban Population	Total Administrators	Urban Administrators	Troops
Ukraine	18	17	14	14	18
Central Russia	17	15	16	15	7
Central Asia	2.7	2.1	1.7	1.3	1.3
Georgia	1.7	1.8	2.3	1.7	4
Polish provinces	7		10.2		22

Source: Table 3 above.

In the nineteenth century, the tsars commanded the largest army (including border troops) in the world—equaled during the 1860s only by the American Union Army. Russia, however, had fewer troops per capita (1:114) than Germany (1:89) or France (1:72, excluding colonies), and not many more than Austria-Hungary (1:132) or France with its colonies (1:124).[29] Within the empire troop concentrations varied considerably: problems of provisioning and inadequate road and rail systems, rather than a policy of repression, were the factors that induced generals to station the bulk of the army not in central Russia, but in non-Russian borderlands, where they could be close to potential enemies. European overseas empires, by contrast, kept most of their troops in the metropole—which was closer than their colonies to potential enemies. Britain, quite exceptionally, stationed 60 percent of its army overseas, where more than 90 percent of its empire's population lived, but by contrast, no more than 20 percent of the French army was stationed overseas, where 52 percent of the people ruled from Paris dwelled. Thus, tsarist Ukraine supported much heavier concentrations of troops than any European African colony (average 1:1,715), British India (1:1,009), or the French colonies (1:358). France did keep sizable forces in Algeria (1:102) because of the unrest there, but far fewer in peaceful Indo-China (1:417, including native formations). Most heavily garrisoned were the Polish territories, with Warsaw province counting 1 soldier for every 23 civilians, followed by the Georgian provinces, the three western Ukrainian provinces (Kyiv, Volhynia, and Podilia), and Moscow province (1:88, urban 1:45). Ratios in Central Asia and the four eastern Ukrainian provinces (Chernihiv, Poltava, Kharkiv, and Katerynoslav) approximated that of the selected interior Russian provinces, and were close to those in the United Kingdom (1:367) and Spain (1:220).[30]

TABLE 6. POPULATION PER SOLDIER BY PROVINCE AND REGION IN 1897

Kyiv, Volhynia, Podilia	82
Chernihiv, Poltava, Kharkiv, Katerynoslav	269
Central Russia	284
Central Asia	242
Georgia	53
Polish provinces	38

Source: Table 3 above.

These figures indicate that only three Ukrainian provinces were relatively heavily garrisoned, and they remind us that although the army was big in

absolute terms, tsarist society was not "militarized." Imperial Russia spent less per soldier than its major neighbors,[31] and with an exemption rate of almost 65 percent it conscripted a smaller proportion of its men than any other major power. Recruits soon discovered that much of Russian army life was rather unmilitary. Not until 1903 were all troops finally quartered in barracks isolated from the civilian population, and only after 1906 did soldiers begin to live more "militarily" as they were relieved of the burden of supplying themselves with their own food and clothing, and working as hired labor to help defray regimental expenses. A shortage of trained NCOs meant that peasant soldiers were free most of the day to organize themselves and behave as they did at home, while the officer corps was isolated from society. No tsarist patriotic-militarist writers had the stature of a Rudyard Kipling, and educated urban males were not enamored with uniforms; nor, unlike their counterparts in Britain and Germany, did they enthusiastically join reserve military units.[32] In short, Ukrainian males lived in a society where they were less likely to be influenced by the military and its values than their equivalents in Western Europe. Up to 1903, the weight of peacetime military burdens on civilians was determined primarily by how many troops they had to feed and quarter.

The 1920s

The 1926 Soviet census lists almost two million people as public employees in the Ukrainian SSR. Since they all belonged to one big organization responsible for everything, from birth certificates to consumer goods distribution, and the USSR had no private sector bureaucracies, Soviet citizens seeking redress on any matter whatsoever inevitably faced only "the government" and understandably saw themselves enmeshed by an ubiquitous "bureaucracy." Category 8 *(uchrezhdeniia),* lists 315,000 persons in central Ukrainian institutions without specifying how many of them were full-time paid party members (*apparatchiki*) working in administration. Listed by occupation in thirteen subdivisions that reflected the government's monopoly on employment, these persons included ballerinas, couriers, and dentists. I integrated within this Category the figures on three subgroups (a, b, e) listing government, executive, and judicial personnel (*rukovodiashchyi, iuridicheskyi,* and *deloproizvodstvennyi personal*) as data congruent with my definition of administrator.[33] These subgroups exclude administrators in the state-owned economy and presumably include at least 25,000 paid full-time party bureaucrats at the all-Union level.[34] Soviet republic borders did not always correspond exactly with ethnic boundaries, nor were Soviet *okrugs* equivalent to tsarist *guberniias.*[35] However, as the concern of this study is regional ratios of administrators to population, not the density or dispersion of the bureaucracy, the relationship between pre-Soviet and Soviet territorial divisions is not detailed here, nor are figures adjusted to correspond to border changes.

TABLE 7. POPULATION, TROOPS, POLICE, AND ADMINISTRATORS BY REPUBLIC AND PROVINCE IN 1926

	Total Population	Urban Population	Total Adminis-trators	Urban Adminis-trators	Troops Police OGPU
USSR	146,419,267	25,748,503	289,964	208,145	614,870 70,415 29,806
UKRAINIAN SSR	28,926,000	5,263,000	48,965	33,932	119,046 13,716 7,304
UZBEK SSR	4,539,000	986,181	8,818	7,497	31,719 2,778 593
KAZAKH ASSR	6,709,000	517,220	7,783	5,387	2,223 1,340 490
AZERBAI-JANI SSR	2,302,000	637,842	4,726	3,704	13,028 1,935 377
GEORGIAN SSR	2,653,000	569,614	7,001	5,607	25,104 1,919 212
ARMENIAN SSR	872,775	159,088	1,785	1,430	8,515 1,013 131(?)
CENTRAL RUSSIA	21,504,480	3,907,364	41,417	25,294	137,143 8,466 476
Kostroma	809,774	114,984	1,820	1,330	1,845 512 90
Novgorod	1,041,641	136,737	2,051	1,137	8,963 431 239
Cherepovets	734,750	52,761	1,404	943	1,070 204 85

Nizhnyi Novgorod	2,737,995	442, 580	5,303	3,795	5,349 1,225 614
Penza	2,207,051	203,569	3,749	2,095	1,730 672 437
Riazan	2,424, 285	192,168	2,975	2,006	4,629 787 224
Samara	2,408,754	314,691	4,372	2,354	4,649 1,019 209
Tambov	2,720, 698	292,173	3,613	2,191	6,216 1,205 820
Tula	1,501,274	213,688	2,683	1,895	3,985 809 246
Viatka	2,223,573	137,863	3,605	2,203	1,259 734 285
Leningrad	2,694,681	1,806,150	9,842	534	97,448 2,868 1,515

Source: See n. 35.

These figures suggest that the Soviet Union in the 1920s still had fewer administrators than European countries in 1910, and about as many regular police (1:2,092) as prewar France—with more of them in the cities than in the villages.[36] With 24,703 of the secret police force (the Ob"edninennoe gosudarstvennoe politicheskoe upravlenie, or OGPU) stationed in cities, its all-Union urban presence (1:1,030) was conspicuously stronger than its overall ratio would suggest.[37] The Soviet republican central administrations appear to still have been smaller than those of the pre-1917 European national states and larger than that of British-ruled India (1:4,303) and French Indo-China (1931, 1:1,639).[38] Ukraine appears to have had the most OGPU personnel per capita of all the republics, its urban ratio being 1:929. As compared with Russia, which for the first time in its history appears to have had more administrators

than its nominal "colonies," Ukraine now had fewer administrators and more police.

TABLE 8. POPULATION PER ADMINISTRATOR, SOLDIER, POLICE, AND OGPU OFFICIAL BY REGION IN 1926

	Administrator	Soldier	Police	OGPU
USSR	505	238	2,092	4,881
Ukrainian SSR	591	243	2,109	3,960
Central Russia	519	157	2,540	4,514
Central Asia	648	313	2,731	10,386
Transcaucasia	452	104	1,197	8,094

Source: Table 7 above.

