

National Identity and History Writing in Ukraine

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Think Ukrainian. You are a successor to Princess Olha, Volodymyr the Great and Yaroslav the Wise, who are Equal to the Apostles. History requires from you confidence and trust in Ukraine. Think Ukrainian. Viktor Yushchenko, President of Ukraine.
Presidential political advertisement, Channel 5 Television,
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The writing of history has a direct influence upon national identities. This is especially the case when historical writing and interpretation are contested, as they are among the three Eastern Slavic peoples (Russians, Ukrainians, and Belarusians). Where contestation is high, as in the Ukrainian–Russian relationship since the disintegration of the USSR, the writing and interpretation of history also impact upon their domestic and foreign policies and, most notably, their inter-state relations. Russian elites and the majority of Russians do not look upon Ukraine and Belarus as “foreign” countries.¹

This article focuses on one aspect of the contestation in history writing between Ukraine and Russia; that of the medieval state of Kyiv Rus. The article surveys four different “schools” within Ukraine for the study of the medieval state of Kyiv Rus: Russophile (traditionally known as Russian imperial), Sovietophile (Soviet), Eastern Slavic, and Ukrainophile (Ukrainian National).² The use of the term “school” to define different interpretations does not signify a coherent group of historians, but rather a broad set of ideas and interpretations.

Two of the four schools are the traditional Russophile and Sovietophile. The former emerged in the Tsarist empire and re-emerged in post-Soviet Russia. It also established a dominant position amongst Western historians of Russia. Sovietophile historiography existed primarily in the Soviet era, although allegiance to it has continued among radical left political parties in post-Soviet states. Within the former USSR, the Sovietophile school of history has only been re-introduced in Belarus by Alyaksandr Lukashenka’s since his election in 1994.³ The Sovietophile school has many aspects that make it similar to the Russophile. It prioritises Russia as the leading Eastern Slavic nation and also accepts that there was a transfer of power after the collapse of Kyiv Rus to Vladimir-Suzdal, Muscovy, and the Russian empire. This *translatio* of the Kyiv Rus legacy is a core concept of Russophile and Sovietophile historiography.

Where the Sovietophile school differed from the Russophile was that it permitted some limited recognition of Ukrainians and Belarusians (who are largely absent from Russophile historiography). In the Sovietophile school, Ukrainians only

emerged in the fourteenth century after the break-up of Kyiv Rus in the preceding century. Following standard Soviet nationality doctrine, the Ukrainians strove not to create an independent state but to re-unite with Russians. This striving was accomplished in 1654 with the Treaty of Pereyaslav between Muscovy (Russia) and Ukraine. The implication of such an interpretation was clear: independence for Ukraine was “unnatural” while union with Russia was the “natural” course.

The Sovietophile and Russophile schools are unpopular in Ukraine because both would undermine the basis upon which Ukraine could build an independent state. The Sovietophile would buttress claims for a revived USSR while the Russophile denies the very existence of Ukrainians (and Belarusians) as separate ethnic groups, defining them merely as Russian sub-regional groups. Support for both the Sovietophile and Russophile schools in Ukraine is therefore marginalised because they are only adhered to by the Communist Party of Ukraine and pan-Slavic groups.

The two remaining schools are the Ukrainophile and Eastern Slavic. The former was banned in the USSR from the early 1930s after a brief period in the preceding decade when it had been permitted during the Ukrainianisation that accompanied the Communist Party’s indigenisation campaign. The Ukrainophile school survived in the Ukrainian diaspora and has re-emerged in post-Soviet Ukraine as the dominant school. The Eastern Slavic school is less a coherent body of scholarship than a reaction to other schools, particular against the Ukrainophile school, which is perceived as too “nationalist.” Whereas the Sovietophile and Russophile schools are either unwilling to recognise Ukrainians as a separate ethnic group or deny them any equality in inter-state relations with Russians the Eastern Slavic school, like the Ukrainophile, does recognise Ukrainians. The Eastern Slavic school’s adherents in Ukraine and the West stress their “scholarly objectivity” over the allegedly more politicised three competing schools.

This article devotes greater attention to the two main schools of historical writing in Ukraine, the more dominant Ukrainophile and the Eastern Slavic. Since the emergence of an independent Ukraine in 1991, Ukraine’s ruling elites have promoted the Ukrainophile school whose most prominent historian is Mykhailo Hrushevsky, president of the independent 1918 Ukrainian People’s Republic, who returned to Soviet Ukraine in the 1920s. The Ukrainophile school of history has established a dominant position in the Ukrainian education system as part of the consensus within Ukraine’s ruling elites on the need for history writing that buttresses nation-building and independent statehood.⁴

This article is divided into two sections. The first surveys the four schools of history on the medieval state of Kyiv Rus. It argues that, although two centrist presidents ruled Ukraine until 2004, Leonid Krawchuk and Leonid Kuchma, they supported the introduction and expansion of the Ukrainophile school of history in the education system and the armed forces. Yet, both Krawchuk and Kuchma are centrists whose views on history are closer to those found in the Eastern Slavic school. The election of Viktor

Yushchenko as president in January 2005 will reinforce the dominant position of the Ukrainophile school in Ukrainian history writing.

The second part of the article discusses how the Ukrainophile and Eastern Slavic schools influence discussion about, and contestation of, the Kyiv Rus legacy. This is discussed through the use of three case studies of historical writing: the 1,500-year history of Kyiv, the cultural inheritance of Kyiv Rus, and the Galician-Volhynian Principality as the successor state to Kyiv Rus. Throughout the article there are references to how the writing of history impacts upon Ukrainian national identity, domestic and foreign policies, and relations with Russia and Europe.

Four Schools of the History of Kyiv Rus

The struggle over the legacy of Kyiv Rus has a “profound impact” on all aspects of the “cultural perception,” “historical awareness,” “modern national consciousness,” and “national mythology” of Ukraine and Russia.⁵ All three traditional schools (Ukrainophile, Russophile, Soviet), the American historian Jaroslaw Pelenski points out, assume that Kyiv Rus was a united state. In reality, it was a “loosely bound, ill defined and heterogeneous entity where the primary loyalty of tribes was to their local territory.”⁶ Nevertheless, this has not stopped the mythologising of Kyiv Rus history by each of these three schools. The fourth school, Eastern Slavic, is as an eclectic reaction to the alleged “nationalism” and “anti-Russian” bias of the Ukrainophile school as well as the unwillingness of the Russophile and Sovietophile schools to recognise Ukrainians as a separate ethnic group.

Russophile and Soviet Schools

Traditionally in Western and English-language translations of Russian historiography the medieval state of Kyiv Rus was described as “Kievan Russia” and studied as part of Russia’s historical legacy. The Russophile school believes that after the fall of Kyiv Rus in 1240 its legacy moved to the Vladimir Suzdal principality, from there to Muscovy and in the eighteenth century to the Russian empire. The Ukrainian and Belarusian peoples allegedly only appeared after the collapse of Kyiv Rus which broke up the unity of the Eastern Slavs. In traditional Russophile histories of Russia, Ukrainians only briefly appear in the mid seventeenth century, when their only purpose is to seek to “re-unite” with Russia.⁷ This nineteenth-century Russophile imperial framework is still used by most Western historians and therefore it became the standard Western historiography of “Russia.” The continued use of this nineteenth-century imperial framework denies any Ukrainian claim to Kyiv Rus, ignores the origins of Russians in Novgorod and Lagoda, and assumes that Eastern Slavic history should be treated as one organic whole. It also ignores changes in historiography in post-Soviet Ukraine.⁸

In the Sovietophile school there was ostensibly a more objective approach to the study of Kyiv Rus, since all three Eastern Slavic groups were understood as originating in Kyiv Rus. In reality, the Russophile imperial framework still dominated history writing because of the blending of Russian imperial nationalism with Communism from the 1930s. Such a fusion of Russian nationalism and Soviet Communism inevitably influenced Soviet nationalities policies and history writing. In the USSR, writing about Kyiv Rus was reserved exclusively for Russian historians. As a Ukrainian historian explained,

