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The Holodomor and Its Consequences in the Ukrainian Countryside

STANISLAV KUL'CHYTS'KYI

THE BOLSHEVIKS' POLITICAL OPPONENTS rightly considered Lenin's April 1917 plan to build a "commune state" utopian. Although the leaders of the Bolshevik party did succeed in creating the state they imagined, they did so with the aid of terror and propaganda. Within two decades an artificial socioeconomic order was created in the Soviet Union that simulated the one described in the classic works of revolutionary Marxism.

In order to disguise the connection between the crisis and the accelerated pace of building communism, Lenin called the policy that was implemented in 1918–20 "war communism"—that is, a system of provisional measures whose adoption was imposed by circumstances independent of the Soviet government: the civil war and foreign military intervention. Twice in the two decades that followed, the accelerated construction of communism led directly to simultaneous economic, social, and political crises. In order to resolve the first crisis, in 1921 Lenin carried out an expropriation of the "commanding heights" of the economy and built relations based on free market principles between the state sector and the multi-million-strong peasantry. The second communist assault, which was implemented in 1929–32, took into account the failure of the economic policy of "war communism." Its main goals were to speed up industrialization of the country at the expense of domestic resources and to expropriate the property of the so-called petty bourgeoisie—peasants, tradesmen, craftsmen, and merchants. In keeping with the 1919 program of the Russian Communist Party (Bolshevik) (RCP[b]), agricultural production was supposed to be concentrated on Soviet state farms and communes, which were regarded as integral links in the planned economy.

Like Lenin in 1919–20, Stalin encountered colossal peasant opposition to the expropriation of private property. In order to create the collective farm system, the state deported hundreds of thousands of well-to-do peasants and imposed punitively high taxes on independent farmsteads. The collective farm

system the Bolsheviks introduced was based on a form of cooperative (*artel'*), not a commune. Collective farm workers were permitted to retain ownership of their private plots "for the moment,"¹ as Stalin emphasized tellingly in his report to the 16th Congress of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolshevik) (AUCP[b]) in June 1930. For their work on collective farms members were to receive payment in the form of grain and cash. The term "workday" (*trudoden'*) was devised to describe a unit of work in the collective farming system. In April 1930 the Soviet government announced that collective farms were to deliver to the state between one-quarter and one-third of the gross amount of harvested grain, while the remaining portion of the harvest was to be divided up as payment for workdays.²

However, despite this publicized declaration, in 1930–32 the state commandeered the collective farmers' output practically without any material recompense. The requisitioned grain was earmarked to meet the needs of the growing urban population and also exported in order to obtain currency with which to import equipment for new construction. The peasants living in the main grain-producing regions—Ukraine, the North Caucasus, and the Transvolga region—reacted to this policy with unorganized but mass sabotage of work on the collective farms, and concentrated their work on their own homesteads. In 1932 famine appeared in many regions of the USSR. In order to avert a countrywide economic collapse and to maintain his grip on power, Stalin announced that the Second Five-Year Plan (1933–37) would not proceed at an accelerated pace. He justified the policy of "cracking the whip" (Stalin's own expression), which was implemented during the First Five-Year Plan, by the Soviet Union's industrial backwardness, which placed the country in "mortal danger" as a result of supposedly imminent foreign intervention.³

In January 1933 Stalin announced the end of unrestricted food requisitioning, which was to be replaced by fixed grain deliveries. The state limited itself to levying a grain tax on collective farms and independent farmsteads—that is, indirectly recognizing the peasants' right to own the results of their production. After fulfilling their tax obligations, collective farm workers could freely dispose of the products they had grown on collective farms and private plots. This meant that collective farms occupied an autonomous niche in the communist economy. The suspension of the assault methods of communist construction helped overcome the disastrous consequences of the famine in the majority of regions in the USSR.

This was not the case in three regions where the famine turned into a catastrophe of immense proportions: Ukraine, the Kuban region, and Kazakhstan. The large scale of the famine in Kazakhstan, which began in 1931, was the result of the forced settlement of the Kazakh nomads. Unaccustomed to farming, the Kazakhs were forced to exchange their cattle for grain in order to meet the assigned state delivery quotas for grain. As soon as they consumed

the meat that remained after the quotas had been filled, they began starving to death.

