Borders, Symbolism and Nation–State Building: Ukraine and Russia

TARAS KUZIO

The Russian–Ukrainian border question always consisted of far more than simply a territorial dispute. It inevitably became bound up with questions of state and nation–building, the creation of new post–Soviet national identities, and the forging of civic nations. These factors involved the revival of historical myths and the return to history to 'prove' first settlement. A discourse, couched in such terms, proved to be highly charged because it was one where, 'history matters and contains a direct challenge to the political survival of every fledgling state'.[1] Russian newspaper commentaries pointed out that the Russian–Ukrainian treaty signed in late May 1997 was more difficult psychologically for Moscow to undertake than the treaties signed with Chechnya and NATO earlier in the same month.

This article surveys the roots of the Ukrainian–Russian territorial dispute and how history has been brought into play as a means to argue for the 'right' of first settlement. It then discusses attitudes within Ukraine to its territorial integrity.

'The border between Ukraine and Russia is in fact a border between one nation but two independent states'.
General Andrei Nikolayev, former Commander,
Russian Federal Border Service[2]

Borders: Sources of Conflicts and Symbols

Empires, Minorities and Borders

Successful secessionist campaigns have been rare since the Second World War. Only Eritrea and Bangladesh managed to successfully secede from Ethiopia and Pakistan respectively and then be diplomatically recognised. Chechnya may become a third after it effectively won a war against Russia between 1994 and 1996.

Nevertheless, the overwhelming majority of countries borders do not coincide with their ethnic groups. Connor found that less than 10 per cent of nation-states were ethnically homogenous in the early 1970s (with one-

Taras Kuzio is a Research Fellow at the Centre for Russian and East European Studies, University of Birmingham.

third of them possessing less than even 50 per cent of the titular ethnic group).[3] The lack of congruence between ethnicity and nation-state borders has given way to a variety of territorial claims – not all of which will be necessarily followed by military action. Spain, Argentina and Eire all *de facto* harbour territorial claims towards Gibraltar, the Falkland islands and Ulster respectively. Although these sentiments may not be actioned, the claims nevertheless remain in place for psychological and nostalgic reasons.[4]

The psychological crisis brought into focus by the disintegration of empires has particular relevance for Ukraine and Russia, the subject of this article. Russian national identity had always been coterminous with empire. Historically, Russia had undertaken nation- and empire-building simultaneously; it was therefore difficult to locate where 'Russia' began and ended. 'Russia' or 'Russian' can refer to both the English-language translations of *Rossiya* and *Russkiy*, yet both are different. Whereas the former refers to the Russian empire (for example, the closest equivalent would be 'British'), the latter refers to the Russian nation (or, say, 'English').

But this division between *Rossiya* and *Russkiy* was only applicable to the non-Slavic nations of the Tsarist and Soviet empires. Ukraine and Belarus were both therefore included within the definition of *Russkiy*, who allegedly began their history together in the medieval state of 'Kyiv Rus' and were fated to 're-unite' in the future. This confusion as to the whether the three eastern Slavic peoples are in fact separate nations, with the right to independent states, or merely branches of one *Russkiy narod,* has a strategic significance for the question of borders. If one adopts the latter view, as does the Belarusian President Alyaksandr Lukashenka and the majority of the Russian elites, then borders should not be established between three 'fraternal brothers'. If, on the other hand, one adopts the former view, as does Ukraine (see below), then borders cannot be divided into those which require delimitation or demarcation and those which do not.

The collapse of empires also leads to crises for the former dominant ethnic group. Russians, just as Turks in the Ottoman empire or Serbs in the former Yugoslavia, did not see their 'homeland' as their republic. Instead, they looked to the entire empire as their 'homeland'. In contrast, the non-Serbs and non-Russians of the former Yugoslavia and the USSR respectively looked to their republics largely as their 'homelands'. Redefining their national horizons to those of their republics is therefore a traumatic experience for Serbs and Russians alike.[5]

The fact that Yugoslavia and the USSR possessed clearly marked boundaries between republics were used by non-Serbs and non-Russians to demand their conversion into internationally-recognised borders and to

favour policies which have largely been in favour of the territorial *status quo*. In contrast, the Ottoman empire was not divided along such lines and the newly independent Turkish state was immediately thrown into a war to define its new borders by conquest and ethnic cleansing. Serbia and Russia followed different paths after the collapse of Yugoslavia and the USSR. Whereas the former backed irredentist claims on Bosnia and Croatia through proxy forces and attempted unsuccessfully to halt the collapse of the state by force, the latter joined with Ukraine and Belarus in peacefully dismantling the USSR.

Nevertheless, although Russia has not launched military aggression against any former Soviet state to back up territorial claims, it has remained difficult for it to reconcile 'Russian' identity to that encompassed within the borders of the Russian Federation. Russia's psychological map of its 'borders' are not those of the Russian Federation; many of its elites often confuse the borders of the former USSR/Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) with those of 'Russia' and not those of the Russian Federation. This has particular relevance for Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakstan. Not only, as outlined earlier, do Russians traditionally not perceive Ukrainians and Belarusans as anything but branches of one *Russkiy narod*, but Russian national identity is itself closely tied up with language, religion and culture. The large number of ethnic Russians and Russian-speakers in Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakstan therefore ensures that Moscow finds it difficult to come to terms with the permanence of their independence or their need for borders.

Borders as National Symbols

Ernest Renan said that France's frontiers in 1789 were not 'natural or necessary'.[6] Forsberg also argued that there was no such thing as 'legitimate borders' or 'natural frontiers'.[7]

Nevertheless, a century after the French revolution France's frontiers had become, as do most borders, an additional national symbol. Between 1820 and 1945, 94 per cent of all wars were between neighbours over borders. Territorial disputes have only largely became a thing of the past since the 1960s. It is therefore, 'more difficult to explain neighbours who never go to war with each other than those who frequently do'.[8]

Borders are regarded as symbols of sovereignty.[9] One of the attributes of a sovereign state is bordered territory.[10] When former colonies or dependencies, such as the former non-Russian Soviet republics, obtained independence they invariably demanded the inviolability of their borders. This, 'consecrates the ex–colonial boundaries',[11] no matter how they may have been arbitrarily formed. It provides additional significance to territory, sovereignty and borders where, 'Even minor boundary disputes often prove difficult to resolve'.[12]

Nation and state building therefore attempts to tie the inhabitants of a former colony or dependency to a particular piece of territory through the construction of a 'We' different to 'others' beyond the borders. Landscapes, monuments, culture, heritage, maps and history all become important allies of the nation-state builders in their endeavour to forge a new 'We' from the peoples living on a clearly defined territory. They therefore dramatise the extent of state sovereignty, and differences between those to whom this sovereignty is applicable and those who fall outside its jurisdiction.[13] Paasi argues that:

> Boundaries make a difference. Social life is full of boundaries which give direction to existence, and which locate that existence…The boundaries between nation-states hence receive their meanings in the continual nation-building process, in the social reproduction of the nation-state and in the socialization of the citizen into specific territorial frames.[14]

Borders are also symbols of modernity because pre-modern entities possessed no clear boundaries. These modern borders are established by power, 'maintained by the constitution and known readiness to defend them by arms'.[15] For the state and nation borders are critical for their functionality as political communities with historical continuity.[16]

In the Ukrainian–Russian case, borders hold emotive significance; for Ukrainians their recognition by its neighbours was a paramount foreign policy priority after the disintegration of the former USSR. 'Ukraine will defend its integrity, sovereignty in line with the Constitution, by all means available to it', former President Kravchuk warned.[17] On only one occasion did the Ukrainian authorities agree to border changes when 4Km of the Odesa–Izmail road and village of Polanka in Moldova were exchanged for the Ukrainian village of Bessarabka.

