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What is This?

Ukraine in the "Gray Zone":
Between the "Russkiy Mir" and Europe

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As a result of the transformations which have taken place in the territory of the former USSR, Ukraine has entered—according to Thomas Carothers—a "gray zone." In the Ukrainian case, it is a zone of ambivalence between evolution toward the Russian model of the political system and transformation toward a West European democracy. It appears that the latter variant is quite likely. This is evidenced by the events connected with the "Orange Revolution" and the social reaction to President Yanukovych's decision not to sign an association agreement with the European Union. The integration of this country into the Euro-Atlantic area clearly calls into question the possibility of Moscow returning to the role of sole hegemonic leader in post-Soviet territory. Over the past several years, Moscow's policy toward Ukraine has been legitimized by the idea of a civilizational community—the "Russkiy Mir." This is based on the assumption that, allegedly, a cultural and spiritual unity exists among the "Orthodox nations." Their consolidation would underwrite—among other things—a civilizational clash with the West. This article aims to answer the question of how the idea of the Russkiy Mir is perceived in Ukraine. It appears that the idea of constructing an Orthodox civilizational community clashing with the West is not compatible with the core unarticulated knowledge which shapes the rules of contemporary social and political life in Ukraine.

Keywords: *gray zone; Russkiy Mir; Ukraine; Orthodox Church; democracy*

Ukraine is a typical example of a "gray zone" state.[1] Democratic institutions have been formally introduced into its political system, but the actual rules by which this system operates are far from the democratic standards understood by Western Europe.

Thomas Carothers, when outlining his vision of the gray zone, warned that the future fate of the countries and systems that belong to it is was not fully settled, because "no political system is eternal."[2] The essential features consigning a given case to the gray zone—a flawed, unproductive pluralism or a system dominated by one political force or central power – can change. It is also possible to leave this zone in democratic or non-democratic directions.

However, in practice, the opportunities for changes of political systems belonging to the gray zone are not endless. They are limited, among other things, by "unarticulated knowledge," meaning everything which, in relation to social reality in this case,

"is accepted as evident" and "what its conclusions are based on."[3] It is generally absorbed in a given society's data resources, which can be described as "an unarticulated grasp of the world."[4] It allows us to pass judgment on the topics of "as it is" and "as it ought to be." The essence of the concept of "unarticulated knowledge" is based on the assumption that the rules that determine the functioning of social phenomena in this political system "are not a creation of the mind independent from the external world," but are "part of the social world."[5] This is how, in the realities of this case, the operation of various institutions introduced into the political system depends to a great extent on local economic, cultural, and historical conditions, as well as on the experiences accumulated in the process of transformation. These considerations and experiences are the sources of both opportunities and constraints for the further development of the political system.

It seems that we can assume that an important source of unarticulated knowledge is the past, including the way to understand and perceive it, which is what Jan Kieniewicz described as "legacy." According to him, "legacy" means a source of information that can be treated as an heirloom, a heritage passed down or just left behind for the next generations.[6] Robert Dahl underlined the importance of the past as one of the crucial factors in which the origins of the specificity of each political system have been coded.[7]

We can consider Dahl's "paths to the present" to be an important part of that legacy. It thus has an impact on the way a certain political system works and, therefore, also on the possibilities and limitations for its transformation. Of course, we should not draw very far-reaching conclusions and create some simple relationships that would lead to historical determinism. Instead, we can assume that in order to accurately analyze social reality and exert an effective influence on it, we ought to take into consideration these paths to the present, meaning this legacy.

Kieniewicz emphasized that the key issue in the functioning of legacy is not so the overall transmission of all its components as its interpretation, which requires ability and will. Without these two, even the most expansive legacy will remain a mere potential referring to what is pointless.[8]

Kieniewicz understands legacy as possessing a dynamic characteristic, since each generation adds its own interpretation of the deposit it received. Such an interpretation also entails a hierarchy of importance for particular elements of this legacy. Each generation decides which elements to consider indispensable for the existence of social bonds and definitions of identity.[9] Thus, a legacy consists of two pillars: the source of information and the generally accepted interpretation. Both of these elements undergo change with the passage of time and the change of generations.

Events associated with the "Orange Revolution" and the reaction of a large part of the Ukrainian population to President Yanukovych's decision to withdraw from efforts to associate with the EU allow us to conclude two things. First, there is a social demand for the democratization of the political system in the Ukraine (by "democratization" we mean implementing the basic institutions and elements of

Western political culture, such as pluralism and civil society as the subject of the political system, independent judicial authorities, genuinely competitive and fair elections, the rule of a law-abiding state, and free and independent media). Second, at key moments, this demand acquires systemic importance. This means that when incumbents ignore it, this leads to stress on the whole system. Because of this phenomenon, the possibility of democratization and strengthening of ties with the West appears as one of the still probable, even though hypothetical directions of Ukraine's development. However, this scenario would have serious negative consequences for the prospects of reintegration of the post-Soviet space under the hegemony of Moscow. That is also why the Kremlin authorities are taking actions in the political, economic, and diplomatic spheres to prevent such developments.

The neo-imperialist goals of Russian policy toward Ukraine in recent years have received a doctrinal foundation—the concept of the Orthodox civilizational community—the Russkiy Mir. Here we will consider this as an alternative model of Ukrainian legacy, a competing vision of the Ukrainian political system's "paths to the present." This model asserts Ukraine's incompatibility with Western institutions, values, and standards. The concept of the "Russkiy Mir" implies isolation from the West and consolidation of the authoritarian regime. It is therefore be in opposition to democratization as the way out of the gray zone.

To what extent can the concept of the Russkiy Mir be regarded as an effective means of legitimizing decisions and actions in Ukrainian internal policy? Alternatively, is it an effective tool of Moscow's policy toward Ukraine? To attempt to answer these questions, it is first worth taking a closer look at the very assumptions of the "Orthodox civilization" project, the way in which it is promoted, and the reactions it evokes in Ukraine. Next, we will compare the assumptions of the Russkiy Mir concept with key elements of the legacy on which the idea of Ukrainian independence was built.

