

ROMAN SOLCHANYK

Language Politics in the Ukraine

The importance of language in the life of a nation requires no special elaboration. The native language, particularly for the so-called “non-historical” or stateless nations of Eastern Europe, has served as a focus of national awareness. This is not to say that language alone defines nationality. Rather, for nations like the Ukrainian, whose efforts at attaining national statehood have largely been frustrated, the role and status of the native language (i.e., “the language question”) has been and continues to be a paramount issue in the quest for legitimization and authentication of the nation itself. The language, to paraphrase Joshua Fishman, becomes to a large extent the message of nationalism.¹

The symbolic function of language, implicit in the foregoing, has been noted in the case of the Ukrainians. Thus, Walker Connor has written that

Ukrainian unrest is popularly reported as an attempt to preserve the Ukrainian language against Russian in-roads....This propensity to perceive an ethnic division in terms of the more tangible differences between the groups is often supported by the statements and actions of those involved. In their desire to assert their uniqueness, members of a group are apt to make rallying points of their more tangible and distinguishing institutions. Thus, the Ukrainians, as a method of asserting their non-Russian identity, wage their campaign for national survival largely in terms of their right to employ the Ukrainian, rather than the Russian, tongue in all oral and written matters. But would not the Ukrainian nation (that is, a popular consciousness of being Ukrainian) be likely to persist even if the language were totally replaced by Russian, just as the Irish nation has persisted after the virtual disappearance of Gaelic, despite pre-1920 slogans that described Gaelic and Irish identity as inseparable? Is the language the essential element of the Ukrainian nation, or is it merely a minor element which has been elevated to *the symbol* of the nation in its struggle for continued viability?²

One might add that this “high visibility” of the language question in the Ukrainian case has been conditioned not only by the purposefulness of the nation seeking to establish its identity, but also by the determination of

politically dominant but ethnically alien national groups seeking to obliterate it. As a result, the language question (and consequently language politics) has been a prominent feature of the Ukrainian national movement from its inception in the middle of the last century to the present day.³

The Tsarist Legacy

“There has not been, there is not, and there can not be any kind of separate Little Russian language.” This statement, in a letter from Minister of Internal Affairs Petr Valuev to Minister of Education Aleksandr Golovnin in July 1863,⁴ reflected the prevailing attitude of the tsarist bureaucracy towards the Ukrainian language and, by extension, towards the Ukrainian nation in the latter half of the nineteenth century. Not only government officials and administrators, but the majority of Russian public opinion – whether of liberal or conservative persuasion – shared the view that Ukrainians were simply a “Little Russian” offshoot of the “all-Russian” nation. From this perspective, the “Little Russian tribe,” which consisted of some thirteen million people in 1860, could hardly expect its vernacular to be recognized as a legitimate language. In the aforementioned letter, Valuev wrote that

their dialect, spoken by the common people, is that very same Russian language, but spoiled by the influence of Poland; the all-Russian language is as comprehensible to the Little Russians as it is to the Great Russians, and even more comprehensible that the so-called Ukrainian language that is currently being created for them by certain Little Russians and especially Poles.⁵

Although maintaining that the Ukrainian language was nonexistent, the authorities nonetheless proceeded to ban it.

On June 20, 1863 Valuev issued a secret decree approved by Tsar Alexander II forbidding the use of Ukrainian in all publications excepts *belles lettres*, singling out religious books, educational materials, and all publications intended for the peasant masses.⁶ This Draconian measure, subsequently known as the Valuev Circular, was prompted by the confluence of certain social and political developments that, in turn, produced what has been described as “a hysteria that seized Russian officialdom and a large segment of the educated public between 1861 and 1863.”⁷ Most important were the Polish insurrection of January 1863 and the emergence of a specifically Ukrainian literary-cultural movement known as *ukrainofil'stvo*.

After the liquidation of the Cyril and Methodius Society in the spring of

1847, the Ukrainian movement in Russia developed along strictly apolitical lines, focusing on ethnographic research, literary activities, and educational work among the masses. This work was carried on by representatives of the Ukrainian intelligentsia, which by the end of the 1850s was organized into loosely knit groups called *hromady* in such major centers as St. Petersburg, Kiev, Poltava, Chernihiv, and Kharkiv. The late 1850s and early 1860s were marked by a revival of Ukrainian literary life. In 1857 Panteleimon Kulish and Danylo Kamenets'kyi founded the first Ukrainian publishing enterprise in St. Petersburg. In 1856-1857 Kulish published his two volume *Zapiski o Iuzhnoi Rusi*.

This was followed by the publication of the works of Marko Vovchok (Mariia Vilins'ka), Ivan Kotliarevs'kyi, Hryhorii Kvitka-Osnovianenko, Mykola Hatsuk, Danylo Mordovets', and others. The third edition of Taras Shevchenko's *Kobzar* appeared in 1860. In October 1858 Kulish unsuccessfully petitioned the Ministry of Education to allow the publication of a Ukrainian journal. Finally, in January 1861 *Osnova* – the first Ukrainian periodical publication in Russia – appeared in St. Petersburg under the editorship of Vasyli' Bilozers'kyi and in close cooperation with Kulish and Mykola Kostomarov. The new monthly published materials in both Russian and Ukrainian. Shortly thereafter, in July 1861, the weekly *Chernigovskii listok* began publication, also in both languages.⁸

The *hromady* played an important role in the movement to organize Sunday schools for the lower classes, the first of which was established in Kiev in October 1859. Instruction in these schools, which in some respects were independent of the Ministry of Education, was conducted in Russian and Ukrainian. Between 1859 and 1862, according to one source, 111 Sunday schools were opened in Ukraine alone.⁹ Efforts were also made to introduce Ukrainian into the officially administered schools system. In 1862 the St. Petersburg Committee for the Promotion of Literacy petitioned the authorities regarding the use of Ukrainian as the language of instruction in elementary schools in Ukraine.¹⁰

The authorities eventually came to view the activities of the *hromady* as evidence of Ukrainian "separatism," "Polish-Jesuit intrigue," and the like. Already in June 1862 all Sunday schools in Russia were closed by imperial decree. By order of the Tsar a special investigating commission headed by Prince Aleksandr Golitsyn was convened in St. Petersburg to examine "Little Russian propaganda," particularly in Right Bank Ukraine. In September 1862 members of the Poltava *hromada* were arrested and exiled on charges of propagating subversion and separatism under the cover of literacy societies;

arrests were also made in Kiev, resulting in the exile of several members of the local *hromada*.¹¹

The government's fears and suspicions were nurtured by the conservative and reactionary press. The appearance of *Osnova* was greeted in the Slavophile camp with critical articles questioning the validity of a separate Ukrainian nation, literature, and language. Slavophiles such as Ivan Aksakov and Vladimir Lamanskii were prepared to recognize the existence of a Little Russian dialect whose functions were limited to the peasant marketplace, but there could be no talk of a distinct Ukrainian literature and language. This was the essence of Lamanskii's polemics with Chernyshevskii in the Slavophile newspaper *Den'* in 1861.¹² The Polish insurrection transformed the discussion about *ukrainofil'stvo* from a literary-cultural debate into a question of state politics. In 1862 *Sovremennaia letopis'*, the weekly supplement to Katkov's *Russkii vestnik*, could still agree to provide the Kiev *hromada* with a forum to state its goals and aims in the form of the collective "Otzyv iz Kiev." By the following year, however, Katkov was writing that

in 1863, as a result of the weakening of Russian censorship, the Ukrainian movement has advanced so far that the government very nearly recognized this common, crude, and unrefined dialect as legal, widely used, and literary. In another instant the government would have been obliged to permit instruction in the schools in this crude language throughout the vast Ukraine. The people would even begin reading the Bible and, in the end, government laws would be promulgated in Ukraine in this common dialect.¹³

Similarly, in his *O zarozhdaiushcheisia tak nazyyvaemoi malorusskoi literature* (Kiev, 1863), the Chernihiv writer and pedagogue Ivan Kul'zhinskii gave the following characterization of the language of his countrymen:

The Little Russian dialect is an anomaly among languages. To be truthful, it is the bastard child of Russian and Polish, born in the kitchen and raised in the back yard of human thought and world. Now you are washing this bastard, dressing it up, bringing it into the drawing room, and demanding that it be recognized as a legal heir. It is difficult to say what has the upper hand in your undertaking – false humanism or genuine insolence?¹⁴

In the aftermath of the Valuev Circular, such diatribes became superfluous. *Osnova* died a more or less natural death in October 1862; *Chernigovskii listok* was banned in August 1863; and the 1864 school statute regulating primary education precluded teaching in languages other than Russian. In the latter half of the nineteenth century there were no official schools in Ukraine with Ukrainian as the language of instruction.¹⁵

Restrictions on the Ukrainian language were intensified by the Ems Ukaz

of May 18, 1876, which in effect banned Ukrainian from public life in Russia. As in the 1860s, the unfounded fear of Ukrainian separatism served as the basis for repressive cultural measures. Specifically, the scholarly work of the Southwestern Branch of the Imperial Russian Geographic Society – which was established in Kiev at the end of 1872 and which served as a focus of Ukrainian life – was judged a threat to the unity of the Russian Empire. On the basis of denunciations forwarded to the government, an important role in which was played by the school official and head of the Kiev Archeographic Commission Mikhail Iuzefovich, as well as anti-Ukrainian polemics in the press,¹⁶ in the summer of 1875 Tsar Alexander II ordered the creation of a special commission “to put an end to ukrainophile propaganda.” The commission’s recommendations served as the basis for the secret decree signed by the Tsar while taking the cure in Ems. It prohibited: (1) the import into Russia of all books and brochures published in Ukrainian without the special approval of the Main Administration for Printing; (2) the publication of original works or translations into Ukrainian, with the exception of historical documents and *belles lettres*; and (3) all stage performances, public lectures, and lyrics to musical compositions in Ukrainian.¹⁷ Mykhailo Drachomanov, a central figure in the Kiev *hromada* and in the events leading up to the Ems Ukaz, commented apropos the 1876 measures: “Now it is a question of the form, not the content, of Little Russian literature, about literature per se, and not about politics or in general about ideas.”¹⁸

In January 1881 the governor-generals of Kiev and Kharkiv submitted memoranda to the Ministry of Internal Affairs urging that certain limitations on Ukrainian language and literature be lifted.¹⁹ This may have prompted the Minister of Internal Affairs, Count Nikolai Ignat’ev, to propose a review of the Ems Ukaz to the new tsar, Alexander III. Accordingly, a commission was formed under the chairmanship of Pobedonostsev which advised that the 1876 restrictions remain in force, but with certain modifications: Ukrainian dictionaries could now be published on the condition that they adhere to the rules of Russian orthography, or rules used not later than the eighteenth century; lyrical compositions were also permitted, but only if they followed Russian orthography and subject to the approval of the Main Administration for Printing; and stage performances and public concerts in Ukrainian could be organized by decision of local authorities on a case by case basis. Exclusively Ukrainian theater companies and performing groups, however, were prohibited. These recommendations were approved by the Tsar in October 1881 and acquired the force of law.²⁰

In essence, the restrictions imposed in 1863, 1876, and 1881 governed

Ukrainian cultural life in Russia until the reforms that followed the 1905 Revolution. The regime's intolerance towards all things Ukrainian often resulted in tragicomic situations, not the least of which was the spectacle of Ukrainian folk concerts performed in French. An accurate reflection of the times is the scandal associated with the Eleventh Archeological Congress held in Kiev in 1899, which was precipitated by the refusal to permit Ukrainian delegates from Austrian Galicia to present their papers in Ukrainian.²¹

The censorship laws governing Ukrainian publications were reviewed again in December 1904, this time by the Council of Ministers, on the basis of a decree by Tsar Nicholas II on December 12, 1904. The ministries of education and internal affairs were instructed to obtain opinions from the Imperial Academy of Sciences, Kiev and Kharkiv universities, and the governor-general of Kiev concerning the restrictions of 1876 and 1881 and present them to the Council of Ministers.²² Although all of the parties involved advised that the restrictions be lifted, in September 1905 the Council of Ministers decided that such a step would be "inopportune."²³ Events, however, took a different turn. The October Manifesto and the provisional press regulations of November 24, 1905 rendered existing censorship practices null and void, although the Ems Ukaz was never formally repealed. On October 24 the newspaper *Kievskie otkliki* was the first to publish an article in Ukrainian, a piece by Serhii Iefremov protesting against the Jewish pogroms in Kiev that accompanied the proclamation of the October Manifesto.²⁴ By July 1, 1906 the authorities had issued thirty-four permits for Ukrainian periodical publications. The most important of these was *Rada*, the first Ukrainian-language daily in Russia, which was published in Kiev in 1906-1914.²⁵

The year 1905 also witnessed the first organized campaign for the school system, which took the form of a mass petition drafted by the Ukrainian community in Kiev on February 26.²⁶ The language question in the schools was debated at the sessions of the last two Dumas, and a draft law providing for instruction in Ukrainian in elementary schools was submitted to the Third Duma on March 29, 1908.²⁷ *None of these efforts proved successful*, although several private and specialized gymnasia in Kiev, Odessa, and Kamianets'-Podil'skyi were permitted to teach in Ukrainian; for a short time in 1907-1908 lectures in Ukrainian were read at Kharkiv and Odessa universities by professors Mykola Sumtsov and Oleksander Hrushevs'kyi, respectively.²⁸

The expectations produced by the 1905 Revolution proved to be illusory. The liberalization of the censorship regulations notwithstanding, the Ukrain-

ian press was consistently faced with the arbitrariness and chicanery of local administrators and bureaucrats. With the outbreak of war in the summer of 1914, all forms of organized Ukrainian life in Russia, and above all the press, were silenced.²⁹

It was at this time, in 1913-1914, that Lenin began to take an active interest in the national question as an important factor in the Bolshevik struggle against the tsarist regime. This was reflected, in addition to his theoretical articles on the subject, in the speech to the Fourth Duma by the Unkrainian Bolshevik deputy Hryhorii Petrovs'kyi in May 1913. The address was drafted by Lenin and devoted considerable attention to the government's discriminatory practices against the Ukrainian language.³⁰

From Lenin to Stalin,
or From Ukrainization to "Linguistic Sabotage"

Lenin's view on the national question, including his pronouncements on language policy, are well known. One or another variation on the theme "The National Question in the Works of V. I. Lenin" has been the subject of countless Soviet articles and monographs; there is also a considerable body of Western scholarly literature on the subject.³¹ What is often overlooked, however, is that the Leninist approach to the national question was by no means immediately and universally accepted by other leaders of the Bolshevik party, to say nothing of the rank-and-file membership. In Ukraine, this resulted in the curious situation whereby Lenin's recipes for the solution of nationality problems had little impact in the realm of practical application until the early or mid-1920s.

