


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Nationalities Papers: The Journal of Nationalism and Ethnicity

Publication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information:

<http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/cnap20>

Ukrainians in World War II: Views and points

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Published online: 19 Oct 2007.

To cite this article: Stephan M. Horak , John A. Armstrong , Basil Dmytryshyn , Kenneth C. Farmer , George Kulchycky , John S. Reshetar Jr. & Orest Subtelny (1982) Ukrainians in World War II: Views and points , Nationalities Papers: The Journal of Nationalism and Ethnicity, 10:1, 1-39

To link to this article: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00905998208407927>

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UKRAINIANS IN WORLD WAR II:
VIEWS AND POINTS*

INTRODUCTION

Stephan M. Horak

The notion that nations emerge from wars either victorious or defeated is not always necessarily true, and the prevailing assumption that a nation enters a war as an aggressor or defender cannot always be upheld either. Neither would the assumption sustain examination that each nation in case of war has a free choice in allying itself or remaining neutral. The fallacy of these prevailing views has been challenged, not by a small nation living in a remote area, but by the fifth largest European people, numbering 38,205,000 in 1933 and populating a geographical area of 932,100 sq. km. (358,500 sq. m.), and known under two historical names: Ruthenians (*Rusyny*) or Ukrainians.

The Ukrainians emerged victorious from the most devastating war they ever experienced, World War II, according to official Soviet claims, but in the opinion of national-minded Ukrainians, they were defeated. Those on the Soviet side considered themselves in a state of war defending their republic (Ukrainian SSR) against the aggression of Nazi Germany. Non-Communists, on the other hand, adhered to the status of statelessness, and, having refused to recognize the Ukrainian SSR as their national state, did not consider themselves at war with Germany. They looked upon the Soviet Union as well as Nazi Germany merely as foreign occupants which must be dealt with differently in the light of previous experiences, national goals, and immediate conditions. Their historical enemy was Moscow and any consideration of cooperation with Soviet Russia amounted to treason. For this very valid reason non-Communists looked toward Berlin with different criteria and responses. Of course, they looked for a friend in Berlin, for the enemies in Moscow (and also in Warsaw, Bucharest and Budapest) were too many for Ukrainians to handle alone. Therefore, Berlin had to be a place of hope for all those with national conviction. The Western democracies were not seriously considered — first, because they were too far away, and second, because they did not care much about the fate of Ukrainians as past experiences had amply proved.

*This Symposium offers papers presented at the 13th National Convention of the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies, Asilomar, California, September 20-23, 1981, at the session sponsored by the Shevchenko Scientific Society, U.S. Branch.

The problem of alliance in a traditional meaning did not exist in this particular situation. The question of the neutrality of a nation subdued by foreign armies and struggling for independence calls for a very different interpretation. Strict neutrality in a war could also mean abdication of national aims because powerful occupants can force any nation to perform duties and services for them without tangible reward. Indeed, this was the situation in 1941 when some forty million Ukrainians represented a reservoir of resources which was bound to be utilized by any one who could master possession of the Ukraine. Therefore, neutrality remained only an abstract and meaningless reference without any particular significance or application. Ukrainians were drafted and fought in the Soviet Red Army, the Polish Army, and after 1939 in the Polish army in exile, in the Romanian, the Hungarian, and even in the Canadian and the United State armies, in addition to the German forces and, finally since 1942, in their own Ukrainian Insurgent Army (*Ukrains'ka Povstans'ka Armia* — UPA). In terms of numbers the estimate might reach as high as four million, or ten per cent of the total population.

This confusing and generally unknown Ukrainian contribution to the World War II is matched by the even less recognized fact that the Ukrainians were the first victims of German-Hungarian aggression in March 1939 when Carpatho-Ukraine had proclaimed its national independence on March 14 as a result of the final disintegration of Czechoslovakia. Paramilitary units of the "Carpathian Sich" offered fierce resistance to the Hungarian troops which invaded this tiny republic with Hitler's blessing and permission, the political support of the Poles, and Stalin's benevolent acquiescence because of his fear of the re-emerging Ukrainian national statehood so close to his realm. Within this sequence of events Ukrainians were the first to forcefully resist Hitler's *Neuordnung* of Europe, as Hungary's invasion of Carpatho-Ukraine was of his design.

Ironically enough, Ukrainians were also the last European nation to disengage from war activities. UPA warfare against the Soviet Union lasted long after the war. On May 28, 1947, the USSR, Poland and Czechoslovakia signed in Warsaw a military agreement coordinating their operations against UPA. Only as a result of such multi-lateral operation did some UPA units operating in Poland begin their march across Czechoslovakia and some 400 men safely reached Austria in September 1947. Those units operating in Volhynia and Galicia, however, continued their clandestine warfare for the next three years. On March 5, 1950, near the city of Lviv, NKVD forces ambushed and killed Roman Shukhevych (Taras Chuprynka — pseud.), the Commanding General of the UPA and head of the Ukrainian Supreme Liberation Council (*Ukrains'ka Holovna Vyzvolna Rada* — UHVR), an underground political organization which considered itself the only national government of the Ukraine, implying that the regime of the Ukrainian SSR was only an agent of Moscow.

This sketchy outline of the prevailing situation should underline the existing complexities, confusion and impossibilities in which Ukrainians found themselves during the years 1941-45.

Realizing the limits of one session in confronting such a magnitude of problems, in my capacity as chairman of the session, I chose a selective approach by providing participants of the session with a number of specific issues to be addressed and elaborated in greater details. While leaving many other outstanding problems to future comprehensive study, it was aimed at the quantitative contribution of the session, which in my opinion, has been achieved thanks to the expert knowledge of the subject on the part of participating experts and contributors to the Ukrainian history in general. They were urged to primarily address themselves to the following issues and points:

1. Were Ukrainians during World War II bound to any particular loyalty (toward Poland or the USSR) considering their national aspirations and previous experiences with Polish and Soviet occupations?
2. In light of these experiences, should the Ukrainian inclination to see in Germany not an enemy but rather a logical ally against the common enemy be seen as "collaboration" or a kind of "unholy alliance" as practiced by others in the past and present alike?
3. Was there any alternative for Ukrainians in the situation as it existed, and if so, offer your comments.
4. Were Ukrainians expected to share at any price the fate of Jews, Poles or any other ethnic group living on Ukrainian territory?
5. Was the proclamation of the independence of Ukraine on June 30, 1941 in Lviv an act of "collaboration" or an act of an independent action of a nation striving toward national independence?
6. The creation and warfare of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army against Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union remains a testimony of the Ukrainian desire to fight any oppressor and at any price; a fact which contrasts with the typical form of collaboration practiced by the nationals of such independent states as France, Norway, Holland, and Belgium.
7. Can certain forms of Ukrainian collaboration with Germany be compared with the American-Soviet war alliance?

John A. Armstrong

Questions concerning the choices available to Ukrainians in the extremely difficult circumstances of World War II are highly interesting but extremely complicated. I dealt with the substance of most of these questions

twenty-six years ago in *Ukrainian Nationalism*,¹ and again thirteen years ago in "Collaborationism in World War II: The Integral Nationalist Variant in Eastern Europe."² I know of no major new evidence which has come to light since then. Time alters perspectives; in the present case, though, the effects as far as I am concerned are ambivalent. On the one hand, the continued harsh inflexible behavior of the Soviet regime toward non-Russians tends to justify, retrospectively, even the rashest aspects of Ukrainian wartime rebellion. Conversely, the wave of recent terrorism, with its horrifying impact on standards of international conduct and the personalities of the terrorists themselves, leads to more concern than ever that Ukrainian nationalist precedents for terrorist behavior be rejected. Overall, therefore, I see no reason for altering the basic conclusions I reached more than a quarter-century ago.

One preliminary observation of some complexity is essential. It is impossible to refer meaningfully to "Ukrainians" or "Ukrainian behavior" without qualification. I agree with Edmund Burke that generalizations about any nation are dubious; there are special reasons why sweeping evaluations of Ukrainians during World War II are not only dubious but ludicrous. As I pointed out in *Ukrainian Nationalism*, the "essential mass" of East Ukrainians "remained uncommitted" to any political movement or program.³ Strictly national objectives, although not insignificant for most people, ranked considerably lower than aims such as physical survival. A much stronger case for West Ukrainian mass involvement in nationalist politics is evident; but even there the terrible pressures of wartime danger and deprivation render it impossible to determine how inarticulate people really identified with specific political movements.

It is therefore impossible to refer to "Ukrainian behavior" even in the sense of "normal expectations" which one uses, for example, in discussing French or Danish behavior during German occupation. In the latter cases, the minimal expectation was that citizens would remain aloof from the occupation authorities, for Frenchmen and Danes had a positive, patriotic duty of allegiance toward their own defeated national states. Ukrainians, on the other hand, cannot fairly be considered to have owed such persistent allegiance either to the Soviet state or to the various alien national states (notably Poland) which had governed them prior to German conquest. In making this evaluation, I am not expressing any judgment as to the wisdom

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1. First ed., New York: Columbia University Press, 1955; second ed., New York: Columbia University Press, 1963; second printing of second ed., Denver: Ukrainian Academic Press, 1980. Subsequent page references are to the second edition.
 2. *Journal of Modern History*, XL (1968), 396-410.
 3. *Ukrainian Nationalism*, p. 289.

or even the morality of the tactics employed by specific Ukrainian organizations in helping the Germans overthrow the Polish state, much less in attacking Polish communities during the confused later stages of German occupation. What I do think is evident is that the East European interwar political systems were organized in such a way that they could hardly claim (and probably did not expect) persistent loyalty of citizens like Ukrainians who did not belong to the dominant nationality.

It is also impossible to discuss Ukrainian wartime behavior in terms of a "central tendency" comparable to that which may be determined for Danes or Frenchmen. This is true, especially, in relation to the extremely important subject of local responsibility for destruction of Jews. A great deal has been written about the "Sorrow and the Pity" of participation by a small minority of Frenchmen, passively abetted by a much larger number, in German deportation of French Jews. Conversely, it is generally recognized that Danes were extraordinarily committed and effective in saving the Jews among them.⁴ Such generalizations, ultimately statistical in nature, derive from kinds of data which were rarely available for the wartime Ukraine. But as evaluations the generalizations also rest on several assumptions: (1) that Frenchmen and Danes preserved, or should have preserved even under occupation, vestigial institutions reflecting the continuing solidarity of all citizens; (2) that prewar patterns of communication among a civically united people should have facilitated wartime solidarity; and (3) that, for non-Jewish Frenchmen and Danes, the costs of at least passive non-collaboration were not so frightfully high as to threaten their physical survival.

For numerous Ukrainians, on the contrary, at least passive collaboration with the Germans was the price of survival. Such was especially true for those taken prisoner after compulsory service in the Red Army. Although the Germans did release numerous POWs of Ukrainian origin, the process was slow, selective, and arbitrary. No one has portrayed the horrible conditions of those remaining in POW camps better than the Ukrainian reporter Iurii Tarkovych, although he had to write under German censorship.⁵ Enlistment in German auxiliary forces, even for police duties, was often the sole alternative to death by starvation. Later, no doubt, some of these involuntary recruits turned out to be racial bigots, sadists, or vicious opportunists. Others, however, just could not escape their assignments. Only intensive investigation of individual cases can distinguish degrees of guilt; any quantitative estimate of the proportion of guilty men is probably forever impossible. For Ukrainian civilians, circumstances were more complicated

4. Raul Hilberg, *The Destruction of the European Jews* (Chicago: Quadrangle, 1961), pp. 362-63, 393ff.

5. *Ukrainian Nationalism*, p. 118.

and varied. Some, like those conscripted or threatened with conscription as *Ostarbeiter*, came under pressures almost as severe as those faced by POWs. Others collaborated when encountering no greater pressures than the ordinary stringencies of a wartime economy. For very many, perhaps a majority, ignorance or naivete rather than physical pressures were the most important factors at the start of active collaboration; but once enlisted in German-commanded units, withdrawal was extremely perilous.