The Concept of the Russkiy Mir

In 2007, under President Putin's ukase, the Russkiy Mir foundation was established. Its official statutory objectives include the promotion of Russian language and culture throughout the world, maintaining ties with diasporas, "creating a favorable public opinion for Russia" and "universalizing knowledge" about Russia.[10] In November 2009, Patriarch Cyril of Moscow signed a cooperation agreement with the foundation's board. This expression by the ROC's highest representatives allows us to define the Russkiy Mir concept more closely. Essentially, it is a new project for integrating post-Soviet space based on a civilizational community. One of the best known proponents of this idea is the current head of the ROC. As early as 2009, Patriarch Cyril delivered a comprehensive lecture at the foundation's annual general meeting, outlining the basic assumptions of the idea of a "Russkiy" community. He

also outlined its core region, consisting of the territories of Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus. The organic part of this community, in his view, also includes two other countries: Moldova and Kazakhstan.[11]

In spiritual terms, this space merges the Orthodox Church with a shared historical memory. This includes the memory of their "common origin," meaning the era of Kievan Rus', when the ancestors of today's members of the Russkiy Mir joined the family of Christian nations. According to the Moscow hierarch, the Russkiy Mir is a separate and autonomous civilizational space, formed, apart from the above-mentioned historical memory, by elements such as the spirit of tolerance and respect for the rights of dissenters, Russian language and culture, and "common views on social development."[12] According to Patriarch Cyril, the mentioned former values have been established by the "common boundaries and one geographical area in which our people lived."[13] According to the Orthodox prelate, in a situation where in this "unique civilizational space" there are no formed (or, rather, not reproduced anew) "common political institutions," a specific role in the integration process and the maintenance of unity falls on the Orthodox.[14]

The Patriarch of Moscow introduced into circulation the concept of the "Russkiy Mir nations": countries in which Russian is used as the language of international relations, where Russian culture is developing, and where "a universal historical memory and uniform values in social life are kept." As the prelate underlined, they were established in the past by the "common national boundaries and one geographical area in which our nations lived."[15]

At the same time, Patriarch Cyril expressed the view that any concerns about promoting Russian culture are unjustified, because "a spirit of xenophobia and chauvinism" and a tendency to "suppress other cultures are foreign to it." In his opinion, the Russian language was formed "as a tool for communicating among different nations," at the same time stating that we cannot ignore the importance of other "native" languages in the territory of the Russkiy Mir because they also comprise its wealth.[16] It should be noted that due to the long and intense process of Russification in Ukraine, the credibility of these declarations may raise doubts.

When analyzing the concept of the Russkiy Mir, it is worth taking a look at what other representatives of the ROC and representatives of related circles have said about this. For example, Igumen Philip (Riabykh), currently representative of the Moscow Patriarchate at the Council of Europe in Strasbourg, former vice deputy of the head of one of the key units in the organizational structure of the Russian Orthodox Church, the Department for External Church Relations of the Russian Orthodox Church, pointed out that in the civilizational space outlined by Patriarch Cyril, Russia must play the central role.[17] Elsewhere, the Orthodox Church dignitary declared that the concept of the Russkiy Mir is a "project of integration." He noted that it is not about the creation of "a kind of Russian Federation center surrounded by satellites" but about the "union of many diasporas scattered throughout the world."[18]

There is no consensus among Russkiy Mir ideologists when assessing the political and social reality created after the collapse of the Soviet Union, which shaped the

new nations born on the ruins of the Soviet empire. Patriarch Cyril, with a certain nostalgia, referred to the time when the civilizational community he outlined was not divided by boundaries. At the same time, however, he stressed that the recently obtained sovereignty of individual nations forces them to "act responsibly to protect their own existence" and favors the construction of "new forms of coexistence on the basis of equality and mutual respect."[19] Meanwhile, according to Igumen Filaret (Bulekov), the emergence of new countries initiated the process of creating nation, consisting in the formulation of "relevant myths" and writing "national histories." Although the minister admitted that this process was inevitable, at the same time he stressed that sometimes it proved to be "very painful and contradictory."[20] Worst of all, it has led to the disruption of existing, "sometimes centuries-old ties between nations and peoples."[21] However, total disintegration has not occurred, since "Orthodox civilization" survived, ensuring the "profound unity of the Orthodox nations."[22]

As noted by Father Euthymius (Moysejev), these transformations require a new doctrine, which will provide the spiritual basis to rebuild unity and allow the formation of a new pattern of shared identity among the newly united peoples. The Soviet identity "has been lost," and a new Russian version has not yet developed.[23]

According to Fr. Euthymius, the so-called canonical territory of the Russian Orthodox Church "practically fully coincides" with the area of the tsarist empire before 1917. Thanks to this, the ROC is the "guardian of the spiritual legacy of the Russian Empire" and the only institution in modern Russia that has maintained continuity from prerevolutionary times.[24] Therefore, according to the concept presented here, the special importance of the Moscow Patriarchate, in an effort to reintegrate post-Soviet space, stems from the fact that it synthesizes the legacy of all the stages of the Russian empire's development.

Orthodoxy is understood not only as a religion but also as a distinct type of civilization, as a crucial factor of the Russkiy Mir's identity. This Orthodox civilization is very easily identified with the ROC. Igumen Filaret, in referring to Patriarch Cyril's statements, makes it clear that the Moscow Patriarchate must be involved in public life—for example, in monitoring the activities of the authorities and politicians in countries that are "historically and culturally Orthodox" and examining whether they are consistent with the spirit of Orthodox civilization. According to this pastor, the pro-European orientation of national governments, which until recently were "nations united with Russia" (Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine), or nations which "always lived culturally and spiritually united with the Russian nation" (Bulgaria, Serbia), is clearly inconsistent with it.[25]

In fact, the ideology promoted by the aforementioned foundation founded by the Kremlin states that the Russkiy Mir is "multiethnic, multifaith, socially and ideologically heterogeneous and multicultural."[26] However, Fr. Euthymius stressed that the Russkiy Mir's multiethnicity is a myth. In reality, it is to be created by a "Russian superethnos," which is based on the "Eastern Slavic ethnos" and Orthodoxy.[27] This minister stressed that it is common knowledge that this is a religion of freedom.

Therefore, wherever it prevails, religious persecutions are excluded. For this reason, according to Fr. Euthymius, representatives of other religious communities within the Russkiy Mir "can feel at ease."[28]

A very important place where the idea of the Russkiy Mir is formed and evolves is the World Russian National Council (WRNC). According to official information, it is one of the biggest "social organizations" in Russia, established in 1993 and headed by the Patriarch of Moscow. Almost every year, the organization hosts a big, festive reunion whose members debate the present and the future of Russia in various spheres of life: social, cultural, political, and spiritual. In 2011, the theme of the "discussions" concerned the values around which society should consolidate.

