

11 The Ukrainian Famine of 1932–3: The Role of the Ukrainian Diaspora in Research and Public Discussion

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Events in Ukraine during 1932–3 have been surrounded by controversy. Did a famine occur that took millions of lives? If a famine occurred, did natural causes (poor harvest and drought) and the destruction of live-stock and seed grain during collectivization bring it about, or did the seizure of food by the Soviet authorities cause the famine? If the actions of Soviet authorities caused the famine, did they consist of a misdirected programme to secure and export foodstuffs for the industrialization campaign, a failure to respond to early reports of famine and an inability to mount effective countermeasures, or did they constitute a wilful policy not to provide assistance, a campaign to conceal famine and a callous refusal to accept foreign assistance? If the latter was the case, were the general ruthlessness of the Stalinist system and the regime's disdain for the peasantry in the face of a disaster it had brought on by its own misguided policies the reasons, or did a preconceived plan to starve the peasantry exist? If the famine was the outcome of a preconceived plan, was the plan directed at the peasantry of the entire Soviet Union, or was it aimed at Ukraine and Ukrainians in particular as part of a destructive campaign against the Ukrainian nation?

From the 1930s to the 1980s there were two major, if unequal, contenders in this debate who had diametrically opposed viewpoints. On one side were the Soviet government, historians and propagandists who insistently denied that there had been a famine in 1932–3. On the other side were Ukrainians living outside the Soviet Union who asserted that a Soviet planned famine aimed at the Ukrainian people had taken place in 1932–3.

Over time, the nature of the two adversaries changed. The Soviet regime evolved after the death of Stalin, and at times, the government permitted limited discussion of the purges and some mention of the failings of collectivization. Nevertheless, while a few literary works alluded to the famine, the regime refused to admit that a tragedy had occurred. The Ukrainian communities outside the Soviet Union also changed greatly over the course of a half-century. In the 1930s Ukrainians outside of the Soviet Union were politically diverse and included a pro-Soviet left that accepted the official Soviet version. At that time the politically active groups outside the Soviet Union primarily consisted of the inhabitants of the Western Ukrainian territories in Poland, Romania and Czechoslovakia, and the political leaders and followers in the émigré centres of Prague, Paris and Warsaw. After World War II, the Soviet annexation of western Ukrainian lands and the occupation of the east-central European centres limited the communities to Western Europe and, above all, to North and South America. Hundreds of thousands of refugees joined the older diaspora communities in the US and Canada. This infusion and the dying out of the socialist and communist groups moved diaspora politics to the right. The wave of refugees also brought thousands of survivors of the famine into the diaspora communities.

Until the 1970s, the Soviet side had considerable success in limiting public awareness and study of the famine. Yet in the 1980s, the Ukrainian diaspora communities fostered heightened public discussion and drew scholarly attention to the famine of 1932–3. The reasons for this change lay not only in the new tactics of the diaspora communities, but also in the evolving nature of political attitudes and scholarly agendas in the decades after the famine. The story of why it took so long for public and scholarly attention to focus on the famine and why it did so in the 1980s involves a web of attitudes and issues that often do not appear to be related directly to the tragedy. Of primary importance were individuals and groups who were neither advocates of a total denial nor proponents of the view that a major genocide had occurred. By the late 1980s, a wide body of the Western public had become aware that a famine had raged in Ukraine in the 1930s and that the Soviet denial was false. Shortly thereafter, glasnost in the Soviet Union undermined the long-held Soviet position in this debate and opened Ukraine up for public discussion and research.

This new discussion of the Ukrainian famine generally evoked surprise that such a major event was so little known. The roots of this inattention can, in part, be traced back to the 1930s, when Western

governments and the public showed relatively little interest in reports of famine while an active lobby denied that a tragedy of great proportions was underway.¹ Subsequently, although the Soviet Union was the subject of intensive study, particularly after World War II, the famine was not examined. If one looks at general works on the Soviet Union, one finds only occasional mention of the 1932–3 famine and virtually no analysis of its causes or of the significance of this event for Ukraine.² As late as 1987, R. W. Davies, an expert on Soviet agriculture and the peasantry, asserted that most Western accounts of Soviet development had treated the famine of 1932–3 as a secondary event, though Davies himself maintained that it should occupy a central place in the history of the Soviet Union.³ Before the late 1980s, attention focused overwhelmingly on the collectivization of agriculture after 1929, and in many works the loss of livestock was discussed in more detail than the loss of human life. The literature on Ukraine focused more frequently on the famine, though it too had a tendency to compress the event into the general list of Stalinist atrocities.

There are multiple causes for the relative neglect of the famine. These include problems with sources, the multiplicity of tribulations affecting the Soviet Union and Ukraine, preferences in research topics, and attitudes toward the nationality question in general and toward Ukrainians in particular. Considerable evidence appeared in the 1930s, including Edward Ammende's book, which dealt with the topic in some detail.⁴ Nevertheless, the closed nature of Soviet society limited sources available in the West. The Soviet government suppressed data from the 1937 census. Even the evidence of contemporary Western journalists was inconclusive. The sensationalist Hearst press in the United States had taken up the issue of the famine, at times with specious evidence, and thereby actually undermined the credibility of more reputable reporting on the topic. Opportunistic and/or pro-Soviet Western journalists, such as Walter Duranty of the *New York Times*, had falsified their reports.⁵ Western visitors such as Sydney and Beatrice Webb joined the Soviets in denying that a famine had occurred.⁶ At any rate, access to Ukraine was already very limited at the time of the famine and continued to be limited in subsequent years. While survivors of the Armenian genocide and the Jewish Holocaust reached the outside world within months or a few years of the events, survivors of the Ukrainian tragedy were nine years removed from the event by the time the Germans invaded the Soviet Union. Thirteen years passed before some survivors reached Western Europe, and over

a decade and a half elapsed before some of these found haven in North America.

In some ways the very multiplicity of afflictions suffered by the Soviet population as a whole and the Ukrainian population in particular diminished Western interest in the famine and even served to cloud memory of the event in Ukraine. Preceded by the forced collectivization and deportation of peasants designated as kulaks, the famine was followed by the purges. Then came the pact with the Nazis in 1939, the deportations in western Ukraine and in 1941 the German invasion of the USSR. The war, prison and concentration camps, Nazi oppression and partisan movements were followed by the post-war deportations, suppression of armed resistance and the famine of 1947. Stalin's death brought an end to the massive destruction of life, but his successors could neither fully come to terms with the nature of the regime they led nor would they abandon repressive controls.

While Stalinism had been an all-Soviet phenomenon, Ukraine had suffered to a greater degree than many other areas did. Ukraine had been a battlefield occupied by the Nazis in World War II and had witnessed massive destruction of its cities and population, deportations to Germany, repression of armed resistance in the late 1940s and Stalin's wrath against a population that had been outside of Soviet control. In his de-Stalinization speech, Khrushchev asserted that Stalin had considered deporting all Ukrainians as he had a number of smaller peoples. The Ukrainians, as all the non-Russian nationalities, were always open to charges of 'bourgeois nationalism', but they also faced a tendency by many Russians to view any use of the Ukrainian language or attachment to Ukrainian culture as disloyal. The especially intense control of thought and culture in Ukraine after the devastation of the Stalin years explains why no public discussion of the famine or of so many other historical events ensued even well into the glasnost period.

Problems with sources and the multiplicity of tragedies and atrocities in the Stalin era only in part explain the failure of Western scholars to research the famine. While it is difficult to ascertain why some subjects fail to draw attention, some of the characteristics of the field may have worked against study of the famine. In general, many Western scholars showed a preference for topics dealing with the establishment of the Soviet system rather than with its opposition and victims, with the exception of internal communist and leftist opponents. They also preferred topics dealing with intellectuals and elites over masses. Most Soviet specialists focused on the Moscow centre, partially reflecting the intense centralization of the USSR. Viewing the Soviet Union

as Russia and knowing only the Russian language, most Western academics dealt with Russian affairs rather than those of the other peoples of the USSR.

The dynamics of contacts with the Soviet Union reinforced these predispositions. In the 1970s, when access to Soviet archives became possible, doctoral students chose topics and host institutions that would not preclude acceptance by the Soviet side. At this time a younger generation of scholars questioned the totalitarian model of studying the Soviet Union and asserted that by using now available archival material they could present a more complete understanding of the Soviet Union as an historical entity. They sought to deal with social history and the situation outside the Moscow, Kremlin centre. This goal would appear to have been conducive to examining events such as the famine in Ukraine. In practice, however, many of these 'revisionists' were interested in the process of 'socialist transformation' and 'revolution from below' and did not examine the obstacles to these processes. They often viewed émigré testimony as biased and inferior to the value of archives, even though access to Soviet archives was limited. Their antipathy to 'Cold War rhetoric' and their leftist convictions steered them away from social groups and cultures designated as rightist and supportive of the Cold War.⁷

To a considerable degree, specialists in Soviet studies, whatever their school or political convictions, avoided issues of nationality. On the whole, specialists in Soviet studies viewed nationalism and national cultures with considerable suspicion. The excesses of nationalism in inter-war Europe and the espousal of extreme nationalism by fascist and Nazi regimes had overshadowed the earlier liberal and progressive associations of nationalism that had existed in the nineteenth century and been embodied in the Wilsonian doctrine of self-determination. Theories of modernization, urbanization and the creation of civil society convinced scholars that development would make ethnic nationalism a relic of the past. After World War II, British, French and North American scholars saw the nation as properly coterminous with the state, and German scholars, who had a different tradition of nationhood, avoided national issues, including the question of German identity. Ostensible Soviet economic and modernizing successes after World War II made many scholars see the decline of national differences and the increasing role of the Russian language in the USSR as natural. All these attitudes reinforced the emphasis on the Moscow centre and discouraged the study of non-Russian republics. The non-Russian peoples and republics were relegated to the margins of the

field where scholars, whose backgrounds were those of the nations studied, did most of the research and publishing. These scholars were often intensely anti-Soviet, and this aroused suspicion about the objectivity of their work. The rise of national dissent movements in the USSR did not substantially change this perspective because most scholars viewed them, like the non-Russian republics, as peripheral and of secondary importance.