Following the October Revolution, Lenin's party made several attempts to extend its influence to Ukraine but it was not until the very end of 1919 that a more or less stable Soviet regime was installed in Kharkiv. Several important factors both domestic and international contributed to these early failures. Not the least of these was the inability or unwillingness of the Bolsheviks to come to terms with the fact that in 1917-1919, side by side with the all-Russian revolution, Ukraine had also experienced a national revolution. The former occurred largely in the Russian or russified urban centers and the latter in the predominantly Ukrainian countryside. Between the two there was little communication and even less understanding. Nikolai Popov, one of the early chroniclers of the Communist Party (bolsheviks) of Ukraine (KP[b]U) and a prominent party figure in his own right, formulated the problem as follows:

The greatest blunder in the work of all of our disjointed party organizations in Ukraine, none of which were united under the leadership of a single center, was that – disregarding the significance and role of the national question and the national movement – right up until October they conducted virtually no work among the masses in the Ukrainian language. As a result, they had little success mastering the ukrainized part of the army and the special Ukrainian military units which, in the final analysis, the Provisional Government was forced to allow. For this very reason the influence of our party in Ukraine on the peasantry, including the poorest strata, before and after October was very small regardless of the fact that the structure of the Ukrainian village itself, because of its higher level of development of productive forces and class differentiation, provided far and away more favorable conditions for Bolshevik work than the structure of the village in central Russia.^{3 2}

In short, the initial experiment of Soviet rule in Ukraine witnessed the failure of the Bolsheviks to communicate, both figuratively and literally, with the Ukrainian masses, which constituted 80 percent of the country's population.

The conflict between theory and practice in the national question became apparent during the period of the first Soviet regime in Ukraine, which lasted from late December 1917 to March 1918. Ukrainian historiography has characterized this period as a relapse into the worst excesses of Russian chauvinism and ukrainophobia. The storming of Kiev in early February 1918 by Mikhail Murav'ev's Red Guards was accompanied by a campaign against even the slightest manifestations of Ukrainian national consciousness. Pavlo Khrystiuk, a prominent Ukrainian Socialist Revolutionary leader, wrote that anyone found speaking Ukrainian in the streets of occupied Kiev was often subject to summary execution.

The Bolshevik struggle against the bourgeoisie frequently took a secondary position to the struggle against the Ukrainian intelligentsia. Simultaneously with the destruction of the Ukrainian intelligentsia came the destruction of Ukrainian culture. From the theoretical equality of languages and cultures there emerged in reality the unconditional domination of the Great Russian, Muscovite culture as during the old tsarist regime. The Muscovite language was dominant in all government and public institutions. In secondary and higher schools and indeed in all urban schools there was a return to the old ways: the Muscovite language, the Muscovite intelligent-pedagogue again assumed their previous dominant positions.^{3 3}

Khrystiuk's observations were later substantiated by Volodymyr Zatons'kyi, who recalled how in Kiev he and another Ukrainian Old Bolshevik, Mykola Skrypnyk, were almost executed by Bolshevik troops for their ukrainianism:

The dialectic of life is that in fact those very same Red Guards who despised Petliura and along with him everything Ukrainian, those who very nearly executed Skrypnyk and me in Murav'ev's Kiev – it was they and not Hrushevs'ki who were building Soviet Ukraine....Objectively, it was those who were doing the executing for the Ukrainian word – they were the ones who in fact built Ukraine.³⁴

As it turned out, Zaton's'kyi was spared the dubious benefits of Murav'ev's cultural philanthropism by producing a document bearing Lenin's signature.

The second attempt to establish a Soviet regime in Ukraine, under the leadership of Georgii Piatakov (party) and Khristian Rakovskii (government), lasted from January to August 1919. It too left a great deal to be desired in terms of Ukrainian national interests. Piatakov, one of the leaders of the Kiev organization of the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party (RSDRP), was a confirmed Luxemburgist who opposed Lenin's concept of national self-determination already in the pre-October period. In 1915 he joined Nikolai Bukharin in denouncing national self-determination as reactionary and utopian. At the Seventh (April) All-Russian Conference of the party in 1917 Piatakov led those who urged the Bolsheviks to drop their advocacy of the right to national self-determination, arguing that such a policy would play into the hands of "petty bourgeois reaction."³⁵ He repeated these demands at the Eighth Congress of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks) (RKP[b]) in March 1919 – i.e., at the time that he stood at the head of the part in Ukraine. According to Piatakov, the party should repudiate not only its fundamental slogan, the right of nations to self-determination, but also that which reserved this right only for "the toiling masses of each nation." In practice, he maintained, such slogans served only to consolidate counter-revolutionary forces, as was the case in Finland and Ukraine.³⁶

Piatakov's views on the national question were shared by Rakovskii. In an article entitled "A Hopeless Affair," which was published in *Izvestia* on January 3, 1919 – i.e., shortly before he was named chairman of the Council of People's Commissars (RNK), in Ukraine Rakovskii described Ukrainian peasants crumpling and throwing away Ukrainian-language Bolshevik literature in disgust while avidly reading similar publications in Russian. To reach the Ukrainian peasantry, he argued, address it in Russian.³⁷ In his first official declaration as head of the Ukrainian government, which was made at a session of the Kharkiv Soviet in January, Rakovskii made no mention of the national question, referring only to the need to conduct elementary education in the native language. Similarly, there were no references to the national question in Rakovskii's speech to the first meeting of the Kiev

Soviet held on February 13, 1919. He was forced to address the issue only in response to questions from Ukrainian and Jewish socialist deputies: "I did not talk about the national question only because it must be approached most thoughtfully and most carefully. Those who reduce the whole national problem to the language question are acting very superficially."³⁸ In his explanation, Rakovskii is quoted as characterizing the discussion about introducing Ukrainian into the schools and government bureaucracy in Ukraine as "Linguistic music." As for declaring Ukrainian the state language, Rakovskii labeled any efforts in this direction as "reactionary and totally unnecessary." He assured his listeners that he had spent five months in Kiev and freely understood every Ukrainian. With regard to the peasantry in Ukraine, Rakovskii was convinced that it considered itself Russian.³⁹ As late as 1921 the head of the Ukrainian government was able to write:

The Ukrainian Mensheviks and SRs augment the demands of the Russian Mensheviks and SRs with the national ingredient, the supremacy of the Ukrainian language in state institutions, counterposing this slogan to the equality of the Russian and Ukrainian languages, which was part of the government's program. The supremacy of the Ukrainian language would have had to have meant the supremacy of the Ukrainian petty bourgeois intelligentsia and the Ukrainian kulaks.⁴⁰

The turning point in the Bolshevik approach to the national question in Ukraine came in the summer of 1919, when the Soviet Ukrainian government and the KP(b)U were forced to seek refuge in Moscow for the second time in a little over a year. It became clear that a reevaluation of policy would have to be made, and at the Eighth Conference of the RKP(b) in December 1919 the Ukrainian question was reexamined. The initiative came from Lenin, whose "Draft Resolution of the TsK RKP(b) on Soviet Rule in Ukraine" was accepted by the party's Central Committee in November and subsequently adopted by the party conference. The resolution obligated all party members to

facilitate in every way the removal of all obstacles to the free development of the Ukrainian language and culture....Members of the RKP in Ukraine must in practice adhere to the right of the toiling masses to learn their native language and use it in all Soviet institutions, opposing in every way attempts by artificial means to push the Ukrainian language into the background and, quite the opposite, striving to transform the Ukrainian language into a weapon of communist education of the toiling masses. Immediate steps should be taken so that all Soviet institutions have a sufficient number of employees conversant in the Ukrainian language and that in the future all employees are able to make themselves understood in the Ukrainian language.⁴¹

The reaction of the KP(b)U delegates at the conference was far from enthusiastic. With the exception of Iakov Epshtein (Iakovlev) and Zaton's'kyi, the representatives from Ukraine were critical of the resolution, viewing it as a concession to Ukrainian nationalism.⁴²

This was symptomatic of the prevailing sentiment within the KP(b)U towards ukrainization not only in December 1919 but also in the years that followed. Ukrainization was largely understood in terms of a forced compromise made necessary, on the one hand, by the complete fiasco of previous policies and the growing criticism of Ukrainian left social democrats and socialist revolutionaries and, on the other hand, by realization that Soviet rule in Ukraine could not be maintained without accommodating the demands of a genuine national revival. As a result, ukrainization was a slow and tortuous process that underwent several distinct phases, encountering opposition at every turn.⁴³

The decisions of the Eighth Conference mark the beginning of what may be termed "declarative ukrainization": the party and government issued resolutions and decrees with little or no impact on practical policies. Indeed, already in January 1919 Rakovskii's government declared that "the language of instruction in the schools depends on the will of the local worker and peasant populations"⁴⁴ This was confirmed by an order of the People's Commissariat of Education the following March, which also announced that the long-repressed Ukrainian language would be aided in its development.⁴⁵ In February 1920 a decree of the All-Ukrainian Central Executive Committee (VUTsVK) guaranteed Ukrainian an equal status with Russian in all civil and military institutions; anyone found in violation of the decree would be "subject to the full severity of military-revolutionary laws."⁴⁶ The following September the RNK ordered that a plan be drawn up for the establishment of schools of all grades and categories with Ukrainian as the language of instruction. Ukrainian books and newspapers were to be published and Ukrainian-language courses were to be organized for government officials.⁴⁷

In the meantime, opposition to ukrainization continued. At the Fifth Conference of the KP(b)U in November 1920 Zinov'ev advanced what was later to become known as the concept of "struggle between two cultures":

We feel that language should develop freely. In the final analysis, after a few years the language that is more rooted, more animate, more cultured will be victorious. Our policy, therefore, is to show the Ukrainian village – honestly, not in word but in deed – that the Soviet regime does not prevent it from speaking and teaching its children whichever language it chooses.⁴⁸

The essence of Zinov'ev's argument, according to party historian Popov,

was that “the party should wait until the ‘more cultured’ Russian language wins.” At the same meeting Skrypnyk rhetorically asked what had become of the resolution adopted the previous year. It was, in his words, a “lost charter.”⁴⁹ The degree to which ukrainization was being ignored could be seen from the resolution on the national question adopted by the First All-Ukrainian Council of the KP(b)U in May 1921, which found it necessary to restate the December 1919 resolution and remind party members that it continues to remain in force today, has not been annulled by any congress nor by any party meeting, requires no commentaries, and should be put into practice by the party with the greatest decisiveness.⁵⁰

Regardless of party directives, anti-ukrainization sentiment continued to grow. In the fall of 1922 Hryhorii Hryn’ko was ousted as People’s Commissar of Education for his “excessive haste in carrying out ukrainization” and replaced by Zaton’s’kyi.⁵¹ At the same time the Central Committee circulated a letter attacking Ukrainian-language schools in the countryside. The majority of newspapers that had switched from Russian to Ukrainian ceased publication, and the publishing houses in Ukraine began to increase the volume of Russian-language books. In March 1923 Dmitrii Lebed’, second secretary of the KP(b)U, provided the anti-ukrainization forces with a theoretical framework for their arguments by advancing a full-blown concept of the struggle between the Russian and Ukrainian cultures. In Ukraine, he argued, there were two cultures, one urban and the other rural. The urban culture was Russian and progressive and the rural culture Ukrainian and backward. The party’s role in the struggle between the two was to support the advanced, proletarian culture of the Russians.⁵²

Popov characterized these early years as a period of “stand-still” in the implementation of nationalities policy.⁵³ On Lenin’s initiative the Twelfth Congress of the RKP(b) once again addressed itself to the national question, producing the most comprehensive statement on the subject to date. Lebed’s ideas were repudiated and a new phase of ukrainization was ushered in.

The first steps were taken by the party. On May 4, 1923 the Politburo formed a committee charged with supervising the implementation of the directives formulated at the recently concluded party congress; a similar committee was established by the RNK on May 25.⁵⁴ On June 22 the Central Committee adopted the first in a series of resolutions designed to ukrainize the party apparatus, and on July 27 an analogous program for schools and cultural-educational organizations was adopted by the government.⁵⁵ On August 1 a joint resolution of the VUTsVK and the RNK incor-

porated measures to guarantee "the Ukrainian language a position corresponding to the numerical superiority of the Ukrainian people in the Ukrainian SSR."⁵⁶

A special committee that had been formed to verify the work of the government organs reported at the end of 1924 that

far from all the institutions took ukrainization seriously, and as a result the decree of the VUTsUK and the RNK was not wholly carried out....After a year's work we have achieved barely half of what we expected. Although our successes indicate that some work is being done, it is nevertheless insignificant.⁵⁷

In view of the fact that only 44 percent of government employees knew the Ukrainian language, the final date for ukrainization was extended to January 1, 1925.⁵⁸ The situation in the party was no better. At the Eighth Conference of the KP(b)U in May 1924, Emmanuil Kviring, the newly appointed first secretary of the party, noted that ukrainization of the party apparatus was "a difficult matter."⁵⁹ The only significant progress was in the ukrainization of the schools. By October 1, 1923 over 61 percent of elementary schools were Ukrainian and almost 12 percent were mixed Russian-Ukrainian; the institutions of higher education remained predominantly Russian.⁶⁰ By 1925 the proportion of Ukrainian schools had grown to almost 71 percent while the share of mixed schools was reduced to over 7 percent.⁶¹

In view of the generally unsatisfactory results, ukrainization was the major topic on the agenda of the April 1925 plenum of the Central Committee. Its resolution read, in part, as follows:

As a result of two year's work, the party has achieved some results with regard to the ukrainization of the Soviet apparatus and elementary education. However, these achievements were made mainly from below, by way of the natural ukrainization of the Soviet apparatus that has contact with the peasantry and by way of the ukrainization of the lower schools. The ukrainization of the party and trade union apparatus, party life, party work, and all of public Soviet life as a whole was confronted with difficulties and in some areas with passive resistance from a section of the workers and party members.⁶²

The plenum also decided on a change in party leadership, replacing Kviring with Lazar Kaganovich. Shortly thereafter, on April 20, 1925, the VUTsK and the RNK issued a decree "On Measures for the Urgent Realization of the Complete Ukrainization of the Soviet Apparatus."⁶³

With the arrival of Kaganovich in Kharkiv the ukrainization program was

transformed into an ideological battlefield for a variety of interrelated issues reflecting several shades of party opinion. The fundamental question underlying the debate that unfolded in 1925-1926 was whether ukrainization was to retain its original purpose – i.e., the vehicle for maintaining contact (*smychka*) with Ukrianian peasant masses, or whether it was in fact to be viewed as the basis for a full-blown Ukrainian national renaissance. The latter position was defended by Oleksandr Shums'kyi who, as People's Commissar of Education, was responsible for overall cultural development in Ukraine. Shums'kyi's basic sentiments were shared by Skrypnyk, although he argued them in a far less obtrusive fashion that was calculated to placate the party leadership in Moscow. The hard core opponents of ukrainization found their spokesman in Iu. Larin (Mikhail Lur'e), who in early 1925 began to criticize the party's nationalities policy for its alleged disregard of the needs of interests of national minorities in the various republics. In Ukraine, charged Larin, ukrainization had unleashed Ukrainian chauvinism directed at the Russian minority, which was being forcibly ukrainized in "Petliura-type fashion."⁶⁴ Although Larin's charges were officially censured as a combination of exaggerations and willful misrepresentations concocted for the purpose of supporting the Russian national deviation in the KP(b)U, the degree to which he could count on the support of influential party leaders could be seen from the fact that at the end of 1926 the central party organ in Moscow, Bol'shevik, provided Larin with the opportunity to argue his case on its pages.⁶⁵ Between these two extremes was the majority opinion represented by Stalin and Kaganovich which saw in ukrainization a way for the party to broaden its social base and guarantee it political legitimacy.

The debate over ukrainization continued into the late 1920s with Kaganovich, Stalin's representative in Ukraine, emerging as the final victor. It was established that the *raison d'être* of ukrainization was not to foster the development of Ukrainian language and culture as such, but rather to direct it along suitable channels for acceptable purposes. The victory was an ideological one that served as the basis for the complete turnaround in Soviet nationalities policy that was an integral part of the "Stalin revolution."