WRNC conventions are important from the point of view of our discussion, since significant representatives from among state authorities, political parties, artists, and cultured society have participated in every convention. In 2011, the opening ceremony of the event was attended, among others, by the Russian Federation's Minister of Education A. Fursenko, deputy chairman of the Federation Council L. Vorobev, representatives of the Russian Parliament, Moscow authorities, and political parties such as United Russia, Just Russia, and the Communist Party of the Russian Federation. Welcome telegrams were sent by D. Medvedev, Vladimir Putin, Alexander Lukashenko, and Boris Gryzlov.[29] A catalog of values was adopted based on "a general nationwide identity" which also contains the usual mottos about faith, justice, equality, freedom, and honesty.[30]

The most interesting conclusions were reached by members of the section that addressed "Eastern-Slavic civilization." In the resulting document, we read of "a single historical consciousness of the Slavic nations," which is to be the source of "their national pride" and gives wings to Eastern-Slavic civilization in the face of the "aggressive global chaos of the spiritless West."[31] Here we find the thesis that currently the Slavic nations face the challenge to "integrate state and public institutions" in their countries to form a "unified cultural and historical space." For this purpose, they should develop a common curriculum that would be based on the "spiritual, moral, cultural and historical values" common to Eastern-Slavic civilization.[32] Additionally, the WRNC recommended formulating a "single development program" for Eastern-Slavic civilization "in the short and long term perspectives."[33]

Some of the arguments from the forum, by secretary S. Obukhov of the Russian Federation's Communist Party's Central Committee, are worth quoting. He emphasized the merits of his party in defending Russkiy identity: taking part in the vote on the law for "freedom of conscience and activities of religious organizations," which helped to isolate Russia from "overseas missionaries" and protect her "eternal values."[34] According to this Russian Communist activist, no one can doubt the "depth of the processes of dehumanization in modern society, which run under the banner of universal liberal and democratic values."[35] He drew the attention of delegates to a characteristic rule: if in some areas ideas of human rights carved into civilizational patterns "from across the ocean" begin to dominate, then "in society, everything is

turned upside down."[36] Obukhov also stipulated that there is no mention of "any Russian project . . . nothing about any modernization or unity of the Russkiy peoples of Eastern-Slavic civilization" without "traditional national values" which—we should add—as proposed by the communist activist, are understood as "Russkiy, Russian and Soviet." From this perspective, from the axiological point of view of the Christian commandments and the "Moral Code of the Communist Party," these turn out to be virtually identical.[37] The representative of the Russian communists strongly opposed "mindless attempts to present the Soviet period as a 'black hole.'" He also expressed his gratitude that the Orthodox Church is among those who speak on behalf of the Soviet legacy's good reputation. This is because the "separated Russkiy nation" can be consolidated only by "a resurgence in social awareness of key conservative Soviet values."[38] Undoubtedly, one of these was the memory of the "great victory" of 1945.

The presence of communist representatives at the forum, under the auspices of the Orthodox Church, can only superficially seem surprising. The Communist Party of the Russian Federation has participated in this committee from its beginning in 1993. The gap which might seem to divide Russian Communists and the management of the ROC does not appear to be very deep, at least in some places. The Communist Party and the Orthodox Church live in nostalgia for the days of old, the original unity of the "Russkiy nation," which was made real by the Soviet Union. For one and the other, World War II was of crucial significance. For the communists, it was a time of great glory and power for the "fatherland of the proletariat." And as Dimitry Pospielovsky observed,[39] it was a moment of resurrection to new life in 1943 for "the core of the higher administration of the Orthodox Church." A key initiator of this revival was Joseph Stalin.

Since 1943, the fate of the Orthodox Church's leadership was very closely linked with the fate of the Soviet state. It seems that this has shaped the way the Soviet past is perceived today, especially the legacy of the great victory of 1945. Pospielovsky characteristically addressed this issue already mentioned by the deputy head of the Department for External Church Relations, Igumen Philip (Riabykh). He stressed that the great successes of the Soviet Union—including the victory in 1945—were not the work of Stalin but also "our multinational people." He also recalled that "at the beginning of their activities," the Bolsheviks contributed to the "collapse of one of the largest Christian countries"—the tsarist empire. He described the system built by Stalin as "inhumane," based on "terror, rape, trampling of human dignity, lies and spying."[40] He stressed that Russia "does not owe anyone anything" for the evil done by the communist authorities because she herself "was the first victim of this regime."

However, the most interesting aspect of this statement is the assessment of Stalin as a builder of the geopolitical power of the Soviet state. Igumen Philip accused him of "voluntarily divid[ing]" the territory of his empire by "artificial borders between the former Soviet republics."[41] In this way, the Soviet dictator started "a delayed time bomb" in the edifice which he himself built. The priest said that "as a result of Stalin's

policies, we are currently collecting the harvest of extremism, nationalism and xenophobia. . . . If it was not for the experiment in the form of a national-territorial division of the former Russian Empire, sharing a united country would not have been a problem." Because of this, the country disappeared "at the beginning of the 90s."[42]

The memory of the Soviet past is not only a manifestation of nostalgia in environments that have evolved from the past. It also aims to legitimize Moscow's contemporary dominance of post-Soviet space. In this regard, the political and religious spheres are quite closely related. Therefore, it is no coincidence that in 2010 Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov was a guest at the XIV WRNC. In his speech, he emphasized the great role that the ROC, under the auspices of the Council, plays in the process of "protecting and strengthening the traditional spiritual values and ideals of our society's moral determinants."[43] The head of Russian diplomacy also noted that "the defeat of fascism and the liberation of Europe was due thanks to all the peoples of the Soviet Union," and an important contribution to the victory was also brought about by the ROC and "other traditional confessions in our country."[44] What is essential, in the opinion of Lavrov, is the "major factor" that led the Soviet Union to victory, which was "the willingness to self-sacrifice."[45] In his opinion, in 1945, the Soviet Union won not only militarily and politically, but also morally. It was this triumph of values that "amounted to the significant contribution of Orthodoxy."[46]

In 2011, President Medvedev initiated preparations for the 1150th year anniversary of Russian statehood.[47] During this meeting, Anatoly Torkunov, presidential adviser and the rector of the prestigious Moscow State Institute of International Affairs at the Russian Federation's Foreign Ministry, argued that it is necessary to include the history of the Russian state during the Kievan Rus' period, and stated that thanks to this, the Russian people will be able to treat a much wider territorial area "as their own," not limited by the "modern state borders."[48] He emphasized that this society will open up to the "wide expanse of Europe" and take a new look at the area "between the Baltic Sea and the Black Sea." He explained that he did not mean a "primitive imperial approach," but "a sense of neighborliness, transparency and objective proximity of the countries of modern Europe."[49]

In the discourse on relations with the West, we have heard voices on the superiority of "the Russkiy world" over the civilization of Western Europe. According to Igumen Philip, already quoted concerning a "Russkiy legacy" under the aegis of Kievan Rus and then Muscovy, the Russian and the Soviet Empire managed to develop a unique model of society "in which representatives of various ethnoses, cultures and religions live together creating a unique space for cooperation."[50] According to the representative of the ROC, this unique "know-how" is presently used by the initiators of other integration processes—such as the European Union.[51]

It should be emphasized that the above description should be considered a fragmented outline of the Russkiy Mir concept. This is so simply because we look at it almost exclusively from the perspective of its Orthodox advocates. In order to capture its essence, especially if we want to treat it as a unique project for a political and

social order, it is not enough to settle for the mottos, slogans and statements by its clerical ideologues and promoters. These should be confronted with the rules of social practice and the model of political culture that the lay advocates of the Russkiy Mir perpetuate in their specific activities. Such a comprehensive analysis leads to the conclusion that the Russkiy Mir's model of social and political reality, based on neopatrimonial mechanisms, assumes an authoritarian regime of government. Society plays the role of object, not subject, in the political system. Undoubtedly, it can be assumed that under Ukrainian conditions, the promotion, dissemination, and protection of the Russian language, in practice, will at best perpetuate the current effects of the Russification of Ukraine.[52]

