6 Local Officialdom and National Movements in Imperial Russia

Administrative Shortcomings and Under-government

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> Good men must not obey the laws too well
>
> — Ralph Waldo Emerson

Since most historians after 1917 have assumed that Russian officials in their legal capacity did little if anything for the Tsar's non-Russian subjects, they paid little attention to incidents that provided evidence to the contrary. In the nineteenth century, for example, Tikhon Rudnev, the Russian head of the Poltava Appeals Court, sought out and worked with Ukrainian intellectuals to stamp out speculation. In New Russia, Mikhail Vorontsov was the first to propose building rail lines in his jurisdiction to facilitate industrial development - rather than grain export - and he later financed an unsuccessful project to build a line. In Kharkov Province, Governor Obolensky, who had no compunctions about ordering brutal floggings for rebellious peasants, also chastised the local *zemstvo* for not providing adequate services for the taxes that it collected.[1]

Historians who noted the national origins of officials thought that politically it mattered little, if at all. Often cited are the words of Viktor Kochubei, Minister of the Interior under Alexander I, who explained that, although he was born Ukrainian ('Little Russian'), he regarded the affairs of his homeland only from the perspective of imperial interests. Kochubei's contemporary, Prince Tsitsianov (Tsitsishvili), told his rebellious countrymen not to expect anything of him just because he was Georgian: 'I was born in Russia, grew up there and have a Russian soul. You will yet have a visit from me, and then I will not burn down your homes, I will burn you with your children and tear out your wives' wombs.' Yet even these men undertook some initiatives that benefited their homelands and they should not be classified alongside people such as Karalina Sobańska, who routinely denounced Polish intellectuals to the secret police, or Ukrainian-born leaders of the anti-Ukrainian Russian nationalist movement in pre-revolutionary Kiev, such as D. Pikhno or A. Savenko.[2]

This chapter does not challenge the proposition that tsarist officials in their legal capacity did little for non-Russians - an issue bound up with the broader question of the impact of tsarist rule on non-Russians. What it does attempt is to determine whether, as in the case of Koshubei or Tsitsishvili, the activities of non-Russian officials ameliorated some of the consequences of foreign rule for their peoples. Were 'collaborators' merely renegades and predators? How many were there like Joseph Lubomirski, for instance, who explained that he could promote Polish interests if his primary loyalty to Russia and the tsar permitted it? How typical was someone like Oleksandr Kistiakivsky, who regarded himself as Ukrainian and did not think that his nationality was incompatible with loyalty to the Empire? In his opinion, the major source of evil in Ukraine was not the political association with Russia, which he believed in, but autocracy. His remedy was not separatism but constitutional monarchy.[3] During the last third of the nineteenth century, nationalist activists were beginning to regard imperial and national loyalties as incompatible, and they looked askance at loyalists like Lubomirski and Kistiakivsky. Judging them today, we should remember that during their lifetimes the idea that people should have only a single exclusive national identity was novel. Patron–client networks crossed national lines more easily then than now, loyalties were multiple and concentric, and centuries of political association had their effect. Depending on circumstances, dynastic–imperial and community–regional as well as national loyalties could motivate behaviour; and not all officials were necessarily antipathetic to local or national interests.

In 1850, Nicholas I decreed that Russian would be obligatory in the courts and administration of the Baltic provinces. Yet the German nobility delayed the implementation of this degree for over thirty years and continued to use German for local administration until 1914. In 1910, officials in the right-bank Ukrainian provinces expressed concern to the Kievan Governor-General about the shortage of native Russians in the administration. They pointed out that local Poles and Ukrainians working in government offices could not be expected to implement policies made 'in the spirit of the Russian national idea', since they were little influenced by Russia's 'national state ideals'. In 1911, D. Doroshenko was denied permission to head the Katerynoslav (Ekaterinoslav) Ukrainian cultural institution by Governor Shidlovsky on the grounds that he was *neblagonadezhnyi.* Shidlovsky, however, was fond of ladies and, caught by a husband one evening, he made his escape through a window and was seen running down the street half-naked. Doroshenko, taking advantage of the governor's dismissal, arranged through friends to have the head of the provincial chancery mislay the disgraced governor's file on himself. His grandfather, meanwhile, obtained a certificate of reliability from the home town police constable who was a friend of the family, and then got Governor Maklakov, another family friend, to vouch for his grandson to the Katerynoslav Provincial Board. A new governor confirmed Doroshenko's appointment.[4]

If we assume that the government was an omnipotent, ubiquitous, effective monolith, such incidents become insignificant. From a centralist-statist perspective, they are aberrations: undesirable vestiges destined to disappear as administration expanded and became more efficient. These examples are also of little interest to those who assume that freedom lies in the absence of police and bureaucracy, rather than in participation within those institutions. From a nationalist or socialist perspective, what is important are the activities of revolutionaries or nationalist activists and the politics of mobilisation, public defiance and confrontation.

