

PREACHING POLITICS:
ANTI-MUSLIM AND
PRO-MUSCOVITE RHETORIC
IN THE SERMONS OF THE
UKRAINIAN ORTHODOX
CLERGY (1660s–1670s)

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IN THE SEVENTEENTH century, Ukrainian-Cossack communities struggled to maintain a fragile autonomy in the face of Polish, Muscovite, and Ottoman attempts to encroach upon their Eastern European homelands. The 1654 Treaty of Periaslavl' between Hetman Bohdan Khmel'nyts'kyi (1595–1657) and Tsar Aleksei Mikhailovich (1629–76) heralded the inevitable surrender of some of the Cossack freedoms in exchange for greater protection by one of these three rulers. When the Polish-Muscovite Treaty of Andrusovo transferred the lordship over Eastern Ukraine from the king to the tsar in 1667, the Muscovite tsar solidified his claim to be the sole patron of all Ukrainian Cossacks, who were his co-religionists. Formal submission to the tsar was encouraged by the Orthodox priesthood in Ukraine west of the Dnipro river, too. The clergy's argument was reinforced by the gathering threat of an Ottoman Empire reinvigorated under the stewardship of the Köprülü grand vizirs that began to advance into the *Rzeczpospolita* (the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth) in 1672. The Polish king's incapacity to halt the Turkish-Tatar advance into Cossack-inhabited Polish territory made the Orthodox clergy's call to the Cossacks to submit to the tsar all the more persuasive. But the clergy's support for the Muscovite cause was not unconditional. And the tsar's authority over the Ukrainian Cossacks remained contested for another generation, as Ivan Mazepa (1639–1709)'s rebellion in 1708 was to show.

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There are few studies on the involvement of Ukrainian-Orthodox clergy in politics in the 1660s–1670s,¹ and the role of religious sermons in Ukrainian politics at that time has not yet been investigated. There are no case studies that analyze the texts or look at their authors, target audiences, and the political circumstances which influenced the sermons. This article sets out to examine both why and how some members of the Ukrainian-Orthodox clergy used sermons for specific political purposes. Its thesis is that this was done chiefly to rally broad anti-Ottoman and anti-Tatar opinion, in order to discourage certain Cossack factions from aligning themselves with the Muslim powers, and instead to persuade their leaders to submit to the authority of the Orthodox Muscovite monarch. In due course, I also intend to demonstrate that it did not necessarily follow that the Ukrainian-Orthodox clergy supported all of the Muscovite political initiatives.

What is a “sermon”? A “sermon” (also known as “homily” or “oratory”) is a speech delivered by a prophet or member of the clergy (such as a full-time preacher, one of the top hierarchs of the Church, or a parish priest). Typically, a sermon is a public address to the faithful. Sermons address various theological, religious, and moral issues by establishing a connection between the biblical past and the present. When dealing with the role of sermons in politics in seventeenth-century Ukraine, it is important to look at the neighboring Orthodox Christian culture of the same historical period. In Muscovy, Patriarch Nikon’s (1605–1681) church reforms resulted in intellectual confrontation between church leaders and by 1667 in a schism between the established Russian-Orthodox church and the

1. The involvement of Ukrainian Orthodox clergy in politics during the second half of the seventeenth century is evident from the following works: Sergei Ternovskii, “Akty, otnosiashchiesia k delu o podchinenii kievskoi mitropolii moskovskomu patriarkhatu (1620–1694),” in *Arkhiiv iugo-zapadnoi Rossii*, part 1, vol. V (Kiev: V Gubernskoi tipografii, 1879), 1–172; Vitalii Eingorn, *O snosheniakh malorossiiskago dukhovenstva s moskovskim pravitel'stvom v tsarstvovanie Alekseia Mikhailovicha* (Moskva: Universitetskaia tipografiia, 1890); Konstantin Kharlampovich, *Malorossiiskoe vliianie na velikorusskuiu tserkovnuiu zhizn'*, vol. 1 (Kazan': Izd.-e M. A. Golubeva, 1914). Although dated, their works remain invaluable sources for this subject. As for Ukrainian-Orthodox sermons, those are rarely analyzed other than as literary pieces. For Ukrainian sermons see Nikolai Sumtsov, “Ioanikii Galiatovskii (k istorii iuzhno-russkoi literatury XVII veka),” in *Kievskaia starina*, vol. VIII, ed. (Kiev: Tip. G.T. Korchak-Novitskago, January 1884), 1–588; Mikhail Markovskii, *Antonii Radivilovskii, iuzhno-russkiiy propovednik XVII v.* (Kiev: Tip. Imperatorskago Universiteta Sv. Vladimira, 1894); Mykola Kostomarov, “Galiatovs'kyi, Radyvilovs'kyi i Lazar Baranovych” in *Istoriia Ukrainy v zhytpeysiakh vyznachiis'hykh ei diiachiv* (L'viv: Z drukarni NTSh, 1918), 357–86, Volodymyr Krekoten', *Opovidannia Antoniiia Radyvilovs'koho. Z istorii ukrains'koi novelistyky XVII st.* (Kyiv: Naukova dumka, 1983), and the more recent Marzanna Kuchynska, *Ruska homietyka XVII wieku w Rzeczypospolitej. Ewolucja gatunku—specyfika funkcjonalna* (Szczecin: Uniwersytet Szczeciński, 2004).

Old Believers (*staroobriadtsy*). The Old-Believers' leader, the Archpriest Avvakum (c.1620–1682), and others appear to have delivered sermons decrying the reform, the loss of “purity of Church,” and even the treacherous tsar.² Preaching a particular political course was therefore by no means alien to the Orthodox clergy.