The only meaningful generalizations about the extent and nature of Ukrainian collaboration must therefore be restricted to Ukrainian organizations and the small elites which operated them. As I wrote in "Collaborationism," "In the Ukraine, *all* political elements (except Communists, if one leaves aside official Nazi-Soviet collaboration) worked with the Nazis at some time between 1939 and 1945."⁶ In other words, as I document in *Ukrainian Nationalism*, every Ukrainian national organization collaborated (in the usual, minimal sense of the term) at times. One qualification to this generalization has already been stated: collaboration with a foreign occupying power was a very different affair, practically and morally, for ethnic elites who did not recognize the legitimacy of the pre-existing national state, than it was for the typical West European collaborator who pursued opportunistic or sectarian political goals inimical to his own fellow citizens. A second caveat is that in every case the Ukrainian organizations regarded collaboration with the German occupation as a tactic to advance their own national interests. Consequently, the tactic was seen as something to be reversed or discarded as soon as Ukrainian interests were no longer served by it.

The most striking instance of such tactical reversal was the proclamation of Ukrainian independence on June 30, 1941, by the OUN faction led by Stephan Bandera. Not only was the "*akt* of Lviv" an expression of the divergence of Ukrainian and German interests; it in fact led to severe German repression and sporadic "Banderist" resistance to the occupation authorities. In spite of the bloodshed, the OUB-B was prepared, some two years later, to collaborate in developing the SS Division "Galizien," again as a purely tactical maneuver to prepare Ukrainians for defense against reimposition of Soviet rule. The history of collaboration by the OUN faction under Andrii Melnyk, although rather more complicated, is essentially similar. Other Ukrainian political organizations are distinguished, mainly, by types of collaboration which involved less violence either for or against the German occupying forces. Certainly the record indicates that the nationalist organizations were determined to combat Germans as well as all other perceived enemies of the Ukrainian cause.

6. "Collaborationism," *JMH*, XL (1968), p. 399.

One factor, almost entirely restricted to the two OUN factions, needs to be stressed, however. At the start of World War II both were heavily penetrated by an extremist ideology having significant affinities to Fascism and Nazism. These affinities did not, one must emphasize, induce leaders of either faction to subordinate their nationalist aims to Nazi goals. On the contrary, Fascist stress on *il sacro egoismo* impelled every ethnic element, Ukrainians no less than others, to pursue a war of all against all to secure perceived advantages. Indeed, it is remarkable that the closer a Ukrainian organization was to Nazism in ideology, the more intransigent, hence the less reliable as collaborators the Germans found it. Nevertheless, the liabilities imposed on Ukrainians by their heritage of integralist ideology were enormous. In the first place, the ideology stressed romantic, irrational action which undermined rational tactics and thus incurred severe losses. Second, despite their fundamental distrust of the Nazis, the ideological affinity led many nationalists to an incorrect calculus derived from exaggeration of Nazi prospects for success in the war. Third, and morally most repugnant, the brutal egoism of the integralist ideology led the OUN factions to employ ruthless methods in conflicts with one another.

It is not evident that the extremist ethnocentrism (which included verbal anti-Semitism) of the pre-World War II OUN led to collaboration in the frightful destruction of Jews in the Ukraine. The subject has received surprisingly little research attention; it is conceivable that irrefutable evidence of organized collaboration by specific Ukrainian groups in these atrocities might appear. But the logic of the wartime situation makes large scale anti-Jewish collaboration unlikely. For the Banderists, protracted collaboration is almost ruled out because they became a hunted underground themselves within days after the German forces penetrated the Ukraine. The potential for anti-Jewish activity of the Melnyk faction was more ominous since it was not outlawed until November 1941. But its collaboration was principally with military authorities, whom the SS Einsatzgruppen which carried out the initial massacres of Jews (as well as the repression of Ukrainian nationalists) kept at arm's length. Conversely, it is evident that during 1941-42 no Ukrainian organization tried to aid the Jews. The plain fact is that the minority of Ukrainians involved in nationalist politics was so narrowly ethnocentric in its fierce opposition to Russians, Germans, and Poles that it would not divert attention to other matters. In a sense, the OUN was more "rational" than Hitler and his rabidly anti-Semitic collaborators like the Hlinka Slovaks, the Rumanian Legion of the Archangel Michael, and the Hungarian Arrow Cross, which diverted important resources to satisfy their hatred of Jews. Considerably later, in 1944-45, the UPA (Ukrainian guerrilla force) claims plausibly to have extended a little aid to fugitive Jews. Similar aid in 1941 could not have been much more effective, given the limited resources of the nationalists; but even tokens of human solidarity might have hastened the process of making the nationalist movement a more humane force appreciative of the value of other ethnic groups.

Even if one entirely prescind from the question of ideology, it is hard to see how a strongly nationalist Ukrainian organization could have refrained from all tactical collaboration with the Germans, however. The position of the Indonesian nationalist movement headed by Sukarno is illuminating.⁷ Its leaders welcomed the Japanese ouster of the Dutch colonial overlords, then tried to use the situation to obtain de facto independence. Active collaboration was pursued until the repressive nature of Japanese occupation became apparent. Despite disillusion, some militant Indonesian nationalists, like the Ukrainians in 1944, resumed collaboration with the Japanese, as the lesser evil, as the tide of war brought the menace of reoccupation by the colonial power. Some Indonesians, like some Ukrainian leaders, encouraged by "friendly" Axis military officers, even believed they could eventually count on the "least dangerous" Allied power — in the Indonesians' case, as they perceived it, the U.S.S.R. — to prevent reoccupation by their former colonial overlords.

No doubt one can imagine an extraordinarily far-sighted Ukrainian leadership which would have tried to maintain loyalty to the Allies, or at least avoid collaboration with the Germans. This was the principle which guided the *Armja Krajowa*. Apart from the lack of material success attained by such Polish "loyalty," it was hardly a course practically available to Ukrainian organizations. Only a remarkable national unity centering on a framework derived from a historical state like Poland could provide the discipline which the loyalty tactic presupposed. The low penetrative power of the Ukrainian organizations would have made a similar course utterly futile; their followers would have melted away, either to Communist guerrillas or to naive, impotent individual collaboration with the Germans.

I do not intend to imply that the course of intermittent collaboration and resistance actually pursued was preferable because it contributed to the continuing strength of the OUN factions and other nationalist organizations. Nevertheless, the viability of these organizations had important consequences. In purely tactical terms, many of the results were deplorable. Apart from the fierce clashes with Poles and the bloody suppression of the Borovets Ukrainian guerrillas, the most costly error of the nationalist organizations during the later stage of the war was "deconspiration." The premature development, in Volhynia, of *large-scale* nationalist partisan formations reduced the ability of the potent nationalist underground in Galicia to lead persistent opposition to Soviet reoccupation. On the other hand, the UPA leadership, initially perfervidly integral nationalist did make significant ideological changes in the direction of a more democratic, socially-oriented program. These changes, hastened by the circumstances of combat

7. George M. Kahin, *Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1952), pp. 110ff, 120.

with Soviet partisans, were lastingly beneficial in purging some of the extremist poison from the most activist Ukrainian movement.

Even more important in the long run, the UPA guerrilla war against the Soviet forces provided the foundation for a strong, enduring myth of national achievement. As I wrote in 1963 — and it remains true today — the history of Ukrainian armed resistance constitutes the longest and strongest record of guerrilla opposition to a Communist regime. From the purely historical point of view, this is no mean achievement. But the mythic resonance, which continues to penetrate the Ukrainian S.S.R. as well as the emigration, is more crucial. Every careful examination of ethnic relations within the Soviet Union suggests that Ukrainian consciousness, stimulated by West Ukrainians who experienced the armed resistance most directly, persists and may well be increasing.⁸ Without the record of resistance and the national myth it has fostered, it is quite possible that the Soviet counter-myth of the “Great Patriotic War” of all the Soviet peoples against the German invader would have undermined Ukrainian consciousness.

Basil Dmytryshyn

If we define “loyalty” as a faithful allegiance to ones lawful sovereign government, then the answer is an absolute “no” with respect to the USSR and a qualified “no” with respect to Poland. In case of the USSR, the available evidence indicates that, before World War II, Stalin’s fury against anything and everything Ukrainian reached a level of actual holocaust. As early as 1929 he declared open war on Ukrainian peasants, intellectuals, language, history and culture — in a word on everything Ukrainian. And his was not simply a verbal war. It was a bloody holocaust, a genocide that cost the lives of millions of innocent persons. Those who survived were reduced to silent and obedient slaves of the Kremlin. In addition to brutalizing the Ukrainian people, Stalin’s policy mercilessly exploited the country’s natural resources.

Some have suggested that, while brutal, Stalin’s policies contributed to rapid transformation of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic (UkSSR) into a major industrial republic of the USSR; that his annexation of Volyn, Galicia, Bukovina, and Carpatho-Ukraine brought under one roof all territories claimed by Ukrainians; and that he elevated the UkSSR to a bona fide and respectable member of the United Nations. While no one can deny these changes in the status of the UkSSR, the fact remains that they were in-

8. For a very recent confirmation of this persistent consciousness, see S. Enders Wimbush and Alex Alexiev, *The Ethnic Factor in the Soviet Armed Forces: Preliminary Findings* (Santa Monica: The Rand Corporation, 1981, mimeo.), pp. 19-24.

tended to benefit not the Ukrainian people but their masters in Moscow. Based on this irrefutable evidence I see no reason why any Ukrainian should have been bound by any loyalty to the USSR.

Concerning Ukrainian loyalty toward Poland, the matter is not so clear-cut because here we are dealing with a degree of "badness". Before World War II, Polish policies towards Ukrainians were stupid, shortsighted and counter-productive. They occupied Galicia and Volyn (regions that were predominately Ukrainian) and then they brought in many Polish colonists to "polonize" these areas. They also provided very few economic opportunities to Ukrainians, interfered with their cultural traditions and denied them many elementary rights. By these and other policies the Poles forced many Ukrainians into exile, imprisoned others and transformed the rest into silent enemies.

Yet it must be noted that, unlike Stalin, the Poles did not completely silence the Ukrainian voice. The *Sejm* and the Polish Senate had freely-elected Ukrainian representatives. Ukrainian newspapers, though censored, were allowed to continue. The government financed a few Ukrainian gymnasias, permitted cooperatives to function and tolerated Ukrainian sports activities. The list of "good things" is not lengthy, but compared with Stalin's policies toward the Ukrainians, the Poles were the lesser of the two evils. This perhaps accounts for the fact that many Ukrainians who had been deported to Siberia by Soviet authorities opted to join General Anders' forces in order to escape Soviet benefits. It must be noted, however, that many Ukrainians rejoiced over Poland's demise and initially welcomed German military units and applauded their successes.

While it is very tempting to respond to this question in the affirmative, I will not do so. Anyone who had studied Hitler's *Mein Kampf* should have known that in his schemes of remaking of Europe there was no room for an independent Ukraine. Ukraine was to be a German colony! Hitler never abandoned that goal. Indeed he revealed it very clearly in March, 1939 when he personally approved Hungarian occupation of Carpatho-Ukraine. He demonstrated it again in July, 1941 when he ordered the arrest of Stephan Bandera and his associates after they had proclaimed Ukraine's independence. He further reaffirmed it by his appointment of Erich Koch and other anti-Ukrainian Nazis as satraps of Ukraine. He also confirmed it by all his other policies and directives towards Ukrainians. And, finally, he clearly disclosed his contempt for Ukrainians when, as late as March, 1945, he ordered the disarming of the SS Division 'Galicia', whose formation he had never authorized in the first place.

