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On: 05 January 2015, At: 09:32

Publisher: Routledge

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Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics

Publication details, including instructions for
authors and subscription information:

<http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/fjcs20>

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Published online: 12 Nov 2007.

To cite this article: Taras Kuzio (1996) Kravchuk to Kuchma: The Ukrainian
presidential elections of 1994, Journal of Communist Studies and Transition
Politics, 12:2, 117-144, DOI: [10.1080/13523279608415306](https://doi.org/10.1080/13523279608415306)

To link to this article: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13523279608415306>

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Kravchuk to Kuchma: The Ukrainian Presidential Elections of 1994

TARAS KUZIO

The 1994 presidential election in Ukraine, in which the former prime minister Leonid Kuchma was victorious over the incumbent President Leonid Kravchuk, tested the effectiveness of the newly enacted laws and regulations concerning campaigning and represented one of the first peaceful transfers of presidential power within the former USSR. Despite Kravchuk's call for postponement, the election went ahead on schedule and seven candidates with distinctive platforms entered the field. Relations with Russia featured prominently in the campaign, as did the status of the Crimea; the role of the mass media, particularly television, in their differential support for candidates was controversial; moreover, the regional differences within Ukraine were brought out clearly. Nevertheless, the election was judged to have passed off fairly, and the political stability and cohesion of Ukrainian statehood was affirmed.

Introduction

The 1994 presidential elections in Ukraine represented one of the first peaceful transfers of presidential power within the former USSR. They should therefore be of interest to all students of transition politics in post-communist countries. However, the elections opened up within Ukrainian society deep wounds caused by Ukraine's inheritance of the twin legacies of external domination and totalitarianism.

The two main contenders were always Leonid Kravchuk and Leonid Kuchma, the incumbent president and his former prime minister. This article argues that many of the myths surrounding the candidates which were raised during the campaign were unfounded and their policies differed little in practice. Indeed, the elections can be regarded as a contest between two branches of the Party of Power divided along language and foreign cleavages, as reflected in the regional voting behaviour covered in the present article.

This article surveys the election law, the election campaign and the role of, on the whole, unreliable opinion polls and the media. It also examines the seven presidential candidates by analysing their voter support, election platforms and popularity. Finally, the article deals with the election

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Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics, Vol.12, No.2, June 1996, pp.117-144
PUBLISHED BY FRANK CASS, LONDON

campaign and the issues raised in the contest for the presidential chair in Ukraine.

Legal Framework

The presidential elections on 26 June and 10 July 1994 were held in accordance with the law 'On the Election of a President of Ukraine', initially adopted on 5 July 1991 by the Supreme Council (Rada) of the Ukrainian SSR¹ which was used as the basis for the presidential elections of 1 December 1991 that brought Leonid Kravchuk² to power in the first round of voting with 61.59 per cent of the votes (his closest rival, Vyacheslav Chornovil, chairman of the nationalist movement *Rukh*, obtained only 23.27 per cent).³ The presidential elections were held simultaneously with the referendum on state independence which gave a 90.32 per cent endorsement for separation from the former USSR.

The law of July 1991 was changed and updated by the Supreme Council of Ukraine on 1 March 1994 by a vote of 251:0 with 71 abstentions.⁴ The law outlined equal opportunities for all persons in terms of nominations, publicity, campaigning opportunities, and treatment by official bodies, institutions and organizations. Any person could be nominated whose minimum age was 35, who had the right to vote and who had resided in Ukraine for ten years. In addition, the nominee should know the state language (although no degree of fluency was demanded).⁵ The nominee must not have entered the presidential race on more than three occasions. Discrimination according to ethnic, social, property, religious, political and occupational status was outlawed.

Nomination of candidates was undertaken through registered political parties and election blocs, which could each propose only one candidate. Political parties or election blocs required a minimum of 1,000 members. Candidates could be nominated only at party congresses or general meetings (the highest governing body according to its registered statute) where two-thirds of the delegates of no fewer than 200 people must be present. Candidates could also be nominated by voters' meetings where a minimum of 500 voters were present.

Candidates were allowed to create a personal campaign fund from their own resources, from the finances of political parties and election blocs and from registered legal bodies residing in Ukraine, but it must not exceed 100 times the minimum wage. A single contribution to the candidate's personal fund must also not exceed 100 times the minimum wage. 'Spending for the campaign in other printed mass media [newspapers] and non-state mass media is limited to the size of the candidate's personal fund, the terms of payment being equal for all candidates', the law stipulated.⁶ The campaign

income of candidates must be completed and lodged according to standard practice with the Ministry of Finance, and was open to voter and media scrutiny.⁷

The registration of candidates required 100,000 signatures (a policy also applied in the December 1991 elections and clearly intended to limit the number of candidates standing to only those with a real chance of winning). Voters' signatures had to be obtained from every constituency, including a minimum of 1,500 in two-thirds of them (an attempt to prevent the standing of regional candidates as opposed to those with an all-Ukrainian profile).⁸

Political parties, election blocs or voters' groups were required to submit the names of candidates to the Central Electoral Commission (CEC) by 26 April 1994 with an appendix attached of a minimum of 500 names and signatures. The CEC then verified the authenticity of the documents. Each candidate then had to obtain a minimum of 100,000 eligible signatures (who could back one only candidate) by 6 May.

The CEC was endowed with wide-ranging powers:

- organization and preparation of the elections;
- control over the implementation of the law;
- explanation of the application of the law;
- the creation of constituencies;
- direction of the electoral commissions within constituencies and polling stations;
- the distribution and allocation of funds for the elections;
- formulation of the ballot papers;
- receipt and compilation of reports from election commissions;
- registration of political parties and election blocs who intended to nominate candidates;
- registration of the presidential candidates;
- determination of the results and their distribution to the mass media;
- review of requests, appeals and complaints;
- provision of a limited number of free election posters and a limited amount of free access to state television and radio and free travel on state transport (except for taxis).

Finally,

- CEC funds would be utilized to advertise the programmes of candidates in the mass media.

Ukraine was divided into 27 constituencies representing 24 *oblasts*

(provinces), one autonomous republic (the Crimea) and two cities with republican-wide status (the capital, Kyiv, and Sevastopol). Each constituency included 20–30,000 voters. Any call for a boycott of the presidential elections was illegal.⁹ For the elections to be valid a 50 per cent turnout of voters was required, and in order to be elected a candidate required more than 50 per cent of those who participated in the vote.

Calls for Postponement

After the presidential election campaign had begun, President Leonid Kravchuk called for its postponement, appealing to newly elected deputies just over a month prior to election day on the grounds that the holding of presidential elections as planned would 'intensify destabilization processes, political polarization and the confrontation of political forces', which would prevent the attainment of 'national accord'.¹⁰ Kravchuk went on to argue as follows: 'If the election takes place without legal changes, we shall see the collapse of executive power. I believe the election must take place. But it must take place only when supported by a legal basis.'¹¹ Following the parliamentary elections in March–April there was allegedly insufficient time to hold presidential elections two months later and the participation of the president in the campaign as a candidate would create a 'power vacuum' in the absence of executive power.¹² Kravchuk warned parliament that 'We shall lose control of the country' as a result of 'constitutional chaos and a constitutional crisis'.¹³

A petition of 120 mainly national-democratic deputies, which allegedly originated in the president's office and had not come through established parliamentary channels,¹⁴ backed the call for a postponement. The appeal, signed by deputies from 20 *oblasts* and the Crimea, argued that, with no new constitution, constitutional court or law 'On State Power', presidential elections would lead to 'further confrontation and chaos which could put the very existence of the state under threat'.¹⁵

The majority of national democratic parties and groups,¹⁶ traditionally allies of Kravchuk, backed the call for a postponement. The only exceptions were the Christian Democratic Party of Ukraine¹⁷ and the Peasant Democratic Party of Ukraine.¹⁸ Rukh, the largest national democratic party, reluctantly agreed with Kravchuk's logic in calling for a postponement, although it had been in 'constructive opposition' to him since early 1992.¹⁹ In addition, its leader Vyacheslav Chornovil argued that additional powers in Kravchuk's hands would not be used to introduce reforms. When he was given additional powers in 1992, Chornovil alleged, these were mainly used to appoint members of the *nomenklatura* into positions of power and transfer nuclear weapons and the Black Sea Fleet to Russia. Additional

presidential powers would therefore merely lead to 'a quiet dictatorship of the oligarchy'.²⁰

But not all national democrats agreed with Kravchuk's call for postponement. Serhiy Holovatiy, president of the Ukrainian Legal Foundation and formerly a Rukh activist, argued that 'It is a conscious political move to derail the elections. And if that is what the leader of the country is attempting to do, he has shown his absolute irresponsibility towards Ukraine. He is willing to spit on Ukraine and its economic and political future because he wants to retain power.'²¹ Taras Stetskiy, a member of the Party of Democratic Revival of Ukraine and the same Reform parliamentary faction as Holovatiy, added that 'Kravchuk's request to postpone the elections is the death cry of a dead politician.'²²

Nevertheless, it was mainly the left wing, in victorious mood after their early successes in the parliamentary elections, which clamoured against any postponement. Kravchuk admitted in his appeal to parliament that when considering his request for the postponement of presidential elections it should take into account the 'alignment of political forces and regional differences'.²³ The Communist Party, which although hostile to the institution of the presidency did not favour postponement of the elections, claimed that the main motive of those demanding postponement was fear of a victory by the Left.

