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ROMAN SOLCHANYK

## The Foundation of the Communist Movement in Eastern Galicia, 1919–1921

On the evening of October 31, 1921, a special edition of *Gazeta Lwowska* reported the sensational news of the arrest of all the delegates to a “Communist congress” that had convened only a few hours earlier on the grounds of St. George’s Cathedral in Lviv (Lwów in the Polish version). According to the newspaper, “the congress had been in preparation for some time [and] was attended by various Communist organizations, although central leadership was in the hands of the Ruthenians.” On the following day the events in Lviv were reconstructed, rather loosely, by the leading newspapers in Poland. Cracow’s *Ilustrowany Kurjer Codzienny*—exclaiming that “the *hajdamacy* [Ukrainian bandits] have even turned over the church for Bolshevik purposes”—related that among those arrested were members of the secret Ukrainian organizations KUM and Volia. Similarly, Warsaw’s *Gazeta Poranna 2 Grosze* (popularly known as the *Dwugroszówka*) informed its readers that professors, engineers, lawyers, doctors, and even a Communist representative from Hungary had taken part in the deliberations.<sup>1</sup> More precisely, those who had gathered in a school adjacent to the cathedral constituted the First Congress of the Communist Party of Eastern Galicia (Komunistyczna Partia Skhidnoi Halychyny).<sup>2</sup>

Thus far the KPSH has received only scant attention in the works dealing with the Communist movement in interwar Eastern Europe.<sup>3</sup> Yet this small

1. Józef Kowalczyk, *Wielki proces* (Warsaw, 1963), pp. 5–6. Similar arrests were conducted throughout Eastern Galicia during the next two months, and ultimately thirty-nine persons, including the twenty-six participants in the congress, were charged with high treason in the so-called St. George’s Trial (Nov. 22, 1922–Jan. 11, 1923). For a full list of the defendants, among whom were such notables of the Polish Communist movement as Stefan Królikowski and Kazimierz Cichowski, see *Proces komunistów we Lwowie (Sprawa świętojurska): Sprawozdanie stenograficzne* (Lwów, 1923), pp. 3–4.

2. Toward the end of 1923 the KPSH was renamed the Communist Party of Western Ukraine (KPZU), and its sphere of activity was enlarged to include Volynia, Polissia (Polesie), Pidliahshia (Podlasie), and the Kholm (Chełm) region, which were transferred to Poland by virtue of the Treaty of Riga.

3. Although there is a constantly growing body of periodical literature devoted to various aspects of KPSH-KPZU history, the party as such has not received adequate

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I would like to express my gratitude to Professor Roman Szporluk, of the University of Michigan, in whose seminar this article originated.

and seemingly insignificant party reflected—perhaps more strikingly than any of its counterparts—the various problems that confronted this movement in its early stages. From the standpoint of the Bolsheviks, Eastern Galicia offered a proving ground—indeed a *platsdarm*—for what Lenin termed the “bacillus of Bolshevism” destined for the proletariat of Poland, Hungary, and, above all, Germany. Accordingly, one of the earliest attempts to export the Russian experience westward was made in Eastern Galicia. In the process the initial forms of interparty relations took shape at a time when the Comintern, far from representing the general staff of the world revolution, was only beginning to emerge from the confines of its Moscow headquarters. Furthermore, by virtue of Eastern Galicia’s incorporation into Poland, the KPSH came to play an important role in the early development of Polish communism. Thus it was the KPSH which presented its overseer, the Communist Workers’ Party of Poland (KPRP), with its first major ideological test—bolshevization—when the reality of an independent Poland “exploded” before the predominantly “Luxemburgist” leadership of the KPRP. It was in Eastern Galicia with its ethnically mixed population and—with the exception of significant oil and salt works—overwhelmingly rural economy that the Polish Communists came face to face with the national and agrarian questions. The result may be viewed as the final stage in the long-standing controversy between Lenin and Luxemburg and the prelude to the transformation of the KPRP into a “party of a new type.” Finally, the Communist movement in Eastern Galicia represents, in its own right, an interesting attempt to reconcile the newly emerged Ukrainian national movement with the demands of a socialist program at a time when the bulk of the Ukrainian population was experiencing the rigors of “war communism.”

The existing literature reveals a lack of consensus about the genesis of

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treatment in either Polish or Soviet historiography. This is explained in large part by the KPZU’s “unparty” status following its dissolution along with the Communist Party of Poland (KPP) by the Comintern in 1938. Partial rehabilitation came in the course of the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU in 1956, and full rehabilitation only in 1963. See “Zaiavlenie,” *Pravda*, Feb. 21, 1956, p. 9, and “Za pravil'noe osveshchenie istorii Kommunisticheskoi partii Zapadnoi Ukrainy,” *Kommunist*, 1963, no. 10, pp. 37–47. Sources dealing with the KPSH-KPZU may be gleaned from the following: Jurij Lawrynenko, *Ukrainian Communism and Soviet Russian Policy Toward the Ukraine: An Annotated Bibliography, 1917–1953* (New York, 1953), pp. 278–91; M. K. Dziewanowski, *The Communist Party of Poland: An Outline of History* (Cambridge, Mass., 1959); Żanna Kormanowa, *Materiały do bibliografii polskiego ruchu robotniczego (1918–1939)*, vol. 1: *Druki zwarte* (Warsaw, 1960), pp. 176–77; S. N. Zlupko, “Istoriia Zapadnoi Ukrainy v epokhu kapitalizma v noveishikh sovetskikh issledovaniakh,” *Istoriia SSSR*, 1968, no. 4, pp. 86–92; V. V. Mashotas, *Komunistychna partiia Zakhidnoi Ukrainy: Bibliografichni pokazchchyk materialiv i publikatsii za 1919–1967 rr.* (Lviv, 1969); and Ie. M. Halushko, “Dzherela z istorii KPZU (1919–1928 rr.),” in *Zahrava voli: Z istorii Komunistychnoi partii Zakhidnoi Ukrainy* (Lviv, 1970), pp. 274–88.

this movement. One viewpoint, dominant in the 1920s and enjoying a certain revival in contemporary Polish historiography, traces the origins of the KPSH to the International Revolutionary Social Democratic Youth (IRSDM). Others see its beginnings in the activities of members of the Ukrainian Communist Party (Borotbisty). Recent Soviet publications, on the other hand, emphasize the role of the Communist Party of the Ukraine (KP[b]U). The latter has been the subject of numerous monographs, most of them originating, quite naturally, in the Ukrainian SSR. The Borotbisty, however, are rarely mentioned in Soviet publications except as objects of derision, although their short-lived party is the subject of a detailed study by one of its former members.<sup>4</sup> Lastly, the IRSDM, which may rightly be considered the ideological precursor of the KPSH, remains virtually unknown to scholars of East European history.<sup>5</sup>

In Eastern Galicia, unlike other parts of Eastern Europe, left socialist elements did not evolve in the ranks of the existing social democratic parties. Rather they were grouped around the IRSDM, the first distinctly "internationalist" organization to make its appearance in this part of Austria-Hungary. Officially founded at a congress held in the spring of 1918, the IRSDM represented a more politicized version of the loose coalition of discussion groups known as Drahomanov circles (Drahomanivky). These circles had begun to form in the 1890s among those gymnasium students for whom the radical movement of the previous decade no longer seemed to express their romantic and often genuine revolutionary idealism. As opposed to the formally constituted Radical and National Democratic parties, which concentrated their efforts on "organic work" for national purposes,<sup>6</sup> the secret and multinational Drahomanov circles offered an open platform, which was in fact no platform at all but rather a *mélange* of various ideologies—Bolshevik, Socialist Revolutionary, Narodnik, and Bakuninist.<sup>7</sup> On the eve of World War I many

4. Iwan Majstrenko, *Borot'bism: A Chapter in the History of Ukrainian Communism* (New York, 1954). Cf. Jaroslaw Pelenski, "Soviet Ukrainian Historiography After World War II," *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas*, n.s., 12, no. 3 (October 1964): 408–9.