In Ukraine it was viewed as “nationalist,” of the worst kind, and a crime to use the words “Ukrainian” and “Ukrainians” for the Kyiv Rus era, whereas Russian historiography could freely use “Rus’ky” as a synonym for the term “drevnerusskaya,” to posit an ancient identification with Russia.⁹

The Sovietophile school of historiography claimed that the Eastern Slavs grew out of a *drevnerusskaia narodnost’*, which was an improvement over the nineteenth-century imperial framework. Nevertheless, *drevnerusskaia narodnost’* was usually understood to mean Russians (*Ruskii*). Soviet textbooks on Kyiv Rus translated into English were entitled *Kievan Russia*.¹⁰ Russia—as the elder brother of the former USSR—was still understood to have exclusively inherited the Kyiv Rus legacy. In the USSR, Ukrainian historians were therefore unable to study Kyiv Rus. The museum for the Kyiv Rus epic poem “The Lay of the Host of Ihor” was located in Yaroslavl in the Russian SFSR—not in the Soviet Ukrainian SSR.¹¹ As Pelenski points out, “It is significant that Kiev is not the principal centre for the study of the history and culture of Kievan Rus.”¹²

Prior to Mikhail Gorbachev’s era of glasnost, Ukrainian historians “were prevented over many years from even thinking about the fact that the Kyiv state, Kyiv Rus, the Princely era was our essence, our roots, our genealogy.”¹³ Only Ukrainian dissidents had the courage to question official Soviet historiography. The Ukrainian dissident Yuriy Badzio wrote an open letter to the USSR Supreme Soviet in which he questioned the false inequality of Russians and Ukrainians whereby Ukrainian history only allegedly began in the fourteenth century. With no history prior to the fourteenth century Ukraine’s origins were clouded in mystery, he claimed. In the Sovietophile school of historiography, Ukraine only briefly made an appearance in the fourteenth century to again disappear after it “re-united” with Russia in 1654. Soviet historiography, Badzio argued, continued to incorporate “Russian chauvinistic historiography which did not recognise the national exclusiveness of the Ukrainian people and did not permit their existence outside the perimeters of the Russian state.”¹⁴

Throughout the former USSR the radical left continues to adhere to this Sovietophile school, a factor that has direct political and foreign policy consequences. Oleksandr Tkachenko, a Communist Party member and a former leading member of the Ukrainian Peasant Party, told the Russian State Duma that Russians and Ukrainians were both forgetting that they were descendants of Kyiv Rus.¹⁵ He supported

Ukraine's alignment with Belarus and Russia in a new union. The Communist Party of Ukraine and the Progressive Socialist Party both support Ukraine's membership of the Belarusian–Russian union. Like Belarusian President Lukashenka, they see the union as a stepping stone towards a revived USSR.

In a similar way, Socialist Party member Volodymyr Mukhin, then head of the parliamentary committee on defence and security, looked upon Russia as Ukraine's "strategic partner." This was, "because Russia and Ukraine came from the same state."¹⁶ Tkachenko's and Mukhin's views of Kyiv Rus history have both incorporated elements of the Sovietophile school. Tkachenko's views are a mixture of pan-Slavism and Soviet internationalism similar to those found in President Lukashenka's Belarus. In 1999 then parliamentary speaker Tkachenko told his Russian guests at a joint Russian–Ukrainian conference in Kyiv,

We have a single motherland, a single fatherland—Kyiv Rus! We have common, deep genetic roots—a single religious, cultural and scientific moral foundation based on our life experience, spirituality and traditions.¹⁷

Apart from in Belarus, where they have official state backing, this Soviet school of history has declining adherents. In the March 2006 Ukrainian elections the political parties that support the Soviet school—the Communist and Progressive Socialist Party—fared poorly. The Communists came last of the five political forces that entered parliament while the Progressive Socialists failed to make it into parliament. Nevertheless, the largest parliamentary faction is the Party of Regions, which won most of its votes in Russophone Eastern and Southern Ukraine and therefore is supportive of the Eastern Slavic school.

Ukrainophile School

The dominant school of history in post-Soviet Ukraine is the Ukrainophile, which has been traditionally defined in the West and in the former USSR in a negative way as "nationalist." Ukraine's humanities and cultural elites are dominated by what have been termed "national democratic" (*i.e.* liberal and centre-right) views. These, in turn, have close links to national democratic civil society groups and political parties that support an expansion of Ukrainian language use, national symbols, and Ukraine's "return to Europe." The Ukrainian diaspora is also closely tied to the Ukrainophile school, civil society, and political parties. Ukraine's President Yushchenko also draws his support from this political, cultural, and intellectual constituency.

The domination of the Ukrainophile school is also assisted by the disproportionate role played by Western and Central Ukraine, including the capital city of Kyiv, in the writing of Ukrainian history. National democratic parties draw their greatest support in these two regions, as seen in the 2002 and 2006 parliamentary and 2004 presidential elections.¹⁸ Eastern Ukrainians, among whom the alternative Eastern Slavic school is

more popular, produce few historians, write few histories of Ukraine, and have few supporters within educational and academic institutions in Kyiv.

In the late Gorbachev era the Ukrainophile school began to challenge the Sovietophile school within the USSR. Before Ukrainian historians began to write new histories this process was assisted by diaspora historians, such as Canadian historian Orest Subtelny, whose *Ukraine. A History* was first published in Toronto in 1988. One million copies have since been published of Subtelny's history in Ukrainian and Russian translations in 1991 and in 1994, respectively.¹⁹ Subtelny's *Ukraine. A History* has been used extensively in Ukraine's education system and in the armed forces.

In the late Soviet era, a Ukrainian historian explained, "Now, the time has arrived when we must loudly say that Kyiv Rus is our history."²⁰ The reclaiming of Kyiv Rus was part of a broader attempt to overcome an inferiority complex fostered through Tsarist and Soviet nationalities policies that portrayed Ukrainians as Russia's "younger brothers." This was documented in the well-known study of the 1654 Periaslav Treaty entitled *Annexation or Reunification?*²¹ In a speech to the founding congress of the Ukrainian Popular Movement (Rukh) in September 1989 the author of *Annexation or Reunification?*, historian Mykhailo Braichevsky, said that Kyiv Rus is the "cradle" of Ukraine because Kyiv Rus was the "first Ukrainian kingdom."²² The second "Ukrainian kingdom" was Prince Danylo Halytskyi's Galicia-Volhynia Principality. Rus began in geographically Ukrainian territories (*i.e.* Kyiv, Chernihiv, Periaslav) and only then spread north. Polotsk in Belarus and Suzdal in Russia only joined Rus in the eleventh and twelfth centuries, respectively, Braichevsky told the Rukh congress.

Reclaiming Kyiv Rus was understood by some historians and politicians as "national revenge" to change the hierarchy among Eastern Slavs so that Ukrainians were now the "elder brother."²³ "In this respect, myths and ideology take upon themselves a serious meaning by creating a basis for the consolidation of the nation, the formation of its political and cultural life," then minister of education and scholar-statesman Vasyl Kremen admitted.²⁴ Ukrainian scholars have pointed out how illogical it is for an "elder brother" to be based in Moscow, a city that only held its 800th anniversary in 1997. Kyiv, in contrast, held its 1,500th anniversary in 1982, making it nearly twice as old as Moscow (see later). With the advent of Ukrainian independence in 1991 everything changed, since Kyiv was now the capital city of a foreign state. Two historians asked, "how can this [Kyiv] be the capital city of the 'younger brother' and the mother city of the 'elder brother'?"²⁵

Since 1991–1992 all of the handbooks (*dovidnyky*) compiling basic facts of Ukrainian history have begun their historical surveys in Kyiv Rus or even earlier in pre-Slavic cultures and states.²⁶ (In November 2005, a 10,000-year-old burial mound in southern Ukraine was discovered, adding further credence to claims that Ukrainian history, as defined in territorial terms, goes back much further than before the Slavs arrived.) Published *dovidnyky* are recommended for use in education by the Ministry of Education and Sciences. A large 1,200-page *Dovidnyk of Ukrainian*