Ukrainian topics faced particular difficulties. The large size of Ukrainian communities in the West and the emigration of hundreds of scholars and intellectuals to Western Europe and North America after World War II insured the continuation of émigré scholarship and institutions. In North America, where many of these émigrés obtained teaching and library positions at universities, this scholarship crossed over to the mainstream. Some of the new immigrants who arrived as students joined the descendants of the early immigrants to produce a group of graduate students who wished to work on Ukrainian topics. Yet this 'ethnicization' of the field may, to a degree, have alienated the general scholarly community, though given the prevailing attitude of the time it is doubtful that other graduate students and scholars would have filled the gap. Many American Slavists and Soviet specialists trained from the 1930s and the 1950s had imbibed the attitudes of the Russian émigré generation that had taught them, even to the point of questioning whether the Ukrainian language existed or whether Ukrainian topics were worthy of serious study. Movements for Ukrainian independence were seen as extremist and undesirable.⁸ The importance of rightist nationalism in Ukrainian émigré political life, the collaboration of some Ukrainians with the Nazis, the history of pogroms in Ukraine and the support of the Republican Party's Captive Nations Programme by an active political leadership in the American Ukrainian community further dissuaded many scholars from examining Ukrainian topics.

In the 1970s, the environment for Ukrainian studies began to shift. The Ukrainian cultural revival of the 1960s and the Ukrainian dissident movement of the late 1960s and 1970s gave relevance to Ukrainian topics, albeit not the attention these phenomena or the field deserved. They also stirred interest in Ukraine among a generation of students of Ukrainian extraction born or entirely educated in the West. The establishment of a Ukrainian history chair (1968) and Research Institute (1972) at Harvard University through donations by the Ukrainian community and, later, the Canadian Institute for Ukrainian Studies at the University of Alberta (1976) through lobbying efforts of the

Ukrainian Canadian community demonstrated the vitality of the diaspora communities and their recognition of the importance of research on Ukraine. Their example stimulated the formation of programmes in Australia. These scholarly institutes, with their publication programmes and journals, were within the structure of universities. They gave Ukrainian studies a base and a higher profile in North American academia.

By the 1970s, the Ukrainian diaspora had evolved into established communities that had the means and unity of purpose to raise the issue of the famine. In the 1930s Ukrainians in Europe and in North America had devoted considerable effort to publicizing the famine and had charged that the regime had caused the famine by grain requisitions and that the policy was aimed against the Ukrainians as a nation.⁹ At that time, a substantial group of pro-communist Ukrainians had challenged the Ukrainian groups who had publicized the famine. These groups had declined precipitously in the US and significantly in Canada by the 1950s, while the anti-communist groups benefited greatly from post-World War II emigration patterns. Nevertheless, the attempts to bring the famine to scholarly and media attention in the early 1950s were largely unsuccessful.¹⁰ The numerous Ukrainian language memoirs and articles had little circulation outside the Ukrainian community, and English language works such as the two-volume history, *The Black Deeds of the Kremlin*, which contained numerous accounts of survivors, were dismissed as rightist émigré propaganda.¹¹ By the 1970s, the achievements of the North American communities in establishing a wide network of community institutions and initiating academic projects and centres of Ukrainian studies had been accompanied by successful integration into the social and political structures of the US and Canada. Thus, the institutional base for raising the issue of the famine was in place in the 1980s.

The approach of the 50th anniversary of the famine in 1983 and the persistent assertion by Soviet authorities that the famine had never occurred focused community attention on the issue. The community was acutely aware that the survivors who could recount at first hand what happened were rapidly passing from the scene. The Allied policy at the end of World War II to repatriate forcibly pre-1939 Soviet citizens in Western Europe to the Soviet Union meant that only a minority of the post-World War II émigrés had witnessed the famine. Stalinist terror and the decision of the Allies to repatriate had so traumatized these Soviet Ukrainian émigrés that many were reluctant to tell their stories for fear for their own persons and for relatives in

Ukraine. While the Soviet Union still frightened many in the 1980s, time and the passing away of family members in Ukraine diminished this fear. The increasing public attention to tragedies such as the Holocaust and the Armenian Genocide in American public life contributed to creating an environment conducive for survivors to speak out.¹²

The community concentrated its attention on demonstrations, which were an important way of drawing attention to the jailing of dissidents or the persecution of Ukrainian churches in the USSR. The younger generation obtained media access, especially in arranging for interviews with famine survivors. Local Ukrainian communities sought to have the famine included in genocide commemorations and school curricula.¹³ The considerable resonance of these activities drew forth rebuttals from Soviet authorities, such as the news release by the Soviet Embassy in Ottawa of 28 April 1983, 'On the So-Called "Famine" in the Ukraine', which admitted only to some 'difficulties' due to drought and kulak sabotage. Soviet representatives denied that there had been draconian grain requisitions or any decline in total population in 1932–3. They argued that the 'slanders' derived from 'emigrant' organizations and their leaders, some of whom, according to the Soviet news release, had actively supported Nazi atrocities.¹⁴

Success in bringing the famine to the public's attention in the 1980s was primarily due to four projects: (1) production of the film *Harvest of Despair* (1984); (2) the organization of scholarly conferences and publications, above all, Robert Conquest's *Harvest of Sorrow* (1986); (3) the establishment of a US Congressional Commission on the Ukrainian famine (1985); and (4) the convening of an international commission of inquiry into the famine (1988). The diverse Ukrainian communities in the diaspora did not have a unified plan, but each of the projects influenced the others and served to bring the famine to the attention of the wider public.

Harvest of Despair, a feature documentary, was commissioned by the Ukrainian Famine Committee of Toronto, with Slawko Nowytski and Yuriy Luhovy as producers. The film contained powerful footage, including interviews with famine survivors and with the veteran British journalist Malcolm Muggeridge. *Harvest of Despair* was first shown in the autumn of 1984 at a number of premières throughout Canada, which garnered considerable press coverage. Issues such as the sheer number of estimated victims (7 million and even up to 10 million) and the exposé of the callous cover-up of the famine by *New York Times* reporter Walter Duranty attracted wide attention. The Canadian

Broadcasting Corporation aired *Harvest of Despair* in April 1985, and the film won awards at seven international film festivals.¹⁵ Partially reflecting the Canadian origin of the film and the greater influence of the Ukrainian community in Canada, *Harvest of Despair* more easily reached TV screens in Canada than in the US, where even Public Broadcasting (PBS) affiliates were reluctant to broadcast it.¹⁶ The growing string of international awards and the increasingly scholarly literature appearing on the famine made it harder to justify not showing the film. Criticism from the American right that PBS had a leftist bias hit the mark, especially after the *National Review* published an article on the issue of airing *Harvest of Despair*.¹⁷ Finally, PBS resolved its dilemma by having the film shown on the programme of the conservative editor of the *National Review*, William F. Buckley. Following the *Firing Line* special showing of 4 September 1986, a panel composed of the scholar Robert Conquest and journalists Harrison Salisbury and Christopher Hitchens discussed the film.¹⁸ The generally favourable public reaction to the film included surprise at the reluctance to show it.¹⁹ Even questions about whether all photographs portraying famine victims were taken in Ukraine in 1932–3 did not substantially undermine its credibility.

The increasing number of scholarly conferences and publications on the famine had contributed to the resonance of the film.²⁰ Canadian scholars Roman Serbyn and Bohdan Krawchenko wrote widely on the topic and edited selected papers from a conference held at the University of Quebec in 1983.²¹ The Ukrainian Research Institute at Harvard sponsored a research project on the famine funded by the diaspora community. The directors ignored threats from the Ukrainian United Nations mission on the consequences of pursuing the project.²² The catalogue of an exhibit held at Harvard's Widener Library and a number of memoirs added to the literature on the famine.²³ The appointment of James Mace as researcher gave the Institute a resident specialist on the Soviet Ukraine, and he wrote numerous pieces on the famine.²⁴ The Harvard project sought to interest an established scholar to undertake a study that would be published by a major press and receive wide attention. The committee at Harvard turned to Robert Conquest. The author of monographs on the Great Terror and on the deportation of nationalities, Conquest had the stature of a major scholar in the field.²⁵ In the politics of the Soviet field, he was associated with the totalitarian school and was seen as a rightist, so that some circles viewed his work with suspicion. By 1984, Conquest began to discuss his findings.²⁶

Conquest's book, *The Harvest of Sorrow: Soviet Collectivization and the Terror Famine*, placed the Ukrainian famine in the broad context of Soviet peasant and agricultural policies, Ukrainian history, and losses of life from starvation in Kazakhstan in 1932 and in the Kuban, Don and Volga regions in 1932–3. Conquest specifically blamed Stalin's regime for (1) requiring impossible grain requisitions, (2) ignoring reports of famine, (3) refusing to release confiscated grain even as the peasantry starved, (4) exporting grain, (5) rejecting foreign attempts to assist the starving, and (6) even forbidding the very mention of the word 'famine'. Conquest placed the death toll in Ukraine at 5 million. He also argued that Ukraine's borders with Russia had been closed to prevent the starving from fleeing and to prevent food from reaching them. No famine occurred in the Russian Central Agricultural Region or in Belarus. According to Conquest, while in Soviet Ukraine the famine was universal, the famine in Russia, which he estimated took 2 million lives, was limited to certain grain-growing regions, including Kuban, with its large Ukrainian population. Arguing that the Ukrainian famine should be considered genocide, he placed it in the context of Stalin's Ukrainian and nationality policies. He also devoted attention to the journalists who had distorted reporting on the famine and to fellow-travellers who had propagated Soviet falsehoods.

Published by the Hutchinson Press in Great Britain and Oxford University Press in the US, *Harvest of Sorrow* was reviewed widely in the mass media, including *Time*, *Newsweek*, *The New York Times*, *The Los Angeles Times* and *The Economist*.²⁷ Many of the reviewers in these publications as well as in *The New Republic*, *Times Literary Supplement*, *The London Review*, *The New York Review of Books* and *The Spectator* were historians in Russian and Eastern European history and even specialists in the period or topic.²⁸ Reviews in scholarly journals followed with the usual delay.²⁹

Most reviewers accepted Conquest's basic theses, and some expressed astonishment that such a tragedy had been almost unknown. Geoffrey Hosking of the School of Slavonic and East European Studies at the University of London wrote:

Almost unbelievably, Dr Conquest's book is the first historical study of what must count as one of the greatest man-made horrors in a century particularly full of them. E. H. Carr used to assert that the history of the Soviet Union after about 1930 probably could not be adequately written, because of the paucity of reliable sources. I had always assumed that this warning applied particularly to the

collectivization and especially to the famine; it therefore comes as a shock to discover just how much material has accumulated over the years, most of it perfectly accessible in British libraries.