If, however, we regard the under-government, inertia, clientelism, feuding patronage systems, nepotism and overlapping jurisdictions that facilitated overt intervention as characteristic of tsarist administration, then the incidents cited above become examples illustrating how individuals exploited administrative shortcomings to impede the centralisation and integration which the central bureaucracy was supposed to promote. Similar incidents occur everywhere, but they become significant when they reveal underlying patterns of evasion and resistance. Does such behaviour, common to all bureaucracies, have more significance in empires than in smaller states in so far as it might reflect 'nationally oriented localism'?

Today we regard national independence as preferable to subordination, and we assume that the possibility of bargaining over political issues disappears with incorporation. But the fate of regions and communities swallowed by more powerful neighbours cannot be seen only in terms of destruction, confrontation or benevolent absorption. Integration is always flawed, dependency is rarely commensurate with extinction, and local elites deprived of native institutions could still express interests through their new institutions. To be sure, minority representation in officialdom does not mean that decisions will inevitably reflect a given group's interests, nor does such participation necessarily promote acquiescence and stability. Administrative behaviour and responsiveness are more functions of social ethos than of origins or representation. None the less, looking at the relationship between national movements, non-Russian elites and officialdom from the perspective of changes in the pattern of control and localism can provide a better understanding of the post-incorporation histories of non-Russian areas than an approach that restricts the subject to nationalist movements and peasant disturbances seen from a perspective of domination and repression. Politics in Imperial Russia was not confined to overt confrontation between an evil state, its collaborators and a heroic people, but also occurred covertly within tsarist structures. People were not in a continuous state of rebellion. They changed their behaviour according to circumstances, and someone who does not rebel does not necessarily obey.

We also assume that impersonal legal authority is preferable to personalised bureaucratic authority, and that the lack of influence in policy making amounts to oppression and no influence. Yet subjects without protection from administrative arbitrariness, and with little influence on policy making, were not totally helpless or passive: they could manipulate those who implemented policy in desired directions through bribery and clientelism. Such practices hardly promote public morality and civic culture, but they do temper authority. Episodic, anonymous, individual acts such as the examples cited above can be difficult to trace, and historians, who normally focus on organisations, collective identities, dramatic confrontations or acts of public defiance, ignore them. Yet covert semi-legal acts of insubordination, bribery, evasion or false reporting should be studied, and it should not be assumed that those who took part in what now appears to be illegal or extra-legal behaviour did so only out of personal interest. Regardless of motives, moreover, the cumulative effect of such behaviour on policy can be as decisive as that of rebellion or mass overt protest. Massive, decades-long tax evasion, for instance, produces fiscal crises. Thousands of spontaneous decisions to desert decisively weakened Napoleon's army well before it reached Moscow, and likewise the American Confederate army in 1865 and the Russian army in 1917.

Finally, it is unwarranted to assume that policies are inevitably enacted exactly as their makers intend. Students of administration and officials soon learn that it is difficult to make the ordinary happen, and what is amazing about government is not delays and mistakes, but that what it does sometimes resembles the original intentions. Bureaucrats in all countries stall, transform or sabotage policy. In response to the appointment of Rudolf Hilferding, a Marxist, as Minister of Finance in Weimar Germany, distraught officials conspired to neutralise him by ensuring that no paperwork ever reached his desk. In a few weeks, Hilferding had a nervous breakdown and promised that he would do nothing that his officials opposed.[5]

In Russia, central rule did not mean central control, and the tsarist government was hardly a perfect despotism. Regions and communities were subject to arbitrary central intervention, but they were virtually without administrative due process, which meant that local elites had much more control over their affairs than the law allowed. As Herzen observed, 'All measures of the government are weakened, all its intentions are distorted; it is deceived, fooled, betrayed and sold, and all under the cover of loyal servility and with the observance of all the official forms.' Herzen himself, by virtue of his position in the Second Section of the Novgorod provincial board during a sentence of exile, was in charge of police matters, and in that position actually signed his own police dossier every three months.[6]