Nonetheless, in 1925-1930 ukrainization witnessed significant achievements, particularly in the educational system. It has been argued that more was accomplished during this period than in the earlier stages of the program.⁶⁶ In June 1926 the Central Committee of the KP(d)U was able to report that 80 percent of all elementary schools were Ukrainian, which corresponded to the proportion of Ukrainians in the republic, and that 60 percent of the press had been ukrainized. In a little over a year, the propor-

tion of Ukrainians in the party had increased from 37 percent to 47 percent and in the Komosmol from 50 percent to 61 percent.⁶⁷ In July 1925 the Central All-Ukrainian Commission for Ukrainization of the Soviet Apparatus of the RNK was formed to coordinate ukrainization of the government bureaucracy.⁶⁸ Within the first six months of 1926, the volume of government business conducted in Ukrainian increased from 20 percent to almost 65 percent.⁶⁹ On July 6, 1927, the VUTsVK and RNK issued a wide-ranging new decree on the equality of languages and development of Ukrainian culture that overhauled and systematized all previous legislation bearing on language status and usage in Ukraine.⁷⁰ By the end of 1927, 75.8 percent of all pupils in elementary schools received instruction in Ukrainian; 6.9 percent attended mixed schools; and 10.6 percent were taught in Russian. On the secondary level, which then consisted largely of seven-year schools, 60.7 percent attended Ukrainian schools; 14.7 percent mixed schools; and 15.5 percent Russian schools.⁷¹ In the same year, 93.9 percent of Ukrainian pupils in the republic were taught in Ukrainian; the corresponding figure for Russians was 66.1 percent.⁷²

Paradoxically, the 1930s witnessed continued adherence to ukrainization and, simultaneously, the massive physical liquidation of the Ukrainian intelligentsia. Initially, the great terror was directed primarily at the non-party intelligentsia; later it engulfed card-carrying cultural figures as well as important party leaders like Syrypnyk. The first major blow was struck against the All-Ukrainian Academy of Sciences (VUAN) in March-April 1930, taking the form of a show trial of the imaginary Union for the Liberation of Ukraine (SVU). Among the forty-five defendants accused of conspiring to overthrow the Soviet regime in Ukraine were a number of prominent linguists (Vsevolod Hantsov, Hryhorii Holoskevych, and Hryhorii Kholodnyi) who had played a significant role in the standardization of the Ukrainian language in the latter half of the 1920s.⁷³ The adoption of a standard Ukrainian orthography in 1928 was now portrayed as part of a larger process termed "linguistic wrecking"; proponents of linguistic purism were linked to treasonous activity against the state. The SVU trial led to further arrests and the closing down of linguistic institutes, and also pointed an accusing finger at Skrypnyk. As Shums'kyi's successor to the post of People's Commissar of Education, Skrypnyk had been active in the debates about the Ukrainian language and was on record as a supporter of linguistic purism.

In articles written in 1931-1932, Skrypnyk was still able to temporize with regard to the campaign that was unfolding on the "language front." By June 1933, however, Skrypnyk was being held responsible for the forcible

ukrainization of Russian school-children and fostering the “linguistic separatism” of the Ukrainian language from Russian.⁷⁴ At the June 1933 plenum of the Central Committee of the KP(b)U, Pavel Postyshev, who had been sent to Ukraine from Moscow as second secretary, declared:

Thus, the area which until recently was under the leadership of comrade Skrypnyk – I have in mind the People’s Commissariat of Education and the entire system of the organs of education in Ukraine – has been shown to be the most littered with wrecking, counterrevolutionary, and nationalist elements.⁷⁵

One month later Skrypnyk committed suicide. The campaign against nationalist deviation in Ukrainian linguistics continued. The resolution of the joint plenum of the Central Committee and Central Control Commission of the KP(b)U in November 1933 defined the deviations in terms of “tearing away” the Ukrainian language as much as possible from Russian; eliminating from the Ukrainian language analogous Russian words and replacing them with Polish, Czech, and German words; and forcible ukrainization of schools.⁷⁶ In 1934 the Institute of Linguistics of the VUAN began publication of the journal *Movoznavstvo*, the main task of which was to conduct the struggle on the “language front.”

The shift towards greater emphasis on Russian reached its apex with the March 1938 all-Union party and government decree providing for the obligatory study of Russian in all non-Russian schools in the USSR. A similar decree was adopted in Ukraine on April 20.⁷⁷ At the Fourteenth Congress of the KP(b)U in June 1938, the new Ukrainian party leader Nikita Khrushchev declared:

Enemies of the people and bourgeois nationalists recognized the power and influence of the Russian language and culture. They knew that this was the influence of Bolshevism, the influence of the teachings of Lenin-Stalin on the minds of the Ukrainian people, on Ukrainian workers and peasants. That is why they were rooting out the Russian language from schools. In many Ukrainian schools German, French, Polish, and other languages were studied, but not Russian....Comrades! As of today all of the peoples will be studying the Russian language.⁷⁸

The tendency towards identifying the Russian people, its culture, and language with the interests of socialism reached its apogee during the war years, and was symbolized by Stalin’s toast to the health of the Russian people in May 1945. This was a far cry from 1931, when a Ukrainian party ideologue could write:

It is argued, that in the USSR the language that is supposed to engulf all other languages is, of course, the Russian language, and in order to cover up the great-power content of this proposal the Russian language is called "the language of all-Union communist culture," the language of the October Revolution, "the language of our single Soviet economy," and the like. Obviously, the Russian language, as the language of the leading segment of the world proletariat, as the language of the a great culture, has world significance. But does this mean that being the language of revolution is a national characteristic only of the Russian language?...the language of revolution exists wherever there is a proletariat that is struggling for revolution or has accomplished it.⁷⁹

The strident campaigns of the 1930s against "bourgeois nationalists" and "enemies of the people" could not but have a negative impact on ukrainization. As early as October 1934, Postyshev stated:

One must admit bluntly, openly, and in a Bolshevik manner that recently we have seen a slackening of work on ukrainization in certain areas. In certain institutions of higher learning there has been a let up on lecturing in Ukrainian, things are not as they should be across the board with regard to ukrainization of the system of party education, the situation is not entirely satisfactory in this regard on some levels of the Soviet and party apparatuses, especially the oblast and central levels. And some of our party organizations have lately let their attention fall off in this most serious area of work.⁸⁰

Ukrainization as such, however, was never formally repudiated. Indeed, at the level of general education schools (elementary and seven-year schools) it kept pace with the overall expansion of the school network. In the 1935-1936 school year, 83 percent of pupils in general schools were studying in Ukrainian, and in 1937 a greater proportion of pupils were being taught in Ukrainian than a decade earlier.⁸¹ Thus, the Stalin revolution had created a situation whereby in 1951 a prominent Ukrainian poet could be denounced in *Pravda* for a poem entitled "Love Ukraine," while Ukrainian schoolchildren could happily sing odes to the leader of the world proletariat and study the exploits of tsarist generals in their native language.⁸²

Language Politics in the Khrushchev Era

The language question has played a prominent role in the political and cultural life of Ukraine during the three decades since Stalin's death in 1953. Thus, within three months of the dictator's passing, Leonid Mel'nikov, first secretary of the Ukrainian party was replaced by Oleksii Kyrychenko, the

first Ukrainian to be entrusted with that position. Mel'nikov's dismissal was accompanied by charges of distortion of nationalities policy in the newly acquired Western Ukrainian regions, including the elimination of Ukrainian as the language of instruction in institutions of higher education.⁸³

Khrushchev's expose of Stalin's crimes at the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU in 1956 and the attendant destalinization campaign gave a fresh impetus to the liberalization of Soviet nationalities policy. For Ukrainians, the revelation that Stalin would have deported the entire Ukrainian nation had such an undertaking been feasible suggested an end to officially sponsored ukrainophobia. In a sense, ukrainianism as such was rehabilitated along with the ukrainian party apparatus and individual political and cultural figures who had perished or were silenced during the purges. Ukrainian-language journals for the study of history, language, and literature, economics, and law were established. The implication was that the development of Ukrainian national culture was once again a legitimate sphere of activity. This included, of course, concern for the Ukrainian language, which found expression in articles published in the party and literary press. In early 1958, for example, one could read the following in *Pravda Ukrainy*:

Imagine a propagandist who delivers a lecture "The Development of Ukrainian Culture, National in Form and Socialist in Content" in the Russian language, although he himself is Ukrainian and his audience consists of Ukrainians. But really, this is absurd. Any yet many comrades do not notice this absurdity. Comrade Tymchak worked as a secretary of the Terebovlia raion committee of the party. He is a native of the western oblasts of Ukraine, but he never addressed the people in the native language. Or another propagandist – comrade Shapoval, also a Ukrainian. He gives us the following gems: "ia slazhivaiu plan," "govoryl," "vypol'niat" and the like. You listen to him and you think: Why are you speaking in broken Russian and disparaging the native language?⁸⁴

Writers and philologists took the lead in propagating the virtues of the Ukrainian language. Typical in this respect was the lengthy article "Let Us Love and Respect the Native Language!" by Anton Khyzhniak, chief editor of *Literaturna hazeta*, which was written with a view towards the upcoming Fourth Congress of the Ukrainian Writers' Union in March 1959.⁸⁵ Urging his colleagues to devote more attention to the perfection of the Ukrainian language in their own usage, Khyzhniak at the same time issued a broadside at the Institute of Linguistics in Kiev for its indifference to the preparation of dictionaries and the training of qualified linguists. This criticism was picked up by Pavlo Pliushch, head of the Department of Ukrainian Language at Kiev University, who strongly intimated that the Institute was

purposely hindering the development of the Ukrainian language. Ukrainians, he concluded,

should decisively struggle against manifestations of disrespect towards the Ukrainian language, which can sometimes be seen in everyday life, as well as in offices, institutions of higher education, and other establishments. The struggle for the culture of the native language is simultaneously a struggle for raising its authority as the vehicle of discourse for the multi-million Ukrainian people; language is truly a "powerful organ," a mighty voice of the people.⁸⁶

The return to "Leninist norms," however, did not imply that the new party leadership was prepared to dismantle the attributes of privilege and superiority bestowed upon the Russian language in Stalin's time. Nor did it mean that the dissemination of Russian in the non-Russian republics was to be halted. On the contrary, the proposed school reform embodied in the November 1958 theses of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the USSR Council of Ministers – which rescinded the obligatory study of the native language in Russian schools in the non-Russian republics – suggested that the role and status of the Russian language was to be enhanced. The opposition that this proposal elicited in the republics led the authorities to sidestep the language issue in the all-Union law that was adopted in December, although eventually all of the republics passed legislation in the spirit of the theses.⁸⁷ In Ukraine, there was extensive criticism of the projected reform by representatives of the republican party apparatus as well as the intelligentsia. Both deputies from Ukraine who took part in the discussion of the draft law at the USSR Supreme Soviet session – Mykhailo Hrechuka, first deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers, and Stepan Chervonenko, Central Committee secretary responsible for ideology – argued against making study of the native language optional in Russian schools. This was also the position taken by Petro Tron'ko, a secretary of the Kiev oblast party committee, in the authoritative party journal *Komunist Ukrainy*. Two highly respected men of letters, Maksym Ryl's'kyi and Mykola Bazhan, spoke in favor of retaining the *status quo* in a joint article published in *Pravda* while the Supreme Soviet was in session.⁸⁸ The language issue was also discussed by party members of the Kiev writers' organization, who rejected the notion that parents be the sole arbitrators of such an important question as language study, and urged that control over all schools in the republic be vested in the Ministry of Education in Kiev.⁸⁹

In March 1959, on the eve of the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet session that was to act on the proposed school reform, Ukrainian writers met for

their Fourth Congress. The keynote speech, delivered by Bazhan in his capacity as head of the Writer's Union, included a lengthy discourse on the richness and beauty of the Ukrainian language and the writer's obligation to further its development. Similarly, Ryl's'kyi's entire presentation was devoted to such themes as language purity and the maintenance of linguistic standards, with appropriate references to Lomonosov, Pushkin, Maiakovskii, Engels, and Lenin. Such sentiments also found their way into the resolution adopted by the congress.⁹⁰

The Ukrainian Supreme Soviet incorporated the controversial language thesis into its law "on Strengthening Ties between School and Life and on the Further Development of the System of Public Education in the Ukrainian SSR," which was adopted on April 17 without any serious discussion. In his report on the draft law, Minister of Education Ivan Bilodid explained that the Council of Ministers was being charged with developing measures guaranteeing,

in the schools with the national language [as the language] of instruction, all the necessary conditions for studying and improving the quality of instruction of the Russian language, which is a powerful means of inter-nationality discourse, consolidation of the friendship of the peoples of the USSR, and familiarization of pupils with the treasures of Russian and world culture.

Similar measures were to be undertaken with regard to Ukrainian and other languages in schools with Russian as the language of instruction for those pupils "expressing a desire to study these language."⁹¹ It is apparent from Bilodid's report that the accent was clearly placed on the Russian language. This was confirmed several months later by Chervonenko, who wrote in *Komunist Ukrainy* that there was a growing number of pupils attracted to the study of Russian. "In this connection," he said, "the network of schools with Russian as the language of instruction is being increased."⁹² Indeed, the available data indicates that after the 1958-1959 reform the proportion of Russian-language schools in Ukraine expanded, albeit modestly, and continued to increase steadily in the 1960s (see Table 1).

More important than the respective number of Ukrainian and Russian schools is the proportion of pupils attending each type of school. Such data is not readily available in Soviet publications, and since the early 1970s it appears to have been withheld altogether. That which has been published, however, reveals a significant increase in the percentage of pupils enrolled in schools with Russian as the language of instruction. Thus, in the 1953-1954 school year 74.9 percent of pupils attended Ukrainian schools, while 23.8

Table 1. General Education Schools in the Ukrainian SSR According to Language of Instruction, 1953-1970

Year	Ukrainian		Russian	
	Number	Percentage	Number	Percentage
1953-54 ^a	25,192	85.2	4,027	13.6
1955-56 ^a	25,034	85.3	4,051	13.8
1957-58 ^a	25,464	84.7	4,355	14.5
1961-62 ^b	33,309	82.1	6,292	15.5
1963-64 ^c	24,485	81.8	over 4,500	over 15.0
1969-70 ^d	23,036	80.7	5,505	19.3

Sources:

- a. John Kolasky, *Education in Soviet Ukraine: A Study in Discrimination and Russification* (Toronto: Peter Martin Associates, 1968), pp. 50-51.
- b. Bilinsky, *The Second Soviet Republic*, p. 163.
- c. Alla Bondar, "Osvitnii nyvi – dobrine zerno," *Radians'ka Ukraina*, December 5, 1964.
- d. *Dneprovskaiia pravda* February 8, 1970, cited in *Molod' Dnipropetrovs'ka v borot'bi proty rusyfikatsii* (Munch: Suchasnist', 1971), p. 40. The percentages are slightly inflated as they are derived from the total number of Ukrainian and Russian schools rather than the total number of all schools in the republic.

percent were enrolled in Russian schools. In 1955-1956 the corresponding figures were 72.8 percent and 26.3 percent.⁹³ Detailed statistics, including a breakdown into three grade-groups, were published for the 1967-1968 school year (see Table 2). These figures show that enrollment in Ukrainian schools had dropped to 62 percent, with 37.2 percent of pupils attending Russian schools.⁹⁴ A further shift in the direction of increased enrollment in Russian schools was reported by Minister of Education Oleksandr Marynych at the end of 1973:

In recent years there has been an increase in Ukraine in the number of pupils who are drawn to the study of the Russian language and [to the study of] all subjects in the Russian language. Whereas ten years ago 30 percent of pupils studied in Russian schools and 70 percent in Ukrainian schools, this year almost 40 percent are in Russian schools and about 60 percent in Ukrainian schools. This tendency is growing, especially in the cities.⁹⁵

Overall, the proportion of pupils receiving their elementary education in Russian almost doubled during the twenty years between 1953 and 1973.