The Red Army was smaller than Imperial Russia's army in both absolute and per capita terms. With more troops per capita than the Japanese empire (1:353), it had fewer than France and its empire (1:129) or Poland (1:125).[39] Ukraine, as all non-Russian territories, supported fewer troops than before 1917, and fewer than central Russia, Spain (1:164), or France (1:98). Non-Russian regions as a whole, like before 1917, supported about as many troops as the French colonies as a whole (1:223), but many more than French Indo-China (1:909), British India (1:969), or Japanese-ruled Korea (1:1,333). Among the regions examined, only French North Africa (1:98) was more heavily garrisoned than the non-Russian republics.[40]

TABLE 9. PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF POPULATION, ADMINISTRATORS, AND TROOPS IN 1926

	Total Population	Urban Population	Total Administrators	Urban Administrators	Total Troops
Ukrainian SSR	20	20	17	16	19
Central Russia	16	15	14	12	22
Uzbek SSR and Kazakh ASSR	7.2		6		5.5
Georgian SSR	1.8	2.2	2.4	3	4

Source: Table 7 above.

The 1930s

In the 1937 census, errors were minimal, but because the results did not support Stalin's conception of what the USSR should have been like, most of the census material was destroyed and what remained was not published at the time. All-Union totals given in a second census taken two years later were acceptable to the leadership and were published, but not the more detailed figures which were instead sent to the archives. Although the 1939 census contains some dubious data, it is reliable if used in conjunction with the 1937 data.[41] The 1937 and 1939 censuses, however, lacked data on individual provinces or republics, and the categories they use corresponded neither to each other nor to those used in the 1926 census. In the published figures, those who in 1926 were listed as *sluzhashchie po uchrezhdenniiakh* were dispersed within the categories *rukovoditeli* and *deloproizvoditeli*, while government personnel were lumped together with Communist Party and economic ministry personnel. In 1939, but not in 1937, 21 percent of urban and 23 percent of rural managers/directors (*rukovodiashchie*) were classified as government administrators, while the remainder were listed as state-owned enterprise officials. Neither census identified *apparatchiki* or distinguished between state-owned enterprise officials and government clerical and secretarial staff (*deloproizvoditeli*). To try and determine at least an approximate number of the latter at the all-Union level, therefore, I arbitrarily applied the 1939 percentage of government managers to 1937 figures. To determine the number of government as opposed to enterprise secretaries at the all-Union level for the 1930s, I used 1926 percentages (76 percent of all and urban secretaries, and 82 percent of rural secretaries).[42] Missing from the 1939 data are lists of administrators and troops by province and republic, as well as republican regular police and secretarial staff. Such serious gaps obviously render all comparisons with 1926 and 1897 figures tentative.

TABLE 10. TOTAL POPULATION, ADMINISTRATORS, AND TROOPS, 1937, 1939

	Population	Administrators	Troops
TOTAL 1937	160,083,000	773,274	1,956,217
TOTAL 1939	167,600,000	865,908	1,903,910

Source: See n. 41.

The number of troops was more than double the 1926 figure (1:82 in 1937, 1:88 in 1939), which meant that even excluding the NKVD (Narodnyi komissariat vnutrennykh del) and border troops, Joseph Stalin's USSR had more soldiers per capita than any other state or empire—France (1:94 exclud-

ing colonies, 1:166 including colonies), Nazi Germany (1:116), and Japan (1:380 including colonies).[43] With more regular police (117,070) in 1937 than in 1926, the USSR still had fewer per capita (1:1,363) than either France (1936, 1:1,211), Britain (1938, 1:692), Weimar Germany (1930, 1:427), or Adolf Hitler's Germany (1939, 1:798).[44] Even if the 1937 totals for Germany and the USSR included all police organizations, the USSR would still appear to have had fewer police per capita (1:412) than Nazi Germany (1:384). Only if paramilitary units are included into Gestapo totals, as they are in NKVD counts, would the NKVD emerge with more personnel per capita (1:591) than the Gestapo (1:744). Excluding the "order police," however, the Gestapo numbered only one official for each 11,368 persons. A comparable ratio that excludes paramilitary personnel cannot be determined for the NKVD, but it could have averaged 1:11,000 if the OGPU totals given in 1926 were valid.[45]

NKVD figures for 1939, unlike those for 1937, are broken down by oblast and republic. They can give some idea of how the organization was territorially distributed, but since they also include an unspecified number of border guards, paramilitary troops, and prison guards, they have little comparative value. According to these data, Ukraine and the Uzbek republic appear to have had the fewest NKVD personnel per capita. The RSFSR (including Moscow and Moscow Oblast, but excluding the Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republics, or ASSRs), with 53 percent of the total population of the USSR, accounted for 55 percent of NKVD personnel, followed by the Ukrainian SSR (18 percent of the population, 14 percent of the NKVD personnel). [46]

TABLE 11. POPULATION, ADMINISTRATORS, AND NKVD BY REPUBLIC IN 1939

	Population	Administrators (excl. clerks)	% of all Administrators	Ratio	NKVD	Ratio
USSR	167,600,000	486,673	100	1:344	365,839	1:458
Ukrainian SSR	30,946,218	55,904	11	1:554	50,670	1:611
RSFSR (excl. ASSRs)	93,243,096	307,554	63	1:303	200,827	1:464
Uzbek SSR	6,271,269	11,149	2	1:563	8,121	1:772
Kazakh SSR	6,151,102	16,413	3	1:375	10,556	1:583
Azerbaijani SSR	3,205,150	7,647	1.5	1:419	9,897	1:324
Georgian SSR	3,540,028	7,301	1.5	1:485	10,346	1:342
Armenian SSR	1,282,338	3,892	0.8	1:330	3,526	1:367

Source: See n. 46.

By the late 1930s the all-Union ratio of administrators to population had dropped to half of the 1926 figure (1:207 in 1937 and 1:194 in 1939), and, as far as may be determined, the governments of the Soviet republics in the 1930s still had many more officials than British India, British Tropical Africa (1:14,761), or French Indo-China (1:2,345), but less than prewar Britain, France, Germany, or 1930 Japan (1:83).[47] Because the published 1939 figures on administrators do not reveal how 379,235 secretarial staff were distributed among the republics, the ratios in Table 11 cannot be directly compared with those of 1926. However, it is likely that Russia replaced Georgia as the republic with the most administrators per capita, although the ratio in the RSFSR probably would be higher if all-Union officials in Moscow were excluded from the RSFSR total, in which case Armenia might emerge as the republic with the most administrators. Particularly striking in the 1939 results is the revelation of how few administrators there were in Ukraine and the discrepancy between that republic's share of the Soviet population (18 percent), and its share of administrators (11 percent).

The 1980s

Toward the end of the last century, government staffing reductions seemed reasonable in North America and the European Union (EU), where, according to figures in an International Monetary Fund (IMF) study, the per capita ratio of general government employees averaged 1:13.[48] In line with these reductions, the IMF and World Bank recommended that Ukraine, together with the rest of the former Soviet Union, implement staff cutbacks.

TABLE 12. RATIOS OF POPULATION TO "GENERAL GOVERNMENT" EMPLOYEES IN 1979–1980

	Total Population	Administrators	Ratios
Austria	8 million	605,000	1:13
West Germany	62 million	3,732,000	1:17
United Kingdom	55 million	5,354,000	1:10
France	54 million	3,078,000	1:18
Sweden	8 million	1,216,000	1:7
USA	223 million	17,697,000	1:13
Japan	118 million	4,381,000	1:27
South Korea	37 million	1,176,000	1:31

USSR	263 million	2,233,000	1:118
Ukrainian SSR	50 million	430,000	1:116
Russian SFSR	137 million	1,283,000	1:107
Georgian SSR	5 million	59,340	1:85
Uzbek SSR	16 million	92,500	1:174

Source: See nn. 48, 49.

Yet if one of the historical legacies of tsarist and Soviet rule was an understaffed central government, such advice for a country where the ratio of personnel in "administrative organs" to population averaged 1:140 during the 1980s seems ill-founded from a state-building perspective.[49] In light of the European experience, Ukraine's attempts to establish private property and a private sector, a more prosperous society, the rule of law, and democracy should not only include a reform of the internal division of labor, practices, and structure of government administration, but also an increase in the size of that administration.[50] Conversely, staffing reductions might make sense for the Russian Federation inasmuch as its post-Soviet government is probably bigger than it would have been, had it only been made up of ex- RSFSR personnel.[51]

TABLE 13. RATIOS OF POPULATION PER GENERAL GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEE IN UKRAINE IN 1980–1993

	Population	Administrators	Ratio
1980	50 million	430,000	1:116
1988	51.7 million	456,000	1:166
1992	52 million	311,000	1:160
1993	52 million	436,000	1:119

Source: See n. 49.