Distance, under-government and institutional confusion impeded centralisation and integration, and arguably fostered autarchy to the detriment of autocracy. The imperial ratio of officials to population was low: in 1897 it was 1 : 1,310 (1 : 2,812 in Central Asia; 1 : 1,642 in the

Ukrainian provinces). Ratios were higher in the cities, averaging 1 : 200 – but in Britain, France, Germany and Japan, urban ratios were 1 : 100 or more.[7] The eight Ukrainian provincial capitals were not linked by telegraph until the 1890s, and by telephone only in the 1900s.[8] Bureaucratic rivalries and lack of systematisation often led to policy deadlock and confusion, with the Ministry of the Interior and the Synod usually pitted against the Second Section, the State Council, the Senate and the Ministry of Finance. Governors had formal authority and were supposed to be local autocrats, but they lacked the people to realise their power. Since there were no regulations concerning priorities, and formally governors were not subordinated to ministries, they could ignore ministry orders and do nothing about given issues until a Senate ruling or the Tsar personally gave an order or decided a priority. Ministers of the Interior had no right to order provincial sub-units to act, while local boards, subject to the Senate, had no formal contacts with the ministries or governors. Local agents of all ministries were independent of governors and provincial boards, which, since they lacked the personnel to implement policies, had to use local elites, primarily through the *zemstva*, which did have the manpower to carry out decisions. But *zemstva* ignored instructions that they thought infringed their autonomy, and when they did work with central officials they did so on their own terms and according to local practice. Higher officials would ignore instructions, and what was or was not done depended more on subordinates than on superiors. Prince Shcherbatov enjoyed a reputation as a good and efficient governor and was in office for three years. When he died, his successor discovered huge piles of mail in his office that turned out to be three years of unopened ministerial correspondence. For much of the nineteenth century, meanwhile, clerks often decided about provincial affairs on their own, and could nullify decisions made by semi-literate governors who did not understand the machinations of chancery procedure or official jargon.[9]

Since chains of command were ill defined, ministers and governors had to rely on the co-operation of a nobility who rendered service on their own terms: a group which 'proved quite effective at extracting the money and labour duties that the peasantry owed them as lords but were wondrously inept at turning over the dues that they collected for the government'. Central administrators had jurisdiction over local offices, but all three estates, through the agency of district and elective local offices, could influence or even dominate local affairs by their ability to change policy during its implementation. Attempts to break or ignore these interests led to passive sabotage and opposition, or to avalanches or petitions for exemption. In the early 1900s the Tsar's chancery dealt with 70,000 petitions a year, while provincial governors took three to five hours each working day to see petitioners. Most petitions were accepted and presumably people were pleased.[10] In administrative terms, however, this practice interfered with due process and undermined the uniformity that ministers desired.

Bribery interfered with policies, also. The Inventory Laws (1847), for example, were supposed to weaken the influence of Polish landowners in right-bank Ukraine by defining the size of peasant allotments and obligations. In an attempt to stop the implementation, Polish nobles sent a delegation to M. Pisarev, Chancery Secretary to Governor-General Bibikov, with a gift of 35,000 silver rubles. The Laws were enacted, but very slowly, and even afterwards landowners simply ignored them, sure that local officialdom would devote little effort either to promulgating or to enforcing them. Presumably more important than the lump-sum payment in explaining this state of affairs was the annual 'salary', which from the beginning of the century wealthier nobles in the region had collected from among themselves to give to officials to keep them amicable.[11]

Turning now to administrators, how many of each nationality were there among them, and what were their levels of education? In 1897, 32 per cent of Russia's 55,000 officials were non-Russians. Of the 22,500 government, *zemstvo* or city *duma* (council) administrators in the eight Ukrainian provinces (0.1 per cent of the population), 9,900 (44 per cent) were Russians (0.4 per cent of the Russians in Ukraine), and 10,350 (46 per cent) were Ukrainians (0.06 per cent of all Ukrainians). Of the roughly 235,000 persons (1 per cent of the population) with secondary or higher education in these provinces, 56 per cent declared themselves to be Russian (6 per cent of all Russians in Ukraine) and 19 per cent Ukrainian (0.3 per cent of Ukrainians). The 3,461 academics, writers and artists, upon whom historians tend to focus their attention, represent only 0.02 per cent of the total population. Of the latter group, 1,914 declared themselves Russian (0.08 per cent of all Russians) and 479 Ukrainian (0.003 per cent of all Ukrainians).