Table 2. Language of Instruction of Pupils in the Ukrainian SSR, 1967-1968

	Grades 1-4		Grades 5-8		Grades 9-10	
	Number	Percentage	Number	Percentage	Number	Percentage
Ukrainian	2,093,764	61.39	1,997,158	62.55	514,961	62.11
Russian	1,287,918	37.76	1,168,688	36.60	308,713	37.23
Moldavian	18,751	0.54	17,183	0.53	2,799	0.33
Hungarian	9,995	0.29	9,456	0.29	2,562	0.30
Polish	162	—	184	—	53	—

Sources: Iu. D. Desheriev, *Zamkonomernosti razvitiia literaturnykh iazykov narodov SSSR v sovetskuiu epokhu: Razvitie obshchestvennykh funktsii literaturnykh iazykov* (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Nauka, 1976), pp.69-71.

The general direction in which Soviet language policy was moving, implicit in the school reform of 1958-1959, came into sharper focus at the Twenty-second Congress of the CPSU in October 1961. The section on nationality relations in Khrushchev's speech on the draft Program of the CPSU, although seemingly balanced, nonetheless stressed assimilationist trends. With regard to the language question, Khrushchev noted "the growing aspiration of the non-Russian peoples to master the Russian language, which in fact has become the second native language for the peoples of the USSR." In a similar vein, he referred to "the positive significance of the voluntary study of the Russian language for the development of inter-nationality cooperation."⁹⁶ The new party Program reflected this sentiment, although it did not enshrine the concept of two native languages. The future disappearance of language distinctions among the nations of the USSR was characterized as "a considerably slower process than the effacement of class boundaries." Officially, Russian was proclaimed "the common language of inter-nationality discourse and cooperation of all the peoples of the USSR."⁹⁷ Shortly after the Congress, the USSR Academy of Sciences established the Scientific Council on the Composite Problem "The Objective Laws of Development of National Languages in Connection with the Development of Socialist Nations," which was charged with organizing and coordinating research affecting language policy in the USSR.

The Twenty-second Congress of the CPSU served as the backdrop for heated polemics in the party and literary press about the merits and, indeed, the future of national languages and cultures in the USSR. The most widely commented affair centered on the Daghestani writer Akhmed Agaev, whose

article in *Izvestiia* in December 1961 urged non-Russian writers to produce “national literature” in the Russian language. Agaev was challenged by the Russian poet Vladimir Soloukhin.⁹⁸ Similar controversies unfolded on the pages of the Ukrainian press in the early 1960s, pitting such well-known writers as Borys Antonenko-Davydovych and Ryl’s’kyi against proponents of “linguistic internationalization.”⁹⁹ In Kiev, one of several counterparts to Agaev was Ivan Kravtsev, who gained notoriety by his publicistic articles advocating greater use of the Russian language in schools, the media, and even in private conversation in the home.¹⁰⁰ Another was Ivan Bilodid, director of the Institute of Linguistics of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences from 1961 until his death in 1981. Bilodid’s views on the language question were hardly a source of inspiration for the nationally conscious Ukrainian intelligentsia:

Unity with progressive Russian culture and with the great Russian language, which generously lay bare treasures for all people and their languages, is one of the finest historical traditions in the development of the culture and language of the Ukrainian people. The task of our secondary and higher schools, of the appropriate scientific research institutions and departments, and, on a larger scale, the task of the Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR, the Ministries of Education, Higher and Secondary Specialized Education, and Culture, and of radio, cinema, the press, literature, and various kinds of publications, especially the scientific popular ones, is the further improvement of the quality of teaching Russian language and literature, propagating knowledge of the Russian language, and multifaceted and broad aid in mastering the culture of the Russian literary language.¹⁰¹

Bilodid played an inordinately influential role in language politics in Ukraine. Prior to his twenty-year tenure at the head of the Institute of Linguistics, he served as minister of education between 1957 and 1962 – i.e., during the implementation of Khrushchev’s school reform.¹⁰²

The editors of *Voprosy iazykoznaviia* added fuel to the fire created by the Agaev affair by raising the question of the future of certain non-Russian languages in a lead article in the January 1962 issue of the journal.¹⁰³ The editorial was particularly distressing for Ukrainians because it did not explicitly refer to the Ukrainian language as among those with a guaranteed future. As late as 1966, at the Fifth Congress of the Ukrainian Writer’s Union, the editors of the journal were taken to task even by orthodox writers like Leonid Novychenko:

It seems to me that this kind of “classification” is totally anti-scientific. I also want to note that in the article there is not so much as a reference to the

languages of the two largest peoples in the Soviet Union after the Russians: the Ukrainian and Belorussian languages. Why? Could it be that the linguists who put together and edited the article forgot about them?! Clearly, this is not the case. It is easy to guess that the authors simply feel that the Ukrainian and Belorussian languages do not belong to those “having a future,” although they do not come right out and say it.¹⁰⁴

The early 1960s also witnessed the emergence of the idea that linguistic unity, based on the Russian language, is one of the characteristics of the Soviet people as “a new historical community.” This was the position taken by Kravtsev in his book *Razvitie natsional'nykh otnoshenii v SSSR* published in Kiev in 1962.¹⁰⁵ Some authors even went so far as to describe the Soviet people as “a single nation with a single language.”¹⁰⁶

In the meantime, in Ukraine opposition to the party's cultural and language policies gained strength with the appearance of a younger generation of writers and poets on the literary scene. Known collectively as the *shestydesiatnyky* or “Sixties Group,” they soon began to leave their imprint on cultural politics in Kiev. Characteristic in this respect was the Third Plenum of the Board of the Ukrainian Writers' Union in January 1962, at which the critical voices of Ivan Dzyuba and Ivan Drach demanded, *inter alia*, that the Ministry of Education take steps to improve the teaching of Ukrainian language and literature in the schools.¹⁰⁷ The frustration and resentment that had built up over the language issue came into the open at the Republican Scientific Conference on Questions of the Culture of the Ukrainian language held in Kiev on February 11-15, 1963, which was the first of its kind organized in Ukraine. The conference turned into a spontaneous protest, with unscheduled speakers condemning official policies such as “the absurd theory that a nation has two languages.” The Soviet press provided only scanty information about the proceedings of the conference. A detailed report, however, appeared in a Ukrainian-language journal published in Poland. According to this source, the conference approved a petition addressed to the Central Committee of the Ukrainian party and the government of Ukraine which demanded that: (1) Ukrainian be the language of instruction in all higher and secondary specialized schools and vocational schools, and that textbooks for these schools be published in Ukrainian; (2) education in pre-school institutions attended by Ukrainian children be conducted in Ukrainian; (3) all business be conducted in Ukrainian in offices and enterprises, on railroads and other forms of transportation, and in commerce; (4) the Academy of Sciences, institutes, and publishing houses issue scholarly works largely in Ukrainian; and (5) that film studios produce artistic and

scientific films only in Ukrainian, and that films made outside of Ukraine be translated into Ukrainian. In addition, it was proposed that Ukrainians living outside of their republic be provided with Ukrainian general education schools, and that a public committee to promote the development of the culture of the Ukrainian language and its expansion into all spheres of state and public life be established within the Institute of Linguistics.¹⁰⁸

Shelest and the Rise of Dissent

The civic *engagement* demonstrated by those participating in the conference reflected the changes that had been wrought in the political atmosphere of destalinization. Petitions and appeals to party and government bodies were accompanied by public protests, the emergence of *samizdat*, and a loosely organized dissident movement. The experience of Mykola Plakhotniuk, as related in a recent *samizdat* document, is perhaps not untypical of the evolution of a Ukrainian dissident in the early 1960s. Born in 1936, Plakhotniuk enrolled in the Kiev Medical Institute in 1960, where he was active as a Komsomol organizer in the cultural sector. In 1963, he began to attend meetings at the Kiev Club of Creative Youth "Suchasnyk," which organized literary and cultural activities for younger intelligentsia under the auspices of the Kiev oblast committee of the Komsomol. The club was frequented by Ivan Svitlychnyi, Ievhen Sverstiuk, Viacheslav Chornovil, Vitalii Korotych, Mykola Vinhranovs'kyi, and other representatives of the *shestydesiatnyky*. For Plakhotniuk, the road to more than nine years in Soviet psychiatric hospitals and his current term of four years in a labor camp began in the summer of 1963, when he wrote a letter to the Ministry of Higher and Secondary Specialized Education arguing that instruction in his Institute be conducted in Ukrainian:

The letter was forwarded to the rector of the Institute, Prof. Vasyl' Dmytrovych Bratus', and he called Plakhotniuk in for a talk. The rector said that he agreed with every word in the letter, but that he could not change anything because there are foreigners studying in the Institute who must be taught in Russian. He also noted that, unfortunately, the Ukrainian language was dying off, especially among the working class. After the talk, which the rector conducted in perfect Ukrainian, they both left for a Komsomol conference at the Institute where, although no foreigners were present, the rector delivered his address in Russian. Plakhotniuk immediately asked to speak, and took the podium directly after the rector. He said that everyone in the audience understood Ukrainian, and that there was no reason for Komsomol members to be ashamed of their native language.¹⁰⁹

Thus, comments the anonymous author of the document, Plakhotniuk became a “white crow.”

Dissent in Ukraine, which strongly accented national rights, was in a sense abetted by the policies of Petro Shelest, who held the post of first secretary of the Ukrainian party from July 1963 until his dismissal in May 1972. Although Shelest’s impact on the political and cultural life of Ukraine in the 1960s and early 1970s remains to be fully elucidated, it is generally agreed that he represented a current of opinion within the party apparatus that sought to legitimize a form of national communism in Ukraine.¹¹⁰ His public statements, most notably his speech at the Fifth Congress of the Ukrainian Writers’ Union in November 1966 urging further development of the Ukrainian language and culture, earned him the reputation of a defender of Ukrainian interests against Moscow’s assimilationist policies. It was during Shelest’s tenure in Kiev, in the summer of 1965, that the Ministry of Higher and Secondary Specialized Education drew up a project for the gradual ukrainization of higher education institutions in Ukraine.¹¹¹ Meanwhile, the dissident movement continued to grow. Among the *samizdat* documents from this period that reached the West, a considerable proportion addressed themselves to language issues. In February 1964, a petition by ten residents of Kiev to the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet, the Central Committee of the Ukrainian party, and the Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian SSR reiterated most of the proposals put forth the previous year at the conference on the culture of the Ukrainian language.¹¹² Another document from about the same time urged Ukrainian parents to demand that authorities provide Ukrainian schools for their children:

Russian parents are making depositions to school directors that their children will not study the Ukrainian language. Ukrainian parents have the same right with regard to the Russian language. The Program of the CPSU states that all peoples have the right to freely choose any kind of school for their children....Fathers and mothers of pupils! Demand native-language schools so that the people of Ukraine will be suitably literate.¹¹³

In December 1964, an Initiative Committee of Communists of Ukraine addressed a letter to communist parties in Eastern Europe and the West calling their attention to “the russification and colonialist policies of Moscow.”¹¹⁴ Several months later, in February 1965, Sviatoslav Karavans’ki petitioned the prosecutor of the Ukrainian SSR to indict Minister of Higher and Secondary Specialized Education Yurii Dadenkov for violating the language rights of Ukrainians.¹¹⁵ Dissatisfaction was not limited to intellectual circles. Dzyuba’s *Internationalism or Russification?*, submitted to

Ukrainian party and government authorities in December 1965, reproduces a letter to *Pravda* from two young miners from the Donbass requesting that the party explain its position on the Ukrainian language:

All in all, one could still write very, very much about the contradictions in the situation of the Ukrainian language, which everybody knows perfectly well. We would only like this question to be more definite and clear. If the time for the final Russification of the Ukrainian people has come, we should actively work in that direction. If not, we should adopt decisive measures to support the development of the Ukrainian language.¹¹⁶

In another document cited by Dzyuba, seventeen mothers of Ukrainian preschool children addressed the Ministry of Education with a complaint against "the reactionary language policy of the Ministry of Health as it is practiced in the day nurseries and kindergartens of our locality and likewise of the whole of Ukrainian SSR."¹¹⁷

By June 1965, developments in Ukraine attracted the attention of the Moscow *samizdat* journal *Politicheskii dnevnik*. Its evaluation of the situation, particularly with regard to the regime's language policy, is worth noting:

The tendency towards nationalism in Ukraine represents, to a considerable degree, a reaction to the jaded methods of leadership and administration that flourished under Khrushchev not only in the economic, but also in the cultural sphere (not to mention the period of Stalin's cult of personality). In recent years, the legal demands and rights of the Ukrainian nation have not always been observed. As an example, one could cite the higher educational establishments of L'viv, where the language of instruction has been switched to Russian (that which is appropriate for Odessa or Kharkiv does not apply to L'viv). In cities in Ukraine, even in Kiev, there are very few schools with Ukrainian as the language of instruction, and there is little and poor training in love for the native language; apparently the situation is much better in this respect among the small nationalities of Daghestan.¹¹⁸

"Nationalist inclinations," wrote *Politicheskii dnevnik*, "are reflected in the activity of some government and even party organs, and they are also widely disseminated among a segment of the Ukrainian intelligentsia." Several months after these lines were written, at the end of August and in the beginning of September 1965, the security organs conducted a sweep of Ukrainian intellectuals, some of who were secretly tried the following year. This prompted further protests and appeals in defense of the persecuted, producing such classics of Ukrainian *samizdat* as *The Chornovil Papers* and Dzyuba's *Internationalism or Russification?*

The arrests and trials of 1965-1966 also created a stir among Ukrainians in

the West. In January 1967, the Communist Party of Canada, which had a strong contingent of Canadian-Ukrainians, decided to dispatch a seven-man delegation to Ukraine “on a mission of enquiry and discussion concerning the policy and the experience of the Communist Party and the Government of Ukraine in dealing with the national question.”¹¹⁹ The delegation filed a report that focused heavily on the language issue. Its conclusions were far from complimentary:

It became evident in the course of our discussions that there are real differences in the understanding of and approach to the language question at the various levels of party organization and amongst different leading comrades, even though they all believe themselves to be subscribing to the Leninist national policy. In addition to variations of understanding and attitudes between individuals, we found instances of gaps between declared policy and practice.¹²⁰

The report cited Shelest to the effect that problems that had existed in the past were being overcome. Shelest is quoted as having told the delegation: “Yes, some comrades have on occasion expressed mistaken ideas about what they call the merging of languages, but only a fool could imagine that there is any possibility of Russian taking over in Ukraine.”¹²¹ The optimistic picture presented by the Ukrainian party leader was offset by the remarks of Andrii Skaba, ideological secretary of the Central Committee, who “declared that what is important is that technique [sic] develops, not the language in which text books are published.” According to the delegation’s report, it didn’t bother him, he stated, whether in the hydro station in Burshtyn, there were more signs in Russian or in Ukrainian....This attitude, that language was secondary or unimportant, that it is a technique [sic], the building of Communism alone which counts, was one that we found to be widespread.¹²²