5. The main source on the IRSDM is V. S. [Roman Rozdol's'kyi], "Do istorii ukrains'koho livo-sotsialistychnoho rukhu v Halychyni (Pidchasvoienni 'Drahomanivky' 1916–18 rr.)," *Vpered: Ukrains'ka robotnycha hazeta* (Munich), 1951, no. 3–4, pp. 11–12. See also O. Iu. Karpenko, "Do pytannia pro vynyknennia i orhanizatsiine oformlennia Komunistychnoi partii Skhidnoi Halychyny (1919–1923 rr.)," in *Z istorii zachidnoukrains'kykh zemel'* (Kiev, 1957), 2:166–67, and Adrian Hoshovs'kyi, "Zasnovnyky i diiachy KPZU," in *Ukrains'kyi Kalendar 1965* (Warsaw, 1965), pp. 185–87.

6. For a general survey of the development of Ukrainian political parties in Eastern Galicia see Ivan L. Rudnytsky, "The Ukrainians in Galicia Under Austrian Rule," *Austrian History Yearbook*, 3, pt. 2 (1967): 408 ff.

7. Myroslav Irchan, *V burianakh: Spohady*, in *Vybrani tvory*, 2 vols. (Kiev, 1958), 1:325.

of the members considered themselves socialists, although, as one member has testified, the circles continued to be “left progressive organizations [which were] not distinctly socialist (and even less so Marxist), even though Socialists, as the most active element, set the pace in their undertakings.”<sup>8</sup> Indeed, in 1913 a formidable nationalist opposition made its appearance within the organization, influencing even its avowed “Marxist” members. Thus when the war erupted, the Drahomanov circles ceased functioning, and the majority of their adherents joined the Ukrainian Sharpshooters (Ukrainski Sichovi Striltsi), on the side of the Austrian armies. It was only two years later that members of the prewar circles revived the organization, giving it a clearly social democratic character.

Most of the organizational work was undertaken by Osyp Krilyk (Vasylkiv), who was later to become the central figure in the so-called Shumskyi national deviation in the KPZU, and in due time centers were established in Stryi, Drohobych, Sambir, Ternopil, and Peremyshl (Przemysł). In Lviv the central organization began to publish its *Vistnyk drahomaniv's'koi orhanizatsii*, wherein it conducted a persistent antiwar campaign and, toward the end of 1917, welcomed the Bolshevik coup in Petrograd as the first stage of the world socialist revolution.<sup>9</sup> Although harassed by the Austrian police, the IRSDM continued to function until the founding of the KPSH at a conference of underground groups in Stanislav (Ivano-Frankivsk) on February 8, 1919, whereupon most of its members joined the new party. In addition to Krilyk-Vasylkiv, these members included such leading KPSH-KPZU figures as Roman Kuzma (Turianskyi), Ludwik Rozenberg (Chorny, Lwiwski), Mykhailo Tesliuk (Ernest), and Hryhorii Mykhats (Bruno Myroniv).<sup>10</sup>

The Borotbisty, better known for their activities in the Ukraine proper than in Eastern Galicia, were the product of a split in the Ukrainian Party of Socialist Revolutionaries in late 1917, the left wing of which eventually merged with its counterpart in the Ukrainian Social Democratic Workers'

8. V.S., “Do istorii ukrains'koho livo-sotsialistychnoho rukhu,” p. 11.

9. See Krilyk-Vasylkiv's testimony in *Proces komunistów*, pp. 79-80. Significantly enough, the *Vistnyk* condemned the Bolshevik takeover of Kiev in February 1918 and, characterizing the Red Army as an occupation force, came out in defense of the Central Rada. See V.S., p. 12, and V. Malanchuk, *Torzhestvo lenins'koi natsional'noi polityky (Komunistychna partiia—orhanizator rozviazannia natsional'noho pytannia v zachidnykh oblastakh URSR)* (Lviv, 1963), p. 169.

10. For valuable biographical sketches of some of the IRSDM activists, see Hoshovs'kyi, “Zasnovyky i diiachy KPZU,” pp. 189-91. In this connection it is worth noting that the overall retrenchment in the USSR has not left researchers of the KPSH-KPZU unaffected. Aside from the consistently poor quality of recent publications, certain titles have been withdrawn from bookstores and presumably from libraries as well. The latest such case is a three-hundred-page anthology of biographies of leading party figures. See John Kolasky, *Two Years in Soviet Ukraine* (Toronto, 1970), p. 154.

Party to form the new grouping. Severely criticized by Lenin for, among other things, their agitation against close ties between the Ukrainian SSR and the RSFSR, and ultimately forced to liquidate their party on the orders of the Comintern,<sup>11</sup> the Borotbisty produced the first leaders of the KPSH in the persons of Karlo Savrych (Maksymovych), Mykhailo Ialovyi, and Mykola Khrystovyi.<sup>12</sup> It was this trio who along with Vasyl Sirko, the representative of the Kiev gubkom of the KP(b)U, arrived in Stanislav in early February 1919 to organize the existing underground groups into a Communist party. The result was the KPSH's first central committee headed by Savrych-Maksymovych.<sup>13</sup>

The role of the KP(b)U in Eastern Galicia assumed major proportions during the Soviet occupation of its easternmost counties (*powity*) in the summer of 1920. To be sure, Ukrainian Communist leaders in Kharkiv and Kiev had an abiding interest in Eastern Galician affairs. Thus, even before the KP(b)U was firmly established in the Ukraine, it resolved at its Third Congress in March 1919 that it was "necessary to place before the party the task of extending its influence to Galicia as well."<sup>14</sup> Practical efforts in the spirit of this resolution had already been initiated in January 1919, when a group of "experienced party workers" headed by Mykhailo Levytskyi and Mykhailo Baran were dispatched to Eastern Galicia for organizational and agitprop work.<sup>15</sup> Simultaneously, Galicians serving in the Austrian armies who had found themselves on the territory of the RSFSR and Ukrainian SSR

11. *Leninskii sbornik*, 35 (1945): 93–94. According to one of the official KP(b)U historians, the "most harmful and most dangerous" aspect of this agitation was the demand for a separate Soviet Ukrainian army apart from the Red Army. See M. M. Popov, *Narys istorii Komunistychnoi partii (bil'shovyktiv) Ukrainy*, 5th rev. and enl. ed. (Kharkiv, 1931), p. 214. For the Comintern's role in the dissolution of the Borotbisty see the interesting chapter entitled "Die unmittelbare 'Einmischung' des Exekutivkomitees der Kommunistischen Internationale in die Angelegenheiten der verschiedenen angeschlossenen Parteien," in G. Sinowjew, *Bericht des Exekutivkomitees der Kommunistischen Internationale an den zweiten Weltkongress der Kommunistischen Internationale* ([Berlin], 1920), pp. 20–21.

12. Stefan Volynets's speech in "Protokoły IV Konferencji Komunistycznej Partii Polski (1925)," *Z Pola Walki*, 1962, no. 3, p. 140, and P. I. Arsenych, "Zasnovnyk KPSH K. M. Savrych (Maksymovych)," *Ukrains'kyi istorychnyi zhurnal*, 1969, no. 1, p. 126.

13. It is indicative of the ideological differences between the Borotbisty and the KP(b)U that initially Savrych-Maksymovych and Sirko stood at the head of different and opposing groups. See I. M. Sirko, "Shliakhom Zhovtnia," in *Na choli vyzvol'noi borot'by: Spohady kolyshnykh aktyvnykh diiachiv Komunistychnoi partii Zakhidnoi Ukrainy* (Kiev, 1965), p. 32.

14. *Kommunisticheskaia partiia Ukrainy v rezoliutsiakh i resheniakh s'ezdov i konferentsii, 1918–1956* (Kiev, 1958), p. 43.

