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## The “Rumour of Betrayal” and the 1668 Anti-Russian Uprising in Left-Bank Ukraine

ABSTRACT: This study explores the origins of the “rumour of betrayal” and its role in the 1668 anti-Russian uprising in the Left-Bank part of Cossack Ukraine. It examines important political developments involving the Cossack polity and identifies the Armistice of Andrusovo between the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and Russia (1667), which cemented the division of Ukraine, as a turning point leading to the uprising. Ukrainians perceived the Armistice as a “betrayal,” and their fears about the future gave rise to rumours of the betrayal and impending doom to their Fatherland. The reconstruction of the content of the “rumour of betrayal” and the political context under which it emerged points to it as the main factor behind the 1668 uprising, which marked a major, albeit temporary, setback in the Russian “Ukrainian policy” of that time.

On 8 February 1668 (JS),<sup>1</sup> a powerful anti-Russian uprising in Left-Bank Ukraine began with Hetman Ivan Briukhovets'kyi's Cossacks wiping out the Russian garrison in Hadiach—Briukhovets'kyi's capital city.<sup>2</sup> The *voevodes*<sup>3</sup> in Pryluky (Kirill Zagriazhskii), Sosnytsia (Vasilii Likhachev), Baturyn (Timofei Klokachev), and Hlukhiv (Miron Kologrivov), along with the details under their command, were taken prisoner, and those *voevodes* were brought to Hetman Briukhovets'kyi in Hadiach. The same fate befell the Russian commanders in Myrhorod and Poltava, who initially contemplated putting up resistance to the Cossacks. The *voevodes* of Starodub, Prince Ignatii Volkonskii, and Isai Kvashnin of Novhorod-Sivers'k were killed.<sup>4</sup>

The uprising spread quickly throughout Left-Bank Ukraine. The rebels called on Right-Bank Cossacks, the Crimean Tatars, and the Ottomans as allies.<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> All chronological references are given according to the Julian calendar (old style).

<sup>2</sup> *Akty, otnosiashchiesia k istorii Iuzhnoi i Zapadnoi Rossii. Sobrannye i izdannye arkhograficheskoi kommissiei* (henceforth—*Akty*), vol. 8 (St. Petersburg: V Tipografii V. V. Pratzha, 1875) 46–47; Sergei Solov'ev, *Istoriia Rossii v tsarstvovanie Alekseia Mikhailovicha*, vol. 3 (Moscow: V Tipografii Gracheva i K<sup>o</sup>, 1862) 29–30; Nikolai Kostomarov, *Ruina 1663–1687. Istoricheskaia monografiia. Getmanstva Brukhovetskago, Mnogogreshnago i Samoilovicha* (St. Petersburg and Moscow: Izdanie knigoprodavtsa-tipografa M. O. Vol'fa, 1882) 203–205.

<sup>3</sup> *Voivodes* were the Russian commanders in charge of garrison troops. For the role of Russian *voevodes* in Cossack Ukraine, see Petr Vladimirovich Pirog, “K voprosu o russkikh voevodakh na Ukraine vo vtoroi polovine XVII veka,” *Otechestvennaia istoriia* 2 (2003): 162–168.

<sup>4</sup> Solov'ev 3: 33; Kostomarov 205–206.

<sup>5</sup> Solov'ev 3: 35.

In June 1668, Hetman Ivan Briukhovets'kyi (1663–1668), hated by his subjects because of his earlier concessions to Moscow, was killed by an angry mob at the Cossack council. This council then confirmed Hetman Petro Doroshenko of Right-Bank Ukraine as hetman of unified Ukraine, with the boundaries it enjoyed under the rule of Bohdan Khmel'nyts'kyi (1648–1657). Doroshenko severed all former arrangements with both the Russian state and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth due to their participation in partitioning Cossack Ukraine, and pledged homage to the Ottoman Porte. At that point, it appeared that Cossack Ukraine was finally reunited and the Russian cause there was all but lost.

This all transpired less than three years after Briukhovets'kyi, the self-professed “forever loyal serf” (*vernii i vo veky neotstupnyi kholop*)<sup>6</sup> went to Moscow in September–October 1665, became a boyar, and married into the Russian nobility.<sup>7</sup> But why did Briukhovets'kyi and the populace of the lands under his rule rise against Russian rule in such a short time?

#### THE ORIGINS OF THE 1668 UPRISING IN HISTORIOGRAPHY

Since the appearance in the nineteenth century of the first studies on “the Ruin”—that era of strife, civil war, and foreign intervention in Cossack Ukraine from the 1650s to the 1670s—and up to the present day, historians have usually kept their main focus on the institutional, diplomatic, and military aspects of this period’s history.<sup>8</sup> Among the implications of this approach are the conservation

<sup>6</sup> See Briukhovets'kyi’s letters to the tsar Aleksei Mikhailovich from 11 November 1663, 12 December 1664, and 25 March 1665 in *Akty*, vol. 5 (St. Petersburg: V Tipografii Eduarda Pratzta, 1867) 190, 223, 262.

<sup>7</sup> *Akty*, vol. 6 (St. Petersburg: V Tipografii Eduarda Pratzta, 1869) 10–13; “Universaly ukrains'kykh het'maniv vid Ivana Vyhovs'koho do Ivana Samoilovycha (1657–1687),” in *Universaly ukrains'kykh het'maniv. Materialy do ukrains'koho dyplomatariiu. Serii I*, edited by Pavlo Sokhan' (Kyiv and L'viv: NTSh, 2004) 272. Moreover, in April 1662, Briukhovets'kyi, then a contender for the office of hetman, in a demagogical fashion expressed his wish to see Ukraine ruled by a “Prince of Little Rus” of Russian origin instead of an elected Cossack hetman. See *Akty* 5: 100–101.

<sup>8</sup> Besides the above-mentioned work by Mykola Kostomarov (*Ruina 1663–1687*), the list of studies that demonstrate this tendency includes Mykhailo Hrushevsky, *History of Ukraine-Rus'*, vol. 9, book 2 (pt. 2) (Edmonton and Toronto: CIUS Press, 2010); Dmytro Doroshenko, *Het'man Petro Doroshenko: ohliad ioho zhyttia i politychnoi diial'nosti (1659–1667 rr.)* (Kyiv: Osnovy, 2003); Taras Chukhlib, *Het'many i monarkhy: Ukrains'ka derzhava v mizhnarodnykh vidnosynakh 1648–1714 rr.* (Kyiv and New York: NTSh v SShA and NAN Ukrainy, 2003); Mykola Krykun, *Mizh viinoiu i radoiu: kozatstvo Pravoberezhnoi Ukrainy v druhii polovyni XVII–na pochatku XVIII stolittia* (Kyiv: Krytyka, 2006); Viktor Horobets', *'Volymo tsaria skhidnoho...': Ukrains'kyi Het'manat ta rosiis'ka dynastiia do i pislia Pereiaslava* (Kyiv: Krytyka, 2007).

of scholarly paradigms and approaches, some of which date back 150 years, and a lack of profound research on various social phenomena and social dynamics in the contemporaneous Ukrainian society. This results in a somewhat lopsided picture of Ukraine’s history during the abovementioned age. This characteristic is fully applicable to the state of research on Briukhovets'kyi’s 1668 uprising—a significant event of “the Ruin”.

Despite being regularly mentioned in the context of Ukrainian politics of the day, Briukhovets'kyi’s uprising and its origins have never been the subject of a separate study. However, the question about this uprising’s origins was addressed by historians as early as the 18th century.<sup>9</sup> During the 1800s, the scholars of Ukrainian origin Mykola Markevych and Dmytro Bantysh-Kamens'kyi considered “rumour” a significant factor contributing to Briukhovets'kyi’s uprising, though no in-depth studies of this phenomenon were ever undertaken. Later on their compatriot, Mykola Kostomarov, also contemplated the role of rumour in the 1668 uprising. However, without actually conducting a detailed study of this social phenomenon, he believed the arrival of Russian tax collectors and new troops in Ukraine to be more important in explaining the Cossacks’ secession from Moscow.<sup>10</sup> During the 1800s, the Russian historian Sergei Solov'ev made an essential point, maintaining that “all those trepidations, rumours, and revolts among the Cossacks” would not have resulted in significant changes in Left-Bank Ukraine if not for Briukhovets'kyi’s leadership.<sup>11</sup> Yet, he made no direct connection between “rumours” and Briukhovets'kyi’s decision to revolt. Overall, while discussing this subject the aforementioned scholars limited themselves to mere comments and provided no thorough analysis to support their claims.

Since then there have been neither significant attempts nor progress made in successfully explaining this uprising’s origins. Perhaps, this has to do with an assumption on the part of modern scholars that those issues were resolved successfully by their predecessors. As of today, there is no definitive answer as to what were the origins and the true impact of this uprising upon Ukrainian society, Ukrainian Cossack polity, and its neighbours. This study re-examines what we know about this historical event. It reviews the existing theoretical framework, reconstructs the politics of that historical period, analyzes political

<sup>9</sup> Aleksandr Rigel'man, *Letopisnoe povestvovanie o Maloi Rossii i eia narode i kozakakh vooobshche... Sobrano i sostavleno chrez trudy inzhener-general-maiora i kavalera Aleksandra Rigel'mana, 1785–86 goda* (Moscow: V Universitetskoj tipografii, 1847). Rigel'man was also among the first to pay attention to the role of rumours in the Briukhovets'kyi uprising. See Rigel'man 102–103.