Historians have often ignored sermons as important rhetorical instruments and overlooked the use of early-modern sermons for political purposes. Until about a decade ago, studies of early-modern sermons in Europe were rare, with a few notable exceptions.³ The main reason for such neglect was that the early modernists were not “accustomed to studying sermons both as events and texts. . . . Historians have not, until recently, thought it necessary to ‘read rhetorically,’ to treat texts as anything other than brute ‘primary sources. . . .’”⁴ Existing studies do not focus specifically upon the role of sermons in political life of either early-modern Muscovy or Ukraine, and therefore offer neither useful perspectives nor a methodological framework. But studies of early-modern European sermons (in England, English colonies in North America, in France, and in other countries) are very useful with respect to both the questions they raise and the approaches they take. Scholars like Jeanne Shami, Peter McCullough, and Lori Anne Ferrell, who study sermons in early-modern England, have made several important observations about the past and current state of this subject.⁵ They write about sermons “falling between the disciplines” for a long time, thus precluding the appearance

2. Aleksandr Borozdin, *Protopop Avvakum. Ocherk iz istorii umstvennoi zhizni russkago obshchestva v XVII veke* (St. Petersburg: Izd.-e A.S. Suvorina, 1900; see the texts of his sermons in the appendix of this work, particularly those on pages 32–34, 34–38, etc.); Viktor Zhivov, *Iz tserkovnoi istorii vremen Petra Velikogo: issledovaniia i materialy* (Moscow: Novoe literaturnoe obozrenie, 2004), 11.
3. W. Fraser Mitchell, *English Pulpit Oratory from Andrews to Tillotson: A Study of Its Literary Aspects* (London: London Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge, 1932); Alan Fager Herr, *The Elizabethan Sermon: A Survey and a Bibliography* (New York: Octagon Books, 1969 [c. 1940]); Millar MacLure, *The Paul's Cross Sermons, 1534–1642* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1958); John F. Wilson, *Pulpit in Parliament: Puritanism during the English Civil Wars, 1640–1648* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969); Barbara B. Diefendorf, “Simon Vigor: A Radical Preacher in Sixteenth-Century Paris,” *Sixteenth Century Journal* 18 (1978): 399–410; Barbara White, “Assize sermons, 1640–1720” (unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, Newcastle-upon-Tyne, 1980).
4. Mary Morrissey, “Interdisciplinarity and the Study of Early Modern Sermons,” *The Historical Journal* 42 (1999): 1111–23; 1112.
5. Morrissey, “Interdisciplinarity,” 1111–16; Jeanne Shami, “Introduction: Reading Donne's Sermons,” *John Donne Journal*, 11 (1992), 2; Peter McCullough, *Sermons at Court: Politics and Religion in Elizabethan and Jacobean Preaching* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 3. Also see *The English Sermon Revised: Religion, Literature and History 1600–1750*, eds. Peter McCullough and Lori Anne Ferrell (Manchester; New York: Manchester UP, 2000).

of more substantial work on the subject. These authors advocate the study of the language used in sermons in the context of the political life of their historical period. Last but not least, they maintain that the sermon, as a text and an event, has come to be viewed as an important cultural phenomenon, literary artifact, and historical source.

A quote from the work by contemporary British scholar Mary Morrissey describes this well:

Early-modern sermons are complex and carefully structured arguments that begin with the text of the Scripture and that use this text to create interpretations capable of providing moral and political instructions in the “here and now” of the sermons’ “application.” Sermons were presented to the hearers “for their moral instructions and sometimes their enjoyment, as well as their immediate information.”⁶

A few words should be said about the sources selected for analysis here and about the nature of this analysis itself. Although dozens of sermons from this period are available, very few deal with contemporary political issues directly. Therefore, I have included private correspondence (e.g., pastoral advice to concrete political figures), which uses the format of a sermon and relates events of biblical and ancient history to important contemporary issues, particularly the Ottoman threat. I treat sermons not just as “texts,” but rather as rhetorical, political events and “tools,” inseparable from their authors and target audiences. They are placed in the political context of their time and related to their authors—the preachers (e.g., Antonii Radyvilovs’kyi and Ioanikii Galiatovs’kyi), their biographies, education, political views, and agendas. This approach allows for an awareness of the circumstances that preceded and/or accompanied the compilation of those sermons. More important, it allows us to learn more about people, their perceived views and rhetoric and to discern the various markings of the historical period during which those people lived.

As for the historical context in which these sermons arose and played a political role, in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, religion and politics in Ukraine were so intertwined that it is difficult to establish where one ended and the other began. In other words, religion was politics and politics was religion. After the Union of Brest in 1596 (which formally reunited the Orthodox in the *Rzeczpospolita* with the Catholic Church), the Ukrainian-Orthodox clergy and laity were striving to ensure the survival of their faith within the Polish-Lithuanian

6. Morrissey, “Interdisciplinarity,” 1117.

Commonwealth, by using the Commonwealth's own legal system and the popular support of the Ukrainian-Orthodox people, especially the Cossacks.⁷ When in 1648 the Cossacks revolted against the Commonwealth, the situation changed drastically. The Orthodox faith was proclaimed as the only religion in the Cossack-controlled territories, banning Roman Catholics, Greek Catholics (Uniates), and Jews from living in those territories.⁸ In 1654, Cossacks under their Hetman Bohdan Khmel'nyts'kyi completely severed their ties to the Commonwealth and pledged allegiance to the Muscovite tsar. However, a power struggle among the Cossack elite led to the Cossack state's division around 1660.⁹ In the course of this conflict, each warring Cossack faction had to solicit support from one of the neighboring powers: Orthodox Muscovy, the Roman-Catholic Commonwealth, the Muslim Ottoman Empire, and the Khanate of Crimea. Given these circumstances, the issue of "faith preservation" became extremely acute, especially to the members of the Ukrainian Orthodox clergy.

Sermons in the Ukraine after the 1650s were delivered by various members of the clergy, such as Archimandrite of the Kyiv Caves Monastery Inokentii Gizel' (1600–1683), Archbishop of Chernihiv Lazar Baranovych (1620–1693), and Archimandrite of the Chernihiv's Ielets' Monastery Ioanikii Galiatovs'kyi (d. 1688). These clergymen delivered sermons primarily because they were required to do so by virtue of their position within the Church hierarchy. However, a graduate of the Kyiv Mohyla Academy and a "full-time" preacher of the Kyiv Caves Monastery, Antonii Radyvilovs'kyi (d. 1688), made preaching his true calling.¹⁰ By 1656, Radyvilovs'kyi had already established himself as a well-known preacher, having spoken on such occasions as the election of Gizel' as archimandrite