He also maintained that Conquest's research had established beyond doubt that the famine was deliberately inflicted there for ethnic reasons to undermine the Ukrainian nation. In concluding, he wrote, 'We are all in Conquest's debt for making coherent what had previously been known in an uncertain and fragmentary way. His book does not only exhume dead knowledge: it is guided by a moral imperative.'³⁰ With rare frankness, Peter Wiles, who announced that he was convinced by Conquest's argumentation, admitted that he had always been too deterred by the title to examine the evidence in *The Black Deeds of the Kremlin*.³¹ Much of the discussion centred on the difficult problem of the number of victims, with some reviewers maintaining that Conquest's estimate was too high.³² Other reviewers questioned whether the famine was targeted against Ukraine and/or against Ukrainians, with special emphasis on the issue of closing the borders.³³ Some reviewers rejected outright any evidence coming from survivors in the West on issues such as the closing of the borders (since confirmed by survivors in Ukraine and by an order of Viacheslav Molotov).³⁴

Of all the scholars, J. Arch Getty stood out for a review that was not only the most negative, but the most strident as a political polemic.³⁵ Since Getty was an important member of the revisionist group of Soviet specialists, the review was of particular interest. It questioned the magnitude of the famine, disparaged the value of the memoir literature, and argued that weak centralism and a surplus of enthusiasm from below caused the disaster. In laying the blame on Stalin, Getty also placed responsibility on the 'tens of thousands of activists and officials who carried out the policy', and 'the peasants who chose to slaughter animals, burn fields, and boycott cultivation in protest'. He did not mention that the Soviet authorities had denied the occurrence of the famine for over half a century and were still denying it and preventing research in 1987. Instead, Getty directed his ire against the Ukrainians of the diaspora, who had sought to bring the famine to public attention. He described the 'intentional famine story' as an 'article of faith for Ukrainian émigrés in the West since the Cold War'. He dismissed *The Black Deeds of the Kremlin* and other books of the early 1950s as 'period-pieces' and labelled *Harvest of Despair* a 'lurid film'. In Getty's view the Ukrainian agenda was to promote the

idea of a terror-famine and to equate the Soviets with the Nazis in order to advance an anti-Soviet militarist agenda and to stop the deportation of alleged World War II war criminals to Eastern Europe.³⁶

Getty intertwined very different issues in order to create an anti-Ukrainian polemic. He charged that *Conquest*

admiringly chronicles the survival and growth of Ukrainian nationalism over the past half-century, and even uses Ukrainian place-names rather than their more standardized Russian versions. Is it then understandable that he should omit any mention of the Ukrainian nationalist anti-Communists who pulled the triggers at the Babi Yar death pits and elsewhere in co-operation with the SS, and the substantial numbers who chose to follow the Nazis out of the USSR at the end of the war?

Thus the use of Ukrainian place-names was seen as proof of a cover-up of war crimes, and the hundreds of Ukrainians who fled to the West at the end of the war were equated with war criminals. These were blatant prejudiced outbursts, but the very use of this type of discourse by a North American academic and its publication in a prominent journal showed how politicized the issue of the famine and how respectable Ukrainophobia were.³⁷

Predictably, Soviet officials issued a statement denying the book's theses.³⁸ The denials that a famine had occurred were becoming more contorted, and the attempt to throw blame for all the difficulties on kulak sabotage sounded more desperate. Much of the tone of the Getty review was echoed in the reviews of the radical left. In Canada, this rearguard action was led by the Soviet apologist Douglas Tottle, who even produced an alliteratively titled book *Fraud, Famine, and Fascism: The Ukrainian Genocide Myth from Hitler to Harvard*.³⁹ More significant were the polemics of Jeff Coplon in the relatively influential *Village Voice*, in particular because he quoted interviews with scholars.⁴⁰

The *Conquest* book had finally put the issue of the Ukrainian famine before the wider public. The book and discussions that ensued stimulated scholars to examine the evidence on the famine. Many agreed with most of *Conquest's* conclusions. The book had also been instrumental in bringing Ukraine and Ukrainian history before a wide audience.⁴¹

The commemoration of the 50th anniversary of the famine in 1983 had sought to obtain official recognition of the event by Western

governments. The consequences of the failure of the Ukrainian diaspora to obtain foreign governmental support in the 1930s heightened the significance of this issue. The aftermath of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the coming to power of the Conservative Party in Canada and the Reagan Administration were conducive to this effort. In addition, attention to Western governmental failure to act during the Holocaust created a new sensitivity to the issue of genocide that transcended party politics. In December 1983 the Prime Minister of Canada, Brian Mulroney, discussed the famine at a meeting of the World Congress of Free Ukrainians in Toronto. The Soviet Embassy in Ottawa responded with the accusation that the famine was a lie. While the Ukrainian community of Canada had long been recognized as a significant force in politics, the proportionately much smaller Ukrainian community in the US had become better organized as a political lobbying group in its defence of Ukrainian dissidents in the 1970s. While the active support of members of the community in the Republican Captive Nations lobby in part explains some of its influence in Washington, the Congressional Resolution describing the famine as a man-made genocidal act against the Ukrainian people was passed by a Democrat-controlled Congress in 1983. The greatest achievement of the US Ukrainian community in this campaign was the establishment, in 1985, of a US Congressional Commission to investigate the famine.⁴² Soviet authorities were especially disturbed that the issue of the famine had taken on international political significance. Under the direction of James Mace, the Commission collected accounts of the famine from approximately 200 survivors in the US in a massive oral history project published in 1990.⁴³

The successes in Ottawa and Washington had shown that the Ukrainian diaspora could gain a hearing in political circles for its assertions, but in the face of continued Soviet denials that a famine had occurred, the community believed that some sort of judicial decision was needed. The World Congress of Free Ukrainians approached prominent jurists to establish an International Commission of Inquiry into the 1932–3 famine in Ukraine. Convened on 14 February 1988, the Commission held two evidence-taking sessions in 1988, a deliberating session in 1989, and in 1990, issued its final report.⁴⁴ Issues addressed include proof of intent and culpability after a 50-year period and the applicability of the Genocide Convention of 1948 to an event that had occurred before the Convention was established. The majority opinion affirmed the petitioner's contention that (1) a famine had occurred in Ukraine in 1932–3, (2) the number of victims was at least 4.5 million,

(3) the causes of the famine were grain procurements, collectivization, de-kulakization, and de-nationalization, (4) the Soviet central and Ukrainian Soviet authorities were aware of the situation but sent no relief until the summer of 1933, and (5) the Soviet authorities, whatever their intent, undertook legal measures that aggravated the famine. Most commissioners did not agree that the Commission had the evidence to affirm the existence of a preconceived plan by Moscow to organize a famine to enforce its policies. Rather, they saw the government taking advantage of the famine to achieve its ends in agriculture and nationality policy. While the majority attributed responsibility to the Soviet authorities in general, commissioners were reluctant to attribute individual responsibility, except to Stalin, and to a degree to Lazar Kaganovich and Viacheslav Molotov. The Ukrainian authorities, except for Pavel Postyshev, were not seen as playing an active role in planning and carrying out the measures that triggered and accompanied the famine. In addressing the question of genocide, the majority (three members) found it plausible that the constituent elements of genocide existed at the time of the famine. One commissioner stated that what the Genocide Convention defined as genocide had occurred, one concurred partly with the majority but believed that crimes against humanity rather than the Genocide Convention should apply, and one saw the evidence as failing to establish criminal intent to destroy Ukrainian ethnicity. An accompanying opinion by the President of the Commission, Professor Jacob W. F. Sundburg, went further in affirming the petitioner's allegations than the majority opinion did.

Although the Commission did not fully endorse the view of the famine that prevailed in the Ukrainian diaspora, this distinguished panel of impartial arbitrators did come to conclusions that affirmed much of what the diaspora claimed. The activities of the diaspora during much of the 1980s had turned what was at first a tragedy unknown to the general public and little studied by scholars into an event known to a significant number of North Americans and Europeans and a major subject in Soviet studies.

Resistance to any admission of the occurrence of a famine in Ukraine, its man-made nature, and the major loss of life was limited to Soviet authorities and their propagandists in the West. This did not mean that there did not remain diverging interpretations of why the famine issue had been raised by the diaspora or degrees of willingness to see the famine discussed as a public issue, usually based on left-right and Cold War divisions. However, resistance to discussing the

Ukrainian famine became increasingly muted with the onset of glasnost in the Soviet Union and then with the disintegration of the USSR. Nevertheless, negative attitudes towards Ukrainians stereotyping them as Nazi collaborators or anti-Semites continue to affect the willingness to see Ukrainians as victims. At times, the famine issue was seen as a diversion from these issues or as a means of covertly justifying anti-Soviet collaboration with the Germans during World War II. Even the number of victims claimed was seen by a few as diminishing the singularity of the Holocaust.⁴⁵

The Ukrainian famine had become a topic of research among North American and European scholars, though debates continued on the degree of culpability of the Soviet authorities and the number of victims. Some specialists rejected the view that the Soviet government either planned or exploited the famine, and more rejected the idea that it was part of a genocidal anti-Ukrainian policy. Ideological divisions still influenced scholarly writing with some members of the revisionist school of Soviet historiography downplaying the significance of the famine and seeking to undermine the credibility of the work of scholars such as Robert Conquest and James Mace. Such writers refused to recognize how significant their contribution had been in the face of Soviet denial and Western scholarly inattention. At times, even reputable scholarly journals published discussions displaying hostility to the Ukrainian diaspora and a reluctance to see any specifically Ukrainian features of the famine.⁴⁶ Still, by the late 1980s, the scholarly community had finally come to see the famine as a major tragedy in Soviet and Ukrainian history.