Ukraine insisted from the moment it became an independent state that all of its neighbours recognise in international law its borders.[18] In an appeal to parliaments and peoples of the world by the Ukrainian parliament, issued less than a week after the Ukrainian referendum on independence, it stated that: 'Ukraine considers its territory indivisible and inviolable, recognises the inviolability of existing state borders and has no territorial claims towards any state'.[19] Kyiv therefore resolutely opposed Russia's concept of 'transparent internal' and 'jointly guarded external' CIS borders which, if agreed to, would have meant Ukraine joining Russia's 'joint military–strategic space'.[20]

Every independent state, in Ukrainian eyes, had a national anthem, flag, symbols, airlines – and borders. 'An independent country must have borders drawn on maps', Ukrainian Foreign Minister Hennadiy Udovenko, argued.[21]

These borders did not require row upon row of barbed wire, which were only inherited on the former Soviet external borders with Poland, Slovakia, Hungary and Romania. On Ukraine's 'new' borders with Moldova, Belarus and Russia delimitation to determine the boundary line was the key – not demarcation. Delimitation of these three borders would, in Ukrainian eyes, serve to:

1. define where the responsibility of the Ukrainian state ended;
2. define the border where there were instances of confusion (factories, farms and villages straddled the border);
3. establish a border regime favourable to both sides; and
4. place markers every one kilometre on the delimited border and in each case where it turns.[22]

Only Russia and Romania dragged the process out of recognising Ukraine's borders until Summer 1997. Russia found the very idea of a delimited or demarcated border with Ukraine to be unnatural and offensive.[23] Ukraine had submitted nearly twenty diplomatic notes to begin serious negotiations over the delimitation and demarcation of their common border – but these had all been ignored prior to 1997.[24] A Russian commentary asked: 'Really, do we need a border with Ukraine? After all, we have managed to come to an agreement with Belarus. We believe that many Russians pose the questions in just this way.'[25]

Ukraine had previously signed treaties with Belarus and Moldova but the process of border delimitation had been dragged out. Belarus had largely backed Russia's division of 'internal' and 'external' CIS borders. Nevertheless, in April 1997, after much Ukrainian persistence, Belarus became the first CIS state to agree to border delimitation with Ukraine. This was followed by the recognition of Ukraine's borders with its last two neighbours – Russia and Romania – in May and June respectively. This signified that Ukraine's territorial integrity was now recognised and that territorial claims were a thing of the past (except on the part of radical right-wing groups). The Black Sea Fleet agreement, signed together with the Russian–Ukrainian treaty, ended the last remaining Soviet institution when Russian replaced Soviet naval flags on Russian naval ships in Sevastopol in June 1997.

The completion of the recognition of Ukraine's borders were given additional symbolism by being linked to the adoption of Ukraine's first post–Soviet constitution in June 1996, as well as, 'to the introduction of the monetary unit or the approval of the Ukrainian state flag and emblem …'[26] In addition, this served to:boost Ukraine's self confidence, gave it greater room for manoeuvre in the Baltic–Black Sea region, and 'formed the legal space around the country'.[27]

History and Borders: Russia and Ukraine

Territorial claims based upon history usually see them, 'through some kind of rose-coloured spectacles'.[28] The land, it is argued, belongs to those who 'first' settled it, with the disputant often also referring to past violations of international law and justice. Standing firm in the face of territorial claims can be used to build up the domestic patriotic credentials of leaders and give a reputation for resolve.[29]

First Settlement

The signing of an inter-state treaty between Ukraine and Russia will only settle their disputed border *de jure*. Debate will continue within Ukraine and Russia (and between them) over border-related questions during the course of their state- and nation-building projects and the reshaping of their national identities.[30]

In central and eastern Europe, the question of who first settled an area and where 'here' actually is often changes in relation to historical memory.[31] The ethnic approach to eastern European nation–state-building (in contrast to the territorial, civic approach largely used in western Europe) has important ramifications for citizenship and the legitimacy of the habitation of certain regions by ethnic groups. In Poland and Spain, territory taken from Germany and the Muslim Moors respectively is justified by reference to 'recovered territory or the 'reconquest' respectively.

Forsberg believes that, 'Historically just borders are almost always contested by the question, which decisive moment in history established borders for all time?'[32] This has particular relevance to the Ukrainian–Russian territorial dispute over their common border and the rights of their co-brethren in one another's countries.

Russians, who never held a nation-state in history, look back to Tsarist Russia (and, presumably in some cases, its borders) as their pre-communist ideal. Ukrainians, on the other hand, in a manner similar to all of the non-Russian Soviet successor states, look to the borders of their republics created by Soviet power. Irredentist claims are usually confined to the radical right in these non-Russian states – something which is not necessarily the case in Russia and Serbia where these claims can be often verbally backed by democrats.[33]

Former President Kravchuk pointed out to those Russians using historical claims to justify territorial claims that when any ethnic group demands the return to certain 'historical' borders they are usually very selective as to which moment in history they choose. 'What reference point should be taken relating to the Ukrainian–Russian borders? Tenth, eleventh or maybe the fourth or fifth centuries?', Kravchuk asked.[34] Even *Literaturna*

Rossiia (21 August 1992), a newspaper not normally noted for its liberal tendencies, asked, 'Why in the case of the Crimea do we follow the borders of 1954, in the case of the Baltic region those of 1939 and in the case of the Kurile islands those of 1855.' Eduard Gurfits, the Jewish Mayor of Odesa, asked in an open letter to the Mayor of Moscow, Yuriy Luzhkov,[35] what would happen: 'if we start trying to work out where the Russians, Ukrainians – or the Germans or the Chinese and so on – built towns and then shed blood, that is a direct route to either the madhouse or to World War Three'.[36] As Gurfits pointed out, the same logic used by Luzhkov could lead to Ukraine demanding the return of the Kuban region of the northern Caucasus.[37] The State Duma's vote in 1996 to include Sevastopol within the Russian budget was as ludicrous as the Ukrainian parliament, 'adopting a decision to finance the city of Tyumen administration – a Russian region where 600,000 Ukrainians are employed'.[38] Similarly, Russia has insisted that a military base is required to protect 'Russian-speakers' in the separatist Trans-Dniester region of Moldova. Should Ukraine, following this logic, not also demand a military base in Tyumen *oblast* in western Siberia?