7. The topic of the Union of Brest and its aftermath in Ukraine has an extensive bibliography. For example see Sophia Senyk, *Osnovni dokumenty Beresteis'koi unii* (L'viv: Monastyr monakhiv Studiis'koho Ustavu; Vydavnychii viddil "Svichado", 1996); Antoni Mironowicz, *Prawosławie i unia za panowania Jana Kazimierza* (Białystok: Orthodruk, 1997); *Unia Brzeska z perspektywy czterech stuleci*, ed. Jan S. Gajek (Lublin: Wydawnictwo KUL, 1998); Borys Gudziak, *Kryza i reforma: Kyivs'ka metropoliiia, Tsarhorods'kyi patriarkhat i geneza Beresteis'koi unii* (L'viv: Instytut istorii tserkvy L'vivs'koi bohoslavs'koi akademii, 2000).
8. For recent studies on this topic see Frank E. Sysyn, *Between Poland and Ukraine. The Dilemma of Adam Kysil, 1600–1653* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard UP, 1985); Lev Zaborovskii, *Katoliki, pravoslavnye, uniati. Problemy religii v russko-pol'sko-ukrainskikh otnosheniakh kontsa 40-kh-80-kh gg. XVII v. (Part 1. Istochniki vremen getmanstva B.M. Khmel'nitskogo)* (Moscow: Pamiatniki istoricheskoi mysli, 1998); Serhii Plokhyy, *The Cossacks and Religion in Early Modern Ukraine* (New York: Oxford UP, 2001).
9. Dmytro Doroshenko, *Narys istorii Ukrainy* (Munich: Dniprova khvyliia, 1966), 51–53; *Istoriia ukrains'koho kozats'tva*, ed. V. Smolii, et al., vol. 1 (Kyiv: Kyevo-Mohylians'ka akademiia, 2006), 355–80.
10. Markovskii, *Antonii Radivilovskii*, 15.

of the Caves Monastery and the anniversary of the death of the Metropolitan of Kyiv, Petro Mohyla (1597–1647).¹¹ Most of Antonii Radyvilovs'kyi's sermons dealt with four topics intrinsic to sermons of other preachers: Issues of dogma; moral issues; specific problematic questions; and various comparisons.¹²

According to the nineteenth-century Ukrainian scholar Mykhailo Markovs'kyi, the tumultuous events of the “Ruin” were barely reflected in Radyvilovs'kyi's sermons.¹³ But Markovs'kyi erred. When in 1672 the Polish fortress of Kamieniec (in Ukrainian Podillia) fell to the Ottoman army, Radyvilovs'kyi reflected on this event in one sermon in the collections that was published in 1676; in “Under the Protection of Virgin Mary” (*Ohorodok Marii Bohoroditsy*) he lamented:

Who can possibly tell how many Christians fell to the sword before our eyes during those years! Who can tell how many [Christians] were taken into captivity by the infidels! Who can tell how many [Christians] perished in the water and fire trying to avoid the sword of God's wrath? And why did that happen? It happened because people, laity and clergy alike, challenged God's Grace with their mortal sins.¹⁴

Moreover, the hand-written collection of Radyvilovs'kyi's sermons, “The Crown of Christ” (*Venets Khristov*), published in 1688, contains the so-called “Five Sermons delivered during the time of war” (*Piat' slov chasu voyny*).¹⁵ Those orations must have been originally delivered by Radyvilovs'kyi to his audience during the time when the actual political events were taking place to which they refer, representing a response to the Turkish assaults on the Cossack capital of Chyhyryn in 1677 and 1678. One of these sermons begins with an introduction to the topic and contains an admonishing word to the audience:

Listen to this, o Orthodox listener. When any country is being attacked by the hosts of the treacherous enemy without any pretext, [the enemy] who wants to plunder and claim this land for his country, take into captivity or put to sword your generals, common people, their wives, children, brethren and beloved friends, then he must be repulsed and resisted by waging war upon, which is condoned by the Holy Script. An example, drawn from the

11. Ibid., 14.

12. Ibid., 61.

13. Ibid., 76.

14. Ibid., 76–77.

15. Krekoten', *Opovidannia*, 383.

Old Testament: Once the Medes were attacking the people of Israel without being provoked, wanting to put [the Israelites] to sword. . . . And what did say God to Moses, the leader of the Israelites?—assemble your troops as quickly as possible and wage war on this treacherous and dangerous enemy . . .¹⁶

After that, a connection between a biblical and contemporary time is established, with biblical Medes being compared to the contemporary Turks:

As for us, could there be possibly more treacherous and dangerous an enemy than a Turk, who wants to lay our Fatherland to waste, desecrate the Lord's churches, turning those to either mosques or stables, put to sword or take into captivity your wives, your children, your brethren and friends? How would you resist such an enemy if not by waging war on him and by placing yourselves under the protection of God Himself and the Most Holy Mother of God? . . .¹⁷

This sermon ends with preacher's appeal to the audience—the "Christian army":

And to make you face that treacherous and dangerous enemy in battle, I would like to speak to you, my beloved. Listen, you, the great Christian army: there are two things, which will make you go to war and to light your hearts driving you to face bravely the advancing treacherous enemy, the infidels. The first thing—God's honor, the second thing—your love for the Fatherland. As for the God's honor, you have to defend it bravely and do not yield the ground to your enemy even if this means losing your life, remembering that such a warrior will receive an immortal glory from God in heaven . . .¹⁸

The appeal is amplified by further references to the Bible:

As St. Paul tells us: And if a man also strives for masteries, yet is he not crowned, except he strive lawfully. As if to say: if one fails to stand bravely against the enemy for God's honor, the Orthodox faith, the preservation of

16. Markovskii, *Antonii Radivilovskii*, appendices 37. In this case Radyvilovs'kyi makes reference to *Numbers* 25: 16–18: "And the Lord spoke unto Moses, saying, vex the Midianites, and smite them: For they vex you with their wives, wherewith they have beguiled you. . . ." This and subsequent quotes in the footnotes are given according to *The Holy Bible, Containing the Old and New Testaments (King James Version)* (New York, 2000).

17. Markovskii, *Antonii Radivilovskii*, ap. 37.

18. *Ibid.*, aps. 37–38.

the Holy churches, enduring great and trying sufferings, cold, hunger, lack of sleep, then he is not worthy of celestial crown. Also, St. Paul speaks to Timothy: Fight the good fight of faith, lay hold on eternal life. As if to say: O Christian warrior, if you are to stand bravely for God's honor, for Orthodox faith, the preservation of the churches, then you will be surely granted the life eternal . . .¹⁹

Members of the Ukrainian Orthodox clergy used not only public sermons for conveying anti-Turkish and anti-Tatar views, but also private homilies (written pastoral advice). It is in these private homilies that we can see the power of persuasion and religious authority being used by the clerics for political purposes most clearly. These messages had a better focus and may therefore have achieved better results.