The changing attitudes in Western public opinion and scholarship were linked to a considerable degree with the onset of glasnost in the Soviet Union. As public discussion opened in the Soviet Union, attention was drawn to many of the events of the Stalin period. Going far beyond the de-Stalinization of 1956, the revelations dealt with the mass nature of the victimization and formerly unmentionable subjects such as the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact and the level of atrocities committed by the Soviet authorities during and after World War II. Moscow received the new dispensation first, and it had the largest group of well-informed intellectuals able to take advantage of the new freedom.⁴⁷ Discussion of aspects of the famine of 1932–3 concentrating on Ukraine began appearing in *Ogonek*, a Moscow journal edited by the Ukrainian poet Vitalii Korotych.

Ukraine was one of the last places in the Soviet Union touched by glasnost. After the purge of Ukrainian intellectual life in 1972, Ukraine

under Volodymyr Shcherbyts'kyi had one of the most hard-line regimes in the Soviet Union. This period had been accompanied by an intensifying Russification and attacks on Ukrainian 'bourgeois nationalism'. The reasons the reforming government in Moscow did not move against the retrograde regime in Ukraine are not yet clear. It seems possible that it did not wish to stir up difficulties in the vast Ukrainian republic or provide an opportunity for dissent in the republic where the mishandled Chernobyl nuclear disaster had occurred in 1986 and where grounds for national dissent were strong. Until Shcherbyts'kyi's death on 16 February 1990, glasnost was very limited in Ukraine.

In 1989–90, a general movement for political and national revival swept Ukraine. It focused on issues of ecology and the Chernobyl nuclear disaster, religious freedom, language and cultural rights, and a re-evaluation of the past. Given the degree of ideological control in Ukraine, this even involved issues such as the traditions of the Zaporozhian Cossacks, Hetman Bohdan Kmel'nyts'kyi's negotiations with the Russian tsar in 1654 and Hetman Ivan Mazepa's siding with the Swedes against Peter I at the battle of Poltava in 1709. In time, discussions developed about twentieth-century events such as Ukrainian national communism in the late 1920s, the independent Ukrainian governments of 1917–21, the Soviet annexation of western Ukraine in 1939, and finally the struggle of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) during and after World War II. Relatively early, attention was directed towards the victims of Stalinism and their mass graves. In all these discussions, writers, intellectuals and dissidents led the way, with professional historians, who had so long been forced to be propagandists for the state, only slowly taking up the issues. Bolder elements in the Ukrainian press had raised the question of the 1932–3 famine as early as 1988, and it became a public issue over the next two years.

The famine issue was brought forth by a number of writers, especially Iurii Shcherbak and Volodymyr Maniak. Memorial, an organization founded to commemorate the victims of Stalinist terror, gathered evidence on the famine.⁴⁸ A generation then over 65 years of age finally had the opportunity to mourn its dead and tell its story. In contrast to the diaspora, where there were thousands of witnesses to the famine, there were still millions in Ukraine, albeit in rapidly declining numbers. The punishment of survivors for even mentioning the word 'famine' after 1933 and the trauma induced by witnessing mass death and even cannibalism had suppressed memories of the

famine. Many of the survivors had left their native villages and attempted to establish new lives in cities. The terror of the 1930s, the devastation of World War II and the famine of 1947 had further contributed to blurring the memory of famine survivors. To a considerable degree, popular memory of the famine had been suppressed and had not been passed down to subsequent generations. Only those who had listened to Western radio had a source of information on the famine, and then only those who saw the Soviet system as fully malevolent were likely to believe that such an atrocity, not even discussed in private circles, had occurred in their midst. Suddenly, the ban on discussions fell. The issue took on special significance in the eastern Ukrainian villages. Although they were depopulated, politically apathetic and fully in the hands of the collective farm elite, that is, Sovietized, the elderly inhabitants had a personal connection that was magnified by living on the site where the events had occurred.⁴⁹ For them, the issue was not a distant national tragedy, but meant the loss of family members and neighbours whom they had known.

For the younger generation in Ukraine, the urbanites and the inhabitants of the western Ukraine where the famine had not occurred, the issue, as for the Ukrainian diaspora, was more likely to take on significance as evidence of the criminal nature of Stalinism or even the Soviet regime in general. As contacts increased in the late 1980s, more of the activities and projects of the Ukrainian diaspora became better known in a Ukraine more receptive to the diaspora's viewpoints. A major refrain in the writing of the time was how it was possible that an event that was so studied in the West had been taboo in the USSR. The activities of the US Famine Commission made for a striking contrast to the Soviet government's denial. Chapters of Conquest's book appeared in 1989 in journals, and later a full edition appeared.⁵⁰ Video cassettes of the Ukrainian version of *Harvest of Despair* circulated. A plan to publish a memorial volume of eyewitness testimony was analogous to the congressional testimony and the initial descriptions of it as a 'white book' even reflected the wording of the subtitle of the *Black Deeds of the Kremlin* volumes. The influence of Ukrainian diaspora literature and the high public profile of the famine in the West as a public and scholarly issue in the 1980s hastened the entire process of dealing with the full gamut of issues associated with the famine.

Scholars in Ukraine found their agenda set by the debate that had occurred in the West. Established historians were in the unenviable position of having to reformulate post-haste their works on the

successes of Soviet collectivized agriculture and industrialization. As the authorities and Communist Party leaders who had so long set the tone for their research suddenly instructed them to deal with the increasingly voluminous evidence that they had ignored or falsified, the historians began the tortured process of dealing with the questions associated with the famine. Long accustomed to serving political masters, the historians lost their footing as it became unclear what the masters wanted of them or how secure the masters were. For some historians, the new freedom was seen as an opportunity, but, in general, the politicized profession moved slowly towards confronting the new issues.⁵¹ In their writings, the historians all discussed the need to deal anew with Ukrainian diaspora views and with the scholarly debates in the West.⁵² By the time an international symposium on the famine was held in Kyiv on 5–7 August 1990, no Soviet Ukrainian scholar could write about the 1930s without dealing with the famine.⁵³ These historians also had archival materials at their disposal, although significant materials were in Moscow and access was still not complete. Despite these limitations, such important sources as the suppressed 1937 census could finally be examined. By the time Ukraine declared its independence on 4 August 1991 and confirmed this declaration with a referendum on 1 December 1991, examination and research on the Ukrainian famine had finally centred in Ukraine rather than in the Ukrainian diaspora. Still, the efforts of the Ukrainian diaspora to publicize the famine had an impact even at this late date. The attention to the famine on Ukrainian television on the eve of the referendum was obviously intended to remind the Ukrainian population what Soviet rule had brought them. As Ukrainians in Ukraine subsequently produced their own film, a poignant account of personal human tragedy entitled *Holod 33* (Famine 33), the director chose the novel *Zhovtyi kniaz'* (Yellow Prince) by the Ukrainian émigré writer Vasyl' Barka as the basis for the script. The impact of the activities of the Ukrainian diaspora on study in Ukraine was demonstrated by Dr James Mace's move to Ukraine to head a Genocide Institute there.⁵⁴ Whatever the impact of the activities of the diaspora, discussion and study of the famine now centred in Ukraine and were shaped by the academic, cultural and political realities of the newly independent Ukraine.

On the 60th anniversary of the famine in 1993, the major commemoration was not in Washington, but in Kyiv with the participation of the president of Ukraine and the local heads of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox and Ukrainian Catholic Churches, both of them

banned during Soviet times. Although all Ukrainian society now recognized the famine as a national tragedy, attitudes about the event and explanations of its causes remained controversial. The issue had been associated with the Ukrainian national revival, anti-communist sentiments, opposition to the policies of Stalinism, including collectivization of agriculture, and resistance to Moscow's control of Ukraine. Considerable numbers of Ukrainians were indifferent or hostile to the Ukrainian national revival, continued to support or sympathize with communist traditions and groups, remained dedicated to the collectivist institutions of the Stalinist period, and favoured retention of some links with Russia. These latter groups increased their activities in 1993–4, in part as a result of the economic collapse of Ukraine. Views and politics were extremely eclectic, and many residents of Ukraine did not have an integrated view. For example, there were elderly peasants who mourned their dead but continued to support pro-communist collective farm elites and feared the consequences of any break-up of the collective farm structure. These shifting political and cultural attitudes affected the degree of public emphasis on the famine and the explanation of its causes.⁵⁵

Scholars in Ukraine are influenced by the general political climate. Certain aspects of the famine debate, above all the degree to which it was planned and the degree to which it was directed against Ukraine and Ukrainians, are still being discussed. While some issues such as the closing of the borders have now been proven by Soviet government documentation, other issues will be more difficult to resolve because of the nature of Soviet record keeping and the difficulty of penetrating Stalin's motives. Questions such as the number of victims will long be disputed, though the opening up of Soviet archives and the contributions of scholars in Ukraine have resulted in raising estimates made by Western scholars who had strongly criticized Conquest's estimate of 5 million.⁵⁶

With Ukrainian independence, the end of the Soviet Union and the shift of famine research from the diaspora to Ukraine, it is an appropriate time to reflect on what the famine issue reveals about the study and evaluation of the Soviet Union. The relative success of the Soviet authorities in diverting attention from the famine not only during the event, but even as late as the 1970s demonstrates how the very continued existence of the Soviet state as a superpower, albeit in a less Stalinist version, served to limit comprehension of the tragedies of the Soviet period. Although this is obvious in the Soviet Union itself, the limited understanding prevailed even in the West. The problem was

more than just an inability to gain access to sources. Certainly this limitation played a role, but even in 1933, substantial evidence existed that a famine was raging at the same time as the Soviet Union was exporting grain. Even the Soviet census of 1939 showed that some catastrophe had occurred to the Ukrainians but not to their neighbours the Belarusians. By the late 1940s numerous survivors in the West could bear witness to the grain seizures, storage of foodstuffs in the midst of starvation and the closing of Ukraine's borders.

