

1 Memory of sovereignty and sovereignty over memory: Poland, Lithuania and Ukraine, 1939–1999

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Revanchism, ethnic cleansing and war are all results of memory; peace in a part of the world where border changes, nationalist murder and bloody conflict are well remembered is at least as interesting. Since the end of the Second World War, Lithuanians have believed that Poland would seize Vilnius if given the chance, while Poles recall Ukrainians (after the Germans) as the greatest and most vicious wartime enemy. Since 1989 Poland and its eastern neighbours Lithuania and Ukraine have successfully negotiated issues of past conflict, in large part because of awareness of the problems memory must pose for statesmen. The question of the importance of national sovereignty to collective memory, and the possibility of gaining sovereignty over memory by way of national policy, involves four theoretical problems.

First, we must distinguish history from memory, while establishing the nature of their mutual independence. Neither can be studied apart from the other, and yet without separate conceptions the study of neither can proceed. Second, we must distinguish two types of collective memory. The first is the recollection of a large number of individuals of events in which they took part. This sort of collective memory we shall call ‘mass personal memory’. The second is the organisational principle that nationally conscious individuals use to organise the national history. This is ‘memoire’ rather than ‘souvenir’, a ‘frame’ (Yuen Foon Kong) rather than a picture. It allows us to place events in the national history, whether or not we took part in them.¹ Third, we must account for the influence of communist power upon memory and national historiography, as Iver Neumann points out. Fourth, we must sketch the margins which remain for responsible political leadership, and the circumstances in which free polities may gain a measure of sovereignty over memory.

¹ These two sorts of collective memory are easily confused and conflated. There are probably disciplinary and national predilections to giving precedence to one or the other. Empiricists may be drawn to mass personal memory, and students of culture to national memory. It may also be that societies with less to remember are apt to regard the mass personal recollections of others as constructs.

These four problem areas correspond to historical periods. The problem of history and memory, of what is to be remembered, corresponds to the period 1939–47. The distinction between the two types of collective memory, and the character of communist influence on memory, are most saliently put with regard to events of 1947–89. The possibility of sound policy towards memory, of asserting sovereignty over memory, will be investigated with respect to events since 1989. This final section will also serve to elucidate the practical implications of these theoretical problems. History, memory, and policy are separate realms, and the relationship among them is far from straightforward. Good foreign policy does not flow simply from vivid memory or good history, but must address the pressing problems of the day while navigating the straits and passages they define.

History and memory (1939–47)

Memory cannot be studied as memory, at all. Our recollections are always recollections of something, and unless we have an independent source of knowledge about this something, we can learn nothing about how memory works. In experiments on human memory, for example, the psychologist must know what is to be remembered, or her observations of actual recall will be meaningless. This holds whether the researcher is studying memory as our ability to recall information, or memory as a system which organises recollections. The same holds for the historian, even though the historian lacks the expedient of experiments. A historian who studies memory of past events must do so against the background of some picture of these events. The historian's first task, then, must be to use the available sources, including the memories of participants and victims of all sides, to establish such an image. Although this image must be derivative of memory, it is not reducible to it. Indeed, a successful historical project almost always proves to be a corrective of memory.

The section that follows is history, in the important sense that no individual does, and no individual could, remember the events in the way that they will be presented: events can only be seen 'as they really were' with the help of research and retrospect. During the period of wartime conflict between Poles and Lithuanians and Ukrainians (1939–47), the usual problems were posed in severe form. No individual had all of the necessary perspectives; no individual had all of the information; leaders were making life or death decisions rather than seeking truth; several parties believed that massacres here or there should not be allowed to slow the arrival of the greater good; perpetrators of violence often intentionally sowed confusion about their identity and motives; victims of violence

were often afraid to press claims; state power was in flux; and the two greatest propaganda machines of all time were at work. With a historical picture of wartime relations between Poles and Lithuanians and Poles and Ukrainians as backdrop, we will be able to pose coherently questions of collective memory.

The Polish–Ukrainian civil war, 1943–7

Polish and Ukrainian memories of the Second World War are extraordinarily different. For Poles, the Molotov–Ribbentrop pact of 1939 was an act of unprecedented treachery. For Ukrainians, its division of Poland allowed all Ukrainian lands to be united into a single political unit.² For Poles, the enemies in the Second World War were the Germans and their (sometime) Ukrainian henchmen. Far more Ukrainians, however, fought in the Red Army against the Germans than in the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) as their allies. The Ukrainian nationalists who did indeed ally with Nazi Germany are regarded by west Ukrainian patriots (and many Ukrainians in Poland) as canny and heroic freedom fighters; for Poles they are usually vicious fascists. Whereas for patriotic Ukrainians the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists created a moment of Ukrainian sovereign action by declaring a Ukrainian state under Nazi occupation in 1941 and a lasting memory of national heroism by their doomed struggle, for Poles its UPA was the organisation which cleansed Poles from western Ukraine in 1943 and 1944. Ukrainian patriots – even liberals with long experience in the West – are unwilling to accept that the UPA did commit mass race murder in 1943–4. Poles, even those hostile to the communist regime, are apt to believe that the anti-Ukrainian military operations of 1944–7 were a direct result (and a just one) of the UPA's earlier ethnic cleansing. Both views are substantially incorrect. The UPA did indeed brutally murder tens of thousands of Polish civilians in 1943–4. But in 1944–7 the Polish communist regime acted to 'resolve the Ukrainian question in Poland', not only to liquidate the UPA. In both cases, of course, it is fallacious in any event to hold the entire nation responsible for the actions in question. Yet the scale and depth of suffering carry their own truth: in all, some 110,000 lost their lives and 1.5 million their homes in what I call the Polish–Ukrainian civil war of 1943–7, in cleansing actions (the word was used at the time) that were largely independent of the battles of the Second World War, and which was carried out in the name of the Ukrainian nation against Poles

² See Volodymyr Serhiichyk, *Etничni Mezhi i Derzhavnyi Kordon Ukrainy* (Ternopil: Vydavnytstvo Ternopil, 1996), 143, for the historical teleology. This view is general and uncontroversial in Ukraine.

and in the name of the Polish nation against Ukrainians. Yet memories of ethnic cleansing provide the sharpest contrast, supply the driest kindling for political conflicts, and evoke the greatest need for historical care. In fact, Poles and Ukrainians each cleansed the other, but in memory each was only the victim of the other. What, then, are the facts?