<sup>10</sup> Nikolai Markevich, *Istoriia Malorossii*, vol. 2 (Moscow: V Tipografii Avgusta Semena, 1842) 154–157; Dmitrii Bantysh-Kamenskii, *Istoriia Maloi Rossii ot vodvorenii slavian v etoi strane do unichtozheniia getmanstva* (Moscow: V Tipografii Nikolaia Stepanova, 1842 [Reprint: Kyiv: Chas, 1993]) 269; Kostomarov 206.

<sup>11</sup> Solov'ev 3: 21.

and social dynamics, and recreates the psychological atmosphere in Ukrainian society during the late 1660s. It identifies and thoroughly investigates a phenomenon of social and political life—rumours about Russia’s betrayal of Cossack Ukraine—arguing that it served as the driving force behind Briukhovets'kyi’s uprising and, more broadly, behind important changes both in Ukrainian and East-European politics. This article shows that in the late 1660s Ukrainians perceived their present and their future differently *before* and *after* the “rumour of betrayal” took hold. Once this rumour emerged and spread, it changed the situation drastically, uniting politically divided Ukrainians against Russian rule, challenging government plans in both Moscow and Warsaw, and, ultimately, delaying Russia’s consolidation of power in Cossack Ukraine.

#### “RUMOUR” IN THEORY AND IN CONNECTION TO 17TH-CENTURY UKRAINIAN HISTORY

In 17th-century Ukrainian chronicles, contemporary official documents (for example, documents produced by Russian officials in Ukraine), and private papers, we find references to rumours using various terms: *slukhi* (rumours), *poslovitsa* (literally, a saying, or “things that people say”), and *plevela* (literally, “chaff”) to name a few.<sup>12</sup> People implicated in spreading rumours were often referred to as *plevoseiateli* (or “chaff-spreaders”).<sup>13</sup> Indeed, rumours seemed to play a considerable role in Ukraine’s political and social life during that time. This circumstance alone makes the absence of profound studies of this social phenomenon in Ukrainian historiography even more perplexing.

Before launching into the analysis of the origin and the role of “rumour” in the 1668 uprising, there are several significant aspects of rumour that need to be addressed with an eye to contemporary theoretical works written on this subject. Although the roots of a specific rumour can often be traced to a specific event (or events), this does not necessarily mean that “the rumour” in question was directly generated by that historical incident. “Rumour” is both the process and the result of people evaluating information that concerns them. This process usually takes time and often involves additional information, both authenticated and non-authenticated, for “rumour” compensates for information that is lacking or is withheld for various reasons. Also, rumours influence the creation and widening of various social networks, which play a crucial role in political developments in a given country during a specific historical period.<sup>14</sup>

<sup>12</sup> See *Litopys Samovydsia*, edited by Iaroslav Dzira (Kyiv: Naukova dumka, 1971) 102; *Akty* 6: 103; *Akty*, vol. 7 (St. Petersburg: V Tipografii V. V. Pratz, 1872) 4–5.

<sup>13</sup> *Akty* 6: 103.

<sup>14</sup> Some of methodological aspects of “rumour” have been addressed in the following studies, which I found helpful while researching this topic: Gordon W. Allport and Leo Postman, *The Psychology of Rumour* (New York: Russell & Russell Inc., 1965); Tamotsu Shibutani, *Improvised News: A Sociological Study of Rumour* (Indianapolis and New

The rumours which were documented during the 1660s and are available for scholarly interpretation today were recorded mainly because of their momentous impact on political life in Ukraine, particularly since they resulted in certain policy changes by the Russian government in the Ukrainian lands. That is why the interrogation records and trial proceedings by Russian investigators and judges are among the best primary sources on "rumour."

#### HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The 1668 uprising represented an important chapter in the history of early-modern Ukrainian statehood and in the history of the struggle for political dominance in Eastern Europe between Russia and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. This uprising also had a significant effect on the entire political architecture of Eastern Europe during the second half of the 17th century. A brief overview of events leading up to the crisis in Ukraine and concerning Russia and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, will help to set the scene.

The Cossack uprising against the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in 1648 resulted in the creation of a Ukrainian Cossack polity under Hetman Bohdan Khmel'nyts'kyi. Surrounded by the Commonwealth, the Khanate of Crimea (and its suzerain—the Ottoman Porte) and the Russian state, this polity—the Hetmanate, located on both sides of the Dnipro River, sought protection from one of those powers, with various Cossack political factions having different views on the Hetmanate's political orientation and its future. The "Russian vector" eventually became predominant with the Cossack polity pledging its allegiance to the tsar in Pereiaslav in 1654. However, after Russia and the Commonwealth reached an armistice agreement in Vilnius (1656) with Moscow ignoring Cossack interests and their warnings about Warsaw's "insincerity," Khmel'nyts'kyi and his administration became disenchanted with the tsar's protectorate over Ukraine.

The situation was exacerbated significantly after the death of Bohdan Khmel'nyts'kyi and the attempt of his successor, Hetman Ivan Vyhovs'kyi (1657–1659) to annul the alliance with Moscow and to make amends with the Commonwealth. This change of political course split the Cossack elite and populace of the Hetmanate and led to military interventions by the Russian and the Commonwealth's armies, eventually resulting in the Cossack polity's own division after 1660. Cossack Ukraine was split into two: the Right-Bank polity with its own hetman, administration, and army under the nominal protectorate of

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York: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1966); Ralph L. Rosnow and Gary Alan Fine, *Rumour and Gossip: The Social Psychology of Hearsay* (New York, Oxford, and Amsterdam: Elsevier, 1976); Gary Alan Fine, Véronique Campion-Vincent, and Chip Heath, eds., *Rumour Mills: The Social Impact of Rumour and Legend* (New Brunswick, USA, and London, UK: Aldine Transaction, 2005); and Nicholas DiFonzo and Prashant Bordia, *Rumour Psychology: Social and Organizational Approaches* (Washington, DC: American Psychological Association, 2007).

the Polish king, and the Left-Bank polity with its own government under the authority of the Russian tsar. Their existence was marked by continuous attempts by competing Cossack hetmans to unify the “old” Hetmanate and by the Commonwealth’s and Russia’s active diplomatic and military involvement in those affairs.<sup>15</sup> In 1668, the Right-Bank Cossack polity was ruled by Hetman Petro Doroshenko (1665–1676), who was about to sever his political ties with Warsaw and recognize the suzerainty of the Ottoman Porte, while the Left Bank was ruled by Hetman Briukhovets'kyi (1663–1668), who depended heavily on Moscow’s goodwill and assistance. In the meantime, both the Commonwealth and Russia were exhausted by years of war and sought a diplomatic solution to their conflict. It just happened that the proposed diplomatic solution and the price both parties were willing to pay jeopardized the vital interests of the Ukrainian Cossacks, above all, their hope to see the Hetmanate unified. In January 1667, Moscow and Warsaw concluded the Armistice of Andrusovo, which legalized the partition of the Hetmanate. When the news of the signing of this agreement reached Ukraine, the countdown to the uprising began.

ANATOMY OF A RUMOUR: THE EMERGENCE AND ROLE OF THE “RUMOUR OF BETRAYAL” IN BRIUKHOVETS'KYI’S UPRISING

The 17th-century Ukrainian *Eyewitness Chronicle* associated the beginning of Briukhovets'kyi’s uprising with two events. The first one occurred in 1666 when this hetman brought the Russian *voevodes* and tax collectors to Left-Bank Ukraine (1666). The second event, arguably more important, was the Armistice of Andrusovo (30 January 1667). Signed by the Russian state and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, the armistice legitimized the partition of Cossack Ukraine between these two powers.

According to the *Eyewitness Chronicle*, in the early winter of 1666 “Hetman Briukhovets'kyi returned from Moscow with great riches for he had given away all of Ukraine,” allowing Russian tax collectors and new Russian garrisons in Left-Bank Ukraine.<sup>16</sup> Kostomarov considered this event to be the main cause of Briukhovets'kyi’s uprising. Undoubtedly, the episode Kostomarov referred to was important in the political and economic life of the Left-Bank Cossack polity. However, we must review its true importance in relation to other developments.

At that time, two powerful people in the Left-Bank part of the Cossack polity advocated the idea of placing their country under greater control of both the Russian military and civil administrations. Those same people would later reverse their position and play key roles in starting the “rumour of betrayal,” disseminating it in Ukraine and instigating the uprising. The first was Metodii,

<sup>15</sup> See Iakovleva. A brief summary of that period’s political events is also provided in Chukhlib 108–115.