In the two regions that had a predominantly Ukrainian population—the Ukrainian SSR and the Kuban region of the southern RSFSR—the horrific scale of the famine was caused by the deliberate actions of the Soviet government. In November and December 1932 dozens of raions in the Ukrainian SSR and Kuban were placed on so-called blacklists, and in January 1933 this punitive action spread throughout Ukraine. If the quantity of confiscated grain did not meet the state grain delivery targets, the state punished the debtors with fines in kind. Guided by existing legislation on fines in kind, Stalin's security service conducted house-to-house searches, confiscating all types of food, not just grain. Furthermore, the Ukrainian SSR and Kuban were blockaded in order to prevent starving peasants from fleeing to other regions. Any incoming data on the famine was processed strictly through secret bureaucratic channels and placed in "special dossiers."

In order to assess the relations between the state and the peasantry during the Second Five-Year Plan, it is crucial to recognize that in all regions, except Ukraine, Kazakhstan, the North Caucasus and the Transvolga, the famine was unanticipated and not of catastrophic dimensions; from Stalin's point of view, it was the result of actions aimed at the construction of the communal state, as proposed in the RCP(b) program. But the state's forcible methods (e.g., selective dekulakization and the taxation/benefits differential), which were used to integrate the peasantry into the command economy, turned out to be inadequate where the Ukrainians were concerned. Therefore, an additional type of violence—the weapon of famine—was used against the peasants of Ukraine. This terrorist action in Ukraine, and its absence in other regions of the USSR, does not mean that scholars should study the Holodomor in isolation from the Kremlin's policy of accelerated socioeconomic transformations, which led to the Union-wide famine of 1932–33. But equally wrong is the other extreme that dilutes the specific horrors of the Ukrainian Holodomor in the all-Union famine, as some Russian scholars do.

Researchers studying the Holodomor and its consequences should determine why the Kremlin leaders, in their policies toward the Ukrainian peasantry, found it necessary to launch the most horrific punitive action known to man: the confiscation of food from an entire nation, accompanied by physical blockades and the suppression of information. This action, which was thoroughly camouflaged as state grain procurements, is the subject of heated debate among scholars around the world: was this an act of genocide or not? But in this paper, the ethnonational aspects of the Kremlin's repressive actions can appear only as background.

To study the consequences of the Ukrainian Holodomor within the context of the "revolution from above" it is necessary to establish the place of this

tragedy in the agrarian socioeconomic transformations that the Kremlin was implementing according to trial and error. As noted above, in 1930 Stalin was not convinced that his retreat from the commune to the cooperative would be long lasting. The General Secretary's position was reflected in a resolution entitled "About the Collective Farm Movement and the Raising of Agriculture," which was approved at the 16th Congress of the AUCP(b). The authors of this document emphasized that at the present stage the main form of the collective farm was the agricultural cooperative, noting, however, that the "collective farm movement can be strengthened into a higher form—the *commune*—corresponding to the strengthening of the technical base, the growth of collective farm cadres, and the cultural level of collective farm workers."⁴

However, it was not a question of a high technical base or the existence of qualified cadres. Of greatest importance to the Kremlin was the need to bind the peasantry tightly to the economy, which was regulated from one command center. The 1932 crisis forced Stalin not only to leave the collective farms in their cooperative form, but also to allow collective farm workers the right to keep part of their output. The peasants could not evade collective work at enterprises that were under state control. But they retained their private plot ownership, formally granted them in 1935, although this ownership had been proclaimed personal for ideological reasons. Collective farmers also obtained the right to sell their products at prices determined by supply and demand. Thus, they—and, above all, the Ukrainian peasants—managed to preserve the circulation of money and free trade on the Soviet collective farm market.

To the end of his life Stalin remained devoted to the model of the commune state, which was outlined in the RCP(b)'s program of 1919. In his final work, *Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR* (September 1952), Stalin wrote: "In order to raise collective farm property to the level of public property, the surplus collective farm output must be excluded from the system of commodity circulation and included in the system of products-exchange between state industry and the collective farms."⁵ But these reflections were his own problems, as they say. To us they are important only insofar as they question the originality of Stalin's communist assault and that of the later term, "Stalinism," common in the West.