Size and Administration

Governments historically were "effective" to the degree that they could penetrate towns and villages, implement decisions effectively, regulate relations, and use resources in specific ways. This growth of an "infrastructural" ability to control, regulate, or coordinate society via central institutions must not be confused with despotism or tyranny; nor should it be overlooked that the increased ability of the state to centralize, nationalize, and standardize social life within its territories necessarily increases or reduces despotic or dictatorial

power. One key reason why law-governed states in Western Europe historically were able to promote rights and check powerful private interests lay in the fact that they had the administrators to execute their will.[52] The territory within which this development occurred is called a "national state" if the inhabitants of annexed regions, as citizens subject to a single centralized bureaucracy, eventually came to accept the power of distant rulers as legitimate authority. Some use the term "empire" to refer to polities in which local populations did not develop such a loyalty, while others note that empires have no single bureaucracy and citizenship and keep the metropole distinct from its peripheries. If we consider Imperial Russia and the USSR as empires, then by this latter criterion they must be considered unique among modern empires because, like ancient Rome, their governments established single bureaucracies throughout their territories and attempted to merge all their inhabitants into a single state.[53] Among the important qualitative variables underlying this state- and empire-building process were levels of literacy, professional training, and work habits. Among the quantifiable variables, such as the methods and speed of information transmission and processing, was the size of the central bureaucracy and the army.

Opinions on when territorial expansion becomes "colonialism" differ, as they do over which peripheral regions can be considered "colonies" and whether "colonial modernization" fostered modernity. Similar differences surround judgments about the expansion of government and increases in staffing levels that have been ongoing since the seventeenth century within national states. On one side, advocates of the expansion of government and contemporary "state-building" literature see the growth of government as the extension of the democratic popular will and point to its benefits. In Western Europe—against a backdrop of rising per capita income, independent courts and judiciaries, and an administration based on legal expertise and procedural knowledge—bigger government brought with it citizenship, social services, and the enforcement of standards.[54] Larger government bureaucracies gave states an unprecedented ability to penetrate and mobilize society. They made implementation more likely and fostered impersonal-formal attitudes towards authority. Moreover, among the middle and upper classes, and later the lower classes, the notion was promoted that interests were to be pursued "bureaucratically," or institutionally via the rule of law and due process. In national states, the same bureaucracies that destroyed political, economic, and cultural localism and successfully disseminated single national identities, fostered democracy and prosperity because they had to function alongside well-defined private sectors that provided alternative sources of employment and services, the rule of law, and representative institutions.

Conversely, in a country with too few central administrators, according to the "state-building" perspective, integration will lag, decisions will be implemented slowly, and services will be few. In reaction, corruption,

unpredictability, clientism, petitioning, extra-procedural intervention, bribery, and influence-peddling remain as important alternative methods of getting things done—making despotism where it existed bearable in the process. According to this logic, one key reason why notions of impersonal and regular due process, systematization, and trust could not take root in Russian-ruled Eurasia lay in the fact that its government was too small to make decisions in routine affairs as fast, predictably, and effectively as constitutional monarchies with their relatively larger bureaucracies. Administrative arbitrariness and languor, the argument continued, alienated people from public institutions, and forced them to use dubious methods in pursuit of routine matters instead of motivating them to think in terms of a public good on an institutional level. The process of demanding and obtaining special exemption, attention or favors from a bribed or petitioned official, for instance, not only ran contrary to moral instincts, but also demeaned the notion of due process and the prestige of bureaucrats, and undermined the systematization and legalization necessary for effective administration.[55] Historians also have drawn attention to the fact that Russian-ruled Eurasia's huge size and small government bureaucracy meant that part-time amateurs, both conscripted and voluntary, performed a host of public duties at the local level well into the twentieth century. While some scholars stress this activity was neither professional, democratic, nor bureaucratic and caused more problems than it solved, others see it as the basis of civil society in tsarist if not Soviet times.[56] In short, on the basis of the European experience, this view notes that big government is a necessary condition of modernity and prosperity.

In their colonies, by contrast, European governments had few personnel.[57] They sought to rule through existing elites and structures and the relationships between ruler and ruled were immediate, personal, clientist, and paternalist-authoritarian rather than democratic. Afraid of violence and dependent on consent, isolated local officials had to rule through collaborators and win acquiescence by routinely exercising restraint and applying the sanctions of colonial law; they preferred not to threaten or use force. Judgments about colonial administrations have shifted from justifying them as an absolute good to a balanced view of their benefits and shortcomings,[58] but it is generally accepted that no European states had bureaucracies in any colony as large or bigger than in the home country and that, with the possible exception of Britain, they did not leave a legacy of "good government," however understood, in any colony after independence.[59]

Such critics as Charles-Louis Montesquieu, John Stuart Mill, and Ludwig von Mises condemned interventionist government in modern national states as an externally imposed tyranny, while Karl Marx took this view to its logical conclusion when he described the state as basically an agency of repression. Alexis de Tocqueville, for his part, deplored government bureaucracy as an instrument of subjugation, which was willingly accepted by people more con-

cerned with private pleasures and interests than the public good. In this tradition, critics of colonialism condemned colonial administrations as linchpins in a system of repression and exploitation.

The question that arises is which approach is most applicable to Ukraine, where the majority of the educated populace has only recently begun to regard its incorporation into the tsarist empire and then the USSR as "colonialism" rather than "state-building"? If the central policies of the tsarist and then Soviet regimes that were intended to foster supranational identities had no realistic prospects—because a small bureaucracy functioning badly in daily affairs had been unable to provide practical stimulus to force Ukrainians' conscious loyalties beyond the confines of village-kinship-patron linkages and because this bureaucracy was unwilling to promote modern notions of inclusive democratic citizenship—then did not these failures to assimilate Ukrainians and foster democratic values help preserve an ethnic basis for modern Ukrainian nationhood alongside premodern political values? How did open access to government jobs affect Ukrainian national identity and the national movement? In 1897, for example, the national movement was weakest in the province with probably the most administrators per capita (Kherson). The two provinces at the center of the movement and from which the majority of activists came (Poltava and Chernihiv) probably had the fewest officials per capita, while Poltava had the least number of literate males per administrator in Ukraine.[60] This paper did not attempt to answer these questions, but has provided a preliminary statistical context for their discussion.

Size and Terror

Control and repression is one aspect of the modern state, but a large state that centrally coordinates and regulates society, as mentioned, is not necessarily one which arbitrarily exercises its power over that society.[61] In the latter instance, a small secret police organization would presumably be as able as a large one to create an atmosphere of terror: the awareness that anyone could be arrested anywhere at any time. What the Soviet and Nazi examples suggest is that political decisions rather than the size of secret police organizations determine whether voluntary "popular policing" and denunciations, as opposed to "terror from above," play the key role in maintaining dictatorial regimes.

Recent research reveals that in Nazi Germany the Gestapo was relatively small in per capita terms and directed its limited manpower and resources against specific targets: Jews, leftists, the clergy, and sects. It regarded the overwhelming majority of ordinary Germans as basically loyal until the last months of the war. Between 1 and 2 percent of the population did denounce fellow citizens, but (except toward the end of the war) unless these victims belonged to a targeted group they were rarely punished and their cases were usually dismissed. As a result, " . . . many Germans perceived the terror not as a personal threat to them but as something that served their interests by remov-

ing threats . . . This acceptance helped guarantee that . . . the Gestapo would not be hampered by limitations to their manpower and means."[62] In short, the Nazis had a small secret police force that used informers but their rule in Germany was not based on "terror from above." The NKVD also used informers, and probably had as few personnel per capita as the Gestapo. Yet the NKVD, in contrast to the Gestapo, historians now argue, doubted the loyalty of the majority of the population, which implies that in the USSR, unlike Germany, terror from above was more important than "popular policing." Stalin and his associates, painfully aware that their rule was weak, directed the secret police to strike brutally, blindly, and wholesale at undefined "enemies." This strained the limited resources of the NKVD and can explain why most ordinary Ukrainians, unlike their counterparts in Nazi Germany, imagined that the secret police was bigger than it was and regarded terror as a personal threat to them.[63]