Perception of the Russkiy Mir in Ukraine

How is the concept of the Russkiy Mir received in Ukraine? For obvious reasons, it is an important topic of public debate. Because of historical and symbolic reasons, Ukraine is a key element of the civilizational community promoted by this project. Kiev—the "mother of the towns of the Rus"—is the cradle of this community, and its fascinating monuments reveal the mythical past of Kievan Rus. Statistical data on the organizational structure of the Orthodox community are also relevant. According to official information in 2010, the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (of the Moscow Patriarchate; UOC [MP]) had more than 11,700 parishes in Ukraine,[53] almost as many as the ROC in the territory of the Russian Federation (12,158).[54] In total, the three main branches of the Orthodox Church in Ukraine (the UOC [MP], the Ukrainian Orthodox Church Kiev Patriarchate, and the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church) in 2010 had 17,149 parishes.[55] It is not only the monuments of the past but also current statistical information that seems to indicate that Ukraine, not Russia, is the "heart" of the Orthodox community.

In Ukraine, the journalists, analysts, politicians or ministers who treat Ukrainian independence and national identity with indifference or outright hostility are most enthusiastic about the concept of the Russkiy Mir. Metropolitan Agafangel (Savvin) of Odessa, who for many years publicly promoted the concept of the Russkiy Mir in its "hard" form, particularly stands out. For example, in 2006, lecturing in Moscow, he vividly depicted the Orthodox civilizational community. He identified it with the "historical mission of Russia, the mission of the great Eastern Slavic civilization as the Third Rome," and at the same time felt responsible for the fate of the "sacred home of Orthodoxy."[56] Metropolitan Agafangel appealed to what he saw as Patriarch Tikhon's prophetic vision, stating that "a world in which almost eternally Orthodox Ukraine separates itself from brotherly Russia and the capital city of Kiev, the mother of the Ruthenian strongholds, the cradle of our baptism . . . will cease to be a city of the Russian state" and will be a source of "great loss and misfortune" that "will not bring the people their longed for rest and solace."[57]

Odessa's Metropolitan merged these prophetic visions from the period of the Tsarist Empire's disintegration with a diagnosis of the situation in Ukraine after the Orange Revolution. In his opinion, "nationalist politicians" had come to power. It is worth noting that Agafangel did not spare words of criticism for those Russian politicians who "consider it necessary *to come to terms* with the fact that Kiev . . . and with her the entire Ukraine from now on are only a geographical neighbor."[58] At a time when a significant part of the "Orange elite" declared that their goal was to integrate the country into the Euro-Atlantic space, Odessa's metropolitan warned against Ukraine's so-called European choice. He claimed that, contrary to politicians' claims, this focus threatens friendly relations with Russia, because "NATO is the bloc hostile to Russia and all of Orthodox civilization."[59] Moreover, in his opinion, a pro-European orientation is another manifestation of the eternal "Protestant-Catholic, Masonic and godless West's" attempt to separate Ukraine from the "unity of the global center of the Orthodox Church—Moscow."[60]

Ukrainian authorities have not taken a firm position on their country's possible participation in "Orthodox civilization." On the one hand, some time ago, Ukrainian Foreign Minister Konstantin Hryshchenko critically commented on this issue. He stressed that Moscow must stop looking at Ukraine as a political tool of the West, whose aim is to weaken Russia. He further stated that although Ukraine cannot turn exclusively to the West, nor can it be enclosed within the Russkiy Mir. The head of the Ukrainian Foreign Ministry stated that the desired model of Ukrainian-Russian partnership must be based on the assumption that both parties "are important each in themselves, and not as an instrument used for pursuing these and other geopolitical plans."[61]

However, at the same time and in the same government, Dmytro Tabachnyk, a member of the Verkhovna Rada, viewed Europe as divided into two opposing worlds, Germanic and Slavic, that have been fighting against each other for centuries. According to his view, the key to the Slavs' success was their unity under the aegis of the Russian state. The future head of the Ukrainian Ministry of Education and Science claimed that the period after World War II was the greatest moment of glory and power for the Slavs. This was because "for the first time in history, the Slavs managed to unite politically and militarily into one system—a socialist community."[62] According to Tabachnyk, "the unity of the Slavic world, the protection of its independence and its successful competition with the Germanic world directly depend on the strength and unity of the Russkiy Mir—the Slavic core."[63]

It is also worth noting that in January 2011, President Viktor Yanukovych received the Patriarch Alexius II Award "for outstanding achievements in strengthening the unity of Orthodox peoples" and for "strengthening and implementing Christian values in social life." The award was granted by the International Social Fund for Unity of the Orthodox Nations at the request of an activist of the Communist Party of Ukraine, who sits on the board of this fund, and it was handed to him by Patriarch Cyril.[64]

Of course, the doctrine of integration under the aegis of the post-Soviet Russkiy Mir has a large group of enemies in Ukraine. For example, Myroslav Marynovych noted that the idea of the Russkiy Mir appeared just when all other ideologies of the modern "gathering of Russian lands" were already exhausted.[65] He expressed the view that Russian civilization "will conceptually never be able to go beyond the framework of its imperial paradigm."[66] According to the Lviv researcher, Russia and Ukraine operate to different civilization formulas. While Moscow "is doomed eternally to struggle with the West," the mission in Kiev consists in the harmonious combination of elements of East and West.[67] Glib Kovalenko, in turn, noted that the idea of the Russkiy Mir deals with the "restoration of . . . the dominance of the Orthodox Church of the Moscow version, Russian language and culture as well as traditions of Russian statehood and Russian social life."[68] The author stressed that Kievan Orthodoxy is distinct from the Moscow tradition.

Seemingly, the UOC (MP) should be the avant-garde of the Russkiy Mir in Ukraine. The reply of Metropolitan Agafangel, one of its most active hierarchs, seems to confirm this assumption. However, very interesting in this context is the position of the superior of their community, Metropolitan Volodymyr of Kyiv (Sabodan). His views on the situation of the Orthodox Church in Ukraine, as well as the issue of Ukrainian civilizational identity, can be reconstructed on the basis of two long lectures he gave in 2008 in Warsaw and Moscow. In his speeches, the Metropolitan of Kiev highlighted the asymmetry in relations between the Orthodox Church and the state, where the state has a far more powerful and privileged position. In light of the facts he presented, the Orthodox Church is treated as a tool for short-term political goals. Metropolitan Volodymyr mentioned two main reasons why Ukraine mixes politics with Orthodoxy. The first is the desire to ensure that the Church fulfills a "sanctifying function for the nation-state." But other forces, according to Metropolitan Sabodan, try to impose the role of "political integrator in the post-Soviet space" on the Orthodox Church.[69] The head of the UOC (MP) stated that in his community, he does not approve of any of these ways to use religion for political purposes. He recalled that in December 2007 the council of UOC bishops condemned the phenomenon of so-called "Political Orthodoxy."