The context elaborated above allows one to subsume two Kremlin actions under one denominator: the terror by famine and the emergence on the free collective farm market of the output of collective farm workers and independent farmers. We do not know how things would have turned out if only one of these actions had suddenly appeared under that common denominator. These two events took place at the same time and therefore cannot be examined separately, as has been the case thus far.

In examining both these Kremlin-inspired actions under a common denominator, we begin to understand the subtext of Stalin and Molotov's secret

instruction of 8 May 1933, which was sent to the heads of party and administrative bodies, state security, the courts, and branches of the prosecutor's office. Scholars have long been familiar with this document because a copy of the instruction was found in Smolensk in an archive that was captured by the Wehrmacht. It was eventually published in the USSR in the February–March 1955 issue of the journal *Sotsialisticheskii vestnik*. The instruction emphasized: “Now the task lies in meeting halfway the growing appeal of collective farms among independent laboring peasants and helping them join the collective farms, the only place where they can protect themselves from the dangers of impoverishment and famine.”

The key word here was “famine.” The Stalinist state proved that it would not stop short of organizing a famine, and this assurance was substantiated by a concrete situation: in the spring of 1933 people in Ukrainian and Kuban villages were dying in the hundreds of thousands—and millions. In order to ameliorate this situation, Stalin and Molotov ordered Soviet officials to suspend the “mass deportations and acute forms of repressions” throughout the countryside.

The subtext of the instruction was that for the Kremlin the repressions were not a goal in themselves, but a method with which to implement the RCP(b)'s program of 1919. With the help of the famine Stalin destroyed millions of peasants merely in order to advance along the path toward building communism. Once this was done, another task rose to the forefront: to force the starving peasants to work effectively on the collective farms. Thus, for the first time in conditions of peace party bodies were created to assume the direct management of agricultural production—the political departments of Machine-Tractor Stations (MTSs) and Soviet state farms.

Without deliberating upon the connection between the forced amendment of the plans for communist construction and the punitive action aimed at the Ukrainian peasantry, the distinguished twentieth-century Ukrainian thinker Ivan Lysiak-Rudnytsky arrived at the correct conclusions. In an article first published in 1956 by the Paris-based Polish journal *Kultura*, he wrote:

The Ukrainian peasantry's mass resistance to collectivization threatened to undo Stalin's ambitious economic plans. This was the reason behind Stalin's wrath and vengefulness vis-à-vis Ukraine, and it coincided with the feelings of resentment among Russian officials who were offended by the Ukrainians' “insolence.” Stalin and the Soviet Russian bureaucracy, of which he was the head, decided “to teach the *khokhols* some sense.” The losses that Ukraine endured as a result of Stalin's policies were horrific.⁶

Paradoxically, the phrase “to teach the *khokhols* some sense” corresponds to the phrase, “to teach the collective farmers any sense,” which Stanislaw Kosior used in a letter that he wrote to Stalin on 15 March 1933 (historians learned

of its existence only in 1990). In it the Ukrainian party head complained to the all-Union chief about the slow pace of the sowing campaign, commenting thus: "The unsatisfactory preparation for the sowing precisely in the worst-off raions shows that starvation still has not taught any sense to very many collective farm workers."⁷ There is nothing odd about the similarity between these two statements. The terrorist policy of "educating by killing" evoked identical associations in people from different historical times.

It was eminently clear that the existence of the collective farm system, as based on the principles dictated by the Kremlin in 1930–32, was untenable. The Soviet leaders and collective farmers were forced to abandon the initially defined positions. The state, as personified by Stalin, repudiated the unrestricted food requisitioning that had doomed the peasants to slave labor on the forcibly created collective farms. The peasants abandoned their boycott of collective farming and reconciled themselves to the obligatory but clearly defined procurements.

