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## Grappling with the Hero: Hrushevs'kyi Confronts Khmel'nyts'kyi

FRANK E. SYSYN

In the aftershock of Ukrainian independence, numerous Sovietologists began to reexamine their statements about Ukrainian affairs. This endeavor took place on the crest of a general reevaluation of the national question in Eastern Europe, and in particular its importance in bringing down the communist order and the Soviet Union. Nations were triumphing over states on their way to building nation-states in a way that disquieted Western commentators, who wished to see the state and the nation as identical. They advocated a civic nation and insisted that a population's nationality, culture, or ethnicity should not influence its political loyalties and concept of political legitimacy. To many such commentators, the ethnic nation was a throwback to nineteenth-century Romanticism and twentieth-century blood chauvinism.<sup>1</sup>

These specialists were soon to find ample reason for their forebodings in the violent disintegration of Yugoslavia. Yet at the same time, the breakup of Czechoslovakia occurred as an almost friendly parting of two nations whose elites understood that the identity of the smaller could not be accommodated in a Czechoslovak (or even Czecho-Slovak) state. The small Baltic peoples proceeded toward establishing Estonian, Latvian, and Lithuanian nation-states, while accepting European norms for minorities, including those inherited from the Soviet occupation. Finally, Belarus demonstrated that when a folk overwhelmingly lacked national consciousness, it could not be mobilized either for state building or for overturning the communist order.

Ukraine has remained the major question mark. While the percentage of Ukrainians in the population exceeds the proportions of Latvians and Estonians in their states, the low level of Ukrainian language use and of national cohesiveness and consciousness in Ukraine have impeded the process of state building.<sup>2</sup> In 1991–1992, many of the Western commentators focused their attention on the potential dangers of Ukrainian nationalism, including mistreatment of minorities, and criticized the steps taken towards rectifying Soviet and Russian imperial discrimination against and persecution of Ukrainian language and culture. They did not see that without a certain level of Ukrainian national consciousness, a rebirth of Ukrainian culture and language, and the institutionalization of Ukrainian symbols, the reasons for embarking on the construction of a Ukrainian state were hardly convincing and the chances that it would endure were minimal.<sup>3</sup>

It was in this atmosphere that Abraham Brumberg wrote his controversial piece “Not so Free at Last,” in *The New York Review of Books* in the autumn of 1992.<sup>4</sup> For many well-wishers of the new Ukrainian state, the article seemed an unbalanced attempt to find negative nationalist excesses in a state and society that, compared to most in Eastern Europe, had relatively few of them. This historian found questionable Brumberg’s portrayal of Bohdan Khmel’nyts’kyi in his effort to demonstrate the baneful influence of the “Ukrainian national myth” in the new state. My letter on the article asserted that it was not modern Ukrainian nationalists, but the Cossack historians of the early eighteenth century who had created the Khmel’nyts’kyi cult, and that a Mazepa cult might well replace the Khmel’nyts’kyi cult in post-Soviet Ukraine.<sup>5</sup> Mr. Brumberg’s reply to the letter in the same issue was intended to deride both hetmans in their role as national heroes, citing some of the usual Soviet clichés on Mazepa’s wealth. But to buttress his argument on Khmel’nyts’kyi, Brumberg also called upon the assessment of Mykhailo Hrushevs’kyi.<sup>6</sup> In so doing, he drew on the authority of the author of one of the works of the canon of the Ukrainian national movement (or as he would have it, national myth) to support his critique of that very construct.<sup>7</sup>

For most historians, Hrushevs’kyi’s view of Khmel’nyts’kyi is the one propounded in his magnum opus, *Istoriia Ukraïny-Rusy* (The History of Ukraine-Rus).<sup>8</sup> From volume 1, first published in 1898, to volume 10, completed before his death in 1934, Hrushevs’kyi used thousands of primary sources and secondary works in his examination of the history of the Ukrainian land and people from prehistory to the 1660s. The reprinting of the 10 volumes (11 books) of Hrushevs’kyi’s *Istoriia Ukraïny-Rusy* has been the greatest project in the process of restoring historical memory in Ukraine.<sup>9</sup> Planned in response to the demands that arose during glasnost in the late 1980s, the reprinting was initiated when the Ukrainian revival was at its height in 1991; people waited in long lines to snap up the first volume’s massive press run. The project has been completed despite the subsequent economic crisis in Ukraine and curtailment of funding for scholarship, in part because of private support, but more fundamentally because of the significance that Hrushevs’kyi—Ukraine’s greatest historian and the leader of the independent state that was declared in 1918—had assumed for the state and society of contemporary Ukraine.

The publication of the reprint of volume 9, part 2, in 1997 has given the Ukrainian public its first opportunity since 1931 to read Hrushevs’kyi’s devastating criticism of Khmel’nyts’kyi. Indeed, it might be more proper to say that for inhabitants of pre-1939 Soviet Ukraine, this is really the first opportunity, since by 1931 the Soviet campaign against Hrushevs’kyi and his *Istoriia* had begun; the very purchase of the volume was a dangerous act.<sup>10</sup> The readers who now encounter Hrushevs’kyi’s views for the first time may find them troubling, in particular if they have internalized the new national iconostasis, which includes both the hetman and the historian. In this they will be joining scholars who have long found chapter 13 of volume 9 intemperate. Within a

year of the volume's original publication, one of Hrushev'skyi's best students and a major specialist of the Khmel'nyts'kyi period in the next generation, Myron Korduba—despite his great sympathy for his beleaguered teacher—negatively evaluated his appraisal of the hetman in a review written outside Soviet Ukraine.<sup>11</sup>

In volume 9, Hrushev'skyi pointed out to his readers that he had offered many general evaluations of the Khmel'nyts'kyi uprising in the past and provided a list of scholarly, popular, and literary works.<sup>12</sup> It is through them that one can best trace the evolution of the historian's views on Khmel'nyts'kyi in order to place his appraisal in the *Istoriia* in context. Only through an examination of the occasions when and reasons why Hrushev'skyi chose to evaluate the hetman can a fuller understanding of the historian's grappling with the image of the hetman emerge.

Hrushev'skyi's earliest appraisal dates to 1897 and the short story "Iasnomozhnyi svat" (His Grace, the Matchmaker).<sup>13</sup> But the young professor's major scholarly statement on Khmel'nyts'kyi came in the special issue of the *Zapysky Naukovoho tovarystva im. Shevchenka*, published in 1898 to mark the 250th anniversary of the 1648 uprising. By then Hrushev'skyi, a student of the great Ukrainian populist historian Volodymyr Antonovych of Kyiv, had spent four years raising the level of academic life among the Ukrainians of Galicia—a land where Polish-Ukrainian antagonism shaped all discussions of Khmel'nyts'kyi and the uprising. The excellent source and literary studies by Stepan Tomashiv'skyi and Ivan Franko in the issue demonstrated the high quality of research being undertaken in Lviv. It fell to Hrushev'skyi to give the general evaluation of the man and the event in his lead article, entitled "Khmel'nyts'kyi i Khmel'nychchyna" (Khmel'nyts'kyi and the Khmel'nyts'kyi Uprising).<sup>14</sup>

On the whole, one finds in this early article many of the assertions that were to dominate Hrushev'skyi's assessment until 1931. He concentrated on the event rather than the man, insisting that the Khmel'nyts'kyi uprising was as significant for the Ukrainians as the Reformation had been for the Germans and the French Revolution for Western Europe. He maintained that the uprising was epochal because it represented the interests of the masses at least until the Zboriv Agreement of 1649, and that the masses continued to struggle for their interests long after. Yet Hrushev'skyi described the Khmel'nyts'kyi uprising as a "complete fiasco" in the long run in terms of its social and political outcomes (p. 27): there was no lasting social change benefiting the masses, and the alliance with Muscovy, which had been planned as temporary, determined Ukraine's political fate. Nevertheless, he saw the emergence of ideas of social emancipation, and the masses' adherence to these ideals for a period of more than a century after the revolt, as being of great significance. He viewed the flowering of Ukrainian culture (an evaluation he later abandoned), the awakening of national consciousness, and the attempt to form a Ukrainian polity as positive developments. Indeed, he even referred to the real relation of Ukraine

to Muscovy after the Pereiaslav Agreement of 1654 as of a state in a personal union (p. 23). He saw the political culture of the Hetmanate, formed by the Khmel'nyts'kyi uprising, as engendering the concepts of autonomism and constitutionalism that underlay modern Ukrainian nationalism (*natsionalizm*).