With regard to the cultural and civilizational position of Ukraine, Metropolitan Sabodan stated that the spiritual and mental character of the lands on the left bank of the Dnieper led to "creative interaction" with Russia, while the cultural character of the right bank regions determined Ukrainian and Polish, Romanian, Austrian, Hungarian, or Lithuanian relations. The UOC's Superior clearly emphasized that both parts of Ukraine are different but at the same time "inseparable" because much binds them together—above all Christianity, which Vladimir the Great gave rise to.[70] According to Metropolitan Volodymyr, Ukraine's mission was to creatively synthesize the legacies of East and West. The Orthodox Church should initiate processes by which antagonisms between Eastern and Western cultural elements would be creatively transformed "into a synthetic whole based on the

Orthodox tradition."[71] In his opinion, the Ukrainian lands comprise a "self-sufficient social and cultural space."[72]

The vision of Ukrainian civilization proposed by the UOC (MP) superior stands in fundamental conflict with the basic assumptions of the Russkiy Mir. The latter is constructed in opposition to the West and assumes the need to make a choice—either Orthodox civilization or Western European civilization. Meanwhile, Metropolitan Volodymyr took the view that elements of both cultures can penetrate and complement each other, and in the territory of Ukraine, this is quite a natural phenomenon. In his opinion of the West, the Ukrainian hierarch went beyond the clichés usually expressed by advocates of the Russkiy Mir. On the one hand, he criticized current European culture's relativism in the realm of values. Metropolitan Volodymyr also expressed the view that postmodernism is particularly dangerous, posing an even greater threat to religion than communism.[73]

At the same time, however, the Ukrainian prelate praised the positive results of European integration, in his opinion a source of political stability. He also noted that "the complex distribution of powers between the national and supranational institutions reduces the temptation to rule as such." The Metropolitan admitted that perhaps in the EU the decision-making process is not as efficient "as we would wish for it to be," but on the other hand, decisions under this regime "are the result of a complex compromise and do not depend on the will of one man, who by nature may be wrong."[74] The Kiev prelate positively evaluated the fact that the "technocratic concept," according to which power is exercised in the EU, excludes the "messianic paradigm of power," which, he added, "in fact, often turns out to be false Messianism."[75] It is not difficult to note that his understanding of the principles upon which power operates in the Euro-Atlantic space is different from the canons of the Russkiy Mir. This is primarily because of a lack of belief in an ontological conflict between Orthodox civilization and Western European culture, which is of fundamental significance for the idea of the Russkiy Mir.

In Metropolitan Volodymyr's statements, one more detail is worth noting. He willingly refers to the person and work of Peter Mohyla, meaning the model of Orthodox culture based on a synthesis of elements of the spiritual and intellectual cultures of Eastern and Western Christianity. The identity of an Orthodox Church built on the Mohylan legacy breaks the pattern of relations between the "East" and "West" that the concept of the Russkiy Mir imposes.

The way in which this project relates to Ukrainian society remains an open question. There is a lack of "hard" data for the state of public sentiment on this issue. However, some indicators can be sought in Patriarch Cyril's recent frequent visits to Ukraine. His main message is the Russkiy Mir idea. In his speech to the Russkiy Mir Foundation in 2009, the ROC's supervisor shared experiences from his recent pilgrimage to Ukraine. He stated that he was struck by "the great number of people" who came to the prayer services he performed. He talked about the "tens of thousands" of faithful who came supposedly to "pray with their patriarch."[76] Patriarch

Cyril stood before the greatest number of faithful during Mass in the Pochayiv Lavra. Around forty thousand people gathered there. It is difficult, however, to assume that they came especially for the visiting dignitary from Moscow. This took place on 5 August, which is the holiday of the icon of Our Lady of Pochayiv. On this day, every year, tens of thousands of pilgrims from all over Eastern Europe come to Pochayiv. A few hundred to a few thousand people came to the other public presentations to meet with the Moscow Patriarch.[77]

A year later at about the same time, Patriarch Cyril once again visited Ukraine. The organizers expected that the service in Kiev on the Hill of St. Vladimir the Great would be attended by thousands of people, yet only two hundred people arrived.[78] Despite this, representatives of the ROC at a press conference in Moscow claimed that "there were thousands of people" on the Hill of St. Vladimir the Great with the head of the ROC.[79] During his trip to Ukraine in 2010, Patriarch Cyril also visited Odessa where about five thousand faithful awaited him. Interestingly, Odessa secured the ceremony with one thousand police officers and related services.[80] In 2011, the Patriarch of Moscow's goal on his May pilgrimage was Kharkov. The visit included a solemn liturgy on Freedom Square. Again, as in Odessa, around five thousand faithful attended. Meanwhile, the Moscow Patriarchate press service reported that "40,000 people prayed" during the liturgy in Kharkov.[81] According to official reports of the Ukrainian services, during the Moscow dignitary's stay, four thousand security officers and police were on standby.[82]

From the above figures, it can be concluded that Patriarch Cyril and his idea of the Russkiy Mir does not arouse much enthusiasm in Ukraine. This is despite the fact that his visits are widely publicized in the media, and the ceremonies that he celebrates are attended by representatives of the highest state authorities. Visits by the Moscow patriarch appear unimpressive, especially if one considers that John Paul II's presence for the liturgy in the Eastern rite in Kiev in 2001 was attended by approximately seventy thousand people.[83] And this is despite the fact that his liturgy was celebrated on a Monday, which was a working day.

Roots of Ukrainian Independence: The Legacy of Kiev-Mohyla Orthodoxy and the Type of Post-Communism

It should be recalled that ideas of Ukraine's independence and sovereignty were tempered in the fire of discussions about Ukraine and its culture—between the spaces of non-Europe ruled by Moscow and "psychological Europe" (Mykola Chwylowyj). Mykola Ryabchuk did not accidentally express the view that the democratic and libertarian movement in Ukraine fought "Russian statism," which was the negation of "civil society."[84] Hence, Ivan Drach strongly emphasized that "we must follow Europe's path."[85] It is worth noting that "civil society" is just one of the basic conceptual categories of "psychological Europe." Ukraine's intellectual

climate of national revival at the turn of the 1980s and 1990s and its European context is well illustrated by Ryabchuk, who concludes, "it is difficult to imagine an educated Ukrainian speaking on behalf of independence and self-determination that stands in opposition to Europe and European democratic institutions."[86]

Of course, the term "European," which in the 1990s became so popular in the Ukrainian discourse about identity, was ambiguous. The popular meaning of Europe has become synonymous with "whatever is civilized, democratic, dignified and full of the spirit of cooperation" with the West "on issues concerning political, economic and cultural rights."[87]

"On a more well-thought-out, scientific level," Europeanism in Ukraine was understood as everything directly or indirectly associated with the roots of the Old Continent's civilization, including "Greek philosophy, Roman law, Christian morality, the Renaissance, the Reformation, the Enlightenment, and the ideology of the Risorgimento."[88] [In the sentence beginning "On a more well-thought-out . . ." it was not clear who the pronoun "they" stood for. Please confirm the sentence as edited is correct.]