<sup>16</sup> *Litopys Samovydsia* 99.

the Bishop of Mstyslaŭ and Orsha (a bishopric in present-day Belarus') and a vicar of the Metropolitan see of Kyiv (1661–1668); the second was the Left-Bank Hetman Briukhovets'kyi. An enthusiastic supporter of the tsar's protectorate over Ukraine, Metodii spoke of the Russian monarch's hereditary right to Ukraine as early as 1657 and repeatedly pleaded for the establishment of the tsar's direct control over all Ukrainian towns.<sup>17</sup> During Hetman Vyhovs'kyi's break with Moscow in 1658–1659, Metodii showed himself to be the tsar's invaluable supporter and agent, persuading Ukrainians not to support Vyhovs'kyi's cause.<sup>18</sup> In 1662, while still a contender for the office of hetman, Briukhovets'kyi promised to abide by the "Articles of Pereiaslav" (1659) and to allow for the collection of taxes by Russian tax collectors in Left-Bank Ukraine.<sup>19</sup> During his visit to Moscow in October 1665, Briukhovets'kyi signed the so-called "Moscow Articles," which resulted in the arrival of Russian tax collectors to the Left Bank as well as more Russian garrisons in Ukrainian towns.<sup>20</sup>

In the meantime, the relationship between Bishop Metodii and Hetman Briukhovets'kyi became strained, eventually turning overtly hostile. Briukhovets'kyi had received the office of hetman in part due to the support of the Orthodox clergy, most of all Metodii, and was now keen to mitigate their influence while strengthening his own authority. In particular, the Left-Bank hetman grew wary of Metodii's great influence in Ukrainian affairs due to his popularity with the Russian court. Thus, Briukhovets'kyi began to accuse the bishop of betraying the tsar.<sup>21</sup> Metodii soon learned of Briukhovets'kyi's plot and decided to rid himself of his "ungrateful protégé." The bishop initiated negotiations with the Right-Bank Hetman Pavlo Teteria (1663–1665), offering him the office of hetman of a unified Ukraine—naturally, at Briukhovets'kyi's expense—in exchange for pledging allegiance to the Russian monarch.<sup>22</sup> The bishop also actively promoted a plan for changes in the internal governance of the Left-Bank polity which was favourably received by Moscow. According to Metodii's plan, the hetman was to be restricted to governing the Cossacks, while the Russian administration was to govern the burghers and peasants (with taxes,

<sup>17</sup> Andrii Iakovliv, *Ukrains'ko-moskovs'ki dohovory v XVII-XVIII vikakh* (Warszawa: Prace ukraińskiego instytutu naukowego, 1934) 86–87.

<sup>18</sup> Vitalii Eingorn, *Ocherki iz istorii Malorossii v XVII v.: snosheniia malorossiiskago dukhovenstva s moskovskim pravitel'stvom v tsarstvovanie Alekseia Mikhailovicha* (Moscow, 1899) 128–129, 231.

<sup>19</sup> *Perepysni knyhy 1666 roku*, edited by Viktor Romanovs'kyi (Kyiv: VUAN; Arkheohrafichna komisiia, 1928) vi.

<sup>20</sup> Iakovliv 84.

<sup>21</sup> Eingorn 246–247, 276.

<sup>22</sup> Eingorn 276–277.



levied in Ukraine, going directly to the Russian treasury).<sup>23</sup> If the bishop's plan had succeeded, it would have deprived the Cossacks of the finances necessary to maintain both their military organization and peacetime economic stability, thus weakening Cossack power considerably and preventing its domination over other social groups in Ukrainian society.<sup>24</sup>

Meanwhile, Briukhovets'kyi's position in Ukraine became extremely vulnerable. In order to preserve his office, the hetman frequently pleaded for more Russian military protection. Using the pretext that he had only "about a hundred people who remain[ed] loyal to him" the hetman asked the tsar to send military "Russian people" for his, Briukhovets'kyi's, safety.<sup>25</sup> During the next two and a half years this hetman would persist with other similar requests.<sup>26</sup> Briukhovets'kyi's fears about the solidity of his position in Left-Bank Ukraine were exacerbated by the fact that since August 1665 he had faced a staunch opponent in the resolute and widely popular Petro Doroshenko, the hetman of Right-Bank Ukraine, who only nominally recognized the authority of the Polish king.<sup>27</sup>

Hetman Briukhovets'kyi's primary and very difficult goal was to secure the loyalty of "his" Left-Bank Cossacks by appeasing them rather than provoking their dissatisfaction. Thus, the hetman was willing to make serious concessions to Moscow at the expense of social groups other than the Cossacks. During his 1665 Moscow visit, Briukhovets'kyi expressed his preference for placing the Ukrainian Orthodox Church and the metropolitan of Kyiv under the authority of the Patriarch of Moscow. This stance and the hetman's plea to send a new metropolitan from Moscow to Kyiv cost Briukhovets'kyi the support of many of the topmost church hierarchs in Ukraine: Bishop Metodii and most of clergy "spoke angrily", pledging to die rather than to see a metropolitan from Moscow enthroned in Kyiv.<sup>28</sup> Many burghers and peasants increased their opposition to Briukhovets'kyi's administration due to the heavy taxes imposed upon them, which they had to pay in money, horses, forage, and other items. Briukhovets'kyi also persecuted many popular Cossack officers opposed to his

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<sup>23</sup> *Perepysni knyhy 1666 roku* vi.

<sup>24</sup> *Perepysni knyhy 1666 roku* vi.

<sup>25</sup> *Akty* 6: 10. The tsar commanded that Kyiv was to have 5,000 Russian soldiers; Chernihiv—1,200; Pereiaslav—2,000; Nizhyn—1,200; Novhorod-Sivers'k—300; Poltava—1,500; Kreminchuk and Kodak—300 each; separate detail for hetman's protection was set at 300 of Russian infantry. See *Akty* 6: 18.

<sup>26</sup> *Akty* 6: 202.

<sup>27</sup> *Akty* 5: 308.

<sup>28</sup> *Akty* 6: 79, 103.

authority, resulting in dissatisfaction in the Cossack ranks and further weakening the overall solidity of his power.<sup>29</sup>

It appears that Briukhovets'kyi realized the complexity of the situation and the threat to his authority. Above all, he foresaw possible trouble arising should Russian officials collect excessive taxes from Ukrainians. Thus, the hetman wrote to the commander of the Russian garrison in Kyiv, boyar Petr Vasil'evich Sheremetev (4–5 May 1666) urging him to collect fewer taxes from “rebellious and disloyal” Ukrainians to avoid irritating them excessively until the Ukrainians got used to those taxes or were broken by the Russian military presence.<sup>30</sup> Moreover, the hetman was aware of the potentially ruinous power of rumours which could emerge and spread among disgruntled Ukrainians. According to him, it would take only “one chaff-spreader” (*odnogo plevoseiatelia*) to cause the rebellion of thousands of people.<sup>31</sup> Briukhovets'kyi went on to write to Sheremetev: “even though they [“chaff-spreaders”] will perish themselves, they will cause trouble, and it will be difficult to stop it, and the enemy will be close and supported by the ‘Zaporozhians.’”<sup>32</sup> Briukhovets'kyi’s words about the danger of rumours soon proved prophetic. This comment illustrates how historical figures themselves recognized and correctly assessed the significant effect a “rumour” could have on the political situation.

Briukhovets'kyi’s concessions to Moscow compounded by numerous incidents of the Russians’ misconduct against the local population soon gave rise to violent opposition. On 20 July 1666, the Cossacks of Pereiaslav, incited by their counterparts in Hetman Doroshenko’s service, rose against their pro-Russian Cossack administration, killing Colonel Danylo (Danko) Iarmolens'kyi, who only a few months earlier, along with other supporters of Briukhovets'kyi,

<sup>29</sup> Besides “many Cossack officers and ordinary Cossacks” whom Briukhovets'kyi punished with death or exile, there were the Military Judge, Iurii Nezamai, Colonels Hryhorii Hamaleia (Myrhorod regiment), Detsyk Vasil'ev (Ovruch regiment), Semen Vysochan (Lysenka regiment), Semen Tret'iak (Kyiv regiment), and Matiash Popke[ie]vych (Irkliiv regiment), accused of treason by the hetman, sent to Moscow, and then exiled to Siberia. Also, up to fifty Cossack officers of various ranks, among them company commanders, military scribes, regimental aides-de-camp, were exiled to Siberia (for example, to Iakutsk, Tomsk, and Irkutsk). Bishop Metodii wrote to the Russian authorities in this regard, saying that for Ukrainian people “it is easier to die than to be exiled to Muscovy.” See *Akty* 6: 99–104; *Dopolneniia k aktam istoricheskim, sobrannye i izdannye arkheograficheskoiu kommissieiu*, vol. 6 (St. Petersburg: V Tipografii Eduarda Pratzha, 1857) 74–75. Also, see Natalia Iakovenko, *Narys istorii seredn'ovichnoi ta rann'omodernoï Ukrainy* (Kyiv: Krytyka, 2005) 381–382.

<sup>30</sup> *Akty* 6: 102.

<sup>31</sup> *Akty* 6: 103.

<sup>32</sup> *Akty* 6: 103. The term *Zaporozhians* refers to the Cossacks from the Zaporozhian Sich.

had received a noble title from the tsar.<sup>33</sup> The rebels elected a replacement colonel from their ranks and proceeded to attack the Russian garrison in Pereiaslav. But the Russian *voivode*, Grigorii Verderevskii, fought them off, burning most of Pereiaslav in the process. The rebels escaped and joined Hetman Doroshenko.<sup>34</sup> This revolt provided a glimpse of what soon awaited the Russian authorities throughout Left-Bank Ukraine.