After 1660 Cossack Ukraine was divided into the largely pro-Muscovite Left-Bank (eastern) Hetmanate and the Right-Bank (western) Hetmanate, which initially rejected Muscovite control and maneuvered between Poland and the Ottoman Porte. The alignment of the Right-Bank hetmans with the Muslims was perceived as the greater threat by the tsarist court as well as the leading members of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, whose well-being and security depended on the tsar. On 18 (28) August 1665,²⁰ the Crimean Tatars dismissed Hetman Stepan Opara, a self-proclaimed hetman of Right-Bank Ukraine who had earlier risen to power with their support. The Tatars then strongly recommended that the Right-Bank Cossacks elect Petro Doroshenko (1627–98) as hetman. According to Muscovite documents of that time, the new hetman made the Cossacks pledge their allegiance “to the king and to the khan.”²¹ Within a few months of Doroshenko's coming to power, one of the chief Muscovite supporters, Bishop Methodius (Fylymonovych) (d. 1690), responded by reproaching Petro Doroshenko. In a private homily for his “treason” against the “hereditary master,” the tsar, and the Orthodox faith, Bishop Methodius exclaimed:

19. Ibid., aps. 37–38. In this passage Radyvilovs'kyi makes reference to 1 Corinthians 9: 25 (“And every man that striveth for the mastery is temperate in all things. Now they do it to obtain a corruptible crown; but we an incorruptible . . .”); and 1 Timothy 6: 12 (“Fight the good fight of faith, lay hold on eternal life, whereunto thou art also called, and hast professed a good profession before many witnesses.”)

20. The Julian (Old-Style) Calendar was not replaced by the Gregorian (New-Style) Calendar in Orthodox Eastern Europe (Ukraine, Belarus', and Russia) until 1918. The Julian Calendar was ten days behind the Gregorian Calendar in the seventeenth century.

21. *Akty, otnosiashchiesia k istorii Iuzhnoi i Zapadnoi Rossii. Sobranie i izdannye arkhograficheskoi kommissiei*, vol. 5 (St. Petersburg: E. Pratz, 1867), 308.

We are not only amazed, but also can not believe our ears, learning about your treason, which has come so quickly and so unexpectedly. Forgetting our Lord God, your numerous pledges of allegiance, your soul and beliefs, your Holy Orthodox faith, God's churches, your suffering beloved Fatherland, you renounced the limitless fatherly benevolence and good deeds of His Grace the tsar, your hereditary master, and did not only break away from his power, but also shamelessly and godlessly attacked him, raising your tyrannical hand against [your master] who is as your natural father. [And you did all that] plundering God's churches, bringing ruin to your suffering mother the beloved Fatherland, also bringing ruin to your brethren the Orthodox Christians by turning them over to the merciless captivity by the infidels . . .²²

The bishop's letter was followed by messages from other clerics. On 15 September 1668, the Archimandrite of the Kyiv Caves Monastery, Inokentii Gizel', wrote a letter to Doroshenko, who had that very year recognized the authority of the Turkish sultan, preaching unity among Christians and persuading the hetman to sever his alliance with the "infidels":

Everybody who knows things can conclude that for centuries our glorious Rus'²³ Ukrainian people have been living in great glory, in the Orthodox faith, remaining strong and prosperous and were revered by an entire world. Everybody must acknowledge that all that has been achieved through God's help during the reign of the Orthodox Christian monarchs, the princes of Rus', whom the people of Rus' served faithfully, and there were no quarrels among [the people of Rus']. And recently Ukraine has experienced great depredations and losses, its armies got depleted and are nearing absolute destruction. Everybody is aware that this is caused by the fact that our Ukrainian people started war and hostility among themselves, abandoned without any cause their good and powerful protector, the monarch of the

22. Yurii Mytsyk, "Z dokumentiv ukrains'kykh het'maniv ta polkovnykiv doby Ruiny (za materialamy pol's'kykh arkhivoskhovyshch)," *Siverians'kyi litopys*, Vol. 3 (1999): 31–32 (on page 31).

23. In seventeenth-century Ukraine, several interchangeable forms of referring to Ukrainians existed: "people of Little Rus'" (*malorosiis'kyi narid*), "Rosian people" (*rosiis'kyi narid*), "Ukrainian Rus' people" (*narid rus'kyi ukrains'kyi*), etc. The people of the Muscovite tsar's state were known in Ukraine as "Muscovites." See the discussion in Zenon E. Kohut's "The Birth of a Ukrainian Fatherland: Civil War, Foreign Intervention, and Innovation in Political Culture (1650s–1660s)," which is to be published by the Polish Academy of Arts and Sciences.

same faith, His Majesty the tsar, whose protection they previously sought and prayed for, and began helping the infidels in their war against the Christians; and now you even consider placing yourself under the authority of [the infidels], which will bring the swift loss to yourself as well as to Orthodoxy, Christian faith and God's church. . . . Upon saying all this, I, in accordance to my position within the church hierarchy, am pleading with tears to you and an entire [Cossack] Host. Please, accept my supplication: return under the authority and protection of His Majesty the tsar, as it has been once before. And for this you will receive both temporary and eternal gifts from the Heavenly King due to the pleas of the Holy Birth-giver of God . . .²⁴

At that time, Doroshenko was not the only recipient of such letters. In January 1668, the formerly pro-Muscovite Hetman of the Left-Bank Ukraine, Ivan Briukhovets'kyi, joined the Cossack uprising against the Muscovites, aligning himself with his old enemy, Hetman Doroshenko. This development evoked a letter-sermon from the Archbishop of Chernihiv, Lazar Baranovych, to Briukhovets'kyi, aimed at convincing the rebellious hetman to return to the protectorate of the Muscovite tsar. It is full of references to contemporary Ukrainian politics and contains references to Biblical characters and their actions.

Baranovych begins his letter by mentioning his and other clerics' communication with the tsar ("His Majesty, great sovereign wrote two letters to me, to Father Methodius, Bishop of Mstyslav [Fylymonovych], and to the Father Archimandrite of the Caves Monastery [Gizel' "] . . .).²⁵ Baranovych continues by expressing his sorrow because of the ongoing war in Ukraine, comparing its people to the people of Israel, delivered by God:

. . . I am very sad that that fire broke out, praying to the Lord as incessantly as water runs to bring down this fire so that our Orthodox Rosian people would walk on land as the people of Israel had done once; as my position demands I always pray to God to heal the imperfectness of the world, praying Him to deliver me with my flock from destruction, God, o God of my salvation. Why is Christian blood spilled? This storm is great; it covers

24. *Akty, otnosiashchiesia k istorii Iuzhnoi i Zapadnoi Rossii. Sobranie i izdannye arkhieograficheskoi kommissiei*, vol. 6 (St. Petersburg: E. Pratz, 1869), 229–30.