15. The practice of sending groups such as these to Eastern Galicia apparently became quite common beginning in the spring of 1919. Reports dating from this period refer to "our comrades arriving in Galicia" or simply "our people." See *Grashdanskaia voina na Ukraine 1918–1920: Sbornik dokumentov i materialov*, 3 vols. (Kiev, 1967), 2:67, 74.

as Russian prisoners of war were mobilized for “Galician work” by local party committees.<sup>16</sup> By April the KP(b)U had formed a Galician Communist Buro, which shortly thereafter was transformed into the Provisional Committee of Communists of Eastern Galicia of the TsK KP(b)U. Having organized the nucleus of a party organization, the KP(b)U began to think in terms of installing a Soviet regime west of the Zbruch.<sup>17</sup>

Developments in Eastern Galicia were hardly conducive to systematic party work. Upon the collapse of the Habsburgs, *de facto* power in Lviv was assumed by the West Ukrainian Peoples’ Republic (ZUNR), which, having claimed sovereignty over all of the Ukrainian-inhabited lands of the former Monarchy, soon came into conflict with a reconstituted Poland. The Polish-Ukrainian war that followed (November 1918–July 1919) was in fact the military climax of a drawn-out political-cultural struggle that had grown in intensity ever since Galicia first came under indirect Polish rule in 1867.<sup>18</sup> Under the existing conditions, when nationalistic passions were strained to the utmost, Bolshevik slogans such as the need for struggle against one’s own bourgeoisie could hardly be expected to gain wide acceptance.<sup>19</sup> This, along with the difficulties associated with the organization of a workers’ party in a largely underdeveloped area,<sup>20</sup> caused innumerable problems for the inexperienced KPSH leaders and contributed significantly to the almost continual crisis situation within the party because of the ideological struggles over the national and agrarian questions.

16. The program for Galicians interned in Turkestan, for example, included a wide array of lectures, meetings, concerts, and even special publications such as *Shevchenko and the Communist Revolution*. For details see *Proces komunistów*, pp. 5–6.

17. A frank statement of Soviet aims in Eastern Galicia just before the Red Army’s advance may be found in H. Piddubnyi [H. Tolmachiv], *Rozbyite kaidany! (Slovo do halys’ts’kykh selian i robotnykiv)* (Vienna and Lviv, 1920), pp. 14 ff.

18. For a concise analysis of the ZUNR as one of the succession states of Austria-Hungary, see Henryk Batowski, *Rozpad Austro-Węgiei 1914–1918 (Sprawy narodowościowe i działania dyplomatyczne)* (Wrocław, Warsaw, and Kraków, 1965), pp. 213–20. Cf. the controversial article by O. Iu. Karpenko, “Do pyttannia pro kharakter revoliutsiinoho rukhu v Skhidnii Halychyni v 1918 r.,” in *Z istorii zakhidnoukraiins’kykh zemel’* (Kiev, 1957), 1:59–90.

19. In due time, however, certain KPSH leaders began to espouse a theory which had become quite popular among Ukrainian social democrats—namely, that the Ukrainian nation, having sprung from a “single stream” (*iedynyi potok*), was “bourgeoisieless.” See, for example, O. Vasyl’kiv, “Natsional’ne vyzvolennia a ukraiins’ke dribnomishchanstvo,” *Nasha pravda*, 4, no. 1 (January 1924): 6.

20. The only significant industrial center in Eastern Galicia was the Drohobych-Boryslav petroleum basin, which figured prominently in the plans of both Polish and Ukrainian nationalists in 1918–19. See Aleksy Deruga, *Polityka wschodnia Polski wobec ziem Litwy, Białorusi i Ukrainy (1918–1919)* (Warsaw, 1969), pp. 225–26, and M. K. Dziewanowski, “Joseph Piłsudski, the Bolshevik Revolution and Eastern Europe,” *Polish Review*, 14, no. 4 (Autumn 1969): 25–26.

Nevertheless, toward the end of 1918 and the beginning of 1919 various underground groups having virtually no contact with each other began to function in the major cities, limiting themselves for the most part to organizational and propaganda activities. The first such group—calling itself simply Socialist-Communists and numbering about twenty persons—was formed in Drohobych in early November 1918. According to one of its members, this rather awkward name was chosen “because the term Communists was unknown to the Drohobych and, in general, to the Galician proletariat. The Communist party was known more by the name Bolsheviks. By retaining the name ‘Socialists,’ it was intended to emphasize to the masses that Communists were genuine revolutionary Socialists.”<sup>21</sup> In spite of such difficulties the Socialist-Communists achieved a certain amount of success in their efforts. In late November they organized workers’ councils at the Stebnyk and Drohobych salt works, and in December they convened joint sessions of both councils, at which a series of purely economic demands were put forth. Such demands were also the main topic of discussions at a general workers’ conference of the Drohobych-Stanislaw region called by the social democrats on January 26, 1919. Although leaders of the Socialist-Communists called for a struggle against the ZUNR and the establishment of a Soviet regime, it appears that the only political demands emanating from the conference concerned the induction of workers’ representatives into local organs of the ZUNR government. Summing up the activities of the Drohobych group, a former member described it as follows:

The group of Socialist-Communists in Drohobych could have but did not know how to become a mass revolutionary political organization of the proletariat and poor masses of the Drohobych region. It remained up until the uprising, up until April 14 and 15, 1919, only an agitation group. This group, given the existing revolutionary situation, could have become a legal and mass [organization], and the regime of the Ukrainian National Council would not have been able to interfere, but it did not realize the significance of this and did not make any attempts in that direction.<sup>22</sup>

Opposition groups were also active in Ternopil, where the first attempt to organize a Communist party was made at an interparty conference of the IRSDM, left radicals, and left social democrats in December 1918. This was also the objective of a group of Jewish social democrats at a party conference convened in Stryi on January 18–19, 1919. Somewhat earlier this group had begun to publish a weekly, *Chervonyi prapor*, and had even managed to establish ties with the Hungarian and Russian Communist parties. At the confer-

21. Hr. Baraba [Hryhorii Ivanenko] and Bruno Myroniv [Hryhorii Mykhats], *Drohobychske povstannia 14–15 kvitnia 1919 r.* (Lviv, 1929), p. 31.

22. *Ibid.*, p. 32.

ence itself, however, the majority of the delegates took a moderate stand and succeeded in defeating a resolution calling for the transfer of all power to workers' and peasants' councils.<sup>23</sup> Thus the only successful organizational efforts were those undertaken in Stanislav, which eventually led to the formation of the KPSH. Aside from the two groups headed by Savrych-Maksymovych and Sirko, a well-organized social democratic faction opposed to the ZUNR government was able to establish itself in the city. As early as December this group succeeded in organizing a Workers'–Peasants' Union, with its organ *Respublikanets'*, which on March 30–31, 1919, convened a Workers'–Peasants' Congress attended by delegates from thirty-two of the fifty-two Eastern Galician counties. The strength of the union can be judged from the fact that the ZUNR officials attending the congress were forced to accede to two of its major demands—land without compensation and an eight-hour work day.<sup>24</sup>

The initial successful efforts by these small and isolated groups did not go unnoticed in Kharkiv. For some time the KP(b)U had been receiving optimistic reports from its agents in Eastern Galicia saying that “everywhere there are inquiries about when the Bolsheviks are coming.”<sup>25</sup> In fact, the only serious manifestation of opposition to the ZUNR occurred in Drohobych, where the Socialist-Communists were able to take over the city for two days with the help of the local militia.<sup>26</sup> Nevertheless, seizing upon these reports and apparently convinced that a revolutionary situation in Eastern Galicia had in fact developed, the KP(b)U decided to initiate an uprising centered in Ternopil. Accordingly, a Galician Revolutionary Committee, intended as a provisional organ of government, was formed on May 17.<sup>27</sup> Ten days later a

23. “Comrade M. Freilich’s Report (Eastern Galicia),” *The Communist International*, no. 4 (Aug. 1, 1919), pp. 127–28. This report, presumably written after the Stanislav conference, attests to the complete lack of coordination among the several underground groups. Thus, upon the defeat of its resolution, the faction headed by Freilich proclaimed the formation of a Communist Party of Eastern Galicia and then declared “the fact of our joining the III International,” obviously unaware of the developments in Stanislav. Subsequently the KPSH dated its membership in the Comintern with the publication of Freilich’s report. See A. D. Iaroshenko, “V. I. Lenin i Komunistychna partiia Skhidnoi Halychyny,” *Ukrains'kyi istorychnyi zhurnal*, 1965, no. 4, p. 36.