High-level Nazi negative attitude toward Ukrainians was so overwhelming that it is very difficult to see how any responsible Ukrainian leader could have viewed Nazi Germany as a friend or an ally. The old saying: "The enemy of my enemy is my friend" does not apply in this instance because "The enemy of my enemy was also my principal enemy." It seems,

therefore, that Ukrainians were partly at fault. They created for themselves erroneous perceptions about Nazi intentions vis-a-vis Ukraine. They based their false hopes on the fact that German authorities allowed a few Ukrainian students to attend German universities; that they tolerated the presence in their midst of Hetman Pavlo Skoropadskyj; that occasionally German publications carried an article or a reference favorable to Ukraine; and that since the Ukrainian cause was a "just" cause the Germans, as civilized people, were bound to come to their assistance. Ukrainians had their views further reinforced by the fact that there were many low-ranking German officials in the military and in academia who sympathized with Ukrainian aspirations. Unfortunately, however, their views did not count. Only Hitler's views were critical and he never was a friend or an ally of Ukraine.

Because neither Moscow, Warsaw, Berlin, Budapest, nor Bucharest favored Ukrainian national aspirations there were few options for Ukrainians to pursue. Moreover, before and during World War II events moved too swiftly to enable responsible Ukrainian leaders to select appropriate alternatives. Tragically, at this crucial time in their history, the Ukrainians did not have far-sighted leaders. As a result many Ukrainians chose resistance, both active and passive, against their masters. It was a very costly alternative which proved only one thing: like their cossack predecessors twentieth century Ukrainians could fight but they could not win. The only concrete evidence of their efforts was, in the words of Taras Shevchenko, "*Mohyly po poli*" ("Grave mounds on the plain").

Yet in retrospect there was one alternative that Ukrainian leadership failed to consider or to explore seriously: to establish a dialogue with political, academic, economic and journalistic groups in France, England and the United States. Of course this effort would not have produced instantly an independent Ukraine since no Western power — France, England or the United States — was in a position to assist Ukrainians in their drive to achieve an independent existence. But such an approach would have enlightened these governments and their public about Ukrainian aspirations. This approach would have prevented the development of a stigma, which still persists in some quarters, that the whole idea of Ukraine was a German invention and that anyone who spoke in behalf of an independent Ukraine was a Fascist.

There are two classic examples which indicate that this approach can work well. The first was successfully tried by Mykhailo Drahomanov, the great Ukrainian scholar and publicist, after Russian authorities exiled him to Western Europe in the 1870s. The second has been well tested since World War II by Ukrainian scholars through their research and publications in the United States, Canada, France, England, West Germany, Italy, Australia and other countries. Moreover, there is some evidence to suggest that before World War II the interest in the Ukrainian cause was substantial enough in some of these countries to warrant such an approach.

No one expected the Germans to be brutal beasts. After all they gave the world many great philosophers, scholars, scientists, musicians and a host of other giants. Nazi brutality, therefore, came as a great shock not only to Ukrainians but to all other peoples of the world, and that brutality came piecemeal. First there appeared only innocent signs of “*Nur für Deutsche*” (For Germans only) in railroad stations, trains, streetcars and other public places. This display applied to everybody and all had to obey. Then came arrests of “hostages” and of “suspicious” individuals. These were followed by public executions and incarcerations of innocent victims in Nazi concentration camps.

While the Jews suffered most under Nazi occupation, it is very important to remember that other peoples, including Ukrainians, also suffered a great deal. Thousands perished in Nazi concentration camps as political prisoners. Thousands of others were executed in public places and their names posted in prominent places to warn others. Additional thousands perished because they either sympathized with or supported anti-German resistance or because they failed to deliver grain, milk, meat or other fruits of their labor to German authorities. A carefully documented study of this aspect of Nazi holocaust against the non-Jewish population of Eastern Europe is desperately needed.

There would have been more Ukrainian victims and more suffering had it not been for two principal factors: 1) Ukrainian willingness to fight and defend themselves against Nazi brutality (especially after 1942); and 2) the organization of the Ukrainian Central Committee in Cracow that offered some comfort and limited assistance to many Ukrainians. Many individuals also received advanced warning of their impending arrest from members of the Ukrainian police. Such committees and such police warnings also functioned for other ethnic groups of Eastern as well as in other parts of Nazi-occupied Europe.

In my view the proclamation was neither an act of “collaboration” nor an expression of political far-sightedness. It was a hastily prepared action by the Bandera-led Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists intended to accomplish three objectives: 1) to present the Germans with a *fait accompli* of Ukrainian independence; 2) to outmaneuver its rival, the Melnyk-led Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists, for leadership among the Ukrainians — a maneuver that intensified bitter rivalry between the two groups and thereby cost the lives of many capable and dedicated young men and women; and 3) to serve as a symbol of Ukrainian aspirations for an independent political existence.

Because the proclamation caught them by surprise and because it was contrary to their long-term interests in and designs on Ukraine, Nazi authorities immediately arrested all persons associated with the act of proclamation, including Bandera, and before too long they set up machinery

for terror against everything Ukrainian. Such steps clearly revealed that Germans were coming to Ukraine not as benevolent liberators but as conquerors.

It is true that Ukrainians demonstrated great determination in fighting the Nazis from 1942 to 1945 and the Soviets from 1944 to 1951. But what were the results? Grave mounds on the plain, incarcerations in Nazi concentration camps and hard labor in the Soviet Gulag Archipelago. What caused the failure? Three factors, it seems to me, were responsible. First, while fighting strong adversaries the Ukrainians also fought each other with suicidal energy, such as the struggle between the followers of Bandera and Melnyk. Second, both Nazi and communist adversaries of Ukrainians were stronger, better equipped and better organized. And finally, the Ukrainian resistance movement received no outside help.

The last point is extremely vital because both experience and evidence shows that in modern times all nations that have gained their independence have done so partly by their own sacrifice, but primarily through massive outside assistance — military, economic, diplomatic and moral — both direct and indirect. The Ukrainians made great sacrifices but they received no outside help. Until that help materializes, Ukrainian independence will continue to remain a dream not a reality.

Concerning French, Norwegian and Belgian collaboration with the Nazis the matter is not that simple. It is true that there were many individuals and groups in those countries that collaborated with the Nazis. Indeed the name of Vidkun Quisling is now synonymous with collaborator and traitor. Yet at the same time it should be noted that there was a substantial anti-Nazi resistance in Norway and in France. Moreover, these countries were independent states under German occupation. Each had a government in exile that was recognized by all the allied powers.

There was nothing of the sort in Ukraine. There was no Ukrainian state or government in exile. Ukraine had no puppet regime that collaborated with the Nazis. Ukraine was mismanaged and exploited by various Nazi *Gauleiters*. Local Ukrainian authorities had no power. The same was true of the Ukrainian Central Committee in Cracow headed by Professor Volodymyr Kubijovych. It functioned only like the Red Cross, a welfare society, a board of education, a relief agency and a cultural association. The Central Committee never enjoyed political authority or political responsibility — essential characteristics of an effective, independent government.

The answer is an absolute “no”. Both the United States and the USSR were independent political entities. Both were great powers. They had mutual diplomatic relations and, what is even more important, both were at war against the same enemy. Their cooperation, although strange, was normal and logical.

In contrast, Ukraine did not exist as an independent political entity. It had no government of its own, recognizable spokesman, or diplomatic ties. Its destiny was in the hands of other powers. Large areas of the country were in the war zone where fortunes changed daily. One region was under Romanian control. Another was occupied by Hungary. The rest was under Nazi domination and exploitation. A few isolated areas were in the hands of nationalist and communist partisans. Finally, because the UkSSR was constitutionally an integral part of the USSR, the chief spokesman for Ukraine, in the eyes of the rest of the world, was Joseph Stalin.

Kenneth C. Farmer

The historical record of events in Ukraine during WW II is reasonably clear and well documented;¹ our enterprise here, I believe, is not one of confirming or disputing the record, but rather one of interpretation.

“Collaboration” is conventionally conceived as the voluntary or involuntary active cooperation on the part of a state’s citizens with the forces of an occupying power during wartime. In the strict technical sense, individuals, organizations and groups of Soviet Ukrainians did collaborate with German occupying forces during WW II. The social, political and ethnic situations of Soviet and Polish Ukraine, however, compel us to qualify, or at least elaborate, that historical data. If we are to interpret and evaluate Ukrainian collaborationism fairly, we must take into account the world-view and motivations of the organizations and individuals involved.

Several *caveats* are in order. First, I am not concerned with isolated, individual acts of collaboration on the part, e.g., of local officials or frightened individuals acting on their own. While, as in all occupied countries, there were instances of collaboration motivated by opportunism, Nazi policies in the east gave the citizenry little choice but to cooperate at least to some degree if they wished to survive. What I am concerned with is active collaboration on the part of organized groups, most especially the OUN and UPA. Secondly, while my interpretation is largely mitigating, and while I am sympathetic to the Ukrainians’ striving for independence, I do not condone terrorist tactics in its pursuit, nor integral nationalism as its expression.

1. See, e.g., the following: John A. Armstrong, *Ukrainian Nationalism 1939-1945* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1955); John A. Armstrong, ed., *Soviet Partisans in World War II* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1964); Yuriy Tys-Krokhmaluk, *UPA Warfare in Ukraine* (New York: Society of Veterans of Ukrainian Insurgent Army, 1972); Ihor Kamenetsky, *Hitler’s Occupation of Ukraine, 1941-1944* (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1956), and, of course, many others.

Before considering factors peculiar to the Ukrainian case, I might note some general conditions of the war the net effect of which are extenuating:

1. It was Stalin's incompetence and obstinacy which in large measure permitted the disastrous surprise attack and occupation to take place. We might further note, in reference to the 1939 Nazi-Soviet Pact, that Stalin himself was the first Soviet collaborator with the Nazis.
2. The Red Army in Ukraine can scarcely be said to have made a valiant stand against the invaders.
3. The OUN and UPA not only collaborated at various junctures with the Germans, but also resisted them at others as well.
4. There were other collaborators. There were, in fact, 900,000 to a million Soviet citizens serving in German formations, including 300,000 to 400,000 *Russians* under Vlasov.²

These are only mitigating circumstances, however, and peripheral to the question of how representatives of the OUN and UPA conceived of their enterprise. Professor Armstrong has elsewhere postulated two ideal-types of the sources of collaborationism: that arising from social and ideological conflicts (characteristic, he notes, of France, Belgium, Norway, etc.), and that arising from the dissatisfactions of subordinated ethnic³ groups in the occupied country (Ukraine being a clear example).

The people who took part in the OUN and UPA were not "quislings." Rather, they were nationalists. They may legally have been engaged in treason against the Soviet government, but in their own eyes they were not betraying Ukraine. Well before the war, they had rejected the legitimacy of Soviet rule, regarding the Muscovites and the Poles in West Ukraine as occupying powers. From their point of view, they could not be accused of treason to a state to which they felt no loyalty.

The principal enemy for the OUN was Russia, then Poland, and only finally Germany. By the same logic on which the West's alliance with Stalin was predicated, they chose to cooperate with the lesser evil temporarily against the greater. The goal of collaboration was not to facilitate Nazi rule, nor certainly to save their own skins, but to achieve a Ukrainian state independent of both Russia and Germany.

Although it is an evaluational question, there seems little doubt to me that the Ukrainian nationalists were justified in withholding their loyalty

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2. Peter Kleist, *Zwischen Hitler und Stalin* (Bonn, 1950). Quoted by Kamenetsky, p. 62.
 3. John A. Armstrong, "Collaborationism in WW II: The Integral Nationalist Variant in Eastern Europe," *Journal of Modern History* Vol. 40, No. 3 (Sept. 1968), 396-410.

from the Polish and Soviet states, considering the long history of oppression they had experienced, and that it was not a political restraint based on consent in any event. Nor was their disloyalty a mere opportunistic reaction to the USSR's weakness; Ukrainian nationalism and the OUN had a history which antedated WW II by a respectably long period.