Conclusion

This paper has attempted to identify and count a group of personnel in the political administration of tsarist and Soviet Ukraine. It drew attention to the difficulties involved in choosing comparable categories and data sets, and noted that estimates of totals and ratios could only represent comparative magnitudes. It concluded that Ukraine, like all Russian-ruled Eurasia, probably was "undergoverned" before 1991 and remained so afterwards inasmuch as it probably had fewer administrators per capita than European national states, as well as Russia. A review of data on the Imperial and Soviet armies confirmed that Russian armies were larger than those of their neighbors only in absolute size; that only in the 1930s did the Red Army become the largest army in the world in per capita terms; and that Ukrainian territories were not particularly heavily garrisoned when compared to other regions of Imperial Russia and the USSR. Ukrainian territories before and after 1917, however, probably did have more troops and bureaucrats per capita than European overseas colonies. By 1930, the Soviet regime was allegedly the third largest user of data processing equipment in the world. Yet with no more than 25 percent of all village councils linked to the telephone grid, it is doubtful that this control technology either compensated for understaffing or made the government stronger and more effective in Ukraine than the post-1918 British, French, or Belgian governments in their colonies.[64] How Moscow's provision of health, education, consumer goods, and welfare services to its Ukrainian population in light of this administrative weakness compared with that of London or Paris to their colonial subjects, has not been studied.[65]

TABLE 14. ESTIMATED POPULATION PER GOVERNMENT ADMINISTRATOR

	ca. 1900	ca. 1926	ca. 1939	1980**
Britain	122			10 (?)
France	137			18 (?)
Germany	163			17 (?)
Austria	198			13 (?)
French Indo-China*	1,063		1,639	
Algeria	1,903			
French Equatorial and West Africa*	7,386			
British India	8,846		4,303	
Imperial Russia/ USSR	1,311	505	344 (excl. clerks)	118 (?)
Ukrainian provinces/SSR	1,642	591	554 (excl. clerks)	116 (?)
Russia/RSFSR	1,387 (excl. clerks)	519	303	107 (?)
Central Asia	2,038	648	452 (excl. clerks)	
Armenian provinces/ SSR	1,448	489	330 (excl. clerks)	
Georgian provinces/SSR	948	379	485	85 (?)

* Includes *all* public employees.

** Figures not based on the same definition of "administrator" as used for pre-1939 data.

Source: Tables 1, 6, 9, 11, 12 above.

Travelers and Ukrainian national activists and oppositionists all imagined police to be everywhere in tsarist Russia, and they had grounds for their belief. As urban dwelling foreigners, radicals, or "separatists" they probably did attract police attention and they were also more conscious of it than the politically passive and overwhelmingly rural majority. Statistics, however,

reveal that tsarist levels of policing in towns were similar to those in urban Western Europe. Stalin's USSR had fewer regular police than its western neighbors, and the NVKD emerges as an organization with more personnel per capita than the Gestapo only on the basis of totals that include an unknown number of paramilitary units and prison guards. In the mid-1930s Ukraine, together with Russia (excluding Moscow and Moscow Oblast), perhaps had larger secret police staffs than Nazi Germany, and the secret police was more numerous in the Transcaucasian fringe than in the Slavic center. Until more detailed figures become available on the NKVD, however, such comparisons are dubious. Moreover, comparison with the Gestapo suggests that terror is a result of a political decision and has little relationship to the size of secret police organizations.

If the tsarist and then Soviet government in Ukraine was understaffed, the question then arises of whether life there was better or worse for the population because of it. This is an important issue given that Western European colonial governments did not necessarily leave their dependencies in a worse shape politically and economically than they would have been as independent states. Another question that arises concerns the historical legacy of undergovernment for post-1991 Ukraine. From a state-building perspective, it would follow that any attempt to establish private property, the rule of law, and a private sector to foster prosperity and democracy has to include not only the establishment of a body of professional administrators organized into a unified civil service and subject to a distinct set of laws—something that did not exist in the USSR—but also the hiring of more central administrators.[66] Yet in the 1990s Ukrainian democrats did not desire more bureaucrats; meanwhile, analysts abroad, hoping to weaken a state with a legacy of excessive centralization, corruption, and unaccountability, directed foreign funding/loans into almost all sectors, but disbursed none for more hirings in public adminstration. Smaller staffs arguably made sense for the Russian Federation, which had more officials per capita than the Ukrainian SSR before 1991—even excluding personnel in Moscow-based central institutions. In the case of independent Ukraine, if the government actually does impose staff cuts averaging 30 percent of central personnel (roughly 4,000 people) in line with neo-liberal criticisms of the European and North American activist welfare state, it will leave the country with about the same ratio of administrators to population (1:160 by 1993 figures) at the beginning of this century as Germany had at the start of the last century. In light of the European historical experience, can such a small administration, even if its structures and practices are ultimately reformed, sustain an environment conducive to Ukraine's "civil society" in the twenty-first century?

Bureaucratization, big governments, and the "administered society" are undesirable from anti-statist or radical free-market perspectives. Weber claimed they could result in an "iron cage," and radicals condemned the imperial extensions of these administrations as agents of exploitation and repression. European polls, meanwhile, revealed that most people in national

states feared "big" government while simultaneously wanting to expand or retain existing government functions.[67] Clearly, modern governments do impose more restrictions and procedures than smaller ones in preindustrial times. Yet it is difficult to imagine urbanization, population growth, pensions, mass schooling, medical care, or mail delivery without professionals organized hierarchically and accountable to elected representatives, and who make predictable decisions according to laws and rules applicable to all. From this perspective, relatively big European national state bureaucracies were not necessarily inimical to liberty or freedom inasmuch as they offered citizens more options and choices in life than their great-grandparents. (What difference more administrators would have made in colonial development is not studied.[68]) Furthermore, what else in the modern world but strong and responsive central government bureaucracies can control local mafias, transnational corporations, and markets, which, if left unregulated to cater to private consumer rather than common public interests, can mutate into permanent forms of criminal syndicalism? As one commentator wrote, " . . . liberal values are threatened just as thoroughly by state incapacity as by despotic power."[69] Although the statement was made in reference to Russia, it is easily applicable to Ukraine.

NOTES

1. Bureaucracy was satirized by tsarist as well as Soviet Ukrainian authors, but as a theme it is less prominent in Ukrainian than in Russian literature. See Vasyl' Kremen', Dmytro Tabachnyk, and Vasyl' Tkachenko, *Ukraïna: al'ternatyvy postupu* (Kyiv, 1996), pp. 86, 303. Evgenii I. Komarov, *Biurokratizm na sud glasnosti* (Moscow, 1989), pp. 144–46, is a recent example of the traditional Russian understanding of the subject.

2. Ivan Nechui-Levyts'kyi, *Ukraïnstvo na literaturnykh pozvakh z Moskovshchynoiu,* ed. M. Chornopys'kyi (Lviv, 1998), p. 150.

3. Most studies devoted to the history of administration in Ukraine are published in the journals *Pravo Ukraïny* and *Visnyk Ukraïns'koï Akademiï derzhavnoho upravlinnia pry Prezydentovi Ukraïny*. Yet there are no entries on bureaucracy or administration in Oleksandr Myronenko et al., eds., *Ukraïns'ke derzhavotvorennia nevytrebuvanyi potensial: Slovnyk-dovidnyk* (Kyiv, 1997) or in Iurii Rymarenko, ed., *Mala entsyklopediia etnoderzhavoznavstva* (Kyiv, 1996). It is easier to find information on the subjects of national identity, civil society, postmodernity, globalization, gender and transnational markets, ideologies, parties and policies, language use, literacy, class, social structure, and urbanization in modern Ukraine than on its bureaucracy and administration.

4. Of the 18,359 persons in the "administrative legal and police personnel" category who gave their native language as Ukrainian, 70 percent (12,728) worked in the Ukrainian provinces. See Stephen Velychenko, "Identities, Loyalties and Service in Imperial Russia: Who Administered the Borderlands?" *Russian Review* 54(2) April 1995: 188–208 and Table 5 in this paper. Nationality, of course, has no necessary relationship to administrative efficiency, benevolence, or malevolence. See idem, "Local Officialdom and National Movements in Imperial Russia," in John Morison, ed., *Ethnic and National Issues in Russian and East European History* (New York, 2000), pp. 74–85.

5. See vol. 28, chart 6, and vol. 34, chart 4 of *Vsesoiuznaia perepis' naseleniia 1926 goda*, 56 vols. (Moscow, 1926–1933); René Houle, "Russes et non Russes dans la direction des institutions politiques et économiques en URSS: Une étude des recensements, 1926–1979" *Cahiers du Monde russe* 38(3) July–September 1997: 358–59; and Grey Hodnett, *Leadership in the Soviet National Republics: A Quantitative Study of Recruitment Policy* (Oakville, Ont., 1978), p. 104. Jews, not allowed to hold government jobs before 1917 and who constituted 5 percent of the Soviet Ukrainian population in 1926, accounted for 19

percent of the republic's administrators and 16 percent of its secret police.