If Russia is raising the question of the transfer of the Crimea's 25,500 square kilometres to Ukraine in 1954, some Ukrainian authors have argued that perhaps Ukraine should demand the return of the 325,000 square kilometres of Ukrainian territory transferred to the Russian FSR in 1924? These Ukrainian lands apparently included 4,800 industrial and agricultural enterprises.[39] The radical right Ukrainian National Assembly calls for the creation of a Ukrainian super-state which includes the Trans-Dniester Republic, the Don and Kuban Cossack regions. Ukrainian Cossack groups have long supported the revival of Ukrainian Cossacks in the Kuban region of the north Caucasus.[40]

Back to History

The normalisation of Polish–Ukrainian relations has served to push into the realm of history discussions surrounding Polish rule in western Ukraine. In order to stress their 'Europeaness' Ukrainians are also careful not to paint Lithuanian–Polish rule in totally negative terms; a constraint which is not always evident when dealing with Tsarist rule in eastern Ukraine. Nevertheless, friction in Przemysl over demands by Ukrainians for the return of Church property led to an upsurge of Polish nationalism. 650 Polish veterans of the Second World War were denied visas to enter Ukraine to build a monument to Polish war victims in Volyn *oblast,* the scene of a bitter Polish–Ukrainian civil war during the Second World War. Thirty-one crosses erected in this *oblast* bearing the Polish names of local towns were taken down on the orders of the local authorities. The authorities in L'viv

demanded the removal of Polish inscriptions on gravestones because they were 'anti-Ukrainian'.

Ukraine and Russia's diametrically opposed historiography's also serve to cloud their contemporary border problems. In the eyes of the majority of Russians, from democrats to communists and nationalists, Sevastopol and the Crimea are 'Russian'. This was because, 'Every stone there is washed with Russian blood, every stone, every home represents a memory associated with the names of heroes who defended the country in every age. That city is just as holy for Russia as other historic cities.' – the words of Aman Tuleyev, the former communist Russian Minister for Co-operation with the CIS.[41] But Russian claims to the Crimea and Sevastopol only go back as far as the late eighteenth century. Ukrainian historiography is now following the Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi schema, laid out in the early part of this century, which claims that Ukraine's history goes as far back as the Antes and Kyiv Rus' from the fourth century AD. According to this schema Russian history began only from the twelfth century under Vladimir Suzdal/Muscovy and then on to the Russian empire from the eighteenth century. The Ukrainian authorities, therefore, seem to be left with little option but to adopt the Hrushevsky schema not only for purposes of state and nation building, but also as a means of defending the right of 'first settlement' of disputed lands, such as the Crimea and the Donbas.[42]

Although there is little dispute that Zaporizhzhia and Kharkiv were historically part of Ukraine, the question of the Donbas and the Crimea are open to question. It is over, and within, these two regions that the greatest deal of controversy is taking place between Russia and Ukraine. As Wilson has commented, the Ukrainian and Russian views of the historical settlement of the Crimea and the Donbas, 'are mutually contradictory at almost every point'.[43]

The growth of the bitter recriminations and claims between Ukraine and the Russian Federation over the Crimea prior to 1997 led to an outburst of published materials which aimed to legitimise Ukrainian sovereignty over disputed areas. Ukraine's title to the Crimea is traced back as far as the medieval state of Kyiv Rus', which is now claimed as a proto-Ukrainian state. As early as the fourth century the 'ancestors of the Ukrainian people' began sailing in the Black Sea and the Mediterranean Sea. This contact with the Black Sea was then developed during the eighth and ninth centuries within the Kyiv Rus' state.[44] Another author from Donets'k *oblast* prepared a book, *Ukraine's Fighting Ships,* which traced the fact that; 'From the third century our ancestors were already sailing on the Black, Mediterranean and Caspian Seas.'[45] The inhabitants of the Crimea are described as inhabitants of Rus', that is part of the population of the Kyiv Rus'–Ukrainian state.[46] The ancient inhabitants of the Crimea were therefore Greeks and Ukrainians

(Ruthenians/Rus'ians), not Muscovites/Russians.[47] The Black Sea was often described in the medieval era as the 'Russkiy Sea', especially after the attacks on Constantinople in 626 and 911 by Kyiv Rus'. 'And this took place before any mention of Moscow in 1147,' an officer from Ukraine's Military-Academy Society pointed out with evident glee.[48]

It was these Rus'–Ukrainians who developed the peninsula's economy and culture.[49] Another author compared the folk cultures and songs of Ukrainians and Russians. Whereas in the former the Crimea and the Black Sea are often mentioned, there are no references to these areas in Russian folk culture, songs and epics.[50] The russification of the Crimea only began in the late eighteenth century; prior to that it had allegedly been populated by Greeks, Ukrainians and Tatars.[51] Another Ukrainian author quoted a Turkish historian to show that in 1666 the Crimea was populated by 180,000 Tatars and 920,000 Ukrainians. Between 1666 and 1989 the proportion of Ukrainians fell from 81.6 to 26.7 per cent.

Even symbols are brought in to prove Ukrainian claims to the Crimea. The Ukrainian national symbol, the trident (*tryzub*), was found in the Crimea dating back to the first five centuries of the first millennium: 'The *tryzub* as the ethnic, historical, state and religious symbol of the Tavrians, Anty, Rus' and the Ukrainian people in general spread throughout the Crimea as well as in the Carpathians.' Therefore, 'the core and most ancient inhabitants of the Crimea are Ukrainians (Tavrians–Anty–Rus'–Ukrainians)'.[52] The Crimea has only one, or two indigenous 'core' ethnic groups – Ukrainians and Tatars (but not Russians). These views serve to reinforce two factors. First, that Kyiv Rus' was a proto-Ukrainian state. Secondly, that Ukrainians harbour a sense of injustice due to the russification and de-Ukrainianisation of the Crimea from the late eighteenth century onwards when the Ukrainian Cossack autonomous state was destroyed by Tsarina Catherine.

Anniversaries

Celebrations of the 300th anniversary of the Russian Black Sea Fleet in 1996 were also the cause of a flurry of Ukrainian responses which provide a new mythology about the 500th anniversary of the Ukrainian Cossack fleet in 1992. Ukrainian Cossack *Chayky* (long boats) first entered the Black Sea in 1492 while the first Russian ships only appeared in 1699.[53] In 1697, Hetman Ivan Mazepa, who led the Ukrainian rebellion against Russia twelve years later, launched the construction of a 'Ukrainian state military-naval fleet'. Therefore, the contemporary Ukrainian navy is not being built on thin air, but upon the historical legacies of 1492 and 1697.[54]

Ukrainian authors did not attempt to disguise the fact that their call for the commemoration of the 500th anniversary of the Ukrainian navy in the

Crimea and the Black Sea was an attempt to upstage Russian commemorations of the 300th anniversary of the Black Sea Fleet. Hence the stress upon Ukrainian ships having sailed in the Black Sea from their Crimea bases 200 years prior to those of the Russian empire. Hetman Mazepa built his Ukrainian fleet before the Russian navy.[55] From 1538 there appear the first records of Cossack naval attacks on the Turks along the Black Sea coast. The Ukrainian Cossack fleet is described as large as 80 vessels.[56] Ironically, the museum of the Black Sea Fleet in Sevastopol traces its genealogy back to these Cossack *Chayky*. After the destruction of the autonomous Ukrainian Hetmanate in the late eighteenth century, Ukrainian Cossack seamen moved westwards to the Trans-Dniester region, where they served in the Turkish navy, and eastwards to the Kuban. There were also Ukrainian Cossacks in the service of the Polish navy.