History was issued on the tenth anniversary of Ukrainian independence in 2002 and is recommended by the Ministry of Education and Sciences for use in schools. The *Dovidnyk* includes 3,500 articles and 1,700 biographical entries.²⁷ These *dovidnyky* nationalise Kyiv Rus history in an all-embracing manner through Ukrainian claims to territory, culture, language, and political ties. As one contemporary Ukrainian scholar argues,

In other words, on the basis of history, archaeology, ethnolinguistics, linguistic, anthropological Ukraine in the sixteenth-eighteenth centuries through its main ethnographic values (culture, language, ethnic territory, mentality, historical consciousness, anthropology) was a direct genetic inheritor of the peoples of southern Rus of the X–XIV centuries.²⁸

The revival of interest in Kyiv Rus in the late Soviet era was also linked to a return to Ukrainianophile historiography banned since the early 1930s that had traditionally looked “upon Kyiv Rus as the first Ukrainian state.”²⁹ This, in turn, drew upon a long tradition going back to the late eighteenth century in the work *Istoria Rusov* (*History of the Rus*), published in 1846 but written in the 1790s or 1800s. *The History of the Rus* argued that only Ukraine—not Russia—could claim title to Kyiv Rus.³⁰ The work believed that Russia and Ukraine developed separately and that their political cultures were therefore different.³¹

Such a view, which is heavily influential in the Ukrainophile school and amongst national democratic intellectuals and politicians, disentangles Ukrainian and Russian identities, histories, and the future destinies of both countries. Ukraine is no longer fated to be forever “united” with Russia, as Belarus President Lukashenka earnestly believes to be the case. Ukraine is able to forge an independent political and geopolitical existence outside Russia’s sphere of influence and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). Ukraine under President Yushchenko seeks to do just that, aiming to integrate Ukraine into NATO and then the EU, two strategic objectives that Russia and Belarus do not support.

Eastern Slavic School

The Eastern Slavic school opposes the nationalisation of Kyiv Rus as a proto-Ukrainian state, which it believes to be a departure from “scholarly” objective standards. Scholars in the Eastern Slavic school agree with criticism levelled by Sovietophile and Russophile schools that Ukrainophile historiography is “nationalist” and therefore more political than academic. Such criticism of alleged Ukrainian “nationalist” historiography has its adherents even among some Western scholars.³²

The Eastern Slavic school positions itself between two schools of history—Ukrainophile and Russophile—which both claim *exclusive* inheritance of Kyiv Rus history. The Russophile school denies the existence of Ukrainians (and Belarusians) as ethnic groups separate from Russians; all three Eastern Slav peoples are therefore

“Russian.” The consequences of accepting such a position are that all of the history of Kyiv Rus is nationalised by Russia. Politically, this leads to its adherents believing that independent statehood for Ukraine (and Belarus) is an anomaly. Alternatively, the Ukrainophile school nationalises all of Kyiv Rus history for Ukraine. Politically, this buttresses a view that Ukraine was always a separate entity from Russia, independence is a return to “normality,” and Ukraine can forge for itself a future destiny separate from Russia.

The Eastern Slavic school’s centrist position and eclectic nature are a product of Eastern Ukraine’s historical ties to Russia, the dominance of the Russian language, and Ukraine’s regionalism. Ukrainophiles seek a clear break with Russia. The Eastern Slavic schools adherents, on the other hand, see a gradual blurring of the distinctions between Ukrainians and Russians due to a common language, culture, and long periods of mutual history. These different views of relations with Russia, in turn, influence national identities, politics, and foreign policy. President Kravchuk, who attempted to seek national democratic support for his presidency, described Ukraine as a “buffer” between “Europe” and Russia, clearly placing Russia outside “Europe.” This view has many adherents among national democratic parties and the Ukrainophile school. President Kuchma redefined Ukraine from a buffer to a “bridge” between “Europe” and Russia, a view commonly propounded by the Eastern Slavic school, placing Russia inside “Europe.”

The Eastern Slavic school looks upon Kyiv Rus as the birthplace of all three Eastern Slav peoples, a stand that the Sovietophile school agrees with. The major difference between the Eastern Slavic and Sovietophile schools is that the latter believe Russians to be the “elder brother” of the Eastern Slavs and therefore the *main* inheritor of the Kyiv Rus legacy because of the transfer of the Kyiv Rus legacy to Vladimir-Suzdal, Muscovy, and Russia. Therefore, the equality of Eastern Slavs is fictitious, since the Ukrainians have no history prior to the fourteenth century. The Eastern Slavic school seek to transform this fictitious equality found in the Sovietophile school into a relationship of genuinely equality. The basis for such a step dominates Ukrainian–Russian relations and is a dominant theme running through Ukraine’s policy towards Russia since 1991. During Kuchma’s first term in office, Russia’s unwillingness to recognise Ukraine’s borders in a treaty changed Kuchma’s foreign policy from the pro-Russian platform he was elected on in 1994 to a policy that was pro-US and pro-NATO. Eventually, playing the NATO card assisted Ukraine in obtaining Russia’s executive and legislative recognition of its borders in 1997–1999.

The question of genuine equal title to Kyiv Rus (*i.e.* the Eastern Slavic school), or Kyiv Rus as a Ukrainian proto-state (*i.e.* the Ukrainophile school), is the main point of disagreement between these two schools over Kyiv Rus. The Eastern Slavic school accepts that by the twelfth to thirteenth centuries the Eastern Slavs had begun to drift apart, a process that continued until the 1654 Russian–Ukrainian Treaty of Periyaslav.³³ Three long-standing academic-statesmen of the Kuchma administration, one of whom was a long-serving education minister, Kremen, believe Kyiv Rus was

the cradle of all three Eastern Slav peoples. Kyiv Rus, they have written, began to drift apart because of internal disputes between the principalities in the late Kyiv Rus era and this accelerated after the destruction of the Kyiv Rus state in 1240.³⁴ Two academic-statesmen, including then education minister Kremen, agree with the director of the National Academy of Sciences Institute of Archaeology, Petro Tolochko, and the Eastern Slavic school that all three Eastern Slav peoples can trace their origins to Kyiv Rus. They refute the claims that supporting this school leads to the automatic assumption that there should be political unity among the Eastern Slavs.³⁵ In other words, support for the Eastern Slavic school does not mean that its adherents back Ukraine's membership of the Russian–Belarusian union or a revived USSR, a view only upheld by the Sovietophile school and its dwindling supporters among the radical left.

A historian of twentieth-century Ukraine, Stanislav Kulchytsky, the head of the Institute of History of the National Academy of Sciences, agreed with this view that the traditions and culture of Kyiv Rus were inherited by all three Eastern Slav peoples. At the same time, he believes that Ukraine was the *primary* inheritor of the traditions, culture and other aspects of Kyiv Rus (not Russia). Quoting the doyen of Ukrainian history, Hrushevskyi, Kulchytsky argues that “the role of Ukraine's ancestors in the creation of the first Eastern Slavic state was decisive.”³⁶

Politically, adherents of the Eastern Slavic school, like Ukrainophiles, both support an independent Ukraine. Within the political realm the replacement of the “pro-Russian” Communist Party by the “pro-Russian” Party of Regions since the 2002 elections has therefore served to buttress Ukrainian independence. The Party of Regions, unlike the Communist Party, is a supporter of Ukrainian statehood. With the Ukrainian parliament dominated by “Orange” (*i.e.* liberal and national democratic) and “Blue” (*i.e.* Party of Regions) political forces, only two of the four schools continue to have influence: the Ukrainophile and the Eastern Slavic, respectively.