Representatives of the OUN and UPA regarded themselves, then, not as collaborators or traitors, but as partisans loyal to the Ukrainian nation. Partisans are fighters loyal to their government, fighting behind enemy lines or in occupied territory: the opposite of collaborators. To be a partisan necessitates the existence of a government on whose behalf the partisan is acting. By this oversimple logic, I mean to stress the crucial importance of the Lviv Act of Independence of June 30, 1941, and the creation of a government.

In the modern age, the legitimate use of military force requires a state. The Lviv "*akt*" did not result in a viable state (whether it might have had it enjoyed German support I don't know), but where news of it was carried in the Ukraine, it was generally received with enthusiasm; the OUN can be forgiven for believing that it had at least some popular legitimacy. Its major role, however, was symbolic in that it legitimized the military activities of the OUN/UPA in their own eyes.

As to the question of whether the Ukrainians should have been expected to share the fate of the Jews and other non-Ukrainians on their territory, this is a difficult moral question. Given our Western, democratic conception of citizenship rather than ethnic background as the basis of nationality, it seems self-evident, at least to me, that they should have been concerned. Most charitably, we can concede that the conditions under which they operated were so difficult, and the nationalistic goal so compelling, that the fate of other nationalities was of secondary importance. (I am aware that there were isolated instances of OUN aid to Jews, but it was not the pattern.)

Finally, I have been asked to comment briefly on the views of the Ukrainian dissenters of the 1960s and 1970s on the events in wartime Ukraine. As I have said elsewhere, with the exception of surviving OUN/UPA participants (such as Karavansky) and some particularly knowledgeable dissidents, most of the younger Ukrainian dissidents know very little about the OUN beyond what they read in the Soviet media. The Soviet press goes to great lengths to make the OUN appear very unattractive, and has succeeded in making it an undesirable symbol for the new generation of patriots to associate with themselves.

There are, of course, some exceptions. I have described elsewhere, for example, the discovery of an OUN cell in 1961, the activities of the Ukrainian National Front (standing on an explicit OUN platform) in Ivano-Frankivsk in 1964-1967, and others, as well as *samvydav* documents on

OUN/UPA heroes and uprisings in the prison camps among OUN/UPA participants.⁴ These, however, have been isolated groups, atypical of the post-Stalin dissent movement. While today's Ukrainian nationalist dissent movements is not monolithic and there are various strains of thought, it has eschewed the integral nationalist concept of the nation, and its tactics have been civil disobedience and the meticulous exhaustion of legal remedies, rather than armed insurgency or terrorism.

George Kulchycky

When World War II broke out in Europe the Ukrainian nation was not morally or legally bound to support any state or nation. The Polish state, partitioned by Germany and the Soviet Union in 1939, could not expect the Ukrainians to defend it because it had alienated the Ukrainians by their betrayal of the Polish-Ukrainian Pact of 1921, the internment of Ukrainian soldiers, their former allies, in prisoner of war camps, and their uncompromising stand towards the Western Ukrainian military units (UHA). Furthermore the absorption of Western Ukraine, a League of Nations Mandate, into the Polish state, pacification and Polonization acutely aggravated Polish-Ukrainian relations and made accommodation impossible. Finally, Polish-Hungarian collaboration in the destruction of the Carpatho-Ukrainian state and the operations of the AK (Polish Home Army) later in western Ukrainian territory made rapprochement impossible. The enmity of Ukrainians toward Poles and vice-versa was correctly assessed by the Polish paper *Slowo Narodowe* which called for the creation of a United Front of the Soviet Union and Poland against Ukraine.¹

The Soviet Union also could not expect to command the sympathies of the Ukrainians who vividly remembered the plunder, death and destruction sown in Ukraine by both the White and Red armies. They could not erase the memory of the Red "prodzahony" (requisition) units which caused the Ukrainian Famine in 1921 and also the collectivization process which, destroyed six to eight million Ukrainians in 1932-1933 during the man-made Stalin Famine.² The Russification, brutality and exile which accompanied the famine made even the most devoted Ukrainian Communists hostile to

4. Kenneth C. Farmer, *Ukrainian Nationalism in the post-Stalin Era* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1980), pp. 156-160. Also of interest, although it lacks documentation, is a discussion of OUN activity in the Ukraine in the 1960s and 1970s: Y. Vilshenko, "The Current Liberation Struggle in the Ukraine," *ABN Correspondence* Vol. XXXI, No. 5 (Sept. - Oct. 1980), pp. 30-41.

1. *Slowo Narodowe* of December 20, 1938 cited in Peter G. Stercho, *Diplomacy of Double Morality* (New York, 1971), p. 325.
 2. F. Pravoberezhnyi, *8,000,000; 1933-yi rik na Ukraini* (Winnipeg, 1957) p. 15. See also S. O. Pidhainy et al., ed. *The Black Deeds of the Kremlin* (Detroit, 1955).

Moscow. These Western Ukrainians who lived in Polish occupied Ukraine and who had a tendency to look to Moscow for deliverance became cured after the Soviet Union briefly occupied Western Ukraine and upon its retreat in 1941 left thousands of Ukrainian patriots dead in the cellars and orchards of the cities of Lviv, Vynnytsia and others.³

Germany also could not command the sympathies of the Ukrainians who very briefly viewed it as a deliverer or liberator. The acquiescence to the absorption of Carpatho-Ukraine into Hungary,⁴ the Soviet-Nazi Non-Aggression Pact, and later the partition of Ukrainian territories lost the Germans any sympathy that they had gained before 1939. When considering Ukrainians vis-a-vis Germany, the former, after 1939 had no reason to feel any loyalty to Germany and as future events showed, approached the Germans with distrust and pragmatism. When indeed Ukrainians did welcome the Germans into Ukraine they did so because they represented the lesser evil vis-a-vis Poland and Russia.

Historically there is a reason why Ukrainians may have been favorably disposed to the Germans. Like other states Ukraine, even though not a territorially recognized state, did have its traditional enemies and friends. Germany would be considered a friendly state not only because it had the same enemies but also because it had aided, even if for a short time, the Ukrainian struggle for independence in 1918. Subsequent cooperation after World War I was dictated by mutual interests and previous historical events. At the time when Ukrainians sought this "unholy alliance" with the Germans, Germany was not viewed as a power bent on committing genocide nor was it committed to fighting an ideological war until 1941.⁵ Besides, historically speaking, "unholy alliances" were acceptable in the west when Christian France aligned with Moslem Turks, when the French Republic aligned with Russian autocracy, or even when the West aligned with the Soviet Union. It is the victor then who provides the definition to "holy" or "unholy" alliances. In pursuit of their realistic goals, Ukrainian activity of necessity, regardless of collaboration or non collaboration, would fall into the category of "unholy" because, regardless of ideology, it opposed Russia, one of the victors. To those without vision or foresight one explanation of Ukrainian cooperation, if there ever was such can be offered. The Ukrainian cooperation, even after Hitler had shown his cards could have been predicated on the possibility that Hitler would be assassinated or that there would be a change of regimes in Germany.⁶

3. *Massacre in Vinnitsa* (New York, 1953), p. 3.

4. Stercho, pp. 375-376.

5. Petro Mirchuk, *Roman Shukhevych: Komandyr Armii Bezsmertnykh* (New York, 1970) p. 99.

6. Iaroslav Stetsko, *30 Chervnia 1941: Proholoshennia Vidnovlennia Derzhavnosti Ukrainy* (London, England, 1967), p. 162.

When examining the question of Ukrainian "collaboration" certain questions have to be considered. Were all those who lived in the Reichskommissariate Ukraine "Ukrainians," or was the term "Ukraine" used as a territorial nomenclature which included many other races? Could the Volksdeutsche who spoke Ukrainian, and prior to World War I numbered 500,000, and collaborated with the Nazis, be regarded as Ukrainians? Could forced cooperation (drafted into army, Ostarbeiten, etc.) be regarded as collaboration? Could the "Ukrainian police" drafted from Soviet POW's and including Poles, Russians and Volksdeutsche be regarded Ukrainian?

Also to be considered is the problem of alternatives. Did the Ukrainians have any alternatives open to them? Both Poland and the Soviet Union were regarded as Allies and both hoped to regain their former territories in Ukraine. Since the Soviet Union was one of the principal allies in the western camp it would be absurd to think that the Soviet Union would abandon its "bread basket." The only other alternative that briefly presented itself to the Ukrainians appeared when Prime Minister Winston Churchill proposed the idea that the Allies should advance into the Balkans, the "Underbelly of Europe," and thence into Ukraine. If such a plan had been adopted Ukraine would have found itself in the hands of the British and under such circumstances perhaps Ukrainian cooperation against the Germans could have been achieved.⁴

The question of whether Ukrainians were expected to share the fate of Jews, Poles, Russians and other ethnic groups living in Ukraine could be turned around. Did those non-Ukrainian ethnic groups who came to Ukraine as administrators, colonizers, tax collectors, etc., and separated themselves from the local population and did not even bother to learn its language share in the fate of the Ukrainians? Normally one viewing the facts would say that the Ukrainians were not expected to share the fate of the Jews but many glowing examples exist which showed that Ukrainians were willing to share the fate of the Jews by giving them assistance. Such may be seen in the activity of the Church and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA).

The stigma of collaboration inevitably invites the question of who was representative of the Ukrainian-German collaboration. Was it the so-called "Ukrainian" police which was for the most part made up of non-

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7. One final question that is germane to the issue: how much did the world know about Jewish executions in 1941-1942?
 8. Had this occurred it is doubtful that the Ukrainians could have achieved anything. As in the Balkans, the British and Russians would have probably worked out a percentage formula which would leave Ukraine totally under Russian control.

Ukrainians, or the existing pre-war Ukrainian organizations and their spokesmen? Having answered this question, we can then proceed to discuss "Ukrainian collaboration" which, if it indeed existed, ended on June 30, 1941, that is, eight days after Operation Barbarossa began.

The Act of June 30, 1941 was an act of defiance and an expression of the will of the Ukrainian nation through the Organization of the Ukrainian Nationalists. True, the OUN was not representative of all the Ukrainians nor was it democratically chosen. It became the spokesman of Ukrainian aspirations because no other organization had such a dynamic following and clear perception of objectives. Pre-war Ukrainian political parties were either dispersed by the turbulent events of 1939 or were in exile and out of touch with Ukrainian realities.

The attempts to link the OUN to the Nazis are for the most part unfounded. The fact that some connections of its leaders with the Austrian Army existed during World War I are irrelevant and do not make them collaborators. The fact that the Organization was undemocratic stems from its clandestine existence and not from its "integral nationalist" attitudes.⁹ The main objective of the OUN was the liberation of Ukraine. Committal to this objective meant cooperation with anyone who could render assistance in its realization.

It is on these grounds that contacts were made with the German Wehrmacht. Subsequent cooperation with the Wehrmacht did not imply cooperation with the Nazis. The Wehrmacht was sympathetic to the Ukrainian struggle for independence and often displayed pro-Ukrainian attitudes. Its interests in Ukraine were dictated by sound military planning which hoped to secure a safe rear for the German Army in event of a war. Events in Carpatho-Ukraine, the Soviet Nazi Pact, and the treatment of Ukrainians in the General Government somewhat cooled Ukrainian-Wehrmacht relations.