Eventually, the report of the Canadian delegation was subjected to criticism both by elements from within the Communist Party of Canada and by prominent government, academic, and cultural figures in Kiev, and was quietly retracted.¹²³ In the meantime, however, Ukrainian authorities were confronted with another embarrassing situation in the form of John Kolasky’s documentary expose *Education in Soviet Ukraine: A Study in Discrimination and Russification*, which was published in Canada in 1968. Kolasky, a high school teacher and member of the Communist Party of Canada, spent two years in Ukraine as a student at the Higher Party School in Kiev. During that time, from September 1963 to August 1965, he became disenchanted with what he saw, “especially the fact that everywhere the Russian language was dominant.” Kolasky wrote:

The party propaganda, that the non-Russians themselves had initiated this natural process of merging all languages into one, proved unconvincing. Daily observation contradicted the official explanation; everywhere in Kiev there was evidence of pressure to impose the Russian language. In addition there were my personal experiences. Many Russians with whom I came into contact displayed open contempt because I spoke Ukrainian. Occasionally there were even insults.¹²⁴

Kolasky's book was a strong indictment of educational and language policies in Ukraine. Faced with unrest at home and beleaguered by criticism from abroad, the authorities were compelled to respond to Kolasky's charges.¹²⁵

The recourse to "administrative measures" against the Ukrainian intelligentsia in 1965-1966 in effect signaled the impending demise of Shelest's policies of consensus-building. The inordinate attention that was devoted to the language question at the writers' congress in 1966, including Shelest's calls to "preserve and respect our beautiful native Ukrainian language," in fact marked the high point of official concern in this area. In retrospect, one wonders to what degree the entire affair was orchestrated in order to placate the widespread discontent evoked by the regime's repressive measures. This is not to suggest that Shelest's "ukrainianism" was simply a charade. He continued to support the interests of the Ukrainian language and culture in his public statement and writings after 1966, albeit in a much more restrained fashion. In his speech to students at Kiev University in September 1968, Shelest called for the compilation of new textbooks, which he insisted "must be published in the Ukrainian language."¹²⁶ His address at the Twenty-fourth Congress of the Ukrainian party in 1971 included a reference to the need "to stand guard over the clarity and purity of our language." At the same forum, the well-known writer Iurii Smolych, citing Shelest's remark, added that "it is first of all we writers who should respect and develop and disseminate the native language." Smolych cautioned, however, that

enrichment of the contemporary Ukrainian language should proceed as a result of innovation and mutual influences with all the languages of the socialist nations, and not through its archaization which, unfortunately, is characteristic of certain writers who peer into the remote past.¹²⁷

A few months later, at the Sixth Congress of the Ukrainian Writers' Union, several speakers (Rostyslav Bratun', Dmytro Pavlychko, Kost' Hordiienko, Vitalii Korotych) expressed concern for the development of the Ukrainian language.¹²⁸ The tone, however, was set by Shelest, who urged that a struggle be conducted in equal measure against both stereotyped and hackneyed terminology and "the littering of our language." The emphasis, none-

theless, was on criticism of those who showed “excessive enthusiasm for obsolete vocabulary, archaisms, and expressions that are not intrinsic to our contemporary language.”¹²⁹

In the late 1960s, newspapers and journals published articles by advocates of language purity and proper usage such as Antonenko-Davydovych. His article in *Literaturna Ukraina* in November 1969, advocating the reincorporation of the letter “g” into the Ukrainian alphabet, caused a minor sensation. It was answered by Vitalii Rusaniv’skyi, deputy director of the Institute of Linguistics, who categorically rejected Antonenko-Davydovych’s arguments. Rusaniv’skyi’s article was accompanied by a statement from the editorial board of *Literaturna Ukraina* stating that it backed the criticism of Antonenko-Davydovych. The “discussion” was thereby officially closed and moved to the pages of *samizdat*.¹³⁰ In 1970, Antonenko-Davydovych was able to publish his extremely popular guide to proper language usage, *Iak my hovorymo*, which was issued by the Radians’kyi Pys’mennyk publishing house in an edition of 65,000 copies. The book was subjected to a highly damaging review in *Literaturna Ukraina* by Hryhorii Kolesnyk, scientific secretary of the Institute of Linguistics, who accused Antonenko-Davydovych of “a subjective perception of the linguistic process” and a “tendentious attempt to archaize the vocabulary of the contemporary Ukrainian literary language.” Interestingly, a completely different evaluation was presented in the authoritative Moscow journal *Voprosy literatury*, expressing amazement at the position taken by Kolesnyk.¹³¹

By the end of 1971, an astute observer of the Ukrainian scene could probably sense that the defenders of language equality in Ukraine were engaged in an uneven struggle. In September of that year, the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences established a Department of Russian Language in the Institute of Linguistics — the first of its kind in the academies of the non-Russian republics.¹³² A sign of the times was the publication of a book in Kiev in which the late Fedot Filin, director of the Institute of the Russian Language in Moscow, could write:

The Soviet people is not only a state-political and socio-economic community. This community is also beginning to acquire certain ethnic characteristics, one of which is the Russian language as the language of inter-nationality discourse.¹³³

Shcherbitsky: Brezhnev's Man in Moscow

A crucial turning point in Ukrainian politics was the widespread arrests of Ukrainian intellectuals in January 1972 and, four months later, Shelest's ouster from the leadership of the Ukrainian party and his removal to Moscow. It soon became obvious that Shelest was dismissed because he either would not or could not implement Moscow's nationalities policy in Ukraine. He was succeeded by Volodymyr Shcherbitsky, a long time associate of Brezhnev. What followed was a thorough purge of Ukrainian cultural life and the imposition of strict ideological controls.¹³⁴ One of the areas affected was, of course, language policy.

In March 1972, shortly before Shelest's dismissal, the *samizdat* journal *Ukrainian Herald* reported that the Central Committee of the Ukrainian party had initiated a campaign against "archaisms" in the Ukrainian language, and that a move was underway to bring the literary language closer to "the living language" – i.e., to the mixed Ukrainian-Russian jargon commonplace in large urban centers in Ukraine.¹³⁵ This was borne out by later developments. At a plenum of the Central Committee on April 17, 1973, Shcherbitsky included "the littering of the Ukrainian language with archaic words and artificial expressions" in his criticism of Ukrainian writers. The same charges were repeated by Valentyn Malanchuk, ideological secretary of the Central Committee, at a meeting of party members of the Kiev writers' organization in October.¹³⁶ A much more ominous step, reported in the last issue of the *Ukrainian Herald* to have reached the West, was a decision of the Politburo of the Ukrainian party in 1973 to gradually shift the language of publication of scholarly journals from Ukrainian to Russian.¹³⁷ A comparison of the data on regularly published journals of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences for 1969 and 1980 shows that during that time the percentage of journals published in Ukrainian decreased from 46.6 percent to 19 percent (see Table 3). This was accomplished by converting a number of already existing Ukrainian and bilingual journals and by publishing newly established journals exclusively in Russian. The same policy was adopted with regard to the so-called interdepartmental periodicals issued by universities and institutes, at least nine of which were converted to Russian between 1977 and 1979. These included such non-technical publications as *Problemy filosofii*, *Pytannia ateizmu*, *Naukovi pratsi z istorii KPRS*, and *Pytannia istorii SRSR*. In January 1973, the Dnipropetrovsk evening newspaper *Dnipro vechernii* became *Dnipro vechernii*.¹³⁸

Table 3. Journals of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences: Language of Publication, 1969 and 1980

Year	Ukrainian		Russian		Bilingual	
	Number	Percentage	Number	Percentage	Number	Percentage
1969	14	46.6	11	36.6	5	16.6
1980	8	19.0	32	76.2	2	4.8

Sources: *Akademiia nauk Ukrains'koi RSR 1969* (Kiev: Naukova Dumka, 1969), pp. 266-268, and *Akademiia nauk Ukrains'koi RSR* (Kiev: Naukova Dumka, 1980), pp. 408-414.

The last ten years have also witnessed a sustained effort to improve the study and teaching of the Russian language in Ukraine. This, of course, is a Union-wide development. It is also not entirely new. A scientific-methodological conference on this problem was organized by the Ministry of Education in Kiev already in October 1961.¹³⁹ An important feature of the current campaign, however, is the emphasis that has been placed on expanding Russian-language study in the preschool institutions of the non-Russian republics. Various aspects of improving the teaching of Russian in the national schools were discussed at a major all-Union scientific-practical conference held in Tashkent in October 1975. According to one source, the Tashkent meeting was the first to raise the issue of broad experimental work regarding the teaching of Russian to non-Russian preschool children.¹⁴⁰ In Ukraine, a follow-up conference on "Ways of Increasing the Effectiveness of the Study of the Russian Language in Schools of the Ukrainian SSR in Light of Decisions of the Twenty-fifth Congress of the CPSU" was convened in Odessa in October 1977, with 450 persons attending. The conference heard a report by Minister of Education Marynych in which he stated that research in Ukraine "substantiated the psychological possibilities of parallel mastery of the Russian and Ukrainian language by children of the younger school-age group."¹⁴¹ Accordingly, the conference recommended that the network of preschool institutions and groups with Russian as the language of instruction be expanded.¹⁴² The Odessa conference coincided with another development that reflected increased concern for Russian-language training in schools – the appearance of the first issue of the bimonthly journal *Russkii iazyk i literatura v shkolakh USSR*.¹⁴³ Approximately one year later, in September 1977, a republican seminar devoted to improving the teaching of Russian language and literature was convened in Zaporizhzhia.¹⁴⁴

The various organizational and scholarly initiatives that had been undertaken to improve Russian-language studies in the republics culminated, at the all-Union level, in the October 13, 1978 decree of the USSR Council of Ministers "On Measures for Further Improving the Study and Teaching of the Russian Language in the Union Republics."¹⁴⁵ Approximately two weeks later, on October 31, the Collegium of the Ukrainian Ministry of Education adopted a resolution in line with the all-Union decree.¹⁴⁶ It provided for: (1) initiating the teaching of Russian in Ukrainian schools in grade 1 (instead of grade 2 as heretofore) as of 1980-1981 school year; (2) increasing the number of hours devoted to Russian in grades 2 and 3; (3) reducing the size of classes for Russian-language study; and (4) increasing the number of schools with intensive study of Russian from 17 to 200.¹⁴⁷ According to the "Program of the Russian Language for Grade 1 of General Education Schools with Ukrainian as the Language of Instruction," beginning in the school year 1980-1981 first graders in Ukrainian schools were to receive one hour of instruction per week in Russian during the first term and three hours during the second. Altogether, seventy hours of Russian-language study were scheduled for the school year.¹⁴⁸ In the aftermath of the second all-Union conference on Russian-language studies in the national republics, which was held in May 1979, various republican conferences and seminars concerned with one or another aspect of the same problem were convened in Odessa (1979), Poltava (1980), Uzhhorod (1980), Rovno (1980), and Chernivtsi (1981). At the end of 1981, it was reported that since 1978 the Collegium of the Ministry of Education in Kiev had examined the question of improving the teaching of Russian in the republic's general education schools on two occasions.¹⁴⁹

The precarious situation of the Ukrainian language on the eve of Shelest's ouster and during the first few years of Shcherbitsky's rule is perhaps best documented in the last two issues of the *Ukrainian Herald*. Issue six, dated March 1972, is particularly rich in statistical data on the press and schools. In addition to the previously mentioned excerpts from Dadenkov's report on higher education in Ukraine, which provides otherwise unavailable information on various universities and institutes, one can find detailed reports on the status of the Ukrainian language in schools in the city of Kiev and in the Crimean Pedagogical Institute. The combined seventh and eighth issue, dated spring 1974, in effect sums up the results of Soviet language policy:

Russification begins in the preschool institutions for children. On the whole, nurseries and kindergartens in Ukraine are predominantly Russian....In

Ukraine, the Ukrainian school has become a problem. Thus, in the cities of Donbass there are no Ukrainian schools whatsoever, nor are they to be found anywhere in Crimea. In such cities as Kharkiv, Zaporizhzhia, Mykolaiv, Dnipropetrovs'k, Kherson, Odessa, and many others, a few solitary Ukrainian schools have remained, but only on the outskirts. Some graduates of L'viv institutions of higher education who are sent to work in Donbass, but do not want their children to attend Russian schools, are forced to send their children to grandmothers, if they live in Western Ukraine, where Ukrainian schools still exist. Their demands that Ukrainian schools be opened in the cities where they must work elicit the same response: the accusation of Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism with the attendant consequences.¹⁵⁰

Soviet officialdom's inclination to view language loyalty as a political crime is not uncommon in Ukrainian *Samizdat*. Thus, in Vasyly's Stus's essay "I Accuse," written in the Dubrovlag camp in 1975, he relates how investigators confronted him with the "testimony" of one of the witnesses for the prosecution, who confidently asserted: "I knew right away that Stus is a nationalist, because he always spoke in Ukrainian."¹⁵¹ Various aspects of the language question are reflected in the *samizdat* literature originating in the camps. Vladimir Osipov's January 12, 1977 statement in defense of Ukrainian political prisoners "forcibly cut off from their native language and national culture" is particularly interesting given his views on the national question.¹⁵² The issue of restrictions on non-Russian languages imposed by camp authorities is raised in the first declaration of the "Ten-Day Period of Solidarity of Peoples," signed by sixteen Ukrainian, Russian, Armenian, Estonian, Jewish, and Tatar political prisoners on August 1, 1978.¹⁵³ In November 1977, six Ukrainian political prisoners in the Sosnovka camp announced the formation of a "Society for the Defense, Promotion, and Perpetuation of the Ukrainian Language."¹⁵⁴ The language issue has also been discussed in several documents issued by the Ukrainian Helsinki Group, and in Iurii Badz'o's analytical essay on the national question.¹⁵⁵

In the area of so-called establishment dissent, the 1970s were but a pale reflection of the Shelest period. The Seventh Congress of the Ukrainian Writers' Union in April 1976, the first presided over by Shcherbitsky, did not address itself to the language question at all, although Bratun' – in what can only be described in terms of a certain degree of fortitude – did question the wisdom of the dissolution of the language and literature departments of the Institute of Social Sciences in L'viv.¹⁵⁶ In 1977, Oles' Honchar managed to write a sentimental article praising the Ukrainian language in a specialized journal that is most probably read only by aficionados of language culture.¹⁵⁷ Pavlo Zahrebel'nyi, the current head of the Writers' Union, had

some very unflattering things to say about the language of Ukrainian novels at a plenum of the Writer's Union Board in April 1978. He reminded his listeners that "language, like traditions, is not simply inherited – it is acquired by indefatigable and unremitting work."¹⁵⁸ In a later article based on his speech at the plenum, Zahrebel'nyi confided that "among Ukrainian writers one can even find those who hardly know their native language."¹⁵⁹ In 1978 and 1979, the work of Ukrainian linguists was examined on several occasions by the Academy of Sciences in Kiev, which criticized the Institute of Linguistics for, *inter alia*, failure to produce the requisite varieties of dictionaries, including dictionaries of dialects, and shortcomings in propagating the culture of both the Ukrainian and Russian languages.¹⁶⁰ The March 1979 session of the Academy's general assembly served as a forum for Honchar's spirited defense of the continued validity of the Ukrainian languages:

All of us hold the beautiful Russian language in high esteem as the language of friendship and inter-nationality discourse, and the Ukrainian language – which in the course of centuries was formed through the efforts of many generations of toiling people and its intelligentsia – as the language which was defended against tsarist reaction by the brightest minds of Russia, who predicted a great future for this language. It showed itself capable of fully recreating fifty-five volumes of the immortal works of Lenin, it showed the strength to pass on to the people the imperishable beauty of Homer's poems, and the sum of that contemporary knowledge incorporated, let us say, in the *Entsyklopediia kibernetiky*.¹⁶¹

"A few years ago," added Honchar, "republican television had the program 'Culture of the word.' Was it necessary to close it down?" he asked.