There is no space here to explain the entire background of the Ukrainian–Polish conflict over Galicia and Volhynia.³ All that can be shown is that Ukrainian political activity was concentrated in Poland by the 1930s, and that the Second World War enabled its most violent elements to take actions altogether disproportionate to their popular support before the war. During the inter-war period the locus of Ukrainian civil society was Galicia, which had fallen under Polish rule after the conflicts which followed the First World War. Galicia had belonged to Austria: along with Volhynia, which had been ruled by the Russian empire, it was home to the vast majority of Poland’s Ukrainian minority. Most of what is now Ukraine was then Soviet Ukraine, but after the reversal of the pro-Ukrainian policies of the 1920s, and especially after the Great Famine of the early 1930s, it no longer supported anything like Ukrainian national activity. Ukrainians in Poland enjoyed enough freedom to organise themselves, but were denied the political options which might have satisfied the ambitions of their elite. In the 1930s Ukrainian political life in Poland was divided among a pro-communist and illegal left, a pragmatically pro-Polish centre, and a violently anti-Polish and illegal right.

This last tendency, the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists, was best prepared for the new situation brought by the destruction of Polish state in 1939. As other organisations dissolved themselves, the habitually conspiratorial OUN survived. But it split in 1941 into two fractions, and lost much of its leadership to internecine war, German arrests and, eventually, Soviet attacks. By 1943, when attacks on Polish citizens were initiated on a mass scale, Ukrainian nationalism had been reduced to its youngest and most violent elements. In conditions of enormous stress, they took decisions based upon a changing strategic environment. Some Ukrainian leaders apparently believed that the Second World War would end with the exhaustion of both Germany and Russia, and that Ukraine’s final enemy would be a resurrected Poland unwilling to abandon its eastern lands.⁴ The formation of sizable units of Polish partisans in the east confirmed this fear. At the time of the establishment of the UPA as a

³ This is the purpose of Timothy Snyder, *The Reconstruction of Nations* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003), chs. 7–8.

⁴ This is the view advanced in a thoughtful essay by Grzegorz Motyka, ‘Od Wołyń do akcji “Wiśła”’, *Więź* 473 (March 1998), 110. His *Tak było w Bieszczadach* (Warsaw: Volumen, 1999) is now the major source on this conflict.

fighting force in 1943, the Wehrmacht had lost its momentum in the east. With the Germans forced westward and the Red Army too strong a foe to defeat, Ukrainian nationalists may then have reasoned that the elimination of Polishness from Ukraine was the most that could now be achieved.

At all events, the consequences (and the available documents) point to a firm political decision to prioritise the struggle with the Polish element, and to use violence against civilians as a means of resolving the Polish question in Ukraine.⁵ Some of the UPA's soldiers were former German policemen responsible for the murder of Jews in 1941–2, and more generally the example of German nationality policy must have demoralised the Ukrainian population. In any case, the policy of expelling (or even physically liquidating) Poles was popular within the UPA, and found substantial popular support among Ukrainian peasants as well.⁶ At least 40,000 Polish civilians were murdered by Ukrainian partisans and peasants in Volhynia in July 1943, and another 10,000 were murdered in Galicia in March 1944. In coordinated attacks on Polish settlements, Ukrainian partisans burned homes and used sickles and rakes to kill those they captured outside. Beheaded, crucified, or dismembered bodies were displayed, in order to encourage remaining Poles to flee. By the time of these attacks, the Polish population in Ukraine had already been thinned by Soviet deportations between 1939 and 1941 and by German executions and deportations since. The enormous majority of remaining Poles who escaped the UPA fled west, some 200,000 before and some 800,000 after the beginning of official 'repatriations' agreed to by Polish and Soviet communist authorities in September 1944.⁷ Their flight ended five hundred years of continuous Polish settlement of these lands, and brought to post-war Poland a million first- or second-hand personal memories of atrocities committed in the name of Ukraine.

Meanwhile, news of the slaughter in Volhynia infuriated Poles in Lviv and Galicia, and Polish partisans (of all political stripes) attacked the

⁵ Petro Balei *Fronda Stepana Bandery v OUN 1940 roku: pryhyny i naslidky* (Kyiv: Tekna A/T, 1996), 141; 'Taras Bul'ba-Borovets', undated open letter to the OUN-Bandera., Central State Archive (CDAVOVU) in Kyiv, 3833/1/107, cited in Władysław Filar, *Eksterminacja ludności polskiej na Wołyniu w Drugiej Wojnie światowej* (Warsaw: Zakład Poligrafii, 1999), 85.

⁶ Ryszard Torzecki, *Polacy i Ukraińcy: Sprawa ukraińska w czasie II wojny światowej na terenie II Rzeczypospolitej* (Warsaw: PWN, 1993), 238.

⁷ A far higher proportion of Poles in Ukraine were willing to be 'repatriated' than Poles in Lithuania and Belarus. Also, Poles in western Ukraine, the site of UPA attacks, were more likely to leave than Poles in central Ukraine. These are reasons to believe that the acceptance of 'repatriation' was a result of wartime experience, and in this sense a result of the UPA's ethnic cleansing.

UPA, assassinated prominent Ukrainian civilians and burned Ukrainian villages. The Polish government-in-exile in London was forced to redirect its limited resources.⁸ Although there is no evidence that the Polish government contemplated a policy of revenge against Ukrainian civilians, and in fact explicitly ordered that civilians not be harmed, in the field Polish partisans burned Ukrainian villages and killed Ukrainians found on the roads in Volhynia.⁹ Further west, where the demographic balance favoured Poles, the situation was that of a pitiless civil war. Polish partisans (usually but not always formations outside the main command of the Home Army) engaged in the mass killing of civilians. In the eastern half of the Lublin region, Polish partisans of the Peasant Battalions matched the Ukrainians atrocity for atrocity. The testimony of one of these Polish partisans, recently published in English, is worth quoting at length:

We reacted to their attacks, which reached unspeakable levels of barbarity, with a ruthlessness of our own. When we overran a Ukrainian settlement, we systematically took out the men of fighting age and executed them, often by letting them run forty paces ahead of us and shooting them in the back. This was considered the most humane method. Others in the unit, whose actions I will describe, behaved differently and exacted a terrible revenge. No one raised a finger to stop them. While I never saw one of our men pick up a baby or a small child with the point of a bayonet and toss it onto a fire, I saw the charred corpses of Polish babies who had died that way. If none of our number did that, then it was the only atrocity that we did not commit.¹⁰