On the imperial level, approximately 50 per cent of government officials had no secondary or higher education. Assuming a similar proportion in the eight Ukrainian provinces would give a total of roughly 6,700 educated government officials (51 per cent Russian, 40 per cent Ukrainian). Together, these officials represented 2 per cent of all those with secondary education or higher in the region - 1.5 per cent of the educated were in the arts, scholarship and literature, while the majority chose teaching, law or medicine as a career. In absolute terms, Ukrainians were under-represented in all these fields. However, whereas roughly 3 per cent of educated Russians held government jobs, the corresponding figure for Ukrainians was 6 per cent. By contrast, only 1 per cent of all educated Ukrainians made careers in the arts, literature and scholarship (14 per cent of this group in Ukraine). The 55 per cent of this group who were Russian also represented only 1 per cent of all educated Russians.[12]

In so far as twice as many educated Ukrainians as educated Russians in Tsarist Ukraine seem to have held administrative positions, it follows that Ukrainians were less alienated from the state than the Russians were. More educated Ukrainians than educated Russians served in Ukraine, despite the fact that more Russians than Ukrainians in those provinces had secondary or higher learning.

Neither this group nor its counterpart in other non-Russian territories has been studied, but if the Ukrainian case is representative, it would mean that not only repression but employment patterns accounted for the small size and moderate character of national movements in Imperial Russia. Except for Poles, who were not allowed to serve in their native provinces after 1831, anyone with primary schooling could make a career anywhere in the understaffed bureaucracy, and bilingual educated non-Russians did take advantage of this particular employment opportunity. Once in service, non-Russians may have been excluded from some higher positions, in which case frustrated career ambitions and resentment could have led some to nationalism, socialism or alcoholism; but this as yet is an unstudied subject, as is the relationship of educated bilingual non-Russians to the professions. By comparison, in West European empires, unlike the position in Russia, bilingual native functionaries could not acquire promotion outside the colony and were sometimes excluded from higher positions inside it. In so far as such restrictions produced frustration, they nurtured support among the literature for national movements defined by the territory of the administrative unit.

Students of Imperial Russia's political history tend to focus on legal government, or explicitly illegal non-governmental behaviour. But this approach leaves out much of the past. On the one hand, official politics excluded most of the population; on the other hand, most people were law-abiding most of the time, and in countries like Russia, where rational-legal authority was weak, it made more sense to pursue interests covertly, personally and anonymously. In 1912, for example, only 5 per cent of *zemstvo* employees fell within the purview of the police because of criminal or seditious activity. Does this mean that the remaining 95 per cent did what they were supposed to do at work? In short, historians should also research semi-legal activities, since they gave people a means to alleviate the harshness of autocracy and advance community or regional as well as personal interests. Obliging officials whose behaviour directly or indirectly contributed to organisational fragmentation and regional autarchy, and who may have been associated with national movements, obviously fall within this purview.

In the 1870s, for example, Illia Hladky, a clerk in the Nizhyn excise office and an activist in the Ukrainian movement, used his office to influence the local student and populist movements. In the 1860s, F. Rashevsky, the head of the Chernihiv excise office, gave positions to Ukrainian activists in fifteen local districts. While performing their professional duties they promulgated the use of Ukrainian books and language among the peasants. I. Rashevsky, who worked in the provincial administration in the 1870s, got permission for Ukrainian concerts and intervened on behalf of anyone who fell foul of the authorities. Ivan Rudchenko, a colleague of Drahomaniv and the brother of a leading writer (Panas Mirny), worked in the Kiev Governor-General's office in the 1880s. It was rumoured that through his friendship with the powerful chancery secretary, M. Merkulov, he influenced the Governor-General to enact pro-peasant policies in right-bank Ukraine. In the 1890s, a Ukrainian activist, N. Molchanovsky, met A. Ignatiev when he was Governor-General of Siberia. When Ignatiev was appointed Governor-General of the South-Western Region in 1894, he took Molchanovsky with him to Kiev and placed him in charge of the chancery. In office until 1905, Molchanovsky did what he could to support Ukrainian interests. The liberal *zemstvo* employee A. Rusov, a statistician in Chernihiv and later Poltava, disseminated illegal Ukrainian-language material while in office. His sister referred to him as 'one of those loyal communist activists who opposed the administration on the basis of its own laws'. A member of the first Ukrainian political parry, K. Kokhlych, worked in the Kiev post office where he slipped illegal publications into mail for activists after it had been screened by censors. Finally, from the 1890s, the informal and semi-legal All-Ukraine Non-Party Organisation traced openings in the administration in order to place nationally conscious activists. Police reports reveal that this network was strong enough to be able to forewarn its members of all raids - men from this organisation later formed the Ukrainian Democratic Workers' Party (UDRP).[13]