Hrushevskyi pointed out how controversial Khmel'nyts'kyi had been and remained, referring to Mykhailo Maksymovych's enthusiasm for the hetman and Panteleimon Kulish's hatred of him. Hrushevskyi was far from either extreme. He presented his view of the individual in history and underlined the relationship of great men to the masses. He maintained that if, with the development of culture, a person does not become capable of being objective—the true sign of culture—he remains a deeply subjective being. Only rarely do people act solely from theoretical motives not associated with their persons. But one's own deeply held perceptions can give one a key to understanding, a feeling for others, an ability to connect one's own grief and wrong with that of the masses, to act as their spokesman. In this way, subjective reasons are transformed in such a heart into a pain through which great souls develop empathy for the whole world. He said that it was possible not to count Khmel'nyts'kyi among such "great souls," but that one must recognize that he was a person of the highest capabilities and remarkable character.<sup>15</sup>

Hrushevskyi then proceeded to make a balance sheet of Khmel'nyts'kyi's failures and successes. In outlining the hetman's shortcomings, he argued that Khmel'nyts'kyi had begun with no plan other than representing Cossack interests, and that the hetman wasted time after his earlier victories instead of pressing on against the Commonwealth.<sup>16</sup> He accused him of having taken a rash step in his relations with Muscovy. He believed that this misstep occurred because, as an experienced and accomplished diplomat (but not a politician) the hetman did not give any importance to words and forms. (This rather unusual distinction between "diplomat" and "politician" appeared frequently in Hrushevskyi's writings.)

On the positive side, Hrushevskyi saw Khmel'nyts'kyi's statements on the unity and political freedom of the "Ukrainian-Ruthenian nation" (*narod*)<sup>17</sup> after Christmas 1648 as of great significance. Even though they were not fully crystallized and were not carried out in the hetman's actions, the statements had emerged after centuries during which no such thought had been expressed (p. 8). Hrushevskyi asserted that the hetman had quickly understood his mistake in entering into relations with Muscovy: he had acted as the head of a state in his acceptance of the oath of the Pinsk nobility in 1657, and he had revealed his plans for a Ukrainian state in his negotiations with Sweden. Hrushevskyi argued that taking into account the circumstances in which Khmel'nyts'kyi operated, one can only marvel at the hetman's great ability in administration and organization. Above all, Hrushevskyi maintained that none of Khmel'nyts'kyi's successors came close to equalling him. While he took the hetman to task for his indifference to the masses and his failure to turn to them as his base of support, Hrushevskyi saw these failings as reflecting the level of

the "Ukrainian intelligentsia" of that age. He declared that while one could regret that Khmel'nyts'kyi did not rise above the wisdom of his age, one could hardly expect that he would do so. He asserted that Khmel'nyts'kyi had to be seen as "one of the most able and talented people of our nation (*narod*)."

The marking of the 250th anniversary of the uprising was only the first of numerous commemorations of the momentous events of the mid-seventeenth century. Hrushevskyi took up his pen again to give his views on the 250th anniversary of the Pereiaslav Agreement in 1904. Although the article appeared in a Ukrainian version in *Literaturno-naukovyi visnyk*, it had been written for *Ruthenische Revue*.<sup>18</sup> Hence, unlike the earlier piece intended for internal Ukrainian consumption, this article was originally meant to present the Ukrainian case to the outside world. Hrushevskyi depicted the Pereiaslav Agreement as a poorly thought-out series of arrangements from the Ukrainian side, designed to secure Russian military support. He maintained that Khmel'nyts'kyi had considered it a temporary measure, but soon had become convinced that the agreement was a mistake and had sought to overturn it. While maintaining that Khmel'nyts'kyi had reckoned wrongly in thinking of negotiations with Moscow as similar to those with "the powerless government of anarchic Poland" (p. 4), Hrushevskyi was in general complimentary to the hetman. He called Khmel'nyts'kyi a great politician as well as an organizer of genius. He maintained that he was a "skillful diplomat" educated in "the highest school of diplomacy—the Oriental," thereby explaining that he had no scruples in making the promises needed to gain allies. This image of the Oriental or Asian hetman was to be expanded in a more negative light in Hrushevskyi's later works, but in 1904 it was merely mentioned. In this piece, Hrushevskyi repeated his earlier criticism of Khmel'nyts'kyi for his attitude toward the masses. At the same time he informed his Western readers and repeated for his Ukrainian readers that the mistakes of the leaders of the seventeenth-century "revolution" in fulfilling the social aspirations of the masses were not being repeated by the current leaders of the Ukrainian movement. He maintained that the contemporary leaders were seeking to undo the consequences of the failed Pereiaslav experiment.<sup>19</sup>

While the Pereiaslav anniversary dealt with a fateful decision of Khmel'nyts'kyi's hetmancy, the 250th anniversary of Khmel'nyts'kyi's death, marked in 1907, focused attention on the hetman himself. In 1857, Mykhailo Maksymovych's piece on the 200th anniversary of Khmel'nyts'kyi's death had initiated a major debate on the role of the hetman, above all as to whether he deserved a monument and what form that monument should take.<sup>20</sup> One of the harshest critics of the monument proposal and of Khmel'nyts'kyi himself had been the conservative Polish intellectual Michał Grabowski.<sup>21</sup> In 1907, however, the discussion of the character of the hetman had already been preempted by a Polish attack on Khmel'nyts'kyi. This view emerged during the celebrations in 1905 of the 250th anniversary of the lifting of the second siege of Lviv. Central to these celebrations were the writings of Franciszek Rawita-

Gawroński, who in publications such as *1655–1905. Krwawy gość we Lwowie* (The Bloody Guest in Lviv) sought to deride the hetman and through him the Ukrainian population of Galicia.<sup>22</sup> These celebrations of the “All-Poles” (*Wszechpolacy*), which Hrushevs’kyi mentioned in *Literaturno-naukovyi visnyk*, seemed to have influenced the dean of Ukrainian historians to take a more sympathetic view of the hetman when writing his piece on the anniversary of Khmel’nyts’kyi’s death.