A thoughtful reading of Honchar's speech sheds more light on the current status of the Ukrainian language than any scholarly analysis. Here is perhaps the foremost contemporary Ukrainian prose writer prefacing what very much appears to be a plea for the existence of a language bearing the name of a people more than forty-two-million strong in the USSR alone with the obligatory gesture of servility before the "beautiful" and "highly esteemed" Russian language. From the very start, therefore, the second-class status of his own language is clearly defined. The argument itself, presumably intended for those internationalists in Moscow and Kiev who would prefer to see Ukrainian vanish well before communism is victorious on a world scale, is based largely on the authority of progressive-thinking Russians whose own sense of national identity was not threatened by the existence of the Ukrainian language and, of course, on the "immortal" Lenin. In this context, the

reference to the two-volume cybernetics encyclopedia published in Ukrainian in 1973, the first of its kind in the Soviet Union, bears a markedly dissonant note. Perhaps not very much more should be expected at a time when the current minister of education in Kiev firmly asserts that “the Russian language is the language of the great Russian people, the language of the first socialist state in the world, the language of the great Lenin, and the language of the new historical community of people – the Soviet people.”¹⁶²

Prospects for the Future

Brezhnev’s death in November 1982 and the assumption of power by Iurii Andropov has been followed by a perceptible shift in the rhetoric of Soviet nationalities policy. The evidence thus far suggest that the new leadership of the CPSU is inclined to favor greater and perhaps more rapid assimilation of its multinational population. This is reflected, above all, in Andropov’s revival of the concept of merger (*sliianie*) of nations as a legitimate objective in his speech marking the sixtieth anniversary of the formation of the USSR in December 1982.¹⁶³ Moving from the theoretical to the practical, at the end of May 1983 it was announced that the Politburo of the CPSU had examined the question of additional measures to improve the study of the Russian language in general education schools and other educational establishments in the Union republics, and that an appropriate decree was adopted by the party’s Central Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers.¹⁶⁴ More recently, it has been disclosed that the 1983-1984 curricula call for “more intense study of the Russian language in the national schools.”¹⁶⁵

In Ukraine, the language question remains high on the agenda. At a joint plenum of the boards of creative unions and organizations of the USSR and RSFSR held in December 1982 to mark the sixtieth anniversary of the USSR, Zahrebel’nyi felt compelled to praise the virtues of the Russian language. “We often talk about it,” he said, “as the means of inter-nationality discourse. This is not enough. For all of us, the Russian language is above all the greatest cultural value.”¹⁶⁶ More important than such panegyrics, which have become *de rigueur* for representatives of the non-Russian intelligentsia (especially when speaking in Moscow), are the implications of Shcherbitsky’s comments on the language question at a meeting of the Ukrainian party *aktiv* in March 1983. He noted the importance of the Russian language, qualifying it as a language not only of inter-nationality but also international discourse, and reminded his listeners that “side by side with the native language, it is

necessary to continue to perfect the study of the Russian language in the schools.” Shcherbitsky then proceeded to criticize “the completely unwarranted enthusiasm for archaic linguistic forms and the needless use of foreign words” in certain literary works, especially translations, as well as in lectures. In the process, he singled out *Zhovten'*, the literary monthly published by the L'viv writers' organization.¹⁶⁷ It is interesting to note that the largest group of contributors to this journal – which maintains a very strong regional profile – are from Western Ukraine, where linguistic russification is much less prevalent than in other parts of the republic.

Another aspect of Scherbitsky's speech that deserves attention is the clear attempt to offset the obvious emphasis on the Russian language with positive references to the native language. “One must always show concern for the purity, study, and knowledge of the native language,” he asserted. This “even-handedness” in the public statements of certain republican party leaders and experts on the national question when discussing language issues is a relatively recent phenomenon. It has been particularly evident in the Baltic states, where popular disaffection with Soviet language policy has resulted in protests and demonstrations. Although difficult to ascertain with any degree of certainty, there may well be a body of opinion in Moscow that recognizes the need to temper the campaign to disseminate the Russian language in the republics if unpleasant situations are to be avoided.¹⁶⁸ In this connection, it is worth citing the remarks made by Oleksandr Kapto, ideological secretary of the Ukrainian Central Committee, at the all-Union conference on international upbringing held in Riga in June 1982. Referring to anti-Soviet propaganda in the West, Kapto argued:

The theme of “russification,” of which everyone is sick and tired, is overgrowing with new insinuations. It is being perceived in scholarship, education, publishing, the press, even in demographic policy and in social psychology. And all of this is being hysterically interpreted in terms of “ethnocide,” “linguicide,” and “denationalization.” Therefore, fully supporting the constructive suggestions and proposals made by Avgust Edvardovich Voss with regard to increasing attention to the study of the Russian language in the Union republics, I would like to remind you that this problem is also acute with a view towards the ideological struggle.¹⁶⁹

Kapto's words were carefully chosen and sufficiently vague to preclude a definitive judgement as to what exactly he wanted to say. It does seem, however, that there is an underlying note of caution in his argumentation. Whatever the case may be, there is little doubt that Soviet policy can be flexible and adaptive on nationality issues, as in other areas, if it chooses

to be. This may well explain the fact that in the spring of 1981, Ukrainian television began airing a program entitled “The Living Word,” which is devoted entirely to the Ukrainian language, and that in December of that year Kiev hosted a republican scientific-practical conference on “Ways of Improving the Effectiveness of Teaching and Learning the Ukrainian language in Light of the Decisions of the Twenty-sixth Congress of the CPSU.”¹⁷⁰ Obviously, such palliatives do not alter the fundamental thrust or direction of the regime’s language policy.

Between 1959 and 1979, the proportion of Ukrainians in the USSR who declared Ukrainian to be their native language decreased from 87.7 percent to 82.8 percent. In Ukraine, the corresponding figures were 93.4 percent and 89.1 percent (see Table 4). These statistics speak for themselves. But do they tell the whole story? A look at the language profile of the city of Kiev shows that during the same twenty-year period the proportion of Kievans who declared Ukrainian to be their native language increased from 43.7 percent to 52.8 percent (see Table 5). The Ukrainian element in the national composition of the capital also grew: from 60.1 percent in 1959, to 64.8 percent in 1970, and reaching 68.7 percent in 1979.¹⁷¹ The Soviet geographer Vadim Pokshishevskii has argued that in the USSR it is the cities more so than the countryside that have become the focal points of national culture and ethnic consciousness.¹⁷² Another Soviet scholar maintains that the proportion of Russians in the cities of the non-Russian republics is the single most important factor determining linguistic processes with regard to the given republic’s indigenous nationality as a whole.¹⁷³ Bearing this in mind, a long range perspective for the Ukrainian language (and nation) may appear in a different light. At the same time, it must be remembered that the Soviet system is such that linguistic processes can be seriously effected by simple administrative fiat. A case in point is the recent decision to publish a parallel Russian-language edition of Kiev’s only evening newspaper, *Vechirnia Kyiv*.¹⁷⁴ Clearly, ethno-linguistic trends in the Ukrainian capital do not justify such a move. Then again, perhaps these trends – from the standpoint of Soviet policymakers interested in accelerating the merger of nations – are precisely at the heart of the issue.

Table 4. Percentage of Ukrainians Claiming Ukrainian as Their Native Language, 1959-1979

	1959	1970	1979
USSR	87.7	85.7	82.8
Ukrainian SSR	93.4	91.4	89.1

Sources: V.I. Naulko, *Etnichnyi sklad naseleennia Ukrains'koi RSR. Statystyko-kartohrafichne doslidzhennia* (Kiev: Naukova Dumka, 1965), p. 115; V. I. Kozlov, *Natsional'nosti SSSR, Etnodemograficheskii obzor*, 2d rev. and enl. ed. (Moscow: Finansy i Statistika, 1982), pp. 240-241; and Roman Solchanyk, "The Ukraine and Ukrainians in the USSR: Additional Data from the Soviet Census of 1979," *Radio Liberty Research*, 339/80, September 23, 1980.

Table 5. Population of Kiev: Language Affiliation, 1959, 1970, and 1979 (In Thousands and Percentages)

	1959*		1970		1979	
	Actual	Percentage	Actual	Percentage	Actual	Percentage
As Native Language:						
Ukrainian	482.6	43.7	827.4	50.7	1,132.1	52.8
Russian	593.8	53.8	775.2	47.5	961.3	44.8
As Second Language:						
Ukrainian	—	—	400.7	24.5	503.9	23.5
Russian	—	—	632.3	38.7	911.3	42.5

*Data on knowledge of a second language were not collected for the 1959 census.

Sources: Roman Solchanyk, "The Ukrainization of Kiev Continues: Partial Results of the 1979 Census," *Radio Liberty Research*, 68/80, February 15, 1980.

Notes

1. Joshua A. Fishman, *Language and Nationalism: Two Integrative Essays* (Rowley, Mass.: Newbury House Publishers, 1972), pp. 40 ff.
2. Walker Conner, "Nation-Building or Nation-Destroying?," *World Politics*, Vol. 24, No. 3 (April 1972), 337-338.
3. The language question in the Western Ukrainian territories in the period prior to their incorporation into the Ukrainian SSR (1939-1945) lies beyond the thematic framework of the essays in this volume. A general survey of the problem is presented in the appropriate sections of *Ukraine: A Concise Encyclopaedia*, 2 vols. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1963 and 1971). See also Paul R. Magocsi, *Ukrainian Heritage Notes: The Language Question in Galicia* (Cambridge, Mass.: Ukrainian Studies Fund, 1978).
4. Mikh. Lemke, *Epokha tsenzurnykh reform 1859-1865 godov* (St. Petersburg: Tipolitografiia Gerol'd, 1904), p.303.
5. *Ibid.*
6. *Ob otmene stesnenii maloruskago pechatnago slova* (St. Petersburg: Imperatorskaia Akademiia Nauk, 1905), p. 8. For a discussion of censorship regulations affecting Ukrainian publications in the pre-1863 period, see Nik. Fabrikant (pseud.), "Kratkii ocherk iz istorii otnoshenii russkikh tsenzurnykh zakonov k ukrainskoi literature," *Russkaia mysl'*, Vol. 26, No. 3 (March 1905), 128-129.
7. Basil Dmytryshyn, "Introduction," in Fedir Savchenko, *Zaborona ukrainstva 1976 r.*, 2d ed., Harvard Series in Ukrainian Studies, Vol. 14 (Munich: Wilhelm Fink Verlag, 1970), p. xvi. This is a reprint of the 1930 edition published in Kharkiv-Kiev.
8. Serhii Iefremov, *Istoriia ukrains'koho pys'menstva*, 4th ed., Vol. 2 (Kiev-Leipzig: Ukrains'ka Nakladnia, 1919), pp. 43-51; M. A. Zhovtobriukh, *Mova ukrains'koi presy (Do seredyny dev'ianostykh rokiv XIX st')* (Kiev: Vydavnytstvo Akademii Nauk Ukrains'koi RSR, 1963), p. 238; *Istoria ukrains'koi literatury*, Vol. 3 (Kiev: Naukova Dumka, 1968); pp. 58-67, V. Dmytruk, *Narys z istorii ukrains'koi zhurnalistyky XIX st.* (L'viv: Vydavnytstvo L'vivs'koho Universytetu, 1969), pp. 49-68; *Istoriia Ukrains'koi RSR*, Vol. 3 (Kiev: Naukova Dumka, 1978), pp. 396-397 and 528-530; and *Knigovedenie. Entsiklopedicheskii slovar'* (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Sovetskaia Entsiklopediia, 1982), p. 546.
9. *Istoriia Ukrains'koi RS*, p. 503.
10. Sergei Efremov, "Vne zakona: K istorii tsenzury v Rossii," *Russkoe bogatstvo*, Vol. 12, No. 1 (January 1905), 70. See also *Istoriia Ukrains'koi RSR*, pp. 503-504.
11. P. Gurevich, "'Delo o rasprostraneniі malorossiiskoi propagandy,'" *Byloe*, Vol. 2, No. 7 (July 1907), 169-175; V. Miiakovskiy, "Istoriia zaslannia P. Chubynskoho," *Arkhivna sprava*, No. 4 (1927), 6-13; R. Serbyn, "La 'Societe politique secrete' de Kharkiv (Ukraine), 1856-1860," *Communications historiques 1973* (Ottawa: La societe historique du Canada, 1973), pp. 159-177; and G.I. Marakhov, *Sotsial'no-politicheskaia bor'ba na Ukraine v 50-60-e gody XIX veka* (Kiev: Izdatel'stvo pri Kievskom Gosudarstvennom Universitete Izdatel'skogo Obshchiny Vyscha Shkola, 1981), p. 136.

12. See Chernyshevskii's articles "Novye periodicheskie izdaniia," "Natsional'naia bestaktnost'," and "Narodnaia bestolkovost'," all published in *Sovremennik* in 1861, and Pavlo Zhytets'kyi's response to Lamanskii, "Russkii patriotizm," published in *Osnova* in March 1862, in *Khrestomatiiia materialiv z istorii ukrains'koi literatury*, Vol. 1 (Kiev: Derzhavne Uchbovo-Pedagogichne Vydavnytstvo Radians'ka Shkola, 1959), pp. 248-275 and 306-321.
13. Quoted by Fabrikant, 132.
14. Quoted by I. Ivan'o *Ocherk razvitiia esteticheskoi mysli Ukrainy* (Moscow: Isskustvo, 1981), p. 167.
15. Elzbieta Hornowa, "Przesladowania ukrainskiej kultury przez rzad carski za panowania Aleksandra II," *Zeszyty Naukowe Wyzszej Szkoły Pedagogicznej im. Powstancow Slaskich w Opole*, Seria A, Filologia rosyjska, Vol. 9 (1972), 119-121; V.I. Borysenko, *Borot'ba demokratychnykh syl za narodnu osvitu na Ukraini v 60-90-kh rokakh XIX st.* (Kiev: Naukova Dumka, 1980), p. 19.
16. See *Vydumki "Kievlianiina" i pol'skikh gazet o maloruskom patriotizme* (Kiev: V tipografii gazety Kievskii Telegraf, 1874).
17. The most authoritative work on the Ems Ukaz remains that of Savchenko, cited in n. 7. See also Ivan Krevets'kyi, "'Ne bylo, net i byt' ne mozhet!'," *Literaturno-naukovyi vistnyk*, Vol. 7, No. 26 (April-June 1904), 129-158 and No. 27 (July-September 1904), 1-18, and Roman Solchanyk, "Lex Jusephovicia: Z pryvodu 100-littia zaborony ukrainstva," *Suchasnist'*, Vol. 16, No. 5 (May 1976), 36-68.
18. Mykhailo Drahomanov, *Po voprosu o maloruskoi literature* (Vienna, 1876), in *Literaturno-publitsystychni pratsi*, Vol. 1 (Kiev, Vydavnytstvo Naukova Dumka, 1970), p. 352.
19. For the text of the memorandum of the Governor-General of Kharkiv, Prince Aleksandr Dondukov-Korsakov, see [Ivan Franko], "Sukhyi pen'," *Literaturno-naukovyi vistnyk*, Vol. 8, No. 29 (Jauary-March 1905), 88-97.
20. *Ob otmene stesnenii*, pp. 11-12.
21. Spectator, "Z rosyis'koi Ukrainy," *Literaturno-naukovyi Vistnyk*, Vol. 2, No. 8 (1899), and Mikh. Grushevskii, "Ukrainskii vopros," in *Ukrainskii vopros: Stat'i* (Moscow: Izdanie T-va Rodnaia Rech', 1917), pp. 18-19.
22. *Ob otmene stesnenii*, pp. i-ii.
23. Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi, "Hanebnii pam"iati," in *Rozstriliane vidrozhennia: Antolohiia 1917-1933*, comp. Iurii Lavrinenko (Paris: Instytut Literacki, 1959), p. 921. Hrushevs'kyi's article was first published in the Kiev journal *Ukraina*, 1926, No. 4, 46-51. The Academy of Sciences' report constitutes the bulk of the materials published in *Ob otmene stesnenii*. On the reports submitted by the commissions of Kiev and Kharkiv universities, see Jan Slavik, "Ruska vlada a ukrajinske huntii pred svetovou valkou," *Slovansky prehled*, Vol. 22, No. 3 (March 1930), 212-219.
24. I.F. [Ivan Franko], "Pershe vol'ne slovo na Ukraini," *Literaturno-naukovyi vistnyk*, Vol. 8, No. 32 (October-December 1905), 160, and S. Rusova, "Periodicheskaia ukrainskaia pressa," *Kniga*, No. 11 (January 18, 1907), 1.
25. Ievhen Chykalenko, the main organizer and financier of the Ukrainian press in Russia, provides a vivid account of *Rada's* beginnings in his *Spoehady (1861-1907)*, Vol. 3 (*L'viv: Nakladom Vydavnychoi Spilky Dilo*, 1926), pp. 74-126. See also Serhii Iefremov, "Vidhuky z zhyttia i pys'menstva," *Literaturno-naukovyi*