Polish communists, the baggage of the Red Army as the front swept across Poland in 1944, knew that in this context the ethnic cleansing of Ukrainians within Poland's new borders would arouse little opposition, and bring much support, from ethnic Poles. Here their interests coincided with orders from Soviet comrades, and the mutual 'repatriations' of 1944–46 were carried out with enthusiasm by both sides. Perhaps 220,000 Ukrainians left Poland of their own volition in late 1944. Many of these

⁸ Ministerstwo Obrony Narodowej, Biuro Ministra-Wydział Polityczny, L.dz. 1900/WPol/44, London, 8 January 1944, Oddział VI, sygn. 3.3.3.13.2 (36); Sztab Naczelnego Wodza, Oddział Specjalny, L.dz.719/Tjn.44, London, 28 January 1944, Oddział VI, sygn. 3.3.3.13.2 (37); Sztab Naczelnego Wodza, Oddział Specjalny, L.dz.2366/tjn.43, 17 May 1943, Oddział VI, sygn. 3.1.3.3.2 (34); Sztab Naczelnego Wodza, Oddział Specjalny, L.dz.108/Tjn.44, London, 8 January 1944, Oddział VI, sygn. 3.1.1.13.2 (22), all in *Studium Polskiej Podziemnej*, London.

⁹ For examples of such Polish attacks see Michał Klimacki, 'Geneza i organizacja polskiej samoobrony na Wołyniu i w Małopolsce Wschodniej podczas II wojny światowej', in *Polska-Ukraina: trudne pytania* (Warsaw: Karta, 1998), IV, 70, and Roman Strika, 'Geneza polskiej samoobrony na Wołyniu i jej roli w obronie ludności polskiej', *ibid.*, 82.

¹⁰ Waldemar Lotnik, *Nine Lives: Ethnic Conflict in the Polish-Ukrainian Borderlands* (London: Serif, 1999), 59.

returned, some by claiming to be ethnic Poles and thus ‘repatriating’ again in the opposite direction, bringing horrifying accounts of Soviet Ukraine. By 1945 Ukrainians were in general unwilling to resettle, and had organised to appeal for the right to remain. The Soviets requested the use of force in August 1945, and in September 1945 Polish authorities sent in three infantry divisions to resettle forcibly remaining Ukrainians to the Soviet Union. Many of these soldiers hailed from the east and had fought against the UPA, and could be counted on to harbour no tender feelings towards Ukrainians. In April 1946, these divisions, other troops and security forces were organised into Operational Group ‘Rzeszów’, with the task of completing the expulsion of Ukrainians from Poland. They encircled villages, forced inhabitants at gunpoint into convoys bound for Soviet Ukraine, and moved on. Roughly 260,000 Ukrainians were expelled from Poland in this way.¹¹

Polish communist authorities realised in 1947 that more Ukrainians than they had expected had managed to stay. The estimate of August 1946 that 14,000 Ukrainians remained in Poland was increased to 74,000 in March 1947 (a better estimate would have been 200,000). By this time planning had already begun, this time apparently without prompting from the Soviet Union (though of course with Stalin’s eventual approval), to disperse remaining Ukrainians in the northern and western territories that Poland ‘recovered’ from Germany. After a general was murdered by the UPA on 28 March 1947, the politburo decided to ‘resettle Ukrainians and mixed families in the regained territories (especially in southern Prussia), not forming any tight groups and not closer than 100 kilometres from the border’.¹² The initial plan, presented on 16 April 1947, began with the words: ‘Task: to resolve the Ukrainian problem in Poland once and for all.’¹³ No Ukrainians were to be spared: even loyal party members trained in the Soviet Union, even communists who had helped ‘repatriate’ Ukrainians in the previous wave, were to be forcibly resettled.

Ukrainians were dispersed from south-eastern to north-western Poland (to the territories ‘recovered’ from Germany) in three waves of operations between April and August 1947. Operational Group ‘Wisła’ used the same tactics as its predecessor ‘Rzeszów’, often allowing Ukrainians hours or even minutes to pack their belongings. Some 140,000 Ukrainians

¹¹ Eugeniusz Misiło, *Akcja ‘Wisła’* (Warsaw: Archiwum Ukraińskie, 1993), 15.

¹² ‘Z protokołu nr 3 posiedzenia Biura Politycznego Komitetu Centralnego Polskiej Partii Robotniczej’: 29 March 1947, Archiwum Akt Nowych, VI Oddział, KC PPR, 295/V-3, reprinted in Misiło, *Akcja ‘Wisła’*, 24.

¹³ ‘Projekt organizacji specjalnej ‘Wschód’’, plan presented by General Stanisław Mossor to Polish politburo 16 April 1947, Archiwum Urzędu Ochrony Państwa, Gabinet Ministra Bezpieczeństwa Publicznego, 17/IX/140, reprinted in Misiło, *Akcja ‘Wisła’*, 24.

were packed into trains, and rerouted at either Lublin or Óświęcim (Auschwitz) station to their new places of settlement. Military courts sentenced 178 Ukrainians to death for collaborating with the UPA. A total of 3,936 Ukrainians, including 823 women and children, were taken to the Jaworzno concentration camp, a wartime affiliate of the Auschwitz–Birkenau complex. Brutal torture was routine.¹⁴ Several dozen died in Jaworzno, including two women by suicide. Later in 1947, another operational group finally defeated the UPA – given new life in south-eastern Poland as a defender of Ukrainians who did not wish to leave their homes. Although Polish communist forces never destroyed a UPA battalion, they could and did make it impossible for the UPA to operate in Poland. UPA soldiers escaped across the (sealed) Czechoslovak border and on to the West, or across the (sealed) Soviet border to continue the fight against Soviet power. Some accepted resettlement, and joined the three quarters of the Ukrainian population in post-war Poland which was ethnically cleansed.

The transfer of Vilnius

Whereas Poles and Ukrainians have killed and expelled each other in great numbers, Poles and Lithuanians have fought no major battle in modern times. Rather, Poles and Lithuanians have both claimed the city of Vilnius. Vilnius was the capital of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, both before and after the duchy was joined with the Kingdom of Poland in 1569 to create the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth. As long as the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth existed, the Grand Duchy of Lithuania was at once connected to and distinct from the Polish crown lands. Its nobles became citizens of the larger Commonwealth and accepted treated Polish as the language of culture, law and public discourse, but they never ceased to regard themselves as Lithuanian. At this time, therefore, the city of Vilnius was therefore neither ‘Polish’ nor ‘Lithuanian’ in a modern, ethnic nationalist sense.¹⁵

After the Grand Duchy of Lithuania was absorbed by the Russian empire in the partitions of the late eighteenth century, this old identity faced a number of challenges. Over the course of the nineteenth century, traditional multinational Lithuanian patriotism was weakened by failures in practice (the risings of 1831 and 1863), changes in economics

¹⁴ This is the conclusion of the investigation of the Polish procurator in 1997. See Leszek Gołowski, ‘Dokumenty Javozhna’ (excerpts from procurator’s report of treatment of Ukrainian prisoners in Jaworzno concentration camp, 1947), *Nashe Slovo*, 28 January 1996, 1, 3.