Two marginalised schools either believe Ukraine should be part of a reconstituted USSR (*i.e.* the Sovietophile) or deny that Ukrainians are anything other than “Little Russians,” a branch of the Russian peoples (*i.e.* the Russophile). Academic and political supporters of the Eastern Slavic school of history are also *derzhavnyky* (statists), like the Ukrainophile national democrats, and therefore support an independent Ukraine. This *derzhavnyk* position differentiates them from the Sovietophile or Russophile schools. Although they are supporters of Ukrainian independence, adherents of the Eastern Slavic school see an independent Ukraine as a state that is closely tied to Russia and see the Russian language as not “foreign.” A belief that Russian is not a “foreign” language, but, in reality, a language indigenous to Ukraine, leads the Eastern Slavic school to support the elevation of the Russian language to official status, alongside Ukrainian, as a state language. Adherents of this school also support the introduction of dual citizenship with Russia. These two positions were promoted by Yanukovych in the 2004 elections and opposed by the

opposition candidate Yushchenko. The Party of Regions 2006 election programme included the elevation of Russian to a second state language.

Adherence to the Eastern Slavic school translates into a desire for Ukraine to integrate into “Europe” together with Russia and it is therefore difficult for both centrist politicians, such as the Party of Regions, and the Eastern Slavic school, to see Ukraine inside NATO and the EU and Russia outside. Russia, meanwhile, cannot come to terms with the idea that Ukraine could one day join NATO and the EU, and therefore split from Russia. What Ukraine’s centrists ignore is that Russia has never sought NATO and EU membership while Ukraine has desired EU membership since 1998 and NATO since 2002. Under Yushchenko, Ukraine’s strategic objective of Euro-Atlantic integration is clearer than the vacillating multi-vector foreign policy of the Kuchma era. Russia therefore perceives it to be more of a threat to Russia’s understanding of how Ukraine should remain a subservient branch of the Eastern Slavic community, rather than an independent country integrated into Euro-Atlantic structures and outside Russia’s sphere of influence.

In his speech to the inaugural congress of the Slavonic Peoples Patriotic Union, Tolochko outlined his thesis that Eastern Slavs belong to a single civilisation. Tolochko is critical of the “idealisation” of Kyiv Rus history and the striving to prove how ancient a people Ukrainians are. The Sovietophile school, in Tolochko’s view, has merely been flipped on its head by the Ukrainophile school.³⁷ Tolochko is concerned that the Ukrainophile school is imbued with an “anti-Russian” hostility; in other words, he dislikes the Ukrainophile schools portrayal of Russia as Ukraine’s negative principle “Other.”³⁸ Tolochko is attempting to integrate the Sovietophile school of Kyiv Rus into what he sees as a genuinely “academic” and “objective” framework. In the Eastern Slavic framework the Sovietophile school is refined and Kyiv Rus is understood as the cradle of all three Eastern Slav people. Ukrainians and Russians have *genuine* equal ethno-cultural claim to the Kyiv Rus legacy, something the Sovietophile and Russophile schools do not permit. Tolochko’s difficulty is that there is no reciprocation from Russia on the question of equal inheritance of the Kyiv Rus legacy or on equality in Ukrainian–Russian relations.

Tolochko remains a passionate and leading advocate of the viewpoint that all three Eastern Slav peoples originated in Kyiv Rus.³⁹ Besides his academic support for such a viewpoint, Tolochko also advocates it in Ukraine’s political arena, demonstrating the degree to which academic studies, history writing, and politics are intertwined in Ukraine. Tolochko entered politics in the 1998 parliament as a member of Hromada, Ukraine’s first opposition oligarch party. In 2002, Tolochko was elected to parliament as a member of the Fatherland Party, a successor to Hromada, which was a member of the radical anti-Kuchma opposition Yulia Tymoshenko bloc. Within this bloc Tolochko found himself alongside radical nationalist and national democrats who would certainly have little truck with his Eastern Slavic school of history.⁴⁰ In October 2002, Tolochko left the Tymoshenko parliamentary faction and became an independent deputy. In March 2003 he addressed the inaugural

congress of the Slavonic Peoples Patriotic Union in Kyiv, renamed two years later the Party of (Vladimir) Putin's Policies. In the 2006 elections the Party of Putin's Policies came 27th out of 45 competing blocs and parties with 0.12% of the vote.

Agreement among the Ukrainophile and Eastern Slavic Schools

Although in disagreement in some fundamental areas, there is close agreement between the Ukrainophile and Eastern Slavic schools in three areas.

First, if Ukrainian history is to follow the Western tradition of territorial histories, the history of Kyiv Rus and earlier settlements found in Ukraine should now be included within Ukrainian history. Both the Ukrainophile and Eastern Slavic schools see Ukraine as the *primary* beneficiary of Kyiv Rus, but in different ways. The Ukrainophile because of ethno-cultural and territorial reasons while the Eastern Slavic school focuses on territorial factors.

Second, the Ukrainophile and Eastern Slavic schools both reject any hierarchy among the Eastern Slavs into "younger" and "elder brothers." Equality of Ukrainians and Russians has been a constant demand by Ukrainian leaders since Ukraine became an independent state in 1991. The only large political groups that still adhere to the younger (Ukrainian)/elder (Russian) brother syndrome lie on the radical left, which continues to support the main tenets of the Sovietophile school, or are pan-Slavic groups, which support the Russophile school's depiction of Ukrainians as "Little Russians."

Third, the Eastern Slavic school agrees with the Ukrainophiles that Ukrainians have a greater claim to the Kyiv Rus legacy. The inherited legacies of Kyiv Rus are likely to be greater for Ukrainians than Russians due to the territorial continuity between Kyiv Rus and Ukraine. Leading scholars in the Eastern Slavic school, such as Tolochko, accept, for example, that the contemporary Ukrainian language is the closest to the dialects spoken in what was the core Ukrainian territory of Kyiv Rus.⁴¹ In Tolochko's words,

Obviously, everything that took place on the territory of our state, in one way or another went into the cultural type and genes of the following generations, but not so primitive as some attempt to portray it by throwing out competitors from history.⁴²

Nevertheless, Tolochko admits,

Everything that took place on the territory of today's Ukraine, which has been left here to its peoples, as well as those who formerly inhabited it, in one or another formed the ethnic community representatives who call themselves Ukrainian.

In addition,

All of the "mutual legacy"—the inheritance which came from centuries long ago (*litopys* (annals), documents ("Rus Pravda") is mainly ours—well, we do live in Kyiv today).

Tolochko also links contemporary Ukraine to Kyiv Rus through names. He points out that the term “Rusyn” was used by Ukrainians to define their identity in Western Ukraine until the 1940s, especially in Trans-Carpathia. Tolochko was therefore in favour of the newly independent Ukrainian state being called “Ukraine-Rus.”⁴³ “Rusyn,” in Tolochko’s view, signifies a link between Ukraine and the medieval state of Kyiv Rus. Tolochko is nevertheless, critical of scholars and Ukrainian school textbooks that use the term “Ukraine” or “Ukrainian” when writing about Kyiv Rus. “Rus” had two meanings, Tolochko argues. The first was the core ethnic region of contemporary Central Ukrainian territory, which was also called “Little Rus.” The wider understanding of “Kyiv Rus” is territorial and incorporates all of the lands within the Kyiv Rus state. Thus, Kyiv Rus extended into Belarus and European Russia. The doyen of the Ukrainophile school, Hrushevsky, also differentiated between the core Kyiv Rus and the outlying empire. In Hrushevsky’s writings, Kyiv was the equivalent of Rome as the core of the Roman empire. The Belarussian–Russian lands in Kyiv Rus were the equivalent of the outlying French, Spanish, and other regions of the Roman empire.