In “Bohdanovi rokovyiny” (The Bohdan Anniversaries), Hrushevs’kyi argued that the very magnitude of the events in which Khmel’nyts’kyi had been involved controlled him more than he controlled them, and therefore they overshadowed him.<sup>23</sup> He maintained that the epochal nature of the events had determined his own contemporaries’ and subsequent generations’ evaluation of the hetman. Thus, while the Ukrainian masses of his generation had often cursed Khmel’nyts’kyi, subsequent generations had come to see him positively as the representative of free autonomous administration and the struggle for political, economic, and national freedom. Nevertheless, the false praise of the propagators of “Orthodoxy, Autocracy, and Nationality” and the erection of the Khmel’nyts’kyi monument to “One and Indivisible [Russia]” by the Iuzefovychites<sup>24</sup> had besmirched the hetman’s reputation for the modern Ukrainian national movement. Hrushevs’kyi went on to call for understanding for this man who had been cursed by the masses, who had been laid low by failures before his death, whose body had been burned and ashes scattered by his enemies. Hrushevs’kyi maintained that those who saw the problems of national renewal in their own time as analogous to those of the seventeenth century might better understand Khmel’nyts’kyi. Could Ukraine under the negative influences of aristocratic Polish rule have produced a more aware or talented leader? Hrushevs’kyi waxed poetic on how Khmel’nyts’kyi was consumed in the great conflagration in which he expended all his energies to fulfill his responsibilities. Turning from the leader to the people in his exposition, Hrushevs’kyi called for the fulfillment of the seventeenth-century great popular movement under a new flag for a free autonomous Ukraine without lord and peasant.

Two years later, Hrushevs’kyi presented Khmel’nyts’kyi to the broad masses in his popular booklet *Pro bat’ka kozats’koho Bohdana Khmel’nyts’koho* (On the Cossack Father Bohdan Khmel’nyts’kyi).<sup>25</sup> Finally, the Ukrainian national movement in the Russian Empire had the opportunity to reach beyond the narrow circles of the intelligentsia and to do so using the Ukrainian language.<sup>26</sup> That Hrushevs’kyi hoped to form the consciousness of broader masses was apparent in his use of the Cossack dumas, a popular poetic form accessible to Ukrainian speakers who still lived in an age of oral literature, throughout the work.

Hrushevs’kyi crafted a sophisticated account couched in simple language. Numerous sources are used and quoted without citations. Negative aspects of the era, such as the violence, the slaughter, and the Tatar raids are mentioned,

but the positive outweighs the negative. Hrushev'skyi begins his account with the image of the Khmel'nyts'kyi monument in the St. Sophia Square. He asserts that no figure has been so loved and so condemned as Khmel'nyts'kyi. Reflecting on the centuries of controversy over the hetman, he maintains: "... only for great people is there great love or great hate. And at times the hate brings them more glory than praise. The whole importance lies in who praises and for what reason, just as in who derides and why" (p. 3).

Hrushev'skyi presented a Khmel'nyts'kyi in accordance with his earlier views, including that the hetman had not begun with a plan to free Ukraine and to improve the lot of the peasantry. Khmel'nyts'kyi is seen as coming to these goals during the uprising. This booklet, focusing solely on the hetman and meant for a mass audience, presents Khmel'nyts'kyi quite heroically. It ends with the conclusion:

But the memory of Bohdan remained eternally living and dear in the Cossack Host and the Ukrainian people. The Ukrainian people did not forget Bohdan for the good that the glorious hetman wished for Ukraine. It sang praises of Bohdan's deeds in songs and dumas as it did for no other hetman. The people retained these songs and dumas to our times, in a way it did not retain the memory of anything or anyone else in Ukrainian history! (p. 54)

The heroic image as portrayed in the popular biography was less clearly drawn in the illustrated history of Ukraine that Hrushev'skyi first published in 1911, and reworked in 1912 when the 7,000 run was sold out.<sup>27</sup> He described the work as intended to be accessible, but he also provided a table of contents to his multivolume academic history for readers who wished to delve more deeply into problems. In the one-volume history, he went far beyond the year 1625 that he had reached in the recently published volume 7 of the *Istoriia Ukrainy-Rusy*, bringing Ukrainian history up to the present. Recounting the events of the Khmel'nyts'kyi uprising, Hrushev'skyi traced the hetman's actions with relatively little discussion of his person. He did describe him as having great political skill and talent as a statesman, and as loving Ukraine and being dedicated to its interests. In the same passage, however, he took Khmel'nyts'kyi to task for seeking foreign help instead of awakening his own people and depending on them. Hrushev'skyi saw the hetman as too attached to Cossack interests even after his vow in early 1649 to bring about the liberation of the entire Ukrainian people and all Ukraine, though Hrushev'skyi admitted that the development and fruition of such concepts required time (p. 309). In describing the Hetmanate, Hrushev'skyi saw Khmel'nyts'kyi as greatly augmenting the hetman's authority and becoming the ruler of the country. He maintained that many political, social, and ideological tensions existed in the newly forming Hetmanate, but they might have been held in check and resolved had it not been for Khmel'nyts'kyi's premature demise (or if Ukraine had enjoyed a decade or more of peace after his death) (p. 324).

In the first years after the revolution of 1905, Hrushevskyyi was optimistic about the future of Ukrainian society and the Ukrainian movement in the Russian Empire. By 1912 when he wrote “Na ukrains’ki temy: ‘Mazepynstvo’ i ‘Bohdanivstvo’” (On Ukrainian topics: “Mazepism” and “Bohdanism”), he had seen the full course of the reaction.<sup>28</sup> Responding to the attempts of Russian nationalists to use the image of Hetman Khmel’nytskyi against the Ukrainian movement, he turned again to a characterization of Khmel’nytskyi, this time in a comparison with Mazepa, whose image he had recently discussed during the 200th anniversary of the Battle of Poltava.<sup>29</sup> This article was Hrushevskyyi’s only characterization of Khmel’nytskyi in which there is no criticism of the hetman or mention of the social issue. Answering the Russian nationalist Right and the tsarist bureaucrats who had renewed their persecution of the Ukrainian movement as treasonous, Hrushevskyyi concentrated on national issues in the present and the past. He called Ivan Mazepa an unlikely symbol for the Ukrainian cause since he had not shown the lifelong dedication to Ukrainian independence that Petro Doroshenko and Pylyp Orlyk had. But he admitted that the statements and anathemas of Peter I and the accusations of Mazepism against the Ukrainian movement in the nineteenth century had associated Mazepa with the Ukrainian cause. He was incensed that there were those who were now trying falsely to use Khmel’nytskyi as a symbol of loyalty to Russia in opposition to Mazepa. Calling him “the great hetman,” he asserted that Khmel’nytskyi had viewed the ties with Russia after 1654 negatively, that many tensions existed between the Russians and Khmel’nytskyi after the Pereiaslav Agreement, and that Khmel’nytskyi resolutely sought to break with Russia through the Swedish alliance. He called Khmel’nytskyi not only a clear autonomist, but a relatively conscious bearer of the Ukrainian state idea (p. 98). He pointed out that the elite of Mazepa’s time had seen the alliance with Charles XII as a continuation of Khmel’nytskyi’s policies.

In the years just before the First World War, Hrushevskyyi was writing volume 8 and collecting material for volume 9 of the *Istoriia*, the tomes of his work that covered the Khmel’nytskyi period. Yet just as he was embarking on this project, new evaluations and interpretations were emerging among Polish and Ukrainian historians. While the major Polish biography of Khmel’nytskyi that appeared from the pen of Rawita-Gawroński in 1906–1909 was a virulent diatribe against the hetman and Ukrainians, the distinguished Polish scholar of the seventeenth century, Ludwik Kubala, wrote an evaluation of Khmel’nytskyi in 1910 that was the most positive made by a modern historian to that time.<sup>30</sup> Describing Khmel’nytskyi as a greater statesman and leader than Cromwell, Kubala called on his fellow Poles to understand that denigrating a man who had brought their state to its knees did them no service.