The Supreme Council, the leadership of which had been taken over by the radical Left, rejected calls for a postponement of the presidential elections in a separate resolution claiming that it was too late in view of the fact that funds had been allocated and the campaign had started.²⁴ The resolution to continue with the presidential elections was approved by 201:69 votes, the vote split largely along ideological lines.²⁵

Those who argued in favour of continuing to hold the elections argued back that if they were indeed 'unconstitutional', as Kravchuk claimed, then he had no right to sign the law and should have returned it to the Supreme Council within ten days. If a new constitution or other legal acts were required to be adopted prior to elections President Kravchuk should have initiated a referendum, as in neighbouring Russia. The law 'On Elections for a President of Ukraine' was adopted on Kravchuk's initiative to forestall the need for a referendum on confidence in parliament and president demanded by striking coal-miners in June 1993 (the referendum was to have been held in September of the same year but was changed in favour of early elections to parliament and for president in March and June 1994 respectively).

Kravchuk did have cause for concern in the fact that local elections were to be held simultaneously with presidential elections on the basis of the law 'On the Formation of Local Power and Self-Governing Organs'.²⁶ At the time President Kravchuk signed it into law on 3 February he had not raised

reservations concerning Article 8, which stated that 'After the election of deputies, heads of councils and the formation of executive bodies the law "on Ukrainian Presidential Representatives" shall lose its legal validity'.²⁷ In other words, presidential prefects would be abolished and local councils would assume executive functions, a back-door attempt to introduce a federal territorial system into Ukraine, Kravchuk claimed. And, 'Federalism, without constitutional and legislative support will inevitably lead to the loss of control over the social process.'²⁸

Other commentaries were more critical of Kravchuk's intentions. In the words of one Western diplomat in Kyiv, 'Ukraine is a rudderless ship, with no direction, drifting at sea.'²⁹ Kravchuk's 'Plan A' had allegedly entailed not to stand in the elections, have them cancelled and then rule by decree. If this failed, 'Plan B' would require Kravchuk to register as a candidate (which he did at the very last moment) and then attempt to persuade the Supreme Council to cancel the presidential elections. Kravchuk claimed he had put forward his candidature when he saw that those already standing could 'ruin our independence or take our country not along the right path'.³⁰

Election Campaign

Ivan Yemets, chairman of the CEC, exhorted voters 'to put off all your domestic problems and projects and come to your polling station to express your civic concern and vote for the president of Ukraine'.³¹ But democracy was still bewildering to many Ukrainians. 'Of course I'll vote. I don't remember for whom. But whomever I'm supposed to vote for that's whom I'll vote for', one pensioner promised.³²

The choice was also bewildering. How different were the candidates? Who had promised what? Could politicians be believed? The *Economist* (18 June 1994) typified much of the analysis: 'Ukrainians are trying to decide not who would be the best president, but who would be the least bad.' Another Kyiv pensioner added that Ukraine had not sufficiently developed 'that we have world-class politicians running for office who would really represent our interests. There's not much of a choice here.'³³

Many voters undoubtedly voted negatively: that is, not in favour of a candidate but against somebody (especially in the second round). The mass circulation newspaper *Kievskie vedomosti* lamented that 'We are not being asked to choose between good and bad, but rather between bad and worse. The current president is the lesser of two evils. He is more experienced, more predictable.'³⁴ The majority of voters, according to one study, went to the elections 'not to vote for this or that candidate but to state their preference "for" or "against" Kravchuk'.³⁵

Many voters saw little difference between Kravchuk and Kuchma. In the

words of one voter, 'When Kuchma was prime minister, he didn't do anything and when Kravchuk was president, he didn't do anything.'³⁶ Another added, 'With Kravchuk I know there won't be war and with Kuchma I know I won't starve.'³⁷

Opinion Polls

Opinion polls proved notoriously unreliable throughout the presidential elections, with support levels varying widely. In the words of the International Foundation for Electoral Systems, a US-government monitoring organization, 'There is no organization in Ukraine capable of conducting a poll in a professional manner. People do not know how to take a sample of voters.'³⁸

An editorial in the newspaper *Vechirnyi Kyiv*, a supporter of the national democrats, added that the top figures in a poll seemed to coincide with the political views of the newspaper in which it appeared. Institutions such as the International Sociology Centre, Kyiv Mohyla Academy and the National Academy of Sciences had obvious links to the incumbent administration and their polls always gave Kravchuk a lead over Kuchma. The National Academy of Sciences predicted that Kravchuk would obtain more votes than Kuchma in the second round, whereas the Kyiv Mohyla Academy in a poll conducted during 2–4 July predicted a result of 51:44 in Kravchuk's favour, with a turnout of 61–67 per cent.³⁹

The high state post occupied by Kravchuk gave him additional visibility, a great advantage over his rivals. Only four to six per cent of the adult population had not heard of Kravchuk, whereas this proportion was much higher in the case of Kuchma (15–20 per cent) and Pluishch (28–33 per cent), despite Kuchma having been a prime minister during 1992–93 and Pluishch parliamentary speaker (1990–94). Konstantin Morozov, former Defence Minister (1991–93), who it was rumoured would stand as a candidate from the national democratic camp, was not known to 50 per cent of the adult population.⁴⁰

The Media

Although the law on presidential elections clearly outlined equal access to the media for all candidates, in reality this proved to be more easily said than done. The slow development of the mass media and the often open reliance of 'independent' newspapers upon state credits or newsprint colours their objectivity.⁴¹ Ukraine's largest-circulation independent newspaper *Kievskie vedomosti*, a daily Russian-language publication, was hostile to Kravchuk during 1992–93, as was its Ukrainian-language

weekly.⁴² Rumours that its shift towards support for the Kravchuk camp in 1994 was related to the state's supply of newsprint which alleviated its crisis seem likely to be accurate.⁴³

A second problem is related to state control over television and radio. During the election campaign Kravchuk still performed his obligations as head of state, which were dutifully covered by television and radio. During these official engagements it was inevitable that Kravchuk would utilize the occasions to promote his re-election. Kuchma, his main rival, constantly complained that Ukrainian Television's Channel One should be renamed 'Kravchuk-TV' or 'an evening-long advertisement for the president'.⁴⁴ In an appeal to the Supreme Council Kuchma complained about Kravchuk's monopolization of state television, radio and the parliamentary newspaper *Holos Ukrainy*.⁴⁵

'Thanks to his presidential duties, Kravchuk does have considerable more exposure and enjoys advantage', admitted Andrew Palmer of the EU-funded Institute for Media Monitoring in Ukraine.⁴⁶ At the same time, the monitoring body believed that access to the media had been relatively equal. As was pointed out by Viktor Ponedilko, head of the Supreme Council Commission on Legislative Safeguards of Freedom of Speech and Mass Media, if the tables had been turned and 'If Kuchma were president he would also be more in the spotlight'.⁴⁷ Although both Kravchuk and Kuchma complained about media coverage neither candidate submitted a formal complaint. 'It is the team's impression that no candidate wished to be investigated too thoroughly', the monitoring agency assumed.⁴⁸

Although Ukrainian television may have covered Kravchuk to a greater extent than Kuchma this was counterbalanced by Ostankino's complete bias in favour of Kuchma (also reflecting the Russian leadership's support for his candidature). Ostankino (now Russian Public Television) and CIS Television have a larger number of viewers in Ukraine than Ukrainian State Television.⁴⁹ Whereas, viewers for both Ostankino and Ukrainian State Television tend to be regionally divided roughly in a similar manner to the outcome of the second round of the presidential elections (western, northern and central Ukraine for Kravchuk where Ukrainian State Television has a majority of viewers and south-eastern Ukraine where Kuchma was victorious and Ostankino is dominant).