A public worn down by repeated tragedy by the end of World War II and the very magnitude of Stalinist atrocities to a degree help explain inattention to the famine. The Soviet Union's success in covering up the famine can also be found in the clashes of radical right and radical left forces in the twentieth century. After the Soviet Union fought alongside the liberal democracies in World War II, the Soviets had relative success in making the famine issue be ignored by associating it with Nazi collaborators, particularly, for example, as they did with the Katyn massacre, when some evidence came from Nazi German sources. While many in academic circles viewed strident anti-fascism and antagonism to Nazi Germany as laudable, they viewed strident anti-communism and antagonism to the Soviet Union very differently. Therefore, the Ukrainian diaspora for many years could only get a hearing in anti-communist and right-wing circles, and even then only if those circles were not overly Russophile. Scholars dismissed evidence and voices that were not framed in a manner they found acceptable. Whether one accepted the Ukrainian diaspora's view of the famine or not, it was strange to find greater hostility towards the survivors of the tragedy because they held politically less 'appropriate' views into the late 1980s than towards Soviet authorities and publicists who were denying that a famine had occurred.

Undoubtedly, the dissident movement in the former Soviet Union, the Afghan invasion and the political success of the right in the US improved the climate for an increasingly well-organized Ukrainian diaspora to have its message heard. But the famine issue was not the creation of a new anti-Soviet political agenda. The tendency not to distinguish between the various elements of the famine issue and to politicize them made for *a priori* stances and attitudes on all sides. Scholars who saw the famine issue as part of a neo-rightist agenda were unlikely to note Soviet attempts to suppress the issue and to discredit those who wished to examine it. Members of the Ukrainian diaspora saw any questioning of the Terror-Famine, when they believed it met all of the criteria of genocide, as a sign of pro-Soviet

or even pro-Stalinist views. Even unbiased scholars were led by their mistrust of the Ukrainian diaspora and its emotionalism to ignore survivors' testimonies or fail to recognize that, whatever its origins, the famine of 1932–3 constituted a tragedy for Ukraine and Ukrainians that was far greater than for Russia and the Russians.

The events of the 1980s show how many extraneous issues (attitudes toward Ukrainians, comparisons of numbers of victims of the famine and the Holocaust, internal American political debates, etc.) shaped the discussion of the famine. Certainly, the political climate favoured the Ukrainian diaspora's activities. Had Soviet–American relations been better, it is unlikely that a Congressional Famine Commission would have been established, and had Pierre Elliot Trudeau rather than Brian Mulroney been prime minister of Canada, one cannot conceive that the Canadian prime minister would have spoken out about the famine. In contrast, the situation in North American academic circles was more mixed. The strengthening of Ukrainian studies and the establishment of high-profile institutes at Harvard University and the University of Alberta provided a structure for raising the famine issue. Nevertheless, the continued neglect of the non-Russian peoples and republics and the rise of the revisionist school in North American historical studies were not conducive to the study of the famine. Scholarly work on Soviet demography did offer tools for establishing the number of victims. This field was, however, handicapped by Soviet denial of access to sources and plagued by political acrimony. In addition, Ukrainian diaspora groups putting forth an agenda raised scholarly hackles, with many scholars little willing to reflect on why certain issues had been ignored and with a few directing their rage at the messengers, including the survivors.

With the fall of the Soviet Union, the left–right divide that has so shaped the discussion of the famine may slowly diminish. At the same time, the independence of Ukraine has removed the tenor of advocacy that characterized the Ukrainian diaspora's activities. The establishment of an independent Ukraine has permitted the resurrection of Ukrainian studies as well as research on the famine in Ukraine. It has also raised interest in Ukrainian topics among Western scholars. In this new climate, the man-made famine of 1932–3 can finally be examined fully in the context of Stalinism, Ukrainian history and the study of genocides.

For those studying the Armenian Genocide, examination of the Ukrainian famine offers considerable comparative material. This discussion of both tragedies has involved questions of intent and

evidence. Both have been surrounded by controversies over the number of victims and the definition of genocide. In each case, powerful states have denied not only responsibility for the tragedy, but its very occurrence. Both diasporas have sought public recognition and have found themselves obliged to deal with complex political situations and academic politics in achieving their goals. With the independence of Ukraine and Armenia, the role of the diasporas has changed, and the study of the Ukrainian Terror-Famine and the Armenian Genocide can now centre in the homelands.

NOTES

1. See Marco Carynnyk, 'Blind Eye to Murder: Britain, the United States and the Ukrainian Famine of 1933', in Roman Serbyn and Bohdan Krawchenko, eds., *Famine in Ukraine, 1932–1933* (Edmonton, 1986), pp. 109–38.
2. One cannot agree with Paul Robert Magocsi's assertion about the famine that 'Since the 1960s, textbook histories of Russia and the Soviet Union have taught thousands of North American college students the basic facts'. Paul Magocsi, 'Famine and Genocide', *The World & I* (April 1987): 417. As evidence, he quotes a phrase in Riasanovsky's textbook '[in 1933] a frightful famine swept Ukraine'. Nicholas V. Riasanovsky, *A History of Russia* (New York, 1963), p. 551. In fact, even the date is not given in Riasanovsky's text. In addition, the passage does not consider causation, magnitude or consequences. Magocsi also cites a passage from Basil Dmytryshyn, *The USSR: a Concise History*, 4th edn (New York, 1984), p. 171, which has three sentences with a fuller description, albeit with no discussion of magnitude. It should be noted that Professor Dmytryshyn is a Ukrainian emigrant. Later in his review article, Magocsi himself maintains that 'The need to strengthen the case put forth in *The Harvest of Sorrow* is not unimportant because the Soviet denial that a famine ever occurred and skepticism about claims to the contrary seem to prevail... Whereas histories of the Soviet Union published in the West have generally mentioned the famine, it has been buried among the many atrocities of Soviet society during the Stalin era' (p. 422). Donald Treadgold's frequently used textbook, *Twentieth Century Russia*, 7th edn (Boulder, San Francisco, London, 1990) (the name itself reveals Western attitudes towards the Soviet Union and the difficulties faced by non-Russian studies) demonstrates the limited attention devoted to the famine. There is only one mention of the famine which is lumped together with collectivization. 'At least five million peasants died in the process of collectivization and the resultant famine (the figure Stalin revealed to Churchill at Yalta was ten million). No wonder that there were Russians who survived the horrors of World War II who could not talk of their

experiences years before, during collectivization, without losing their composure' (p. 272). Not only is the tragedy implicitly made 'Russian', but the geography of the famine is not discussed. The section on Ukraine in this period (pp. 278–80) makes no mention of the famine at all. In the fifth edition of Sidney Harcave, *Russia: a History* (Philadelphia and New York, 1964), p. 603, Harcave stated: 'Those conditions [peasant inexperience with collective farming, inadequate tools, and the lack of livestock for farming and food owing to slaughter by rich peasants] added to crop failures in 1931 and 1932, helped to bring about serious famine in parts of Ukraine and the North Caucasus in the winter of 1932–1933'. No mention is made of the seizure of foodstuffs or the regime's refusal even to admit the existence of the famine. Systematic study of textbooks and widely read general works is needed to establish what the general public, students and scholars knew about the famine until the 1980s.

3. Review of *Harvest of Sorrow* in *Detente* nos. 9–10 (1987): 44–5. In his hostile review of the activities of the Ukrainian diaspora, Stephan Merl asserted that in comparison to the 'Great Purges' and the 'liquidation of the kulaks as a class', the famine had received astonishingly little attention in the literature outside of 'Ukrainian exile' circles. 'Entfachte Stalin die Hungersnot von 1932–33 zur Ausloschung des ukrainischen Nationalismus? Anmerkungen zu neueren westlichen Veroffentlichungen über die "ukrainische" Hungersnot', *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas*, 37, no. 4 (1989): 568.
4. The German original appeared in 1935, *Muss Russland hungern?: Menschen und Volkerschicksale in der Sowjetunion* (Vienna) and an English translation a year later, *Human Life in Russia* (London, 1936).
5. Duranty was awarded a Pulitzer prize for his reporting on the Soviet Union. In the 1980s, *The New York Times* rebuffed the efforts of the Ukrainian community to have his picture removed from a place of honour in the paper's offices and some of the paper's discomfort with the famine issue may have been due to its embarrassing position. Subsequently, Duranty's disgraceful role in professional journalism was fully researched by S. J. Taylor in *Stalin's Apologist* (Oxford, 1990). See also, Marco Carynnyk, 'Making the News Fit to Print: Walter Duranty, *The New York Times* and the Ukrainian Famine of 1933', Serbyn and Krawchenko, eds., *Famine in Ukraine*, pp. 67–96.
6. Sidney and Beatrice Webb, *Soviet Communism: a New Civilization* (London, 1937).
7. For a discussion of the revisionists and their criticism of the totalitarian school, see Jane Burbank, 'Controversy over Stalinism: Searching for a Soviet Society', *Politics and Society*, 19, no. 3 (1991): 325–40. Examining the work of the revisionists at a time when glasnost in the Soviet Union was leading many Soviet citizens to search for a history of the groups and issues the revisionists had avoided, Burbank maintained, 'My point is rather that western revisionists err both in sticking to the old story of socialist transformation and in holding to a single story line' (p. 336).
8. See, for example, Anatole Lieven's letter discussing Conquest's *Harvest of Sorrow*. Lieven, a journalist who subsequently wrote an excellent book on the Baltic independence movement, saw independence as an extreme

demand of Ukrainian nationalism. *The Tablet*, 22 November 1986. As late as 1993, Soviet history and nationalities specialist Ronald Grigor Suny regretted the break-up of the Soviet Union, expressing a preference for a reformed USSR to the successor national states. *The Revenge of the Past: Nationalism, Revolution, and the Collapse of the Soviet Union* (Stanford, 1993), p. xv.