24. V. Borodaiko, “Do 10-tyrichchia ‘Zakhidno-Ukrains'koi Respubliky,’” *Litopys revoliutsii*, no. 6 (October–December 1928), p. 309; also Sirko, “Shliakhom Zhovtnia,” pp. 33–34.

25. See, for example, *Grazhdanskaia voina*, vol. 1, pt. 1, pp. 675, 677, 678; vol. 2, pp. 67, 74.

26. For details, see Baraba and Myroniv, *Drohobyt's'ke povstannia*, pp. 46–52.

27. Gereon Iwański, “Z dziejów Komunistycznej Partii Galicji Wschodniej,” *Z Pola Walki*, 1967, no. 4, p. 28. Between May and June 1919 both the Provisional Committee of Communists of Eastern Galicia and the Galician Revolutionary Committee underwent a series of changes in connection with the participation of Ukrainians from Bukovina in their activities. For details see N. K. Kucherov, “K voprosu o vozniknovenii i organizatsionnom oformlenii Kommunisticheskoi partii Vostochnoi Galitsii (1919–1923 gg.),” *Voprosy istorii KPSS*, 1965, no. 12, p. 63.

plenum of the TsK KP(b)U discussed the details of the operation, which included the subordination of the Galician party organization to the KP(b)U, increased agitation among the Galician peasantry and the army of the ZUNR, and possible use of Red Army units stationed along the Zbruch.<sup>28</sup> In pursuance of these objectives, a seven-man delegation headed by Volodymyr Zatonskyi and General Antonov-Ovseenko, and including the Borotbists Oleksander Shumskyi and Hnat Mykhailychenko, arrived in Proskuriv.<sup>29</sup> Although there is little information on these activities, it appears that because of the rapid advance of the Polish armies under General Haller, the uprising failed to materialize. According to the report of the KPSH delegate to the Second Congress of the Comintern, by mid-July 1919 “all party work [in Eastern Galicia] was crushed.”<sup>30</sup>

Following the occupation of the remainder of the country by the Poles, the majority of the leading KPSH activists—of the local and Soviet varieties—pursued their activities elsewhere. Many of the “locals” emigrated to Czechoslovakia, where the first steps were taken in the organization and dissemination of the KPSH press;<sup>31</sup> the “emissaries,” on the other hand, withdrew to Soviet territory, where organizational efforts were undertaken anew, especially within the retreating ZUNR army.<sup>32</sup> By October the KP(b)U had organized the existing Galician Provisional Committee into an Orgburo, which was given a budget of one hundred thousand rubles and asked “to establish a Communist organization that would be able to lead and control the growing revolutionary movement in Galicia and Bukovina.”<sup>33</sup> To aid in this task, special Galician buros were formed within the central committees of the KP(b)U and RKP(b).

In this, as in other aspects of its “Galician work,” the KP(b)U virtually ignored the local KPSH leadership, which had succeeded in organizing an underground central committee in Lviv in the spring of 1920. Indeed, as was the case with the first such body elected in Stanislav, the KP(b)U managed to have its representatives seated in Lviv in the persons of Levytskyi and Arnold Baral (Savka).<sup>34</sup> Simultaneously it formed its own party organ in

28. *Grazhdanskaia voina*, 2:88–89.

29. Hoshovs'kyi, “Zasnovnyky i diiachy KPZU,” p. 187; also *Grazhdanskaia voina*, 2:121–22.

30. [Mikhail] Levitsky, “Polozhenie v Galitsii i Bukovine,” *Vestnik 2-go Kongressa Kommunisticheskogo Internatsionala* [supplement to *Pravda*], no. 2 (July 29, 1920), p. 1.

31. It was presumably in Prague that Krilyk-Vasylykiv met Petro Diatliv, the first KPSH “publisher.” On Diatliv see A. D. Iaroshenko, “Nevtomnyi soldat revoliutsii (Do 80-richchia z dnia narodzhennia P. Iu. Diatlova),” *Ukrains'kyi istorychnyi zhurnal*, 1963, no. 1, pp. 94–96, and Ievhen Voloshko, “Taiemnychi emihrant,” *Vitchyzna*, 1967, no. 9, pp. 127–35.

32. For details, see *Grazhdanskaia voina*, 2:291–92.

33. *Ibid.*, pp. 447–48.

34. Levytskyi and Baral, like Baran, were Galicians by birth, although they spent very little time there. The first two represented the KPSH at the Second Congress of the

Kiev—the Galician Organizational Committee of the KP(b)U (Halorkom)—headed by Feliks Kon. Kon, although experienced in organizational work among Poles in the Ukraine, had even fewer ties with local Eastern Galician Communists than either Levytskyi or Baran, both of whom also occupied leading posts in the committee. For lack of documentation, it is impossible to determine what reaction, if any, the KP(b)U’s “Galician work” evoked among the local Communists. It should be pointed out, however, that at least on one occasion Levytskyi urged that representatives of local workers’ and peasants’ organizations, as well as “comrades who have a revolutionary past behind them and who are known to the Eastern Galician and Bukovinian proletariat,” should be included in the Halorkom.<sup>35</sup> The KP(b)U, however, continued to bypass these people in favor of “experienced party workers.” The results have been described as follows:

Another serious shortcoming of the Galician Communist movement was that for a long time there was no unified center for its leadership. [There were] various Communist groups and organizations which often referred to themselves as Communist parties. Between them there were no ties or coordinated activities. Frequently, the Executive Committee of the Comintern, the TsK KP(b)U, and the Galician Committee (which had different names at different times) worked in Galicia and on Galician affairs independently of each other. They sent their representatives to Galicia, formed organizations there which worked in isolation and, at times, collaterally, all of which led to an irrational dispersion of forces. People who were sent to Galicia sometimes were not familiar with local conditions or had been out of touch with these conditions for a long time. . . . There were certain disagreements between Siiak, who held a mandate from the Comintern and the TsK KP(b)U, and the leadership of the Galician Committee of the TsK KP(b)U which refused to recognize his mandate.<sup>36</sup>

KPSH activities began to assume a more organized character during the two-month existence of the Galician Soviet Socialist Republic (July–August 1920). This order, however, was apparently achieved at the expense of the local Communists, very few of whom were to be found in the ruling party and state organs of the new regime. The Galician Revolutionary Committee (Halrevkom), which acted as the provisional government, was strictly a Soviet

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Comintern and worked for the most part in Moscow; Baran forged his career in the ranks of the RSDRP and held leading posts in the Red Army in the Ukraine. On Baral, who was also a leading member of the Austrian Communist Party, see V. M. Turok, “Dokumenty o deiatele mezhdunarodnogo kommunisticheskogo dvizheniia A. G. Barale-Savko (1890–1957),” *Novaia i noveishaia istoriia*, 1961, no. 1, pp. 182–83.

35. *Grazhdanskaia voina*, 3:271.