A damaging episode loomed when the Kravchuk-appointed National Council for Television and Radio Broadcasting threatened to close the independent television station 'Hravis' because it gave prominence to Kuchma. Its director, Viktor Leshyk, complained that, 'Now the current party of power is not satisfied with its monopoly of the state mass media, it is striving to destroy the least competition on any pretext'.⁵⁰

At the same time, various sources testify to the fact that Kuchma's

expenditure on the elections far exceeded that of his rivals (a factor the law could not seriously pretend to control). This may have been surprising given the fact Kravchuk should have possessed far greater resources as head of state, with many people in positions of authority who were beholden to him for their posts and privileges. Kuchma hired the services of a Moscow-based advertising agency which produced slick adverts for him on Ostankino.

The Candidates

Seven candidates entered the 1994 presidential elections in Ukraine.⁵¹ Of these it was initially assumed that the main contest would be between Ivan Pluishch, speaker of parliament (1990–94) and an ally of the national democratic camp, and Kuchma. But Pluishch was eclipsed by Kravchuk who entered the race at the last moment. Thereafter, the main election battle was fought out between Kravchuk and Kuchma while Pluishch's backing remained that of a small number of national democrats who were disillusioned with Kravchuk (such as the Ukrainian Conservative Republican Party led by Stepan Khmara);⁵² the Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists backed Petro Talanchuk.

Prior to Kravchuk's entry into the race Pluishch was reportedly very cocky and confident that his former post would ensure his victory.⁵³ Comparing himself to Kravchuk he said, 'He seems to decide one thing today and something else tomorrow. I never did and never will do so. This is what I am – as straight as a ruler.'⁵⁴

The seven candidates included the following (with their approximate electorate in brackets):⁵⁵

National Democrats⁵⁶/Party of Power

- Ivan Pluishch, parliamentary speaker, 1990–94;
- Leonid Kravchuk, president, 1991–94;
- Petro Talanchuk, minister for education, 1992–94.

National democrats/liberal democrats

Volodymyr Lanovyi, Liberal Party; President, Centre for Market Reform.

Social democrats/liberal democrats

- Valeriy Babych, President, Ukrainian Financial Group,
- Leonid Kuchma, chairman, Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs of Ukraine; joint chairman, Inter-Regional Bloc of Reforms; former Prime Minister (1992–93).

Communists/socialists/agrarians

- Oleksandr Moroz, chairman, Socialist Party; parliamentary speaker, 1994–.

A number of candidates dropped out of the elections in favour of others. The leader of the Communist Party, Piotr Symonenko, withdrew his candidature on 28 April in favour of Moroz.⁵⁷ The communists had undertaken the same tactic in the newly elected Supreme Council where they backed Moroz's candidature for the post of speaker. In both cases the aim was to defuse anti-communist feeling by standing behind the more moderate socialists. It was also reported that Symonenko dropped out of the elections after a confidential two-hour meeting with then President Kravchuk, who may have persuaded him to back the more moderate Moroz in order not to create undue friction and instability.⁵⁸

Other candidates who dropped out of the election race included Viktor Pynzenyk, former deputy prime minister in the government and an advocate of radical reform, whose supporters undoubtedly backed Lanovyi (who had held a similar post in the Fokin government during 1992). Rumours that Ihor Yukhnovsky, backed by the Party of Democratic Revival of Ukraine and the Democratic Party of Ukraine, Chornovil, leader of Rukh and Kravchuk's main challenger in the December 1991 presidential elections, and Holovatiy, president of the Ukrainian Legal Foundation and since September 1995 Minister for Justice, were to run proved groundless.⁵⁹ Gryneov, joint leader of the Inter-Regional Bloc of Reforms (MRBR) and former second deputy speaker of parliament, initially proposed his candidature but then dropped out in favour of Kuchma, his co-leader in the MRBR.⁶⁰ Although Rukh called upon the national democrats to agree on the choice of one candidate for the presidential elections, hoping that this might be Chornovil, this proved to be illusory and no candidate was proposed. Instead, the national democrats backed Talanchuk, Pluishch, Kravchuk or Lanovyi. Rukh claimed much of the credit for collecting Lanovyi's registration signatures and recommended its branches to decide independently whether to back Kravchuk or Lanovyi.⁶¹

Of the seven candidates the three least likely to win many votes were Pluishch (because of Kravchuk's entry into the race), Babich and Talanchuk.⁶² The two outsiders who came third and fourth were Moroz and Lanovyi, two potential candidates in Ukraine's next presidential elections whose voter support was sufficiently high to stand again. The bulk of voters who backed Moroz and Lanovyi in the first round went on to back Kuchma, although neither candidate endorsed either Kuchma or Kravchuk.⁶³

Moroz's programme included standard left-wing policies opposing the sale or privatization of land, and urging that privatization should be 'just'

while economic reform should be slow and limited. Moroz claimed he was different from the other candidates because he had not been in power and he understood the needs of the *narod* (the People). His foreign and defence policies were similar to those of Kuchma: 'My views towards Russia are those towards a great neighbouring state with whom Ukraine unites centuries of common history.' Under Moroz, Ukraine would not therefore turn its back on Russia or the CIS (as it would under Kravchuk or Pluishch). Like Kuchma, Moroz favoured transferring the Black Sea Fleet to Russia and leasing Sevastopol.⁶⁴

Lanovyi⁶⁵ appealed to a far different, younger audience and many liberal and national democrats voted for him in the first round. These included Rukh, which had been in conflict with Kravchuk since early 1992. In the second round these national democrats who voted for Lanovyi went on to vote for Kravchuk as 'the lesser of two evils'. Lanovyi claimed that he had put himself forward because his rivals had failed to use their state posts to take Ukraine out of the crisis or show real leadership.

Lanovyi's socio-economic programme, however, contained a large degree of populism. It promised that Ukraine would emerge out of its crisis within six to eight months while monthly wages, in real terms, would rise four to five fold to \$100 within one year and to double that level within 3–4 years. He would compensate people who lost their savings and repay all the debts incurred during 1992–94. Lanovyi was seen as 'Ukraine's Kennedy', and his election platform rested on two planks: escape from the socio-economic crisis by 1995 and the establishment of a European state between 1996 and 1998.⁶⁶

Pluishch appealed to those national democrats and nationalists who either were disillusioned with Kravchuk or had never backed him. His programme reflected a more nationalist orientation than that of Kravchuk, who attempted to portray himself as a centrist and *derzhavnyk* (statesman). Nevertheless, Pluishch, like all the candidates, described himself as a 'centrist' not linked to any political party or group who would serve the interests of the state (of the seven candidates only Moroz and Lanovyi were members of political parties). Pluishch therefore stressed the need for Ukraine's spiritual revival.

On problems with the Crimea he openly blamed, 'some third force which is interested in the beginning of an armed conflict'. Like Kravchuk, Pluishch also looked more to Ukraine's integration with Europe and the world than with the Eurasian CIS. On Ukraine's foreign orientation Pluishch remained vague: 'We will have to orientate towards those blocs which will take us'.⁶⁷

As an ardent supporter of parliament's role in Ukraine's post-Soviet political system in his former capacity as speaker he had opposed President

Kravchuk's becoming head of the executive, rather than merely head of state. During the presidential elections his views metamorphosed. Now Pluishch stood for the concentration of executive power in the hands of one person, who would be head of government. 'Without bringing the reform of the political system to an end we shall never be able to get out of this crisis', Pluishch stated.⁶⁸ Pluishch clearly favoured establishing a Baltic-Black Sea bloc, the nationalist *cordon sanitaire* solution to Ukraine's geopolitical predicament.