9. See the study by Mykola Kovalevs'kyi, *Ukraina pid chervonym iarmom: Dokumenty i fakty* (Warsaw-Lviv, 1937). An article in the western Ukrainian daily *Dilo* in 1934 discussed the significance of the famine in changing the nationality balance in the Soviet Ukraine. 'Skil'ky liudei pomerlo holodovoivu smertiu?!' *Dilo*, 6 December 1934.
10. One of the few studies by a non-Ukrainian author to appear on the famine in this period was Dana Dalrymple, 'The Soviet Famine of 1932-34', *Soviet Studies* 15, no. 3 (January 1964): 250-84 and 'The Soviet Famine of 1932-1934: Some Further References', *Soviet Studies* 16, no. 4 (April 1965): 471-4.
11. Semen Pidhainy, ed., *The Black Deeds of the Kremlin: A White Book*, 2 vols. (Toronto-Detroit, 1953-5); Dmytro Solovij, *The Golgotha of the Ukraine* (New York, 1953); M. Verbyts'kyi, *Naibil'shyi zlochyn Kremlia: Zaplianovanyi shtuchnyi holod v Ukraini 1932-1933 rokiv* (London, 1952); Olexa Woropay, *The Ninth Circle: In Commemoration of the Victims of the Famine of 1933* (London, 1954); and Mykola Haliy, *Organized Famine in Ukraine, 1932-33* (Chicago, 1963). Evidence could also be found in the émigré memoirs of the highly placed Soviet official Victor Kravchenko, *I Chose Freedom: the Personal and Political Life of a Soviet Official* (New York, 1946) and *I Chose Justice* (New York, 1950).
12. Paul Robert Magocsi saw this as a conducive environment for promoting political goals:

Part of the logic behind the public relations efforts of Ukrainians in the West is based on the successful experience of the Jews. If Jews have been able to gain sympathy and support for Israel through constantly reminding the world of Jewish suffering during World War II, then Ukrainians hope to do the same through publicizing 'their holocaust' – the famine of 1933. ('Famine and Genocide', p. 422)

13. Roma Hadzewycz *et al.*, eds., *The Great Famine in Ukraine* (Jersey City, 1983); Walter Dushnyck, *50 Years Ago: the Famine Holocaust in Ukraine* (New York-Toronto, 1983); Wasyl Hryshko, *The Ukrainian Holocaust of 1933* (Toronto, 1983); Stephen Oleskiw, *The Agony of a Nation: the Great Man-Made Famine in Ukraine in 1932-1933* (London, 1983).
14. *Famine in the Soviet Ukraine 1932-1933. A Memorial Exhibition* (Cambridge, MA., 1986), pp. 71-2. See *News Release*, no. 60, 28 April 1983.
15. The film was screened in 1984. See the review by Victor Malarek, 'Graphic Film Documents Ukraine Famine', *The Globe and Mail*, 27 October 1984.
16. The CBC had already aired a documentary segment on the famine, 'And No Birds Sang', on its major news magazine, *Fifth Estate*, in 1983.

17. Peter Paluch, 'Spiking the Ukrainian Famine, Again', *National Review* (11 April 1986): 33–6. Paluch was a member of the Ukrainian Studies Fund of Harvard University.
18. See the transcript of the Southern Educational Communications Association.
19. John Corry wrote a particularly biting review of PBS's equivocation and the *Firing Line* format in *The New York Times*, 24 September 1986. He recounted the Soviet government's denial that a famine had occurred and then argued that 'Public television's contribution to the argument, meanwhile, is to suggest, the historical record aside, that the Soviet Union may have a point'. He criticized *Firing Line* for giving the issue a political cast by the make-up of the panel. He asserted that despite some of the useful comments by Robert Conquest, two unfortunate things happened:

The first is that much of the conversation, even if inadvertently, diverts our attention from the reality of one of history's great tragedies. Mr. Hitchens, for example, opens his part of the discussion by coming close to suggesting that the Ukrainians had it coming to them. Weren't they anti-Semites? Didn't they cooperate with the Nazis?

Mr. Conquest must then respond by noting that Ukrainian guerrillas in World War II fought both the Soviet and German armies. Later Mr. Hitchens seems disturbed when Mr. Buckley attempts to draw a comparison between Hitler and Stalin.

Corry also criticized the impression that the famine was widely commented on outside the USSR. In contrast, while another reviewer, Arthur Unger, praised the film and PBS's initiative in showing it, Unger asserted, 'Only Mr. Hitchens is bold enough in the framework of this programme, to point out that Ukrainians were not blameless themselves in certain actions during and after World War II. Without condoning the famine, he accuses thousands of Ukrainian volunteers of participating in the massacre of Jews at Babi Yar'. *Christian Science Monitor* (24 September 1986): 24. For Hitchens' comments see the transcript distributed by the Southern Educational Communications Association. Harrison Salisbury, after viewing the film, still indicated that he believed the famine occurred throughout the Soviet Union and that policies were the same everywhere.

20. See S. Maksudov [Aleksandr Babenyshev], 'The Geography of the Soviet Famine of 1933', *Journal of Ukrainian Studies* 8, no. 2 (1988): 52–8 and his article 'Ukraine's Demographic Losses, 1927–1938', in Serbyn and Krawchenko, *Famine in Ukraine 1932–33*, pp. 27–44.
21. Bohdan Krawchenko, 'The Man-Made Famine of 1932–1933 in Soviet Ukraine', *Conflict Quarterly* 4, no. 2 (1984): 29–39. Serbyn and Krawchenko, eds., *Famine in Ukraine 1932–1933*.
22. A group from the UN Mission travelled to Cambridge, Massachusetts to deliver these threats including warnings that archives would be forever closed to scholars from the Institute. Soviet attacks centred on the staff of the Ukrainian Research Institute at Harvard. For example, see Valery

Styrkul, 'Who is behind the Masks', in the October 1985 issue of *News from Ukraine*, p. 7, a publication aimed at the diaspora and English-speaking readers in the West:

To find some 'theoretical' grounds for their adventuristic plans, politicians of the imperialistic countries try to enlist the services of various agencies and scientific establishments. One of them is the Ukrainian Research Institute at Harvard University. The director of this 'Institute' is Omeljan Pritsak. Last year, in the US, appeared a new collection of slanderous articles about the 'failures of Soviet agriculture' and the 'miserable' life of our people, concocted by the research officer of Pritsak's 'Institute', James Mace, as well as by Myron Kuropas and Marco Carynnyk. Pritsak wrote the foreword for the publication. According to the nationalist newspapers that was not the only example of his activity: disregarding the high responsibility of the U.S. Academy of Sciences, Pritsak stooped to writing cheap, slanderous articles. His academic degree, in fact, serves him a mask to hide the pseudo-scientific character of this and similar researches.

Subsequent attacks use terms such as 'freeloaders' and 'lackeys of the Imperialist reactionary circles', particularly focusing on support from the US Congress.

A member of the mission, Ivan Khmil, wrote about his meeting with James Mace: "This was at Harvard University, which I visited while staying in the USA, in the delegation of the Ukrainian SSR at the session of the General Assembly of the UN. He was presented to me as a researcher who had just written about the famine in Ukraine of the years 32–33. Publicly I answered him according to the official version that prevailed among us... However after the general conversation we continued in private, and I said to him emphatically: "Young man, the famine occurred, I almost became its victim. What the hell is that to you?"' Cited in an article by Petro Chasto, 'Ne po ukrains'ky', *Svoboda*, 22 March 1994, taken from *Demohratychna Ukraina*, 12 February 1994. Khmil is also cited as stating that over the course of decades many 'Maces' had been found to frame the history of Ukraine to fit the needs of the Cold War. In the 1980s Dr Khmil was assumed to be a highly placed KGB operative in the Ukrainian-American community. After glasnost and Ukrainian independence, he needed to defend his past. Like many others of the old guard, he kept his position at the Institute of History of the Academy of Sciences.

23. *Famine in the Soviet Ukraine 1932–1933. A Memorial Exhibition* (Cambridge, MA., 1986). See Olexa Woropay, *The Ninth Circle: In Commemoration of the Victims of the Famine of 1933* (Cambridge, MA: 1983); Miron Dolot, *Who Killed Them and Why?: In Remembrance of Those Killed in the Famine of 1932–33 in Ukraine* (Cambridge, MA., 1984); Miron Dolot, *Execution by Hunger: the Hidden Holocaust* (New York–London, 1985).
24. See James Mace, 'Famine and Nationalism in Soviet Ukraine', *Problems of Communism* (May–June 1984): 37–50; James Mace, 'The Man–Made

- Famine of 1933: What Happened and Why', in Israel W. Charny, ed., *Toward the Understanding and Prevention of Genocide: Proceedings of the International Conference on the Holocaust and Genocide* (Boulder, 1984), pp. 67–83.
25. See Robert Conquest, *The Great Terror: Stalin's Purges of the Thirties*, revised edition (New York, 1973).
 26. Robert Conquest, Dana Dalrymple, James Mace and Michael Novak, *The Man Made Famine in Ukraine* (Washington, D.C., 1984), printed by the American Enterprise Institute.
 27. For a listing of reviews, see 'Conquest's *Harvest of Sorrow*: an Overview of the Reviews', *The Ukrainian Weekly* (25 January 1987): 5, 12. Conquest's book was widely reviewed in mass media publications. Jim Miller wrote: 'Astonishingly enough, Conquest's book is the first general history of these terrible events aimed at a non-specialist audience', *Newsweek* (17 November 1986): 85. In *The Los Angeles Times* of 19 November 1986, Herbert Ellison wrote: 'This is a carefully researched and superbly written study', and

For many specialists in Russian history – and for the informed reader as well – the most difficult of Conquest's many unsettling conclusions will probably be that Stalin used the 'terror-famine' consciously and purposely as an instrument of its Ukrainian policy. The chapter on 'Responsibilities' anticipates questions with careful documentation and analysis of precisely this point... In sum, the famine was used to break Ukrainian resistance.

Patricia Blake wrote, 'Conquest argues that Stalin was aiming at the genocide of the Ukrainians, whose nationalist yearnings he despised and feared. The toll supports his view and of the "innocents who perished on the Soviet land". Now 50 years after they were effaced from memory, Conquest has succeeded in restoring their human faces', *Time* (8 December 1986): 91–2. For other reviews see Jars Balan of the *Edmonton Journal*, 2 December 1986, and Dmitrii Simes in *Book World; The Washington Post* (19 October 1986). In an unsigned review, *The Economist* (11 October 1986): 104, uses the term genocide, but states:

He presents the famine victims as pawns in a power struggle within the Communist party and the famine itself as the last of many assaults upon the Russian peasantry and upon the Ukraine (which declared its independence in 1918). These explanations may not quite convince but Mr. Conquest's conclusion does: that Stalin starved 14.5m people to death imposing communism in the countryside.