Briukhovets'kyi's explanation of this uprising and why Ukraine experienced such unrest was expressed in his conversation with the tsar's envoy Iona Leont'ev on 30 September 1666. The hetman remarked that the Russian commanders (like Fedor Protas'ev of Hadiach) and their troops were responsible for numerous wrongdoings with regard to the local people. He also pointed out that the male population of neighbouring towns had had to leave their households and to escape together with their wives and children to *Zaporizhia*<sup>35</sup>, where accounts of their grievances could trigger a riot. Finally, the hetman accused Bishop Metodii of provoking the conflict. As stated by Briukhovets'kyi, the bishop, in his travels from Moscow to Ukraine via Belgorod in 1666, "spread *venomous words* among the people" (yet another term for "rumour") contributing to the spread of this unrest.<sup>36</sup> This letter illustrates the great significance Briukhovets'kyi accorded to the power of rumours and the necessity to contain them. It also indicates that Metodii was no stranger to spreading rumours and probably knew the circumstances in which they could effectively stir up the desired reaction.

As this research shows, despite the conflict in Russian-controlled Cossack Ukraine, particularly Hadiach, Poltava, and *Zaporizhia*, and even the uprising in Pereiaslav, as of 1666 there was no indication that Moscow might be on the brink of losing control over this land and over its puppet ruler, Briukhovets'kyi. After all, Cossack Ukraine had been in a continuous state of conflict since Vyhovs'kyi's split with Moscow, known by later generations as "The Ruin."<sup>37</sup>

<sup>33</sup> This important event was recorded in the contemporaneous Ukrainian—*Eyewitness*, *Chernihiv*, and *Dvoret's'kyi Family*—chronicles. See respectively *Litopys Samovydtisia* 100; Iu. Mytsyk, "Chernihivs'kyi litopys," *Siverians'kyi litopys* 4.10 (1996): 113; and also his "Litopisets' Dvoret'skikh—pamiatnik ukrainskogo letopisaniia XVII veka," in *Letopisi i khroniki 1984*, edited by Boris Rybakov (Moscow: Nauka, 1984) 233.

<sup>34</sup> *Akty* 6: 137–138.

<sup>35</sup> *Zaporizhia* was the name for the Lower Dnipro region with the centre at the Zaporozhian Sich. I use this term to describe a certain historical territory instead of using its modernized form "Zaporizhzhia," as in the city's name in modern Ukraine.

<sup>36</sup> *Akty* 6: 149, 177. This accusation can be considered among the first implications of Metodii in spreading rumours with political subtext.

<sup>37</sup> Zbigniew Wójcik, "From the Peace of Oliwa to the Truce of Bakhchisarai. International Relations in Eastern Europe, 1660–1681," *Acta Poloniae Historica* 34 (1976): 261. Also, see the previously cited works by Kostomarov, Horobets', Iakovleva, Iakovenko, and Chukhlib.

The Polish king's invasion of Left-Bank Ukraine (October 1663–February 1664), which ended in failure, represented the last attempt by the Commonwealth to retake that territory by military force.<sup>38</sup> Subsequently, no direct challenge to Briukhovets'kyi came from Warsaw. Doroshenko's raids on Left-Bank Ukraine and his popularity there, though threatening, could not and would not result in the loss of power for Briukhovets'kyi so long as the latter remained loyal to Moscow.<sup>39</sup> In 1666, Briukhovets'kyi was a loyal subject of the tsar and with the help of Russian forces managed to preserve at least limited control over his domain. Metodii remained Moscow's valuable "agent of influence" in Ukraine, though his importance to the tsarist government was somewhat diminished. The dissatisfaction of many Ukrainians with the Russian presence and the local uprisings, though worrisome to both the hetman's and Russian administrations, could still be contained and did not shift the balance of power in Left-Bank Ukraine at that time. Thus, the introduction of Russian tax collectors and troops to the Left Bank in 1666, although a significant aggravation to the Ukrainian population, was hardly the trigger of the 1668 uprising.

Looking at political affairs from 1666 on, one particular event stands out as the likely cause of the emergence of the "rumour of betrayal" and the 1668 uprising. On 30 January 1667, the Russian state and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth signed the Armistice of Andrusovo, finalizing the partition of Cossack Ukraine along the Dnipro. According to the Polish historian Zbigniew Wójcik, the Armistice "jolted [...] Ukraine and prepared the ground for a further aggravation of the already tense situation in that tragic land."<sup>40</sup> Wójcik also writes about widespread hostility in Ukraine towards the authorities in both Moscow and Warsaw caused by this armistice:

[...] Quite evidently, the ending of the long-drawn-out Polish-Russian hostilities and the agreement of 30th January, 1667, were reached mainly at the cost of Ukraine which was now to remain [...] divided right across its middle between the two powers [...] The tragedy of the partition dawned immediately on the entire Ukrainian community, from the landed gentry and well-to-do Cossack elders to the poor disowned Ukrainian peasants [...] An air of hostility towards both the signatories of the Andrusovo agreement swept the entire Ukrainian people [...]<sup>41</sup>

The *Eyewitness Chronicle* attests to the fact that the news of the Armistice of Andrusovo and its conditions spread in the form of rumours throughout Ukraine. These rumours contained references to actual articles of the

<sup>38</sup> Jan Perdenia, *Hetman Piotr Doroszenko a Polska* (Kraków: Universitas, 2000) 62–63; Iakovenko 382.

<sup>39</sup> Kostomarov 143–145.

<sup>40</sup> Wójcik, "From the Peace of Oliwa to the Truce of Bakhchisarai," 261.

<sup>41</sup> Wójcik, "From the Peace of Oliwa to the Truce of Bakhchisarai," 261–262.

agreements, such as the ceding of Kyiv (article 7 of the treaty) to the Commonwealth, the prohibition for Cossacks on both banks of the Dnipro to change their allegiance to their respective sovereigns (article 4), and the return of Cossack booty (silver, sacred ritual objects, and books), taken from Roman Catholic churches (articles 6, 8, and 9).<sup>42</sup> Those rumours also referred to one very important provision: were the Cossacks on either side of the Dnipro to resist, they would be pacified by joint Commonwealth-Russian forces (article 30).<sup>43</sup>

News about the signing of the Armistice of Andrusovo as well as the way it reached Ukraine affected the hetmans of both banks of the Dnipro. Upon learning of it, Hetman Doroshenko of Right-Bank Ukraine “fell ill for two days,”<sup>44</sup> while Briukhovets'kyi, who had heard about the provisions of the Armistice and the Russian secret negotiations with his rival, Doroshenko, became disillusioned with Russian protection.

After concluding the Armistice, the tsar sent his envoy, *stol'nik*<sup>45</sup> Ivan Telepnev, to Briukhovets'kyi to notify him of the end of war. The same news was conveyed to Briukhovets'kyi's own envoys, Colonels Iakiv Lyzohub and Kostiantyn Myhalevs'kyi, stationed in Moscow since late January-February 1667. These envoys were told to write to their hetman to inform him that the tsar “had made peace with the Polish king and there would be no war between them, that he, the hetman, not send troops and [reconnaissance] parties to the other side of the Dnipro,” and that the same instructions were sent to the hetman with *stol'nik* Telepnev.<sup>46</sup>

Telepnev's mission to Ukraine lasted from 12 February to 11 March 1667. The Russian envoy met with Briukhovets'kyi in Hadiach on 27 February 1667 and handed him the tsar's letter about the armistice with Poland concluded for the duration of 13 years and 6 months (until June 1680) and, allegedly, the list of the articles (*spisok s dogovornykh statei o mirnom postanovlenii*).<sup>47</sup> In Kyiv, boyar Sheremetev invited the heads of local monasteries to attend a celebratory

<sup>42</sup> *Litopys Samovydsia* 102. For the actual articles of the Armistice of Andrusovo, see *Polnoe sobranie zakonov rossiiskoi imperii* (hereafter *PSZRI*), vol. 1 (St. Petersburg: V Tipografii II otdeleniia sobstvennoi ego Imperatorskago Velichestva kantseliarii, 1830) 656–669.

<sup>43</sup> *Litopys Samovydsia* 102. Article 30 of the treaty ruled that the Commonwealth and Russia would secure the retention of both parts of Ukraine and Zaporizhia under their respective authority, and that they would secure the loyalty of Ukrainian Cossacks by uniting their military forces. See *PSZRI* 1: 668.

<sup>44</sup> *Akty* 6: 243.

<sup>45</sup> “Master of the pantry,” in this case, the palace official entrusted with foreign affairs.

<sup>46</sup> *Akty* 6: 159–160.