Operation Barbarosa launched by the Germans rekindled Ukrainian hopes. The Wehrmacht reacted sympathetically while the Nazis not at all. It is this lack of Nazi reaction which then forced the OUN to act independently without German approval. Earlier, in April of 1940, the Second Great Conclave of the OUN (B) worked out a program which took into account the wartime objectives of the Germans.¹⁰ This program was subsequently

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9. John A. Armstrong, *Ukrainian Nationalism* (New York, 1963), p. 129. The author admits that "integral nationalism" was not deeply rooted in Ukraine.
 10. Mykola Lebid, *UPA: Ukrainska Povstanska Armia*, (1946), p. 14. It should be pointed out that the OUN until 1940 was headed by A. Melnyk but with the approach of the war broke up into the Bandera and Melnyk factions. The Bandera group consisted of more voluntarist elements and was more prone to radical activism. However, both factions continued to play an important role in the liberation struggle.

reflected in the article "For a Correct General Line of OUN Policy" authored by Y. Stetsko and warned the Germans that "Ukraine will rise against Germany if her independence is not recognized."¹¹ Though convinced of German interests in Ukrainian independence and reassured by the Wehrmacht and Abwehr that indeed such were German interests, the OUN prepared for non-recognition.¹²

The objectives of the OUN in early 1941 were independence, creation of a Ukrainian Army, and cooperation or alliance with Germany against Moscow. The resources of the OUN at the time consisted of: 1) a nation committed to independence; 2) Ukrainian military formations "Roland" and "Nachtigal" in the German Army, and OUN Marching Units; 3) Ukrainian interpreters in the German Army; 4) a loyal OUN network; 5) the Ukrainian Catholic and Orthodox Churches; and 6) future Soviet-Ukrainian POWs.¹³

The Wehrmacht sensed the impatience of the OUN and asked it not to declare independence. It reassured the OUN that it was working on the problem. While the Wehrmacht asked for time the OUN thought of timeliness. To wait for German permission was not in the spirit of voluntarist-nationalists who adhered to the "decatalogue." To wait and give the Germans the time to consolidate their victory meant not realizing independence, the major OUN objective. The OUN decided to defy the Germans and meet them with a "fait accompli."

Involved in the "fait accompli" was the seizure of Lviv, the capital of Western Ukraine, its radio stations, and police. This was done by the OUN even before the arrival of the German Army which entered the city on June 30, 1941, eight days after Operation Barbarosa began. As the German army marched into Lviv it was met with placards reading "Ukraine for the Ukrainians" and other ominous signs. Initially the Proclamation of Independence was to be announced in Kiev, the Ukrainian capital, but Iaroslav Stetsko and other nationalists of the Bandera faction, fearing that the opportunity would be lost once the Germans took Kiev, decided to proclaim independence on June 30, 1941. Earlier, in Cracow, the OUN had prepared lists of government members and the only thing necessary was to call a National Assembly and proclaim the act. Acting with haste, Stetsko convened the National Assembly in the "Prosvita" building. Present were

11. Stetsko, p. 36.

12. A Committee was organized in Cracow which had as its objective to prepare a government made up of people from different political parties. H. Polikarpenko, *Orhanizatsia Ukrainskykh Natsionalistiv pidchas Druhoi Svitovoi Viiny* (Canada, 1951) p. 177. See also Z. Knysh, *Rozbrat: Spohady i materialy do rozkolu OUN u 1940-1941 rokakh* (Toronto, n.d.), p. 175..

13. Point six was predicated on German agreement and cooperation.

former diplomats, high church dignitaries, and members of former and even hostile parties. The unanimity of the Act of June 30 was symbolic. It represented the coming together of different groups. Had the National Assembly, made up of a majority of non-OUN people, so wished it could have ignored the act read by Stetsko.¹⁴ But consensus was evident. Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky issued a pastoral letter which together with the Proclamation was read over and over on the Lviv radio. The Orthodox Archbishop Polikarp also issued his pastoral letter. For three days following, until the Germans seized the radio station, the Ukrainians rejoiced. No voice of opposition was raised and no attempt to detract from the act was made.

Of great significance at the time of the proclamation was the position of the Catholic and Orthodox Churches. The Catholic Church was fortunate to have strong leadership in the person of Metropolitan A. Sheptytsky. It is his pastoral letter, which according to many, gave credibility to the Act of June 30, 1941. In accepting the Act, which was to be an act of defiance of the Germans, the Metropolitan in effect restated his views on Ukrainian independence and his attitude to the Nazis whom he criticized as early as 1933. The prestige of this man was so enormous that both the Bolsheviks in 1939-1941 and later the Germans, despite his constant criticism, refrained from arresting him. The Nazi regime saw the exacerbation of his activity against the Germans. In his pastoral letters to the faithful he warned against acts that might help the Nazis.¹⁵ Heinrich Himmler cautioned Sheptytsky not to concern himself with affairs that were not in his domain. Specifically he warned him not to defend the Jews.¹⁶ In defiance Sheptytsky launched "Operation Save the Jews" for which he is today regarded in Israel as one of the "Righteous Gentiles of the World." Although the history of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church is more complicated, it also is known for its stand against the Nazis and for its support of the Act of June 30, 1941.

The immediate reaction of the Germans was to have its creators revoke or renounce the Act. In return the Germans promised a local government to the Ukrainians.¹⁷ Stetsko and the head of the OUN-B Stephan Bandera refused and were placed in concentration camps. Leaders of the Melnyk faction of the OUN were also arrested. With this all illusions of cooperation or

14. Stetsko, p. 209.

15. *Pysma-Poslannia Mytropolyta Andreia Sheptytskoho z chasiv nimetskoï okupatsi*, Part II, (Yorkton, Sask. 1969), pp. 222-231, 267-270, 27-28.

16. Kurt I. Lewin, "Andreas Sheptytsky and the Jewish Community in Galicia" *The Annals of the Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences in the U. S.*, Nos. 1-2, 1959, p. 1, 661.

17. Stetsko, p. 119. For the OUN-B stand on the creation of such a government see *OUN v Svitli Postanov Velykykh Zboriv, Konferencii ta inshykh dokumentiv z borotby 1929-1955 rr.* (Zbirka Dokumentiv) (1955), p. 56.

“alliance” against Moscow disappeared. Two million Ukrainians were forcefully sent to Germany as “Ostarbeiter” to work for the German war effort. Ukrainian lands were divided among the General Gubernia, Transistria and the Reichskommissariat Ukraine. German requisition units gleaned the land of food leaving behind many dead and famine conditions.

Today enemies, critics, and detractors of the Act attack its organizers and the OUN-B. While failing to criticize the Act during its proclamation, and this is understandable since the Act was extremely popular at the time of the declaration. Critics today maintain that irresponsible people attempted to “play government” while others feel that it was of no consequence and had “little long range effect.”¹⁸ Others claim that it gained importance because it had the support of the “bedridden” Metropolitan Sheptytsky who was tricked into endorsing it.¹⁹

However, in the perspective of time, the Act of June 30 became more important. It proved that the Ukrainian nation had a will and objectives of its own and its spokesman, the OUN, closely reflected the views of all Ukrainians and did not collaborate with the Nazis.²⁰ Furthermore the Act of June 30, was not only an act of defiance but an act whose next logical step was resistance.

Critics of the Ukrainian resistance movement and those who would place the Ukrainians in the pro-Nazi Camp attack the OUN for its lack of active resistance until late 1942. The reasons for such a delay, for those who want to accept such reasons, are evident. Before beginning the anti-Nazi struggle the OUN had to stockpile weapons, organize and train its units, prepare the population with necessary propaganda, and decide on the methods that were to be used in such a struggle.

18. Armstrong, p. 282; Knysh, p. 178.

19. The letter of Metropolitan Sheptytsky to Hlibovych dated July 13, 1941 indicates that he was very much aware of the political situation and the split between Bandera and Melnyk. In it he recognized Stetsko as head of government, does not in any way revoke or withdraw his support, and referring to the OUN split writes: “Is it possible to reconcile them? (Bandera and Melnyk) It is imperative.” A copy of the letter is owned by Mr. R. Danylewych of Cleveland, Ohio who kindly allowed me to copy portions of it.

20. One may try to make an argument for German-Ukrainian collaboration when the Ukrainians created a military unit which was to make up part of the German Army. It is a fact that almost all Ukrainians welcomed the creation of this unit under Gen. P. Shandruk. But once again we have to put emphasis on the time element and objectives of the Ukrainians. By 1945 the German High Command was aware that the war was lost and welcomed any help they could get. For the Ukrainians it was the last chance to organize a military unit which would serve as the nucleus of an independent army of a hoped for independent state. Armstrong, p. 169.

The struggle of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) against the Germans is well documented and need not be mentioned here. Its methods were not only military, which included the killing of General V. Lutze head of the SD, but also opposition to the German land reforms and the "Ostarbeiter" program.

The same people who organized the Act of June 30, 1941 also were responsible for the creation of the Ukrainian Supreme Liberation Council (UHVR) in 1943, which was responsible for including Ukrainians of all political orientations in the struggle first against the Germans and then against the Russians. Without attempting to overstate their importance, Ukrainians have the best track record of resistance of any country including France.

John S. Reshetar, Jr.

Although wars have resulted in the liberation of nations because of the collapse of empires, the Ukrainian nation in World War II was fated only to exchange oppressors and to experience military occupation and the distinction of having the country serve as a battleground for three years. The Soviet inability to defend Ukraine against the Nazi invaders served to raise the issue of where Ukrainians should place their loyalties and what hopes and aspirations they could reasonably be expected to have.

Such loyalty as may have linked Ukrainians to the Soviet regime in its Stalinist form was strained to the breaking point and failed to survive the test of cruel events and the sense of betrayal. The depredations perpetrated in Ukraine under Stalinist rule could hardly have promoted bonds of loyalty. The famine of 1932-33 with its horrendous loss of life and the destruction of much of the Ukrainian intelligentsia as well as the widespread terror of the Yezhovshchina can be said to have dissolved any claims that Stalin may have had on the loyalty of Ukrainians. Indeed, Stalin's failure to fulfill his pledge of March 10, 1921 (at the Tenth Party Congress) to Ukrainize the large cities of Ukraine could also be regarded as having provided the initial basis for the ultimate rejection of his system of rule by Ukrainians.¹

The question of Ukrainian loyalty to the Polish state must be viewed in terms of the fact that Western Ukraine was incorporated into the new Polish state as a result of military conquest which was resisted by the Western Ukrainians in 1919. The incorporation was approved by the Western Powers in March, 1923 without the consent of the Ukrainian population of the region. In many respects Polish rule in Western Ukraine had the quality of a foreign occupation with Ukrainians experiencing the

1. I. V. Stalin, *Sochineniia* (Moscow: Gospolitizdat, 1947), V. p. 49.

most demeaning kind of treatment and a wide range of discriminatory practices. The so-called "pacification" practices, the destruction of Orthodox churches and the misguided efforts at "Polonization" added to the Ukrainian grievances. Such short-sighted policies eroded whatever loyalty Ukrainians may be said to have had to the Polish state of the inter-war period.

The arrival in Lviv, the Western Ukrainian capital, of a small Ukrainian military unit in German uniform in June 1941 was the consequence of a collaboration between the German military and the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) which began when the latter was under the leadership of Colonel Yevhen Konovalets. The decision of the OUN leadership abroad to collaborate with German military intelligence was based on several apparent assumptions. By agreeing to the formation of the two battalions with the code-names "Nachtigall" and "Roland", the OUN-Bandera (OUN-B) leadership sought to make certain that its cadres would be on the Ukrainian scene as early as possible following the outbreak of hostilities between Germany and the Soviet Union. Thus the units were to conduct political mobilization efforts among the Ukrainian population; "Roland" carried typewriters and mimeographs and was to prepare and distribute political leaflets and other literature. Although the two units were limited to but several hundred men each ("Nachtigall" had approximately 330 men and "Roland" 280 men), their formation was seen as providing an opportunity to obtain military training and experience and to gain possession of weapons, although the units were only lightly armed as infantry. Undoubtedly the OUN-B assumed that this limited military collaboration with the Wehrmacht, used for Ukrainian political ends, might subsequently develop into an opportunity to form military units of division size and possibly a Ukrainian army recruited from the population of occupied Ukraine. Mykola Lebed, chief of the OUN-B Security Service, subsequently pointed out that the OUN-B was in contact with the German military and *not* with the German government or the Nazi Party. He contended that the OUN-B had no other option and could not seek another ally since its leadership in 1939 was in Germany and in Italy or in countries occupied by Germany. Yet he conceded that "faith tended to outweigh reality" in the mentality of OUN members.²

However, the assumptions concerning a mutually advantageous Ukrainian-German collaboration quickly acquired a dubious character as the nature of the Nazi occupation policies in Ukraine became clear.