John Gross called the book 'indispensable reading for anyone who wants to understand the shaping and the misshaping of the modern world', and of Stalin's orders that brought about the famine: 'This time his aim was not only to master the peasants but also to crush once and for all Ukrainian culture and any thoughts of Ukrainian autonomy', *The New York Times* (7 October 1986): C17. (See also an article by Walter Good-

- man on Conquest's book in the same newspaper on 15 October 1986); David Floyd, *The Daily Telegraph* (12 September 1986); Ferdinand Mount, 'Ruling through Famine', *The Sunday Telegraph* (28 September 1986): 14.
28. Christopher Brooker in *The Spectator* (25 October 1986): 32–4; Michael Bourdeaux, *Church Times* (21 November 1986); Paul Robert Magocsi, 'Famine and Genocide', pp. 416–23; Bruce Lincoln, 'Russia's Grim Famine History', *The World & I* (April 1987): 424–30; Arnold Salisbury, 'The Ukrainian Holocaust Documented', *Global Affairs* (Spring 1987) (reprinted in *The New York City Tribune*, 20 April 1987); H. Methvin, 'The Other Holocaust', *National Review* (28 February 1987): 48–9; Henry R. Huttenbach in *Martyrdom and Resistance* 13, no. 4 (March–April 1987): 1, 10. See also additional footnotes below.
 29. See Vladimir N. Brovkin, 'Robert Conquest's *Harvest of Sorrow*: a Challenge to Revisionists', *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 11, no. 1–2 (June 1987): 234–45 and R. H. Johnson, *Canadian Slavonic Papers* 29, Nos. 2–3 (June–September 1987): 348–9. Johnson states that: 'The centrality in this study of the Ukrainian hetacomb seems, to this reviewer, justified'.
 30. 'Arranging a Catastrophe', *Times Literary Supplement* (20 February 1987).
 31. 'Stalin's Two Famines', *The New York Review of Books*, (26 March 1987). 'I must confess that the title of that book has always put me off from reading it, but it is not the least of Conquest's merits to have ploughed ahead'. He continues, 'So Conquest (and James Mace before him) has adopted the Ukrainian exile view, and he has persuaded this reviewer'. Hosking also deals with the failure to examine evidence. 'Western scholars have been inclined to pass snootily by compilations with such lurid titles. But they are wrong; such records represent 'popular history' in a way that ought to appeal to every reader of *Annales*'.
 32. Alec Nove assumed that there were over five million victims and called Conquest's estimate of seven million well within the bounds of possibility. Alec Nove, 'When the Head Is Off . . .' *The New Republic* (3 November 1986): 34–7. In the early 1980s, a debate emerged on economic statistics and on demography and death losses during the Stalin period. Although it occurred just as the famine issue was being raised, it did not originate as a response, and the influence of public activity on its course remains to be examined. The debate began over the Soviet economy and forced labour statistics. It was initiated by S. Rosefielde in 'The First "Great Leap Forward"' *Slavic Review* 39, no. 4 (December 1980): 559–582. For the other side of the discussion, see R. W. Davies and S. G. Wheatcroft, 'Steven Rosefielde's *Kliukva*', *Slavic Review* 39, no. 4 (December 1980): 593–602; and the articles by S. G. Wheatcroft, 'On Assessing the Size of Forced Concentration Labour in the Soviet Union, 1929–1956', *Soviet Studies* 33 (April 1981): 265–95, and 'Towards a Thorough Analysis of Soviet Forced Labour Statistics', *Soviet Studies* 35 (April 1983): 223–232. More direct attention to population statistics resulted in further debate that came to be focused more frequently on the famine. See Steven Rosefielde, 'Excess Mortality in the Soviet Union: a Reconsideration of the Demographic Consequences of Forced Industrializa-

tion, 1929–1949', *Soviet Studies* 35, no. 3 (July 1983): 385–409; Steven Rosefielde, 'Excess Collectivization Deaths, 1929–1933: New Demographic Evidence', *Slavic Review* 43, no. 1 (Spring 1984): 83–8; Stephen Wheatcroft, 'A Note on S. Rosefielde's Calculations of Excess Mortality in the USSR, 1929–1949', *Soviet Studies* 36 (April 1984): 277–81; Steven Rosefielde, 'New Demographic Evidence on Collectivization Deaths: a Rejoinder to Stephen Wheatcroft', *Slavic Review* 44 (Fall 1985): 509–16; Stephen Wheatcroft, 'New Demographic Evidence on Excess Collectivization Deaths: Yet Another Kliukva from S. Rosefielde', *Slavic Review* 44 (Fall 1985): 505–8. Also see B. A. Anderson and Brian Silver, 'Demographic Analysis and Population Catastrophes in the USSR', *Slavic Review* 44 (Fall 1985): 517–36. (This article mentions a publication on the Ukrainian famine to which Mace, Conquest and Dalrymple contributed. It may be seen as an outcome of the Harvard Famine Project, and it discusses the new attention given to the Ukrainian famine, pp. 518, 532–4). The *Slavic Review* then published a compendium entitled 'Ongoing Discussion', which included letters by Robert Conquest, Stephen Cohen and Stephen G. Wheatcroft, pp. 295–9 and Steven Rosefielde, 'Demographic Analysis and Population Catastrophes in the USSR: A Rejoinder to Barbara Anderson and Brian Silver', pp. 300–6 and Barbara Anderson and Brian Silver, 'Tautologies in the Study of Excess Mortality in the USSR in the 1930s', pp. 307–13, in the *Slavic Review* 45 (Summer 1986).

33. Craig Whitney in *The New York Times Book Review* (26 October 1986) questioned Conquest's thesis that the famine was aimed against Ukraine. In his review, he showed a certain insensitivity to the nationality issue by calling all of the victims of dekulakization and the famine 'Russians'. He objected to Conquest's use of Ukrainian émigré sources with their emotional titles. In a response published in the 30 November 1986 issue, Conquest argued that the 'unthinking rejection of books with such titles is only a cultural prejudice'. Nove found the 'Ukrainian aspect' the only matter in Conquest's book with which he disagreed and questioned Conquest's acceptance of the 'Ukrainian national myth' in the interpretation of history, p. 37. Conquest responded to this criticism in the 1 December 1986 issue of *The New Republic*.

One of the most confusing discussions of the Ukrainian aspect of the famine is in Paul Robert Magocsi's review. He wrote: 'The figures summed up by Conquest (p. 306) further belie the Ukrainian specificity of the tragedy. Of the estimated 14.5 million deaths, less than half [5 million] are assigned to Ukraine, and even this figure must include non-Ukrainians as well as Ukrainians in the ethnically heterogeneous agricultural regions of the Ukrainian SSR' (p. 421). Magocsi added Conquest's estimates of 6.5 million dead as a result of dekulakization (of which a considerable number were in Ukraine or Ukrainians in other republics) and his estimate of 1 million Kazakh victims to Conquest's estimate of 7 million famine victims in 1932–3. It is, of course, for the famine that Conquest argued a Ukrainian specificity. Magocsi also did not mention that Conquest estimated that of the 2 million famine victims in Russia, 1 million were Ukrainians.

34. Craig Whitney, *The New York Times Book Review*. See also Magocsi, *Famine and Genocide*, p. 421.
35. J. Arch Getty, 'Starving the Ukraine', *London Review of Books* 9, no. 2 (22 January 1987): 7–8. For a review written in a scholarly tone that is largely negative concerning Conquest's estimate of the number of victims, his assertion of Ukrainian specificity, and his attribution of causes to Communist ideology, see R. W. Davies, *Detente*, nos. 9–10 (1987): 44–5.
36. Getty's fears of the implication of the famine issue may have been borne out by some of the reviewers' responses. For example, R. H. Johnson wrote that 'Conquest feels, and his book confirms, that the events described cannot just be forgotten as too remote to be of any current significance. Today's Soviet rulers remain 'the heirs and accomplices of the dreadful history' described here until they face the issue squarely and publicly'. *Canadian Slavonic Papers* 29, nos. 2–3 (June–September 1987): 348–9.
37. Getty's comment, 'Of course, it would be wrong to tar all Ukrainians (or Soviets) with the same brush, or to deny the legitimacy of Ukrainian grievances and aspirations. At the same time, scholars are obliged to eschew polemic in favour of balanced analysis', does not ring true, given the polemical tone of his review. 'Starving the Ukraine', *London Review of Books*.
38. Yuri Bogayevsky, First Secretary of the Embassy, responded to the publication of two fragments of the book in *The Globe and Mail* (29 November and 1 December 1986). He insisted that no 'imposed' famine had occurred in 1931–2 (*sic*), though drought conditions had reduced the harvest in those years. He denied that there was mass starvation and dwelt on kulak sabotage as disorganizing agriculture. He concluded: 'True, times were hard and many people did suffer, especially those families whose fathers, sons, and brothers were murdered by Kulaks. But not nearly to the extent portrayed in less than scholarly publications'. *The Globe and Mail* (13 December 1986). Conquest answered his arguments in the issue of 10 January 1987.
39. The volume was published in Toronto in 1987 by Progress Publishers. The introduction contains a long citation from Getty's review to support the linkage of the famine issue with a campaign to divert attention from war crimes (p. 3). Tottle admitted that a famine had occurred, but attributed it to drought and kulak sabotage. He argued that figures cited by Conquest and others were wildly exaggerated, but he did not provide his own figures. He maintained that epidemics and not hunger caused many deaths without discussing the relationship of the two phenomena (pp. 92–4). Also see his review 'The Realm of Subjectivity', *Canadian Dimension* (March 1987): 36–7. A response published by Jars Balan questioned why so much of the left continued to pretend that the Ukrainian famine had never happened and why the Ukrainian question was usually dismissed as being irrelevant, non-existent or the exclusive concern of rightist nationalists. *Canadian Dimension* (October 1987): 2, 46. For a discussion on the role of the Communist Party of Canada and the authorization of Kyiv in publishing the book, see Petro Kravchuk,

Our History: the Ukrainian Labour-Farmer Movement in Canada, 1907–1991 (Toronto, 1996), pp. 248–51.