Pluishch's platform was both 'dynamic' and in favour of 'evolutionary changes': 'It is evolutionary – not revolutionary – transformation that corresponds to human nature most of all as it takes into account its essence and requires non-violence.' Likewise his new-found backing for 'dynamic' privatization was at odds with parliament's blocking of privatization programmes during 1992–94. In a similar manner to other candidates, he argued that economic reform would guarantee the development of 'free, civilized enterprise' while the key to privatization would be 'justice'. His support for agriculture reflected Pluishch's earlier career within that sector and his allies within the agrarian sector (he was often described as the *bryhadyr*, the term for a team-leader or foreman on a collective farm).⁶⁹

The newspaper *Vechirnyi Kyiv* (25 June 1994) carried the front-page headline on the eve of the elections with the following conundrum: 'If we elect Kravchuk, we'll have what we have now. If we elect Kuchma, we won't have even what we have now. If we elect Pluishch we'll have the hope that we'll have something.' As a national democratic newspaper and disillusioned former supporter of Kravchuk, Kyiv's evening newspaper therefore backed Pluishch.

Kuchma's election platform included the following planks:⁷⁰

- establishment of a sovereign, democratic Ukraine and defence of its territorial integrity;
- strong executive power;
- a new constitution;
- greater power to local authorities and regions, especially in budgetary affairs;
- opposition to a federal territorial division of Ukraine;
- struggle against organized crime and corruption;
- transition from a command-administrative to a market economy through evolutionary (not revolutionary) change;
- de-monopolization, privatization and equality of all types of ownership;
- renewal of mutually beneficial economic ties to Russia, including full

- membership of the CIS Economic Union;
- state support for high-tech and scientific industries and co-operation between industrialists and the state;
- concentration of national capital to create industrial and financial groups;
- liberalization of foreign trade;
- support for the development of national culture, Ukrainian as the state language and Russian as an official language;
- provision of social welfare and medical care.⁷¹

In contrast to the seasoned politician Kravchuk, Kuchma was heavily reliant upon his advisers and experts.⁷² When speaking or answering questions *impromptu* he often made mistakes, on one occasion blaming the Ukrainian crisis upon 'the national radicalization of history' (which could have served only to harm his patriotic credentials further).⁷³

Voters were attracted by Kuchma's decisiveness and insistence upon the need for strong presidential powers. An employee of *Pivdenmash*, where Kuchma previously served as director, had no hesitation in voting for her former boss: 'If Leonid Danylovych runs the country the way he runs *Pivdenmash*, we'll be in good hands. We need a decisive leader, like Yeltsin in Russia. I think Kuchma could be that leader.'⁷⁴

Kuchma was also accused of a whole multitude of sins, however, including lack of patriotism, a desire to revive the former USSR, lack of interest in Ukrainian statehood, and planning to give away the Crimea and Black Sea Fleet to Russia. In fact, Kuchma on no occasion supported political and military integration with Russia or the CIS, always rejected any suggestion that the former USSR could be revived and supported Ukrainian statehood. His plans for the transfer of the Fleet and the lease of Sevastopol by Russia were backed by Kravchuk at the Massandra summit with Russia in September 1993, when he was accompanied by then Prime Minister Kuchma. His emphasis upon renewing economic ties with Russia and taking an active role in economic affairs within the CIS was one of a series of policies designed to deal with the economic crisis. He stressed that relations with Russia would not distract Ukraine from improving and expanding ties elsewhere, especially with the West.⁷⁵ Kuchma rejected Ukraine's role as a buffer against Russia and one of his election slogans was 'Build Bridges, Not Fences'.

Kuchma's election campaign fell into a similar trap to that which Kravchuk had faced during his term in office, obscuring his programme by attempting to appeal to everyone at the same time. His platform became increasingly hazy 'as he sought to simultaneously win the communist vote

and woo market reformers, to appeal to the pro-Russian east while reassuring the rest of the nation that he would not be Moscow's pawn'.⁷⁶

There were few good words that Kravchuk and Kuchma could say about each other during the election campaign. Kuchma often went out of his way to praise Kravchuk as an individual but added, 'it seems the people around him are simply incompetent. Current economic policy has turned Ukraine into a cemetery'.⁷⁷ He even suggested that Kravchuk should resign voluntarily and thereby not stand again in the presidential elections (an unlikely option as Kravchuk was convinced he would win).⁷⁸

Criticism of Kravchuk's 'inertia' and lack of continuity could also be looked upon as a political advantage through his search for compromise, prevention of sharp conflicts, rejection of forceful methods and willingness to listen to different viewpoints.⁷⁹ Kravchuk came to power with an impossible task: simultaneously to build a nation, a state, an elite and an effective economy – and all within two and a half years. Ironically, Kravchuk's greatest achievement may have been to make Kuchma possible.⁸⁰

In many areas Kravchuk's policies were little different from Kuchma's:⁸¹

- a new constitution;
- a presidential and parliamentary republic with a clear division of powers;
- evolutionary reform and transition to a market economy;
- privatization and reform under state direction;
- an increase in the struggle against organized crime and corruption;
- Russian as an official language;
- economic local self-government in a decentralized unitary state;
- rejection of federalism;
- economic integration with Russia and the CIS, but only associate membership of the Economic Union;
- good relations with Russia;
- rejection of any political and military union or Slavic federation;
- full integration with the outside world, particularly 'Europe'.

Results

In the first round of voting Kravchuk and Kuchma led in 16 and 11 electoral districts respectively. The overall distribution of votes was as follows:⁸²

Leonid Kravchuk	37.72 per cent
Leonid Kuchma	31.27 per cent

Oleksandr Moroz	13.4 per cent
Volodymyr Lanovyi	9.32 per cent
Valeriy Babych	2.39 per cent
Ivan Pluishch	1.29 per cent
Petro Talanchuk	0.54 per cent

Observers found discrepancies in the first round in favour of Kravchuk, who believed that he obtained less than the declared 37.72 per cent.⁸³ Foreign observers complained about the large number of absentee voters, especially in rural areas. After the first round of voting Kuchma's team complained to the CEC of falsified voting of up to ten per cent in some districts, or as many as half a million extra votes in Kravchuk's favour.⁸⁴ Other complaints included the following:⁸⁵

- violation of the secrecy of the ballot;
- interference by local officials;
- greater television and radio air time for Kravchuk;
- ballot-stuffing;
- pressure on voters;
- manipulation of voting procedure.

The results of the second round of voting proved to be rather close, and Kuchma won by a margin of only 7.8 per cent:

Leonid Kuchma	14,017,684	52.1 per cent
Leonid Kravchuk	12,112,442	45.06 per cent

Pluishch's and Talanchuk's voters undoubtedly voted for Kravchuk in the second round. Babych's voters probably went to Kuchma, although his Ukrainian Financial Group had received patronage while Kravchuk was in office and he had helped to finance his presidential election campaign of December 1991.⁸⁶ Lanovyi's voters probably divided – businessmen backed Kuchma while liberals supported Kravchuk. Lanovyi had described the MRBR⁸⁷ as 'unconditionally pro-Russian' and he pointed to serious reservations in Kuchma's reform programme.⁸⁸ At the same time, Kravchuk's sacking of Lanovyi from the government in July 1992 soured relations between the two.