<sup>47</sup> *Akty* 6: 173.

service at St. Sophia Cathedral to mark the end of hostilities between the Russian state and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth.<sup>48</sup>

It is important to establish whether the Cossack leadership and general public in Ukraine learned of all of the armistice's conditions. Also, it is important to know whether they learned about those conditions from the tsar's manifesto and did so promptly. Aleksandr Rigel'man, in his *Letopisnoe povestvovanie o Maloi Rossii*—a compilation of facts from earlier works, particularly Cossack chronicles, which was completed some hundred years after these events—wrote that the tsar sent *stol'nik* Evstratii Antipov to notify the hetman of the armistice and its conditions, "which were announced to the hetman and all the people" in the Russia-controlled part of Ukraine.<sup>49</sup> However, what exactly Antipov told the hetman about the armistice's conditions remains unclear. As for the tsar's manifesto to Briukhovets'kyi, delivered by Telepnev, it *did not* contain a detailed account of the armistice's articles. Bishop Metodii in his later testimonies denied that either he or the late hetman was informed of the decisions regarding Kyiv and the partition of Ukraine.<sup>50</sup> In Briukhovets'kyi's letter to the tsar of March 1667 we find the following lines: "*Stol'nik* Ivan Stepanovich Telepnev did not inform me sufficiently about this current peace or an armistice, and without informing me [about it] left for Kyiv suddenly; none of the Cossacks and commoners in Little Rus' towns are informed about [the armistice's conditions] either [...]"<sup>51</sup> What is evident is that the tsar's manifesto about the armistice that was made public in Left-Bank Ukraine contained no reference to Moscow's important concessions to the Commonwealth whatsoever (particularly, that Kyiv was to revert to the Commonwealth in 1669).<sup>52</sup> Thus, we have a situation where the Russian government withheld important information about an armistice crucial to Ukraine's political future. Perhaps this was done to negate any possibility of unrest in Russia-controlled part of the Cossack polity. Regardless, news of such grave importance could never be contained: the authorities of the Commonwealth, in an attempt to draw a wedge between the Left-Bank populace and Moscow, leaked the news of the armistice's articles to the Ukrainian subjects of the Russian tsar, emphasizing the forthcoming return of Kyiv to the king. As could have been predicted, the leaked news immediately gave rise to great confusion, first of all, among the Kyivan townsfolk and the Orthodox clergy.<sup>53</sup>

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<sup>48</sup> *Akty* 6: 176.

<sup>49</sup> Rigel'man 103.

<sup>50</sup> *Akty* 7: 78–79.

<sup>51</sup> Dmitrii Bantysh-Kamenskii, *Istochniki malorossiiskoi istorii*, part 1 (Moscow: V Universitetskoi tipografii, 1858) 180.

<sup>52</sup> *Akty* 7: 78–79; Kostomarov 186–187, 206.

<sup>53</sup> Eingorn 419.

To both official Moscow and Warsaw this armistice meant relief from hostilities, if not their end. The head of the Russian government's department in charge of affairs in Ukraine, the *Malorossiiskii prikaz*, boyar Afanasii Lavrent'evich Ordin-Nashchekin, favoured Russia's reconciliation with the Commonwealth and was willing to cede most if not all of Cossack Ukraine to the Polish king if this would bring lasting peace between two countries. This position of Ordin-Nashchekin was known to Ukrainian political figures of that time, which made the tsar's minister very unpopular among them.<sup>54</sup>

The news of Ukraine's partition and the ceding of Kyiv to the Poles was disseminated quickly and created widespread fury and feelings of great uncertainty about the future among Ukrainians.<sup>55</sup> After all, despite the hardships of the war against the Commonwealth, there was still hope in Left-Bank Ukraine that all Cossack lands would be united under the sceptre of the Russian tsar. Ukrainians must have felt furious, betrayed, and distrustful of the Russian authorities, their plans, and all news coming from Moscow. They, no doubt, expected even worse than what had been reported to them.

Indeed, rumours about "secret protocols," reached at Andrusovo, regarding the partition and the complete obliteration of Ukraine, began to fly around Ukraine, further aggravating feelings aroused by talk of Moscow ceding Kyiv to the Poles and the partition of Ukraine between the tsar and the king. There were a number of factors that contributed to the development of these rumours. Not only were Cossack delegates excluded from the actual negotiations at Andrusovo, but when those delegates went to Moscow, they felt they had been "maltreated" there. Speeches by some Russian officials in Moscow also contributed to the growth of these rumours. Briukhovets'kyi was not spared from feelings of uncertainty about the future of Cossack Ukraine and, particularly, its Left-Bank part. Unsure what to expect, he wrote to the tsar in June 1667: "I beseech and ask for Your Illustrious Majesty the Tsar's edict [explaining] what will happen here in Ukraine in the future?"<sup>56</sup>

Some of the reasons for the hetman's uncertainty can be found in the same letter. One of the tsar's officials, Mikołaj Spodoba, allegedly told Briukhovets'kyi's envoy in Moscow, Military Scribe Lavrentii Kasperev, that "Your Majesty, through Your Majesty's supreme envoys [...] while negotiating peace with His Majesty the king, which we all wish for and with which we are

<sup>54</sup> Vasilii Kliuchevskii, *A Course in Russian History: The Seventeenth Century*, translated by Natalie Duddington, with introduction by Alfred J. Rieber (Armonk and London: M.E. Sharpe, 1994) 367–368. After the 1668 uprising and due to "extreme irritation and rage of all representatives" of Cossack Ukraine against him, A. Ordin-Nashchekin in January 1669 was removed from his position at the *Malorossiiskii prikaz*. See Pavel Matveev, "Artamon Sergeevich Matveev v prikaze Maloi Rossii i ego otnoshenie k delam i liudiam etogo kraia," *Russkaia mysl'* (1901): 7.

<sup>55</sup> Matveev 3–4.

<sup>56</sup> *Akty* 6: 203.

all pleased, had agreed upon and affirmed by secret protocols, to jointly raze Ukraine [...]”<sup>57</sup> Apparently, Spodoba was loosely interpreting article 30 of the Armistice, which provided for a joint Russian-Commonwealth suppression of Cossack opposition should it arise. The hetman in his letter then assured his sovereign that he had not believed that story even for a second (*chemu ia vo vek ne imuchi very*). Despite this assurance, Briukhovets'kyi forbade Kasperev to say anything to anyone about what he had been told in Moscow. The hetman argued that were the local people to learn of the incident with Spodoba, the Cossacks would become extremely anxious.<sup>58</sup> Given this possibility, Briukhovets'kyi, unsure as to what to expect from the armistice, tried to contain the dangerous rumours in his jurisdiction.

By the early summer of 1667 there was already talk in Left-Bank Ukraine of the looming Cossack attack on the Russian garrisons. On 25 June 1667, the abbess of one of the convents in north-eastern Ukraine reported to the Russian commander there that a Cossack had spoken of the imminent Cossack attack against the Russian garrisons in various towns.<sup>59</sup> It is likely that there was no plan to take out all the Russian garrisons in Ukraine at once, as would be attempted by Briukhovets'kyi in February 1668, because in the summer of 1667 this hetman was still loyal to the tsar. However, those Russian units represented the most obvious target for the Cossacks, who were already in a very agitated state. In summer 1667, news about the May 1667 killing of the Russian envoy to Crimea, *stol'nik* Evfimii Ladyzhenskii, by the Zaporozhian Sich Cossacks as well as the news about growing popular unrest in Ukraine reached Moscow. The tsar responded to this news with a 7 July 1667 manifesto to all Ukrainians calling on them to remain faithful to the hetman and the Russian monarch.<sup>60</sup>

Meanwhile, in early 1667, Bishop Metodii, Briukhovets'kyi's political enemy, beseeched the Russian government to grant him the eparchy of Belgorod (Bilhorod). Apparently, he wanted some compensation in case Kyiv was returned to the Commonwealth. Metodii also asked for donations of honey, sable pelts, and money for both his personal needs and to use in securing the loyalty of Ukrainians to Moscow. In contrast to previous years this time the bishop, whose current influence on Ukrainian affairs was deemed by the tsar's court as rather modest, received nothing and understandably was very upset.<sup>61</sup>

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<sup>57</sup> *Akty* 6: 203.

<sup>58</sup> *Akty* 6: 203.

<sup>59</sup> Eingorn 420.

<sup>60</sup> *PSZRI* 1: 716–718; Bantysh-Kamenskii, *Istochniki malorossiiskoi istorii* 180–183.