Disloyalty is rare and difficult to sustain. People do not normally see it as relevant to their frustrations and deprivations, and they spend more time trying to 'beat the system' than plotting rebellion. Officials sat in the 'belly of the beast', but not all their doings were motivated by greed, nor were all necessarily antithetical to community, regional or non-Russian concerns as defined by nationalists. Historians, therefore, should not ignore the surreptitious, semi-legal attempts that people made to manipulate rules, even through the authorities at the time often did so. Prosecuting all the guilty would have left the country without officials, while calling too much attention to skulduggery risked encouraging more of it and underlining the tenuousness of central authority outside the major cities. In 1800, for instance, no action was taken against 3,000 elected officials in Viatka province because there would have been no one left to conduct administration. Secret police, ministerial and governors' reports to the Tsar, meanwhile, overlooked malfeasance if higher personages were involved. The Governor-General of Kiev and Right-Bank Ukraine, D. Bibikov, ignored the massive graft and corruption that surrounded his chancery secretary because the man's wife was his mistress. Nicholas I knew about this situation, but he left both men in office, just as he left his 58 governors in office after learning that all but two of them took bribes.[14]

Russia had one official language and a single administrative apparatus, but the desire for centralised uniformity did not eliminate the reality of regionalism and national differences. This diversity did not evolve into formal self-government or bureaucratic nationalism, but local politics were either mired in bureaucratic deformities or were in the grip of provincial elites, which meant that local interests pervaded local administration. Only a few formulated policies. But, since the bureaucracy was *de facto* dependent on representatives of the local nobility, while corruption, overlapping jurisdictions, arbitrariness, under-government and lack of systematisation impeded central control, those interested could influence policies during implementation. Obviously, nationalist intellectuals and various semi-legal or illegal alternative institutions, alongside the local landed nobility, were the focus of community-localist activity. But non-Russian officials might also be studied as a possible fourth focus of regionalism or nationalism. There is evidence to suggest that the presence of non-Russians in tsarist officialdom did matter, and that research into the impact that their covert and semi-legal, as well as their overt and legal, activity might have had would be worthwhile.

Notes

1. O. Varneke, 'Do istorii zaliznychoho transporty na Ukraini', *Zapysky istorychnoho filolohichnoho viddily*, **XI** (1927), pp. 315, 320; M. Kovalevsky, *Pry dzherelakh borotby* (Innsbrück, 1960), p. 235.
2. Cited in F. E. Marakhadze (ed.), *Ocherki po istorii rabochago i krestianskago dvizheniia v Gruzii* (Moscow, 1932), p. 42; Ronald Grigor Suny, *The Making of the Georgian Nation* (Bloomington, IN, 1994), p. 68; D. Saunders, *The Ukrainian Impact on Russian Culture, 1750–1850* (Edmonton, Alberta, 1985), pp. 108–11.
3. J. Lubomirski, *Historia pewnej ruiny. Pamiętniki 1839–1870* (Warsaw, 1975), pp. 270–74; V. Shandra et al., *O. F. Kistiakivskyi. Shchodennyk (1874–1895) v dvokh tomakh* (Kiev, 1994–95), Vol. I, pp. 412–14; Vol. II, pp. 440, 455. Kistiakovsky thought that Russians by nature were more democratic than Poles; he would therefore have preferred Ukraine to remain part of a despotic Russia, believing that ultimately the country had to become a constitutional monarchy, rather than have it join a more liberal Austria, where, he thought, Poles would dominate in Ukraine. See also Norman Davies, *Heart of Europe: A Short History of Poland* (Oxford, 1984), pp. 179–92.
4. M. Haltzel, 'The Baltic Germans', in E. C. Thaden (ed.), *Russification in the Baltic Provinces and Finland, 1855–1914* (Princeton, NJ, 1981), p. 139; D. Doroshenko, *Moi spomyny pro nedavne minule: 1901–1914 roky* (Winnipeg, 1949), p. 141; S. Pyvovar, 'Truzheniki na polzu obruseniia kraia ...', *Kyiivska starina*, 1995, no. 5, p. 69.
5. Henry Jacoby, *The Bureaucratization of the World* (Berkeley, CA, 1973), p. 163.
6. *My Past and Thoughts: The Memoirs of Alexander Herzen*, translated by Constance

Garnett (London, 1924), Vol. I, p. 296; Vol. II, p. 191. See also B. Mironov, 'Local Government in Russia in the First Half of the Nineteenth Century: Provincial Government and Estate Self-Government', *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas*, Vol. 42 (1994), pp. 161–201.