2. Mykola Lebed, "Do zv'iazkiv OUN-Bandery z nimets'kym viis'kom," *Svoboda* (Ukrainian daily, Jersey City, N.J.) June 10, 1960. Confirmation of the ties between the OUN and the German military is provided by the former Abwehr station chief in Istanbul, Paul Leverkuehn in his work, *German Military Intelligence* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1954), pp. 158-16.

“Nachtigall,” after participating in the Act of June 30, 1941 proclaiming an independent Ukrainian state, proceeded as far east as Vinnytsia by mid-August and was then ordered by the German military to return to its training camp at Neuhammer in Silesia. “Roland,” which was trained near Wiener Neustadt, suffered a similar fate after being deployed at the village of Untylivka on the Proskuriv-Odessa railway line and was ordered to return to Austria at the end of August. The two battalions were merged in October, 1941 to form a special constabulary battalion, with approximately 500 men in green police uniforms, and was used to combat Soviet partisans in the forests and swamps of the Vitebsk region of Belorussia. In December 1942 the unit refused to continue police operations and was then ordered back to Lviv where it was dissolved and its officers arrested.³

The Ukrainian-German military collaboration proved to be very uncertain and decidedly unsatisfactory from the Ukrainian point of view. The principal reason for this initially was the German refusal to accept the Lviv Act of June 30 proclaiming the Ukrainian state as well as the German decision to arrest Iaroslav Stetsko and Roman Ilnytsky. Although the German occupation authorities tolerated the existence of the Council of Elders in Lviv, which became the Ukrainian National Council on July 30, 1941, this body was dissolved by the Gestapo on March 3, 1942.⁴ Similarly, the Ukrainian National Council in Kiev, which was under the influence of the Melnyk branch of the OUN, was dissolved in February 1942 and approximately forty Ukrainian intellectuals were executed, along with the Ukrainian mayor, Volodymyr Bhazy.⁵

The failure of a Ukrainian-German alliance to develop was due to the fact that the Nazis came not as liberators but as conquerors and occupiers. The Nazis did not regard the Ukrainians as allies and did not seek an alliance with them — despite the OUN illusory view of Nazi Germany as an acceptable and reliable ally. Hitler intended to place large numbers of German colonists in Southern Ukraine and in the Crimea as well as Norwegian, Swedish, Danish and Dutch colonists in the name of a “racial policy.”⁶ He foresaw a population of ninety million in Ukraine (consisting largely of

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3. This information regarding the battalions is based on the detailed accounts by Iurii Lopatynsky and Dr. Liubomyr Ortynsky (who were, respectively, officers in “Nachtigall” and “Roland”) that were published in *Svoboda* between June 15 and June 25, 1960.
 4. Stephan M. Horak, “Ukrainci v Druhii svitovii viini,” *Ukrains'kyi istoryk*, Nos. 65-68 (1980), pp. 66-67.
 5. *Ibid.*, pp. 68-69 and John A. Armstrong, *Ukrainian Nationalism*, 2nd edition (New York: Columbia University Press, 1963), pp. 116-117.
 6. *Hitler's Secret Conversations, 1941-1944*. (New York: Farrar, Straus and Young, 1953), pp. 13-14, 20-21, 29.

Nordic colonists) and referred to it as “that new Indian Empire” in which Ukrainians were to be segregated from the colonists.⁷ Hitler was explicit (in his *Tischgesprache* on September 17-18, 1941 on the eve of the capture of Kiev) in declaring: “We have no interest in maintaining Baltic states, any more than in creating an independent Ukraine. We must likewise prevent them from returning to Christianity. That would be a grave fault, for it would be giving them a form of organization.” He also noted: “I am not a partisan, either of a university at Kiev [advocated by Alfred Rosenberg]. It’s better not to teach them to read. They won’t love us for tormenting them with schools. Even to give them a locomotive to drive would be a mistake.”⁸ In a moment of unusual generosity Hitler added: “We’ll supply the Ukrainians with scarves, glass beads and everything that colonial peoples like.”⁹ Subsequently, on October 17, 1941, Hitler noted: “. . .let them know just enough to understand our highway signs so that they won’t get themselves run over by our vehicles!”¹⁰

Erich Koch, the ruthless gauleiter of East Prussia who served as Reichskommissar of Ukraine held views similar to those of Hitler. In addressing a German audience in Kiev on March 5, 1943, Koch declared: “We have come here to create the basis for victory. We are a master race, which must remember that the lowliest German worker is racially and biologically a thousand times more valuable than the population here.”¹¹ Nazi policy in Ukraine was based on brutality and fragmentation. The Ukrainian leaders such as Bandera, Stetsko, and Melnyk who were willing to collaborate with Germany — but only on terms that would be beneficial to Ukrainians — were arrested and confined in the Sachsenhausen concentration camp until the autumn of 1944. The crimes perpetrated against Ukrainians, Jews and others in Erich Koch’s Reichskommissariat Ukraine prompted Gerald Reitlinger to label it “the illfare state.”¹²

7. *Ibid.*, p. 76.

8. *Ibid.*, p. 29.

9. *Ibid.*

10. *Ibid.*, p. 57.

11. *Nuremberg Documents*, 1,130-PS as quoted in Alan Bullock, *Hitler, A Study in Tyranny* (Long Acre — London: Oldhams Press Ltd., 1952), p. 633.

12. Gerald Reitlinger, *The House Built on Sand* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1960) chapter 6. The brutality that characterized Erich Koch’s rule may be attributed to a pathological mentality as well as to Nazi racist ideology. Hans Gisevius, who knew Erich Koch, characterized him as a “devil of a fellow. . .a first-rate demagogue, a bold adventurer. . .[with] a vigorous imagination.” He is said to have been able to influence Hitler, in his own view, by providing the Fuehrer with “something novel at every interview, something extravagant, exorbitant, and impressive.” Gisevius states that Koch had “become a megalomaniac” by the time of his appointment as Reichskommissar

of Ukraine. See Hans B. Gisevius, *To the Bitter End* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1947), pp. 200-201. However, the possibility remains that Erich Koch's extreme Ukrainophobia has not been fully explained and could also have been related to his allegedly pro-socialist (Communist) past which might have been associated with a grudging respect for Russia. Originally a railway clerk, Koch had been associated with the anti-capitalist and pro-socialist (Gregor and Otto) Strasser wing of the Nazi Party. He advocated a "pro-Russian policy," according to Hermann Rauschning in his *The Revolution of Nihilism, Warning to the West* (New York: Alliance Book Corporation, Longmans Green & Co., 1940), p. 258. The pro-Soviet view is also evident in Koch's book, *Aufbau im Osten* (1934). Conceivably Koch's brutality in Ukraine could have been prompted by a desire to demonstrate that he had overcome these earlier pro-Soviet views. See Alexander Dallin, *German Rule in Russia, 1941-45* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1957), pp. 124-127. Yet there remains the fact that Erich Koch (who was apprehended only in 1949) was not tried in the Ukrainian S.S.R., the scene of his worst crimes, but was, instead, turned over to the Poles and was not placed on trial for nearly a decade and in the end succeeded in escaping the death penalty. By contrast, Dr. Hans Frank, who ruled the General Gouvernement of Poland, was found guilty by the Nuremberg International Military Tribunal and was executed. A possible reason for the Soviet decision not to have Koch put on trial in the Ukrainian S.S.R. is suggested by Reitlinger: "In Moscow there was nothing against Koch's treatment of the Ukrainian nationalists, but there was very much against publicity for Koch's victims." (Reitlinger, *op. cit.*, p. 226). For whatever reasons, wittingly or not, Koch more than any other responsible Nazi official in the field, served Stalin's purposes in Ukraine and turned Ukrainians against Germany. There remains the unanswered question of whether or not the Kremlin influenced Polish justice in the case of Erich Koch.

Various German officials criticized Erich Koch's policies and vainly advocated measures designed to win support among Ukrainians. These included Alfred Rosenberg, head of the Ostministerium (who was isolated in the Nazi leadership and had no real authority); although he favored the development of a Ukrainian state for the containment of Russia, Rosenberg remained a racist and a rabid anti-Semite. Other officials who at various times criticized Erich Koch included Professor Theodore Oberlaender, Professor Hans Koch, Dr. Otto Braeutigam and Georg Leibbrandt. See Dallin, *op. cit.*, pp. 88, 109-110, 121, 157-67, 513-515. Even Dr. Joseph Goebbels as propaganda minister ultimately recognized the senseless nature of Nazi policies in Ukraine in an entry in his diary on April 25, 1942 (*The Goebbels Diaries, 1942-1943*, edited and translated by Louis P. Lochner [Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1948] p. 185). However, the continued dominance of Hitler, Bormann, Himmler, Goering and Erich Koch nullified all efforts to reorient German occupation policies. Nazi occupation policies in Ukraine are described in Ihor Kamenetsky, *Hitler's Occupation of Ukraine, 1941-1944* (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1956) and in his *Secret Nazi Plans for Eastern Europe* (New York: Bookman Associates, 1961).

The Nazi policy of fragmentation was first evident in the decision to attach Eastern Galicia to the General Government and to give Odessa and the area east of the Dniester river to Romania. Koch's Reichskommissariat Ukraine was ruled by 114 Gebietskommissars who were all Germans.¹³ Ukrainians were permitted to serve as local officials at the *raion* level and as "mayors." Ukrainian police units were permitted (though they were always subordinate to German officials), but there was to be no Ukrainian army. The Ukrainian Central Committee in Cracow was used to counter the Ukrainian National Council in Lviv.¹⁴ The Ukrainian Autonomous Orthodox Church was used to counter the influence of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church especially when the latter quickly gained strength.¹⁵

The occupation authorities also took advantage of the divisions within the OUN, and Berlin may have indirectly encouraged the conflict and Bandera's challenge to Melnyk's leadership. Various questions remain unanswered regarding the presence in the OUN leadership of Colonel Richard (Riko) Jary, an Austrian (probably of Czech origin) who had served as an officer in the Austrian army and in the army of the Western Ukrainian Republic in 1919. Some Ukrainian critics of the OUN-B have contended that Jary was actually a German agent who allegedly helped to bring about the division in the OUN.¹⁶ Jary commanded "Roland" and was confined by the Nazis following its dissolution.

German plans to use the OUN could not have included approval of the Act of June 30 proclaiming a Ukrainian state and establishing a government headed by Iaroslav Stetsko.¹⁷ Apparently the Abwehr officer, Professor Hans Koch, who was present at the proclamation of the Act, did nothing to

13. Reitlinger, *op. cit.*, p. 188.

14. Stephan M. Horak, "Ukrainci i Druha svitova viina," *Ukrains'kyi istoryk* Nos. 61-64 (1979), pp. 35-37.

15. Indicative of the Reichskommissariat's hostility to the Autocephalous Church was the fact that the Church found it necessary to consecrate six bishops in semi-secrecy in Kiev in May 1942. Among the many repressive measures suffered by the Autocephalous Church was a ban by the Reichskommissariat on a conference of bishops in October 1942, although the hierarchs circumvented it by meeting in Lutsk for "private" discussions. See Ivan Wlasowsky, *Narys istorii Ukrains'koi Pravoslavnoi Tserkvy* (New York and Bound Brook: Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the U.S.A., 1966) Vol. IV, Part Two, pp. 222, 240-241, 390.

16. Lebed, *op. cit.*, confirms that Jary was the contact between the OUN and the German military. For an example of criticism of Jary's role in the OUN as well as the pro-German orientation see *Nashe Slovo* (Munich-London), No. 7, 1980, pp. 90-93. Cf. John A. Armstrong, *op. cit.*, p. 35. Jary withdrew from political activity and remained silent until his death in 1969.