<sup>61</sup> Eingorn 399, 412–414. As of 1667, the Russian government relied less on Metodii's political influence in Ukraine and sought assistance from other clerics instead (for example, from Innokentii Gizel'—the Archimandrite of the Caves Monastery in Kyiv). Also, the Russian officials did not understand why they had to bribe Ukrainians at great



Nevertheless, Metodii continued recommending steps he considered necessary to pacify Ukrainians and keep them loyal to Moscow. He warned Russian officials about Hetman Doroshenko's plan to secure the loyalty of the residents of Left-Bank Ukraine (which was true) and advised that Russian garrisons there should be increased so that Doroshenko could not overcome them. In view of the recent local mutinies and general dissatisfaction in Ukraine, the tsar instructed boyar Ordin-Nashchekin to discuss these matters further with Metodii. During their meeting on 15 August 1667, the bishop repeated his apprehension about the situation in Ukraine only to have it dismissed by Ordin-Nashchekin, who allegedly said that Doroshenko was not "worth spit" because he had no support. According to Russian historian Vitalii Eingorn, it was at this meeting that Metodii realized the Russian government no longer trusted him with the task of pacifying Ukraine. The bishop left Moscow nursing a great frustration with the tsar's government. He arrived in Ukraine in early September 1667.<sup>62</sup>

Complying with the tsar's order to reconcile with Briukhovets'kyi, Metodii went to Nizhyn to meet with the hetman.<sup>63</sup> Briukhovets'kyi rode outside the town to meet the bishop in person. There they feasted and talked in the hetman's tent for a whole week. In Nizhyn, Metodii received more bad news via his underling, priest Simeon Adamovych, also an active agent of Moscow's influence in Left-Bank Ukraine. The bishop learned that the Russian government had decided to replace him with the Archimandrite of the Kyiv Caves Monastery, Innokentii Gizel', as the chief negotiator between the tsar and both Hetman Doroshenko and Metropolitan Iosyf Neliubovych-Tukal's'kyi. The objective of the negotiations was to win the Right-Bank hetman and "his" metropolitan over to the Russian side.<sup>64</sup> Metodii's only consolation was that the renewed efforts by Moscow to shift Doroshenko's and Tukul's'kyi's loyalty to the tsar would also weaken the position of the Left-Bank hetman, Briukhovets'kyi. The bishop became convinced that in these circumstances, adverse for them both, Briukhovets'kyi might no longer see him as the enemy,

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expense when there was no grave danger to Russian authority there (unlike during the time of Hetman Ivan Vyhovs'kyi's revolt in 1658).

<sup>62</sup> Eingorn 414–415.

<sup>63</sup> Though placed in charge of the Metropolitan see of Kyiv, Metodii would not go to Kyiv willingly, because the commander of the local Russian garrison, Petr Sheremetev, was the bishop's personal enemy.

<sup>64</sup> Iosyf Neliubovych-Tukal's'kyi (?–1675) was elected metropolitan on 19 October 1663. Widely popular among Ukrainians on both banks of the Dnipro, Tukul's'kyi was nonetheless shunned by both Moscow and Warsaw. See discussion in Kostomarov; Illarion Chistovich, *Ocherk istorii zapadno-russkoi tserkvi*, part II (St. Petersburg: Tipografiia Departamenta udelov, 1884); and Roman I. Shiyani, "Between Faith and Country: The Predicament of Metropolitan Iosyf Nelibovych-Tukul's'kyi," *Canadian Slavonic Papers* 52.3–4 (September–December 2010): 373–390.

and might be willing to mend their relationship.<sup>65</sup> Indeed, the previous animosity was forgotten, replaced with a “firm friendship.” To cement their reconciliation, Metodii even offered his daughter as a bride to the hetman’s nephew.<sup>66</sup>

What exactly did the bishop and the hetman discuss all week? Briukhovets'kyi “bitterly complained” to Metodii about his maltreatment by the Russian government, while Metodii not only did not try to dissuade his future relative, but added fuel to the fire by divulging news of the Russian government’s contacts with Briukhovets'kyi’s enemy—Doroshenko. The real purpose of those contacts was to win Doroshenko over to the Russian side, not to oust Briukhovets'kyi from his office. In fact, the tsar refused Doroshenko’s request to be named hetman of a unified Ukraine and thus remained the committed patron of the Left-Bank hetman.<sup>67</sup> Nonetheless, the discussion with Metodii served to escalate Briukhovets'kyi’s suspicion of Russian plans for Ukraine and his own authority.

In December 1667 more news that seemed to confirm the already circulating “betrayal” rumours reached Ukraine. First, Bishop Metodii, Archbishop Lazar Baranovych of Chernihiv, and Hetman Ivan Briukhovets'kyi all received letters from Tsar Aleksei Mikhailovich about his impending visit to “His Majesty’s patrimony”—Kyiv, where the Russian monarch desired to pray before the local relics. The letters also notified the recipients that boyar Ordin-Nashchekin would be coming to Ukraine with an army to prepare for the arrival of the Russian sovereign.<sup>68</sup> Of no less impact was news of the so-called “envoys’ treaty,” signed in Moscow on 14 December 1667 by Commonwealth and Russian negotiators. According to this treaty, the tsar promised to supply the Commonwealth with 25,000 troops to carry out a diversion against the Khanate of Crimea.<sup>69</sup> This latest treaty also contained provisions for joint military operations of Commonwealth and Russian forces against both the “Muslim threat” and “mutinous Cossacks,” and could not possibly have come at a worse time.

The “envoys’ treaty” was meant to be a means of carrying out some of the Armistice of Andrusovo’s decisions, but the “mutinous Cossacks” clause raised

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<sup>65</sup> Eingorn 428–429.

<sup>66</sup> Bantysh-Kamenskii, *Istoriia Maloi Rossii* 269. In regard to Bishop Metodii having children, it must be noted that he had been initially a married cleric (a proto-presbyter of Nizhyn), though widowed and celibate at the time of his elevation to a higher office (1661). See Oleksandr Morozov, *Nizhyns'kyi protopop Maksym Fylymonovych* (Nizhyn: Nizhyns'kyi derzhavnyi pedahohichnyi universytet im. Mykoly Hoholia, 2000) 63.

<sup>67</sup> Eingorn 430–431.

<sup>68</sup> Eingorn 436–437.

<sup>69</sup> *PSZRI* 1: 727–734; Zbigniew Wójcik, *Między traktatem Andruszowskim a wojna turecką stosunki polsko-rosyjskie 1667–1672* (Warszawa: Państwowe wydawnictwo naukowe, 1968) 123–124.

alarm in Ukraine. The very title of this treaty looked ominous: “A treaty, concluded between the Russian and Polish envoys about the uniting of the Russian and Polish troops, 25,000 from each side, against the Turks and the mutinous Cossacks [...]”<sup>70</sup> Article 1 of the treaty described the provisions in greater detail. It stipulated that the tsar would dispatch five thousand cavalry and 20,000 infantry troops to be garrisoned in fortified places between the Dnipro and Dnistro rivers, and that these forces would be matched by the king. This unified army would be available to repulse the “infidels” in case of war, and to pacify the unruly people of Ukraine—subjugating the rebellious Cossacks.<sup>71</sup>

Although the article specifically referred to the Cossacks of Right-Bank Ukraine, Hetman Doroshenko and his Muslim allies,<sup>72</sup> not only Doroshenko but also Briukhovets'kyi saw the massing of these troops as an imminent danger to their respective individual power as well as to Cossack Ukraine as a whole. Ironically, Doroshenko, who was already growing more suspicious about the true nature of Russian intentions, learned of the tsar’s trip from boyar Sheremetev’s letters and immediately suspected treachery on the part of the Russians and the Poles. He was wary of the possibility that the Commonwealth, bolstered by the presence of a large Russian force in Ukraine, would take the opportunity to wage war on the Cossacks.

Doroshenko’s suspicions were soon disseminated among Briukhovets'kyi’s subjects: the Cossacks on the Left Bank began to blatantly repeat that Ordin-Nashchekin was coming to Ukraine with the purpose of returning Kyiv to the Poles, as agreed at Andrusovo, and to raze Ukraine with fire and sword.<sup>73</sup> Rumours that Moscow and Warsaw had signed “secret protocols” aiming to obliterate the Cossacks rapidly spread through Ukraine. This heralded a new twist in the “rumour of betrayal” and its dissemination among Ukrainians.

Rumours about the “envoys’ treaty” reached the Left Bank through other channels as well. Hlukhiv magistrate Oleksii Zaruts'kyi passed on to both Briukhovets'kyi and Metodii that a painter from Hlukhiv, Zakharko, had returned from Moscow two weeks after this new treaty had been concluded and related news concerning the “eternal treaty” between the tsar and the king (that is, the “envoys’ treaty”). According to Zakharko, about 20,000 Russian cavalry (!) and 40,000 Russian infantry (!) would soon arrive in Ukraine. Zakharko even claimed that on his way to Ukraine he had seen Russian troops marching near the Russian town of Kaluga.<sup>74</sup> This case illustrates how the inflated troop numbers and personal observations of a single traveller could augment suspicions of people in power as well as their subjects and affect both their

<sup>70</sup> *PSZRI* 1: 727.

<sup>71</sup> *PSZRI* 1: 729.

<sup>72</sup> *PSZRI* 1: 730.

<sup>73</sup> *Eingorn* 436–437.

<sup>74</sup> *Akty* 7: 79.

understanding of the situation and their actions. Solov'ev noted in his work that at this point the Left-Bank Cossacks' position changed from suspecting the existence of the "secret protocols" between the Russians and the Poles to claiming that those protocols actually existed.<sup>75</sup>

Thus, December to early January 1668<sup>76</sup> was a crucial time for the escalation of rumours. The news of the impending arrival of fresh Russian troops to Ukrainian towns was augmented by news of the recent Russian-Commonwealth negotiations and was combined with rumours about the "secret protocols," the looming return of Kyiv to "the Poles," and the destruction of Ukraine. In early January 1668, the commander of the Russian troops in Nizhyn, Ivan Rzhetskii, informed boyar Sheremetev about "the rumours related to him by the Bishop of Nizhyn, Metodii, that boyar Afanasii Ordin-Nashchekin is coming with troops to Little Rus' and that Kyiv will be ceded to the Poles."<sup>77</sup> Rzhetskii also reported that the bishop had repeated these rumours in the presence of Russian officers and "other people."<sup>78</sup>

In January 1668, the tsar ordered Russian commanders in Ukraine to persuade Ukrainians that no harm would come from the arrival of Ordin-Nashchekin and Russian troops so that people in Ukraine would "not harbour any doubts or fear and [would] not succumb to *rotten chaff-spreading nuisances* [...]"<sup>79</sup> But it was already too late. It was around this time that Metodii wrote to Briukhovets'kyi: "[...] May the Lord not allow us to be dragged into the Polish yoke by our necks, or, for that matter into the Russian one! Better death than such an evil fate [...]"<sup>80</sup> There is reason to believe that it was exactly around January 1668 that Briukhovets'kyi had finally reached the momentous decision to rebel against the tsar.