6. The 15,989 officials listed for Indo-China (from a 1914 population of 19 million) include all public employees. See Pierre Brocheux and Daniel Hemery, *Indochine. La colonisation ambiguë, 1858–1954* (Paris, 1995), p. 85; Thomas E. Ennis, *French Policy and Developments in Indochina* (Chicago, 1936), pp. 72–77; and Henri Brunschwig, "French Expansion and Local Reactions in Black Africa, 1880–1914," in H. L. Wesseling, ed., *Expansion and Reaction: Essays on European Expansion and Reaction in Asia and Africa* (Leiden, 1978), pp. 122–23. It is not clear if the 2,891 Algerian officials (from a 1912 population of 5.5 million) included natives. See *Annuaire Statistique*, vol. 33 (Paris, 1914), p. 263, and *The Statesman's Year Book* (London, 1897), pp. 120, 505. In India (population 221 million), the Indian executive and judicial administration employed 25,370 in 1897. See Baidyanath B. Misra, *The Administrative History of India, 1834–1947* (Bombay, 1970), pp. 227–28.

7. Neo-liberal (or New Right) "New Public Management" reforms are based on the premise that less government is good government. Their advocates claimed they reflected a popular backlash in Western Europe against the welfare state and its high taxes. Although the existence of this backlash is very doubtful, Western European voters with fixed incomes do support tight credit and reductions in government staffing and spending—the same demands imposed by World Bank and IMF policies on former Soviet bloc countries. See David Osborne and Ted Gaebler, *Reinventing Government: How the Entrepreneurial Spirit is Transforming the Public Sector* (Reading, MA, 1992); *Survey of Public Management Developments: 1990* (Paris, 1990); and *Governance in Transition: Public Management Reforms in OECD Countries* (Paris, 1995); Max Kaase and Kenneth Newton, *Beliefs in Government* (Oxford, 1995), pp. 65–96. Hans van Zon, *The Political Economy of Independent Ukraine* (New York, 2000), pp. 39–43, does not explain how the strong state that Ukraine needs can function with a small bureaucracy. Civil service criteria for European Union (EU) membership make no reference to size. See Tony Verheijen, ed., *Civil Service Systems in Central and Eastern Europe* (Cheltenham, UK, 1999), p. 88.

8. See "Ukraine. Letter of Intent and Memorandum of Economic Policies" [16 March 1999], p. 5 at the following website: <http://www.imf.org>. The terms of the 1999 World Bank loan for public administration reform did not explicitly demand firing staff but suggested: "reduction on the numbers of state bodies and agencies of the central executive power and . . . consolidation of ministries and agencies." Larisa Leshchenko (World Bank), e-mail correspondence to the author, 3 December 1999. The U.S. government also implied it would like to see staff firings, which

liberal Ukrainian critics later welcomed. See the editorial "US Changes its Tune," *Kyiv Post* 9 December 1999; O. Holovko, "Winter Storms Ahead," *Ukrainian Observer* 23 December 1999. It is worth noting that much of former Vice-President Albert Gore's *From Red Tape to Results: Creating a Government that Works Better and Costs Less* (Washington, 1993) was written by David Osborne and reflects his ideas.

9. Joachim J. Hesse, ed., *Administrative Transformation in Central and Eastern Europe: Towards Public Sector Reform in Post-Communist Societies* (Oxford, 1993), pp. 243–44, and C. Torres-Bartyzel and G. Kacprowicz, "The National Civil Service System in Poland," in *Civil Service Systems,* p. 182. Alexander J. Motyl, *Dilemmas of Independence: Ukraine after Totalitarianism* (New York, 1993), pp. 65, 164, and Bohdan Krawchenko, "From Communism to Democracy: The Challenge of Public Service Reform in Ukraine," *Ukraine-Canada Policy and Trade Monitor* 1 (1993): 33–40, first drew attention to independent Ukraine's understaffed state. The subject was first analyzed in Paul D'Anieri, Robert Kravchuk, and Taras Kuzio, *Politics and Society in Ukraine* (Boulder, 1999), pp. 90–140. See also Bohdan Krawchenko, "The Law on the Civil Service," in Taras Kuzio, Robert S. Kravchuk, and Paul D'Anieri, eds., *State and Institution Building in Ukraine* (New York, 1999), pp. 135–154. S. Frederick Starr, *Decentralization and Self-Government in Russia, 1830-1870* (Princeton, NJ, 1972), pp. 26–49, was perhaps the first historian to draw attention to "undergovernment" in Imperial Russia.

10. Peter S. Heller and Alan A. Tait, *Government Employment and Pay: Some International Comparisons* (Washington, 1983), pp. 15, 35; Marshall Meyer, *Limits to Bureaucratic Growth* (New York, 1985); Harvey Feigenbaum, Jeffrey Henig, and Chris Hamnett, *Shrinking the State: The Political Underpinnings of Privatization* (Cambridge, UK, 1998), pp. 14–35.

11. Nonetheless, laws strictly limit the number of government employees in Japan. Ceilings can be changed only with the approval of the cabinet and parliament, while no new organizational unit may be created unless another is abolished. See Hyung-ki Kim et al., eds., *The Japanese Civil Service and Economic Development: Catalysts of Change* (Oxford, 1995), p. 532, and Paul S. Kim, *Japan's Civil Service System* (New York, 1988), pp. 15–16.

12. Kyiv, Volhynia, Podilia, Chernihiv, Poltava, Kharkiv, Katerynoslav, and Kherson.

13. Kostroma, Novgorod, Nizhnyi Novgorod (Gorky), Penza, Riazan, Samara (Kuibyshev), Tambov, Tula, Viatka (Kirov), Moscow.

14. Erevan, Tbilisi, Kutaisi, Elizavetpol, Baku.

15. Uralsk, Turgai, Akmolinsk, Semipalatinsk, Samarkand.

16. Volodymyr F. Shevchenko, ed., *Ukraïns'ki politychni partiï v kintsi xix-pochatku xx stolittia* (Kyiv, 1993); Oleksii Haran', ed., *Ukraïna bahatopartiina: prohramni dokumenty novykh partii* (Kyiv, 1991).

17. Willard Sunderland, "The 'Colonization Question': Visions of Colonization in Late Imperial Russia," in *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas* 48(2) (2000): 212. The tsarist empire became a nationally "Russian" empire only in the middle of the nineteenth century. See Hugh Seton-Watson, *The New Imperialism* (Chester Springs, PA, 1961), p. 23. On tsarist/Soviet imperial continuities, see Dominic Lieven, *Empire: The Russian Empire and its Rivals* (London, 2000), pp. 288–344.

18. Although subjected to russification, Ukraine had centers of industry, and Ukrainians held important positions in central government and dominated local government. See Boris A. Rybakov et al., eds., *Istoriia Rossii,* vol. 1 (Moscow, 1994), p. 16; Sergei V. Kuleshov et al., *Natsional'naia politika Rossii: istoriia i sovremennost'* (Moscow, 1997), pp. 35, 174–79, 296–305; and Aleksandr V. Nikonov, Aleksandr I. Vdovin, and V. Iu. Zorin, *Russkii narod v natsional'noi politike xx vek* (Moscow, 1998), pp. 11–13, 167, 173, 201–10.

19. Peter Flora and Jens Albers, *State, Economy, and Society in Western Europe, 1815–1975. A Data Handbook in Two Volumes*, vol. 1 (Frankfurt am Main, 1983), p. 193. Only the 1897 and 1926 censuses used categories suggested by the International Institute of Statistics. For methodological issues, see Charles L. Taylor, ed., *Why Governments Grow: Measuring Public Sector Size* (Beverly Hills, 1983); Charles T. Goodsell, *The Case for Bureaucracy: A Public Administration Polemic* (Chatham, NJ, 1983) pp. 110–16; Ralph Clem, ed., *Research Guide to the Russian and Soviet Censuses* (Ithaca, NY, 1986); and Alain Blum, *Naitre, vivre et mourir en URSS: 1917–1991* (Paris, 1994), pp. 60–64.