In the circle of Ukrainian post-Soviet elite nomenclature, the concept of "Europe" was understood in a very pragmatic way. It was more like a "zone of development, stability and tolerance" than "an assembly of sovereign nation-states" and their "dominant majority."[89]

In any case, the idea of Ukrainian independence and being "European" are quite closely connected with each other—no matter how this "Europeanness" is understood. This relationship seems to be taken for granted by a large part of Ukrainian society. Under the new circumstances, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, it was updated, inter alia, by reviving the tradition of the Orthodox Church of Kyiv, which symbolizes the idea of their own patriarchy, and by a Central European type of post-communism.

The history of Christianity and the religious institutions which arose on its basis have had a significant impact on Western European political culture.[90] Similarly, the Orthodoxy of the Kievan circle has become an important medium inculcating elements of that culture into the Ukrainian lands. Tomáš Halík, in describing the creative interaction between the religious and political spheres of Western Europe in the past, pointed to three key events.

The first is the "defense of the independence of the papacy against the emperor's power," which led to the separation of secular and spiritual authorities. This led to the institutionalization of freedom and became the impetus for "the distinction, separation and emancipation of individual social functions," meaning the processes driving modernization. Separating the "throne" and the "altar" enabled the later development of a "pluralistic society" and "de facto" was one of the factors that triggered the process of the secularization of Europe.[91] Halík stressed that the Christian East, in contrast to the West, enforced "a devotional attitude towards the emperor's power" and the related "caesaropapism."[92] Apparently this was one of

the major reasons why a phenomenon analogous to the "political and economic freedom of Western culture" did not appear in the East.[93] The traditions of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church in Kyiv completely break with the caesaropapism model attributed to Eastern Christianity. Generated in the Kyiv-Mohyla circle, under the conditions of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, the relationship between the Orthodox and secular authorities harmonized with the principle that divides the "throne" and the "altar" in Western culture.

The second key event in the history of the Western Church, which according to Halík had a significant impact on the evolution of Western political culture, was the "emancipation of the laity in the Church."[94] The Czech theologian described this phenomenon as a "democratizing movement" and linked it with Protestantism. He stressed that over time, "striving for a new, non-hierarchical organization of the Church" emerged "beyond the framework of the institutional structures of the Church" and gained "general social and political significance."[95] At the same time, a similar phenomenon could be observed in the Orthodox Church on Ukrainian lands. These are the Orthodox Brotherhood Movements. To a large extent, they contributed to internal reforms in the Orthodox Church. The activities of these fraternities can be considered, inter alia, as the result of the reception slogans and ideas from the Reformation and Counter-Reformation on Orthodox territory.[96]

Among the phenomena of an intra-religious nature that eventually influenced the direction of the evolution of secular political culture in Western Europe, Halík also mentioned "the beginnings of the theology of human rights."[97] In this context, the history of Kyiv-Mohyla College is worth recalling—the first educational institution with an academic character in the Eastern Slav territory. . It was built in 1632 in the environment associated with the Orthodox Metropolitan of Kyiv, Peter Mohyla, and became a hotbed of the Ukrainian intellectual elite—both clergy and laity.

From our perspective, most significant is the fact that the Academy of Kyiv was an extremely important medium through which the trends and ideas that changed the face of Western European civilization were synthesized with native Eastern European traditions on Ukrainian lands.[98] As a rule, the college lecturers studied at Western universities. The patterns they borrowed built the identity of Kiev University.[99] Thanks to the noble political culture of the Republic of Poland, the educated Ukrainian elite in Kiev participated in the "mainstream" civilizational processes in Europe, especially when it came to developing the concept of human rights.

For us, the most important thing is the question of how the interaction of Eastern Christianity in Ukraine with Western European culture transfers onto modern Ukrainian realities. Of course, it would be naive to expect that the activity of the Brotherhood Movement or the Kyiv-Mohyla legacy might somehow directly shape current social and political reality in Ukraine. However, it is impossible not to notice, at the level of symbols, the renaissance of Kiev's Orthodox legacy. For now, it is sufficient to mention the idea of the Kiev Patriarchate, which has become a major cause of contemporary divisions within the Orthodox Church in Ukraine. At about the same

time, a new institution of higher education was set up in Kyiv named the National University of the "Kyiv-Mohyla Academy," referring to its great predecessor.

The revival of the Kiev Patriarchate and the academy is closely related to the building of Ukrainian independence. More specifically, these symbols help to specify the contents of this concept. Promotion of the symbolism associated with the Orthodox Church of Kiev at the dawn of the modern Ukrainian state suggests a desire to graft patterns and influences from the West into social practice.

However, is the hypothesis of a mutual relationship between the renaissance of Kyiv-Mohyla's symbolism and the willingness and ability to adapt to the canons of Western political culture really justified? At least in the case of the university, it is relatively easy to answer this question in the affirmative.[100] Moreover, in this case, it is possible to have recourse to an argument *a contrario* in a convincing way: it is no accident that the modern successor of the academic tradition of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy has its enemies in Ukraine in environments that openly declare their reluctance toward the West and maintain sympathies among the neo-imperial Eurasian concepts.[101]

The revival of religion in the form of the Kyiv-Mohyla Orthodox tradition also has a strong social dimension. At the level of the symbols and myths upon which modern post-soviet Ukrainian identity is built, it facilitates belief in the undivided connection of Ukraine to the European civilizational circle, particularly against those who would contest this . In the sphere of social practice, religion, primarily the divisions among the Orthodox caused by autocephalous ideas and the Kievan Patriarchate, has become perhaps the most important guarantor of genuine social pluralism and greatly compensates (of course, as far as possible) for the disadvantages resulting from feckless pluralism in the political sphere.[102]

Another factor that, in its own way, "Europeanizes" the social and political system in Ukraine, is the type of post-communism occurring there. On the basis of the typology proposed by Jadwiga Staniszkis, we can distinguish two types of post-communism: Russian and Central European. The first grows from cultures that Staniszkis describes as "Orthodox," "the culture of antinomy." Its essence relies on the fact that "the meaning of a certain element (institution) is mediated by its opposite . . . and the formula for interpreting this antinomious whole."[103]

However, post-communism in Central Europe derived from a culture that was originally deeply rooted in bivalent logic, and the "concept of identity is closely intertwined with the category of difference."[104] As a result, the characteristic Central European cultural diversity resulted from the fact that here, within a single country or region of identity, the geopolitical orientation and civilization, in principle, were always different, but also as a rule did not exclude each other.