¹⁵ See Snyder, *The Reconstruction of Nations*, ch. 2.

(the emancipation of the serfs in 1861), and in some measure by Russian policy (which sought to use ethnic Lithuanians as a counterweight to patriotic Poles). As the Lithuanian national movement consolidated along modern ethnic nationalist lines in the late nineteenth century, the re-claiming of Vilnius from Polish culture was one of its major goals – even as most of ‘Lithuania’ and ‘Poland’ were ruled by tsarist Russia. After the First World War, Lithuanian leaders struck a bargain with the Bolsheviks for Vilnius, but were foiled when Poland won the Polish–Bolshevik war in 1920. Vilnius was occupied by Polish troops, the local population voted for annexation to Poland, and the victorious powers accepted this frontier arrangement.¹⁶

Lithuania continued to insist on its legal right to Vilnius, and Lithuania and Poland were technically at war over the city until 1938. The denial of Vilnius determined Lithuanian attitudes towards its neighbours and played an important role in domestic politics. The December 1926 coup and the authoritarian dictatorship that followed were justified in terms of purported Polish interference in Lithuania’s internal affairs, and Latvian and British representatives were assured that Poland rather than Russia posed a military threat to the Baltic region.¹⁷ The regime accepted money and favours from Moscow, believing that Poland posed the greater military threat.¹⁸ When the Soviet Union did advance west into Poland on the strength of the Molotov–Ribbentrop pact, Lithuanian representatives pressed claims to Vilnius in Moscow. In October 1939, Lithuania received Vilnius from the Soviet Union in exchange for allowing Soviet military bases on its territory. Lithuanian troops marched unopposed into Vilnius on 28 October, Polish armies having been defeated by the German and Soviet attacks of September.

Lithuanian soldiers were astonished to find that they could not communicate with the local population, and officers were forced to resort to French and German to ask for directions. Even by the official Lithuanian count, only 6 per cent of the residents of Vilnius were Lithuanian. Lithuanian national activists were forced to accept that ‘Vilnius, so desired and so dear to Lithuanians, turns out to be entirely non-Lithuanian’.¹⁹

¹⁶ The authoritative account of these events is A. E. Senn, *The Great Powers, Lithuania, and the Vilna Question 1920–1928* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1966).

¹⁷ Iver Neumann, ‘Poland as a Regional Great Power: the Inter-war Heritage’, in Iver Neumann (ed.), *Regional Great Powers and International Politics* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1992), 134–5.

¹⁸ Tomas Venclova, ‘Litwo, ojczyzna nasza’, *Lithuania*, 26–27 (1998), 70–82. See also Zenonas Butkas, ‘Jei opozicija gauna param iš svetur’, *Diena*, 214 (1995).

¹⁹ Algis Kasperovicius, ‘Stosunek władz i społeczeństwa Litwy do Polaków na Wileńszczyźnie Wrzesień 1939 – Czerwiec 1940’, in Małgorzata Giżejewska and Tomasz Strzembosz (eds.), *Spółczesność białoruskie, litewskie i polskie na ziemiach poł*

Official propaganda nevertheless spoke of liberating Lithuanians and restoring Lithuanian identity to ‘polonised’ inhabitants: the consequent policy of suppressing the Polish and Jewish majority population was very popular in Lithuania as a whole, but led to riots in the streets of Vilnius. The ‘re-lithuanisation’ of Vilnius lasted until June 1940, when the Soviet Union invaded Lithuania. The next twelve months saw tens of thousands of Poles, Jews and Lithuanians deported to Siberia, on class grounds. In the first days of Operation Barbarossa, in June 1941, German troops occupied the city, and in 1941–3 the Nazis (and some Lithuanian allies) killed more than 95 percent of Lithuania’s Jewish population.²⁰ Poles organised in the Home Army succeeded in gaining control of the countryside around Vilnius in 1943, and were preparing to seize Vilnius from the Wehrmacht and the Lithuanian police in summer 1944. This they failed to do before the Red Army returned to Vilnius in July 1944, and Home Army soldiers were the first victims of the NKVD (the Soviet secret police) in the months that followed. In all, the Soviets killed, deported to Siberia or ‘repatriated’ to communist Poland perhaps half of the Polish population in Lithuania as a whole, and the majority of the Polish population of Vilnius. Vilnius was virtually emptied of its two leading peoples, and the border with Poland was pushed westwards, just as Lithuania was incorporated into the Soviet Union. As the Lithuanian joke had it, ‘Vilnius is Lithuanian, but Lithuania is Russian’.

During the Second World War, Poles and Lithuanians did little direct harm to each other. Polish soldiers fleeing across the Lithuanian border in September 1939 were well treated by independent Lithuania.²¹ Independent Lithuania did intend to eradicate Polishness in the Vilnius region in 1939–40, but its policies were very mild by the standards of the day, and it did not expel or kill Poles. After the German invasion, clashes between the Polish Home Army and Lithuanian police and SS units, as well as attacks on civilians (by Germans and Lithuanians, and in retribution by Poles) brought no more than a few thousand casualties. Poles and Lithuanians did not cooperate against either Nazi or Soviet occupation, but they were not ranged against each other as were Poles

nocno-wschodnich II Rzeczypospolitej w latach 1939–1941 (Warsaw: Instytut Studiów Politycznych Polskiej, 1995), 309; see also Longin Tomaszewski, ‘Społeczeństwo Wileńszczyzny wobec władzy Litewskiej i sowieckiej’, in *ibid.*, 326–33.

²⁰ John F. Crossland, ‘A Difficult Enquiry Into Lithuania’s Holocaust Bears Grisly Fruit’, *International Herald Tribune*, 22 March 1994. See also Dina Porat, ‘The Holocaust in Lithuania: Some Unique Aspects’, in David Cesarani (ed.), *The Final Solution: Origins and Implementation* (New York: Routledge, 1994), 160.