Russia does not therefore hold the right of claim to 'first settlement' in Sevastopol, Ukrainian authors argue. Ukrainian Cossacks re-established control over the Crimea and built Sevastopol.[57] Cossack naval marines, who built their sea prowess on the 'the sea-faring traditions' of Kyiv Rus', launched attacks against the Crimea in 1606, 1619 and 1623. One Ukrainian author believed that; 'The Ukrainian military glory of our ancestors is closely tied to the Crimea and the Black Sea.'[58] As Gurfits, the Mayor of Odesa, pointed out in his open letter to his Moscow counterpart, Luzhkov, the city of Sevastopol was actually built by Ukrainian serfs from Kyiv, Poltava, Vynnitsia, Orel, Voronezh and Kursk *oblasts*, 'known from our geography lessons as *Slobodskaya Ukraiina'*.[59] In the words of another Ukrainian author: 'In 1784 seamen on the ships of the Sevastopol tsarist vessels were former Ukrainian peasants and shore Ukrainian fishermen.' In addition, the commanders were Ukrainian, while, 'On the streets of Sevastopol one only heard the Ukrainian tongue, because then in the vessels only Ukrainian seamen lived.'[60]

The Ukrainianess of the Black Sea Fleet when it was constructed was due to the fact that it recruited its officers and seamen locally. This, in the view of Ukrainian authors, explains why the Black Sea Fleet supported the Ukrainian Central *Rada* in 1918 and voted positively in the December 1991 referendum on independence.[61] In other words, it was only due to Bolshevik and Russian intrigue and imperialism that the Black Sea Fleet was scuttled (in 1918) or turned against Ukraine (during the 1990s).

Ukrainian authors have also argued that Ukrainian Cossack–farmers were the first settlers in the Donbas at the end of the seventeenth century. Russian peasants only migrated to the region after 1820 when the first coal mines were opened and the city of Yuzivka (Donets'k) was established.[62] In Odesa the problem of the cities origins re-surfaced in the 1990s. Ukrainian authors argue that the city, like all of eastern and southern Ukraine, was

brought within the Ukrainian Hetmanate and/or the Tsarist Russian empire by Ukrainian Cossacks who were its first settlers. Therefore, 'Why should these be forgotten and we begin the history of the city (of Odesa) only from that moment when Muscovites entered the Ukrainian steppes.'[63] The Ukrainian government, local civic groups and political parties, together with local politicians, largely opposed the return of the monument to Tsarina Catherine in Odesa (a monument existed in the Tsarist era). Again, the issue boils down to the fact that Ukrainian and Russian historiography hold contradictory positions on the legacy of Tsarina Catherine.

Sevastopol and the Crimea

Territorial Claims

The view that the Crimea and Sevastopol historically and ethnically belong to 'Russia' is very widespread within the elites of the Russian Federation, even among many democrats. Seventy per cent of Russians polled in early 1997 supported the transfer of Sevastopol to Russia.[64] One Ukrainian commentator pointed out that:

> It would be a mistake, however, to boil down the 'Crimean' activities of Moscow to a method of scoring points by Russian politicians because those who want to see Crimea as Russian prevail among the helmsmen of the Kremlin's course.[65]

Territorial claims against Ukraine were launched by Yeltsin's press secretary just after Ukraine declared independence in August 1991.[66] The Russian parliament then began to initiate them itself almost immediately in early 1992, particularly *vis-à-vis* the Crimea and the city of Sevastopol. Vladimir Lukin, former Russian Ambassador to the US and a leading member of Yabloko, initiated the first votes in the Russian parliament in favour of using the Black Sea Fleet to exert pressure upon Ukraine *vis-à-vis* the Crimea.[67]

Moscow Mayor Luzhkov became an ardent supporter of territorial claims against Ukraine.[68] Luzhkov is backed by Boris Nemtsov, the respected reformist former Governor of Nizhni Novgorod and Deputy Prime Minister, who also regards Sevastopol as a 'Russian city acquired with Russian blood'.[69] Grigory Yavlinsky, head of Yabloko, had always considered Sevastopol to be historically a Russian town.[70] The degree to which these imperialist views by democrats have elite consensus could be seen in the comments of Aleksei Mitrofanov, Chairman of the State Duma Geopolitics Commission and a member of the radical right-wing Liberal Democratic Party, who said that, '... Luzhkov behaves very correctly, he is

increasingly resembling Zhirinovsky'.[71] The radical left and right within Russia both backed these territorial claims.[72] On questions such as these therefore, there is a strong elite consensus within the Russian Federation.

The Russian executive always officially reiterated its view that Sevastopol and the Crimea belong to Ukraine.[73] Yet, the 'Russia is Our Home' faction in the State Duma and Yeltsin appointees in the Federation Council all supported resolutions staking claims to the Crimea and Sevastopol made prior to 1997. While ruling out military means, Russian Foreign Minister Yevgenniy Primakov still reiterated that; 'Enshrined in the heart of every Russian is the idea that Sevastopol is a Russian town.'[74] Military means were ruled out because, after all, as one Russian official newspaper pointed out, sovereignty could only be reversed in the case of Sevastopol by 'turning the city of our glory into a city of shame, into Grozny-2?'[75] President Kuchma had repeatedly refused to countenance any transfer of Sevastopol to Russia because not only would he be impeached but, he believed, Ukraine would then lose its independence.[76]

The Russian executive, according to the 1993 constitution, reserves for itself the prerogative of foreign policy. There was nothing, therefore, to stop the Russian executive from implementing its alleged official policy by signing an inter-state treaty with Ukraine, the draft of which was initialled by the then Ukrainian Prime Minister, Ievhen Marchuk, and the then Russian Deputy Prime Minister, Oleg Soskovets, as early as February 1995. In addition, the Russian executive were no doubt aware that the Black Sea Fleet command gave covert support to separatist forces in the Crimea in the form of the 'most ardent supporters of anti-Ukrainian activities by the Russian Communities'.[77]

Between 1992 and 1996, the Russian leadership had refused to sign the draft treaty with Ukraine until it was given the entire city of Sevastopol as a naval base on a long-term lease. Russian pressure on Ukraine to accept this position rested upon five planks. First, the November 1990 Russian–Ukrainian treaty and the CIS founding acts of December 1991 only respected borders if the contracting parties remained within the former USSR or CIS respectively. The November 1990 treaty, therefore, in Russian eyes, had lost its legal validity. Second, at the crudest level some Russians argued that Ukraine had never existed as a state prior to the creation of the former USSR. It therefore was an 'artificial' construct of the Soviet era.[78]

Third, while grudgingly accepting the Crimea as part of Ukraine the Russian authorities focused upon the city of Sevastopol, arguing that it, unlike the Crimea, had never legally been transferred to Ukrainian jurisdiction in 1954. Therefore, Sevastopol was legally Russian territory; how could Russia lease land from itself? Fourth, Russia promoted the idea of an international status or joint administration over the city of Sevastopol