36. Ie. M. Halushko, *Narysy istorii ideologichnoi ta orhanizatsiinoi diial'nosti KPZU v 1919–1928 rr.* (Lviv, 1965), p. 43 (hereafter cited as Halushko, *Narysy istorii KPZU*).

affair at the head of which stood Zatonskyi. The Halorkom, transplanted from Kiev to Ternopil, performed the functions of the leading party organ. It was not until August 1 that representatives of the Galician Buro of the RKP(b) and the Halorkom, meeting in Moscow, agreed to “merge” the underground committee in Lviv with the appropriate Soviet-sponsored bodies. The result was a new Central Committee of the Communist Party of Galicia (KPH) headed by one I. I. Krasnokutskyi, a functionary of the RKP(b)’s Galician Buro. Of its nine full members, only two—Savrych-Maksymovych and Dmytro Mojsa—represented the underground. No “locals,” however, were elected to the Politburo, Orgburo, or Secretariat.<sup>37</sup> It was also at this time that the KPH, which it must be remembered was a separate section of the Comintern, found itself completely dependent upon the KP(b)U. The appropriate resolution stated that “without prejudging the state relations between Galicia and the Ukraine, the TsK KPSH certifies its factual subordination in ideological and organizational matters to the TsK KP(b)U.”<sup>38</sup>

Having “legalized” its control over the Galician party organization, the KP(b)U began to cleanse its ranks of undesirable elements, especially former social democrats and representatives of the intelligentsia. Thus on September 10 a country-wide purge was initiated, the first victim of which was Fedir Palashchuk (Konar), commissar of finance in the Halrevkom.<sup>39</sup> Although there are no detailed figures for party membership at given periods, it has been established that at the beginning of August 1920 the KPH numbered only 232 full and 246 candidate members.<sup>40</sup> The purge was one of the final acts of the Soviet-dominated TsK KPH before it declared the dissolution of its Politburo. Three of the Politburo’s five members withdrew with the Red Army, and the remaining two proceeded to Vienna. On September 21 the Halrevkom ceased functioning. In its place was formed a secret Provisional Central Committee of the KPSH in Lviv consisting of Krilyk-Vasylkiv, Sydir Senyk (Syrel), Nestor Khomyn, and L. Pasternak (Ulan).<sup>41</sup>

37. M. K. Kucherov, “Komunistychna partiia Skhidnoi Halychyny—orhanizator radians'koho budivnytstva v 1920 r.,” *Ukrains'kyi istorychnyi zhurnal*, 1964, no. 4, p. 82.

38. Halushko, *Narysy istorii KPZU*, pp. 51–52. The KP(b)U’s views on organizational questions had already been articulated as early as May 1919, at which time a plenum of the TsK KP(b)U resolved to “recognize the formal independence of the Galician party organization” while “regarding it as an oblast organization of the KPU.” See *Grazhdanskaia voina*, 2:88–89.

39. Palashchuk had been corresponding with Volodymyr Vynnychenko, one of the leaders of the pre-Bolshevik government in the Ukraine, on the subject of the latter’s “taking the leadership of a new movement” (Halushko, *Narysy istorii KPZU*, p. 59).

40. A. D. Iaroshenko, *Komunistychna partiia Zakhidnoi Ukrainy—orhanizator i kerivnyk revoliutsiino-vyzvol'noi borot'by trudiashchyykh zakhidnoukrains'kykh zemel'* (Kiev, 1959), p. 19.

41. Iwański, “Z dziejów Komunistycznej Partii Galicji Wschodniej,” p. 21.

The changed circumstances created by the Polish occupation of Eastern Galicia immediately raised the question of who was to exercise control over the KPSH. Besides the KP(b)U and the RKP(b), now the Central Committee of the Communist Workers' Party of Poland (KC KPRP) and the Executive Committee of the Comintern (ECCI) began to consider this problem.

The earliest known document regarding what was soon to become "the KPSH question" is a decision of the ECCI's Small Buro (the body renamed "Presidium" in August 1921) dated November 15, 1920, urging that in order to establish organizational relationships between the KPSH and the KPRP a meeting of representatives of the central committees of both parties should be held in Berlin.<sup>42</sup> Thus far it has not been established what course of action was decided upon at the meeting or, in fact, whether it was actually held. There can be no doubt, however, that the KPRP, in view of the *de facto* incorporation of Eastern Galicia,<sup>43</sup> considered its role in this part of the country as no less authoritative than in the rest of Poland. This was reflected, for example, in the agreement concluded between members of the Polish Buro of the RKP(b) and the KP(b)U in December 1920 and even more so in the changes to which this document was subjected by the KC KPRP.<sup>44</sup> According to the agreement, political and organizational leadership over the Galician party organization was vested in the KPRP in the sense that the former was converted into a territorial unit of the Polish party while retaining its own central committee. Furthermore, all financial and technical aid from the KP(b)U was to be administered by the Polish Buro. The last point concerned the tactics to be used in the countryside, whereupon it was decided to agitate for the apportionment of the land but only among the landless and in those areas where land hunger was especially acute. With regard to the national question, the agreement mentioned only the peasantry, omitting references to all other social classes.<sup>45</sup> In effect, this marked a significant shift, at least on the part of those Polish Communist leaders residing in Moscow, with regard to the national and agrar-

42. Halushko, *Narysy istorii KPZU*, p. 78. For details on the structure and organization of the ECCI and its Small Buro see Jane Degras, ed., *The Communist International, 1919-1943: Documents*, 3 vols. (London, 1956-65), 1:271-73.

43. On December 3, 1920, the Sejm included the territory of Eastern Galicia into the Lwów, Kraków, Tarnopol, and Stanisławów voevodships, but it was not until March 15, 1923, that the Conference of Ambassadors in Paris granted Poland sovereignty over these territories. Cf. Leo J. Haczynski, "Two Contributions to the Problem of Galicia," *East European Quarterly*, 4, no. 1 (March 1970): 103.

44. Because of the difficulties connected with the war, the KPRP was unable to send its official representatives outside of the country until 1921. Hence the differences of opinion between such unofficial representatives as members of the RKP(b)'s Polish Buro and the KC KPRP. See Józef Kowalski, *Zarys historii polskiego ruchu robotniczego w latach 1918-1929*, pt. 1: *Lata 1918-1928*, 2nd enl. ed. (Warsaw, 1962), p. 204.

45. Halushko, *Narysy istorii KPZU*, pp. 78-79.

ian questions. Indeed, the December 1920 agreement may be viewed as the first step toward revision of the KPRP's original program. These stipulations, however, did not satisfy the KC. It proposed that the Galician party should function strictly as a local organization of the KPRP and that accordingly its highest organ should be termed the executive rather than the central committee. Assistance to the KPSH was to be administered directly by the KC rather than through the Polish Buro. Finally, the KC refused to sanction those points touching upon the agrarian question, stating, "we cannot formally commit ourselves to obligations regarding the land program without a [party] conference."<sup>46</sup> These corrections, as they were referred to at the time, offer a glimpse at the origins of what was to become a lengthy and often bitter struggle both within the KPSH and between it and its Polish counterpart.

According to Iwański, the main shortcoming of the December 1920 agreement, as well as of all other arrangements between the KPRP and the KP(b)U regarding the Galician party, "was the underestimation and, in the main, the incomprehension of the essence of the national liberation struggle of the Ukrainian population of Eastern Galicia."<sup>47</sup> It must be remembered that the Polish Communist Party, although the product of the unification of two groups, the Social Democracy of the Kingdom of Poland and Lithuania (SDKPiL) and the Polish Socialist Party-Left, inherited for the most part the ideological arsenal of the former, which in turn reflected the views of Rosa Luxemburg, one of its founders and undoubtedly its most prominent theoretician. These views included, among other things, a denial of the right of national self-determination and a depreciation of the role of the peasantry in the socialist revolution.<sup>48</sup> Thus in the political platform adopted by the founding congress of the KPRP (December 16, 1918) we find the following formulation of the party's position on the national question:

In the period of the international socialist revolution, which is destroying the foundations of capitalism, the Polish proletariat rejects all political slogans such as autonomy, self-government, and self-determination [which are] based on the development of political forms during the