This consensus between the state and the peasantry was reinforced by the Model Statute of the Agricultural Cooperative, which the All-Union Congress of Collective Farm Shock Workers approved in February 1935. The statute restricted the size of private plots (by up to one-quarter or one-half of a hectare, depending on local conditions). The motives behind this restriction were explained frankly in a speech given at the congress by Serhii Oriekhov, the head of the Kuibyshev collective farm, located in Putyvl raion, Chernihiv oblast: "Comrades, it is clear that the size of the private plot must be reduced; it must be turned into the kind [of plot] that will not keep the collective farmer from going out to work."⁸

After the Holodomor the Ukrainian peasants had to accept the rules of the game, which the Russian collective farmers—historically long accustomed to communal farming—had already accepted. In order to avert the threat of hunger, which constantly loomed over them from the moment the collective farms were created, they undertook to work hard and voluntarily in the communal farming system. Having rejected slave work in the communes, they acquiesced to serf-like labor in the cooperatives.

This change in mentality, which occurred rapidly, is perfectly illustrated by recollections of Ie. Kosykh, the head of the Postyshev Collective Farm in Dnipropetrovsk oblast, who recounted his fellow villagers' struggle for the 1933 harvest:

We put locks on our houses. We sent the collective farm administration, the rural soviet, the [party] center, and the cooperative into the fields. The entire village—from children to the elderly—went out to weed couch grass and to poison mice and gophers. And the work went so well that we ourselves were surprised. We hoed one 100-hectare plot two times,

and three, and even five times. And from our sandy plots, from our poor hectares we took 15 centners each of spring and winter wheat, 17 centners of high-quality oats, 13 centners of corn, and 15 of barley. For one workday we received over one pood of grain and 3 rubles 90 kopecks in cash.⁹

In Ukraine, the harvest of 1933 was accompanied by huge losses caused by the collective farmers' physical incapacity for work. There was an acute shortage of labor, which the authorities struggled to overcome by creating mobile brigades of collective farmers living in districts that had suffered less during the Holodomor, and also by temporarily suspending the latest call-up to territorial units of the Red Army. Red Army soldiers, workers from large industrial enterprises, and students played a significant role in the harvesting. In 1934 Kosior, recalling the shortcomings of the previous year's harvesting campaign, declared that, according to the most modest estimates, grain losses reached several hundred million poods, and it was only the good harvest that "to a certain degree erased all the mistakes during the harvesting."¹⁰

In previous years, losses during poor harvests were also colossal. At the Third Conference of the CP(b)U held in July 1932 the Ukrainian leaders cited figures of the absolute losses during the 1931 harvest: Panas Liubchenko cited a figure ranging between 100 and 150 million poods; Kosior—between 120 and 150 million poods; Oleksandr Shlikhter reported 150 million; while Mykola Skrypnyk's figure was closer to 200 million poods. Although these figures do not purport to be accurate, they give a good idea of the scale of losses, which amounted to one-half of the annual food stocks of Ukraine's rural population.¹¹ Meanwhile, the real harvest of 1932 cannot be estimated at all, despite Mark Tauger's long-term efforts.¹²

As a result of the conversion from food requisitioning to purchasing, the government's situation in 1933 turned out to be completely different. In 1930–32 the state was seizing, in the form of state grain deliveries, whatever it could lay its hands on, but with every passing year it found less and less to confiscate. In contrast to those years, Ukraine had already fulfilled its state grain delivery plan from the 1933 harvest by early November. The colossal losses did not have any impact on the state plan because the mandatory requisitions were tallied from the ungathered harvest. The peasants, exhausted from starvation, were the ones who suffered.

Although the collective farm peasantry had succeeded in wresting autonomy for itself within the command economy, it was forced to provide the state with an excessively large proportion of its surplus products. Let us compare the climate conditions for two years: 1933 and 1936. With 1,419 million poods of grain standing in the fields and 317 million poods delivered to the state, in 1933 the ratio of grain production to the total output stood officially at 22.3 percent, an amount equal to that of the second half of the 1920s, and two-thirds of the

pre-Revolution ratio. However, as in preceding years, immense crop losses were recorded in 1933. In order to determine the real level of the ratio of grain production, these losses must also be tallied. Assuming that one-third of the harvest was lost (this figure is based on estimates made by Soviet party leaders and independent foreign experts at the time), then the specific weight of the grain handed over to the state increases to 33.5 percent. This level of the ratio of production was not lower than the pre-Revolutionary ratio.