7. *Obshchii svod dannykh perepisi 1897 g. po Imperii*, Vol. 1 (St. Petersburg, 1905), pp. 1, 9, 11; *Obshchii svod po Imperii rezul'tatov razrabotki dannykh pervoi vseobshchei perepisi naseleniia*, Vol. 2 (St. Petersburg, 1905), charts 20, 20a. Category I includes as administrators an unspecified number of lawyers and judges. *Pervaia vseobshchaia perepis' naseleniia Rossiiskoi imperii 1897 goda* (St. Petersburg, 1897–1905), chart 21. Ukrainian provinces: Vols 8, 13, 16, 32, 33, 41, 46, 47; Central Asia: Vols 81, 83, 84, 87, 88. Hermann Finer, *Theory and Practice of Modern Government* (London, 1932), Vol. 2, p. 1167. Figures do not include police or teachers.
8. 'Istoricheskoe obozrenie putei soobshcheniia publichnykh zdanii s 1825 po 1850 god', in *Sbornik imperatorskago Russkago istoricheskago obshchestva*, Vol. 98 (1898), pp. 554–5; V. Kubiiovych, *Heohrafiia Ukrainy i sumezhykh kraiiv*, 2nd edn (Lviv, 1943), p. 489.
9. G. L. Yanev, *The Systematization of Russian Government* (Urbana, IL, 1973); I. A. Blinov, *Otnosheniia Senata k mestnym uchrezhdeniiam v XIX veke* (St. Petersburg, 1911), p. 158; S. M. Seredonin (ed.), *Istoricheskii obzor deiatel'nosti Komiteta Ministrov* (St. Petersburg, 1902), Vol. 4, pp. 319–21; S. D. Urusov, *Zapiski gubernatora* (Moscow, n.d.), p. 5.
10. S. Frederick Starr, 'Local Initiative in Russia before the Zemstvo', in T. Emmons and W. S. Vucinich (eds), *The Zemstvo in Russia* (Cambridge, 1982), p. 14; V. Mamontov, *Na gosudarevoi sluzhbe* (Tallinn, 1926); R. G. Robbins, *The Tsar's Viceroys* (Ithaca, NY, 1987), pp. 48–52.
11. P. A. Zaionchkovskii, *Pravitel'stvennyi apparat samoderzhavnoi Rossii v XIX v.* (Moscow, 1978), pp. 148, 156; Shandra et al., *O. F. Kistiakivskyi*, Vol. I, p. 225.
12. *Obshchyi svod po Imperii*, Vol. 2, charts 15, 20a; *Pervaia vseobshchaia perepis'*, charts 15, 21; Vols 8, 13, 16, 32, 33, 41, 46, 47.
13. N. Makarenko, 'Materialy Vseukrainskoho tovarystva politkatorzhan i zsylnoposelentsiv pro narodnytskyi rukh v Ukraini', *Ukrainskyi istorychnyi zhurnal*, 1992, nos 10–11, p. 52; N. A. Shio, *Intelligentsiia na Ukraine (XIX v.)* (Kiev, 1991), p. 144; S. Rusova, 'Moii spomyny', *Za sto lit*, Vol. 2 (Kiev, 1928), pp. 144, 165; O. Doroshkevych, 'Ukrainskyi rukh v otsintsi pomishchyka 80-kh rokiv', *Chervonyi shliakh*, 1924, no. 6, p. 223; Iu. G. Oksman (ed.), *Vospominaniia E. M. Feoktista* (Leningrad, 1929), p. 277; N. Polonia-Vasylenko, 'Tsenzurovi utysky na Ukrainy', *Ukraiina*, no. 7 (Paris, 1952), p. 514; O. Hermaize, *Narysy istorii revoliutsiinoho rukhu na Ukraini*, Vol. I, *Revoliutsiina Ukraiinska partiia* (Kiev, 1926), p. 207; H. Kasianov, *Ukrainska intelihentsiia na rubezhi XIX–XX stolit* (Kiev, 1993), pp. 49–50.
14. Mironov, 'Local Government in Russia', p. 168; Zaionchkovskii, *Pravitel'stvennyi apparat*, pp. 143–8, 156. The addenda to the annual Ministry of Justice reports record only the illegal activities of lesser officials actually brought before Senate or provincial tribunals.