²¹ Gintautas Vilkialis, ‘żołnierze polscy internowani na Litwie w latach 1939–1940’, in Giżejewska and Strzembosz, *Społeczeństwo białoruskie*, 316–22.

and Ukrainians along the Ukrainian–Polish ethnographic frontiers. As the war ended, and as the Soviet incorporation of the Baltic states was de facto accepted by the great powers, the main disagreement between Lithuanian and Polish elites remained the status of Vilnius, the new capital of the Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Soviet Republic. To the protests of the Polish government in exile, the official Lithuanian reply was that Lithuania had gained no territory, Vilnius having been within its legal borders since 1920.²²

Two types of national memory (1945–89)

What sort of memory do such experiences leave behind? There are of course numerous legacies of such dramatic events, but the temper of the two conflicts just described is sufficiently different to suggest that two separate types of memory may be usefully invoked. In the case of the Polish–Ukrainian civil war, we contemplate the personal memories of large numbers of Poles and Ukrainians who suffered at the hands of organisations which acted in the name of the other nation. This is an instance of the first sort of collective memory, mass personal memory. By ‘mass personal memory’ we mean personal recollections held by enough individuals to have national significance. If you and a large number of people of your nation have experienced terrible suffering at the hands of a neighbouring people, this experience will certainly have an irreducibly vivid character unmatched in the generally shared national memory of the rest of your group,²³ and your vivid personal memories (literal flashbacks) can probably be triggered by the reproduction of the emotional state of the original experience.²⁴ Consider the words one Polish survivor of the Ukrainian massacres, fifty years on, added to a detailed factual account of his own experience of the war: ‘Volhynia aflame, the glow of the fires, I see it still, I can’t get over it, I can’t forget it. I cannot forget my family. What happened in Volhynia will remain in my memory until the end of my days. Although I want to, I can’t forget any of it. Everything, as in a film, stands before my eyes.’²⁵

²² Krzysztof Tarka, ‘Spór o Wilno. Ze stosunków polsko-litewskich w latach drugiej wojny światowej’, *Zeszyty Historyczne*, 114 (1995), 64.

²³ Martin Conway, *Flashbulb Memories* (Hove: Erlbaum Associates, 1995), especially 53, 112; Zahava Solomon, Ronald Garb, Avraham Bleich and Daniel Grupper, ‘Reactivation of Combat-Related Posttraumatic Stress Disorder’, *American Journal of Psychiatry*, 144, 1 (January 1987), 51–5.

²⁴ See Dawn Macauley, Lee Ryan and Eric Eich, ‘Mood Dependence in Implicit and Explicit Memory’, in Peter Graf and Michael Masson (eds.), *Implicit Memory* (Hillsdale: Erlbaum Associates, 1993), 75–94.

²⁵ Wspomnienie II/2110, Archiwum Wschodnie, Ósrodek Karta, Warsaw.

In the Lithuanian case, some other phenomenon is clearly at play. Before and during the Second World War, Lithuanians had relatively little reason to fear Poles (as opposed to Russians and Germans), and only historical and mythical (rather than demographic or strategic) reasons to attach such importance to Vilnius. This centrality of Vilnius to the Lithuanian experience of the war (and indeed of the century) suggests that we are dealing with the second sort of collective memory, national memory. This is *memoire* rather than *souvenir*: the organisational principle, or set of myths, by which nationally conscious individuals understand the past and its demands on the present. It appears generally true that ideal national histories envision an ancient nation, always present in history as a state, morally at least equal to other states, behaving in the past according to the beliefs of present nationally identifying people. When the state is incontestably absent, nationalists emphasise continuities in culture – in language, in literature, in religion – and the ceaseless political struggle for a new state. If culture is absent, they find surprising continuities, and claim that ‘de-nationalised’ minorities can be ‘re-nationalised’. If the political struggle is criticised, they call this propaganda, and say the ends justified the means. In every case, the malevolent neighbour rather than any weakness in the nation is to blame.

For Lithuanians, questions of the continuity of statehood, the survival of national culture and the struggle for independence, and the question of victimhood and moral status all centre on the city of Vilnius. ‘To give up Vilnius,’ protested a leading inter-war intellectual, ‘would break the organic tie which links the present of the Lithuanian nation to its past.’²⁶ As a Lithuanian scholar put it, fifty years after Lithuania regained its historic capital, ‘Poland ruled Vilnius for nineteen years, but in moral terms this act of aggression has remained forever in the eyes of the world a testament to the fact that justice and truth were on Lithuania’s side and not with the Poles’.²⁷ This is not memory as personal experience, as *souvenir*. This is memory as organising principle, as *memoire*, which we are calling ‘national memory’. If personal memories are the lifelong fate of individuals who have suffered, national memory is the destiny of the dead: to become numbers, facts and events worked into a predictable scheme which ‘straightens’ the national past and justifies national statehood.²⁸

²⁶ M. Bagdonas, editor of *Lietuva*, cited in Senn, *The Great Powers*, 144.

²⁷ Kazimieras Graužinas, ‘Lithuania’s Conflict with Poland over the Territories of Vilnius and Suvalkai’, in Algirdas M. Budreckis (ed.), *Eastern Lithuania: A Collection of Historical and Ethnographic Studies* (Chicago: trans. and publ. by the Lithuanian Association of the Vilnius Region, 1985), 509.

²⁸ ‘Straightens’ is precisely the word used by Algirdas Budreckis in his introduction to *Eastern Lithuania*.

Then again, as one of the great figures of interwar Lithuanian politics reminds us, ‘a nation is composed more of the dead than of the living’.²⁹

Communist power and collective memory (1945–89)

If these two sorts of collective memory (mass personal memory in the Ukrainian case and national memory in the Lithuanian case) are indeed different, one would expect to see this difference revealed in the collective memories of Lithuanians, Poles and Ukrainians in the post-war period. For the sake of simplicity, we will limit this part of the study to two cases: Lithuanians in Soviet Lithuania, and Poles in communist Poland (with some brief comment on the position of Ukrainians in Poland). As this demarcation suggests, the most important feature of the context of recollection after 1945 is communist power. It affected both sorts of collective memory in roughly similar ways: emphasising primitive ethnic nationalism, seeking foes other than Russians, isolating nations from one another, and blocking out rival conceptions of nationality emerging in the West. Yet even in this peculiar context, the differences in the two sorts of collective memories remain visible and striking.