Agreement between the Eastern Slavic and Sovietophile Schools

The eclectic nature of the Eastern Slavic school, which sometimes sides with the Ukrainophile and at other times with the Sovietophile, leads the Eastern Slavic school to be negatively viewed by adherents of the Ukrainophile school. Although the Eastern Slavic and the Sovietophile schools of the history of Kyiv Rus are different these nuances can be lost on those who are not experts in the field. Both schools look upon Kyiv Rus as the cradle of the Eastern Slavs. The similarities of the Eastern Slavic and Sovietophile schools has made both unusable by Ukraine’s ruling elites in Ukraine’s post-Soviet nation-building project. Long-time minister of education Kremen is a member of the Kyiv oligarch clan’s Social Democratic United Party (SDPUo), which that favours the Eastern Slavic over the allegedly “nationalist” Ukrainophile school. Yet, SDPUo senior member and education minister Kremen promoted the Ukrainophile school of history in the Ukrainian education system throughout Kuchma’s decade-long term in office.⁴⁴

Rewriting History and National Identity in Ukraine: Three Case Studies

In Ukraine interest in, and publication on, Kyiv Rus by scholars and politicians began to grow in the late Soviet era.⁴⁵ Former presidents Kravchuk⁴⁶ and Kuchma looked upon Kyiv Rus as a proto-Ukrainian state.⁴⁷ In his first term in office Kuchma, when he forged an alliance of convenience with the national democrats and oriented Ukraine towards the West, backed the Ukrainophile school on Kyiv Rus.⁴⁸ Kyiv Rus represents a “golden age of Ukrainian history,” Kuchma said, a view that gave

credence to Ukrainophile views in both scholarly and political worlds. During Kuchma's second term in office his views were closer to the Eastern Slavic school, a reflection of the break-up of the national-democrat–centrist alliance in 2001, his growing reliance on the centrists and oligarchs for domestic political support, and the re-orientation of Ukraine from the West towards Russia.

The next section surveys the interlinking of the rewriting of history and national identity with three case studies: the 1,500th anniversary of the founding of Kyiv, the cultural legacy of Kyiv Rus, and the Galician-Volhynian Principality.

Kyiv—Over 1,500 Years Old

The city of Kyiv is an important factor in Ukraine's national historiography, especially when dealing with the Kyiv Rus legacy.⁴⁹ In 1982, the Soviet regime celebrated the "1,500th" anniversary of Kyiv's foundation. A British newspaper was surprised at the celebration because it "reminds Moscow that Kiev is an older city."⁵⁰ The same was not true when the millennium of Christianity was primarily commemorated in Moscow, not in Kyiv in 1988. This celebration was undertaken in Moscow despite the fact that the city had not yet been founded when Kyiv Rus adopted Christianity in 988.

At the time of the 1,500th anniversary some Western commentators pointed out that the year 482 had no special significance. They speculated that it was chosen because 1982 coincided with the 60th anniversary of the formation of the USSR.⁵¹ *The Financial Times* believed that by merging the two anniversaries the Soviet regime would "emphasize the common roots of the Russian people and ignore the conflicts that have caused numerous burnings and sackings of Kiev."

Besides this coincidence there were other factors at work in the 1982 celebration:

The central thread running through all of these articles is the ethnic, linguistic, cultural, and historical unity of the modern Russian, Ukrainian, and Belorussian nations, which are said to have evolved from a "single early Rus' nationality" (*edinaia drevnerusskaia narodnost'*) with its political center in Kiev.⁵²

The central tenet of Soviet nationality policy was of a common Kyiv Rus (Eastern Slavic) nationality from which Russia was the primary inheritor of the different facets of the Kyiv Rus tradition. This meant there were negligible differences between the three Eastern Slav peoples who had always possessed an "eternal longing for unity." Independent statehood was an "unnatural" aberration. As a Soviet Ukrainian school textbook stated, a single Rus nationality, language, and culture "gave rise to the concept and feeling of unity" that "has been maintained by the people of our country throughout the ages."⁵³ Kyiv Rus was understood as the precursor to the USSR. Eastern Slavic unity in Kyiv Rus was to be established with the creation of a new Soviet people who were to be the core people of the USSR. To reach such a conclusion, Soviet nationality policy incorporated from the 1930s many tenets from the Russian imperial school of historiography.

The Soviet commemoration of Kyiv's 1,500th anniversary led to the construction of new monuments, and existing ones were renovated, museums were built, films, books, and plays were produced, and conferences were held. This expensive extravaganza influenced Ukraine's inhabitants in the Soviet era and has continued to have an influence on how a majority of Ukrainians continue to uphold the view that the city of Kyiv was founded in 482. Post-Soviet Kyiv has benefited from this anniversary by inheriting 4,000 architectural monuments, 51 of which are under UNESCO's patronage.

In the post-Soviet era much of this Soviet legacy in Kyiv has been nationalised by independent Ukraine because of its status as a capital city of a large independent state.⁵⁴ Kyiv is also home to many of the cultural and humanities intelligentsia involved in the rewriting of Ukrainian history, who traditionally vote for national democratic parties and presidents (*i.e.* Yushchenko and the Orange camp). Kyiv's educational system was Ukrainianised in the early 1990s.⁵⁵

While scholars and journalists continue to discuss the lack of any evidence for the year 482 as the founding date of the city of Kyiv, this is not the case among politicians and intellectuals. Popular former Kyiv mayor Oleksandr Omelchenko subscribed to the view that Kyiv is over 1,500 years old and is therefore far older than Moscow.⁵⁶ As Omelchenko said, "I would like to point out that Kyiv is the 'Mother of All Rus' cities: it is more than 1,500 years old."⁵⁷ Omelchenko, who was ideologically allied to President Yushchenko, believed that "We shouldn't separate spiritual rebirth, cultural development or economic growth." This was because "Kyiv for me is a measure of my existence—both spiritually and worldly. It is the limitless spring for my energy and passion."⁵⁸

Kyiv was understood by Omelchenko to be a more tolerant city than Moscow and Ukrainians to be a more tolerant people than Russians. "We believe in religious tolerance," Omelchenko said.⁵⁹ In the Soviet era, two-thirds of Russian Orthodox parishes were located in Ukraine. Today, Ukraine has more than double the number of Orthodox parishes of Russia, a country with three times the population of Ukraine.⁶⁰ In Kyiv there are two Orthodox Churches, one of which is the Ukrainian branch of the Russian Orthodox Church and the other pro-autocephalous. There is also a large Ukrainian Catholic (Uniate) Church, which moved its headquarters to Kyiv in the first year of Yushchenko's presidency. Unlike Russia, Ukraine has no state church but has religious pluralism.

Cultural Inheritance

Ukrainian historians have sought to use the social and cultural traditions of Kyiv Rus to inculcate a new national identity and the formulation of a new "national idea."⁶¹ Laying claim to Kyiv Rus helps elevate the Ukrainian "ethnos" into a "nation," historians claim, because it refutes the thesis of Ukraine as a "Little Russian" province. Including Kyiv Rus within Ukrainian history "transforms the ethnographic Little Russians into a (Ukrainian) nation."⁶² These views are particularly promoted by

scholars for whom the need for an independent state to have a “national idea” is self-evident. These are primarily national democrat politicians and members of the humanities and cultural intelligentsia.

Reviving Ukraine’s historical memory as the primary inheritor of the Kyiv Rus legacy also aims to re-establish Ukraine as a “European” state, rather than as part of Eurasia. Ukraine’s identification with Kyiv Rus reinforces a link between national identity and foreign policy which, in turn, impacts upon the country’s geopolitical re-orientation towards Europe.⁶³ President Yushchenko has repeatedly defined Ukraine as a “European” country, never once placing it within “Eurasia.”⁶⁴ The “European” culture of Kyiv Rus is contrasted with that of the “Asian” culture found in Muscovy and in the Tsarist empire.⁶⁵

The linkage between national identity and history writing repeatedly re-surfaced in the 1990s. French Foreign Minister Hubert Vedrine acknowledged that French–Ukrainian relations went back to the eleventh century, when Kyiv Rus Grand Prince Anna Yaroslavna married the French King.⁶⁶ On the anniversary of Ukrainian independence in August 1997 Prime Minister Valeriy Putsovoitenko, leader of the pro-presidential People’s Democratic Party, said,

The state that built them was named Kyiv Rus and was one of the most well known and authoritative European countries of its time. Well then, our roots are to be found in the grey mists of time. From its deep sources came our beginning and our tradition of national identity.⁶⁷