Moroz's Communist voters supported Kuchma as the 'lesser of two evils' while his rural supporters voted for Kravchuk.⁸⁹ Kravchuk was also backed by the majority of Ukraine's diplomatic staff abroad (54 per cent), who believed their careers were beholden to his championing of Ukraine's membership of the world community, compared to only 18 per cent who voted for Kuchma.⁹⁰

The Kravchuk team had not expected to lose the elections. In the end they were defeated not so much by a large vote in favour of Kuchma as by a sizeable negative vote against Kravchuk.⁹¹ The election results can also be analysed by asking, 'Why did Kravchuk come so close to winning?' Could this be due to Ukraine's conservatism which prefers stability over change?⁹² One commentator suggested that 'Villages don't like speed. They see that Kravchuk is making steps ahead slowly but steadily. The village will vote for a progressive, but moderate line. This is altogether typical for Ukraine.'⁹³

The vote for Kuchma was certainly not a vote in favour of reform, as many people looked to his easier populist option of renewing economic ties with Russia as the way to deal with the economic crisis. In actual numbers of voters, the regions that voted for Kravchuk could not match the large urban and industrial regions of Eastern and Southern Ukraine which voted for Kuchma.⁹⁴ In addition, Kravchuk's campaign team members were often not visible in Eastern and Southern Ukraine, and when they were they were often 'Kuchma's team inside Kravchuk's headquarters', the head of the Union of Ukrainian Women in Mykolaiv believed.⁹⁵

After the victory of Kuchma in the second round, members of Kravchuk's team feared for their positions.⁹⁶ A government official recounted how the Kravchuk team members were confident that they would win. Kravchuk signed decrees in his last days in office and made promises to people. A victory banquet had been planned and Mykda Mikhailchenko, Kravchuk's domestic adviser, even announced on election day that 'We have won. Not as easily as we hoped, but our margin of victory across the country is between five and seven per cent.'⁹⁷

The victory of Kuchma came as a shock to many people, despite the attempt by many political parties to play down the event as not a 'tragedy'. One Kyivite summed up this feeling as follows: 'It may be a good day for Ukrainian democracy. But it's a bad day for Ukrainian independence. I thought we were done with being treated by Moscow as a "little brother" somewhere in the provinces.'⁹⁸ Commentators in the national democratic media called the Russophone Ukrainians who voted for Kuchma 'Little Russians' whereas only the 'real Ukrainians' had voted for Kravchuk.⁹⁹

These fears about an uncertain future were also felt by diplomats stationed in Kyiv who were all reported to be in a state of shock, and repeatedly telephoned the offices of the International Foundation for Electoral Systems to see if it were true that Kravchuk had indeed lost. Clearly, the view was widespread that Kravchuk would ensure that he obtained the necessary result in his favour.¹⁰⁰

A number of violations of electoral procedures were also reported during the second round. Some voters in Kyiv were given ballots with Kravchuk's name already crossed off. The Kuchma team claimed that turnout figures

were falsified in L'viv. In Odesa Kravchuk's and US observers were not allowed into some polling booths. The chairman of the Odesa electoral commission gave out two or three ballot papers to those who wished to vote for Kuchma, 'on advice from above', while in Kharkiv ballot papers were given out without identification, and at a number of polling stations 'members of the electoral commission themselves spent many hours campaigning for Leonid Kuchma'.¹⁰¹

International election observers were particularly disturbed that Ukraine had divided regionally when it had voted for Kravchuk or Kuchma, with the former decidedly rejected in the Crimea and the latter overwhelmingly rejected in Galicia.¹⁰² This brought out exaggerated fears of a split of Ukraine and even civil war.

Regional Variations

According to an opinion poll conducted by the National Academy of Sciences, Ukraine was divided into three zones of voter identification according to candidate.¹⁰³ In the first zone Kravchuk's support was twice as large as that of Kuchma and included most of the Western and North-Central Ukrainian regions of Kyiv city and the Kyiv, Cherkasy, Zhitomir, Vinnytsa, Khmelnytsky, Chernivtsi, Ivano-Frankivsk, Ternopil, L'viv, Volyn, Trans-Carpathia and Rivne provinces. The regions with a large majority in Kuchma's favour in the second zone included the city of Sevastopol, the Crimean autonomous republic, the Donbas (Donets'k and Luhans'k *oblasts*) and Chernihiv *oblast*.

Public opinion could not be swayed in those two zones. Zone three was where the battle was decided as in these regions neither candidate had an overall majority in early polls. That zone included the left-bank regions of Poltava, Sumy and Kharkiv, the Central and Eastern industrial regions of Dnipropetrovs'k, Kirovohrad and Zaporizhzhia, the agricultural areas of Kherson and Mykolaiv and the cosmopolitan port city of Odesa.¹⁰⁴ Many rural voters in Central Ukraine voted for Moroz in the first round and for Kravchuk in the second. Few voters backed calls for a revival of the former USSR and most supported independence. But they were tired of Kravchuk's 'indecisiveness' and favoured good relations with Russia.¹⁰⁵

Clearly, Kravchuk expected to be victorious in a large swathe of the third zone. This did not turn out to be completely the case. After the first round of voting Kravchuk's election team expressed its disappointment at the support the candidate had received in Central Ukraine where the proportions of ethnic Russians and Russophone Ukrainians were only 8.6 and 3.3 per cent respectively.¹⁰⁶ Similarly, during the second round of voting Kravchuk did far worse than expected in the Central Ukrainian agricultural regions of

Poltava, Kirovohrad and Mykolaiv.¹⁰⁷ Nevertheless, Kravchuk did receive a high number of votes in areas such as Mykolaiv and Kirovohrad (the only *oblast* where neither candidate obtained more than 50 per cent).¹⁰⁸

The election preference given to Kuchma in these regions, all lying in left-bank Ukraine, may have been a consequence of historical factors. Left-bank Ukraine came under Muscovite (Russian) influence and control in the mid-seventeenth century whereas right-bank Ukraine, which exhibited a higher preference for Kravchuk, remained within the Polish–Lithuanian commonwealth until its incorporation at the end of the eighteenth century. Polish and Ruthenian (Ukrainian) – not Russian – landlords tended to dominate in right-bank Ukraine until 1917.

Both leading presidential candidates rejected the territorial reorganization of Ukraine along federal lines. Kravchuk had long rejected it, favouring instead local self-government and regional economic – not political – independence. ‘But political federalism – this is a premature question. We could undermine our statehood if we were to pose this today and harm the status of our 1991 referendum’, Kravchuk said.¹⁰⁹

After Kuchma’s victory he also categorically rejected any notion that he backed federalism: ‘I do not currently consider it possible and, above all, I want to call on everybody to unite.’¹¹⁰ Kuchma emphasized that ‘[the] first thing I want is national reconciliation’.¹¹¹

The regional division of Ukraine exhibited by its voting behaviour towards Kravchuk and Kuchma clearly made Kuchma even less susceptible to arguments in favour of federalism. Yet, many Western, Crimean and Russian commentators had assumed that Kuchma was in fact in favour of federalism, possibly because his partner, Grynev, joint leader of the MRBR, supports Ukraine’s territorial reorganization as a federal state.

Kuchma’s first priority after his election was to heal – not accentuate – the regional divisions that had been exacerbated by the presidential elections. ‘Everything that happened during the campaign was criminal in terms of confrontation between east and west ... If we act intelligently, we can overcome this split’, Kuchma hoped.¹¹² Nevertheless, Kuchma was given a hostile reception in Western Ukraine after which he described the population as ‘just hating anything associated with Russia’.¹¹³ A leaflet allegedly produced by Kuchma’s campaign team also received widespread critical coverage. In a Kharkiv newspaper an appeal was published allegedly from Kuchma to Eastern Ukrainian voters exhorting them to vote in the second round: ‘If you don’t come to the elections the national radicals from L’viv and their “representatives” from abroad will continue to rule over you’, it stated.¹¹⁴

Similarly, his former opponents during the elections, such as Chornovil, rejected suggestions that Kuchma would not attempt to overcome these

divisions. The newly elected Western Ukrainian local authorities expressed their readiness to co-operate with Kuchma 'on the basis of his programme of economic transformation'.¹¹⁵

In the Crimea the situation was clearer. The only serious vote against Kuchma came from the Crimean Tatars who, like many voters, backed Kravchuk as 'the lesser of two evils' because of Kuchma's alleged 'pro-Russianism'.¹¹⁶ On 10 June 1994 the Crimean Tatars' unofficial parliamentary institution, the Majlis, recommended a vote for Kravchuk. In the words of Mustafa Dzhemilyov, leader of the Majlis, 'If Kuchma comes to power all the effort on coming to an understanding with Kravchuk will be for nought'.¹¹⁷ Both the Majlis and the Ukrainian Civic Congress of the Crimea warned that Kuchma's victory could lead to instability in the Crimea.

In contrast, the newly elected leadership of the Crimea, which came to power as the Russia Bloc and controlled the presidency and a majority of the Supreme Council of the Crimea, welcomed Kuchma's victory. Crimea's President Yury Meshkov claimed that Kuchma and he shared a similar policy of giving priority to economics over politics, giving grounds for co-operation. 'We have had enough of people who destroyed the Soviet Union. It is time to create, and Kuchma is a good organizer', Meshkov claimed in an appeal to the Ukrainian people.¹¹⁸ The Crimean parliamentary speaker, Sergei Tsekov, was also optimistic that relations between Ukraine and the Crimea 'will be smoother, calmer and better thought out than before'.¹¹⁹

Meshkov hoped that newly elected President Kuchma would now unite Ukraine in 'a much closer union with Russia, Belarus and other CIS countries'.¹²⁰ These hopes proved unfounded. President Kuchma has adopted a more constructive approach to the CIS, but this has largely remained confined to the economic sphere. *Izvestiya* (13 July 1994) correctly foresaw that 'there is hardly likely to be any drastic change in Ukraine's political course'.