40. Jeff Coplon, 'In Search of a Soviet Holocaust: a 55 Year Old Famine Feeds the Right', *The Village Voice* (12 January 1988): 28, 30, 32. Coplon's ideological fervour resulted in his use of inflammatory language and distortion of the facts. He characterized the Ukrainian National Association as having a 'hard right tradition' (in fact, it had a mixed constituency) and imputed that the World Congress of Free Ukrainians had fascist antecedents. Ukrainian nationalism was described historically as a 'narrow, urban middle-class movement' that had little support among the peasantry, an assertion clearly unfounded for western Ukraine and questionable for eastern Ukraine after World War I. Coplon admitted that hundreds of thousands and possibly one or two million Ukrainians died during the famine, but he quoted Getty's review to maintain that the blame was not on one side. Among others, Coplon quoted Douglas Tottle. In assembling statements against Conquest's book, Coplon also quoted Moshe Lewin as saying 'This is crap, rubbish' and 'I am an anti-Stalinist, but I don't see how this [genocide] campaign adds to our knowledge. It's adding horrors, adding horrors until it becomes a pathology'. Roberta Manning of Boston College had the most intemperate remarks attributed to her. Speaking of James Mace, she is quoted as saying, 'I doubt he could have gotten a real academic job. Soviet studies is a very competitive field these days – there is much weeding out after the Ph.D. If he hadn't hopped on this political cause, he would be doing research for a bank, or running an export-import business'. It is of interest that Professor Manning, whom Coplon described as a 'veteran Sovietologist', had no monograph on Soviet history at that time, while Dr Mace had published the generally well-received volume *Communism and the Dilemmas of National Liberation: National Communism in Soviet Ukraine* (Cambridge, MA: 1983). While Coplon may not have quoted the scholars accurately, the letters published in *The Village Voice* about the article include none from the scholars quoted.
41. Michael Bourdeaux, in *Church Times* (21 November 1986), called the book a 'magisterial volume' and directly addressed the issue of attitudes toward Ukrainians:

Harvest of Sorrow answers a question which has long troubled me. Why is it that Ukraine, as a nation, receives either no press or a bad one (though, since Chernobyl at least people know where it is)? The country which, in surface area, is the largest country in Europe after Russia, and has a population of fifty-one million, is simply not seen as an entity. It is just another part of the Soviet Union; its eccentric émigrés have funny names and occasionally make ineffectual demonstrations. Mr. Conquest's book shames all who think thus (or would if they read it).

David Floyd called the famine and the policies of the 1930s 'Stalin's first successful advance westwards'. He maintained that 'As a result the

Ukraine, with its 40 million people, became the forgotten country of Europe, the largest nation in the world without a state. It is not the least of Dr Conquest's services that he has reminded us of the fate of Ukraine which had recently to suffer yet another man-made disaster at Chernobyl', *The Daily Telegraph* (12 September 1986).

42. The ninety-ninth Congress of the United States established the 'Commission on the Ukraine Famine' through Public Law 99-335. The first organizational meeting was held on 23 April 1986. *Investigation of the Ukrainian Famine 1932-1933: Report to Congress* (Washington, D.C., 1988).
43. James E. Mace and Leonid Heretz, eds., *Investigation of the Ukrainian Famine 1932-1933: Oral History Project*, vols. 1-3 (Washington, D.C., 1990).
44. *International Commission of Inquiry into the 1932-33 Famine in Ukraine: The Final Report* (Toronto, 1990).
45. Michael Bourdeaux raised sensitive issues when he wrote:

Genocide is a word often loosely applied, but in its fullest legal sense there are fewer crimes in this century to justify its use. The worst example, everyone believes, was Hitler's extermination of the Jews (and of other races) in the Holocaust. Yet everyone is wrong. Stalin's destruction of the people of the Ukraine, as a deliberate policy in the 1930s, was an even greater crime against humanity. And in caring so much more about the former, indeed in not even wanting to know the facts of the latter, we ourselves – ordinary people, our political leaders, the Press, the Church – compound the felony. (*Church Times*, 21 November 1986)

Henry R. Huttenbach addressed the expanded use of the word 'Holocaust' and the parallels of the Holocaust of the Jews and the Ukrainian famine, especially with regard to a cover-up and the failure of the Roosevelt Administration to act. See *Martyrdom and Resistance* 13, no. 4 (March-April 1987): 1, 10. Coplon, who saw the famine campaign as having the agenda of Holocaust denial, quoted Eli Rosenbaum, former general counsel of the World Jewish Congress, as saying, 'They are always looking to come up with a number bigger than six million . . . It makes the reader think: "My god, it's worse than the Holocaust".' *The Village Voice* (12 January 1988): 32. Mr. Rosenbaum wrote a letter asserting that the quote should not be interpreted to mean that he denied the magnitude of the tragedy of the famine in Ukraine and the responsibility of Stalin, but did not deny making the statement. *The Village Voice* (2 February 1988). The issue became markedly politicized by those who saw the entire issue of the famine as intended to divert attention from the Holocaust or from war crimes by some Ukrainians during World War II. This view was most strongly argued by the communist apologist Douglas Tottle in his 'Anti-Semitism and the Ukrainian 1933 Famine Genocide Hoax', *Outlook* (June 1987): 5-6. On those who deny the famine because they see the Ukrainians as anti-Semites, see Arch Puddington, 'Denying the Terror Famine', *National Review* (25 May 1992): 33-6.

46. Stephan Merl, 'Entfachte Stalin die Hungersnot von 1932–1933'.
47. Moscow was the first site of discussions of literature that had appeared in the West. See V. Danilov, 'Diskussiiia v zapadnoi presse o golode 1932–1933 gg. i "demograficheskoi katastrofe" 30–40-kh godov v SSSR', *Voprosy istorii* no. 3 (1988): 116–21. Danilov evaluated Conquest's book negatively. Discussion of Western reviews was limited to Peter Wiles and J. Arch Getty. Danilov supported the 'Revisionists of Anti-Communism'. Most attention was devoted to the issue of the number of victims through discussions of literature by Wheatcroft, Anderson, and Silver, and others. In a polemic with Conquest about the Ukrainian aspect of the famine, Danilov distorted Conquest's discussion of the national composition of the Kuban and seemed to limit the population to Kuban Cossacks, thereby denying that there was a large Ukrainian population in the Kuban (p. 117).
48. L. Kovalenko and V. Maniak, *Holod 33. Narodna knyha-memorial* (Kyiv, 1991).
49. On the project to erect a monument in the village of Malynivka in Poltava oblast and the difficulties placed in its way by the authorities, see O. Iahol'nyk, "'Tin" Solovkiv. Pro initsiatyvu liudei, iaki vyryshyly vstanovyty pam'iatnyi znak svoim odnosel'chanam-zhertvam holodu 33–ho', *Radians'ka Ukraina* (26 August 1989).
50. The full Ukrainian version, *Zhnyva Skorboty. Radians'ka kolektyvizatsiia i holodomor*, appeared in Kyiv in 1993.
51. The prime example is *Holod 1932–1933 rokiv na Ukraini: Ochyma istorykiv, movoiu dokumentiv* (Kyiv, 1990), published by the Institute of the History of the Party under the Communist Party of Ukraine. Compiled at the Party's behest, the volume demonstrates how much of the old mentality remained, especially in the article by V. Savel'iev, 'Trahediiia ukrains'koho narodu u vysvitleni zarubizhnoi istoriohrafii', pp. 85–108, which deals quite favourably with Coplon's article in *The Village Voice*.
52. For a discussion of Stanislav Kul'chyts'kyi's reactions to the literature in the West, see James E. Mace, 'Soviet Ukrainian Historian Pens Attack on U. S. Famine Commission', *Ukrainian Weekly* (27 November 1990): 1, 4.
53. The symposium supported the conclusions of the US Famine Commission and condemned the 'pseudo historians' of the Institute of History of the Academy of Sciences and of the Institute of the History of the Communist Party for their falsifications. 'Ukhvala Mizhnarodnoho sympoziumu Holodomor-33', *Literaturna Ukraina* (11 October 1990).
54. See an interview with James Mace, 'Khochu spokutuvaty velycheznu provynu amerykans'koho narodu pered ukrains'kym', *Ukraina* no. 13 (July 1994): 11–13.
55. At the Second Congress of Famine Researchers in December 1994, the political significance of the famine was very much in evidence. The deaths of the activists Volodymyr Maniak and Lidia Kovalenko, who had organized Memorial's collections of materials, had obviously weakened activities. Still, it was reported that 48 famine monuments were planned. The political nature of the issue was clear in the remarks of

Levko Lukianenko, a long-term political prisoner under the Soviets and a leader of the current democratic national opposition who, according to *News from Ukraine*, maintained that 'the research of the famine is deliberately hampered by former members of the occupation bodies of power. Today, they hold office again and feel responsible for the crimes committed'. Lukianenko was elected chairman, and vowed to appeal for recognition for the crimes of Russian communism against the Ukrainian nation. *News from Ukraine* no. 1 (1995). For the current state of the discussion, see Dzeims Meis (James Mace), 'Politychni prychny holodomoru v Ukraini (1932–1933 rr.)', *Ukrains'kyi istorychnyi zhurnal* no. 1 (1995): 34–48.

56. Stephen Wheatcroft has raised his estimates of famine losses throughout the Soviet Union from 3–4 million to 4–5 million based on statistics of death registrations. Although he discusses the high rates of mortality throughout Ukraine, he does not give a figure for how many of the deaths were in Ukraine. See 'More Light on the Scale of the Repression and the Excess Mortality in the Soviet Union in the 1930s', in J. Arch Getty and Roberta Manning, *Stalinist Terror: New Perspectives* (n.p., 1993), pp. 280, 282–3, and Alec Nove's article, 'How Many Victims in the 1930s?', in *Soviet Studies* 42, no. 2 (April 1990): 355–73. Stanislav Kulchyts'kyi argues that Wheatcroft's use of death registry statistics underestimates the number of deaths because the statistics are inaccurate. Using the 1937 census and the shortfall of population in Ukraine after migration, he estimates 3–3.5 million deaths and 1–1.3 million unborn who would have been born had the famine not occurred. 'Ukraine's Demographic Losses from the Famine in 1932–33 According to the General Census of the Population in 1937'. Unpublished paper, 1994.