Ukraine’s existence outside the Russian sphere of influence is repeatedly emphasised to prove that Ukraine was not always within the Russian orbit. This requires emphasising the Galician-Volynian Principality as a successor state to Kyiv Rus, as well as Ukrainian territories within the Lithuanian empire, Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and the Ukrainian Hetmanate. The Ukrainophile school of historiography emphasises Ukraine’s distinctiveness from Russia such that Ukraine is portrayed as possessing a long history as an independent or autonomous state among European countries prior to its incorporation by the Tsarist empire in the late eighteenth century.⁶⁸

The claim that the languages spoken in Kyiv Rus were closer to modern Ukrainian than Russian has a long history in Ukrainian scholarship and unites the Ukrainophile and Eastern Slavic historical schools.⁶⁹ In the nineteenth century the historians Mykhailo Maksymovych and Volodymyr Antonovych and the writer Mykola Kostomarov identified the language spoken in Kyiv Rus as closer to Ukrainian than to Russian. These writings and theories were drawn upon by Hrushevsky in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century.⁷⁰ In post-Soviet Ukraine they have been revived and incorporated into history and myth making. The alleged ancient origins of the Ukrainian language reinforce demands that it be given a dominant and state status in independent Ukraine (rather than Ukrainian and Russian being two state languages). The language of Kyiv Rus was an early form of Ukrainian—not Old Slavonic or

Russian—Ukrainian historians now claim.⁷¹ This must be the case because, it is argued, Ukrainians are the “direct inheritors” of the social, historical, and cultural traditions of Kyiv Rus.⁷² Ukrainians were originally called “Antes,” then “Rus,” and only later from the twelfth century “Ukrainians.” This process paralleled the state building that led to the creation of the “proto-Ukrainian” state of Kyiv Rus.⁷³

Galicia-Volynia as the Continuation of Kyiv Rus

The Galician-Volynian Principality provides an alternative focus for the traditional Russophile and Sovietophile schools that looked to the Vladimir-Suzdal principality and Muscovy as the direct descendants of Kyiv Rus after it was occupied by the Mongols in 1239–1240. The Ukrainophile school argues that the Galician-Volynian state—not Vladimir-Suzdal—inherited the Kyiv Rus legacy. In contrast, in both the Russophile and Sovietophile schools there is a direct linkage between Kyiv Rus, the Vladimir-Suzdal principality, Muscovy, Russia, and, in some cases, the USSR.

In 1999, the 800th anniversary of the “mighty Ukrainian Galician-Volynian state” was celebrated in Ukraine in local communities. The head of the Volyn state administration believed that Galicia-Volynia continued the traditions of Kyiv Rus and “consolidated the people, developed the basis of its culture.” The Galician-Volynian Principality is understood to be an example of Ukraine’s long tradition of statehood.⁷⁴ The 800th anniversary was an opportunity, the head of the Volyn state administration believed, to “yet again prove our ancient historical traditions in Europe.”

Galicia-Volynia is portrayed as standing on a higher cultural plane than other states at the time in Western Europe. It defeated the Poles and Hungarians and united the majority of Ukrainian “ethnographic territories.” Galicia-Volynia lays claim to Ukrainian first settlement in what is now Western Ukraine in its long-standing territorial disputes with Poland. Polish rule in Western Ukraine came, as with Tsarist Russian rule, much later as a consequence of expansion into Ukrainian lands. The Galicia-Volynia Principality defended Europe against the Mongol–Tatar and other Asiatic tribes, a viewpoint commonly found in the Ukrainophile school, where Ukraine is seen as a bulwark of Europe against Asia. In such an understanding of “Europe,” Russia is left outside. This perception of being the last eastern fortress of Europe has its analogues in other states, such as Poland.

Conclusion

This article has surveyed four schools of history in Ukraine. Two of these—the Sovietophile and Russophile—have become marginalised in Ukraine, since both undermine, in the eyes of Ukraine’s centrist or national democratic ruling elites, Ukraine’s independent statehood. Russophile historiography remains influential in

the West and in post-Soviet Russia. Soviet historiography has been re-introduced in Belarus but in Ukraine maintains adherents only within the dwindling remnants of the radical Ukrainian left.

The two influential schools of history in post-Soviet Ukraine are the Ukrainophile and Eastern Slavic. Of these, the Ukrainophile school dominates the educational system and intellectual discourse, and promotes an identity that lays exclusive claim to Kyiv Rus as a proto-Ukrainian state. Although the Eastern Slavic school is more popular in Eastern Ukraine and among centrist political parties it is an eclectic compromise between two “mutually exclusive” schools—the Ukrainophile and Russophile—which gives it a weak ideological and symbolic base to compete with the Ukrainophiles and therefore influence Ukraine’s educational system.

History matters as much to politicians as to historians, since it has a direct impact on a country’s national identity, domestic politics, and foreign policy orientation. The Ukrainophiles see Kyiv Rus as a proto-Ukrainian state, Ukrainians as an older people than Russians, Russia lying outside Europe, and Russia as Ukraine’s principle Other. The Russian language is understood to be a foreign language that was forcibly imposed upon Ukrainians through Russification in the Tsarist and Soviet eras.

The Eastern Slavic school disagrees in almost every area. It does not emphasise a sharp break between Russia and Ukraine, as Ukrainophiles do. The Eastern Slavic school believes that Russia lies within “Europe,” and that the Russian language was voluntarily adopted and is therefore not a “foreign” language in Ukraine. Kyiv Rus was the cradle of all three Eastern Slav peoples, Ukrainians and Russians are consequently closely related, and therefore Ukraine and Russia should maintain a close relationship.

The eclectic nature of the Eastern Slavic school made it difficult to introduce in Ukraine’s nation-building project after it became an independent state in 1991. Although two centrist presidents, who tended to favour the Eastern Slavic over the Ukrainophile school, ruled Ukraine between 1991 and 2004, they nonetheless continued to promote the Ukrainophile school in the education system and the armed forces. This strategic decision contributed to making the Ukrainophile school the dominant historical discourse in post-Soviet Ukraine, a position that will be further reinforced by the election of Ukraine’s first national democrat president, Yushchenko.

NOTES

1. Russian involvement in Ukrainian domestic politics, as, for example, during the 2004 Ukrainian presidential elections, is therefore not understood by Russia as “interference” in the domestic affairs of a foreign country. During the 2004 Ukrainian elections and Orange Revolution, Russia strongly protested against Western “interference” because it did not perceive its own activities in support of the pro-regime candidate, Viktor Yanukovich, in the same way. Tor Bukkvoll succinctly argues that, in not recognising Ukraine as a “foreign” country, Russia has failed to formulate a coherent policy towards Ukraine. See