In 1936 the harvest covered 221 million centners, or 1,381 million poods. The state took delivery of 545 million poods—that is, a larger amount than in any previous year, including the period of food requisitioning in 1930–32. The specific weight of the state grain deliveries of the biological harvest was 39.5 percent. Harvested crops are always smaller; therefore, the true ratio of grain production was over 40 percent. It is not possible to arrive at a more accurate figure without knowing the extent of the losses that occurred between field and granary. What is known, however, is that once the situation in the agricultural sphere was normalized losses shrank to a minimum, and the real ratio of grain production to the total output was only a little higher than the 40-percent level.¹³

A comparison of the years 1933 and 1936 indicates that the state turned to its advantage all the savings that it had obtained in agriculture by overcoming losses. However, after the abolition of food requisitioning some positive changes appeared in the lives of collective farmers. Collective farms began to expand their subsidiary branches: orchard farming, market gardening, poultry farming, bee-keeping, and pond farming. In connection with this, the participation of able-bodied members of families engaged in collective farming increased. During 1937 every collective farm homestead in Ukraine's steppe zone received an average of 149 poods of grain for their workdays. This was a crucial supplement to the output that was produced on the private plots. Between 1934 and 1937 collective farmers acquired nearly 1.5 million cows and calves. In 1937 there were 118 head of horned cattle for every 100 collective farms.¹⁴

Returning to Stalin and Molotov's instruction of 8 May 1933 banning "mass deportations" and "acute forms of repressions," it should be noted that this ban pertained only to the countryside, which had been subdued by the famine. It was precisely in the spring of 1933 that the Kremlin launched mass repressions of the Ukrainian intelligentsia, including Communist Party members, under the slogan of the struggle against bourgeois nationalism as the main threat to the Soviet order. These repressions were carried out in tandem with the party and state leaders' demonstrative attention to the linguistic and cultural aspects of "Bolshevik" Ukrainization in the Ukrainian SSR. At the same time, Ukrainization outside the borders of Ukraine was labeled "Petliurite," and then banned. The crowning point of the Kremlin's two-pronged policy vis-à-vis Ukraine was the transfer in mid-1934 of the republic's capital from proletarian

Kharkiv to the country's national center, the city of Kyiv. After the Holodomor this move no longer alarmed the Kremlin leaders.

The distinguished Russian agricultural expert Viktor Danilov studied the ethnonational composition of Soviet citizens who were repressed by the NKVD between August 1937 and July 1938. He discovered that Russians comprised 58.3 percent of all those arrested, while only 16.2 percent of those arrested were Ukrainians.¹⁵ Meanwhile, according to the 1937 census, Russians comprised 55 percent of the total population of the USSR and Ukrainians, 16.5 percent.¹⁶ Analyzing the correlation between these figures, Danilov asked me the following question: how can one claim that Ukrainians were the focus of increased attention on the part of the Soviet punitive organs when the Russian people suffered the greatest losses during the Great Terror—not just absolute losses but also relative losses?

Nevertheless, it must be stated that Ukraine was at the epicenter of Stalinist repressions. In 1937–38 the state security organs arrested 266,000 people in the Ukrainian SSR, and in 1932–33, 199,000.¹⁷ Thus, the number of people arrested during the Holodomor is only slightly below the Great Terror figures. Responding to Danilov's question during our last meeting, I told him that the Great Terror in Ukraine began at the same time as the Holodomor.

Why did Stalin destroy Ukrainians to a greater degree than Russians? No answer to this question may be found even in Stalin's now-published correspondence with his closest associates, Kaganovich and Molotov. The Kremlin's nationality policy was always cloaked in the lexicon of "ardent internationalism." However, the hypothesis that none other than Ukraine was at the epicenter of the Stalinist repressions is corroborated by an immense amount of factual material.