17. For three somewhat different texts of the Act of June 30 see Kost' Pankivsky, *Vid derzhavy do Komitetu* (New York-Toronto: v-vo Kliuchi, 1957), pp. 111-115.

discourage Stetsko from summoning the "National Assembly" and announcing the Act and having it broadcast over Radio Lviv — which had been seized by "Nachtigall." The German refusal to acknowledge the Act of June 30 and the demand that it be annulled raises the question of how the OUN-B could have misjudged the Nazi position and what Berlin would or would not tolerate.

Slightly more than two years earlier the OUN had experienced the bitterness of betrayal by Berlin when Hungary was permitted to seize Carpatho-Ukraine in March 1939. Apparently it was assumed by the OUN-B that in 1941 the stakes were higher for Germany and that there would not be a repetition of 1939 and Stetsko would not suffer a fate similar to that of Father Voloshyn. Although presumably the OUN-B leaders should have been acquainted with Hitler's *Mein Kampf* and aware of the likelihood of a negative German attitude, a rationale can be offered for their decision to proclaim Ukrainian statehood.¹⁸ There may still have lingered the belief that, in the end, the Germany of 1941 would support Ukrainian statehood as did the Germany of 1918 — in recognizing the Ukrainian People's Republic (the Central Rada) and subsequently Hetman Skoropadsky's regime. Yet Professor Hans Koch was present at the proclamation and expressed a discordant note which "created a very unpleasant impression" when he observed that "the war is not ended and all political plans must await the decision of the Fuehrer."¹⁹

Thus the OUN-B probably sought to present Berlin with a fait accompli on the chance that it would acquiesce in the Act and in the formation of Stetsko's government. In any case, the Act would require Berlin to adopt a clear position on the question of Ukrainian statehood. In the event that Berlin would oppose the Act, its proclamation would nevertheless remain "for the record" as a symbolic act adding to the mythology of the struggle for Ukrainian national statehood and to the historical legends that may be said to link generations. Still another reason for the Act was to promote OUN-B factional partisan interests since its text asserted that: "By the will of the Ukrainian people the OUN under the leadership of Stepan Bandera proclaims the renewal of the Ukrainian State." In seeking partisan advantage, the OUN-B sought to defame its rival, the OUN-M, without attacking Melnyk who was generally held in high esteem in Lviv and was not present to respond.²⁰ Critics have contended that the OUN-B sought to monopolize an event of great potential significance and arrogate to itself the right to determine the nature of the future Ukrainian political order.

18. Dr. Liubomyr Ortynsky, an officer in "Roland," stated that the OUN leadership issued a circular in the second half of April 1941, on a "strictly confidential" basis, in which it warned of the possibility of a negative attitude on the part of the Nazi government toward the cause of Ukrainian national liberation. *Svoboda*, June 21, 1960.

19. Pankivsky, *op. cit.*, p. 32.

20. *Ibid.*, p. 40.

The hostile and brutal Nazi response to Ukrainian hopes was to lead to the exceptional growth of the UPA (Ukrainian Insurgent Army) which sought to repay the occupation forces in kind. Although the UPA had as many as 50,000 men under arms and obtained substantial support from the civilian population, its armed resistance has been regarded by some observers as quixotic or as adventurism. The UPA can be viewed as a response to the conditions of the Nazi occupation and as an attempt on the part of the OUN-B to utilize the armed struggle as a means of claiming political ascendancy. The original UPA led by Taras Borovets (Bul'ba) fought Soviet partisans early in the war and was subsequently taken over by the OUN-B by means of reprehensible methods. However, this take-over in the end enabled the UPA to expand its operations over a much larger area. The enlarged UPA bore the marks of its OUN origins with its emphasis on integral nationalism, its willingness to employ violent means, its anti-parliamentarism, and its reliance on conspiratorial underground activity as practiced in the conditions of the Polish state in the 1930s.²¹

The UPA has been defended as a form of Ukrainian self-defense and as a natural response to the Nazi practice of taking group hostages and the German refusal to recognize a Ukrainian state. It provided a ready refuge for fleeing labor conscripts, military deserters, and escaped prisoners of war. Yet its critics have pointed to the fact that many Ukrainians fell victim to the UPA and its Security Service. They contend that it contributed significantly to the "anarchization of daily life" in Western Ukraine in 1944 and demonstrated a lack of political maturity by promoting killing and other acts of violence. It also prompted Nazi counter-measures often inflicted on the innocent civilian population.²² Among the most severe criticisms is that regarding "deconspiracy" of the nationalists because UPA, by means of its steady guerrilla warfare, exposed the nationalists to ultimate reprisal by the Soviets in the course of their reoccupation of Western Ukraine.

Indeed, probably the most serious criticism of the UPA is that, in fighting the Germans, it contributed to the Soviet military victory. Although the UPA fought the Soviet forces for several more years it could not hope to win in the absence of substantial external support. Yet it is significant that Nikita Khrushchev in his published reminiscences offered a grudging tribute to the UPA. He describes his war-time visit to Volyn and recounts his stopping to rest at a Soviet rear supply base where he "noticed

21. On the origins of the OUN see Alexander Motyl, *The Turn to the Right: The Ideological Origins and Development of Ukrainian Nationalism, 1919-1929* (Boulder: East European Monographs, 1980).

22. Kost' Pankivsky, *Roky nimets'koi okupatsii* (New York-Toronto: v-vo Kliuchi, 1965), pp. 278-280, 282-285, 289.

a curiously large number of people loitering about. I wondered to myself how many of them were Banderites in disguise, eating our food, warming themselves in front of our fires, and spying on us. I was warned that the area was swarming with Banderites."²³ In describing a visit to Lviv at the end of 1949, following the assassination of Yaroslav Halan, Khrushchev observed: "It happened in the midst of our struggle against the Ukrainian nationalists. The Carpathian Mountains were literally out of bounds for us because from behind every bush, from behind every tree, at every turn of the road, a government official was in danger of a terrorist attack."²⁴

The armed struggle waged by the UPA involved many contradictory elements. In one sense it was a doomed struggle that could not hope to succeed in the face of Soviet military victory unless the entire constellation of emerging military-political forces were to undergo abrupt change following the war. Yet it was also an act of resistance "for the record" — futile, destructive and demoralizing in the view of its critics and heroic and purposeful to its adherents. At the very least the UPA gave Ukrainians the distinction of having fought both Germany and the Soviet Union in World War II.

If the UPA was the OUN's vengeance inflicted on Nazi Germany, it also reflected the failure of the Nazi occupation of Ukraine and of the efforts at Ukrainian-German collaboration. Any collaboration or alliance involves payoffs and benefits as well as costs. Unless there is a sufficient degree of symmetry between costs and benefits, the occupation becomes untenable. In the case of Ukraine the costs were excessive and the benefits were questionable.

Ukrainians were not in an advantageous position because of Nazi short-sightedness, racist ideology, obtuseness and hubris. Ukraine produced no Quisling, Ante Pavelic, Father Tiso or Marshal Petain, although it is conceivable that a comparable Ukrainian figure might have emerged in World War II had German policy been more flexible and realistic. Collaboration was on the part of individuals (who were local officials) rather than by means of any national institution — given the fragmented condition of the country as a result of German policies. Professor John Armstrong's conclusion that "the mass remained uncommitted"²⁵ has validity, but this condition was due to the weakness of leadership and the fact that the occupying powers (both Soviet and German) had sought to decapitate the nation by decimating its leadership. The mass is by its nature usually uncommitted and almost always requires leaders to give it commitment and direction.

23. Nikita S. Khrushchev, *Khrushchev Remembers* (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1970), p. 218.

24. *Khrushchev Remembers, The Last Testament* (Boston: Little Brown and Co., pp. 94-95.

25. Armstrong, *op. cit.*, p. 289.

The historical record indicates that there was a substantial degree of spontaneity manifested by Ukrainians in the early period of the occupation prior to the descent of the Nazi mailed fist. Local committees were formed, meetings and assemblies convoked, churches reopened, publishing of newspapers commenced (soon subjected to censorship), and local militia units were organized (and quickly subordinated by the Nazis to German police units). The lifting of the oppressive hand of Soviet rule created the illusion of a new day since the initial prospects of the German occupation appeared to be promising when compared with Stalinist rule. Many Ukrainians had had experience with German occupation in 1918, although Professor Hans Koch is said to have obliquely warned the Ukrainian National Council in Kiev that "we Germans are not those of 1918" while also allegedly assuring his listeners that Ukraine "will extend to the Volga."²⁶

The term "collaboration" is used to refer to a variety of relationships, including joint intellectual endeavors and co-authorship. In the political lexicon it is often used to identify the relationship between an enemy state or people and those representatives of a subjugated people under foreign military occupation who seek to mediate the relationship between occupier and occupied. However, the term is far too generic to have more than the most general meaning, and it is necessary to distinguish between types of collaboration. The simplest and most readily understood type is that represented by the (presumably) totally committed agent who serves the enemy either because of ideological affinity or personal motives involving self-aggrandizement. In this limited definition the term "collaborator" is one of opprobrium. However, not every collaborator is a puppet. There are various forms of collaboration that may be imposed by force of arms or that may be chosen in order to achieve certain ends and that can be rationalized either in terms of "the lesser evil" or "the enemy of my enemy is my friend." Thus those who "collaborate" with a foreign power may be doing so with motives that have little or nothing in common with the purposes of the major partner in the collaboration.

Indeed, collaboration need not be limited to a war-time situation but can refer to a protracted "occupation" (annexation) of a neighboring people involving the use of officials representing the subject people. Thus one can ask whether Basques who serve the Spanish government in Madrid should be regarded as "collaborators?" Ukrainian officials who carry out the instructions of the Russian-dominated CPSU Politburo and Secretariat in Moscow are regarded by advocates of Ukrainian national independence as little more than "collaborators." Yet such "collaborators" may perceive their role in entirely different terms contending that their options are very

26. Based on the memoirs of Mykola Velychkovs'ky and quoted in Horak, *op. cit.*, *Ukrains'kyi istoryk*, Nos. 65-68 (1980), p. 69.

limited and that after giving Moscow its due they may be able to serve the interests of the Ukrainian S.S.R. and the Ukrainian people. Such an attitude may represent rationalization rather than reality, but it adds to the varieties of collaboration and indicates that the term has many meanings and includes different degrees of cooperation and different forms of mutual accommodation and opportunism.

In international relations there have emerged forms of international collaboration in which states with very different political and social systems develop a relationship based on a degree of common interest. Such a relationship may not result in a formal military alliance but is confined to the pursuit of a limited range of specific shared interests. Examples of such international collaboration include the development of military cooperation between the United States and the Franco dictatorship in Spain outside of NATO as well as the emergence of joint efforts on the part of the United States and the People's Republic of China in the 1970s to deal with the growing military power of the Soviet Union. Thus "collaboration" must also be understood as an effort to obtain the support of quasi-allies and to use them in pursuit of one's own end.

When viewed in contrast with comparable situations among neighboring peoples, the Ukrainian effort to seek foreign aid prior to and during World War II is hardly unique. Finland under President Peter Svinhufvud (who had been arrested by the tsarist government and held in Siberia) sought German military aid on behalf of Finnish independence in 1918 after Sweden had refused to provide aid. Not only were Finnish troops trained in Germany during World War I (the approximately 2000 volunteers of the Jaeger Battalion) to fight against Russia, but German troops under General Rudiger von der Goltz fought on Finnish territory against efforts to establish a Soviet Finnish republic.

A certain parallel may be said to exist between the OUN in World War II and Jozef Pilsudski's efforts on behalf of Poland in World War I. Pilsudski fled Russian rule and in August 1914 began to organize two Polish Legions to fight on the side of the Central Powers against the Russian Empire. However, Pilsudski was imprisoned by the Germans (as were the OUN leaders) when he became dissatisfied with the terms of the Austro-German grant of independence to Poland in November 1916. In the end his military organization was turned against the Germans (which also provides a parallel with the UPA declaration of war against the German occupation forces).