25. *Akty, otnosiashchiesia k istorii Iuzhnoi i Zapadnoi Rossii. Sobranie i izdannye arkhieograficheskoi kommissiei*, vol. 7 (St. Petersburg: V.V. Pratz, 1872), 52–53.

the ship, which is Ukraine, with the waves of blood. We, clergy and apprentices are to lift our voices: Lord, forsake us not for we are drowning . . .²⁶

The archbishop dedicates more than a few lines to the tsar, whom he compares to the biblical King David, calling the Muscovite monarch a pious person and a peacemaker:

. . . The ruler, anointed by God, is similar to King David, because he was pious and not hostile to even those people, who hated peace itself. . . . Our great sovereign, for whom we pray, tell us to stand among you and speak up: peace is to you all; his piety is clear to every person. . . . If [His Majesty] wants to do good to someone, he will do that. As Sirach once wrote: doing good to someone, know to whom you are doing it and the Lord's grace will be upon thee . . .²⁷

Speaking directly to Briukhovets'kyi, Baranovych uses Biblical parallels in persuading the rebellious hetman to make peace with the tsar:

. . . Your highness, look for peace and resort to peace for blessed are the peacemakers as they will be called the children of God. Apostle Jacob writes: you cause evil and wars; and you do not possess if you do not ask; and you ask and do not receive for you ask inadequately. Knock and the doors will open to you, as Our Lord Jesus Christ promises. I hope that seeing piety of the [Cossack] Host of Zaporozhe, the great sovereign will forgive you and grant you liberties. [He will do this] because he follows in the steps of the Son of God and never withdraws his grace entirely . . .²⁸

Finishing his homily to Briukhovets'kyi, the archbishop urges the hetman to sever his union with the "infidels" and once again recognize the authority of the tsar:

26. *Akty*, vol. 7, 52–53.

27. *Ibid.* For King David as a pious and peace-loving person see Psalms 120: 6–7 ("My soul hath long dwelt with him that hateth peace. I am for peace: but when I speak, they are for war . . ."), and Psalms 122: 8 ("For my brethren and companions' sakes, I will now say, peace be within thee"). For "Sirach" see Sirach (*Apocrypha*) 12: 1 ("When thou wilt do good know to whom thou doest it; so shalt thou be thanked for thy benefits").

28. *Akty*, vol. 7, 52–53. For "blessed are the peacemakers . . ." see Matthew 5: 9 ("Blessed are the peacemakers: for they shall be called the children of God"); for Apostle Jacob's gospel see Jacob 4: 2 ("Ye lust, and have not: ye kill, and desire to have, and cannot obtain: ye fight and war, yet ye have not, because ye ask not . . ."); for "Lord's promise" see Matthew 7: 7 ("Ask, and it shall be given you; seek, and ye shall find; knock, and it shall be opened unto you . . .").

... If you do well to the benevolent tsar then you receive the reward and if not from him, then from the tsar in the Highest. The same Apostle teaches us: do not be persuaded into the yoke of the infidels; what does light have to do with darkness, what is common between the faithful and the infidels? Didn't the Host of Zaporozhe know or learn that the infidels are its enemy? ... And finally, listen to what I have to tell you. ... If anybody is going to stand between you two, brothers of the Host of Zaporozhe from both banks, it will be the God of Love Himself. If you love each other, then you will have no use for the infidels' yoke; as fire can not be mixed with water, so the faithful Host of Zaporozhe can not join the infidels. Only under the protection of the pious monarch the Host of Zaporozhe will have its liberties. ... Kneel before the illustrious monarch, because even God can be appeased by piety: repent and be saved. Likewise, the tsar, anointed by God, will be appeased seeing your repentance ...²⁹

Archbishop Lazar Baranovych was also strongly involved, and even quite successful, in convincing Hetman Doroshenko's deputy on the Left Bank, acting Hetman Dem'ian Mnohorishnyi, to submit to the authority of the Muscovite tsar. One of Mnohorishnyi's letters to Baranovych, written September–October 1668, attests to this:

While Briukhovets'kyi was still alive,³⁰ we received your frequent pastoral advices to live in peace, not to fraternize with the Tatars and, as is suitable for Christians, obtain liberty not by means of the sword, but by submitting oneself voluntarily to His illustrious Majesty the tsar and asking Him to grant one that liberty. ... If His Majesty takes us under his authority and confirms our liberty. ... then I am ready to bow before His Majesty the tsar together with all the regiments on this side of the Dnipro and direct my forces against those whom His illustrious Majesty the tsar commands. ...³¹

29. *Akty*, vol. 7, 52–53. For “yoke of the infidels” see 2 Corinthians 6: 14–15 (“Be ye not unequally yoked together with unbelievers: for what fellowship hath righteousness with unrighteousness? And what communion hath light with darkness? And what concord hath Christ with Belial? Or what part hath he that believeth with an infidel?”).

30. Hetman Ivan Briukhovets'kyi was slain by his own Cossacks in June 1668. After his passing, Hetman Doroshenko was successful, albeit briefly, in expanding his authority over both banks of the Dnipro.

31. *Akty*, vol. 7, 64.

By March 1669, Mnohohrishnyi broke his allegiance to Doroshenko, putting himself and lands in his control under the protection of the Muscovite tsar. Mnohohrishnyi's decision was apparently dictated by the political situation on the Ukraine's Left Bank at that time. But one should not dismiss the persistence and the power of persuasion demonstrated by Lazar Baranovych in convincing this hetman to change his political orientation. For example, in one of his letters to the influential court cleric Simeon Polots'kyi (1629–1680) in Moscow, the archbishop insisted that Mnohohrishnyi was turned because of Baranovych's efforts.³²

In 1676, following years of futile armed struggle and diplomatic maneuvering, Petro Doroshenko resigned from office and submitted to the authority of the Muscovite tsar, thus ending his political career. The Ottomans, however, would not abandon their claims to Ukraine without a fight and invested Yurii Khmel'nyts'kyi as Doroshenko's heir. As the vassal of the Turkish sultan, Bohdan Khmel'nyts'kyi's son participated in two Ottoman attacks on the Cossack-and-Muscovite-defended fortress of Chyhyryn, the capital of Western-Ukrainian Cossack hetmans (1677–1678). As with Doroshenko, Mnohohrishnyi and Briukhovets'kyi, members of the Ukrainian-Orthodox clergy, beseeched Yurii Khmel'nyts'kyi to break his allegiance to the Muslims.