- vistnyk*, Vol. 10, No. 38 (April-June 1907), 142-154.
26. For the text of the petition, see [Ivan Franko], "Iz suchasnykh faktiv," *Literaturno-naukovyi vistnyk*, Vol. 8, No. 30 (April-June 1905), 68-70.
 27. For the text of the proposed legislation, see O. Lotots'kyi, *Storinky mynuloho, Vol. 3* (Warsaw: *Ukrains'kyi Naukovyi Instytut*, 1934), pp. 96-102.
 28. D. Doroshenko, "Ukraina v 1906 rotsi," *Ukraina*, Vol. 1, No. 1 (January 1907), 22-23; F. Matushevs'kyi, "Z ukrains'koho zhyttia," *Literaturno-naukovyi vistnyk*, Vol. 10, No. 40 (October-December 1907), 152-155; and Volodymyr Doroskenko, *Ukrainstvo v Rosii: Novisshi chasy* (Vienna: Nakladom Soiuzu Vyzvolennia Ukrainy, 1917), pp. 72-75.
 29. A characteristic view of officialdom's view of Ukrainian matters during this period is the June 23, 1916 police report "Zapiska ob ukrainskom dvizhenii za 1914-1916 gody s kratkim ocherkom istorii etogo dvizheniia, kak separatistko-revoliutsionnago techeniia sered naseleniia Malorossii," in Osyp Hermaize, "Materialy do istorii ukrains'koho rukhu za svitovoi viiny," *Ukrains'kyi arkhheografichnyi zbirnyk*, Vol. 1 (Kiev: Z drukarni Ukrains'koi Akademii Nauk, 1926), pp. 274-354.
 30. See *Gosudarstvennaia Duma. Chetvertyi sozvyv. Stenograficheskie otchety 1913 g. Sessiia pervaiia. Chast' II* (St. Petersburg: Gosudarstvennaia Tipografiia, 1913), pp. 1778-1792.
 31. For an original interpretation of the formulation of Lenin's ideas on nationalities policy, and especially the language question, see Isabelle Kreindler, "A Neglected Source of Lenin's Nationality Policy," *Slavic Review*, Vol. 36, No. 1 (March 1977), 86-100.
 32. M.M. Popov, *Narys istorii Komunistychnoi partii (bil'shovyktiv) Ukrainy*, 2d ed. (Kharkiv: Vydavnytstvo Proletarii, 1929), pp. 120-121.
 33. Pavlo Khrystiuk, *Zamitky i materialy do istorii ukrains'koi revoliutsii. 1917-1920 rr.*, Vol. 2 (Vienna: Ukrains'kyi Sotsiologichnyi Instytut, 1921), pp. 149-150.
 34. V. Zatons'kyi, *Natsional'na problema na Ukraini* (Kharkiv: Dezhavne Vydavnytstvo Ukrainy, 1927), p. 79.
 35. James E. Mace, *Communism and the Dilemmas of National Liberation: National Communism in Soviet Ukraine, 1918-1933*, pp. 23-24 (manuscript to be published in the Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute's Monograph Series in 1983).
 36. *Vos'moi s'ezd RKP(b) mart 1919 goda. Protokly* (Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe Izdatel'stvo Politicheskoi Literatury, 1959), p. 81.
 37. Mace, p. 35.
 38. Quoted by Popov, p. 185.
 39. Pavlo Khrystiuk, *Zamitky i materialy do istorii ukrains'koi revoliutsii*, Vol. 4 (Vienna: Ukrains'kyi Sotsiologichnyi Instytut, 1922), pp. 172-173.
 40. Quoted in I. Lakyza's introduction to *Ostanni partiini dokumenty z natsional'noi polityky KP(b)U (Pro natsionalistychnyi ukhyl u KP(b)U t.t. Shums'koho i Maksymovycha)* (Kharkiv: Derzhavne Vydavnytstvo Ukrainy, 1927), p. vii.
 41. *Vos'maia konferentsiia RKP(b) dekabr' 1919 goda. Protokoly* (Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe Izdatel'stvo Politicheskoi Literatury, 1961), pp. 189-190.
 42. See especially the speeches of Rakovskii, Bubnov, and Drobnis in *Vos'maia konferentsiia RKP(b)*, pp. 95-104 and 109-111.

43. For a delineation of the successive stages of Soviet language policy in Ukraine, see Iurii Sherekh (Iurii Shevel'ov), "Pryntsypy i etapy bol'shevyts'koi movnoi polityky na Ukraini," *Suchasna Ukraina* (Munich), June 29, July 13, and July 27, 1952.
44. *Kul'turne budivnytstvo v Ukraini'kii RSR. Vazhlyvishi rishennia Komunistychnoi partii i Radians'koho uriadu 1917-1959 rr. Zbirnyk dokumentiv*, Vol. 1 (Kiev: Derzhavne Vydavnytstvo Politychnoi Literatury URSR, 1959), p. 31.
45. Harold R. Weinstein, "Language and Education in the Soviet Ukraine," *The Slavonic Year-Book* (American Series, I), 1941, p. 129.
46. *Kul'turne budivnytstvo*, p. 63.
47. *Ibid.*, pp. 71-72; Weinstein, p. 129.
48. Quoted by Popov, p. 240.
49. See V. Sadovs'kyi, *Natsional'na polityka sovitiv na Ukraini* (Warsaw: Ukrain's'kyi Naukovyi Instytut, 1937), p. 71, and Popov, p. 272.
50. *Komunistychna partiia Ukrainy v rezoliutsiakh i risheniakh z'izdiv i konferentsii 1918-1956* (Kiev: Derzhavne Vydavnytstvo Politychnoi Literatury URSR, 1958), p. 126.
51. Popov, p. 274.
52. See E.F. Girchak, *Na dva fronta v bor'be s natsionalizmom*, 2d ed. (Moscow-Leningrad: Gosudarstvennoe Sotsial'no-Ekonomicheskoe Izdatel'stvo, 1931), pp. 19-22, and Mykola Skrypnyk, *Do teorii borot'by dvokh kul'tur*, in *Statti i promovy*, Vol. 2, Pt. 1 (Kharkiv: Derzhavne Vydavnytstvo Ukrainy, 1929), pp. 97-119.
53. Popov, p. 271.
54. P.P. Bachyns'kyi, "Zdiisnennia lenins'koi natsional'noi polityky na Ukraini u vidbudovnyi period (1921-1925 rr.)," *Ukrains'kyi istorychnyi zhurnal*, 1966, No. 1, 102.
55. *Kul'turne budivnytstvo*, pp. 239-242.
56. *Kul'turne budivnytstvo*, pp. 242-247. The July 27 and August 1 legislation is analyzed in detail by V.N. Durdenevskii, *Ravnopravie iazykov v Sovetskom stroe* (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Rabotnik Prosveshcheniia, 1927), pp. 78-82.
57. M. Vaisfligel', "Pro ukrainizatsiiu rad"aparatu," *Visty VUTsVK*, October 8, 1924.
58. *Ibid.*
59. "Vseukrainskaia partiinaia konferentsiia," *Pravda*, May 16, 1924. Lebed's report to the conference revealed that only 30 percent of the Party membership considered itself to be Ukrainian.
60. Ia. Riappo, "Pro ukrainizatsiiu shkoly," *Visty VUTsVK*, August 9, 1924.
61. By Comparison, in 1922 Ukrainian schools constituted over 50 percent of the total and mixed schools accounted for over 16 percent. See Iurii Shevel'ov, "Ukrainizatsiia: Radians'ka polityka 1925-1932 rokiv," *Suchasnist'*, Vol. 23, No. 5 (May 1983), 43.
62. "Postanovlenie plenuma TsK KP(b)U ob ukrainizatsii," *Pravda*, May 10, 1925; *Kul'turne budivnytstvo*, p. 283.
63. The full text is reproduced in A. Khvyliia, *Natsional'nyi vopros na Ukraine* (Kharkov: Gosudarstvennoe Izdatel'stvo Ukrainy, 1926), pp. 123-128.
64. *Tsentral'nyi Ispol'nitel'nyi Komitet 3 sozyva 2 sessiia. Stenograficheskii otchet*

- (Moscow: Izdanie TsIK Souiza SSR, 1926), pp. 458-468. For a detailed discussion of Larin's role in KP(b)U politics, see Robert S. Sullivant, *Soviet Politics in the Ukraine, 1917-1957* (New York and London: Columbia University Press, 1962), pp. 139-145.
65. Grichak, pp. 38-48; Popov, p. 291.
 66. Shevel'ov, 37 ff.
 67. *Budivnytstvo Radians'koi Ukrainy. Zbirnyk*, Vyp. 1: *Za lenins'ku natsional'nu polityku* (Kharkiv: Derzhavne Vydavnytstvo Ukrainy, [1929]), p. 61.
 68. Shevel'ov, 42-43.
 69. *Budivnytstvo Radians'koi Ukrainy*, p. 61.
 70. The full text is reproduced in Durdenevskii, pp. 145-154.
 71. Weinstein, 132.
 72. And. Rychyts'kyi, *Natsional'ne pytannia doby nastupu sotsializmu svitli nastanov XVI z'izdu VKP(b)* (Kharkiv: Partvydav Proletar, 1931), p. 17.
 73. On the discussions leading to the adoption of a standard orthography, see Oleksa Syniavs'kyi, "Korotka istoriia 'Ukrains'koho pravopysu,'" *Suchasnist'*, Vol. 22, No. 1-2 (January-February 1982), 98-116. The article is reprinted from *Kul'tura ukrains'kohoo slova*, Vyp. 1 (Kharkiv-Kiev: Derzhavne Vydavnytstvo Literatura i Mystetstvo, 1931, pp. 93-112).
 74. Mace, pp. 390-395.
 75. P.P. Postyshev, *V borot'bi za lenins'ko-stalins'ku natsional'nu polityku partii* (Kiev: Partvydav TsK KP[b]U, 1935), p. 19.
 76. For the text of the resolution, see S. Kossior and P. Postyschew, *Der bolschewistische Sieg in der Ukraine. Reden auf dem Vereinigten Plenum des ZK under der ZKK der Kommunistischen Partei Der Ukraine (Bolschewiki) im November 1933* (Moscow-Leningard: Verlagsgenossenschaft auslasendischer Arbeiter in der UdSSR, 1934), pp. 153-173. The standard work on language politics in Ukraine in the 1930s remains Roman Smal'-Stots'kyi's, *Ukrains'ka mova v Sovets'kii Ukraini* (Warsaw: Ukrains'kyi Naukovyi Instytut, 1936).
 77. *Kul'turne budivnytstvo*, pp. 740-744.
 79. Quoted by Ivan Maistrenko, *Istoriia Komunistychnoi partii Ukrainy* (Munich: Suchasnist', 1979), p. 160.
 79. Rychyts'kyi, pp. 33-34.
 80. Postyshev, p. 104.
 81. Weinstein, 141-142.
 82. This bizarre "duality" of the Stalinist period is emphasized by Isabelle Kreindler, "The Changing Status of Russian in the Soviet Union," *International Journal of the Sociology of Language*, No. 33 (1982), 10-13.
 83. Yaroslav Bilinsky, *The Second Soviet Republic: The Ukraine after World War II* (New Brunswick, N. J.: Rutgers University Press, 1964), p. 18.
 84. V. Nuzhnyi, "O nashei progagande," *Pravda Ukrainy*, February 6, 1958.
 85. Anton Khyzhniak, "Liubimo, shanimo ridnu movu!," *Literaturna hazeta* May 20, 1958. For readers' responses to this article, see "Ridna mova-nashe bahatstvo," *Literaturna hazeta*, July 15, 1958.
 86. P.P. Pliushch, "Nevidkladni pytannia rozvytku ukrains'koi movy," *Literaturna hazeta*, September 26, 1958.