The fear occasioned by Polish personal memories of Ukrainian nationalism was directed by the Polish communist regime in a fairly straightforward way. Personal memories of the experience in the east were not encouraged or supported by any organisation subsidised by the state, as the subject of the eastern lands absorbed by the Soviet Union after the shift of Poland to the west was taboo. Nor were the operations of the Polish army and security forces against the UPA and the native Ukrainian population in 1944–7 publicised: only in exceptional circumstances did Poles learn any of the particulars about these operations. The aim was not to draw attention to the concrete, but to promote fear of Ukrainians in the abstract.

To this end, school texts placed the war against Ukrainian partisans at the centre of Polish–Ukrainian relations. Ukrainians were treated as slavish counterparts to the Nazis, bound to them by a wild spiritual kinship. Because some Ukrainian nationalists did cooperate with the Nazis, they could be treated as their mere henchmen. Collaborating Ukrainian units were singled out as such, while collaboration by other nations

²⁹ The figure is Augustinas Voldemaras, cited in Senn, *The Great Powers*, 55. This view is not entirely unprecedented. Voldemaras did not mean that all of the dead counted: he presumably meant those whom he regarded as Lithuanians. This is not so dissimilar to Auguste Comte’s notion of the ‘subjective immortality’ of individuals who lived in such a way as to leave a historical trace. Given the name, Voldemaras’s own ancestors were probably Estonians.

(especially Russians) was ignored or minimised.³⁰ Ukrainian patriotism was thus reduced to a kind of mindless collaborationism with fascism, which fitted an older Polish prejudice of believing the Ukrainians to be something less than a nation. Meanwhile, the study of history of Ukraine as a political subject in its own right was strongly discouraged.³¹

One aim of this propaganda effort was to deflect attention from the crimes committed by communists during the same period, and here the communists achieved at best mixed results.³² A second goal was to prevent contact between Polish and Ukrainian oppositionists; by the late 1980s they met regularly. The main success of post-war historiography, literature and propaganda was to move the centre of gravity of the Polish–Ukrainian conflict westwards into Poland: away from Lviv and other areas incorporated into the Soviet Union, and into the Bieszczady mountains, which remained in Poland. The Ukrainian became less a traditional competitor for dominance in certain historically specific regions (Galicia and Volhynia) than a depersonalised object of fear and loathing. One can only speculate how Polish feelings towards Ukrainians would have evolved in other circumstances, and there is no doubt that the simple experience of a million Poles is the fundamental source of Polish disquiet about Poland’s great eastern neighbor. Yet the fact that Ukrainians are the first or second most feared nation in public opinion polls taken in the 1990s, half a century after the events in question, is in some measure due to the efforts of communist national policy.³³ In any case, the dominant ethnic definition of the state is a result of communist policy, as is the almost total ignorance of Poles of the suffering of Ukrainians in the Soviet Union, in communist Poland – and in inter-war Poland.

Meanwhile, the mass personal memory of Ukrainians in Poland reminds us of the stubborn force of personal memory even when it is discouraged by the state. Ukrainians were physically dispersed, deprived of

³⁰ John Basarab, ‘Postwar Writings in Poland on Polish–Ukrainian Relations’, in Peter Potichnyj (ed.), *Poland and Ukraine: Past and Present* (Toronto: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 1980), 249.

³¹ There were several exceptions. Zbigniew Wójcik attempted to teach his readers that Ukrainians had indeed suffered greatly under Polish rule. See his *Dzikie Pola w Ogniu*, (Warsaw: Wiedza Powszechna, 1962), 281–2.

³² Józef Lewandowski, ‘Polish Historical Writing on Polish–Ukrainian Relations During World War Two’, in Potichnyj, *Poland and Ukraine*, 232–3, 237–42; Roman Szporluk, ‘The Role of the Press in Polish–Ukrainian Relations’, *ibid.*, 223.

³³ ‘Ukraine Seen as “Most Dangerous Neighbor”’, Warsaw PAP in English, 14 February 1992, in *FBIS-EEU*, 18 February 1992, 31; ‘Boimy się przede wszystkim sąsiadów’, *życie Warszawy*, 1 August 1992, 23. See also Marek Skórka, ‘Wspólne sąsiedztwo czy nie chciani intruzi?’ *Więź*, 473 (March 1998), 70–81; Michał Strzeszewski, ‘Milczenie nie goi ran’, *Nasze Słowo*, 21 November 1999, 2.

their national church, and until 1956 prevented from organising themselves in any way. Between 1956 and 1989 they were carefully monitored, and efforts to recall Operation Wisła and the repatriations were criminal offences. Nevertheless, Ukrainians in today's Poland have preserved a memory of their own suffering, and their demands for an official apology for Wisła are as consistent (if not more so) than the demands of Poles for an official Ukrainian apology for the slaughter which preceded it.³⁴ Young Ukrainians almost without exception recall the UPA as the organisation which defended their families and culture.³⁵ Ukrainians thus continue to present their nation as innocent victims of the actions of the Polish state, which is a view which requires serious qualification; Poles who remember the UPA see Operation Wisła as the final stage in a struggle against armed Ukrainians, which is politically plausible but historically dubious. Here we see mass personal memories blending into national memories, as each side assumes that it was the innocent victim and the other a simple aggressor.

If the predominant sort of memory in Polish–Ukrainian relations remains mass personal memory, the Lithuanian case illustrates the twists and turns characteristic of national memory. In post-war Polish–Lithuanian relations the issue was not the continuing force of the memories of individuals, but the attitude of Lithuanians as a group to the abstract issue of the right to the city of Vilnius. This continuity of attitudes under Soviet rule requires a word of historical explanation. After Lithuania was absorbed for the second time by the Soviet Union, substantial numbers of Lithuanians took up arms against communist rule. When the last of these courageous resisters were executed or sent to Siberia in the 1950s, Lithuanian intellectuals faced a fundamental choice. The struggle to regain Lithuanian independence through the only political method at hand, armed struggle, had failed. Even more than in Poland, academic and political advancement in the Soviet Union required party membership. As a rule, Lithuanian intellectuals chose to join the Lithuanian Communist Party (or at least to profit from state institutions), but worked to preserve national life. They published a large number of uncensored books and supported a Lithuanian-language university. Intellectuals gravitated towards history, cultivating after the Second World War a historiography

³⁴ To understand the persistence of Ukrainian demands, see the documents collected in Mirosław Czech, *Ukraińcy w Polsce, 1989–1993* (Warsaw: Związek Ukraińców w Polsce, 1993), and compare to 'Menshyny rivni bil'shosti', *Nashe Slovo*, 4 April 1999, 1–2; Natalia Kravchuk, 'Reprivatyzatsiia i politychna bataliia', *Nashe Slovo*, 12 September 1999, 4–5; Eva Pochtar-Shcherba, 'Karta poliaka', *Nashe Slovo*, 17 October 1999, 1, 6; Myroslav Chekh (Mirosław Czech), 'Shchob ne bulo hirshe', *Nashe Slovo*, 9 January 2000, 1, 6.