According to Staniszkis's concept, the decisive influence on the current form of post-communism was "the first division among the Communist elite," which then made an impression on the "creeping pluralism of society (or 'audience' or executive power apparatus) associated with the retraction of selected categories of

persons into the orbit of conflicts 'at the top' and the last division among the elite at the end of communism."[105]

For the Russian version of post-communism, the dispute about its "founding" was the issue of "the formula for autonomic interpretation of 'the whole': Communism—Capitalism."[106] This controversy raised the question whether the only type of interaction between these systems is conflict and struggle, or whether "interdependence" and reciprocal "fulfillment" are possible and advisable. This was also one of the last disputes at the end of the Soviet Union, updating the old controversy in the discussions about Gorbachev's "common European home."[107] However, for the Central European post-communist model, this determining "first argument" that "returned" at the end of the 1980s concerned the relationship between *the country* and "*the people of Moscow*."[108]

Under conditions in Ukraine, this tension between *the country* and "*the people of Moscow*" manifested itself at the beginning of Soviet rule in Ukraine with full force in the form of so-called national communism . The representatives of this movement believed that the social revolution in Ukraine could only be carried out by taking into account the nation's cultural and national specificity and individuality. In particular, they were opposed to the mechanical transfer into the Ukraine of Russia's revolutionary solutions.

In the 1920s, this conflict moved into the realm of culture and science in relation to so-called Ukrainization. The liberalization of national politics which took place at that time gave birth to the illusion that the full and equal legal status of Russian and Ukrainian cultures is possible. But in reality, Ukrainization deepened the feeling of separateness and once again highlighted the mental and cultural differences between Ukraine and Russia. Mykola Chwylowyj most clearly formulated them in the form of the thesis of the destructive influence of Russian culture and the need to reorient toward "psychological Europe."[109]

The debate triggered by Chwylowyj's political pamphlets crystallized a new formula for a dispute between "our country" and "the people of Moscow," meaning Europe versus "the people from outside of Europe." Chwylowyj clearly placed Ukrainian culture in a pan-European civilizational trend. Meanwhile, opponents stated that the so-called supporters of "Chwylowism" were "Westernized intellectuals who lack faith in their own people."[110] They wanted to withdraw from the cultural legacy of Western Europe and denied its universal values, claiming that Europe is synonymous with "decay and rot."[111]

In the late 1980s and early 1990s, based on Mikhail Gorbachev's perestroika, there was a return to discussions from the 1920s.[112] This time, the tone was set by Gorbachev's slogan "returning to roots," Lenin's original assumptions. This imposed a certain way of speaking about the USSR's history. Based on this, the early pioneering years of building socialism proceeded according to Leninist principles. Then they were squandered by Stalinist repression. The Ukrainian intellectual elite willingly answered to the call to return to Leninist roots[113] as a signpost toward modernization

and reconstruction inside the Soviet empire.[114] This in turn would inevitably lead to the rediscovery of disputes and dilemmas with which the proponents of the nationalized version of communism in Ukraine struggled with in the 1920s.

Thus, as noted by Alexandra Hnatiuk, another "Ukrainian revolution" at the turn of the 1980s and 1990s was provoked by an "updated project from the 20's, returning to the sources of Soviet identity."[115] We must note that this meant the Ukrainian variant of this identity, whose axis is a tension between "our country vs. the people of Moscow."

There are many indications that the source of the stability of the political system in Ukraine, formed under the conditions imposed by the local version of post-communism, is the belief in the need to maintain a minimum balance of influence between "the people of Moscow" and what is "national" and thus associated with "psychological Europe." When this balance is disturbed, there is a turning point whose nature and course depend on the actual circumstances and context. We saw such a situation during the "Orange Revolution." This can be interpreted as a manifestation of stress in the system caused by the excessive dominance "of the people of Moscow." The Orange Revolution even more clearly emphasized the Central European post-communist tone in Ukraine. In this context, the controversies associated with the concept of the Russkiy Mir can be regarded as a continuation of this type of post-communist Ukrainian conflict.

Conclusion

One of the fundamental errors of the adherents of the "Third Wave of Democracy" that Carothers pointed out was disregard of the local cultural, historical, and social determinants in which the processes of transformation proceeded. It seems that the Russkiy Mir concept with reference to Ukraine is burdened with a similar lack of attention to local context.

However, in post-Soviet societies, the interpretation of the past is quite often extremely selective and not entirely conscious in character.[116] This is due to the fact that the reinterpretation of selected fragments of tradition is treated in quite an instrumental and extemporaneous way. As a result, instead of genuine legacies from the past multiplying, in many cases we deal with the phenomenon of "neotraditionalization" which leads to the pastiche of original tradition. Its particular elements are separated from their primary connotations and adapted to their new functions or even submitted to them. Besides, within neotraditionalization the meaning of arbitrarily selected elements are "sharpened" and idealized. Another consequence of this process is the radical breaking of the rule of sequencing, which is the essence of tradition and the source of its legitimacy.[117]

Both the concept of the reintegration of the post-Soviet space, promoted as the Russkiy Mir, as well as the conceptual basis for Ukrainian independence and sovereignty are formulated in terms of this neotraditionalization. From our point of

view, it is important that the concept of the Russkiy Mir excludes the possibility of positive interactions with the Western European cultural space both in the past as well as the present. In this way, it clearly challenges an important part of the modern Ukrainian legacy (in the sense that Kieniewicz uses it). We must note that here we are not only dealing with such elements as the Kyiv-Mohyla Academy's tradition or the Central European type of post-communism. This also concerns our key elements of unarticulated knowledge that refer to such concepts as freedom, democracy, civil society and pluralism. It can be assumed that the Orange Revolution and the "Euromaidan" have become or will become symbols of these values in the consciousness of an important part of Ukrainian society. Although they seemed short-lived experiences, at the same time they were extremely intense. For this reason, we can consider them an important new element of unarticulated knowledge that shapes the contemporary rules of social and political life in Ukraine. At the same time, they are (and will be) recognized as crucial elements of the legacy associated with Ukrainian independence.

From our point of view, the fact that all these elements cannot be reconciled with the basic assumptions of the Russkiy Mir is important. Under these circumstances, the concept of the Russkiy Mir in the way that it was presented here should be considered a pretext for Russian political, economic, or "security" policies toward Ukraine. Its components (e.g., the defense of the Russian-speaking population or "common views of social development") serve more as a justification for Russia's forcible intervention in the territory of Ukraine than as an agenda to be used by Ukraine's independent authorities. The Crimean case appears to be a good confirmation of this hypothesis.