87. See Yaroslav Bilinsky, "The Soviet Education Laws of 1958-9 and Soviet Nationality Policy," *Soviet Studies*, Vol. 14, No. 2 (October 1962), 138-157, and Vernon V. Aspaturian, "The Non-Russian Nationalities," in *Prospects for Soviet Society*, ed. Allen Kassof (New York-Washington-London: Frederick A. Praeger, 1958), pp. 168-173.
88. Bilinsky, *The Second Soviet Republic*, pp. 30-31. See also M. Syvits'kyi, "Problema movy v shkolakh Ukrainy," *Nashe slovo* (Warsaw), January 25, 1959.
89. "Vykhovuvaty liudei komunistychnoho zavtra," *Literaturna hazeta*, December 19, 1958.
90. See *Literaturna hazeta* for March 11, 13, and 17, 1959.
91. *Zasedaniia Verkhovnogo Soveta Ukrainskoi SSR (Piatogo sozyva) (Pervaia sessiia) (15-17 aprelia 1959 godal): Stenograficheskii otchet* (Kiev: Gosudarstvennoe Izdatel'stvo Politicheskoi Literatury USSR, 1959), p. 28.
92. S. Chervonenko, "Tisnyi zv'iazok z zhyttiam – neodminna umova uspikhu ideolohichnoi roboty," *Kommuist Ukrainy*, 1959, No. 7, 38.
93. Kolasky, pp. 50-51.
94. It is interesting to note that in the spring of 1967 Minister of Education Petro Udovychenko assured a visiting delegation of the Communist Party of Canada that "whereas Ukrainians constituted 77 percent of the population, 82 percent of all the pupils attending school are enrolled in schools in which all tuition is in the Ukrainian language." See "Report of Delegation to Ukraine," *Viewpoint* (Toronto), Vol. 5, No. 1 (January 1968), 3. The figure of 82 percent surely refers to *schools*, not *pupils*.
95. "Sovershenstvovat' prepodavanie russkogo iazyka vo vsekhn natsional'nykh shkolakh strany," *Narodnoe obrazovanie*, 1974, No. 3, 9.
96. *XXII s'ezd Kommunisticheskoi partii Sovetskogo Soiuz. 17-31 oktaibria 1961 goda. Stenograficheskii otchet*, Vol. 1 (Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe Izdatel'stvo Politicheskoi Literatury, 1962), p. 217.
97. *Programma Kommunisticheskoi partii Sovetskogo Soiuz. Priniata XXII s'ezdom KPSS* (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Politicheskoi Literatury, 1974), pp. 115-116.
98. See Borys Lewickij (Lewytzkyj), *Polityka narodowosciowa Z.S.A.R. w dobie Chruszczowa* (Paris: Instytut Literacki, 1966), pp. 138 ff., and Jacob Ornstein, "Soviet Language Policy: Continuity and change," in *Ethnic Minorities in the Soviet Union*, ed. Erich Goldhagen (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1968), pp. 132-133.
99. Bilinsky, *The Second Soviet Republic*, pp. 32-34; Kenneth C. Farmer *Ukrainian Nationalism in the Post-Stalin Era: Myth, Symbols and Ideology in Soviet Nationalities Policy* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1980), pp. 133ff.
100. See M.T. Shch[yrba], "Natsional'ni ta internatsional'na kul'tura: Pravyi'ni i putani pohliady," *Nasha kul'tura* (Warsaw), 1962, No. 3, 4-5.
101. I.K. Beloded, *Russkii iazyk – iazyk mezhnatsional'nogo Obshcheniia narodov SSSR* (Kiev: Izdatel'stvo Akademii Nauk Ukrainskoi SSR, 1962), pp. 17-18.
102. For a vivid description of Bilodid's reputation among Ukrainian intellectuals, see John Kolasky, *Two Years in Soviet Ukraine* (Toronto: Peter Martin Associates Limited, 1970), pp. 66-70.
103. "XXII s'ezd KPSS i zadachi izucheniiia zakonomernosti razvitiia sovremennykh

- natsional'nykh iazykov Sovetskogo Soiuza," *Voprosy iazykoznaviia*, 1962, No. 1, 3-9.
104. *V z"izd pys'mennykh Radians'koi Ukrainy 16-19 lystopada 1966 roku. Materialy z"izdu* (Kiev: Radians'kyi Pys'mennyk, 1967), pp. 226-227.
 105. Cited by M.I. Kulichenko, "Razrabotka problemy istoricheskoi obshchnosti v sovetskoi istoriografii," in *Osnovnye napravleniia izucheniia natsional'nykh otnoshenii v SSSR* (Moscow: Nauka, 1979), pp. 44-45.
 106. A.A. Isupov, *Natsional'nyi sostav naseleniia SSSR (po itogam perepisi 1959 g.)* (Moscow: Statistika, 1964), p. 9.
 107. "Vsi slyly tvorchosti – budivnytstvu komunizmu," *Literaturna hazeta*, January 16, 1962.
 108. D. Porkhun, "Dolia ridnoi movy," *Nasha kul'tura* (Warsaw), 1963, No. 3, 5-6. This article appears in Russian translation in *Natsional'nyi vopros v SSSR: Sbornik dokumentov*, comp. Roman Kupchinsky (Munich: Suchasnist', 1975), pp. 26-28. For related documentation, see the correspondence between Vasyl' Lobko, a participant of the conference, and Ryl's'kyi in *Suchasnist'*, Vol. 10, No. 2 (February 1970), 81-109.
 109. Arkhiv Samizdata (Munich), No. 4650, p. 9.
 110. The literature on the Shelest period is quite extensive. For a balanced judgement, see Borys Levyts'kyi (Lewytzkij), "Petro Shelest v Ukraini persona non grata," *Ukrains'kyi samostiinyk* (Munich), Vol. 23, No. 6 (June 1972), 13-19.
 111. For details, see V. Chornovil, "Iak i shcho obstoiuie Bohdan Stenchuk (66 zapytan' i zauvah 'internatsionalistovi')," in *Ukrains'kyi visnyk*, Vypusk 6 (Paris-Baltimore: P.I.U.F. and Smoloskyp, 1972), pp. 24-30.
 112. "Borot'ba za ridnu movu na Ukraini," *Suchasnist'*, Vol. 8, No. 9 (September 1968), 73-75.
 113. *Ibid.*, 75-76.
 114. "Zvernennia do kommunistiv us'oho svitu," *Suchasnist'*, Vol. 9, No. 12 (December 1969), 92-98.
 115. Reproduced in *The Chornovil Papers*, comp. Vyacheslav Chornovil (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1968), pp. 170-174. See also Karavans'kyi's essay "About One Political Error" regarding the 1959 school reform in Ukraine in *ibid.*, pp. 174-180.
 116. Ivan Dzyuba, *Internationalism or Russification? A Study in the Soviet Nationalities Problem* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1968), p. 191.
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 118. "Natsional'nyi vopros v SSSR," *Politicheskii dnevnik*, No. 9 (Iiun' 1965) in *Politicheskii dnevnik 1964-1970* (Amsterdam: Fond imeni Gertsena, 1972), pp. 90-91.
 119. "Report of Delegation to Ukraine," 1.
 120. *Ibid.*, 10.
 121. *Ibid.*, 2.
 122. *Ibid.*, 11.
 123. See John Weir, "On the Delegation to the Ukraine," *Viewpoint* (Toronto), Vol. 5 No. 4 (November 1968), 20-22; "To the Central Executive Committee of the Communist Party of Canada and to Members of the Delegation from the CP of

- Canada Who Visited the Ukraine in March-April 1967" *Communist Viewpoint* (Toronto), Vol. 1, No. 4 (September-October 1969), 57-61; and *Ferment in the Ukraine*, ed. Michael Browne (London: Macmillan, 1971), pp. 214-215.
124. Kolasky, *Education in Soviet Ukraine*, p. xii.
 125. O. Dzeverin, O. Savchenko, and V. Smal, *Public Education in Soviet Ukraine: Actual Facts vs. Nationalistic Fabrications* (Kiev: Association for Cultural Relations with Ukrainians Abroad, 1969).
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 128. *Literaturna Ukraina*, May 23 and 25, 1971.
 129. *Literaturna Ukraina*, May 20, 1971.
 130. Borys Antonenko-Davydovych, "Litera, za iakoiu tuzhat'," *Literaturna Ukraina*, November 4, 1969; V. Rusanivs'kyi, "Za chym turzhyty?," *Literaturna Ukraina*, November 28, 1969; and "Dyskusiia navkolo statti Borysa Antonenko-Davydovycha 'Litera, za iakoiu tuzhat'," in *Ukrains'kyi visnyk*, Vypusk 3 (Winnipeg and Baltimore: "The New Pathway" and Smoloskyp, 1971), pp. 92-94.
 131. Hryhorii Kolesnyk, "Chy zh tak my hovorymo?," *Literaturna Ukraina*, January 29, 1971, and A. Kuznetsov, "V arsenalakh slova," *Voprosy literatury*, 1971, No. 5, 224-225.
 132. I.K. Beloded, " 'Vsiak suschii v nei iazyk'," *Vestnik Akademii nauk SSSR*, 1978, No. 6, 96.
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 136. *Radians'ka Ukraina*, April 20, 1973; "Zavzhdy z partiieiu, zavzhdy z narodom," *Literaturna Ukraina*, November 2, 1973. See also V. Iu. Malanchuk, "Ideini dzherela literatury," *Vitchyzna*, 1973, No. 12, 1-16.
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140. A.M. Bogush, *Obuchenie russkomu iazyku v detskom sadu* (Kiev: Radians'ka Shkola, 1983), p. 7.
141. "Respublikanskaia nauchno-prakticheskaia konferentsiia 'Puti povysheniia effektivnosti izucheniiia russkogo iazyka v shkolakh Ukrainkoi SSR v svete reshenii XXV s'ezda KPSS'," *RIaL*, 1977, No. 1, 7.
142. *Ibid.*, 29.
143. V.E. Malanchuk, "Opyt raboty partiinykh organizatsii po internatsional'nomu vospitaniiu trudiashchikhsia," in *Partiia v period razvitogo sotsialisticheskogo obshchestva. Materialy Vsesoiuznoi nauchno-teoreticheskoi konferentsii "XXV s'ezd KPSS i razyitie marksistsko-leninskoi teorii."* Moskva. 4-6 oktiabria 1976 goda (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Politicheskoi Literatury, 1977), p. 93.
144. L.E. Ivashen', "Respublikanskii seminar metodistovslovesnikov." *RIaL*, 1978, No. 1, 95-96.
145. See Yaroslav Bilinsky, "Expanding the Use of Russian or Russification?," *Russian Review*, Vol. 40, No. 3 (July 1981), 317-332, and Roman Solchanyk, "Russian Language and Soviet Politics," *Soviet Studies*, Vo. 34, No. (January 1982), 23-42.
146. The text of the reslution has not been published in the press. An outline of its contents was first made available to the public in "Udoskonaliuvaty vyvchennia i vykladannia rosiis'koi movy v zahal'noosvitnykh shkolakh i pedagogichnykh navchal'nykh zakladakh respubliky," *Radians'ka osvita*, November 11, 1978. For the date of its adoption, see "Prohrama z rosiis'koi movy dlia I klasy zahal'noosvitnykh shkyl z ukrains'koiu movoiu navchannia," *Pochatkova shkola*, 1980, No. 2, 75, and "Z pozitsii sovremennykh trebovanii," *RIaL*, 1982, No. 1, 8.
147. L.N. Karpova, "Na povestke dnia – obuchenie russkomu iazyku i literature v sel'skoi obshcheobrazovatel'noi shkole," *RIaL*, 1979, Np. 2, 78.
148. *Pochatkova shkola*, 1980, No. 2, 75-76.
149. "Mova braterstva i druzhby," *Radians'ka osvita*, October 17, 1981.
150. *Ukrains'kyi visnyk*, Vypusk 7-8, p. 75.
151. Arkhiv Samizdata (Munich), No. 2307, p. 4.
152. *Khronika tekushchikh sobytii*, Vypusk 45 (New York: Izdatel'stvo Khronika, 1977), p. 35.
153. Arkhiv Samizdata (Munich), No. 3646, pp. 1-5.
154. Arkhiv Samizdata (Munich), No. 3230, p. 1.
155. See *The Human Rights Movement in Ukraine: Documents of the Ukrainian Helsinki Group 1976-1980*, ed. Lesya Verba and Bohdan 1980), and Iurii Badz'o, *Vidkrytyi lyst do Prezydii Verkhovnoi Rady Soiuzu RSR ta Tsentral'noho Komitetu KPRS* (New York: Vydannia Zakordonnoho predstavnytstva Ukrains'koi hromads'koi hrupy spriannia vykonanniu Helsinks'kykh uhod, 1980). Badz'o's essay, probably written in the spring of 1979, is available in German translation as *Protest aus Kiew gegen Menschenrechtsverletzungen: Ein sowjetischer Wissenschaftler berichtet* (Munich: Gesellschaft zu Förderung der Ukrainischen Helsinki-Gruppe, 1981).
156. *VII z'izd pys'mennykiv Radians'koi Ukrainy 14-16 kvitnia 1976 roku. Materialy z'izdu* (Kiev: Radians'kyi Pys'mennyk, 1977), p. 88.
158. Oles' Honchar, "Tsvit narodnoho slova," *Kul'tura slova*, Vypusk 12 (1977), 13-20.

159. Pavlo Zahrebel'nyi, "Obrii romanu," *Radians'ke literaturoznavstvo*, 1978, No. 7, 26.
160. See "Stan i perspektyvy leksykohrafichnykh doslidzhen' v Akademii nauk URSR," *Visnyk Akademii nauk Ukrain'skoi RSR*, 1978, No. 10, 5-6, and "Pro diial'nist Instytutu movoznavstva imeni O. O. Potebni," *Visnyk Akademii nauk Ukrain'skoi RSR*, 1979, No. 4, 6-8.
161. "Zahal'ni zbory Akademii nauk Ukrain'skoi RSR," *Visnyk Akademii nauk Ukrain'skoi RSR*, 1979, No. 7, 29.
162. M.V. Fomenko, "Sovershenstvovat' izuchenie i prepodavanie russkogo iazyka i literatury," *RJaL*, 1979, No. 3, 4.
163. See Roman Solchanyk, "Andropov Tries an Old Plan to Unify His Many Nations," *The Wall Street Journal*, June 7, 1983.
164. "V Politbiuro TsK KPSS," *Pravda*, May, 27, 1983.
165. Iu. Vasil'ev, "V pervyi raz vo vsekh klassakh," *Trud*, August 12, 1983.
166. "Vsegda s partiei, vsegda s narodom," *Literaturnaia gazeta*, December 8, 1982.
167. *Radians'ka Ukraina*, March 26, 1983. These criticisms were repeated by Zahrebel'nyi at an enlarged session of the Presidium of the Board of the Ukrainian Writers' Union held in July. See "Dovir"ia partii zobov'iazuie," *Literaturna Ukraina*, July 14, 1983.
168. For Details, see Roman Solchanyk, "USSR's Great Language Debate," *Soviet Analyst*, Vo. 11, Nos. 24 and 25 (December 8 and 22, 1982), 7-8 and 4-7, respectively.
169. A.S. Kapto, "Problemy aktualizatsii internatsional'nogo i patrioticheskogo vospitaniia v usloviakh obostrivsheisia ideologicheskoi bor'by," in *Vospityvat' ubezhdenykh patriotov-internatsionalistov* (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Politicheskoi Literatury, 1982), p. 66.
170. The conference materials were published in issues four through seven of *Ukrains'ka mova i literatura v shkoli* for 1982. On the television series, see Oles' Lupii, "Barvy 'Zhyvoho slova'," *Literaturna Ukraina*, December 4, 1981.
171. Solchanyk, Radio Liberty Research, 68/80. This data is taken from the report of the Statistical Administration of Kiev published in *Prapor komunizmu*, January 10, 1980. Parts of that data were later published in P.T. Tron'ko, *Kiev sotsialisticheskii* (Kiev: Naukova Dumka, 1982), p. 93, and G.P. Izhakevich, "Moguchee sredstvo edineniia narodov Sovetskogo Soiuzu," *RJaL*, 1982, No. 4, 7.
172. See Szporluk, *Handbook of Major Soviet Nationalities*, p. 42. See also his "Kiev as the Ukraine's Primate City," in *Eucharisterion: Essays Presented to Omeljan Pritsak on His Sixtieth Birthday by His Colleagues and Students*, ed. Ihor Sevchenko and Frank E. Sysyn, Vol. 3/4, Pt. 2 (1979-1980) of *Harvard Ukrainian Studies*, 843-849, and "Urbanization in Ukraine since the Second World War," in *Rethinking Ukrainian History*, ed. Ivan L. Rudnytsky (Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 1981), pp. 180-202.
173. Ia. Z. Garipov and A.A. Susokolov, "Pervaia Vsesoiuznaia shkola-seminar po etnosotsiologicheskim problemam," *Sovetskaia etnografiia*, 1979, No. 4, 214.
174. "'Vechirni Kyiv' maie rosiis'koho 'dviinyka'," *Svoboda* (Jersey City, N.J.), August 10, 1983.