The *Eyewitness Chronicle* tells us that on the feast of the Theophany, 7 January 1668, Briukhovets'kyi summoned his colonels, military judges, and other Cossack officers. At that time they agreed to break away from the authority of the tsar, request help from the Crimean Tatars, and either persuade the Russian troops to leave Left-Bank Ukraine or remove them by force.<sup>81</sup> It is noteworthy that the colonels present at that council initially did not believe their leader and suspected a ruse on his part. It is likely that despite all the uproar over the armistice in Ukraine, those Cossack officers still could not believe that their

<sup>75</sup> Solov'ev 3: 19.

<sup>76</sup> In 17th-century Ukraine and Russia the New Year began on September 1.

<sup>77</sup> *Akty* 7: 5.

<sup>78</sup> *Akty* 7: 5. It is clear that the inflated numbers of Russian troops derived from circulating rumours rather than from the actual articles of the "envoys' treaty."

<sup>79</sup> *Akty* 7: 6–7.

<sup>80</sup> *Akty* 7: 63–64.

<sup>81</sup> *Litopys Samovydsia* 104; also see *Akty* 7: 89; Solov'ev 3: 25–26.

hetman would pursue such a drastic departure from his pro-Russian policy. However, after Briukhovets'kyi kissed the cross to prove his sincerity, they agreed to the hetman's plan.<sup>82</sup> And on 8 February 1668 Left-Bank Ukraine exploded in an all-out anti-Russian uprising.

In February 1668, Briukhovets'kyi issued a number of manifestos to the Ukrainians and Don Cossacks explaining that the reason for his uprising against the tsar was Moscow's betrayal—along with the Poles, the Russians were plotting to raze “beloved Ukraine” and kill its people regardless of age.<sup>83</sup> For example, when addressing the residents of Novhorod-Sivers'kyi (10 February 1668), Briukhovets'kyi among other things wrote in his manifesto that “we moved away from allegiance [...] to Moscow [because] [...] the Muscovite envoys and the Polish commissars negotiated peace [...] and swore to plunder and depredate [...] Ukraine, from both sides, the Polish and the Muscovite [...]”<sup>84</sup> While the picture drawn by the hetman in those manifestos did not reflect the actual plans of Moscow and Warsaw with regard to Cossack Ukraine, this no longer mattered: up until his assassination in June 1688, Briukhovets'kyi was convinced of the betrayal by the tsar and the king and firmly maintained his anti-Russian and anti-Commonwealth political platform.

Thus, we see that the precursor to the uprising was not just a series of events but also reflections and interpretations of those events that took the shape of rumours. The emergence and possible power of the rumour was well known to many political actors in these historical events. Some individuals fed such tales, while others tried to contain them. Regardless, rumours spread and gave impetus to further political actions.

#### THE RUMOUR-MONGERS AND THEIR MOTIVATION

The “rumour of betrayal” emerged out of an attempt by Ukrainians to make sense of the news about the important Russian-Polish agreements (the Armistice of Andrusovo and the “envoys’ treaty”) and unconfirmed reports about “secret protocols” between those two powers, presumably containing plans for the ruin of Cossack Ukraine. This rumour, and an array of other rumoured distortions with similar content, developed from the curious combination of Ukrainians’ fear and concern over the Russian-Commonwealth reconciliation and true and imaginary “facts” about the words and agreements of that reconciliation that would lead to a deterioration of affairs in the Ukrainian lands. Indeed, this

<sup>82</sup> Solov'ev 3: 26.

<sup>83</sup> See *Akty* 7: 41–42; Kostomarov 208. Also see discussion on Hetman Briukhovets'kyi's rhetoric in Zenon E. Kohut, “Vid Hadiacha do Andrusova. Osmyslennia ‘otchyzny’ v ukrains'kii politychnii kul'turi,” in *Hadiats'ka uniiia 1658 roku*, edited by Pavlo Sokhan' (Kyiv: NAN Ukrainy, KMA, and KIUS, 2008) 237–238.

<sup>84</sup> *Akty* 7: 39–40; “Universaly ukrains'kykh het'maniv vid Ivana Vyhov'skoho do Ivana Samoilo'vycha (1657–1687),” 353; Kohut 238.

mixture of substantiated and unsubstantiated facts served the personal agenda of key political players of that time who, for varying reasons, had been growing more and more dissatisfied with Russian protection, chose to believe the “rumour of betrayal,” and acted accordingly. While analysing the roots and spread of the “rumour of betrayal” in Left-Bank Ukraine in 1667–1668, it is important to look at the personalities of its instigators as well as the domestic and foreign factors which contributed to this rumour’s significance.

Testimonies of Russian military and civil officials, Ukrainian Orthodox clergy, and Kyivan burghers implicated Bishop Metodii in spreading rumours and disturbing the peace in Ukraine. The Russian official, *striapchii*<sup>85</sup> Vasiliï Tiapkin, managed to avoid capture by the rebellious Cossacks, fleeing Nizhyn and reporting to the Kyiv *vovode*, boyar Petr Sheremetev. Sheremetev in his letter to the tsar (after 29 March 1668), in which he quoted Tiapkin, accused Metodii of starting the rebellion:

[...] All mutinies, Your Lordship, were started because of Bishop Metodii. As soon as he returned from Moscow and stayed in Hadiach with Hetman Briukhovets'kyi, and gave his daughter to [Briukhovets'kyi's] nephew [as a bride], and later on [Metodii] came to Nizhyn and began spreading *evil words* among people: and because of that, Your Lordship, all evil and mutinies were started by the Cossacks and non-Cossacks [...]<sup>86</sup>

Bishop Metodii was known to spread rumours on various occasions as he was outspoken about his displeasure with the Russian authorities, accusing them of “maltreating” him. In September 1668, Metodii was put on trial in Moscow with Innokentii Gizel' (archimandrite of the Caves Monastery in Kyiv), Oleksii Tur (*iegumen*<sup>87</sup> of St. Nicholas the Hermit Monastery in Kyiv), Feodosii Sofonovych (*iegumen* of St. Michael Monastery in Kyiv), other clerics, and Kyivan magistrates testifying against the bishop. Accusing Metodii of stirring up the uprising, they all seemed to agree that while Metodii was in Moscow, things were calm in Ukraine. However, once he returned to Ukraine and opposed the tsar, mutinies and bloodshed took place in this land. These accusations resulted in Metodii’s confinement in a Russian monastery until his death.<sup>88</sup>

The role of Briukhovets'kyi in this drama was equally prominent, but for a different reason. Scholars generally agree that he believed the “rumour of betrayal” to be true. Indeed, as Hans-Joachim Torke noted, “there was some foundation to the rumours, circulating among the Cossacks, which Briukhovets'kyi believed as well, to the effect that Ordin-Nashchekin had

<sup>85</sup> “The palace servant” at the Russian court.

<sup>86</sup> *Akty* 7: 59.

<sup>87</sup> Abbot.

<sup>88</sup> *Akty* 7: 72–74.

bartered them away to Poland.”<sup>89</sup> Russian authorities allegedly concealed “the fact that Kiev was to be returned to Poland in two years,” but the hetman learned of this and became even more distrustful, “when in autumn of 1667, Ordyn-Nashchekin prevented his envoys from obtaining an audience with the tsar.”<sup>90</sup>

This research shows that Hetman Briukhovets'kyi's drift to breaking with the tsar began initially with him finding out about the articles of the Armistice of Andrusovo late in the winter of 1667. Briukhovets'kyi learned about the provision for the handing over of Kyiv to the Commonwealth *long before* he began corresponding with Doroshenko and planning his attack against the Russians. Thus, it is doubtful that the potential loss of Kyiv to the Poles, alone, was sufficient to sway Briukhovets'kyi from his pro-Russian position; after all, the hetman spent years appeasing the tsar and destroying his opponents among the Left-Bank Cossacks to secure his current office. In fact, it is very likely that the loss of Kyiv, located on the Right Bank of the Dnipro and controlled by the Russian garrison, meant considerably less to him than retaining his position on the Left Bank. It was rather the “rumour of betrayal” about the joint Russian-Commonwealth attack against Ukraine and the looming threat of losing his power to Doroshenko<sup>91</sup> that set the hetman off, as it had Metodii before him. Briukhovets'kyi learned about the secret negotiations between Moscow and his rival, Doroshenko, from Metodii, and this must have convinced Briukhovets'kyi that the Russians had chosen Doroshenko over him.<sup>92</sup>

However, even these tidings, menacing as they were to Briukhovets'kyi's position, were not sufficient to make him rebel against the tsar and negotiate an anti-Russian alliance with Doroshenko. Throughout 1667 Briukhovets'kyi must have felt Moscow's support for his hetmancy diminishing. Yet, it was only when the hetman learned from his envoy of the “secret plan” (“secret protocols”) between the tsar and the king “to raze Ukraine,” the arrival of fresh Russian troops, and the existing plans for a joint operation with the Poles against the “mutinous Cossacks,” that the proverbial straw broke the camel's back: in desperation, Briukhovets'kyi entered into secret talks with his enemy

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<sup>89</sup> Hans-Joachim Torke, “The Unloved Alliance: Political Relations between Muscovy and Ukraine in the Seventeenth Century,” in *Ukraine and Russia in Their Historical Encounter*, edited by Peter J. Potichnyj, et. al. (Edmonton: CIUS Press, 1992) 50.