20. Russia, like France, Germany, Italy, and Britain, spent over 50 percent of its budget on central government (military, justice, and administration) at the turn of the century, but unlike them, allotted much less (8 percent) to "local" government. Tsarist local personnel, moreover, were "local" only in theory and comprised a smaller percentage of total full-time administrators than did their counterparts further west who averaged 40 percent or more of all personnel at the turn of the century. See R. Rose, "From Government at the Centre to Nationwide Government," in Yves Meny and Vincent Wright, eds., *Centre-Periphery Relations in Western Europe* (London, 1985), p. 17; Aleksandr P. Pogrebinskii, *Gosudarstvennye finansy tsarskoi Rossii v epokhu imperializma* (Moscow, 1968), p. 29; and Peter Gatrell, "Economic Culture, Economic Policy and Economic

Growth in Russia, 1861–1914," *Cahiers du Monde russe* 36(1–2) January-June 1995: 40.

21. Guy Thuillier, *La bureaucratie en France aux XIXe et XXe siècles* (Paris, 1987), pp. x, 8.

22. Flora and Albers, *State, Economy and Society,* vol. 1, pp. 42, 44, 49, 51, 195, 209, 214, 240. The percentages given there for police in Germany are only from 1926. I assumed police constituted 10 percent of "general administrators" in 1910. See *The Statesman's Yearbook* (London, 1911), pp. xxxiv, 42, 613, 862, 981. Higher totals for the listed countries that include postal and rail workers as "civil servants" can be found in Herman Finer, *Theory and Practice of Modern Government*, vol. 2 (London, 1932), p. 1167. Figures compiled by Michael Mann, *The Sources of Social Power*, vol. 2 (Cambridge, 1986), pp. 804–808, give ratios of 1:246, 1:91, and 1:87 in 1900 for Britain, France, and Austria, respectively. See also D. F. Good, "Austria-Hungary," in Richard Sylla and Gianni Toniolo, eds., *Patterns of European Industrialization. The Nineteenth Century* (London, 1991), p. 228, and Angus Maddison, *Monitoring the World Economy, 1820–1992* (Paris, 1995), pp. 194–201. Russian figures are from an unpublished 1912 government study: Andrei M. Anifimov and Avenir P. Korelin, eds., *Rossiia 1913 god: statistiko-dokumental'nyi spravochnik* (St. Petersburg, 1995), pp. 265. The 252,870 (b in Table 1) persons listed on "active government service" here include public employees such as teachers, but they are categorized differently than in the 1897 census and the number excludes civilian officials in the military, border troops, firefighters, and police forces. The 187,266 (a in Table 1) would be "administrators" as defined in this paper.

23. *Obshchii svod po Imperii rezul'tatov razrabotki dannykh Pervoi vseobshchei perepisi naseleniia, proizvedennoi 28 ianvaria 1897 goda,* vol. 1 (St. Petersburg, 1905), pp. 1, 9, 11, and vol. 2, charts 20, 20a. Category 1 also includes as administrators an unspecified number of lawyers and judges. See *Pervaia vseobshchaia perepis' naseleniia Rossiiskoi Imperii 1897 goda* (St. Peterburg, 1897–1905), chart 21. For the Ukrainian provinces, see vols. 8, 13, 16, 32, 33, 41, 46, 47, and 48; for Transcaucasia, vols. 61, 66, 69, and 71; for Central Asia, vols. 81, 83, 84, 87, and 88; for the Russian provinces, vols. 10, 18, 23, 25, 26, 30, 35, 36, 42, and 44; and for the Polish provinces, vols. 51–60. The addition of a tiny number of rural dwellers listed as part-time administrators (chart 23) to totals would affect ratios minimally, if at all.

24. Soldiers, sailors, border troops, and, where possible, civilian employees of the military were excluded from the population totals in an attempt to determine per capita ratios accurately.

25. Neil B. Weissman, *Reform in Tsarist Russia: The State Bureaucracy and Local Government, 1900–1914* (New Brunswick, 1981), pp. 16–17, 222; *Obshchii svod po Imperii*, vol. 2, chart 20a. At the Imperial level, 13 percent of the 104,808 persons listed under *obshchestvennaia sluzhba* were either elected or full-time officials and another 36 percent (45,300) served part-time. For the subject of the clergy as the spiritual arm of the government and their secular duties, which included violating the sanctity of confession in the name of the state, see Gregory L. Freeze, *The Parish Clergy in Nineteenth-Century Russia* (Princeton, NJ, 1983), pp. 27–36, 63–65, 99, 459–60.

26. *Obshchii svod po Imperii*, vol. 2, chart 21.

27. In the fifty provinces west of the Urals, 52 percent of the *obshchestvennaia sluzhba* category were elected as full-time and part-time officials. The figures in the total and ratio columns in Table 5 reflect this percentage. The remainder were caretakers, watchmen, and messengers. Thus, the "total" column represents the 52 percent of all the members of the *obshchestvennaia sluzhba* who were officials and not the latter groups. The figures in the Ukrainian column, however, include all within the *obshchestvennaia sluzhba* category because the subcategories were not broken down by language. *Pervaia vseobshchaia perepis'*, chart 21. *Obshchii svod po Imperii*, vol. 2, chart 20a.

28. Imperial police totals cannot be determined from the census, which included them along with gendarmes and rural firefighters into one category, while the secondary literature does not list totals by region: Neil B. Weissman, "Regular Police in Tsarist Russia," *Russian Review* 44(1) January 1985: 47; Peter S. Squire *The Third Department: The Establishment and Practices of the Political Police in the Russia of Nicholas I* (London, 1968), pp. 105–107; and A. N. Martynov, *Moia sluzhba v otdel'nom korpuse zhandarmov* (Stanford, 1972), p. 7. Gendarmes in Russia were a militarized political police. See Flora and Albers, *State, Economy and Society*, vol. 1, pp. 49, 51, 209, 240.

29. This applies to the regular force only. See *The Statesman's Year Book* (London, 1897), pp. 340, 356, 471, 485, 506–26, 545, 532. Walter M. Pintner, "The Burden of Defense in Imperial Russia," *Russian Review* 43(3) July 1984: 246-47, does not include European overseas colonial possessions in his comparative calculations.

30. *The Statesman's Year Book* (1897), pp. 16, 55, 120, 133, 506–26, 948. British India had 219,601 troops. France had 117,303 troops stationed among its 41,949,800 colonial subjects (45,542 in Indo-China, 43,529 in Algeria). The African average is derived from totals in the Belgian Congo, British East Africa, Uganda and German East Africa. See An-

thony H. M. Kirk-Greene, "The Thin White Line: The Size of the British Colonial Service in Africa," *African Affairs* 79(314) January 1980: 40.

31. William C. Fuller, *Civil Military Conflict in Imperial Russia, 1881–1914* (Princeton, NJ, 1985), pp. 49–58; D. R. Jones, "The Soviet Defense Burden Through the Prism of History," in Carl G. Jacobsen, ed., *The Soviet Defense Enigma: Estimating Costs and Burden* (Oxford, 1987), pp. 162–69; G. Best, "The Militarization of European Society," in John R. Gillis, ed., *The Militarization of the Western World* (New Brunswick, NJ, 1989), p. 15.

32. John Bushnell, "Peasants in Uniform: The Tsarist Army as a Peasant Society," in Ben Eklof and Stephen P. Frank, ed., *The World of the Russian Peasant* (Boston, 1990), pp. 101–11; Peter Kenez, "A Profile of the Pre-Revolutionary Officer Corps," *California Slavic Studies* 7 (1973): 152–53; Alan K. Wildman, *The End of the Russian Imperial Army*, vol. 1 (Princeton, NJ, 1980), pp. 38–39.

33. Neither the 1926 census nor the 1937 and 1939 censuses identify Finance Ministry personnel, who are also probably excluded from the figures in Flora and Albers, *State, Economy and Society*. My "total administrators" for 1926 therefore excludes group D (*uchetno-kontrol'nyi* personnel)—451,874 at the all-Union level, excluding instructors and statisticians—and 115,944 "directors" of cultural and medicinal facilities as well (subdivision no. 204), or 57 percent of the 197,806 counted at the all-Union level as directors and managers. Vol. 34, charts 5, 5a, 6.