TABLE 1
RUSSIAN PARLIAMENTARY VOTES ON BORDER QUESTIONS IN THE CIS

267: 0   (26 April 1995): State Duma resolution opposing the withdrawal of the Russian army
from Moldova;

301: 4   *(9 February 1996): State Duma resolution to maintain the Russian army in Moldova
in a 'stabilising role';*

315:1   (14 February 1996): State Duma overrode a Federation Council veto to halt the
division of the Black Sea Fleet to Ukraine;

250: 98   (15 March 1996): State Duma resolution renouncing abrogation by the RSFSR
parliament in December 1991 of the 1922 (Soviet) Union Treaty and its replacement
by the CIS;

252: 33   (15 March 1996): State Duma resolution affirming the legal force of Mikhail
Gorbachev's March 1991 referendum on a 'Revived Union';

320: 8   (5 April 1996): endorsement by the State Duma of the creation of a
Belarusian–Russian Community of Sovereign Republics (SSR);

200:   (June 1996) State Duma draft law on the annexation of eastern/southern Ukraine;

334:1   (23 October 1996) State Duma vote to halt the division of the Black Sea Fleet and
demand exclusive basing rights in Sevastopol;

282:0:   (24 October 1996) State Duma Appeal to Ukraine on the Black Sea Fleet and
Sevastopol as legally Russian territory;

284:29:   (14 November 1996) State Duma declares the Trans-Dniester a zone of strategic
interests while demanding direct ties to the region and permanent military bases;

286:56:   (14 November 1996) State Duma agreed to give the floor to Belarusian President A.
Lukashenka in support of the unconstitutional dissolution of his parliament. Only 40
deputies walked out during his speech;

110:14   (5 December 1996) the Federation House voted in favour of Sevastopol as Russian
territory;

288:8   (5 December 1996) the State Duma sent a message of support to the Belarusian leader
congratulating him on his referendum results which confirmed the creation of a puppet
parliament;

by Kyiv and Moscow. Finally, although officially distancing itself from
parliamentary votes on the Crimea and Sevastopol, the Russian executive
indirectly used them as an additional form of pressure upon Ukraine. As a
Ukrainian military commentator pointed out, 'this explanation (by the
Russian executive) is too weak to be taken seriously'.[79] These votes were
backed by some democrats (including the pro-government 'Our Home is
Russia' faction) as well as the radical left- and right-wing, who remained
heavily in favour of territorial changes:

Ukraine rejected these various options proposed by Russia, and its
parliament regularly replied to Russian territorial ambitions with large
constitutional majorities.[80] The Mayor of Sevastopol pointed out that his city
had been included within the last Soviet Ukrainian constitution of 1977. In
contrast, the last Soviet Russian constitution of that year only mentioned
Moscow and Leningrad as two cities with Russian republican status.[81]
Nevertheless, Luzhkov remained unconvinced:

Sevastopol, as an independent entity, has never in any context
whatsoever been supplied or financed by the Ukrainian republic. No

> document has ever indicated that when Crimea was transferred,
> Sevastopol was also handed over to Ukraine.[82]

President Kuchma held a different view. He argued that, 'Truth is on our side and everyone should proceed from this fact.'[83] But he forgot to mention that those Russian political leaders who backed territorial claims on Ukraine also argued that 'truth is on their side'. After the November 1996 vote by 110 to 14 in the Russian Federation Council to claim Sevastopol they blamed Ukraine's unilateral actions which were, 'tearing away from Russia a part of its territory'. This was, 'not only illegal under international law, but also directly damaged Russia's security'.[84] Russia's territorial claims on Ukraine were not therefore the cause of a deterioration of Russian–Ukrainian relations, but Ukraine's stubbornness in not conceding to Russia's 'legal demands' regarding territory which it allegedly owned in international law.

Ukraine, on the other hand, believed Russia's actions to be, 'simply aggressive', according to Volodymyr Horbulin, Secretary of Ukraine's National Security and Defence Council.[85] The Ukrainian view remained that regardless of the fact that these territorial claims were only officially made by the legislature, they nevertheless were still tantamount to territorial pretensions, 'anti-Ukrainian actions', and were an infringement of international law.[86] The May 1997 Russian–Ukrainian treaty ended speculation about the ownership of the Crimea, the city of Sevastopol and eastern Ukraine at the level of the Russian executive and in international law. Even though President Yeltsin declared after the signing of the Russo–Ukrainian treaty that the Sevastopol question was now resolved this is likely to prove to be too optimistic a forecast.

The Myth of Separatism in Ukraine

Russian political parties and members of the parliamentary (and perhaps also the executive) leadership were surprised by two developments in Ukraine. First, Russian-speaking regions of Ukraine voted heavily in favour of independence during the 1991 referendum. Russian President Boris Yeltsin told his Ukrainian counterpart, Kravchuk: 'And you don't say – this is incredible! – What, and even the Donbas voted "yes"?'[87]

Second, they were surprised that the Russian–speaking regions of eastern Ukraine and the Crimea did not create a Russian-speaking lobby which then proceeded to agitate for separation from Ukraine to Russia. This, in fact, only happened in the Crimea over the three-year period between 1992 and 1994.[88] The recognition by Russia of Ukraine's borders in May 1997 has taken the wind completely out of the former Crimean separatist

movement, which has now dropped its demands for union with Russia to defend Russian–speakers and speak in favour of a pan–eastern Slavic union.[89] The collapse in support for Crimean separatism had also been helped by three factors in Russia. First, the Chechnya war, which provided Ukraine with a window of opportunity to deal peacefully with its own separatist challenge. Second, the re-election of Yeltsin (Crimean separatists had pinned their hopes on Russian Communist leader Gennadiy Zyuganov winning the 1996 presidential elections).[90] Third, interest in the Crimean problem within Russia had begun to decline, although it remained at the level of the sub–conscious.[91] In March 1995, Ukraine abolished the institution of the Crimean presidency, which had served as the main vehicle for separatist agitation. This action on the part of President Kuchma, elected primarily by votes within Russian-speaking eastern Ukraine, was supported by nearly two-thirds of Ukrainians. Even in the Crimea one-third of respondents backed this move.[92]

In looking for signs of a 'pro-Russian' or separatist movement in Ukraine, those with territorial ambitions in Russia or those largely possessing Russo–centric foreign policies in the West, would only realistically have found them in the Crimea during 1992 to 1994 – and nowhere else in Ukraine. They may have actually been surprised to find high public support for Ukraine's territorial integrity throughout the country regardless of linguistic affiliation, inherited political culture or current political beliefs.