While the elderly Polish historian’s comments did not have an immediate impact on Polish historiography, they contributed to the reevaluation of the hetman and the uprising among the younger generation of Ukrainian historians who were evolving into the “statist” (*derzhavnyts’ka*) school. These historians

were already influenced by the return of attention to the role of the great man in history that was occurring in German and Polish historiography. Influenced by the rise of Ukrainian political movements advocating statehood, they were dissatisfied with the Ukrainian populist tradition that almost revelled in the statelessness of the Ukrainians and condemned elites. V'ïacheslav Lypyn'skyi, a Polish nobleman turned Ukrainian patriot, headed this movement, and the appearance of his monograph on Mykhailo Krychev'skyi in the massive volume of materials he edited, *Z dziejów Ukrainy*, revolutionized studies of the Khmel'nyts'kyi period.<sup>31</sup> Lypyn'skyi demonstrated the mass participation of the Ukrainian nobility in the revolt and devoted great attention to its state-building elements. Above all, he considered Khmel'nyts'kyi a brilliant leader and a conscious state builder. The conservative political thinker Lypyn'skyi was working in parallel with a number of Hrushev'skyi's students such as Stepan Tomashiv'skyi, Myron Korduba, and Ivan Kryp'ïakevych, who also saw Khmel'nyts'kyi in a positive light for his state- and nation-building activities. After the First World War and the attempt to set up a Ukrainian state, the statist school became dominant in western Ukraine and the Ukrainian emigration and influenced historians in Soviet Ukraine.<sup>32</sup>

In the 1890s and early 1900s, Hrushev'skyi was the unchallenged doyen of Ukrainian historians who swept all along with him by his phenomenal erudition and range of expertise from archaeology to medieval diplomatics. When he later undertook his writing on the Khmel'nyts'kyi period, however, he was no longer in such a position, in part because of his own success in training a younger generation of scholars who worked on the period. One can see his reaction to this situation in the historiographical survey on the Khmel'nyts'kyi period in volume 8, part 2, written just before the First World War and first published in 1916. While his description of Lypyn'skyi's contribution was cautiously factual, when he went on to discuss Tomashiv'skyi's recent work he described it as "also having an apologetic and even enthusiastic characterization of the Khmel'nyts'kyi uprising and especially Khmel'nyts'kyi himself."<sup>33</sup>

In introducing the person of Khmel'nyts'kyi in volume 8, Hrushev'skyi gave one more assessment of the hetman. The short biography of Khmel'nyts'kyi up to the beginning of the uprising sought to separate fact from fiction in the many legends of the hetman's life. Regrettably, the excursuses that Hrushev'skyi wrote on these complex questions were not published in volume 8, part 2, and his plan to publish them separately was thwarted when they were burnt along with his library during the Bolshevik bombardment of his house in 1918. In depicting Khmel'nyts'kyi's decision to rebel as a result of personal persecution, Hrushev'skyi believed a turning point occurred in the life of the cautious and levelheaded Cossack captain so great that one might speak of two different people. Hrushev'skyi characterized Khmel'nyts'kyi as accustomed to hide his intentions and to appear humble. He described him as talkative and witty, and desirous of surprising his listeners. He saw him as an actor who combined sincere directness with Oriental cunning, a mixture of both petty noble obse-

quiousness and prideful consciousness of his great power and providential election. Hrushevs'kyi believed that the tribulations that Khmel'nytskyi suffered drove him to seek solace in drink but at the same time called forth from him extraordinary talents, energy, organizational skill, a remarkable dexterity, and an unprecedented power to influence people, all of which place him in the ranks of the most prominent heroes of history.<sup>34</sup>

Hrushevs'kyi completed the final chapter of part 3 of volume 8, that brought the account of the revolt to early 1650, in 1917, but the first printing was destroyed. He published the three parts together in Vienna in 1922, introducing no changes so as not to allow the momentous events he had just lived through to affect his account. He wrote in the preface to part 3, "Let it be as it was written then, when present-day politics did not yet divide Ukrainians." His next volume, however, was to reflect these divisions.

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Hrushevs'kyi resumed his research on the *Istoriia* after his controversial return to Soviet Ukraine in 1924.<sup>35</sup> Since he was partially retracing work that he had completed before the war and the destruction of his archive and papers, this resumption of work on volume 9 must have been stressful. With his customary energy, he carried on new archival searches and organized a network of colleagues in Kyiv, Lviv, Moscow, Cracow, Warsaw, and Vienna to assemble new materials. In his introduction he thanks Myron Korduba, Vasył Herasymchuk, A. Vytoshyn'skyi, Volodymyr Iefymov'skyi, Viktor Iurkevych, Anatol' Iershov, D. Kravtsiv, Mykola Petrov'skyi and S. Porfyrev for their assistance, a group that included both his prewar colleagues and his new colleagues in Soviet Ukraine. Writing the volume between 1926 and 1928, he published the first part in the latter year, and the second part in 1931.

The introduction revealed the historian's leftward drift since 1917 and reflected the new Marxist-influenced climate in which he worked. His insistence that he had sought to illuminate the actions and thought of the popular masses rather than the elites was not a great departure from his traditional populist approach. His terminology on social-economic struggle, class interests, and his ordering of his social-economic discussion before his discussion of changes in consciousness did fit the ethos of Soviet Ukraine. So did his use of terminology and periodization in asserting that the sixteenth-century movement of rebirth had continued its development in the Khmel'nytskyi period and had shaped that which in time would be the Ukrainian nation (*natsiia*). The degree to which Marxist-like terminology or Hrushevs'kyi's espoused view of himself as a historian-sociologist shaped the volume has yet to be explored.<sup>36</sup>

More significant for his vision of Khmel'nytskyi was the degree to which Hrushevs'kyi viewed his magisterial work as an answer to the statist school and to V'iacheslav Lypyn'skyi in particular. This aim underlay his characterization of Khmel'nytskyi and the Khmel'nytskyi uprising in chapter 13 of part 2.<sup>37</sup> In

discussing his own writings on Khmel'nyts'kyi, Hrushevs'kyi openly admitted that the context in which he had written his works had affected his evaluations, calling his 1898 piece a defense of Khmel'nyts'kyi against attempts (presumably by Panteleimon Kulish and Polish historians) to represent the hetman as "a wild destroyer, a morally flawed nobody" (p. 1496). He asserted that he had since changed some of his opinions, in particular as to whether Khmel'nyts'kyi had stood out above his contemporaries. Indeed there were other changes in his opinions that he did not explicitly point out, such as about the cultural life of Ukraine in the age of Khmel'nyts'kyi, which he now viewed negatively.

Hrushevs'kyi began his chapter with the question to what degree the Khmel'nyts'kyi uprising had been coherent, planned, and constructive. In practice, as he outlined the historiography on the question he also dealt with the evaluation of Khmel'nyts'kyi. He presented the traditional eighteenth-century image of Khmel'nyts'kyi as an all-national (*vsenarodnii*) liberator and the Khmel'nyts'kyi uprising as an all-national struggle for liberation, only differing in emphasis as to whether the interests of the clergy or the Cossack officers dominated. Mentioning Hryhorii Skovoroda's characterization of Khmel'nyts'kyi as "father of liberty, the hero Bohdan," Hrushevs'kyi saw this tradition as one that viewed the hetman as "the finest son of the Ukrainian people and the finest representative of this all-national (*vsenarodnii*) character of Cossackdom, the all-national hero, the liberator of Ukraine, who gave his life to this task and in some way succeeded in it . . ." (p. 1480).