There are no grounds to regard the mass repressions targeting the citizens of Ukraine as ethnic purges, although this particular notion does appear in Ukrainian-language historical literature. The conflation of the Holodomor with the Great Terror in the two Ukrainian-speaking regions of the USSR is explained not by ethnic considerations but by the political concerns of the Kremlin leaders. It is worth revisiting the reflections of Lysiak-Rudnytsky:

Stalin's policies on Ukraine boiled down to a gigantic attempt to break the resistance of the Ukrainian people by methods of physical violence. Yet, at issue was not the total annihilation of Ukrainians, as was done to the Crimean Tatars, the Volga Germans, the Kalmyks, and some peoples of the North Caucasus; Ukrainians were too numerous for this. Nevertheless, Stalin consistently sought to destroy all the leading Ukrainian social groups in order to decapitate the nation, force it to capitulate, and turn it into a submissive tool in the hands of the Kremlin powers that be.¹⁸

Therefore, the Holodomor must be viewed as the result of a terrorist action. The nature of terror by famine completely coincided with the nature of Stalin's other campaigns of preventive terror. However, the Holodomor was part of an all-Union famine in 1932–33, which began in rural districts of grain-producing regions as a result of the draconian state grain requisitions, and in cities of grain-consuming regions—because of the elimination from the centralized food supply of population categories that the government deemed less important. However, the all-Union famine was not simply the background, but the beginning, of the Holodomor. In Ukraine, the draconian food requisitions caused the same kind of famine as in other commodity farming regions. But the situation changed qualitatively when Stalin's security service began confiscating all foodstuffs in order to avert—immediately and with guaranteed success—the expected social explosion. After the confiscations, the peasants ended up utterly dependent on food relief from the state. Beginning on 8 February 1933, Stalin set about feeding the starving populace through the collective farms and Soviet state farms.¹⁹ This assistance should not be mistaken for charity: the only people who were fed were those who were still capable of working on the sowing campaign. Those who could not work perished.

The demographic consequences of the punitive action carried out by Stalin's security service were so horrific that they could not be concealed. Rumors that millions of people had died in the USSR began circulating throughout the world. In order to put a stop to them, Stalin assumed a monopoly on dispersing information on the mortality level, birthrate, and the total population of the Soviet Union. During his speech at the 17th Congress of the AUCP(b), held in January 1934, the Soviet leader emphasized that the population of the Soviet Union had grown from 160.5 million people in late 1930 to 168 million in late 1933.²⁰ The latter number was the sum of two figures: the total population in early 1933 (165.7 million), as published by Soviet statistical agencies, and the annual natural increase, which was approximately 2.5 million by the early 1930s. In announcing this figure, Stalin let it be understood that there had been no famine in the USSR.

This fabricated Stalinist population figure was used only in propagandistic publications. Demographers did not publish official data on the total population at the beginning of every year, as had been done in the past. As the independent Russian historian and demographer Alexander Babyonyshev (Sergei Maksudov) writes, "One cannot rid oneself of the thought that in 1936–37 the leaders of the country, and even demographers, did not have a real idea of the consequences of the social measures that had been carried out. They could not have failed to guess that the famine and the mass mortality rate in the countryside [were] changing the demographic picture, but they did not know how or to what extent."²¹

It is not known who warned Stalin about the political threats spelled by the

upcoming population census, but the date of this warning is easily established. On 27 June 1936 the Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR (Sovnarkom) banned abortions (a ban lasting until November 1955). Ukraine's birthrate rose from 766,000 in 1935 to 1.214 million in 1937.²² However, the date of the census was approaching, and the ban on abortions did not have a fundamental impact on the total population.

The census took place during the night of 6 January 1937. Ivan Kraval', the head of the Central Administration of Economic Accounting of the Ukrainian SSR (TsUNKhU), and other directors of the census campaign were awarded high state honors. Newspapers and journals began publishing the first selected census data. However, everything came to a crashing halt when the union republics submitted data to Moscow on their total populations as recorded by the census. In particular, Ukraine's population in 1937 turned out to be lower than the one recorded during the 1926 census.

A comparison of the data on the top ten numerically largest nationalities in the USSR, which are contained in these two censuses, clearly shows the catastrophe that had struck the Ukrainians and Kazakhs. If one uses the base figure of 100 to indicate the total population in 1926, in 1937 the following picture of the population increase emerges: Armenians, 125.5; Tatars, 125.2; Azerbaijanis, 125.1; Russians, 120.7; Georgians, 115.3; Uzbeks, 115; Belarusians, 102.9; and Jews, 101.6. Meanwhile, the population of Ukrainians in the USSR had decreased to 84.7, and the Kazakhs to 72.3.²³

The main cause of the drop in the Ukrainian and Kazakh populations was the famine that each of these nations had experienced. The increased numbers of Russians was explained not so much by a high birthrate as by the rejection of the policy of indigenization outside the borders of republics with "titular nations." In other words, during the 1937 census the millions of Ukrainians and Belarusians who resided permanently outside their respective republics were registered as Russians. After the Holodomor, the autochthonous population of the Kuban region no longer broached the question of its annexation to the Ukrainian SSR.