Meshkov was also relieved at Kuchma's victory because on at least two occasions, in May 1992 and May 1994, Crimean-Ukrainian relations looked set to emulate those of other hot spots in the former USSR.¹²¹ However, by voting overwhelmingly for Kuchma, the Crimeans could not be seen to oppose his policies. Separatism had grown in the Crimea not solely as a result of the activity of pro-Russian forces, which was an 'intolerable over-simplification': it had also grown in consequence of 'the self-destruction of the economy' and 'national radicalization'.¹²² With the election of a Russophone Ukrainian president, critical of Kravchuk's alliance with national democrats and the launch of serious economic reform policies with the backing of international financial institutions, much of the support for Russian separatism evaporated in the Crimea, allowing Kuchma

to reassert Kyiv's control over the peninsula.

When Kuchma repeatedly stated during his election campaign that there was 'no order' in Ukraine he was also referring to the Crimea, which he argued had to obey Ukrainian laws and constitution. Hence, to the surprise of his Crimean electorate, Kuchma used Russian's entanglement in Chechnya after December 1994 to deal a decisive blow against Crimean separatism, going so far as to abolish the institution of the presidency in March 1995. Kuchma's tough policies towards the Crimea received endorsement from the radical Left in parliament, in part because of Meshkov's anti-communism and their hostility towards nationalism and the institution of presidency. Moroz, parliamentary speaker and chairman of the Socialist Party, described the Crimean leadership as 'akin to a child specifying to his father what rights he has'.¹²³

Kuchma as President¹²⁴

Kuchma's election campaign was marred by rumours of a terrorist plot against him. Alleged secret documents passed to a Russian television journalist in the Crimea were published in the Moscow newspaper *Segodnya* (12 June 1994). The documents were in the form of a secret memorandum from the head of military intelligence, Major-General Oleksander Skipalskyi, to then President Kravchuk warning him that they had uncovered a terrorist plot against Kuchma which would take place one or two days after he was elected.

Skipalskyi recommended that they allow the plot to take place in view of Kuchma's known 'pro-Russian' views. The Ministry of Defence denied the authenticity of the document.¹²⁵ Nevertheless, Oleg Popov, an adviser to Kuchma, admitted that, although the reports were unofficial, 'we took every report into consideration and acted on it'.

Kuchma's inauguration address aroused much protest from national democrats who felt it had brought out their worst fears about his policies. Kuchma told parliament that 'The state of Ukraine is not an icon one should pray to'. It should work for the interests of its people. Reform was the only way to escape from the crisis because 'To stand still in one place is death for the Ukrainian economy and the Ukrainian state'. Kuchma pledged to give Russian the status of an official language.

Kuchma's most controversial remarks were diametrically at odds with those of Kravchuk and his voters on the need to normalize relations with Russia as a strategic partner:

Historically, Ukraine is a part of the Eurasian economic and cultural space ... Ukraine's self-isolation, its voluntary refusal to fight actively

for its own interests in the Eurasian space, was a serious political mistake which, first of all, harmed our national economy. We should not simply be present among the CIS, but we should influence policy making in the commonwealth and actively develop our own interests.¹²⁶

The reaction to Kuchma's inauguration speech was so hostile that he has never since described Ukraine as a Eurasian state. In contrast, Crimea's President Meshkov believed that 'A normal person has come to power [in Ukraine]', while nationalist members of the Supreme Council of Ukraine believed differently. In their view, the 'Russian Party' had come to power.¹²⁷ In a long statement in response to the inauguration speech signed by most national democratic parties and civic groups Kuchma's victory was blamed on 'anti-Ukrainian and anti-democratic forces'. They rejected any differences between state and official languages. The granting of the status of 'official' to the Russian language would mean 'the continuation of the process of de-Ukrainianization', according to a protest by the Writers' Union.¹²⁸

Eurasia 'is economically and politically subservient to Russia', while 'historically, geographically and geopolitically Ukraine belongs to Europe', the statement read. Economic ties with Russia should not harm sovereignty. They warned that, 'If Kuchma supported the plans of Russia into turning the CIS into a single state, this would lead to a bloody conflict or war since Ukraine is not going to become part of a new empire voluntarily.'¹²⁹

Conclusions

The 1994 presidential elections in Ukraine followed the parliamentary elections held only three months earlier. As an example of a peaceful transition of power Ukraine's evolving democracy passed its first real test. In the majority of regions of the former USSR either the transfer of power has been undertaken in a violent manner or presidential rule has been extended by referendum, leading to the eclipse of parliaments.

The presidential elections suffered from a number of infringements but, on the whole, they were held freely and fairly, according to outside observers. The most important confirmation of this was Kravchuk's failure to be re-elected. The role of the media remained controversial, especially that of state television and radio. Russian support for Kuchma's candidacy ensured his monopolization of Ostankino, which has a larger number of viewers than has Ukrainian television in Ukraine. Meanwhile, Ukrainian television's coverage of Kravchuk's presidential duties enabled him to use its air time also to promote his campaign.

After agreeing to hold parliamentary and presidential elections in 1994, rather than a referendum on confidence in both institutions in September 1993, President Kravchuk initially argued that the presidential elections should be postponed until after the adoption of a new constitution. This ploy failed to win widespread support, apart from within the national democratic camp.

Of the seven presidential candidates only two – Kravchuk and Kuchma – were likely to enter the second round. Only one of the remaining five (Lanovyi) could have been classified as coming from the democratic camp while two had the backing of nationalists and national democrats disillusioned with Kravchuk (Pluishch and Talanchuk). Another was a businessman (Babych), while the fifth candidate was a socialist who represented the traditional policies of the radical left (Moroz).

This article concludes that in terms of policies there were few radical differences between Kravchuk and Kuchma. The differences were more apparent in their style of leadership and their ability to implement policies. This has led to a large measure of continuity between Kravchuk's and Kuchma's presidential rule, and both presidents have understood the need to build upon national, all-Ukrainian policies.

The presidential elections brought out serious regional divisions within Ukraine. Whereas Central and Western Ukraine voted for Kravchuk, Eastern and Southern Ukraine voted for Kuchma. This was less the result of an ethnic split of Ukraine and more a reflection of Ukraine's legacy of external domination and language cleavages. However, these regional divisions did not signify that Ukraine was heading for civil war or its re-absorption within Russia.

Finally, the successful conclusion of the 1994 presidential elections in Ukraine is a reflection of the country's political stability and the cohesion of its statehood, something that was not readily accepted by most outside observers until 1994–95. The next presidential elections in Ukraine are unlikely to repeat the sharp conflicts and traumas brought out during the 1994 elections.