<sup>90</sup> Torke 50.

<sup>91</sup> Doroshenko 161–162.

<sup>92</sup> It has been emphasized earlier in this article that the Russian government in appeasing Doroshenko still refused to remove Briukhovets'kyi from his office.

Doroshenko, sent envoys to Istanbul,<sup>93</sup> and ordered a co-ordinated attack against Russian forces in the Left Bank.<sup>94</sup>

Doroshenko also circulated the rumour and spread fear of Ukraine’s imminent downfall. Informed by Sheremetev of the arrival of additional Russian troops, Doroshenko became suspicious of Moscow’s true intentions and communicated his fears to Briukhovets'kyi (thus, confirming and amplifying Briukhovets'kyi’s own worries that “the rumour” was indeed true). Moreover, Doroshenko and Metropolitan Tkal's'kyi suggested a course of action to Briukhovets'kyi: not long before the uprising, they dispatched a monk, Iakubenko, to the Left-Bank hetman to let him know that Doroshenko was willing to recognize Briukhovets'kyi as the sole ruler of Cossack Ukraine on one condition—Briukhovets'kyi had to join Doroshenko in the fight to protect their country.<sup>95</sup>

Another aspect of this problem has a certain irony to it: it was official Moscow—the tsar’s court, the officials of the palace, and the department in charge of Ukrainian affairs—that fuelled this rumour by its words and deeds. Thus, the disrespectful treatment of the Cossack envoys by the tsar’s court, the words of the tsar’s officials (Ordin-Nashchekin and Spodoba) about the approaching “end” of Ukraine, the announcement of the Russian court about sending fresh troops to Ukraine under Ordin-Nashchekin’s command, and various related hearsay emanating from Moscow through a variety of channels all served to escalate the rumours. This illustrates how rumours can develop inadvertently and contrary to the original intentions of some of their authors. After all, it is difficult to imagine that various officials in Moscow purposely intended to incite the 1668 uprising!

Intentional Polish “leaks” contributed to the unrest in Left-Bank Ukraine as well. In particular, the Commonwealth authorities deliberately spread news about Moscow’s concessions to the king in order to facilitate the split between the populace of Left Bank and Russia.<sup>96</sup> Such “informational warfare” seemed to reinforce other evidence of Russian betrayal making its way around Ukraine.

Finally, rumours travelled with Ukrainians visiting the Russian capital on business and returning to their homeland from Moscow, such as rumours of Russia’s military buildup close to Ukraine’s borders.<sup>97</sup> Apart from troop

<sup>93</sup> In April 1668, Colonel Hryhorii Hamaleia went as Hetman Briukhovets'kyi’s envoy to Istanbul pleading the sultan for protection. See Solov'ev 3: 35.

<sup>94</sup> Unlike local and largely unsuccessful uprisings (e.g., in Pereiaslav in 1666), which were aimed against both the hetman’s and the Moscow’s power, the February 1668 uprising was a co-ordinated attempt led by the hetman himself: hence its success, temporary though it may have been.

<sup>95</sup> *Litopys Samovydsia* 103; Rigel'man 104; Solov'ev 3: 25.

<sup>96</sup> Eingorn 419.

<sup>97</sup> *Akty* 7: 79.



numbers being exaggerated, the very fact of troop movements in proximity to Ukraine's borders seemed to feed the rumours and confirm the fears of the local population of the imminent destruction of their country.

“THE RUMOUR” IN THE EMOTIONAL ATMOSPHERE OF UKRAINIAN SOCIETY

Ukrainians' animosity toward Moscow had grown steadily over the years. Arguably, this became evident soon after Cossack Ukraine recognized the tsar's authority in Pereiaslav in 1654, and certainly in the aftermath of the Treaty of Vilnius (1656), in which both Moscow and Warsaw ignored Cossack Ukraine's interests. The increase of Russian military garrisons and the introduction of Russian tax-collectors (1666), the infringement of some Ukrainians' “ancient” rights and liberties, and numerous cases of misconduct by Russian military and civil authorities played a role in further straining Ukrainian-Russian relations. This animosity peaked in the aftermath of the Armistice of Andrusovo (1667), which affronted Ukrainians with the proposition that the Cossack polity created by Khmel'nyts'kyi was to remain divided.

Even key pro-Moscow political figures in Ukraine, Hetman Briukhovets'kyi and Bishop Metodii, upon learning that Moscow had been holding talks with their political enemies on the Right Bank, began to fear that they themselves might be expendable in the eyes of the Russian authorities. Despite the tsar remaining a benign master to both the hetman and the bishop (in the context of the Russian political tradition of that time), the atmosphere was such that various “signs” of the monarch's diminishing benevolence to them seemed to carry more weight than any assurances to the contrary from Moscow.

The “rumour of betrayal” that swept across Left-Bank Ukraine in late 1667–early 1668 and was believed by the hetman himself, was about Russian forces coming to Ukraine to eradicate the Cossacks and, in alliance with the Poles, to destroy Ukraine completely. This widely-believed assessment of the current political situation and near future prospects led the populace and the leadership of Left-Bank Cossack polity to believe that there was no clear option other than to revolt.

All these events can be better understood within the general context of Ukrainian-Russian relations, which, among other things, were marked by mutual suspicion, with accusations of betrayal being exchanged regularly. In fact, “the entire history of Russo-Ukrainian relations” in the 17th century (and in the early 18th century as well) represented a “chain of mutual distrust.”<sup>98</sup> This lack of trust remained an important factor in Ukrainian-Russian relations and a key psychological factor that affected both the popular mentality and the decision-making of important political players in Ukraine at that time. It was a factor that gave the power of suasion to “the rumour of betrayal” in 1668.

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<sup>98</sup> Torke 57.

This article shows that in the late 1660s Ukrainians perceived their present and their future differently *before* and *after* the "rumour of betrayal" took hold. For example, prior to "the rumour," people in Left-Bank Ukraine were divided over the issue of Russian protectorate. This division meant that although there was opposition to Moscow and to the pro-Russian hetman, there was also no unified front against the Russian protectorate with any possibility of toppling it. In other words, the division between the rebellious Ukrainians and the pro-Russian Cossack administration led by Briukhovets'kyi allowed for the Russian protectorate over Left-Bank Ukraine to persevere. Then the "betrayal" rumours began to fly in Ukraine, uniting Left-Bank Ukrainians of various social standings against Moscow and leaving the tsar's government without any significant allies in that land.

#### CONCLUSION

In early modern Eastern Europe the interaction and exchange of information between the political elite and the mass of society was often limited and almost never adequate. Of course, the central government's decrees were announced and local administrations played their part in both disseminating and collecting information about various affairs for the purpose of better governance. Regardless, official information trickling down to the mass of society was limited in both scope and content. Similarly, despite the best efforts of members of the local administrations to gather information and send it to the central government, the information was rarely complete or current. These deficiencies resulted in a certain "informational hunger" (sometimes, indeed, an information vacuum) in which various rumours could flourish.

In a society where "real" (genuine) information was underprovided the general public was left wanting, especially when it concerned important issues of their well-being and their future. In these circumstances the deficiencies provided fallow ground for what is known as "suspect news," "hearsay," or "rumours" from various sources—within the halls of power, covert agents and agents of influence, travellers, merchants, adventurers of all kinds and so forth. Once a rumour started, it spread quickly and was very difficult to contain despite the best attempts by the local administrations and the central government. In this regard it should be noted that the issue of the "actual truthfulness" of rumours (or the lack thereof) is of much less importance to researchers than the effect of those rumours in a given society and on the course of political events.

The case of Left-Bank Ukraine in 1668 sheds light on how rumours functioned in early modern societies, revealing their vital role in social and political processes as an important form of group problem-solving. The "rumour of betrayal"—a curious combination of actual news, fragmentary facts, insinuations, and projections, augmented by the general state of anxiety in Ukrainian society—was the product of both the lack of sufficient information

and years of adverse political and social changes in a divided Cossack Ukraine. It was also a trigger of the uprising under Hetman Ivan Briukhovets'kyi.

It is very likely that without the “rumour of betrayal” there would have been no 1668 uprising and the Russian advance in Ukraine during the 17th century would have been swifter and more conclusive.