46. Ibid. The KP(b)U, on its part, refused to acknowledge the revised version of the agreement.

47. Iwański, "Z dziejów Komunistycznej Partii Galicji Wschodniej," p. 32.

48. "Just as nationalism was an unsuitable bed-fellow for Socialist aspirations, so peasant discontent could only divert the energy of working-class Socialism into petit-bourgeois channels. In Rosa Luxemburg's view the primary role of the proletariat in the Russian revolution of 1905-6—a conception shared fully by the Bolsheviks—necessarily led her to refuse alliances with peasants and nationalists just as firmly as with the bourgeois liberals." J. P. Nettl, *Rosa Luxemburg*, 2 vols. (London, 1966), 2:851. For an excellent discussion of this problem see Józef Chlebowczyk, "W sprawie genezy stanowiska KPP w kwestii narodowej," *Z Pola Walki*, 1968, no. 4, pp. 143-47.

period of capitalism. . . . For the camp of the international socialist revolution, the question of boundaries does not exist.<sup>49</sup>

This same kind of “nihilism” also characterized the KPRP’s attitude toward the peasantry. The earliest programmatic statements adopted by the party did not concern themselves with the agrarian problem. It was discussed for the first time at the February 1919 plenum of the KC KPRP, which worked out a program calling for the nationalization of large and middle-sized landed estates and their incorporation into “socialist agricultural cooperatives.”<sup>50</sup> Speaking at the Second KPRP Congress in 1923, Adolf Warszawski (Warski) was forced to concede that the KPRP, by neglecting the countryside, had in fact resigned from the revolution:

We must admit to ourselves that in the struggle for the victory of the revolution, we did not know how to seek allies where they existed. We had nothing to say to the peasant struggling for land, to the denationalized and disinherited peasant of Eastern Galicia. . . . The distinguishing characteristic of our party, similar to that of the Mensheviks and all the parties of the II International, was that we were a “guild” party [*partia “cechowa”*]. . . . We wanted to be “a purely workers’ party,” and the Mensheviks talked about themselves in the same way. They also refused to make any “concessions” ostensibly harmful to the workers.<sup>51</sup>

These manifestations of “infantile leftism” created an immediate stir within the KPSH, all the more so because it had not been invited to participate in the Moscow discussions. Even before the December agreement, however, there had been conflicting viewpoints within the TsK KPSH regarding the organizational question. One group, referred to as the *kapeerpowcy* and represented by Khomyn and Pasternak, was quite willing to subordinate the party to the KPRP; the other, headed by Krilyk-Vasylykiv and Senyk and dubbed the *wasylykowcy* after their leader, argued for a separate organization with membership in the Comintern (as one of its sections).<sup>52</sup> Thus as early as

49. *KPP: Uchwały i rezolucje*, 3 vols. (Warsaw, 1954–56), 1:42–43.

50. *Ibid.*, p. 72. The editors inform us that “the advancement of the slogan of ‘nationalization of large and middle-sized landed estates’ as opposed to ‘land to the peasants without compensation’ resulted from an incorrect position on the agrarian question, which maintained that the middle peasantry is by nature reactionary and cannot be an ally of the proletariat.” Cf. I. Khrenov, “Kommunisticheskaia rabochaia partiia Pol’shi na putiakh prevrashcheniia v partiia novogo, leninskogo tipa (1918–1923 gg.),” in *Iz istorii pol’skogo rabocheho dvizheniia* (Moscow, 1962), pp. 237–38.

51. *II Zjazd Komunistycznej Partii Robotniczej Polski (19.IX.–2.X. 1923): Protokoły obrad i uchwały* (Warsaw, 1968), pp. 175–80 (hereafter cited as *II Zjazd KPRP*).

52. It has been impossible to determine the exact position of the Khomyn-Pasternak faction on the organization question during the early stages of the controversy. Thus, with the exception of Karpenko and Halushko, who maintain that this group thought in terms

October Khomyn, acting unilaterally, approached the Polish party with a request that it send its representative to Eastern Galicia. The KC KPRP responded by dispatching Królikowski to Lviv with instructions to arrange organizational ties “on the basis of a common struggle for a Polish Soviet Republic.”<sup>53</sup> Taking advantage of the tactlessness of the KPRP and accusing Khomyn of attempting to advance his personal position within the party with the help of the Polish comrades, Krilyk-Vasylykiv and Senyk resigned from the Central Committee. On January 31 they convened a conference in Lviv, which elected a rival five-man committee that included Krilyk-Vasylykiv, Senyk, and Adolf Jung (Szanin). Within two weeks the *wasylykowcy* addressed themselves to the KP(b)U and requested support for their efforts in the Comintern.<sup>54</sup>

An analysis of the 1921 split reveals that it was not simply a matter of Polish “imperialism and great-power chauvinism” on the one hand and Ukrainian “nationalism and separatism” on the other. Such mutual accusations, although freely exchanged by the Polish and Galician Communists at the time, obscure rather than clarify the issues.<sup>55</sup> Even less so was the conflict the result of a struggle “between the Ukrainians and the Polish and Jewish elements over the Ukrainian character and supremacy of the party.”<sup>56</sup> Here it need only be mentioned that since over 75 percent of the party’s membership was Ukrainian,<sup>57</sup> the KPSH was bound to have a “Ukrainian character.” Furthermore, the opposing factions did not split along national lines,<sup>58</sup> but rather according to the degree to which they perceived that the events of 1918–19 in Eastern Galicia had created a political atmosphere quite unlike the one in Poland

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of some sort of territorial autonomy for the KPSH, all other sources refer to its desire to “unite with the KPRP.” M. Herasymenko and B. Dudykevych in *Borot'ba trudiashchyykh Zakhidnoi Ukrainy za vozz'iednannia z Radians'koiu Ukrainoiu* (Kiev, 1960), p. 43, go so far as to say that these “Communists considered themselves KPRP members.”

53. Franciszka Świetlikowa, *Komunistyczna Partia Robotnicza Polski, 1918–1923* (Warsaw, 1968), p. 101.

54. Halushko, *Narysy istorii KPZU*, p. 81.

55. Thus Rozenberg, reacting to Leszczyński’s statement that economic considerations must be taken into account before advancing the slogan of self-determination, remarked that, as applied to Eastern Galicia, “this smells of Boryslav oil” (*II Zjazd KPRP*, p. 245). See also Aleksander Lenowicz, “Na II Zjeździe KPRP (Wspomnienia uczestnika),” *Z Pola Walki*, 1958, no. 2, p. 146, on the bitter arguments between Krilyk-Vasylykiv and Franciszek Grzelszczak.

56. S. Vytvytsky and S. Baran, “Western Ukraine Under Poland,” *Ukraine: A Concise Encyclopaedia*, vol. 1 (Toronto, 1963), p. 840a.

57. Rozenberg’s report in *II Zjazd KPRP*, p. 87.

58. It was quite possible, for example, for Rozenberg, who had been a member of Poale Zion in 1911–20, to represent the *wasylykowcy* at the Second Congress of the KPRP, while Khomyn, Mykhats, Ivanenko, and others felt equally at home among the *kapeerpowcy*.

proper.<sup>59</sup> This becomes fairly clear upon examining the arguments advanced by the *wasyłkowcy* in support of their demand for a separate party organization.