TABLE 1
OPINION POLLS DURING THE 1994 UKRAINIAN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION
(per cent)

Polling Organization	Date	Location	Kuchma	Kravchuk
Sociological Service, Democratic Initiatives	March	Ukraine	14.4	11.8
Centre for Solutions to Information Support Problems, National Academy of Sciences ^a	–	Kyiv	7	56
International Sociology Centre, Kyiv Mohyla Academy ^b	6–10 June	Ukraine	23	29
Socis–Gallup ^c	–	Ukraine	19	18
Independent Sociological Research Centre 'Barometer' ^d	–	Ukraine	29	23
International Sociology Centre, Kyiv Mohyla Academy ^e	–	Ukraine	30	22
Newspaper <i>Vechirnyi Kyiv</i> ^f	–	Kyiv	2.5	14.7
Newspaper <i>Uriadovyi kurier</i> ^g	–	Ukraine	20	27
Independent Sociological Research Centre 'Barometer' ^h	–	Ukraine	34	24
Centre for Solutions to Information Support Problems, National Academy of Sciences ⁱ	–	Ukraine	42.7	51
International Sociology Centre, Kyiv Mohyla Academy ^j	2–4 July	Ukraine	44	51
<i>Kievskiy vedomosti</i> (7 April 1994)	–	Dnipropetrovs'k	51	13

TABLE 1 (cont)
REGIONAL BREAKDOWN OF OPINION POLLS

City ^k	Kravchuk	Kuchma
Kyiv	19	18
L'viv	36	4
Odesa	11	31
Kharkiv	22	26
Donets'k	21	36

City ^l	Kravchuk	Kuchma
Kyiv	16	21
L'viv	50	7
Odesa	10	29
Donets'k	15	40
Mykolaiv	22	26

Notes:

a *Molod Ukrainy*, 17 June 1994.

b *Holos Ukrainy*, 21 June 1994.

c *The Ukrainian Weekly*, 19 June 1994.

d *Reuters*, 25 June 1995.

e *Reuters*, 25 June 1995, and *UNIAN news agency*, 20 June 1994.

f *Vechirnyi Kyiv*, 22 June 1994.

g *Uriadovyi kurier*, Nos 92–3 (16 June

1994).

h *UNIAN news agency*, 29 June 1994.


i *Holos Ukrainy*, 7 July 1994.

j *Holos Ukrainy*, 7 July 1994.

k *Post Postup*, No. 12 (29 April–6 May 1994).

l *Post Postup*, No. 17 (26 May–2 June 1994).

FIGURE 1
ATTITUDES OF CANDIDATES TO REFORM AND INDEPENDENCE



Source: Scientific Practical Centre for Political Psychology, Academy of Pedagogical Sciences (*Holos Ukrainy*, 25 June 1994)

NOTES

1. *Vidomosti Verkhovnoi Rady URSR*, 1991.
2. See Alexander J. Motyl, 'The Conceptual President: Leonid Kravchuk and the Politics of Surrealism', in Timothy J. Colton and Robert C. Tucker (eds.), *Patterns in Post-Soviet Leadership* (The John M. Olin Critical Issues Series) (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1995), pp.103-21.
3. On the December 1991 presidential elections see Peter J. Potichnyi, 'The Referendum and Presidential Elections in Ukraine', *Canadian Slavonic Papers*, Vol.XXXIII, No.2 (June 1991), pp.123-38.
4. *Holos Ukrainy*, 16 April 1994, and *Zakon Ukrainy pro Vybyry Presydenyta Ukrainy* (Kyiv: Ukrainian Legal Foundation, 1994). For an English-language translation see Yaropolk Kulchyckyj (ed.), *Repeat Voting Presidential Election Guide* (Kyiv: International Foundation for Electoral Systems, 1994).
5. This requirement of the presidential election law undoubtedly encouraged Leonid Kuchma, a Russian-speaking Ukrainian, to learn the Ukrainian language in the months preceding the elections. During his tenure as Prime Minister (October 1992-September 1993) he had continued to use the Russian language.
6. *Zakon Ukrainy* ...
7. It is highly unlikely that most candidates, especially the leading figures (Kravchuk and Kuchma), submitted honest records of their campaign funds: see below.
8. A resolution of the CEC on the collection of signatures by candidates in line with the law 'On the Election of the President of Ukraine' was published in *Holos Ukrainy*, 14 April

1994. A breakdown of the number of signatures for each candidate by *oblast*, republic and city is given in *Dovidnyk do Presydenstskykh Vyboriv v Ukraini* (Kyiv: International Foundation for Electoral Systems, June 1994).
9. No calls for a boycott of the election campaign were made, even though the Communist and Socialist Parties, as in other regions of the former USSR, are in principle against the institution of a presidency. In the Crimea President Meshkov, elected on 30 Jan. 1994, called upon Crimean voters to boycott elections to the Supreme Council of Ukraine by taking their ballot papers home. However, during the presidential elections Meshkov called upon Crimeans to vote for Kuchma: *Reuters*, 8 July 1994; see also the appeal by Meshkov to the Ukrainian people praising the election of Kuchma (*Holos Ukrainy*, 14 July 1994).
 10. *Uriadovyi kurier*, Nos.72–3 (12 May 1994).
 11. *Reuters*, 2 June 1994.
 12. *Vechirnyi Kyiv*, 25 Feb. 1994.
 13. *AP*, 12 May 1994, and *Reuters*, 28 April 1994.
 14. *The Ukrainian Weekly*, 8 May 1994.
 15. *Uriadovyi kurier*, No.68 (30 April 1994).
 16. See the calls for postponement from the Ukrainian Republican Party in *Holos Ukrainy* and *Vechirnyi Kyiv*, 20 April 1994, and *Kievskiy Vedomosti*, 21 April 1994, and by the Democratic Party of Ukraine and the T. Shevchenko Ukrainian Language Society 'Prosvita' in *Sils'ki visti*, 26 April 1994.
 17. See their statement in *Vechirnyi Kyiv*, 13 May 1994.
 18. The Peasant Democrats opposed the postponement of the presidential elections 'Because every day Leonid Kravchuk remains in his post as president is a slap against Ukraine, a step backwards towards neo-colonialism': *Vechirnyi Kyiv*, 5 May 1994.
 19. *UNIAR news agency*, 8 March 1994.
 20. Statement by Rukh dated 26 March 1994 (in the author's possession).
 21. *The Ukrainian Weekly*, 27 Feb. 1994.
 22. *AP*, 12 May 1994.
 23. *Uriadovyi kurier*, Nos.72–3 (12 May 1994).
 24. *Uriadovyi kurier*, Nos.88–9 (9 June 1994).
 25. *The Washington Post*, 3 June 1994.
 26. *Holos Ukrainy*, 16 Feb. 1994.
 27. 'Zakon Ukrainy pro Predstavnyka Presyidenta Ukrainy', *Vidomosti Verkhovnoi Rady Ukrainy*, 1992, No.23, and changes to the law in *ibid.*, 1992, Nos. 31 and 33; see also Ihor Markov, 'The Role of the President in the Ukrainian Political System', *RFE/RL Research Report*, Vol.2, No.48 (3 Dec. 1993).
 28. *Uriadovyi kurier*, Nos 72–3 (12 May 1994).
 29. *The New York Times*, 3 June 1994.
 30. *Uriadovyi kurier*, No.87 (7 June 1994). Kravchuk had earlier complained that taking part in the elections would require him to defend the socio-economic situation, while his opponents 'would concentrate not on a constructive programme but would try to prove that I have not fulfilled my responsibilities': *Reuters*, 22 Feb. 1994; see also his interviews in *Demokratychna Ukraina*, 23 Feb. 1994, and *Der Spiegel*, 19 Feb. 1994.
 31. *Reuters*, 26 June 1994.
 32. *The Washington Post*, 27 July 1994.
 33. *Wall Street Journal*, 24 June 1994.
 34. *Reuters*, 23 June 1994.
 35. *Uriadovyi kurier*, No.95, 21 June 1994.
 36. *UPI*, 12 June 1994.
 37. *UPI*, 26 June 1994.
 38. *Reuters*, 25 June 1994.
 39. *Holos Ukrainy*, 7 July 1994.
 40. *The Ukrainian Weekly*, 20 March 1994.
 41. See Chrystyna Lapychak, 'Media Independence is Still Alien to Ukraine's Political Culture', *Transition*, Vol.1, No.18 (6 Oct. 1995).
 42. See *The Ukrainian Media Bulletin*, *European Institute for the Media*, No.1 (March 1995),