³⁵ Antonina Kłoskowska, *Kultury narodowe u korzeni* (Warsaw: PWN: 1996), 197–9.

which cast the nation as the innocent victim of powerful neighbours. Meanwhile, lack of contact with People's Poland and Soviet propaganda allowed stereotypes about Poles lingering from the inter-war period to survive and flourish.

The Soviet system in combination with the Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic's success in preserving Lithuanian culture allowed Lithuanian national memory to flourish in a very pure form. The Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic was the first Lithuanian state in modern times with its capital in Vilnius, and Soviet propaganda and educational curricula treated this as a natural state of affairs. The national memory of Vilnius as Lithuania's 'eternal' capital faced no serious challenges, and the demographic changes of the war combined with the Soviet policy of urbanisation eventually (around 1980) allowed ethnic Lithuanians to predominate in the city central to their account of national history. Lithuanian national memory could gloss over just how this correspondence came about (the Molotov–Ribbentrop pact, the Holocaust, and the death or flight of educated Poles). Lithuanians (as a stateless nation) were bound to cherish traditions of statehood – and thus Vilnius as the capital of the only previous 'Lithuanian' state, the mediaeval Grand Duchy. In independent Lithuania, international politics was thus at first curiously dependent upon national history. Even as Poles repeatedly recognised the Lithuanian right to Vilnius, Lithuanians remained unsatisfied that Poles could resist once again seizing the city. This was not a result of personal memory of conflict, but of national memory striving to organise the history of a stateless nation. Lithuanians feared Poles because of enduring stereotypes, their own defensiveness about the acquisition of Vilnius, and the Polish refusal to accept the Lithuanian version of interwar history. For three years after 1991, Lithuania refused to sign an interstate treaty with Poland, on the grounds that Poland should apologise for 'invading' Vilnius in 1920 and 'occupying' the city until 1939.³⁶ Lithuanian schoolchildren asked after independence to select the most shameful event in the history of Lithuania named the 1569 union with Poland.³⁷

Kundera's dictum that the struggle of freedom against power is the struggle of memory against forgetting is not quite right, when the memory

³⁶ For greater detail see Timothy Snyder, 'National Myths and International Relations: Poland and Lithuania, 1989–1994', *East European Politics and Societies*, 9, 2 (1995), 317–44.

³⁷ Vytautas Toleikis, 'Historia w szkole litewskiej w perspektywie stosunków polsko-litewskich', in Robert Traba (ed.), *Tematy polsko-litewskie* (Olsztyn: Borussia, 1999), 210–12; for an analysis of school texts see Birute Vareikiene, 'Od konfrontacji do zrozumienia. Stosunków polsko-litewski w podręcznikach szkolnych na Litwie', *ibid.*, 216–25.

in question is national memory. National memory is a means of organising the past such as to preserve the dignity of the group with which we identify, and thus bolsters our pride as individual human beings. The truths which we might find as dispassionate observers must yield to the Truth we need to make our collective story straight and whole. As Nietzsche puts the problem in *Beyond Good and Evil*, ‘I have done that, says my memory. I cannot have done that, says my pride, and is unyielding. Memory surrenders at last.’ Pride is thus the limit of an impartial investigation of historical truth: when we identify with a nation, our national memory yields to a scheme which, unless and until we learn better, we will try to foist upon others.

Sovereignty over memory (1989–99)

However, a few short years after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Poland’s political relations with both Ukraine and Lithuania were excellent. In the teeth of such problems of memory and power, how did this come to pass? The first necessary condition was a Polish eastern programme which took account of the problems posed by memory to relations with these eastern neighbours. The Paris monthly *Kultura* and a number of Polish oppositionists advocated such a programme well before 1989. It sought sovereignty over memory: memory not as individual recollections, not as a collective phenomenon, nor as a reaction to communism, but as a political problem which could be addressed in a future independent Poland by political means. We Poles, their argument ran, may think it natural to reclaim the eastern territories stripped from us by the Soviet Union, but the interest of preserving the Polish state and thus the future of the nation demands that we recognise existing borders. We Poles might think it natural to assert our superiority as the bearers of Western culture in the east, but it would be more profitable to the Polish state to accept our eastern neighbours as equals. We should learn the histories of Lithuania, Belarus and Ukraine, understand that they treated episodes of their pasts with the same sorts of biases Poles applied to their own past, and even appreciate that the eastern neighbours’ views of past relations could check Polish prejudices.³⁸ Statesmanship, above all, is a matter of understanding

³⁸ Key texts are Kazimierz Podlaski, *Białorusini, Litwini, Ukraińcy*, published illegally several times from 1983; Juliusz Mieroszewski, ‘Polska “ostpolitik”’, *Kultura*, 309 (June 1973); Juliusz Mieroszewski, ‘Rosyjski “kompleks polski” i obszar ULB’, *Kultura*, 324 (September 1974). This programme was rightfully known as the *Kultura* eastern programme, after the Paris monthly which supported it for decades. On *Kultura*, see Jerzy Giedroyc and Krzysztof Pomian, *Autobiografia na cztery ręce* (Warsaw: Czytelnik, 1996). For evidence of the programme’s reception, Andrzej Friszke, *Opozycja polityczna w*

the demands of the future, to which the demands of the past must be subordinated. But to be subordinated, they must first be understood.³⁹

The second necessary condition was the realization of this programme. It was implemented, albeit with rough patches here and there, by the post-Solidarity elites who came to power after 1989. Poland began relations with the Lithuanian, Belarusian and Ukrainian republics while the Soviet Union still existed, and gradually earned credibility by its consistent policy: existing borders were to be preserved regardless of historical or other claims, minorities were to be granted cultural rights but treated above all as citizens of the countries they inhabit, historical debate should yield to 'European standards' of international conduct, and history if used at all in international affairs must be understood in instrumental ways: one should make history for the future by protecting the nation now, leave difficult questions of history to historians, and draw examples from the history of post-war western Europe.⁴⁰ Poland signed a state treaty with Lithuania in early 1994, just after postcommunists came to power in Poland, but the hard work had been done by their predecessors. By that point Poland's eastern policy had begun to bear fruit, and socialist governments of 1993–7 did not undermine its basic premises. The postcommunist president Aleksander Kwaśniewski, elected in 1995, deserves a great deal of credit for the continuing Polish–Ukrainian political reconciliation.⁴¹