In exploring the questions he posed, Hrushevs'kyi went on to demonstrate how subsequent historical writing had diverged from the traditional view, including the harsh evaluations of Khmel'nyts'kyi by Petr Butskii and Panteleimon Kulish. He took into account the opinions of his teacher Volodymyr Antonovych and his own students. His analysis of the changing view of the nature of the Khmel'nyts'kyi uprising then turned to the generally accepted opinion that there had been no equal to Khmel'nyts'kyi among the Cossack elite, a view he himself had earlier espoused. Next, after posing the question to what degree Khmel'nyts'kyi and the Cossack elite had represented general national (*zahal'no-natsional'ni*) and general state interests, Hrushevs'kyi focused on an evaluation of Khmel'nyts'kyi. He maintained that despite the universal opinion of the hetman's great significance, no really scholarly critical analysis existed. Given the considerable attention to Khmel'nyts'kyi in the 1910s and 1920s, above all by V'iacheslav Lypyn'skyi, Hrushevs'kyi was thus denigrating the most recent writing, which he asserted was still under the influence of traditional historiography in emphasizing the fundamental significance of Khmel'nyts'kyi.<sup>38</sup>

Hrushevs'kyi quickly made clear that, in his new view, Khmel'nyts'kyi did not particularly stand out among his contemporaries in his capabilities and influence. He declared that he had wished to use as the epigraph to the volume a statement by Hetman Mikołaj Potocki—"Do they only have one Khmel'nyts'kyi? One could count thousands of them. If they lose one today, in

his place they select another still more talented and effective.” He maintained, however, that he had wished to do this to illustrate a high evaluation of the revolutionary Ukrainian masses, but had not done so because he feared that it would have been seen as an attempt to denigrate the reputation of Khmel’nyts’kyi. He insisted that this was not his wish (p. 1486). Later, he maintained, “I do not wish to belittle the person of Khmel’nyts’kyi in the least” (p. 1496), and, still later, “I repeat, with this I do not wish to denigrate Khmel’nyts’kyi” (p. 1507). The more he protested the clearer it became that this was exactly what he was doing.

Hrushevskyi began the discussion of his views with a presentation of the recent opinions in historical circles. He concentrated on the most striking praise of the hetman by Ludwik Kubala, whom he called Khmel’nyts’kyi’s panegyrist. Hrushevskyi translated a four-page excerpt from Kubala, which contained his views that Khmel’nyts’kyi had succeeded in the fields of war, finances, state economy, administration, and relations with surrounding states on a territory open to enemies and without the benefit of an established state and an experienced intelligentsia. After citing Kubala’s effusive praise of Khmel’nyts’kyi, Hrushevskyi called it perceptive. He agreed with certain elements of the characterization of Khmel’nyts’kyi’s character: uneven temperament, extraordinary energy, dynamism, sensibility, a deeply developed sense of fantasy, quick-wittedness, a tendency to hyperbole, a talent to use psychological influence, a tendency to theatricality, poor discrimination, ruthlessness, freedom from any moral boundaries, and an extraordinary attachment to rule as a dogma of life. In sum, he selected what might be called the less attractive qualities that Kubala saw in Khmel’nyts’kyi rather than those associated with statesmanship. Still, Hrushevskyi concluded this discussion with an assertion that “Bohdan was a truly born leader-ruler and politician-diplomat. He easily captured and aroused the masses, knew how to rule over their moods—with bloody force as well as with a kind word, a humble gesture, in his nature there was something disarmingly charming that drew people to him.” But then he queried, “But was he also a politician in the higher meaning—a builder of society and state, an organizer of society and culture? In the long-term perspective?” (p. 1490).

Before dealing with that question, Hrushevskyi discussed the views of Lypynskyi. He mentioned *Ukraina na perelomi* (Ukraine at the Turning-Point), which had been published in Vienna in 1920 and was in reality the work his conclusion answered directly.<sup>39</sup> He summarized Lypynskyi’s view of Khmel’nyts’kyi as a statesman of genius who sought to create a hereditary monarchy and a European society of estates in Ukraine. He also presented Lypynskyi’s opinion that Khmel’nyts’kyi had engaged in a successful process of first breaking with Poland through an alliance with Muscovy and then limiting Muscovite Asiatic influence in Ukraine, a process that ended with the hetman’s untimely death. Hrushevskyi ostensibly eschewed a critique of Lypynskyi’s political concept of a “Tillers’ Monarchy,” which he saw Lypynskyi reading back into the Khmel’nyts’kyi period. However, one cannot

divorce Hrushev'skyi's critique of both Khmel'nyts'kyi and Lypyn'skyi's historical views from Hrushev'skyi's rejection of Lypyn'skyi's politics.

From then on, Hrushev'skyi mentioned Lypyn'skyi six times by name and on other occasions in references such as the "adorers" of Khmel'nyts'kyi. His depiction of Khmel'nyts'kyi became an attempt to smash the idol that he saw Lypyn'skyi and the statist school fashioning. It was this new Khmel'nyts'kyi cult, not the traditional Cossack cult, that Hrushev'skyi saw both as historically incorrect and politically dangerous. The anger that Hrushev'skyi spewed forth against Khmel'nyts'kyi, the "Great Scythian" who devastated his land, was directed against the Ukrainian conservative statist and their attempt to dethrone the people as the hero of Ukrainian history and enthrone in their place "great men." Therefore, Hrushev'skyi sharpened his early argument that Khmel'nyts'kyi had begun the revolt without a plan, had not properly taken account of the potential and interests of the Ukrainian masses, and had entered the Pereiaslav Agreement without proper care and attention to the nature of Muscovy. He maintained that although the Ukrainian people were European and strove to be a European society, Khmel'nyts'kyi had too much of the steppe and Asia in him to lead them to this goal. He selected one of the central tenets of Lypyn'skyi's ideology, the importance of territory in defining the Ukrainian society and polity, and argued that Khmel'nyts'kyi had little loyalty to territory, allowing wars to be fought on the Ukrainian land and creating conditions in which much of the population fled eastward. He insisted that not only were the colleagues of Khmel'nyts'kyi equal to him in talent, but that much of the policy during Khmel'nyts'kyi's hetmancy was formulated by the chancellor Ivan Vyhov'skyi, who was the real proponent of European society. Finally, he maintained that contrary to Lypyn'skyi's assertion, Khmel'nyts'kyi's policies were already in ruins before his death and only his timely demise had saved his reputation.

Hrushev'skyi's final characterization of Khmel'nyts'kyi was written after he had experienced the failure of the revolutionary upsurge in 1917 and the attempt to establish a Ukrainian state. In his 1907 article, he had pointed out to his contemporaries that having seen the recent difficulties in organizing the masses to rise above their current cultural level (after the 1905 revolution), they could be more sympathetic to Bohdan for what he had achieved in more difficult circumstances. In the late 1920s, he did not find that the revolutionary events of 1917–1921 should make his contemporaries treat the hetman with greater understanding.