34. Merle Fainsod, *How Russia is Ruled*, rev. ed. (Cambridge, MA, 1963), pp. 190, 205.

35. *Vsesoiuznaia perepis' naseleniia 1926 g.*, vol. 34, charts 4 and 5 (USSR), and charts 6 and 7 (Ukrainian SSR); vol. 28, charts 6a (Georgian, Armenian, and Azerbaijani SSRs); vol. 31 (Kazakh ASSR); vol. 25 (Uzbek SSR); vol. 32 (Russian provinces); and vols. 18–21, charts 4, 4a. The Ukrainian and Transcaucasian SSRs occupied roughly the same territories as the thirteen tsarist provinces they replaced. The Kazakh ASSR included parts of the old Transcaspian, Syr Daria, and Semerechinsk provinces, as well as the Uralsk, Turgai, Akmolinsk, and Semipalatinsk provinces. The Uzbek SSR included parts of the Samarkand and Syr Daria provinces as well as half of the Bukhara Khanate. The area of the 10 selected tsarist central Russian provinces in 1926 contained one more unit formed from part of old Novgorod province—Cherepovets. See the detailed map comparing Kyiv's provincial boundaries in 1926 and 1897 in Ansley J. Coale, Barbara A. Anderson, and Erna Harm, *Human Fertility in Russia since the Nineteenth Century* (Princeton, NJ, 1979), p. 226.

36. *Vsesoiuznaia perepis' naseleniia 1926 g.*, vol. 34, chart 5. Including 7,545 factory and transport police (vol. 34, chart 6).

37. Ibid., vol. 34, chart 5, included "other security personnel" under the all-Union "Security Organs" category no. 274, which presumably meant the OGPU. This category is not separately given anywhere else, but provincial and republican totals may be calculated by subtracting the number of police, prison guards, and firefighters from the "security organs" total. In 1924, the chief of the OGPU indicated that his organization numbered 24,700 employees, excluding border troops. See Lennard D. Gerson, *The Secret Police in Lenin's Russia* (Philadelphia, 1976), p. 310n14. V. S. Izmozik, *Glaza i ushi rezhima: Gosudarstvennyi politicheskii kontroľ za naseleniem sovetskoi Rossii v 1918–1928 godakh* (St. Petersburg, 1995), p. 120, notes that the secret police had well over 100,000 personnel in 1924. If so, the question arises of whether the total at the time was understated knowingly.

38. *Annuaire de documentation coloniale comparee. Année 1937*, vol. 2 (Brussels, 1937), p. 116. Europeans (23 percent of 12,508 officials) held the higher positions. See *The Statesman's Year Book* (London, 1933), p. 121. There were 82,000 central Indian ministry employees in the 1930s. See Bankey B. Misra, *Government and Bureaucracy in India* (Delhi, 1986), p. 124.

39. *The Statesman's Year Book* (London, 1927), pp. 854, 865, 866, 880, 1043, 1048, 1190, 1194, 1282, 1286.

40. Ibid., pp. 117, 129, 882, 893. British figures refer to that part of India under direct rule.

41. *Vsesoiuznaia perepiś naseleniia 1937 goda. Kratkie itogi* (Moscow, 1991), pp. 142–57; *Vsesoiuznaia perepiś naseleniia 1939 goda. Osnovnye itogi* (Moscow, 1992), pp. 112–15. For an analysis of the politics and reliability of these two censuses, see the introductions to the above publications and V. B. Zhiromskaia, I. N. Kiselev, and Iu. A. Poliakov, *Polveka pod grifom "sekretno": Vsesoiuznaia perepiś naseleniia 1937 goda* (Moscow, 1996). See also Catherine Merridale, "The 1937 Census and the Limits of Stalinist Rule," *The Historical Journal* 39(1) 1996: 225–40.

42. *Vsesouiznaia perepiś naseleniia 1926 g.*, vol. 34, chart 5. Of 245,963 clerks and secretaries, 187,495 were in government administration (urban: 146,341 of 192,726; rural: 41,154 of 50,455). In 1926 and 1937 this category included an unspecified number of "correspondents." Soviet data enumerated separately judges and "legal workers," who are normally not considered administrators. However, since the 1897 census included these professions within the administration rubric, I must include them into my Soviet administrator totals as well. In 1937 army totals included an unspecified number of border troops who in 1939 were reclassified under the NKVD.

43. *The Statesman's Year Book* (London, 1937), pp. 11, 45, 887, 898, 929, 931, 967, 977, 1094, 1098. Spain garrisoned 46,174 troops among its 933,686 colonial subjects (1:20). *The Statesman's Year Book* (1935), pp. 1313, 1322.

44. Flora and Albers, *State, Economy and Society*, vol. 1, pp. 42, 49, 51, 209, 214, 240; *Vsesoiuznaia perepis' naseleniia 1937 goda*, pp. 146, 159. I have estimated the 1930 German population as 63,814,000. Pre-1939 German police totals include an unknown number of the paramilitary "Order police."

45. Germany in 1939 (population 79,576,758) had 100,000 regular police and 100,000 paramilitary "Order Police." Gestapo personnel in 1937 numbered 7,000 (including clerks). See *The Statesman's Yearbook* (London, 1941), pp. 959, 970, and Robert Gellately, "Denunciations in Twentieth Century Germany: Aspects of Self-Policing in the Third Reich and the German Democratic Republic," in Sheila Fitzpatrick and Robert Gellately, eds., *Accusatory Practices: Denunciation in Modern European History, 1789–1989* (Chicago, 1996), p. 187. Fitzpatrick and Gellately (p. 9) failed to note the different categories of personnel enumerated in German and Soviet figures, which led them to claim that because the USSR had twenty times more secret police per capita than Nazi Germany, the two "police states" were fundamentally different from each other. Robert Thurston, *Life and Terror in Stalin's Russia, 1934–1941* (New Haven, 1996), p. 70, claimed that a ratio of 1:412 was not enough to make the NKVD "a vast organization" but then referred to a ratio of 1:11,000, which suggests it was indeed as thinly dispersed as the Gestapo.

46. *Vsesoiuznaia perepis' naseleniia 1939 goda*, pp. 24, 229–38. The total USSR population (excluding 8,917,000 residents of Moscow and Moscow Oblast) was 158,683,000. The total RSFSR population (excluding the ASSRs) was 84,326,000. The RSFSR (excluding Moscow and Moscow Oblast) NKVD personnel presumably numbered 167,255.

47. *Annuaire de documentation coloniale comparée. Année 1937*, vol. 2 (Brussels, 1937), p. 116 lists administrators only (23 percent of whom were European). European employees only are listed in *Annuaire de documentation coloniale comparée. Année 1938*, vol. 2, pp. 79–80. British Africa (population 43 million) had 2,913 district commissioners and judicial and "other" officials. See Kirk-Greene, "The Thin White Line," p. 39. It is unclear if Japanese figures include all public employees. See Starr, *Decentralization*, p. 48.

48. This ratio is derived from a different definition of "administrator" than used in this paper and cannot be compared to the pre-1939 ratios given above. It excludes "nonfinancial public enterprises." See Heller and Tait,

Government Employment, Table 20, and *The Statesman's Yearbook* (London, 1983–1984), passim.

49. *Narodnoe khoziaistvo SSSR v 1988 g.* (Moscow, 1989), p. 35; *Narodnoe khoziaistvo RSFSR v 1988 g.* (Moscow, 1989), p. 33; *Narodnoe khoziaistvo Ukrainskoi SSR v 1988 g.* (Kyiv, 1989), p. 23; *Narodne hospodarstvo Ukraïny v rotsi 1992* (Kyiv, 1993), p. 79; *Narodne hospodarstvo Ukraïny v rotsi 1993* (Kyiv, 1994), p. 278; *Narodnoe khoziaistvo Gruzinskoi SSR v 1982 godu* (Tbilisi, 1983), pp. 151–52; *Narodnoe khoziaistvo Uzbekskoi SSR v 1988 g.* (Tashkent, 1989), p. 26. Between 25 and 30 percent of the postwar Soviet category *rukovoditeli* or *apparat organov gosudarstvennogo upravleniia* were economic ministry personnel, who are included in the totals in Table 12. This Soviet category was not necessarily analogous to the "general government" category used by Heller and Tait in *Government Employment*. The figures in Table 12 conform to the generally accepted maxim that governments get bigger, but they are not directly comparable to the pre-1939 Soviet totals given above.

50. Political science literature devoted to "transitional" economies identifies a weak state as a serious problem in postcommunist Russia without specifying whether this term should be understood to include the notion of a quantitatively small government. See Cynthia Roberts and Thomas Sherlock, "Bringing the Russian State Back in Explanations of the Derailed Transition to Market Democracy," *Comparative Politics* 31(4) July 1999: 477–98. Tony Verheijen and David Coombes, eds., *Innovations in Public Management* (Northampton, MA, 1998) is a comparative survey of recent reforms in European bureaucracies that totally ignores the question of size.