The third necessary condition was the possibility of a return to Europe. Although the Polish eastern programme of sovereignty over memory had originally been articulated as a means of securing Polish independence by eliminating grounds for Polish–Russian discord, it was attractive in 1989

PRL 1945–1980 (London: Aneks, 1994); Jacek Kuron, *Wiara i wina: do i od komunizmu* (London: Aneks, 1989), 347; Roman Solchanyk, *Ukraine: From Chernobyl to Sovereignty. A Collection of Interviews* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992), 59–64; Jerzy Pomiński, *Ruski miesiąc z hakiem* (Wrocław: Wydawnictwo Dolnośląskie, 1997); Adam Michnik et al., 'Rozmawiajcie z Prezydentem' (interview with Aleksander Kwaśniewski), *Gazeta Wyborcza*, 3–4 January 1998, 10.

³⁹ Interview with Jerzy Giedroyc, editor of *Kultura*, Maisons-Lafitte, France, 7 November 1998.

⁴⁰ On memory and policy see Krzysztof Skubiszewski, 'Niebezpieczeństwo nacjonalizmu w Europie' (paper delivered in the series 'Nachdenken ber Europa', Frankfurt-am-Oder, 21 February 1992), in Krzysztof Skubiszewski, *Polityka Zagraniczna i Odzyskanie Niepodległości* (Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Interpress, 1997), 197; 'Konkluzja: Pozycja Polski w Europie', *ibid.*, especially 380–1. Skubiszewski was foreign minister during the crucial years 1989–93. The policy documents which describe early eastern policy are Grzegorz Kostrzewa-Zorbas, 'Stosunki Polsko-Litewski: Uwagi i propozycje', Memorandum submitted to the Polish Senate's Foreign Affairs Committee and to the Obywatelski Klub Parlamentarny, 23 October 1989; Grzegorz Kostrzewa-Zorbas, 'Tezy do Polskiej Polityki Wschodniej u Progu Lat Dziewięćdziesiątych', Memorandum submitted to Polish government and parliament, 22 March 1990.

⁴¹ For the full story of Polish eastern policy since 1989, see Snyder, *The Reconstruction of Nations*, chs. 10–14.

as a method of showing west Europeans that Poland was a mature state ready for integration in Western institutions. In the early 1990s, Polish eastern policy neutralised rather than resolved historical problems: it prevented the cycles of animosity that would have inevitably followed had Poland matched historical claim with historical claim, and thereby bought time for political elites in all three countries to learn to think politically about international politics. Such neutralisation was certainly sufficient for Poland's own entrance into Western institutions, but probably insufficient for genuine reconciliation with eastern neighbours. But as the 1990s progressed, the European Union and NATO also became attractive goals for Lithuanian and Ukrainian nationalists and national elites. As Lithuanian elites recognised at the end of 1993, and as Ukrainians seemed to understand all along, the return to Europe involved a Polish waystation. Moreover, programmes such as NATO's Partnership for Peace created an umbrella for institutional cooperation (such as the joint Ukrainian–Polish and Lithuanian–Polish peacekeeping battalions) while Phare and other EU programmes created a cadre of Polish experts now expected to train their eastern colleagues.⁴²

Even in this final period of political success, the two types of collective memory remain distinct. Although the goal of Polish eastern policy was to treat memory as a political problem liable to political solution, we may close by noting that in this last period as in previous ones, the character of mass personal memories and that of national memory are significantly different. In Lithuania, where national memory predominates, a moment of national debate and national catharsis was required before reconciliation with Poland could begin. In late 1993 and early 1994, a corner was visibly turned: leading politicians such as the president and foreign minister argued quite explicitly that a secure state was needed to protect the nation and its traditions, and that good relations with Poland were needed to secure the state. The argument for compromise had to begin from the good of the nation, and had to address directly the mental habit of treating international politics as a means of rectifying the national past. In Polish–Ukrainian relations, there have been local conflicts around Lviv and Przemyśl, in the areas of Ukraine and Poland where the bloody war of the 1940s is well remembered by those who suffered and their children. The Polish public fears Ukraine, but in general active opposition to reconciliation is limited to survivors of ethnic cleansing – and even some of them have spoken out for forgiveness and good relations with the new Ukrainian state. By the late 1990s, the two non-governmental

⁴² For a conceptualisation of the EU's unintended attractiveness, its 'passive leverage', see Milada Anna Vachudová, *Revolution, Democracy and Integration: East Central and South Eastern Europe since 1989* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, forthcoming).

organisations representing opposing Ukrainian and Polish historical claims and the interests of the ethnically cleansed on both sides were jointly sponsoring historical seminars on the Second World War.⁴³

Roughly put, the problem posed by national memory is qualitative: when nations identify with a certain version of the past, policy which exposes its incoherence will be at first resisted, and must be justified in terms of the larger interest of the nation. Lithuanian leaders, with the help of Polish policy and the existence of attractive Western institutions, were able to begin such a redefinition. The problem posed by mass personal memory is quantitative: when people have painful recollections of experiences with another nation, they will probably be inclined to oppose reconciliation. These individuals can nevertheless prove to be generous and reasonable, they can be persuaded by arguments appealing to their interests – and in the last instance outvoted. The success of Polish eastern policy on both the Polish public and Lithuanian and Ukrainian elites demonstrated that both sorts of memory can be fruitfully addressed by political means, and that democratic nation-states with good arguments about national interests can exert sovereignty over memory. Democratic nation-states can neither create new memories from nothing nor wish away old ones, but they can conspire with the passage of time to divert personal memories from the issues of the day and coopt national memories in the name of the common good. Although it is too soon to say, the final significance of policy may be at the juncture of these two sorts of collective memory. Policies which bring peace at critical moments when sovereignty is regained and national conflict is expected probably influence the direction of mass personal memories as they flow into the shared national memory. Recollections of the Second World War might have determined, but now probably will not determine, the sense of the these nations' collective memories of one another in the century to come.

⁴³ I have in mind the Union of Ukrainians in Poland and the World Union of Home Army Soldiers (Volhynia). See the eight volumes of their jointly sponsored *Trudne pytania* (Warsaw: Karta, 1997–2001).