Without documentary evidence it is risky to second-guess Hrushev'skyi's motives and psychological state in 1928 and their influence on his characterization. Yet it is hard to separate his writing from the impact of the revolution and failed attempt to establish a Ukrainian state. While most Ukrainian historians saw these events as proof that populism and leftist thought had lost the struggle and that what was needed was greater discipline, respect for authority, and attention to national above social issues, Hrushev'skyi took the side of the masses and saw the Ukrainian leadership as failing their interests. He returned

to Ukraine and rebuilt Ukrainian culture because he wanted to be with the Ukrainian masses, who, he believed, would be able to regenerate the Ukrainian cause even under Moscow Bolshevik rule. He wanted the Ukrainian movement to have respect for the masses, not leaders. With the tide already running against the non-Marxists in 1928, and the full attack on Hrushevskyyi and the destruction of his work well advanced in 1931, Hrushevskyyi may have reacted by placing all hope in the masses. He could not know that by 1932–1933, the Ukrainian village, which he saw as the bearer of the nation, would die.<sup>40</sup>

We are on safer ground when we speculate that part of the emotional tone of Hrushevskyyi's depiction came from the frustration of the grand old man of Ukrainian historians seeing that by the 1920s not only his political but also his historical views were rejected by his colleagues and students. Concurrently, he was coming under attack by the Marxist historians, who at that time also negatively evaluated Khmel'nytskyi, but who already were beginning their transformation of Hrushevskyyi into the demon of Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism. Writing in the midst of this struggle of historical schools and political groups, Hrushevskyyi produced a work that reflected the various terminologies and views of these rising forces. He thus dwelt on issues of the state and state building as a positive element much more than he had in his earlier writings, though he hardly could satisfy the statist in his denying Khmel'nytskyi's success in this process. At the same time, he cloaked the Khmel'nytskyi period with many of the terms current among the Marxists—above all the concept of revolution, which he had used earlier but which was *de rigueur* in Soviet Ukrainian writings, while his description of social conflict also took on the terminology of Marxist class struggle.<sup>41</sup> Still, the Marxists could hardly be satisfied with Hrushevskyyi's evaluation of the Khmel'nytskyi uprising as the "most important epoch in the history of our people—the greatest revolution it has experienced" (p. 1507).<sup>42</sup>

Hrushevskyyi concluded his discussion by arguing against the unhealthy idealization of the period and person of Khmel'nytskyi and the depiction of the age as a lost paradise in which the Ukrainian land flourished, a Ukrainian state was being built, social harmony reigned, and the hetman was loved. He insisted that "the Ukrainian people did not experience its paradise in the time of Bohdan—or in any period of its past. Our social, political, and cultural ideals lie before us, and not behind us." But he still insisted that the Khmel'nytskyi movement had been an important stage in the Ukrainian people's journey toward social, political, cultural, and national ideals. He praised it as an age when "simple people" had been able to feel themselves "fully human." It was for bringing about this great upheaval that Hrushevskyyi was willing to call him the "hero of Ukrainian history" (pp. 1507–1508).

Hrushevskyyi's final characterization came after the magnificent achievement of his writing the history of Khmel'nytskyi's age, which he dedicated to the "creative sufferings of the Ukrainian masses." In many ways his concentration on the masses and his resistance to heroic figures had permeated his entire

oeuvre. He himself had pointed out that the situation and genre of his work had influenced his evaluations of Khmel'nyts'kyi throughout his career. What may seem jarring is that his final sharp polemic came not in a political piece or a review article, but in his magnum opus. In some ways, it showed the importance that he attached to the statement that he was making, but it also may reflect the declining level of historical discourse and the more fractious nature of Ukrainian scholarly and political life in the late 1920s. It would be foolish to underestimate the importance of his examination of thousands of sources in forming his evaluation of the hetman. Still, it is likely that the political environment of his time and his own feeling of political and scholarly isolation explain the intemperate nature of Hrushevskiy's remarks in comparison to his many earlier evaluations.

Hrushevskiy's final characterization of Khmel'nyts'kyi had little impact in undermining the hetman's position as the archetypical Ukrainian hero. He failed to vanquish the statist school, which remained dominant among Ukrainian historians in western Ukraine and abroad. Beginning in the 1930s, Soviet historiography revived the praise of leaders, and the increasing influence of Russian traditional thought turned Khmel'nyts'kyi into the icon of the "Reunification of Ukraine with Russia" by the 1950s. Indeed, Khmel'nyts'kyi was virtually the only Ukrainian political leader after the princely period depicted in a positive light in Soviet Ukraine from the 1930s to the 1980s. The cults of the Cossack-age writings (republished widely in the late 1980s and early 1990s),<sup>43</sup> the statist school, and Soviet historiography combined to make of Khmel'nyts'kyi a national hero in 1991 without any special effort by the new Ukrainian state. Certainly the variety of cults of Khmel'nyts'kyi made him acceptable to very different constituencies in Ukraine. In historical writing, however, it is clearly the statist image that dominates.<sup>44</sup> Whether the reissuing of volume 9 will change either popular attitudes or historical writing remains to be seen. The reprinting of other works by Hrushevskiy ensures that not one, but a number of Hrushevskiy's confrontations with the hetman will contend in shaping the new image.

## NOTES

1. For a theoretical work presenting this argument, see Liah Greenfeld, *Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity* (Cambridge, MA, 1982). For an influential popular discussion that deals with Ukraine, see Michael Ignatieff, *Blood and Belonging: Journeys into the New Nationalism* (New York, 1995).
2. On the extremely controversial topic of the need for an ethno-national core for new states, see Timothy Garton Ash, "Cry, the Dismembered Country," *The New York Review of Books* 46(1) 14 January 1999: 29–33. His comment that "History suggests that a contemporary European state with less than 80 percent ethnic majority is inherently unstable" (p. 33) states a viewpoint that many Western social scientists and politicians have been loath to accept. Obviously, it does not augur well for Latvia, Estonia, and Ukraine.
3. For an example of such views, see Andrew Wilson, *Ukrainian Nationalism: A Minority Faith* (Cambridge, 1997), and my review article, "Ukrainian 'Nationalism': A Minority Faith?" *The Harriman Review* 10(2) Summer 1997: 12–20.
4. *The New York Review of Books* 39(17) 22 October 1992: 56–63. The title on the cover is the more provocative: "A Nasty New Ukraine?"
5. *The New York Review of Books* 40(3) 28 January 1993: 45–46. On the evolution of views on Khmel'nyts'kyi, see my "The Changing Image of the Hetman: On the 350th Anniversary of the Khmel'nyts'kyi Uprising," *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas* 46(4) 1998: 531–45. The decline of the Ukrainian national revival, the deceleration of the movement away from Russia, and the greater influence of the country's east in Ukrainian politics have meant that Mazepa did not replace Khmel'nyts'kyi. Mazepa's name still remains anathema in many circles in Ukraine, although the presence of his likeness on the 10-hryvnia note places him officially on the national iconostasis.
6. In his article, the only work by Hrushevs'kyi that Brumberg cites is the English translation of the *Iliustrovana istoriia Ukraïny, History of Ukraine* (New Haven, 1941), though only for a quotation from the introduction by George Vernadsky.
7. On the importance of Hrushevs'kyi's work, see John Armstrong, "Myth and History in the Evolution of Ukrainian Consciousness," in *Ukraine and Russia in Their Historical Encounter*, ed. Peter Potichnyj et al. (Edmonton, 1992), pp. 125–39.
8. The major discussion is in John Basarab, *Pereiaslav 1654: A Historical-geographical Study* (Edmonton, 1982), pp. 129–33, based only on the *Istoriia Ukraïny-Rusy*, as is the report of a paper by Mykhailo Pasichnyk,