Yet, the survivability of the Ukrainian independent state was deemed doubtful both by the Russian leadership (for the reasons outlined earlier in this article) and by many scholars, experts, journalists and foreign governments in the West. During 1992 and 1993 the view that Ukrainian independence was a temporary phenomenon was widespread. The *Strategic Survey (1994–1995)* of the well respected International Institute for Strategic Studies, argued that, 'In the past year, many outside observers have compared Ukraine to a state on the edge of collapse'.[93] In January 1994 a United States National Intelligence Estimate, reflecting consensus among America's various intelligence organisations, predicted that Ukraine would split into two and the east would clamour for 'unification' with Russia, something that would lead to civil war.[94] The London–based Royal United Services Institute also predicted that Ukraine was on the point of 'disintegration',[95] as did an internal report circulated to West European Christian Democratic parties.[96] The Rand Corporation's Eugene B. Rumer argued that the best solution for the West to forestall the security threat of Ukraine's impending 'collapse' would be its reunion with Russia.[97] As late as two years later the highly respected *Forbes* magazine predicted that, after Yugoslavia, Ukraine would become Europe's next ethnic and security crisis.[98]

TABLE 2
SHOULD THE CRIMEA REMAIN PART OF UKRAINE ?(%)

	Ukraine	Ethnic Ukrainians	Ethnic Russians	City of Kyyiv	Crimea
Part of Ukraine	69	75	55	83	27
Independent	11	9	18	9	19
Part of Russia	5	2	14	3	42
Other	2	1	4	1	5
Don't Know	12	13	9	4	8

Source: Elehie N. Skoczylas, *Ukraine 1996. Public Opinion on Key Issues* (Washington DC: IFES, 1996), pp.53 and 104. The polls were conducted by the US-funded International Foundation for Electoral Systems.

TABLE 3
TO WHOM SHOULD THE CRIMEA BELONG (%)?

	North East	East	South	Donbas	Crimea	Total
Ukraine	48	67	45	51	5	48
Independent	8	18	14	16	20	16
Russia	8	3	7	6	55	10
Other	8	2	9	9	7	7
Don't Know	27	10	25	18	14	18

Source: Politychnyi Portret Ukraiiny, no.9, 1994, p.46. The poll was conducted by the Democratic Initiatives Think Tank.

These prophesies of impending doom, separatist revolt and civil war in Ukraine proved to be wrong. In contrast, Ukraine has exhibited a high degree of stability and consensus regarding its inherited borders – both at the elite *and* the public level. This support for Ukraine's territorial integrity, as reflected in the above tables, proved a strong bargaining hand for Ukraine's leaders when demanding that its neighbours recognise these borders in international law. Support for Ukraine's territorial integrity remains high among both ethnic Ukrainians *and* ethnic Russians, as well as in the capitol city Kyiv where the ruling elites are based. One should also note the divided opinion even among Crimeans about where their fate should reside: (see Table 2).

If we now break down this same question by territorial region we still find a high level of support for Crimea to remain part of Ukraine throughout the country. But, perhaps more importantly, we also find little support for it to be transferred to Russian sovereignty, except in the Crimea: (see Table 3).

Western and Russian misgivings about the strength of separatism within

Ukraine therefore proved to be highly exaggerated. Public support for Ukraine's territorial integrity always remained high – support which is likely to grow. This was always used as a strong card by Ukraine's leaders to face off territorial challenges by its neighbours.

Conclusions

Between 1994 and 1997 Ukraine confirmed its territorial integrity by signing border treaties with its last two neighbours, Russia and Romania, while obtaining security assurances from the world's declared nuclear powers and NATO. In 1995, Crimean separatism collapsed as a serious political force and is unlikely to recover steam. The following year, the first post-Soviet constitution was adopted. This, in the view of the head of the directorate on Domestic Issues of the Presidential Administration, Vasyl' Kremen', signified that Ukraine could no longer go back to the former USSR or to statelessness. 'Despite the importance of of the Declaration (of independence), the referendum (on independence), Ukraine was finally established as a state precisely in June 1996,' Kremen' argued.[99] In 1997 the final two remaining portions of Ukraine's borders were recognised by Russia and Romania. Nevertheless, the Ukrainian–Russian dispute over borders, the Russian national minority and the status of the Russian language in Ukraine, geopolitical alliances and historiography will continue for many years to come.

NOTES

1. Pavel K. Baev, 'Old and New Border Problems in Russia's Security Policy' in Tuomas Forsberg (ed.)., Contested Territory. Border Disputes at the Edge of the Former Soviet Empire (Aldershot: Aduard Elgar, 1995), p.95.
2. Reuters, 3 August 1994.
3. Walker Connor, 'Nation–Building or Nation–Destroying?', World Politics, 24/3 (April 1972), p.320.
4. See James Mayall, 'Irredentist and Secessionist Challenges' in John Hutchinson and Anthony D. Smith (eds.)., Nationalism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), pp.269–280.
5. See D. C. Rapoport, 'The Importance of Space in Violent Ethno–Linguistic Strife', Nationalism and Ethnic Politics, 2/2 (Summer 1996), pp.258–285.
6. E. Renan, 'What's in a Nation?' in Geoff Eley and Ronald G. Suny (eds.), Becoming National. A Reader (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), p.46.
7. Op cit., T. Forsberg, p.36.
8. Op cit., D.C. Rapoport, p.265.
9. Michael Mann, 'Nation–States in Europe and Other Continents: Diversifying, Developing, Not Dying', Daedalus, 122/3 (Summer 1993), p.123.
10. Robert H. Jackson, Quasi States: Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), p.38.
11. Ibid, p.41.
12. Ibid, p.190.