Among the first clerics to come to the fore was the acting Metropolitan of Kyiv and Archbishop of Chernihiv, Lazar Baranovych. On 4 May 1677, he issued a public address to all Orthodox laity and clergy on both banks of the Dnipro, naming God's retribution for human sins as the cause for the ruin in Ukraine and calling on all people to repent and to show Christ-like piety to secure God's mercy and help against imminent Turkish attacks. According to Baranovych, even though historical narratives and the Bible provided numerous examples of how people who had forgotten God were punished, similar examples could be found in recent Ukrainian history, when Right-Bank Ukraine was ravaged by the enemy. The archbishop repeatedly emphasized that it was God's retribution for people's sinful behavior:

“Many fell to the edge of the sword . . . ,” so speaks Jesus, the son of Sirach . . . more than one man drowned at home in his own blood; more than one kingdom, principality, land, country, district, lay in terrible ruins; more than one glorious city is forgotten lying in ashes . . . many such examples can be found in different histories and books of the Old and the New Testaments: however, there is no need to illustrate this clear and

32. Eingorn, *O snosheniakh*, 484.

renowned matter by referring to the ancient examples. Even in our lifetime, there were years when we saw how much evil was done by the enemy's sword, as when recently our own fatherland on the other side of the Dnipro experienced ruin, brought there by the blood-covered sword of the enemy of the Holy Cross, because God allowed this to happen. . . . And all this happened because of our sins. Our own sins provoked God's mighty rage, which brought that blood-covered sword unto us. . . . God wants to protect us, but we act against His will, and then He acts accordingly. . . . He punishes us by subjecting us to the attack by the harsh, God-appalling, Christ-hating, Christian blood-spilling enemy, the Turk, who is difficult to repulse, unless we follow in the steps of the repenting residents of Nineveh . . .³³

Later on, Baranovych addressed his pastoral word to all residents of Ukraine, urging them to mollify God through their repentance and pious behavior (e.g., by not playing music, not dancing, and not committing other "improper" actions), so that:

God, by observing our genuine repentance, would avert His righteous rage from us and would save us from the falling infidel sword, so that through God's help, armies of the great sovereign His Illustrious Majesty, the tsar, being empowered from heaven, would achieve a decisive victory over the Turk.³⁴

On 4 December 1678 (after Chyhyryn had been sacked by the Turks), one of the most eloquent members of the Ukrainian Orthodox clergy of that time, Archimandrite Ioanikii Galiatovs'kyi of Chernihiv's Ielets' Monastery, wrote a private letter-homily to Yurii Khmel'nyts'kyi, urging him to sever his alliance with the Turks and to return to the monastery as the monk he once was.³⁵ Galiatovs'kyi's epistle, composed with the sole purpose of convincing the hetman to leave politics, is filled with religious and historical references. "Have courage to remember with your heart and your memory the words of Christ," the archimandrite wrote,

33. *Akty*, vol. 5, 141–42. For "Many have fallen by the edge of the sword . . ." see Sirach (*Apocrypha*) 28: 18. For "Nineveh repents" see Jonah 3: 1–10.

34. *Akty*, vol. 5, 142.

35. After his first time in office as Hetman (1659–1662), Yurii, plagued by military defeats at the hands of the Muscovite commanders and Cossacks of the Left-Bank Ukraine, surrendered his office and was tonsured as Monk Gedeon. See "Universalnyi ukrains'kykh het'maniv vid Ivana Vyhovs'koho do Ivana Samoilovycha (1657–1687)," *Universalnyi ukrains'kykh het'maniv. Materialy do ukrains'koho dyplomatychno. Serii I* (Kyiv; L'viv: NTSh, 2004), 112.

“what good is it for a man, if he conquers the entire world, but loses his soul, or what would a man aspire in exchange for his very soul?”³⁶ Galiatovs’kyi then answers this rhetorical question by saying that “your lordship is ready to lose your soul for this world’s earthly riches and for the title of ‘prince’ and ‘hetman,’ even though you yourself know that this entire world is not worthy of one man’s soul.”³⁷

In his attempt to convince the hetman to accept the inevitable, the archimandrite resorted to biblical as well as historical examples:

... May your lordship read in a gospel by the Evangelist Luke, Chapters 9 and 14, and in the history about Gebron, who, first, had accepted the monastic life and later abandoned the monastery serving as a court’s marshal to the French king.³⁸ When he passed away, some monks heard noise over the river and voices: we are the demons, who are carrying the soul of Gebron, who had left the monastery and returned to the world and who is now dead ...³⁹

At the end of this letter, Galiatovs’kyi unequivocally refers to current politics, calling Yurii Khmel’nyts’kyi’s political orientation “a sin,” advising him to surrender, and promising mercy and protection from the Hetman of the Left-Bank Ukraine, Ivan Samoilovych (r. 1672–87):

... His lordship Hetman Ivan Samoilovych, in charge of His Majesty the tsar’s Host of Zaporozhe, promises through me to your lordship that no harm will be done either to your life or your honor or your property, and that you will be guaranteed clerical status within the Lord’s Church. Remember the latter and you shall never fall into sin; remember about death, Last Judgment, heavens and hell; [you will be delivered] if you do not fall in sin, sever friendship with the Muslims and stop fighting against the Orthodox Christians ...⁴⁰

36. *Akty, otnosiashchiesia k istorii Iuzhnoi i Zapadnoi Rossii. Sobranye i izdannnye arkhеоgraficheskoi kommissiei*, vol. 13 (St. Petersburg: A.M. Kotomin, 1884), 750–51: 750.

37. *Ibid.*

38. The origin of the name “Gebron” is somewhat obscure. Perhaps Galiatovs’kyi was referring to St. Gerold of Fontenelle (d. 806), the Benedictine monk, bishop, and courtier to Charlemagne.

39. *Akty*, vol. 13, 750.

40. *Ibid.*, 750–51.

At this point it must be noted that sermons and private homilies by no means represented the main or only form of the clergy's participation in politics for the benefit of the Muscovite government. In fact, Church hierarchs such as Methodius Fylymonovych, Gizel', Baranovych, and Galiatovs'kyi had a long history of relationship with the Muscovite government.