- “Het'man B. Khmel'nyts'kyi u M. Hrushevs'koho,” *Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi i Zakhidna Ukraïna*, ed A. Karas' et al. (Lviv, 1995), pp. 116–18.
9. On *Istoriia Ukraïny-Rusy*, see my “Introduction to the *History of Ukraine-Rus'*,” in Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi, *History of Ukraine-Rus'*, vol. 1: *From Prehistory to the Eleventh Century*, trans. Marta Skorupsky (Edmonton and Toronto, 1997), pp. xxii–lvii.
  10. The possibility of banning *Istoriia Ukraïny-Rusy* was discussed by the government and secret police in Moscow as early as 1925, and a decision was made to gather information on those who were interested in the work or disseminated it. *Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi: Mizh istoriieiu ta politykoiu (1920–1930-ti roky)*. *Zbirnyk dokumentiv i materialiv* (Kyiv, 1997), doc. 41, p. 64.
  11. Myron [Miron] Korduba, “Der Ukraine Niedergang und Aufschwung,” *Zeitschrift für Osteuropäische Geschichte* 6 (1932): 30–60, 192–230, 358–85, especially pp. 377–81 (a review of Hrushevs'kyi's vols. 7–9). In a short review of both parts of volume 9 in *Literaturno-naukovyi visnyk* 106 (1931): 1029–1031, Symon Narizhnyi called chapter 13 valuable, but said that it was if not polemical, then very debatable. He maintained that the assertions and conclusions of the author were of great interest, though they called forth significant objections.
  12. In addition to the works cited here, Hrushevs'kyi mentions *Pereiaslavs'ka umova* (1917); the belletristic works, “Khmel'nyts'kyi v Pereiaslavi” (1915), “Stricha z Kryvonosom” (1914), “Vykhest Oleksandr” (1914); and his general works *Pro stari chasy na Ukraïni* (1907), *Ocherk istoriia ukrainskogo naroda* (1904, 1906, 1911; reprint: Kyiv, 1990, 1991), *Illustrovannaia istoriia ukrainskogo naroda* (1913; reprint: Kyiv, 1996), “Istoriia ukrainskogo naroda,” in *Ukrainskii narod v proshlom i nastoiashchem*, vol. 1 (1916), *Ukrains'ka istoriia dlia serednikh shkil* (1920). Many of the belletristic works are republished in *Predok* (Kyiv, 1990). See also the historical discussion in Hrushevs'kyi's pamphlet *Khto taki ukraïntsi i choho vony khochut'* (Kyiv, 1917).
  13. It was published in *Literaturno-naukovyi visnyk* 1(2) 1898: 1–26. The short story takes place against the events of the first year of the uprising, Khmel'nyts'kyi is the powerful and caring matchmaker who overcomes the opposition of Father Kyrylo Ivanovych to give his daughter Nastia in marriage to the former seminarian and now Cossack, Hryts'ko Pishchenko.
  14. Hrushevs'kyi, “Khmel'nyts'kyi i Khmel'nychchyna: istorychnyi eskiz,” *Zapysky Naukovoho tovarystva im. Shevchenka* 24 (1898): 1–30, reprinted in the anthology *Z politychnoho zhyttia staroi Ukraïny* (Kyiv, 1917), pp. 50–77.

15. On the individual in Hrushevs'kyi's writings, see Natalia Iakovenko, "Osoba iak diach istorychnoho protsesu v istoriohrafii Mykhaila Hrushevs'koho" in *Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi i ukrains'ka istorychna nauka: Materialy naukovykh konferentsii prysviachenykh Mykhailovi Hrushevs'komu*, ed. Iaroslav Hrytsak and Iaroslav Dashkevych (Lviv, 1999), pp. 86–97.
16. The article includes the traditional assertions that Khmel'nyts'kyi was in the ranks of the rebels in 1637 and that his son was killed in Daniel Czaplinski's raid, views that Hrushevs'kyi later modified (pp. 3–4).
17. The problems of translating the word *narod* are formidable. In Ukrainian it embodies both the concept of a people as a nation and of the people or the masses. In early twentieth-century texts the use of *narod* and *natsiia* for "nation" at times was a conscious decision to make distinctions between different types of national communities but often was not. This article will provide the original after translation of *narod* and other similar terms.
18. "Ein interessanter Jahrestag. Ein geschichtliche Rückblick," *Ruthenische Revue* 1 (1904): 11–16; "250 lit," *Literaturno-naukovyi visnyk* 25(7) 1904: 1–6. (Citations here are to the Ukrainian version.) Reprinted in *Z politychnoho zhyttia*.
19. In his 1898 "Khmel'nyts'kyi i Khmel'nychchyna," he used the word "revolution" only in his assertion that the leaders of the Cossacks did not aim for a "social revolution" (p. 21).
20. See Maksymovych's "Pis'ma o Bogdane Khmel'nitskom" (1857–1859) in *Sobranie sochinenii M. A. Maksimovicha*, vol. 1 (Kyiv, 1876), pp. 395–474.
21. On the controversy over the monument, see Orest Levyts'kyi, "Istoriia budovy pamiatnyka B. Khmel'nyts'komu u Kyievi," *Literaturno-naukovyi visnyk* 16 (June 1913): 467–83; and M. G., "Istoriia odnogo pamiatnika," *Golos minuvshhego* 1913 (7): 284–85.
22. Published in Lviv in 1905. Also see his booklet *Bohdan Chmielnicki i jeho polityka* (Warsaw, n.d.).
23. Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi, "Bohdanovi rokovyny," *Literaturno-naukovyi visnyk* 10 (1907) vol. 39: 207–212, reprinted in *Z politychnoho zhyttia*. Appearing to refer to the commemorations of 1898, Hrushevs'kyi called the attitude of Galician Ukrainians to the events of the mid-seventeenth century more straightforward, since they represented the struggle against the Poles. He maintained that for the Russian-ruled Ukrainians the depiction and the marking of the event presented more problems, presumably because of their different relations with the Poles and the role of the revolt in bringing them under Russian rule.

24. Adherents of views similar to those of Mykhailo Iuzefovych, who became a ukrainophobe and argued in the 1880s that the Khmel'nytskyi monument must be erected against "Ukrainian separatism."
25. (Kyiv, 1909). The edition of 1993 published in Dnipropetrovsk is used here.
26. Hrushevs'kyi was writing for a Ukrainian reader in the Russian Empire in the early twentieth century, who almost assuredly had received his or her education in Russian and had been denied access to Ukrainian printed texts for 50 years. Hrushevs'kyi demonstrated his concern for these problems by providing the Russian names for months next to their Ukrainian equivalents. He also felt obliged to explain to his readers who were used to the pejorative connotation of *zhid* in Russian that *zhyd*, not *ievrei*, was the proper, neutral form for "Jew" in Ukrainian (p. 20).
27. *Iliustrovana istoriia Ukraïny* (Kyiv–Lviv, 1913), reprinted in Kyiv in 1992. The volume has "tenth thousand" on the title page, presumably the run to that time.
28. Hrushevs'kyi, "Na ukraïns'ki temy: 'Mazepynstvo' i 'Bohdanivstvo,'" *Literaturno-naukovyi visnyk* 15(57) 1912: 94–102, reprinted in *Z politychnoho zhyttia*, pp. 117–26.
29. For Hrushevs'kyi's views on Mazepa on the occasion of the 200th anniversary of the Battle of Poltava, see his "Shvedsko-ukraïns'kyi soiuz 1708," *Zapysky Naukovoho tovarystva im. Shevchenka* (henceforth *ZNTSh*) 92 (1909): 7–20, reprinted in *Z politychnoho zhyttia*, pp. 102–116, and "Vyhovs'kyi i Mazepa," *Literaturno-naukovyi visnyk* 12(46) 1909: 417–28.
30. Rawita-Gawroński, vol. 1: *Bohdan Chmielnicki do elekcyi Jana Kazimierza* (Lviv, 1906); and vol. 2: *Bohdan Chmielnicki od elekcyi Jana Kazimierza do śmierci* (Lviv, 1909). Ludwik Kubala, *Wojna moskiewska: Szkice historyczne, seria III* (Warsaw, 1910), pp. 1–46 (pp. 7–18 on Khmel'nytskyi).
31. V'iacheslav Lypyn'skyi (Wacław Lipiński), ed., *Z dziejów Ukrainy* (Kyiv and Cracow, 1912). Much of the material in *Z dziejów Ukrainy* was written by Lypyn'skyi, including the monograph *Stanisław Michał Krzyczewski: Z dziejów walki szlachty ukraińskiej w szeregach powstańców pod wodzą Bohdana Chmielnickiego (rr. 1648–1649)*, pp. 147–513. Khmel'nytskyi is discussed on pp. 147–50 (evaluation) and pp. 253–61 (issue of noble descent).
32. For historians outside Soviet Ukraine who saw Khmel'nytskyi as a state builder, see Ivan Kryp'iakevych, "Studii nad derzhavoiu Bohdana Khmel'nyts'koho," *ZNTSh* 138–40 (1925): 65–81; 144–45 (1926): 109–140; 147 (1927): 55–80; 151 (1931): 111–50; and Myron Korduba, "Der