- p.6, which gave the following top 1995 subscriptions to Ukrainian newspapers: *Holos Ukrainy* and *Golos Ukrainy* (506,300), *Sil'ski visti* (337,200), *Robinycha hazeta* and *Robinychaya gazeta* (207,000), *Uriadovyi kurier* (195,800) and *Kievskiy vedomosti* and *Kyivski vidomosti* (146,000).
43. See the series of interviews with Kravchuk by the editor of *Kievskiy vedomosti* entitled *Leonid Kravchuk. Ostanni Dni Imperii... Pershi Roky Nadii* (Kyiv: Dovira, 1994).
 44. *Reuters*, 10 July 1994.
 45. The appeal was published in *Holos Ukrainy*, 28 June 1994, with a rebuttal by the editor in the same issue.
 46. *AP*, 23 June 1994.
 47. *UPI*, 30 June 1994. The parliamentary committee was charged with investigating all grievances regarding equal access to the media (*UNIAR news agency*, 1 July 1994).
 48. *Reuters*, 1 July 1994.
 49. Iryna Bekeshkina, Ilko Kucheriv, Viktor Nebozhenko and Yury Orobets, *Demokratychni Initsiatyvy: Politychnyi Portret Ukrainy*, No.3, pp.17–23.
 50. *UNIAR news agency*, 30 June 1995.
 51. *Holos Ukrainy*, 27 May 1994, and *Uriadovyi kurier*, No.82 (28 May 1994).
 52. *Vechirnyi Kyiv*, 5 May 1994.
 53. *UNIAR news agency*, 25 April 1994.
 54. *Holos Ukrainy*, 5 May 1994.
 55. Biographies of the seven candidates can be found in *Nezavisimost*, 29 April 1994; *Vechirnyi Kyiv*, 24 June 1994; *Halytskyi kontrakty*, No.23, 1994; *The Ukrainian Weekly*, 19 June 1995; *AP*, 25 June 1995; and *Reuters*, 26 June 1995.
 56. It is noticeable that Kravchuk obtained one-sixth of his signatures supporting his candidature in L'viv oblast alone (52,000 out of 300,000). Plushch also obtained 20,669 in this oblast, which traditionally gives strong backing to national democrats, while Kuchma obtained only 2,683 signatures in the same oblast, a factor later reflected in his dismal performance in Galicia during the elections (*Ukrainske slovo*, 5 June 1994).
 57. One report claimed that his petition to be registered as a candidate was rejected owing to 'signature-gathering inconsistencies' (*The Ukrainian Weekly*, 1 May 1994).
 58. *ITAR-TASS news agency*, 1 May 1994.
 59. *Ukrainske slovo*, 23 Jan. 1994.
 60. *Kievskiy vedomosti*, 9 Oct. 1993.
 61. *Ukrainske slovo*, 31 July 1994.
 62. The election programmes of these and all the candidates can be found in Yaropolk Kulcyckyj (ed.), *Dovidnyk do Prezydentskykh Vyboriv v Ukraini* (Kyiv: International Foundation for Electoral Systems, June 1994). Babich's programme is also outlined in *Post Postup*, 1994, No.21.
 63. *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, 12 July 1994, claimed Lanovyi had agreed to back Kuchma in return for the post of prime minister.
 64. *Post Postup*, No.21, 1994.
 65. See *Vechirnyi Kyiv*, 4 May 1994, and *Post Postup*, No.21, 1994, for his biography.
 66. See *Holos Ukrainy*, 23 and 25 June 1994.
 67. *Post Postup*, 1994, No.21.
 68. *UNIAR news agency*, 11 May 1994.
 69. *Ukrainian State Television*, 16 June 1994.
 70. See Kuchma's biography in *Post Postup*, 1994, No.13 (7–13 May).
 71. *Dovidnyk do Prezydentskykh Vyboriv v Ukraini*; see also *Izvestiya*, 13 July 1994, and *Financial Times*, 12 July 1994.
 72. On the Kuchma team see *Narodna Armiya*, 22 July 1994.
 73. *Vechirnyi Kyiv*, 21 June 1994.
 74. *The Ukrainian Weekly*, 3 July 1994.
 75. See *ITAR-TASS news agency*, 15 June 1994; *UNIAR news agency*, 16 and 26 June 1994; and *Halytskyi kontrakty*, 1994, No.23.
 76. *Financial Times*, 12 July 1994.
 77. *Reuters*, 31 March 1994.

78. *Obschchaya gazeta*, 31 March 1992.
79. *Uriadovyi kurier*, Nos.96–7 (23 June 1994).
80. Motyl, 'The Conceptual President', p.120.
81. *ITAR–TASS* news agency, 20 June 1994, and Kulcyskyj (ed.), *Dovidnyk do Prezydenskykh Vyboriv v Ukraini*.
82. *Uriadovyi kurier*, Nos.100–101 (30 June 1994). See also the *oblast* breakdown in Kulchyskyj (ed.), *Repeat Voting Presidential Election Guide Book*.
83. Oleksandr Kyshniak, Viktor Hebozhenko and Valeriy Pylypenko, 'Chy Peredbachyly Sotsiolyhy Peremohy Leonida Kuchmy?', *Henezha*, 1994, No.2, p.250.
84. The Russian Institute of Sociological Research claimed that Kravchuk's result was weighted with an additional 6–6.5 per cent of votes (*UNIAN news agency*, 2 July 1995).
85. *UPI*, 4 July 1994.
86. Interview with Babych, Kyiv, Dec.1991.
87. Gryneov, Kuchma's joint leader of the MRBR, hoped that the MRBR would become this presidential party; Kuchma said on the eve of the elections that there was a need for such a 'centrist' presidential party: *Holos Ukrainy*, 3 June 1994.
88. *Reuters*, 31 March 1994.
89. *Reuters*, 28 June 1994.
90. *Narodna armiya*, 28 June 1994.
91. *Izvestiya*, 13 July 1994.
92. *Moskovskie novosti*, 10–17 July 1994.
93. *Holos Ukrainy*, 5 July 1994.
94. A sympathetic post-mortem on Kravchuk was published in *Visti z Ukrainy*, 1994, No.29.
95. *Vechirnyi Kyiv*, 2 August 1994.
96. *The Independent*, 13 July 1994. See the report in *The New York Times* (13 July 1994) about the fear of Kyiv's bureaucrats losing their posts after Kuchma's victory.
97. *UPI*, 12 July 1994. To claim this victory with such margins suggests that Mikhailchenko expected that voting would be rigged in Kravchuk's favour, in the same manner as allegedly was undertaken during the first round; see below.
98. *The New York Times*, 13 July 1994.
99. See *Narodna hazeta*, 1994, No.28; *Literaturna Ukraina*, 14 July 1994; and an editorial and report in *Vechirnyi Kyiv*, 15 July and 2 Aug. 1994.
100. *The Independent*, 13 July 1994.
101. *UNIAN news agency*, 10 July 1994.
102. See the maps that reproduced the voting patterns, in *Post Postup*, No.24 (14–20 July 1994), *Vechirnyi Kyiv*, 15 July 1994, and *The Economist*, 16 July 1994.
103. *Holos Ukrainy*, 7 July 1994.
104. A report from Odesa portrayed the population as more concerned about local – rather than national – elections, a common factor throughout Eastern and Southern Ukraine where regionalism is a powerful force; the absolute majority of election materials on display were in favour of Kuchma (*Reuters*, 23 June 1994).
105. *Reuters*, 26 June 1994.
106. *Reuters*, 27 June 1994.
107. *Reuters*, 11 July 1994.
108. For a more detailed analysis see Dominique Arel and Andrew Wilson, 'Ukraine under Kuchma: Back to Eurasia?', *RFE/RL Research Report*, Vol.3, No.32 (19 Aug. 1994); the authors fell into the same trap as many Western commentators if the title reflected their conclusions.
109. *The Ukrainian Weekly*, 10 April 1994.
110. *UPI*, 11 June 1994.
111. *AP*, 11 July 1994.
112. *Financial Times*, 12 July 1994.
113. *UPI*, 11 June 1994.
114. *Post Postup*, No.24 (14–20 July 1994).
115. *Izvestiya*, 13 July 1994.
116. *Molod Ukrainy*, 17 June 1994.

- 117. *Reuters*, 8 July 1994.
- 118. *Reuters*, 8 July 1994.
- 119. *Reuters*, 11 July 1994.
- 120. *Holos Ukrainy*, 14 July 1994.
- 121. See Taras Kuzio, 'The Crimea and European Security', *European Security*, Vol.3, No.4 (Winter 1994), pp.734–74.
- 122. *Kyivska Pravda*, 27 June 1994.
- 123. *Reuters*, 16 Aug. 1994.
- 124. Kravchuk sent a greeting to Kuchma on the occasion of his victory, asking him to continue with political and economic reform, social welfare for the population and the promotion of Ukraine's international position (*UPI*, 12 July 1994).
- 125. *Narodna armiya*, 14 July 1994.
- 126. *Holos Ukrainy*, 21 July 1994.
- 127. *The Ukrainian Weekly*, 24 July 1994.
- 128. See the protest by the Writers' Union of Ukraine in *Literaturna Ukraina*, 21 July 1994.
- 129. *Molod Ukrainy*, 26 July 1994.