After the Muscovite tsar accepted authority over Ukraine in 1654, a new rhetoric picturing him as a hereditary ruler of Ukrainian lands was gradually adopted by both Ukrainian clergy and laity. Bishop Methodius was among the first and steadfast champions of this concept. On 27 September 1654, in a public address before the tsar, he spoke: "... Your Tsarist Majesty rules over us in a fatherly way, having inherited us . . . from Your Majesty's ancestors, great princes and autocrats of Rus' . . ." ⁴¹

A similar approach was adopted by Archimandrite Gizel', who in his major work, styled as history (*Synopsis*, 1674), introduced the concept of a joint historical space between Muscovy and Ukraine.⁴² As early as 1667 the Muscovite government contacted Gizel' urging him to expand the scope of his tasks, beyond providing Moscow with information about the events in Ukraine and neighboring lands.⁴³ In 1670, Gizel' was probably the most active representative of Muscovite government interests in Ukraine: He lent monastery money to help the Muscovite commander in Kyiv pay his troops, and informed Moscow about events in Poland and Turkey.⁴⁴ Alarmed by the adverse political developments, the archimandrite wrote in 1669:

... Kyiv and the Kyiv Caves Monastery are as if under the siege. . . . Doroshenko submitted himself to the Turkish sultan and the Turkish general is standing with his troops at Kal'nyk, which is 125 kilometers from Kyiv, [also] the Tatars are camped only twenty kilometers from the Caves Monastery; [they are] plundering churches, monastery's property, even approach Kyiv, killing and capturing people . . . ⁴⁵

41. Zenon E. Kohut, "Vid Hadiacha do Andrusova. Osmyslennia 'otchyzny' v ukrains'kii politychnii kul'turi," *Hadiats'ka uniia 1658 roku* (Kyiv: NAN Ukrainy; KMA; KIUS, 2008), 231.

42. Zenon E. Kohut, "Ot Iafeta do Mosokha: Protsess sozdaniia bibleiskoi rodoslovnoi slavian v pol'skoi, ukrainskoi i russkoi istoriografii (XVI–XVIII vv.)," *Ukraina i sosednie gosudarstva v XVII veke. Materialy mezhdunarodnoi konferentsii* (St. Petersburg: Sanktpeterburgskii gosudarstvennyi universitet, 2004), 71.

43. Eingorn, *O snoshenniakh*, 424–25.

44. *Ibid.*, 691.

45. *Ibid.*, 624.

Gizel's motivation for serving the Muscovite government is easy to understand. Naturally, the Archimandrite was interested in the well-being of his monastery, the Church and its flock. For one thing, due to the depredation of the monastery's properties, Gizel' relied on Moscow's financial help. Also, due to the growing threat of Ottoman invasion of Ukraine in 1672–1673, Gizel' further bolstered his political ties with Moscow, asking the Muscovite authorities to garrison troops in the monastery and to repair its fortifications.⁴⁶

Baranovych was similarly active in serving the political interests of Moscow. Indeed, his efforts helped the Muscovite government to re-establish its control over the Left-Bank Ukraine in 1669. For his services Baranovych was well rewarded. In 1667, the Muscovite civil and church authorities helped Baranovych to be elected the archbishop of Chernihiv.⁴⁷ In July 1670, Baranovych was appointed caretaker of the Metropolitan see of Kyiv.⁴⁸ During the 1670s his political influence with Muscovite authorities began to fade because of the rise of new Muscovite political agents from among the Ukrainian Orthodox clergy (like Simeon Adamovych). However, as his anti-Muslim and pro-Muscovite sermons and other activities from the 1670s show, Baranovych remained loyal to Moscow to the end.

As a member of the Ukrainian Orthodox clergy and a celebrated preacher and talented author, Galiatovs'kyi could not and would not avoid issues of faith, particularly while addressing the religious and political issue of the "Muslim threat."⁴⁹ Besides the aforementioned criticism by Galiatovs'kyi of Yurii Khmel'nyts'kyi's political agenda, this cleric is more known for his anti-Muslim polemical works, written during the joint Polish-Muscovite campaigns against the Ottomans: *Lebid'* ("The Swan", 1683) and *Alkorań machometów, nauka heretycka* ("Mohamed's Koran as heretical teaching", 1687).⁵⁰

The support rendered by the senior members of the Ukrainian-Orthodox clergy to the Muscovite tsar, even if he was the only independent monarch of the Orthodox faith, was nevertheless subject to certain conditions and political considerations. Thus Inokentii Gizel' was very helpful arguing in favor of the Muscovite tsar's authority over Ukraine, but Gizel' ardently resented the attempts

46. Ibid., 885–86.

47. Ibid., 395.

48. Ibid., 561.

49. Kostomarov, "Galiatovs'kyi," 358; Nikolai Petrov, *Ocherki iz istorii ukrainskoi literatury XVII–XVIII vekov* (Kiev: Petr Barskii, 1911), 23.

50. Kostomarov, "Galiatovs'kyi," 368–73.

of Muscovite lay and clerical authorities to place the Ukrainian Church under the authority of the Patriarch of Moscow. He repeatedly ignored Ukrainian-Muscovite councils (as in 1658, 1659, and 1666) at which this issue had been raised by Muscovite representatives.⁵¹ According to Ukrainian scholar Mykola Sumtsov, the status of the Ukrainian Church, which was to remain under the authority of the Patriarch of Constantinople, was the boundary Gizel' was determined not to cross. In 1666, the archimandrite even told the Muscovite envoy Iona Leont'evich that were the Muscovites to appoint "their" Metropolitan of Kyiv he, Gizel', would barricade himself in his monastery with all his monks.⁵² Sumtsov points out that Gizel's loyalty to Moscow "... had strictly defined borders. It ended where important national interests of Little Rus' began."⁵³

Bishop Methodius (Fylymonovych) remained a steadfast champion of the Muscovite cause in Ukraine until 1666–1667, when he was irritated by Muscovite attempts to place the Ukrainian Church under the Patriarch of Moscow and by the conditions of the Armistice of Andrusovo (January 1667), according to which Right-Bank Ukraine and, eventually, Kyiv were to be returned to Poland.⁵⁴ Fylymonovych resolved his conflict with Hetman Briukhovets'kyi and they, dissatisfied with Muscovite protection, conspired to rebel against the tsar.⁵⁵ In one of his letters to the hetman Fylymonovych wrote: "... May God not allow us to be dragged into the Polish yoke by our necks, or, for that matter to the Muscovite one! Better death than such an evil fate ..."⁵⁶ After the anti-Muscovite uprising had begun, the tsar's government turned at first to Fylymonovych, asking him to broker peace, not knowing about bishop's true role in the ongoing events. In the fall of 1668, however, Fylymonovych was arrested and confined to a monastery, where he died in 1690.⁵⁷

Yet another example of Ukrainian Orthodox clerics' opposition to Muscovite policies is even more revealing. The Metropolitan of Kyiv Iosyf Neliubovych-Tukal's'kyi (d. 1675) was supported by Petro Doroshenko and advised the hetman

51. Eingorn, *O snoshenniakh*, 139.

52. Nikolai Sumtsov, "Innokentii Gizel' (k istorii iuzhno-russkoi literatury XVII veka)," *Kievskaiia starina*, vol. X (October 1884): 183–226: 194.