13. See Fredrik Barth, 'Introduction' in F. Barth (ed.), *Ethnic Groups and Boundaries. The Social Origins of Cultural Difference* (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1970), pp.9–38.
14. Anssi Paasi, 'Constructing Territory, Boundaries and Regional Identities' in op cit., T. Forsberg (ed.), p. 59.
15. Elie Kedourie, *Nationalism* (London: Hutchinson, 1979), p.125.
16. Shmuel Sandler, 'Ethnonationalism and the Foreign Policy of Nation–States', *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics*, 1/2 (Summer 1995), p.263. See also Daniele Conversi, 'Reassessing Current Theories of Nationalism: Nationalism as Boundary Maintenance and Creation', *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics*, 1/1 (Spring 1995), pp.73–85, Steven Grosby, 'Territoriality: the Transcendental, Primordial Feature of Modern Societies, *Nations and Nationalism*, 1/2 (July 1995), pp.143–162 and Sun–Ki Chai, 'A theory of Ethnic Group Boundaries', *Nations and Nationalism*, 2/ 2 (July 1996), pp.281–308.
17. Serhiy Kychyhin (ed.), *Leonid Kravchuk. Ostanni Dni Imperii ... Pershi Roky Nadii* (Kyiv: Dovira, 1994), p.129. David R. Marples and David F. Duke believe that, 'Kravchuk had staked his presidency on the survival of his country within its existing borders'. See their 'Ukraine, Russia and the Question of Crimea', *Nationalities Papers*, 23/2 (June 1995), p.279.
18. See T. Kuzio, *Ukrainian Security Policy, Washington Paper 167* (Washington DC: Praeger and the Center for Security and International Studies, 1995) and Chapter Six, 'New Foreign and Defence Policies' in *Ukraine under Kuchma. Political Reform, Economic Transformation and Security Policy in Independent Ukraine* (London: Macmillan, 1997), pp. 179–226.
19. *Holos Ukraiiny*, 5 December 1991.
20. Yuriy Porokhniavyi, 'Problemy Kordony Ukraiiny', *Nova Polityka*, 2, 1996, pp.43–44. See also Chapter Five, 'The Strategic Significance of Borders' in T. Kuzio, *Ukraine. State and Nation Building* (London: Routledge, 1998).
21. *Interfax news agency*, 27 February 1997.
22. See the comments by Colonel Leonid Osovaljuk, Chief of the State Border Committee's department on the Delimitation and Demarcation of the State Border, in *Ukrayina moloda*, 10 June 1997 and Vadym Dolhanov, head of the directorate on Foreign Policy of the Presidential Administration, in *Nezavisimost*, 27 December 1996.
23. See the interview with Russian Communist leader Gennadiy Zyuganov in *Sovetskaya Rossiya*, 21 February 1997.
24. *Holos Ukraiiny*, 4 March and *Ukrayina moloda*, 10 June 1997. See also the views of Viacheslav Zhyhulin, head of the Topographical directorate of the Ukrainian Ministry of Defence (UNIAN News Agency, 16 December 1996), Leonid Osavoliuk, Deputy Head of the delegation to discuss the delimitation of the Russian–Ukrainian border (*Den'*, 22 February 1997) and Deputy Foreign Minister Kostyantin Hryshchenko in *Zerkalo Nedeli*, 23 August 1996 and *Den'*, 28 February 1997.
25. *Granitsa Rossii*, 41 (December 1995), p.2. See the reply in *Narodna Armiya*, 13 December 1995.
26. *Ukrayina moloda*, 10 June 1997.
27. Comments by Volodymyr Horbulin, Secretary of the National Security and Defence Council, in Interfax News Agency, 2 and 4 June 1997.
28. T. Forsberg, 'Theories on Territorial Disputes' in op cit., T. Forsberg (ed.), p.35.
29. This certainly applied to former Ukrainian President L. Kravchuk. Robert Mandel, 'Roots of the Modern Interstate Border Dispute', *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 24/3 (September 1980), p.429.
30. See T. Kuzio, 'National Identity in Independent Ukraine: An Identity in Transition', *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics*, 2/4 (Winter 1996), pp. 582–608 and Glenn Chafetz, 'The Struggle for a National Identity in Post–Soviet Russia', *Political Science Quarterly*, 111/4 (Winter 1996–1997), pp.661–88.
31. See op cit., D. L. Horowitz and Alexander G. Murphy, 'Historical Justification for Territorial Claims', *Annals of the Association of American Geographers*, 80/4 (1990), pp.531–48.
32. T. Forsberg, 'Theories on Territorial Disputes' in op cit., T. Forsberg (ed.), p.36.
33. See T. Kuzio, ''Radical Nationalist Parties and Movements in Contemporary Ukraine Before and After Independence: The Right and its Politics, 1989–1994', *Nationalities Papers*, 25/2 (June 1977), pp.211–242.

34. Mykola Shpakovaty (ed.), *Leonid Kravchuk. Our Goal – A Free Ukraine* (Kiev: Globus, 1993), p.36. A commentary in *Holos Ukraiiny* (25 October 1996) provided a mock response to the Russian State Duma which had again voted in favour of Russian sovereignty over Sevastopol. It claimed that the Ukrainian parliament had adopted a law to, 'return to Kyiv its historic status as mother of Rus'ian cities. From the day of its publication, Novgorod, Vladimir, Suzdal, Murmansk and Moscow are now to be regarded as outlying provinces of Ukraine. The state language throughout its integral territory is to be Ukrainian'. This, the newspaper added, was followed by a vote in the British House of Lords transferring Marseilles to the United Kingdom.

35. Y. Luzhkov's open letter to Yeltsin was published in *Moskovskaya Pravda, Rossiskaya Gazeta* and *Trud*, 22 October 1996.

36. *Izvestiya*, 6 November 1996. The letter was prepared by the Ukrainian Foreign Ministry.

37. On the history of the russification of the Ukrainian population of the Kuban see Stanislav Kul'chyts'kyi, 'Pro "Borhy" Narodiv, Pro Ukraiins'ku Kuban' i Bezvidpovidal'nist' Deiakykh Politykiv', *Narodna Armiya*, 24 December 1996. Gurfits was backed by the Mayor of Sevastopol, Viktor Semyonov, who has, 'no doubt that Sevastopol is a Ukrainian town. For me, the supreme law is the constitution of Ukraine, in which the status of the town is precisely defined'. (ITAR–TASS news agency, 12 December 1996).

38. UNIAN news agency, 18 October 1996.

39. *Pam'iatky Ukraiiny*, May 1991, p.12.

40. See the comments by the then head of the Socio–Psychological Directorate of the Ministry of Defence and Hetman of Ukrainian Cossacks, Volodymyr Muliava, in Serhii M. Plokhy, 'Historical Debates and Territorial Claims: Cossack Mythology in the Russian–Ukrainian Border Dispute' in S. Frederick Starr (ed.), *The Legacy of History in Russia and the New States of Eurasia. The International Politics of Eurasia, vol. 1* (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1994), pp.163–164.

41. *Sovetskaya Rossiya*, 12 November 1996.

42. See op cit., Chapter Nine, 'History, Myths and Symbols' in T.Kuzio, *Uraine. State and Nation Building*.

43. Andrew Wilson, 'The Donbas between Ukraine and Russia: The Use of History in Political Disputes', *Journal of Contemporary History*, 30/2 (April 1995), p.282.

44. Vladimir Chayka, 'Boyevyie Pokhodyi Voysk Kniazey Kievskoy Rusy', *Flot Ukraiiny*, 12 October 1996.

45. Nikolai Razdobud'ko, 'Chto v Imeny Tebe Most?', *Flot Ukraiiny*, 28 September 1996.

46. 'Rus' Krymu', *Uriadovyi Kurier*, 27 July 1995. See also Yuriy Knysh, 'Krym I starodavnia ukraiins'ka derzhavnist'', *Ukraiins'kyi Istoryk*, 30/116–119 (1993), pp.58–77. Translated in *The Ukrainian Quarterly*, XLIX/3 (Fall 1993), pp.294–317.

47. See Mykhailo Ivanchenko, 'Pradavnia Ukraiina, Praukraiinsti Krymu', *Ukraiinskyi Zasiv*, nos.4–6 (1996), pp.137–154.

48. Oleksiy Redchenko, 'Komy zh Nalezhav Chornomors'kyi Flot?', *Narodna Armiya*, 9 August 1996.

49. Petr Vol'vach, 'Vklad Ukrains'koho Etnosa i Uchenykh v Razvitiya Ekonomiky, Nauky i Kulturiy Kryma', *Flot Ukraiiny*, 24 August 1996.

50. 'Deshcho do 300–richya Rosiys'koho Flotu', *Krymska Svitlytsia*, 23 November 1996.

51. Volodymyr Kravtsevych, 'Iak Stav "Rosiys'kym" Krym', *Vechirnyi Kyiv*, 14 and 17 December 1996.

52. Oleksandr Mindiuk, 'Ukraiintsi–korinnyi narod Krymu', *Chas*, 6 September 1996.

53. Captain Yuriy Badakh, 'Pravda i brekhnia pro 300–richnu istoriu rosiys'koii fl'oty', *Ukraiins'ke Slovo*, 20–27 October 1996.