It will be increasingly difficult to continue the politics of ambivalence between Russia and the West for Ukraine's leaders under these conditions. Since 1991, they have practiced the concept of a multivectoral policy. Keeping this kind of an indecisive position ("between Russia and the West" or "with Russia and the West at the same time"), they were able to maintain relative equilibrium in the Ukrainian political system. However, this policy solidified characteristics typical for the gray zone. At present, it is necessary to make a decision—with or without the West (Europe)—and the decision seems to be exigent. In other words, the possibility of consuming the payoff of Ukrainian independence within the framework of social and political order created under the conditions of the gray zone appears to be getting lower and lower.

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77. Андрій Юраш, "Богословіє Патріарха Кирила: український вимір," http://www.religion.in.ua/zmi/1458-bogosloviye-patriarxa-kirila-ukrayinskij-vimir.html (accessed 20 October 2013).

78. "Орден патриарха—соратнику Вахи Арсанова," http://svpressa.ru/society/article/28346/ (accessed 20 October 2013).

79. "В «Интерфаксе» прошла пресс-конференция по итогам посещения Святейшим Патриархом Кириллом Украинской Православной Церкви," http://www.mospat.ru/ru/2010/07/30/news23391/ (accessed 20 October 2013).

80. "Около 5 тыс. человек ожидают патриарха Кирилла рядом со Спасо-Преображенским собором в Одессе," http://www.interfax.com.ua/rus/main/44226/ (accessed 20 October 2013).

81. "В неделю 3-ю по Пасхе, святых жен-мироносиц, Святейший Патриарх Кирилл возглавил служение Божественной литургии на площади Свободы г. Харькова," http://www.mospat.ru/ru/2011/05/08/news40972/ (accessed 20 October 2013).

82. Через візит Патріарха Кирила харківську міліцію перевели на посилений режим, http://risu.org.ua/ua/index/all_news/state/church_state_relations/42213/ (accessed 20 October 2013).

83. *Kronika podróży*, http://www.opoka.org.pl/biblioteka/T/TH/THW/kronika_jp2_ukraina2001.html (accessed 20 October 2013).

84. M. Riabczuk, "Społeczeństwo obywatelskie i emancypacja narodowa," *Zustriczi* 7, no. 1 (1991): 99.

85. Ibid., 101.

86. Ibid., 103.

87. А. Процик, "«Європейськість» як чинник ідентичності," in *Українське суспільство на шляху перетворень: західна інтерпретація*, ed. В. Ісаїв (Kiev, МАУП, 2004), 150.

88. Ibid., 150.

89. K. Wolczuk, "History, Europe and the 'National Idea': 'The Official' Narrative of National Identity in Ukraine," *Nationalities Papers* 28, no. 4 (2000): 687–88.

90. Ph. Nemo, *Qu'est-ce que l'Occident?* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2004).

91. T. Halík, "Chrześcijaństwo a wolność—doświadczenie europejskiego Zachodu," in T. Halík, *Wzywany czy niewzywany Bóg się tutaj zjawi* (Cracow: Wydawnictwo WAM, 2006), 268.

92. Ibid., 268.

93. Ibid., 267.

94. Ibid., 269.

95. Ibid., 270.

96. For more on the topic of the Brotherhood Movement, see A. Mironowicz, *Bractwa cerkiewne w Rzeczypospolitej* (Bialystok: The Orthodox Brotherhood of Sts. Cyril and Methodius in Poland, 2003).

97. Halík, "Chrześcijaństwo a wolność," 271.

98. For more on this topic, see Włodzimierz Mokry, "Akademia Kijowsko-Mohylańska szkołą baroku ukraińskiego i nowożytnej literatury rosyjskiej," *Krakowskie Zeszyty Ukrainoznawcze* I-II (1992–1993): 17–39.

99. For more on this topic, see *Релігійно-філософська думка в Києво-Могилянській академії: європейський контекст*, ed. В. С. Горський (Kiev: Видавничий Дім «КМ Академія», 2002).

100. In particular, this university—just like over the centuries Kiev's college did—aims to ensure Ukraine a permanent place on an equal basis in a "dialogue of national cultures in Europe," which is to "confirm the Europeanness" of Ukrainian culture—*Релігійно-філософська думка*, 5.

101. Cf. also Віталій Червоненко, "Табачник добиває Могилянку," http://glavcom.ua/articles/4203. html (accessed 20 October 2013). More on D. Tabachnyk's views—cf "Антиукраїнська риторика Табачника: за 'русскій мір' без галичан," http://tyzhden.ua/News/59174 (accessed 20 October 2013).

102. As an illustration of this thesis, it is worth recalling the statement of one of the active participants of this system—the deputy of the Supreme Council on behalf of the Party of Regions Volodymyr Zubanow, who said that the multi-confessional character, including the internal diversity of the Orthodox Church in Ukraine, is one of the "natural safeguards" that protects the Ukrainian political system against drifting toward dictatorship and authoritarianism—"Українська багатоконфесійність— запобіжник від диктатури,—політик" http://risu.org.ua/ua/index/all_news/community/religion_and_ society/45906/ (accessed 20 October 2013).

103. Jadwiga Staniszkis, *Postkomunizm. Próba opisu* (Gdansk: słowo/obraz terytoria, 2005), 229.

104. Ibid., 228.

105. Ibid., 231.

106. Ibid., 232.

107. Ibid., 232.

108. Ibid., 232. I took the term "people of Moscow" directly from Staniszkis. This is an English translation used by the said author of the term "ludzie Moskwy." I believe that it should not be directly equated with the term "Moskali" which operates mainly in Western Ukraine as a pejorative term indicating the Russians. "People of Moscow" is not an evaluative or clear ethnic connotation. It should be used as a term for people whose mission and purpose is to keep the non-Russian population under Moscow's control, and who in their actions and way of thinking are fully amenable toward Moscow.

109. Мирослав Шкандрій, *Модерністи, марксисти і нація. Українська літературна дискусія 1920-х років* (Kiev: Ніка-Центр, 2006), 89–90.

110. Ibid., 87.

111. Ibid., 87. In the *Ukrainian Soviet Encyclopedia* in the 1960s, it was written that "using demagogical slogans as a cover up to support the general line of the Communist Party and its supporters, Chwylowyj in fact acted against the party's policies and sought to break Ukraine and its culture away from Soviet Russia—quoted after: I. Лисяк-Рудницький, "Михайло Хвильовий," in *Історичні есе* (Kiev: Основи, 1994), vol. 2, 122.

112. Aleksandra Hnatiuk, *Pożegnanie z imperium. Ukraińskie dyskusje o tożsamości* (Lublin: Wydawnictwo UMCS, 2003), 126.

113. Ibid., 92.

114. Ibid., 92.

115. Ibid., 94.

116. Staniszkis, *Postkomunizm*, 137.

117. Ibid., 137.

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