- Ukraine Niedergang und Aufschwung.” The only exception to this tendency among members of the statist school was Stepan Tomashivskyi. After the failure to establish Ukrainian independence and the revolutionary events of the period, his conservative politics resulted in his questioning whether Khmelnytskyi was an appropriate hero. He advocated heroes of the earlier princely epoch. He also argued for seeing the Zaporozhians who followed Mazepa—rather than the hetman and elite of the Hetmanate, whom Lypynskyi praised—as the heroes of 1709. His negative evaluation was strengthened by his Catholic convictions that caused him to disapprove of Khmelnytskyi’s attack on the Uniates. He entered into a bitter historical polemic with his fellow conservative thinker Lypynskyi over these questions. See Stepan Tomashivskyi, *Pro ideï heroïv i polityku: Vidkryti lyst do V. Lypyns'koho z dodatkamy* (Lviv, 1929), especially pp. 29–35. On the influence of the statist school on historians in Soviet Ukraine, see Lev Okinshevych, “Heneralna rada na Ukraïni-Hetmanshchyni XVII–XVIII st.,” *Pratsi Komisii dlia vyuchuvannia istorii zakhidno-rus'koho prava* 6 (1929): 253–425; idem, “Tsentral’ni ustanovy Ukraïny-Hetmanshchyni XVII–XVIII st. Ch. II. Rada starshyny,” *Pratsi Komisii dlia vyuchuvannia istorii zakhidno-rus'koho prava* 8 (1930): 1–349; idem, “Rada starshyns’ka na Hetmanshchyni,” *Ukraïna* 4 (1924): 12–26 (these studies are reworked in his *Ukrainian Society and Government [1648–1782]* [Munich, 1978]); and Mykola Petrovskyi, “Do istorii derzhavnogo ustroiu Ukraïny XVII v.,” *Zapysky Nizhens’koho pedagogichnoho instytutu* 11 (1931): 87–97.
33. Mykhailo Hrushevskyi, *Istoriia Ukraïny-Rusy*, vol. 8, pt. 2 (reprint: New York, 1956), p. 223.
  34. Hrushevskyi, *Istoriia Ukraïny-Rusy*, vol. 8, pt. 2, pp. 162–63.
  35. On Hrushevskyi’s life and career in Soviet Ukraine, see R. Ia. Pyrih, *Zhyttia Mykhaila Hrushevskoho: Ostannie desiatylittia (1924–1934)* (Kyiv, 1993).
  36. On Hrushevskyi as a “historian-sociologist,” see Leo Bilas, “Geschichtsphilosophische und ideologische Voraussetzungen der geschichtlichen und politischen Konzeption M. Hruševskyjs. Zum 90. Geburtstag des ukrainischen Historikers (29 September 1956),” *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas* N.S. 4 (1956): 262–92; Illia Vytanovych, “Uvahy do metodolohii i istoriosofii Mykhaila Hrushevskoho,” *Ukraïns’kyi istoryk* 3(1–2) 1966: 48–51; Omeljan [Omelian] Pritsak, “Istoriiosofiiia Mykhaila Hrushevskoho,” in Mykhailo Hrushevskyi, *Istoriia Ukraïny-Rusy*, vol. 1 (reprint: Kyiv, 1991), pp. xl–lxxiii.
  37. Hrushevskyi, *Istoriia Ukraïny-Rusy*, vol. 9, pt. 2 (reprint: New York, 1956), pp. 1497–1506, including criticism of Lypynskyi’s views.

38. It was in the notes to this section that Hrushevs'kyi mentioned the importance of Lypyns'kyi in studying at least the noble colleagues of Khmel'nyts'kyi (p. 1485).
39. *Ukraïna na perelomi: Zamitky do istorii ukrains'koho derzhavnoho budivnytstva v XVII-im stolittiu* (Vienna, 1920), pp. 145–51, and also p. 121 on the goal of building a European state. On Hrushevs'kyi's scholarly and political contacts with Lypyns'kyi, see Pavlo Sokhan and Ihor Hyrych, "V'iacheslav Lypyns'kyi i Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi u dorevoliutsiini chasy," in *V'iacheslav Lypyns'kyi: Studii*, vol. 1: *Istoriopolitohichna spadshchyna i suchasna Ukraïna*, ed. Iaroslav Pelens'kyi (Kyiv and Philadelphia, 1994), pp. 53–59; and Ihor Hyrych, "Derzhavnyts'kyi napriam i narodnyts'ka shkola v ukrains'kii istoriohrafii (na tli stosunkiv Mykhaila Hrushevs'koho i V'iacheslava Lypyns'koho)," in *Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi i ukrains'ka istorychna nauka*, pp. 47–64.
40. For Hrushevs'kyi's views on the need for the intelligentsia to work among the peasant masses, see his speech of 3 October 1926 at the celebration of his sixtieth birthday, *Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi mizh istoriieiu ta politykoiu*, doc. 52, pp. 72–77.
41. For a discussion of the Khmel'nyts'kyi uprising as a revolution by the major Ukrainian Marxist historian of the 1920s, see Matvii Iavors'kyi, *Narys istorii Ukraïny*, 2 vols. (Adelaide, 1986), vol. 2, pp. 65–139. For a discussion of the concept and use of the term "revolution" for the Khmel'nyts'kyi uprising, see Frank E. Sysyn, "War der Chmel'nyčkyj-Aufstand eine Revolution? Eine Charakteristik der "grossen ukrainischen Revolte" und der Bildung des kosakischen Het'manstaates," *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas* 43(1) 1995: 1–18.
42. For the Marxist attack on Hrushevs'kyi, including his terminology, see the review article by F. Iastrebov, "Tomu dev'iatoho persha polovyna," *Prapor marksyzmu* 9: 133–48.
43. See Frank E. Sysyn, "Cossack Chronicles and the Development of Modern Ukrainian Culture and Identity," *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 14(3–4) 1990: 593–607.
44. V. A. Smolii and V. S. Stepankov, *Bohdan Khmel'nyts'kyi: Sotsial'nopolitychnyi portret* (Kyiv, 1993); and their *Bohdan Khmel'nyts'kyi: Khronika zhyttia ta diial'nosti* (Kyiv, 1994). See also the special issue of *Ukrains'kyi istorychnyi zhurnal*, 1995, no. 4, especially the lead article by V. A. Smolii.