To this day historians have only a superficial understanding of the processes that were taking place in the consciousness of Soviet citizens on the eve and in the course of the Second World War. There is no doubt, however, that an awareness barrier was forming between the generation that was approaching adulthood and the generation that had had firsthand experience of all types of terror, including terror by famine. No public statements could be made about the Famine of 1932–33. Furthermore, not even members of families that had lived through the Holodomor ventured to discuss it at home so as not to endanger their children and themselves and risk being accused of disseminating anti-Soviet propaganda.

The temporally distant consequences of the Holodomor were clearly mani-

fested after Nazi Germany's attack on the Soviet Union. The failures of 1941 were caused not so much by the military-political and army leadership as by the low moral-psychological state of the armed forces. Whereas in the northern and central directions of the Germans' advance their armies encountered strong resistance, in the southerly direction the front was constantly collapsing. The majority of Red Army soldiers and officers were captured as a result of encirclement. At the same time, they often failed to put up any resistance whatsoever. Red Army troops had no desire to fight for a government that had caused them so much grief. The total number of Soviet prisoners of war captured throughout the entire conflict was 5.7 million; 3.3 million were captured in 1941 alone.²⁴

In 1942 the mood among Red Army troops and the civilian population of Ukraine began to change radically. In contrast to the "first Germans" of 1918, who had acquiesced to the existence of a national, albeit puppet, Ukrainian state, the Nazis set out systematically to destroy the population in order to create *Lebensraum* for settlers arriving from the Third Reich. Realizing that the physical existence of the nation was at stake, the citizens of Ukraine began a counteroffensive in earnest.

The historical memory of the Holodomor was actively and systematically repressed for several decades afterward. With the advent of perestroika in the late 1980s, scholars finally began to uncover the true history of the famine. Unfortunately, many of the voices that could have told what happened in the countryside had already fallen silent by that time. Nonetheless, some few have been captured, and can restore the memory of the past.

Translated from the Ukrainian by Marta D. Olynyk and Andriy Wynnyckyj

NOTES

1. I. Stalin, *Tvory* (Kyiv, 1951), 12:283.
2. V. Danilov, R. Manning, L. Viola et al., eds., *Tragediia sovetskoï derevni: kollektivizatsiia i raskulachivanie: dokumenty i materialy v 5 tomakh, 1927–1939*, 5 vols. (Moscow, 1999–), 2:383–84.
3. Stalin, *Tvory*, 13:183.
4. *Komunistychna partiia Radians'koho Soiuzu v rezoliutsiakh i rishenniakh z'izdiv, konferentsii i plenumiv TsK*, vol. 4 (Kyiv, 1980), 431.
5. I. Stalin, *Ekonomicheskie problemy sotsializma v SSSR* (Moscow, 1952), 93. The English translation is located at: <http://www.marx2mao.com/Stalin/EPS52.pdf>, 97–98.
6. Ivan Lysiak-Rudnyts'kyi, *Istorychni ese*, ed. Frank Sysyn and Iaroslav Hrytsak, 2 vols. (Kyiv, 1994), 2:297–98. *Khokhol* is a derogatory Russian epithet for Ukrainians.

7. R. Pyrih et al., comp., *Holod 1932–1933 rokiv na Ukraïni: ochyma istorykiv, movoiu dokumentiv* (Kyiv, 1990), 443.
8. See M. A. Vyltsan, *Zavershaiushchii etap sozdaniia kolkhoznogo stroia, 1935–1937 gg.* (Moscow, 1978), 28.
9. See M. I. [Mikhail Ivanovich] Kalinin, *Vypolniaem zavety Lenina* (Moscow, 1934), 68. One centner equals 100 kilograms; one pood equals 16.38 kilograms or 36.11 pounds.
10. *Komunist*, 17 June 1934.
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