Thus Krilyk-Vasylykiv and his followers contended that the program proposed by the KPRP, according to which the Galician Communists were asked to gear their activity to the creation of a Polish Soviet Republic, was totally unrealistic, because it overlooked what was perhaps the most obvious aspect of the Eastern Galician situation—the anti-Polish attitude of the Ukrainian population. Taking this into consideration, as well as the fact that the Paris peacemakers had not yet decided the Eastern Galician question, the *wasyłkowcy* maintained that their tasks were different from those of the KPRP. More precisely, they considered it imperative that their work be aimed at the unification of Eastern Galicia with the Ukrainian SSR. This, in fact, was also the position of some of the *kapeerpowcy*, although they did not draw from this the same conclusions as their opponents. Ostap Dłuski, for example, was quite clear on this point:

When, after the bloody struggles of 1919, after the brutal suppression of the Ukrainian nation, the KPRP began its work in Eastern Galicia, it did not come to us with a vehement, all-inclusive protest against the horrors which had been committed, but rather with the slogan “Polish Soviet Republic,” a slogan which to us was incomprehensible, alien, and which aroused suspicion. The utilization of appropriate slogans for the Ukrainian lands and an understanding of the national question in the spirit of the III International do not, however, necessitate a separate party.<sup>60</sup>

There was, to be sure, still another aspect to the national question as conceived by the *wasyłkowcy*. According to them, aside from being decidedly anti-Polish and therefore not given to supporting Polish state formations (Soviet or otherwise), the Ukrainians, unlike the Poles, constituted a potentially revolutionary element. This circumstance was a result of the particular distribution of social forces in Eastern Galicia whereby the large landowner tended to be a Pole and the landless or land-hungry peasant, a Ukrainian. In reaction to the government’s colonization program,<sup>61</sup> this revolutionary potential surfaced in the form

59. “In order to bring to light the extent to which the national-revolutionary movement influenced the KPZU, one must pose the question of the social significance of the national movement in Galicia in 1918–19 and especially the national war of 1919 between the Polish Democratic Republic and the Western Ukrainian Peoples’ Republic (ZUNR).” M. Skrypnyk, *Dzherela ta prychnyny rozlamu w KPZU* (Kharkiv, 1928), p. 69.

60. *II Zjazd KPRP*, p. 129.

61. Toward the end of 1920 the Sejm enacted legislation facilitating the military colonization of the “eastern borderlands” (*kresy wschodnie*). For details see “Ustawa z dnia 17 grudnia 1920 r. o nadaniu ziemi żołnierzom Wojska Polskiego,” *Dziennik Ustaw Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej*, no. 4 (Jan. 12, 1921), pp. 40–41.

of modern-day *jacqueries*. The *wasylkowcy*, on their part, felt obliged to support this "Irelandization" of Eastern Galicia as a means of promoting its unification with the Ukrainian SSR.<sup>62</sup> To that end, they decided to cooperate closely with Communist groups working among the former soldiers of the ZUNR interned in Czechoslovakia, who could provide the necessary external factor for the initiation of an uprising in Eastern Galicia.<sup>63</sup>

The views of the KPRP and its supporters with regard to this *sabotazhizm*, as it was termed, followed from its position on the national and agrarian questions. Indeed, the ideology of *sabotazhizm* reflected both of these questions, in that it was aimed at the separation of Eastern Galicia from Poland, with the peasantry providing the foundation. Perhaps the clearest explanation offered by the KPRP for its opposition to this tendency is to be found in Władysław Stein-Krajewski's KC report to the Second KPRP Congress. Aside from exposing the alleged dangers of *sabotazhizm*, the report throws considerable light on the three-way relationship between the KPSH, the KPRP, and the Polish proletariat:

[The Eastern Galician comrades] conducted overt separatist agitation, aimed their agitation toward war, awaited opportunities when it would be possible to initiate an uprising aimed at separation from Poland. We felt this kind of attitude to be extremely harmful and resolutely opposed it. While emphasizing [that] should the course of events lead to this kind of uprising we would firmly support it [and] oppose all efforts at its suppression, the KC at the same time maintained that the political line of our party could not be oriented toward war and the possibilities which might result, but rather toward the class struggle, the struggle for the overthrow of the rule of capital in Poland which the oppressed nationalities should support with all of their strength in the interests of their national as well as class liberation. This revolutionary struggle must have centripetal tendencies; it must aim at the overthrow of state power at the very center. This does not change the fact that should the occasion arise the KPRP will support the possible struggle of the oppressed nationalities in separating themselves from the Polish state, but it does mean that this struggle can count on success only if it is supported by the revolutionary struggle of the workers and peasants in Poland proper.<sup>64</sup>

62. Kos, "Proty nastroiv," *Nasha pravda*, 4, no. 1 (January 1924): 21–22, and Tomasz Dąbal, "Ruch partyzancki w Polsce," *Nowy Przegląd, 1924–1925* (repub.; Warsaw, 1959), pp. 291–302.

63. Indeed, there was a precedent for this line of thinking. In late August 1920 Fedir Bekesh, a former officer in the ZUNR army, crossed the border from Czechoslovakia and initiated an uprising which produced the short-lived (one week) Boiko Soviet Republic. See Pavlo Dehtiar'ov, "Zhovtnevyi vidhomin u Beskydakh," *Zhovten'*, 1969, no. 1, pp. 54–64; also "V vostochnoi Galitsii: Povstanchesкое dvizhenie," *Pravda*, Sept. 11, 1920, p. 1.

64. *II Zjazd KPRP*, pp. 67–68.

Stein-Krajewski was obviously quite correct in his estimation that solitary efforts on the part of the nationalities were unlikely to achieve the desired results. However, the KPRP's stand on the national question had also created a "Polish problem." In essence, by rejecting the necessity of an independent Polish state, the KPRP had created the impression that it was representing the working class against the nation and not the nation against the capitalists.<sup>65</sup> The result was that the majority of the Polish working class sympathized with the Socialists, who, unlike the KPRP, were not handicapped by a "Luxemburgist" heritage.<sup>66</sup> Furthermore, unlike the Polish Communist Party, which was "nihilistic," the Polish proletariat was nationalistic and especially so in the "borderlands."<sup>67</sup> Radek, addressing the Second Congress of the KPRP as a representative of the Comintern, formulated the problem in the following terms:

Our attitude toward the Belorussians and Ukrainians is the historical test whether we, the Polish working class, have freed ourselves of the influence of nationalist ideology. Every Communist who senses inner resistances [*wewnętrzne opory*] with regard to these matters should firmly struggle against them, because at a crucial moment these resistances may become the bridge linking him to the bourgeoisie. . . . There are many reasons for these resistances; not only nationalism but also the realization that a clear presentation of this question makes our agitation in Poland proper more difficult.<sup>68</sup>

Thus the KPRP was in an extremely precarious position. On the one hand it had to take into account the unmistakable social-patriotism of the Polish proletariat, while on the other it was being pressured to assume the role of defender of the nationalities. In short, it found itself in the unenviable position of having to reconcile conflicting nationalisms at a time when its party program continued to reflect the viewpoint that nationalism was nothing more than a clever bourgeois trick to fool the masses.<sup>69</sup> It would seem that the *wasyłkowcy* in the

65. Królikowski in *II Zjazd KPRP*, p. 223.

66. "Among a significant segment of Polish workers there was a desire to see an independent Polish state. Surely Polish workers, Communist sympathizers, left Socialists, and all those who desired social liberation and socialism and who, in this, agreed with the KPP program must have found themselves in a difficult situation, desiring at the same time an independent Poland which they did not find in the KPP program, but which was included in that of the PPS [Polish Socialist Party]." Lucjan Kieszczyński in "Ewolucja myśli marksistowskiej w kwestii narodu i państwa," *Z Pola Walki*, 1966, no. 3, p. 129.

67. Królikowski, for example, warned his listeners that "it must not be forgotten that a segment of the Polish workers in Eastern Galicia, rifles in hand, helped in the subjugation of this country, stifling militarily the liberation struggle of the oppressed, and that it is not long past that the Polish worker voted to drive out the Ukrainian worker from the shop" (*II Zjazd KPRP*, p. 359). See also Jerzy Czeszejko-Sochacki's speech (pp. 334-35).

68. *Ibid.*, p. 325.