51. In 1991 the number of employees in the "administrative organs" of the Russian Federation—with a GDP per capita of half or less of EU members—had increased by almost one million from the 1979 RSFSR total, and its per capita distribution had dropped proportionately to 1:60. See Irene A. Boutenko and Kirill E. Razlogov, eds., *Recent Social Trends in Russia, 1960–1995* (Kingston, 1997), p. 155, and Maddison, *Monitoring the World Economy*, pp. 23, 142.

52. Mann, *The Sources of Social Power*, vol. 2, pp. 59–61, 358–510.

53. Britain attempted but failed to establish a single imperial bureaucracy. Spain did establish such a bureaucracy but unlike Rome never granted equal citizenship to all its subjects. See Michael Doyle, *Empires* (Ithaca, NY, 1986); Otto Hintze, "The Formation of States and Constitutional Development," in *The Historical Essays of Otto Hintze* (New York, 1975) pp. 161–65; Samuel E. Finer, "State Building, State Boundaries and Border Control," in *Social Science Information* 4–5 (August–Octo-

ber 1974): 79–126; and Michael Hechter, *Internal Colonialism: The Celtic Fringe in British National Development* (Berkeley, 1975), pp. 60–64.

54. Charles Tilly, *The Contentious French* (Cambridge, MA, 1986); idem, *Coercion, Capital and European States, AD 990–1990* (Oxford, 1990); idem, *Popular Contention in Great Britain, 1758–1834* (Cambridge, MA, 1995); Thomas Ertman, *Birth of the Leviathan: Building States and Regimes in Medieval and Early Modern Europe* (Cambridge, UK, 1997). These are detailed comparative studies illustrating how "bargaining"—violent and peaceful—between rulers and subjects over taxes and duties, produced new rights and protective institutions alongside bigger centralized bureaucracies in Western Europe. See also Joel S. Migdal, *Strong Societies and Weak States: State-Society Relations and State Capabilities in the Third World* (Princeton, NJ, 1988), and Linda Weiss, *The Myth of the Powerless State* (Ithaca, NY, 1998), pp. 1–40. Norbert Elias, *The Civilizing Process,* 2d. ed., 2 vols. (Oxford, 1978, 1982), equates the extension of the state and its monopolization of violence with the development of self-restraint—namely, "civilization."

55. Russian political culture has been interpreted in this manner. See Marc Raeff, *Understanding Imperial Russia* (New York, 1984); Andrew M. Verner, *The Crisis of Russian Autocracy* (Princeton, NJ, 1990), pp. 48–56; Peter Gatrell, "Economic Culture, Economic Policy and Economic Growth in Russia 1861–1914," *Cahiers du Monde russe* 36 (1–2) January–June 1995: 39, 49; and Wayne DiFranceisco and Zvi Gitelman, "Soviet Political Culture and Modes of Covert Influence," in Arnold J. Heidenheimer, Michael Johnston, and Victor T. Levine, eds., *Political Corruption: A Handbook* (New Brunswick, NJ, 1989), pp. 467–89. As applied to modern Ukraine: Zon, *The Political Economy of Independent Ukraine*, pp. 149–68. For an attempt to look at nineteenth-century Ukraine in these terms, see Velychenko, "Local Officialdom," pp. 74–85. Modern Ukrainian political culture has similarities to the Russian, but the subject has only begun to be studied. See Iu. Prysiazhniuk, "Mental'nist' ukraïns'koho selianstva v umovakh kapitalistychnoï transformatsiï suspil'stva (druha polovyna XIX–pochatok XX st.)," *Ukraïns'kyi istorychnyi zhurnal* (1999) 3: 28–32.

56. Boris Mironov, *A Social History of Imperial Russia*, vol. 2 (Boulder, 2000), pp. 148–53, juxtaposes this "public administration" to the state administration as an agency of "civil society." See also Thomas S. Pearson, *Russian Officialdom in Crisis: Autocracy and Local Self-Government, 1861–1900* (New York, 1989), and Kimitaka Matsuzato, "The Concept of 'Space' in Russian History: Regionalization from the Later Imperial Period to the Present," in Teruyuki Hara and Kimitaka

Matsuzato, eds., *Empire and Society: New Approaches to Russian History* (Sapporo, 1997), pp. 184–87.

57. The "colonial state" has begun to be studied as a socio-political subject only recently and I am unaware of works discussing the implications and legacies of its size. See Crawford M. Young, *The African Colonial State in Comparative Perspective* (New Haven, 1994); Bruce Berman, *The Dialectic of Domination: Control, Crisis, and the Colonial State in Kenya, 1895–1963* (London, 1990); and Jurgen Osterhammel, *Colonialism* (Princeton, NJ, 1997), pp. 49–68. The similarity between the methods used by tsarist governors, Soviet oblast first secretaries, and British district officers in Kenya to assert their authority is striking: ibid., pp. 204–208; Richard G. Robbins, *The Tsar's Viceroys: Russian Provincial Governors in the Last Years of the Empire* (Ithaca, NY, 1987); and Jerry F. Hough, *The Soviet Prefects: The Local Party Organs in Industrial Decision-Making* (Cambridge, MA, 1969).

58. For the interpretations and for more discussion on the mixed legacy of colonial rule, see Norman Etherington, *Theories of Imperialism, War, Conquest, and Capital* (London, 1984); David K. Fieldhouse, *The West and the Third World* (Oxford, 1999); and Bernard Waites, *Europe and the Third World* (New York, 1999).

59. Japanese colonial administration had more personnel than any of its European counterparts—1:1,000 in Korea by 1910, the year of its formal annexation, and 1:239 in 1937. Japanese rule was efficient and honest but brutal. Its impact on Korea is discussed in M. Woo-Cummings, "Developmental Bureaucracy in Comparative Perspective: The Evolution of the Korean Civil Service," in *The Japanese Civil Service*, pp. 434–41.

60. See Table 4 and Andreas Kappeler, "The Ukrainians of the Russian Empire, 1860–1914," in A. Kappeler, ed., *The Formation of National Elites* (Dartmouth, 1991), pp. 114–22.

61. Michael Mann, *States, War and Capitalism: Studies in Political Sociology* (Oxford, 1988), chap. 1; David Held, *Democracy and the Global Order: From the Modern State to Cosmopolitan Governance* (Stanford, 1995).

62. Eric A. Johnson, *Nazi Terror. The Gestapo, Jews and Ordinary Germans* (New York, 1999), pp. 26, 286, 363, 367, 485.

63. J. Arch Getty and Oleg V. Naumov, eds., *The Road to Terror: Stalin and the Self-Destruction of the Bolsheviks, 1932–1939* (New Haven, 1999), pp. 21, 72, 577–78.

64. James R. Beniger, *The Control Revolution: Technological and Economic Origins of the Information Society* (Cambridge, MA, 1986), p. 419; Thurston, *Life and Terror*, p. 73. The USSR also had the world's largest

signals intelligence unit in the 1930s—which might have been the principal recipient of all this control technology. See Christopher Andrew and Vasili Mitrokhin, *The Mitrokhin Archive: The KGB in Europe and the West* (London, 1999), p. 69.

65. Fieldhouse, *The West and the Third World*, pp. 84–87. For the case advanced that during the 1930s African farmers were better off materially than their Southern and Eastern European counterparts, see Waites, *Europe and the Third World*, p. 150.

66. How the government would pay for more administrators is unknown. Nonetheless, neither this nor the question of size appears in a discussion about the administrative reform introduced by the man in charge of it, former President Leonid Kravchuk: "Aktual'ni pytannia teorii i praktyky provedennia v Ukraïni administratyvnoï reformy," *Visnyk Ukrainskoï Akademiï derzhavnoho upravlinnia pry Prezydentovi Ukraïny* 4 (1999): 5–12. As of 2000 no cuts had been made. See Zon, *The Political Economy of Independent Ukraine,* pp. 29–30.

67. Beate M. Huseby, "Attitudes Towards the Size of Government," in Ole Borre and Elinor Scarbrough, eds., *The Scope of Government* (Oxford, 1995), p. 115.

68. Elias' critics point out that because traditional societies were small, social control was more complete and unavoidable than in more technologically advanced societies. This argument is directed at Elias' implicit claim that European rule brought "civilization" to colonies. See Hans P. Duerr, *Der Mythos vom Zivilisationprozess*, 3 vols. (Frankfurt am Main, 1988–1993).

69. Stephen Holmes, "When Less State Means Less Freedom," *Transitions* 4(4) (September 1997): 67.