53. *Ibid.*, 194.

54. Oleksandr Morozov, *Nizhyns'kyi protopop Maksym Fylymonovych* (Nizhyn: Nizhyns'kyi derzhavnyi pedahohichnyi universytet im. M. Hoholia, 2000), 105–06.

55. Morozov, *Nizhyns'kyi protopop*, 109–10.

56. *Akty*, vol. 7, 63–64.

57. Morozov, *Nizhyns'kyi protopop*, 112–19.

to submit to the authority of the Turkish sultan (which happened in 1668–1669). In a letter to the tsar in the spring of 1668, the commander of the Muscovite garrison in Kyiv, the *Boyar* Petr Sheremetev, attested to this fact, writing how “Metropolitan Tukul’s’kyi, and most of all Yurii Khmel’nyts’kyi are persuading [hetman] Doroshenko and are standing firm on the issue [that he is] not to be under the authority of Your Majesty or of the [Polish] king, but to be under the authority of the Turkish sultan and obedient to the Crimean khan.”⁵⁸ This piece of information had been initially relayed to Sheremetev by Archimandrite Gizel’, even if the latter was very respectful of Tukul’s’kyi.⁵⁹ In October 1668, the Archpriest of Nizhyn and one of the main supporters of the Muscovite cause, Symeon Adamovych, reported to the *Posol’skii prikaz* (the tsar’s Foreign Office) that Tukul’s’kyi was behind Hetman Briukhovets’kyi’s rebellion and had received through the Patriarch of Constantinople the sultan’s confirmation letter as Metropolitan of Kyiv, while Hetman Doroshenko listened only to Tukul’s’kyi and had submitted to the sultan’s authority because of Tukul’s’kyi’s advice.⁶⁰ According to Vitalii Eingorn, Tukul’s’kyi decide to favor the sultan’s protection after much contemplation. This can be seen from the Metropolitan’s written response to Petr Sheremetev, in which Tukul’s’kyi highly approved of the Cossack-Ottoman alliance and urged the boyar to surrender Kyiv to Doroshenko rather than (in accordance to the conditions of the Armistice of Andrusovo) to eventually hand it back to the Poles, who were persecutors of the Orthodox faith.⁶¹

These examples not only demonstrate the limits that certain high-ranking Ukrainian Orthodox clergy placed on their support of the Muscovite cause, but they help us imagine a more detailed picture of the complex political relations, maneuverings, and intrigues in which both Ukrainian laity and clergy were actively involved.

In conclusion, the role of the Ukrainian Orthodox clergy and the impact of their homilies on Ukrainian politics during the period of the “Ruin” (c. 1648–1681) in all their complexity need further study yet. But it seems evident from this introductory overview that some members of the Ukrainian-Orthodox clergy during the era were actively involved in Ukrainian politics, particularly by using sermons to achieve concrete political results. They dissuaded pro-Ottoman

58. *Akty*, vol. 7, 59.

59. *Ibid.*

60. Eingorn, *O snoshenniakh*, 92–93.

61. *Ibid.*, 511.

Cossacks from aligning with the sultan and encouraged them to submit to the Muscovite tsar. Sermons conveying messages to that effect were delivered to the public during liturgical services and on special occasions such as religious feasts. They were considered an important vehicle with which to educate people and to address problems that included political ones. Antonii Radyvilovs'kyi's mobilizing of the anti-Ottoman mood during the late 1670s serves as an example of such an activity. Members of the Ukrainian-Orthodox clergy also used the private homily in their correspondence with certain political leaders.

For the preachers, the anti-Muslim sermons exhibit several interconnected objectives. They express opposition to the Ottoman onslaught on Europe and particularly for Ukraine, they support the Muscovite tsar as a shield against the Ottoman aggression, and they counter anti-Muscovite, pro-Ottoman sentiments among Ukrainian-Cossack political factions. The political participation of members of the Ukrainian-Orthodox clergy on the Muscovite side also might ensure a more secure and prosperous future for them.

It is important, meanwhile, not to overlook the differences between these preachers. For example, Radyvilovs'kyi had made preaching his vocation. He was interested in educating people, teaching them religious zeal and conduct. He wrote and delivered sermons to people in person (particularly at the famous Kyivan Caves Monastery, where he served as full-time preacher under the archimandrite Gizel'). Other hierarchs of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, such as Gizel' and Baranovych, delivered sermons because it was expected from them due to their senior position within the Church. They were responsible for their institutions and clergy, and, during the time of the "Ruin," increasingly grew dependent on the Muscovite tsar's generosity and military protection. This was equally true for Galiatovs'kyi, who appears to be one of the most prolific and renowned preachers of his time. These clerics wanted to make themselves useful by serving the tsar's political interests, particularly by dissuading Cossack leaders like Mnohohrishnyi and Doroshenko from their allegiance to the Ottomans and the Crimean Tatars.

Finally, some points can be made about the sermons' target audience and the effect of the preaching. The different contents of public sermons and private homilies reflect their different purposes. Firstly, public sermons were primarily aimed at Ukrainian-Orthodox Christians who could carry arms, while private homilies were aimed directly at the leaders of the Cossack factions. Secondly, the purpose of public sermons was to strengthen people's religious fervor and thereby rally support for the anti-Ottoman cause and the protection of Ukraine; private homilies were meant to persuade the leaders of the pro-Ottoman, anti-Muscovite Cossack factions to change their political affiliation. Thirdly, while the effect of

the public homilies is often difficult to establish, there are indications that some private homilies were effective: For instance, the influence of Baranovych's letters on Doroshenko's deputy in the Left-Bank Ukraine, Mnohohrishnyi, who, within a few months after being entrusted by hetman Doroshenko with the Left-Bank Ukraine, submitted himself to the authority of the Muscovite tsar. And if the attempts by clerics to sway hetmans Briukhovets'kyi, Doroshenko, and Yurii Khmel'nyts'kyi were unsuccessful, it was not for lack of trying.

Published sermons, composed for political purposes and aimed at the broad public, need to be studied together with private homilies, addressed to political figures of this period in private correspondence, as well as with any other works by their authors. Even though the form, the target audience, and the purpose of these texts may vary, they share at least one characteristic, that is, the great majority of them served as rhetorical and political instruments to ensure that Cossack Ukraine remained under the scepter of the Orthodox Muscovite monarch. The period of the "Ruin" cannot be fully understood without examining this question.