Reliance on foreign aid has often played an important role in national independent movements. Imperial Russia contributed to the independence of the Serbs, Greeks, Romanians, and Bulgarians. The Japanese occupation of Southeast Asia contributed to the liberation of Asian peoples from British, Dutch and French imperial rule. The Haganah, the underground army of the Jewish Resistance Movement in Palestine, had a mission in Prague in 1947-48 and obtained weapons and military aircraft from

Czechoslovakia; the Czechs also trained Jewish pilots to fly Messerschmitt aircraft sold to the Haganah.²⁷ Bangla Desh obtained its independence from Pakistan with foreign (Indian) military aid.

Ukraine's situation in World War II differed from the above examples in that it was caught in a titanic conflict between two totalitarian empires neither of which desired an independent Ukraine. Ukrainians had no choice regarding whether or not the German occupation would occur. The war that was initially seen as the harbinger of liberation resulted only in new forms of subjugation.

Although there may have been theoretical alternatives for the Ukrainians to follow (apart from the vain hope that Nazi Germany would permit a Ukrainian state), harsh reality severely limited Ukrainian options. There was passive resistance and, in the end, armed resistance to both German and Soviet rule. Yet, initially at least, there did not appear to be a potential ally apart from Germany, and in practice the Ukrainians had only a Hobson's choice in the most literal sense of the term. A pro-Allied policy on the part of the Ukrainians (i.e. the OUN in 1939-40) was hardly feasible and, even if followed, would not have changed the outcome. The example of the Polish Government in Exile and its Home Army, which followed a pro-Allied policy, was hardly reassuring for it brought the Poles nothing more than Stalin's distrust and the empty Soviet concessions made at the Yalta Conference. It is unlikely that either Great Britain or the United States would have supported Ukrainian aims as opposed to Stalin's dictatorship. The pursuit of total military victory over Nazi Germany was the objective of the Roosevelt Administration, and this meant that the Ukrainians were to be left to the tender mercies of Stalin. Indeed, Roosevelt was not sympathetic to the admission of the Ukrainian S.S.R. as a charter member of the United Nations and in the end agreed to it only reluctantly. Thus Ukrainians could not pursue a pro-Allied policy in 1941 anymore than they were able to pursue a pro-Entente policy in 1918. Yet when the Ukrainian People's Republic did seek to develop a pro-Entente policy in 1919 it was met with rebuffs at every turn and denied admission to the Paris Peace Conference.

Ukrainians in World War II were faced with what was essentially a "no-win" situation. Ukraine's population losses as a result of the war have been conservatively estimated at 4 or 4.5 million, although it is possible that the loss was higher than 6 million — a substantial portion of which was Jewish. The only real gains that resulted from the war were: the unification of nearly all the Ukrainian territories in a single state and Ukrainian membership in the United Nations, UNESCO, the ILO and various other international organizations. These were very modest gains when compared with the very high costs in human and in material terms.

27. See Arnold Krammer, *The Forgotten Friendship; Israel and the Soviet Bloc, 1947-1953* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1974), pp. 61-65.

Orest Subtelny

In the western literature which deals with Ukrainian-German relations during World War II two basic approaches stand out. One seeks to apply, explicitly or implicitly, moral-humanist criteria to Ukrainian political behaviour. The other focuses on the political pressures and contingencies which confronted the Ukrainian leadership. Neither of these approaches appears in a pure form. The "moralists" often demonstrate an awareness of the political difficulties which confronted the Ukrainians under German occupation, and the "political tacticians" are quick to admit the moral depravity of the Nazis. Yet the assumptions of one approach or the other tend to color their respective adherents' perceptions of the issue.

For the "moralists" the underlying assumption is that Nazism was an unadulterated evil. It follows, therefore, that anyone who had anything to do with the Nazis was morally tainted or, at the very least, suspect. Since Ukrainian Nationalist contacts with the Nazis before and during the war are undeniable, the goal for the "moralists" is to assess how much moral damage this relationship inflicted on the Ukrainian cause in general. Arguments are made for and against Ukrainian Nationalism's guilt by (admittedly limited) association with the Nazis. Thus, the scholarly tone and format notwithstanding, a trial atmosphere creeps into the discussion.

And who are the judges? By and large they are people born and bred in the Anglo-Saxon, liberal, democratic tradition. Moreover, they have the advantage of hindsight and the luxury of criticizing difficult choices rather than making them. From this comfortable position, a critical attitude towards the actions of the Ukrainian Nationalists comes easily. It is difficult for these judges to understand why the Nationalists were attracted to Fascism, with its undeniable appeal to frustrated nations, rather than to the democracy of the satiated western societies. Why were they so extremely ethnocentric when they could have espoused the cause of a supranational world (something isolationist American found difficult to do)? Why did they not do more for the Jews than did the Poles, French, Romanians, and others? In addition to these troubling questions one sometimes has the impression that one more query is on the edge of their tongues or at least in their subconsciousness. Paraphrasing Henry Higgins in *My Fair Lady*, "Why couldn't those Ukrainian Nationalists be more like us American liberals?"

This is not to say that the "moralists" wish to be unfair to the Ukrainians. On the contrary, in true Anglo-Saxon fashion they often make a real effort to be fair. They do take into account the frustration of Ukrainian National aspirations, the OUN's strong disagreements with the Nazis, and UPA's open conflict with the latter. Thus, to their way of thinking, all is not lost. The Ukrainians cannot be judged completely guilty of collaboration. But they are also not blameless. Therefore, the entire issue of Ukrainian collaboration is left shrouded in a cloud of inconclusiveness which results in intermittent showers of recrimination and protestations.

For the “political tacticians” the Ukrainian relationship with the Germans represented a political rather than a moral dilemma. (Incidentally, the Ukrainians initially assumed that they were dealing with Germany, in the sense of a traditional great power, and not with Nazism in the sense of a radical new regime). Essentially the problem was that, contrary to the general rule, the enemy of the Ukrainians’ enemies was not the Ukrainians’ friend. Although Germany went to war with Poland and the USSR, both of whom mercilessly repressed Ukrainian national aspirations, the Germans also did not recognize these aspirations. At first, given the Ukrainians’ crushing experience with the Poles and Soviets in recent decades, Germany quite logically seemed to be the lesser evil. Therefore, limited tactical cooperation occurred. But when the Germans very quickly cracked down on the Nationalists it became evident that the Ukrainians were in a classic no-win situation.

In the view of the “tacticians,” this was the crux of the matter: How could the Ukrainians salvage the best of a bad situation? How were they to act when there were so few promising options available to them? Thus, for the “tacticians,” what the Ukrainian leadership had to solve was a political puzzle. To do this it needed men with political problem-solving skills, not paragons of morality. Men like Melnyk, Bandera, Kubiovych were certainly not morally inferior to political leaders elsewhere. As it happened, these leaders could not find an answer to the Ukrainians’ political dilemma. Perhaps it was because they lacked the necessary skills; but, more likely, it was because there simply were no answers to the problem.

Not surprisingly, most of those who favor the “tactical” approach to analyzing Ukrainian-German relations in World War II are Ukrainians. Many of them pride themselves in being personally acquainted with the times and events they discuss. And herein lies a danger. This personal experience often leads the “tacticians” into evaluations which are based on their own, relatively narrow experiences rather than placing them into a broad, historical context. When the “tacticians” do level criticism it is most often directed at the Nazis and specifically at their political stupidity which to some is as striking as their moral depravity. Ukrainian Nationalists are also subject to criticism. However, they are usually taken to task not so much because of their contacts with the Germans but because of their factional strife. This factionalism, in the view of most “tacticians” was the Ukrainians’ greatest political error in World War II. And this conclusion has interesting implications: namely that the political harm the Nationalists did in World War II was inflicted not on others but on themselves.

The parameters in which Ukrainian-German relations are usually treated need to be expanded. All too often these relations are examined exclusively in terms of the Ukrainian Nationalists’ contacts with the Germans. To a certain extent, this is understandable, for the Nationalists were undoubtedly the most dynamic, visible and powerful Ukrainian political organizations during World War II. But that is not to say that they were

representative of West Ukrainian society as a whole. These "young Turks" were primarily the spokesmen for the youth (just as the radicals were in America in the 1960s and 1970s). However, the "silent majority" of the Ukrainians still viewed the leaders of the prewar legal parties and institutions as their legitimate and accepted representatives. Therefore, in order to establish what the mainstream Ukrainian political relationship with the Germans was one should look at how the West Ukrainian "establishment" interacted with them.

The vast majority of the recognized, experienced West Ukrainian leaders did not have close relations with or great sympathy for Nazi Germany. Despite the persecution which they experienced during the Soviet occupation of 1939-1941, many of these leaders felt duty bound as soon as the Germans arrived to step forward and speak up in the name of the Ukrainians. In June 1941 they formed the "Council of Seniors" (Rada Senioriv) in Lviv. At its head stood the most respected West Ukrainian political figure, the aged Kost' Levytsky. The sponsor of the council was the universally beloved Metropolitan Sheptytsky. Most members of this body were prominent lawyers, mayors, scholars, heads of financial and pedagogical institutions and other men of distinction. The goals of the council were twofold. It wished to unite all the West Ukrainians in order to present a common front to the Germans. This meant, first and foremost, healing the tragic rift between the Melnyk and Bandera factions of the Nationalists. The council also wished to present the Ukrainian desiderata to the Germans and find out their intentions towards the Ukrainians. On both points the council was disappointed. It proved impossible to bring together the Nationalist factions. And the Germans, by annexing Galicia to the General Government, made it clear that they intended to ignore Ukrainian aspirations for some form of statehood.

The German actions shocked the council. In September 1941 it protested to the General Governor, Hans Frank, but to no avail. In fact, for its "impertinence" the council was disbanded and reformed into an emasculated committee. Now the "Old Mohicans" of the Ukrainian political establishment had no more illusions about the new regime. Almost all of them experienced a similar reaction; they wanted to have nothing to do with the Germans. Any kind of socio-political activity seemed pointless. It was at this point that a moral dilemma confronted the "establishment." They had to ask themselves whether they had the right to throw up their hands in disgust and disillusionment and withdraw to private life. Or they could continue to try, in their capacity as *bat'ky narodu*, to deal with occupying regime in hopes of making the best of a bad situation. Despite the risks and burdens involved, many of them made the latter choice. In this case, the decision to "work" with the Germans was, by any standard, a responsible and morally courageous act.

The same kind of decision was taken by V. Kubijovych and his co-workers when, in April 1939, they formed the Ukrainian Central Committee (UCC) in Cracow. This organization became the recognized representative of the Ukrainians in the general government and has often been cited as an example of "Ukrainian collaborationism." What form did this so-called "collaborationism" take? Realizing that open political activity was impossible, the UCC turned to social welfare, a crying need of the Ukrainian population in the underdeveloped and oppressed western borderlands of Galicia. It organized relief for the needy, the refugees, the unemployed, the former prisoners of war and student cooperatives. A Ukrainian bank and agricultural societies were formed. A vast network of all kinds of Ukrainian schools was established where none had existed before. The Ukrainian press and bookstores were introduced for the first time to the Ukrainians west of the Buh and Sian Rivers. Much of the local administration passed into Ukrainian hands. And hundreds of members of the Ukrainian intelligentsia became involved in the work of the UCC. In examining the activity of the UCC three points must be stressed: a) the work of the UCC did not appreciably aid the German war effort, b) it did not cause harm to non-Ukrainians such as Jews or Poles, and c) it was of tremendous benefit to the most underdeveloped segment of the Ukrainian nation. In this respect, the Ukrainian "establishment" did make the best of a bad situation. True, the UCC was involved in the organization of the Ukrainian division "Galicia." But this was done under a very important condition, namely, that the troops were to be used against the Soviets only. Especially from today's perspective, this was hardly a crime. In conclusion, therefore, the activity of the Ukrainian "establishment" during World War II indicates that, in certain cases, contacts with the Germans were not *ipso facto* acts of collaboration. On the contrary, often they were responsible and morally uncontestable actions.