54. V. Kravtsevych, 'Shche 500–lit tomu Kozats'ki chayky Utverdzhuvaly Slavy Ukraiiny. Ivan Mazepa Iak Fundator Ukraiins'koho Flotu', *Vechirnyi Kyiv*, 19 and 22 October 1996. See also Borys Kozhyn (former commander of the Ukrainian navy), 'Viys'kovo–mors'kym sylam Ukraiiny – ponad 500 rokiv. Het'man Sahaydachnyi – na "chaytsi" I kreyseri', *Chas*, 15 November 1996.

55. B. Kozhyn, 'Istoriya Varto Toho Shchob ii ne zabuvaty', *Narodna Armiya*, 30 November 1996.

56. 'Chy Maly Kozaky Chornomorskyi Flot?', *Holos Ukraiiny*, 29 July 1995.
57. See Val'ko Kravchenko, 'Ukraiintsi v Boyakh za Sevastopol', *Dzvin Sevastopolia*, 8–9 (July 1996).
58. Volodymyr Navrotskyi, 'Kozats'ka vishka–pamia'tnyk ukraiins'kym matrosam u Krymu', *Holos Ukraiiny*, 23 January 1997.
59. *Izvestiya*, 6 November 1996.
60. V. Kravtsevych, 'Ukrains'kyi Vijskovyi Flot', *Narodna Armiya*, 18 October 1996.
61. *Molod' Ukraiiny*, 3 December 1996.
62. *Holos Ukraiiny*, 13 December 1995.
63. *Holos Ukraiiny*, 7 October 1995.
64. Russia TV Channel, 21 January 1997.
65. *Vseukrainskiye Vedomosti*, 18 January 1996.
66. *Robitnycha Gazeta*, 27 August 1991.
67. *Komsomolskaya Pravda*, 22 January 1992.
68. See his open letter to Yeltsin in *Moskovskaya Pravda*, 22 October 1996 and his views in *Literaturnaya Gazeta*, 22 January and *Trud*, 13 February 1997. An open letter in response was sent by Odesa Mayor Gurfits (*Izvestiya*, 6 November 1996).
69. ITAR–TASS *news agency*, 20–21 January 1997.
70. Mayak Radio, 1 June 1997.
71. ITAR–TASS news agency, 20–21 January 1997.
72. Georgii Tikhonov, head of the State Duma commission on CIS Affairs and Ties to Compatriots believed, 'Sevastopol was, is, and will be Russian' (ITAR–TASS news agency, 30 September 1996). See also the views of Yegor Stroyev, speaker of the Federation Council, the upper house of the Russian parliament, in *Komsomolskaya Pravda*, 25 February 1997.
73. See the comments by Russian Foreign Ministry spokesman Gennadiy Tarasov in Interfax News Agency, 17 December 1996.
74. ITAR–TASS news agency, 1 March 1997.
75. *Rossiyskiye Vesti*, 3 June 1997.
76. Interview with L.Kuchma in *Zerkalo Nedeli*, 25 December 1996.
77. *Vseukrainskiye Vedomosti*, 12 April 1997.
78. See the views of Konstantin Zatulin, former head of the State Duma commission on CIS Affairs and Ties with Compatriots, in *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, 1–7 April 1995 and those of the Russian historian, Yevgenniy Kisilov. Transcript of interview with Kisilov on SBS, Sydney Radio, 4 and 8 December 1996 is in the possession of the author.
79. *Narodna Armiya*, 27 February 1997.
80. See the comments by Deputy Foreign Minister K.Hryshchenko as carried by ITAR–TASS News Agency, 22 April 1997.
81. *Obshchaya Gazeta*, 9–15 January 1997.
82. Russian Public TV, 21 October 1996.
83. Radio Ukraine, 14 December 1996.
84. *Reuters*, 5 December 1996.
85. *Reuters*, 6 December 1996. See also the large document prepared as a reply to the Russian parliament by Serhiy Holovatiy, then Justice Minister, entitled 'Sevastopol Aggression' ('Sevastopols'ka Ahresiya', *Narodna Armiya*, 26 December 1996).
86. See *Holos Ukraiiny*, 19, 22 and 25 October 1996.
87. Op cit., S. Kychyhin (ed.), p.21.
88. On the pre–1994 period see T. Kuzio, 'Russia–Crimea–Ukraine. Triangle of Conflict', *Conflict Studies* 267 (London: Research Institute for the Study of Conflict and Terrorism, January 1994) and 'The Crimea and European Security', *European Security*, 3/4 (Winter 1994), pp.734–774. On the post–1994 period see op cit., Chapter Three, 'The Crimea Returns to Ukraine' in T. Kuzio, *Ukraine under Kuchma*, pp.67–89.
89. Op cit., Chapter Four, 'Federalism, Regionalism and the Myth of Separatism' in T.Kuzio, *Ukraine. State and Nation Building*.
90. Valentina Ivanova, a teacher in the Crimea, was quoted by *Reuters* (9 June 1996) as saying, 'Those able to vote in Crimea will be rooting for Zyuganov, the only one capable of restoring our shattered Motherland'.

91. See the views of Sergei Karaganov, head of the Council on Foreign and Defence Policy, on Mayak Radio, 29 May 1997.
92. The poll was conducted by SOTSIS–Gallup *(Demokratychna Ukraiina*, 27 April 1995).
93. 'Ukraine: Rising from the Ashes', *Strategic Survey 1994–1995* (Oxford and London: Oxford University Press and the IISS), 1995), p.93.
94. See 'U.S. Intelligence Predicts Ukraine Break–up Report', *Reuters*, 25 January, Daniel Williams and R. Jeffrey Smith, 'U.S. Intelligence Sees Economic Plight Leading to Break–up of Ukraine', *The Washington Post*, 25 January, Martin Fletcher, 'Spy agencies warn of Kiev ethnic turmoil', *The Times*, 26 January and James Adams, 'West fears Ukraine is sliding towards war with Russia', *The Sunday Times*, 6 February 1994.
95. 'Partnerships, National Interests and Defence Realities' in *International Security Review* (London: RUSI, 1994), p.VI.
96. 'L'Ukraine Aujourd'Hui. Rapport sur La situation economique, politique & sociale de l'Ukraine', Internationale Democrate–Chretienne, Brussels, 6 December 1993. Copy in the authors possession.
97. E. B. Rumer, 'Eurasia Letter: Will Ukraine Return to Russia?', *Foreign Policy*, 96 (Fall 1994), pp. 129–144. See also 'The Birth and Possible Death of a Country, A Survey of Ukraine. Unruly Child', *The Economist*, 7 May and Paula J. Dobriansky, 'Ukraine: A Question of Survival', *The National Interest*, 36 (Summer 1994), pp.65–72.
98. Paul Klebnikov, 'Tinderbox. The world hasn't seen the last of ethnic turmoil in Eastern Europe. Keep your eye on Ukraine', *Forbes*, 9 September 1996.
99. *Ukrayina moloda*, 3 July 1997.