69. "Comrade Pstrąg [Tadeusz Żarski] has doubts about how the two nationalisms,

KPSH perceived the difficulties of the situation somewhat earlier than their comrades in the KPRP, and concluded that the only solution lay in a separate party in Eastern Galicia.<sup>70</sup>

After the split the opposing factions turned to their respective supporters—the KPRP and the KP(b)U.<sup>71</sup> Thus in February the *wasyłkowcy* succeeded in reaching a compromise with Horwitz-Walecki, who in his unofficial capacity as KPRP representative in Moscow agreed to full autonomy for the KPSH. This arrangement, as was to be expected, did not satisfy the KC KPRP. In the meantime the ECCI had decided to send Cichowski to Eastern Galicia. After conducting negotiations with the interested parties in Berlin and Vienna, Cichowski arrived in Lviv in April with a mandate from the Polish and Ukrainian parties to put an end to the split. His negotiations with the *wasyłkowcy*, however, did not bring the desired results, inasmuch as they were at that very moment engaged in separate talks in Moscow. These talks ended in the April 12, 1921, agreement between representatives of the KPRP, the KP(b)U, and the *wasyłkowcy* whereby it was decided that the KPSH should work under the banner “Soviet Eastern Galicia united with the Soviet Ukraine!”<sup>72</sup> Five days later the *kapeerpowcy* convened a conference in Lviv, at which it became apparent that the views of their opponents had begun to make inroads among the adherents of the KPRP. This was evident, for example, in the disagreements between the faction headed by Pasternak and the one led by Królikowski and Cichowski over the nature of the slogans to be advanced in Eastern Galicia. Pasternak’s proposal, which foresaw the establishment of an “Eastern Galician Soviet Republic of Workers’ and Peasants’ Councils,” was defeated by only one vote. The conference’s final act was to elect an Executive Committee of the KPSH, which in effect formalized the

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Polish and Ukrainian, will be resolved, how we will manage with Lwów and Wilno. . . . The time will come when Polish patriots will gladly rid themselves of Lwów and Wilno in order to retain Warsaw” (Dłuski in *II Zjazd KPRP*, p. 246).

70. It is indeed paradoxical that the national problem, which contributed significantly to the debilitation of parliamentary government in interwar Poland, should have had an equally deleterious effect on the KPRP. Thus the active participation of Jews and Ukrainians in the Polish Communist movement, coupled with the heritage of “Luxemburgism,” was successfully exploited by the government to discredit the KPRP as a tool of “foreign interests.” On the ramifications of the national question on Polish domestic politics see Alexander J. Groth, “The Legacy of Three Crises: Parliament and Ethnic Issues in Prewar Poland,” *Slavic Review*, 27, no. 4 (December 1968): 564–80, and idem, “Dmowski, Pilsudski and Ethnic Conflict in Pre-1939 Poland,” *Canadian Slavic Studies*, 3, no. 1 (Spring 1969): 69–91.

71. On January 11, 1921, the Politburo of the TsK KP(b)U had approached the RKP(b) to request support for its letter to the ECCI wherein it asked to be given control over party work in Eastern Galicia and Bessarabia. See Halushko, *Narysy istorii KPZU*, p. 82.

72. Krilyk-Vasylyk in *II Zjazd KPRP*, p. 329. Cf. Świetlikowa, *Komunistyczna Partia Robotnicza Polski*, pp. 102–3.

existing split. An attempt to bring about a unification at a meeting in Warsaw on June 3 failed, because the KC KPRP refused to sanction the April agreement, whereas the *wasyłkowcy* considered it the only basis upon which they would conduct negotiations.<sup>73</sup>

The “KPSH question” ultimately found its place on the agenda of the Third Congress of the Comintern (June 22–July 12, 1921), which appointed a special commission whose purpose was, as before, to unify the two factions. On July 9 the commission produced a document which, although agreed to by the *wasyłkowcy*, was far from satisfying their demands.<sup>74</sup> In essence it continued to reflect the views of the KPRP on the national, agrarian, and organizational questions. Thus in a special supplement to the agreement the representatives of the KPRP emphasized that

one of the most important tasks of the Ukrainian Communists in Eastern Galicia is the struggle against those Ukrainian nationalist elements in the party who exploit the national and social disenfranchisement [*bespravie*] of the Ukrainian people of Eastern Galicia, deceive it with nationalistic phraseology, restrain it from the revolutionary class struggle, pit it against the workers of other countries, maintain it under the yoke of its own bourgeoisie, and transform it into the subject of imperialist and counter-revolutionary intrigues and adventures of various capitalist governments.<sup>75</sup>

On the basis of the July agreement a unified Provisional Central Committee of the KPSH was elected at a conference attended by delegates of both factions on August 9 in Lviv. Its task was to prepare the groundwork for the KPSH’s First Congress, which was to have resolved all of the outstanding questions with regard to the split. As mentioned earlier, the congress was barely under way when the police arrested all of its delegates.

It is doubtful that even if the St. George’s Congress had been able to conclude its work, the differences between the Polish and Galician parties could have been reconciled. The documents seized by the police reveal that although a measure of agreement had been reached on a number of questions, the problem of appropriate slogans for Eastern Galicia continued to divide the

73. Iwański, “Z dziejów Komunistycznej Partii Galicji Wschodniej,” pp. 39–41.

74. At the Second Congress of the KPRP, Krilyk-Vasylykiv stated that “although we felt that the agreement was bad, that it would be harmful to our movement, we nevertheless submitted to it since it had been dictated by the International” (*II Zjazd KPRP*, p. 329). It is significant, however, that no one from the KPSH of either faction signed the document. See “Soglashenie mezhdru Kommunisticheskoi Partiei Ukrainy i Kommunisticheskoi Rabochei Partiei Pol'shi,” in *Deiatel'nost' Ispolnitel'nogo Komiteta i Prezidiuma I.K. Kommunisticheskogo Internatsionala ot 13-go iulia 1921 g. do 1-go fevralia 1922 g.* (Petrograd, 1922), p. 51.

75. “Raz'iasnenie,” *ibid.*, p. 52.

two groups.<sup>76</sup> Moreover, at the trial itself the defendants continued to level bitter accusations at each other to the apparent amusement of the judges and the prosecutor. In October 1921 Lenin found it necessary to raise the issue of “leftism” in the Polish party, as did the Comintern in December of the following year.<sup>77</sup> It was at this time, during the course of the Fourth Congress of the Comintern (November–December 1922), that a new crisis emerged in connection with the decision of the *wasyłkowcy* to boycott the Sejm elections.<sup>78</sup> Although “Leninist” positions on the national and agrarian questions were adopted by the Second Congress of the KPRP (October–November 1923), a new ultra-left faction gained control of the Polish party in 1924. In the summer of that year the Comintern held its Fifth Congress; its resolution on the national question read, in part, as follows:

The Ukrainian problem is one of the most important national problems in Central Europe, and its solution is dictated by the interests of the proletarian revolution in Poland, Czecho-Slovakia, and Rumania, as well as in the countries adjoining. The Congress declares that the Ukrainian problems in Poland, Rumania, and Czecho-Slovakia form one Ukrainian national question, demanding a common solution in all these countries.<sup>79</sup>

The leaders of the KPZU accepted the Comintern’s analysis at face value. Thus when the opportunity to “solve” the Ukrainian problem presented itself in connection with the Ukrainization program in the Ukrainian SSR, the majority of the KPZU supported the “national deviation” of Shumskyi within the KP(b)U. Having perceived the existence of formidable “inner resistances” to this program both within his own party and in the RKP(b), he demanded its forthright application in all spheres of Ukrainian life. This interference of the KPZU in the affairs of a fraternal party eventually resulted in the exclusion of its leadership from the ranks of the international Communist movement. In due time the party as a whole was judged to have been infiltrated by counter-revolutionary renegades in the service of bourgeois Poland and was dealt with accordingly.

76. Karpenko, in *Z istorii zachidnoukrains'kykh zemel'*, 2:187.

77. V. I. Lenin, “Pis'mo pol'skim kommunistam,” *Kommunist*, 1962, no. 6, pp. 16–17, and “List Komitetu Wykonawczego Międzynarodówki Komunistycznej do Komunistycznej Partii Robotniczej Polski,” in *KPP: Uchwały i rezolucje*, 1:179–88.

78. See “Korespondencja Marii Koszutskiej (Wery Kostrzewy) z lat 1922–1924: Część I (styczeń 1922–marzec 1923 r.),” *Z Pola Walki*, 1965, no. 2, pp. 162–67.

79. “Resolution on National Question in Central Europe and Balkans,” *The Communist International*, n.s., no. 7 (December 1924–January 1925), p. 95.