- Tor Bukkvoll, "Off the Cuff Politics—Explaining Russia's Lack of a Ukraine Strategy," *Europe-Asia Studies*, Vol. 53, No. 8, 2001, pp. 1141–1157. On Russian intervention see T. Kuzio, "Russian Policy towards Ukraine during Elections," *Demokratizatsiya*, Vol. 13, No. 4, 2005, pp. 491–517.
2. For an earlier survey of how post-Soviet Ukrainian historiography has changed see T. Kuzio, "Nation-State Building and the Re-writing of History in Ukraine: The Legacy of Kyiv Rus," *Nationalities Papers*, Vol. 33, No. 1, 2005, pp. 30–58.
3. For a survey see T. Kuzio, "History and National Identity among the Eastern Slavs. Towards a New Framework," *National Identities*, Vol. 3, No. 2, 2001, pp. 109–132.
4. See T. Kuzio, *Ukraine. State and Nation Building* (London: Routledge, 1998), pp. 198–229 and "The Nation-Building Project in Ukraine and Identity: Toward a Consensus," in T. Kuzio and Paul D'Anieri, eds, *Dilemmas of State-Led Nation Building in Ukraine* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2002), pp. 9–28.
5. Jaroslav Pelenski, *The Contest for the Legacy of Kievan Rus* (Boulder, CO: East European Monographs, 1998), p. 1.
6. *Ibid.*, p. 4.
7. For historiography surveys see Stephen Velnychenko, *National History as Cultural Process. A Survey of the Interpretations of Ukraine's Past in Polish, Russian, and Ukrainian Historical Writing from the Earliest Times to 1914* (Edmonton: University of Alberta, 1992) and *Shaping Identity in Eastern Europe and Russia. Soviet-Russian and Polish Accounts of Ukrainian History, 1914–1991* (New York: St Martin's Press, 1993).
8. See Vera Tolz, "Rethinking Russian–Ukrainian relations: A New Trend in Nation-Building in Post-Communist Russia," *Nations and Nationalism*, Vol. 8, No. 2, 2002, pp. 235–253.
9. Yaroslav Isayevych, "Problema Pokhodzhennia Ukrayinskoho narodu: istoriohrafichnyi i politychnyi aspekt," *Ukrayina*, No. 2, 1995, pp. 7.
10. B. Grekov, *Kievskaiia Rus* (Moscow/Leningrad: Progress, 1944).
11. V. Tolz, "The Lay of the Host of Igor in the Service of Ideology," *Radio Liberty Research*, RL 390/85, 22 November 1985.
12. J. Pelenski, "The Contest for the Kievan Inheritance in Russian–Ukrainian Relations: The Origins and Early Ramifications," in Peter Potichnyj, ed., *Ukraine and Russia in Their Historical Encounter* (Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 1992), p. 4.
13. Anna Chernenko, *Ukrayinska Natsionalna Ideya* (Dnipropetrovsk: DDU, 1994), p. 4.
14. Yuriy Badzio, "An Open Letter to the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR and the Central Committee of the CPSU," trans. Roman Senkus, *Journal of Ukrainian Studies*, Vol. 9, No. 1, 1984, pp. 74–94 and No. 2, 1984, pp. 47–70.
15. *Holos Ukrayiny*, 22 December 1998.
16. *Vremya*, 11 February 1997.
17. *Holos Ukrayiny*, 11 June 1999.
18. In the 2002 parliamentary elections, Our Ukraine and the Yulia Tymoshenko bloc dominated Western and Central Ukraine. In the 2004 presidential election, Viktor Yushchenko won his greatest support in these two regions, going on to win the election. The Orange Revolution, a reaction to election fraud, also drew most of its adherents from these two regions. See T. Kuzio, "Kuchma to Yushchenko: Ukraine's 2004 Elections and 'Orange Revolution'," *Problems of Post-Communism*, Vol. 52, No. 2, 2005, pp. 29–54.
19. Orest Subtelny, *Ukraine. A History* (Toronto: University of Toronto, 1988), *Ukrayina. Istoriya* (Kyiv: Lybid, 1991) and *Ukraina. Istoria* (Kyiv: Lebid, 1994).
20. "Istoriia Ukrayiny—nove vysvitlennia," *Ukrayina*, No. 41, 1989, p. 4.

21. The text was refused publication in Ukraine and circulated in *samizdat* (*samvydav*) before being published abroad. See M. Yu. Braichevsky, *Pryednannia chy Vozzyednannia? Krytychni Zauvahy z Pryvodu Odniyeii Kontseptsii* (Toronto: Novi Dni, 1972).
22. *Literaturna Ukrayina*, 12 October 1989.
23. "Ukrainians are the eldest (of the three Eastern Slavs)," one author emphasised in *Flot Ukrayiny*, 18 November 1995.
24. Vasyl Kremen and Vasyl Tkachenko, *Ukrayina: shliakh do sebe. Problemy suspilnoi transformatsii* (Kyiv: DrUK, 1998), p. 187. Kremen was the minister of education between 1997–2004 and a member of the pro-presidential Social Democratic United Party. Although Kremen supported the Ukrainophile school within Ukraine's education system, the political party of which he is a senior member inclines more towards the Eastern Slavic school. In the last three years of Kuchma's administration, when SDPUo leader Viktor Medvedchuk was head of the presidential administration, the SDPUo was a vocal critic of the alleged "nationalism" of opposition leader and presidential candidate Yushchenko.
25. Yuriy Kanyhin and Zenoviy Tkachuk, *Ukrayinska Mriya* (Kyiv: Leksykon, 1996), p. 36.
26. See M. Kotliar and V. Kulchytsky, *Shliakhamy Vikiv. Dovidnyk z Istorii Ukrayiny* (Kyiv: Ukrayina, 1993) and *Dovidnyk Istorii Ukrayiny* (Kyiv: Ukrayina, 1996); V. Smoliy, V. Verstiuk, S. Vidnianskyi, V. Horbyk, V. Danylenko, M. Koval, M. Kotliar, S. Kulchytskyi, V. Lytvyn, O. Mayboroda, P. Panchenko, Yu. Pinchuk, V. Sarbey, A. Sliusarenko, P. Tronko, eds, *Malyi Slovnyk Istorii Ukrayiny* (Kyiv: Lybid, 1997) Ihor Sharov, *100 vydatnykh imen Ukrayiny* (Kyiv: Alternatyvy, 1999) and *100 Nayvidomishykh Ukrayintsiv* (Kyiv: Orfey, 2001); Yu. M. Alekseeveva, ed., *Istoriya Ukrayiny. Navchalnyi posibnyk* (Kyiv: Novyi Svit, 2002). M. F. Kotliar's *Istoriya Ukrayiny v Osobobakh. Davnoruska Derzhava* (Kyiv: Ukrayina, 1996) only deals with Kyiv Rus and Galicia-Volynia.
27. I. Pidkova and P. Shust, eds, *Dovidnyk Istorii Ukrayiny* (Kyiv: Institute of Historical Research, Lviv State University, 2001).
28. L. Zalizniak, "Kyivska Rus-praukrayinska derzhava," *Istorychnyi Kalendar* (Kyiv: n.p., 1997), p. 183.
29. Leonid Zalizniak, "Ethnogeneza Ukrayintsiv," *Henezha*, Vol. 1, No. 3, 1995, p. 151.
30. This book was originally published in Moscow in 1846 by Moscow University Press. It was reprinted and translated into Ukrainian in 1991 by the Lviv publishing house Atlas with an introduction by the well-known writer and then head of the Ukrainian Popular Movement (Rukh), Ivan Drach.
31. *Narodna Armiya*, 1 October 1996.
32. The Eastern Slavic school has two Western adherents. See Andrew Wilson, *Ukrainian Nationalism in the 1990s. A Minority Faith* (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1997) and *The Ukrainians. Unexpected Nation* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000), and Paul R. Magocsi, *A History of Ukraine* (Toronto: University of Toronto, 1996).
33. O. P. Tolochko and P. P. Tolochko, *Kyivska Rus* (Kyiv: Alternatyvy, 1998).
34. V. Kremen, Dmytro Tabachnyk, and V. Tkachenko, *Ukrayina: Alternatyvy Postupu, Krytyka istorychnoho dosvidu* (Kyiv: ARC-UKRAINE, 1996), pp. 62–63, 111.
35. Kremen and Tkachenko, *Ukrayina: shliakh do sebe*, p. 18.
36. S. Kulchytsky, "Davnokiyvska Spadshyna u Vystvitleni Mykhaila Hrushevskoho," *Polityka I Chas*, No. 9, 1996, p. 80.
37. Interview with P. Tolochko by Dmytro Kyianskyi, "My Bilshe Ruski, Niz Vony. Istoriya Bez Mifiv I Sensatsii," *Zerkalo Nedeli/Dzerkalo Tyzhnia*, 27 January to 2 February 2001.

38. See T. Kuzio, "Identity and Nation Building in Ukraine. Defining the 'Other'," *Ethnicities*, Vol. 1, No. 3, 2001, pp. 343–366.
39. See P. P. Tolochko, *Vid Rusi do Ukrayiny* (Kyiv: Abrys, 1997) and Tolochko and Tolochko, *Kyivska Rus*.
40. Hromada was led by former prime minister Pavlo Lazarenko, who fled Ukraine in 1999 to seek asylum in the US, where he is standing trial on charges of money laundering. Tymoshenko was an ally of Lazarenko but after he (Pavlo Lazarenko) fled created her (Yulia Tymoshenko) own Fatherland Party. In 2002 the Fatherland Party merged with the radical nationalist Conservative Republican Party led by Stepan Khmara. Tymoshenko's bloc was elected to parliament in 2002 and 2006. In the 2004 elections Tymoshenko backed Yushchenko.
41. Tolochko interviewed in *The Day*, 22 August 1998.
42. Tolochko, "My Bilshe Ruski;" *Zerkalo Nedeli/Dzerkalo Tyzhnia*, 27 January to 2 February 2001.
43. On this point Magocsi and Tolochko part company. Tolochko's view that "Rusyn" is simply an old term for "Ukrainians," as it was in Galicia until the late nineteenth century, is disputed by Rusyn activists, including Magocsi who is a long-time advocate of Rusyns as a fourth Eastern Slavic people. The Eastern Slavic and Ukrainophile camps *both* agree that Rusyns are a sub-group of Ukrainians. Magocsi, as a long-time advocate of Rusyn identity, disagrees. Interview with Professor Magocsi, University of Toronto, 9 September 2002. See T. Kuzio, "Rusyns in Ukraine: Between Fact and Fiction," *Canadian Review of Studies in Nationalism*, Vol. 32, Nos 1–2, 2005, pp. 17–29.
44. Bukkvoll points out that, of the three largest centrist oligarchic clans, the SDPUo was the strongest supporter of Ukraine's integration into the CIS Single Economic Space. See T. Bukkvoll "Private Interests, Public Policy. Ukraine and the Common Economic Space Agreement," *Problems of Post-Communism*, Vol. 51, No. 5, 2004, pp. 11–22. In the 2006 elections the SDPUo, as part of the Ne Tak! (Not Like This!) bloc, campaigned against NATO membership and in favour of the CIS Single Economic Space. The Ne Tak! bloc came 11th out of 45 blocs in the 2006 elections with 1.01% of the vote.
45. Mykola Kotliar, "Zvilnennia vid nasliduvannia," *Prezydentskyi Visnyk*, 31 July to 6 August 2000.
46. S. O. Kychyhyn, ed., *Leonid Kravchuk. Ostanni Dni Imperii. . . Pershi Roky Nadii* (Kyiv: Dovira, 1994), p. 207.
47. Former Ukrainian ambassador under both Kravchuk and Kuchma to Canada, US, and Israel, Yuriy Shcherbak included Kyiv Rus within a broad swathe of Ukrainian history that also includes Ukraine within the Russian empire, the People's Republic of 1917–1918, and the USSR. See Y. Shcherbak, *The Strategic Role of Ukraine. Diplomatic Addresses and Lectures (1994–1997)* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute, 1998), p. 25. Shcherbak is an adviser to parliamentary speaker Volodymyr Lytvyn, a centrist politician, whose Lytvyn bloc came seventh in the 2006 elections with 2.44% of the vote.
48. Kuchma's preface to L. V. Reshod'ko, *Mykhailo Hrushevsky* (Kyiv: Ukrayina, 1996).
49. Roman Szporluk, "Kiev as the Ukraine's Primate City," *Harvard Ukrainian Studies*, Vol. 3, No. 4, 1979–1980, pp. 843–849.
50. Frank Lipsius, "Blood Ties and Bloody History," *Financial Times*, 5 October 1982. <http://www.izvestia.ru/politic/article3094512> (translated by Lisa Koriouchkina for UKL).
51. Frank Lipsius and Roman Solchanyk, "Kiev's 1500th Anniversary and Soviet Nationalities Policy," *Radio Liberty Research*, RL 186/92, 5 May 1982. See also

- Omelian Pritsak, "Za kulisamy proholoshennia 1500-littia Kyeva," *Suchasnist*, No. 9, 1981, pp. 46–54.
52. Lipsius Solchanyk, "Kiev's 1500th Anniversary and Soviet Nationalities Policy," p. 2.
53. *Ibid.*, p. 4.
54. Yuriy Hnatkevych, "Derusyfikatsiya Kyiva: Konteptsiya, Napriamy, Zasoby," *Vechirnyi Kyiv*, 18 September and 11 October 1996.
55. On the Soviet era see Serhiy Pirohov, "Do pytannia pro 'ukrayinizatsiu' Kyiva," *Suchasnist*, No. 6, 1980, pp. 61–64. On the post-Soviet era see Dominique Arel, "A Lurking Cascade of Assimilation in Kiev?" *Post-Soviet Affairs*, Vol. 12, No. 1, 1996, pp. 73–90.
56. Interview with O. Omelchenko, *Ukrainian Weekly*, 10 November 2002. See also Natalia A. Feduschak, "Renaissance of Kyiv: One of Europe's Most Vibrant Cities," *Ukrainian Weekly*, 3 November 2002, and Marta Kolomayets and N. A. Feduschak, "Renaissance of Kyiv: A Religious Capital for a Diversity of Faiths," *Ukrainian Weekly*, 8 December 2002.
57. *Ukrainian Weekly*, 10 November 2002.
58. *Ibid.* Omelchenko was named "Man of the Year" by New York City's Ukrainian Institute of America (UIA). He opened a multimedia exhibit entitled "Renaissance of Kyiv" at the UIA. See *Ukrainian Weekly*, 22 December 2002.
59. *Ukrainian Weekly*, 8 December 2002.
60. See Alexei D. Krindatch, "Religion in Post-Soviet Ukraine as a Factor in Regional, Ethno-cultural and Political Diversity," *Religion, State and Society*, Vol. 31, No. 1, 2003, pp. 37–73 and T. Kuzio, "The Struggle to Establish the World's Largest Orthodox Church," RFE/RL Newline, 5 September 2000.
61. Oleksandr Shmorhun, "Osnovy Zmist Poniattia 'Ukrayinska Natsionalna Ideya'," *Rozbudova Derzhavy*, No. 6, 1997, pp. 10.
62. Mykhaylo Hrechka, "Chy Mozhlyve Stanovlennia Natsii Bez Natsionalnoi Ideii?" *Viche*, December 1996, p. 82.
63. Hryniv argued that Ukraine's roots in Kyiv Rus reinforce Ukraine's ties to Europe. See Oleh Hryniv, "Dvi Pravdy Ukrayinskoi Istorii?" *Molod Ukrayiny*, 26 September 1996.
64. See T. Kuzio, "Is Ukraine Part of Europe's Future," *Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 29, No. 3, 2006, pp. 89–108.
65. Serhiy Datsiuk, "Ukrayina: evraziystvo i atlantyzm," *Den*, 2 September 1999.
66. *Zerkalo Nedeli/Dzerkalo Tyzhnia*, 6 December 1998.
67. *Uriadovyi Kurier*, 28 August 1997.
68. Bohdan Klid, "The Struggle over Mykhailo Hrushevskyi: Recent Soviet Polemics," *Canadian Slavonic Papers*, Vol. 33, No. 1, 1991, p. 45.
69. Ihor Burkovskyi, "Chy Mala Mova Kyivskoi Rusy Davnomoskovsku Osnovu?" *Rozbudova Derzhavy*, No. 12, 1996, pp. 15–18 and *Ukrayinska hazeta*, 7 March 1996.
70. Pelenski, *The Contest for the Legacy of Kievan Rus*, p. 218.
71. Burkovskyi, "Chy Mala Mova Kyivskoi Rusy Davnomoskovsku Osnovu?" and *Ukrayinska hazeta*, 7 March 1996. The Russian view that the language of Kyiv Rus was closest to modern-day "Russian" is given by Oleg Trubachev, a member of the USSR Academy of Sciences, in *Pravda*, 27 March 1987.
72. Shmorhun, "Osnovy Zmist Poniattia," p. 10.
73. Volodymyr Borysenko, "Anty. Rusy. Ukrayintsi," *Viche*, July 1993, p. 148.
74. "Mayemo chym hordytysia, z koho braty pryklad," *Holos Ukrayiny*, 14 May 1999.