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Between Faith and Country: The Predicament of Metropolitan Iosyf Neliubovych-Tukal's'kyi

ABSTRACT: This is an investigation of the life of a top hierarch of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, Metropolitan Iosyf Neliubovych-Tukal's'kyi, pastor and a chief advisor to Hetman Petro Doroshenko (1665–1676). This article explains the circumstances and consequences of the Metropolitan's advocacy for accepting the patronage of the Muslim Ottoman sultan over Cossack Ukraine. The Metropolitan's decision is shown to be less paradoxical than it may appear, emerging out of Tukal's'kyi's understanding of what was best for Cossack Ukraine, its people, and the Ukrainian Orthodox Church.

INTRODUCTION

The role of the Ukrainian Orthodox clergy in political events in Ukraine during the second half of the 17th century was first studied during the 1800s and early 1900s by scholars such as Sergei Ternovskii, Vitalii Eingorn, Konstantin Kharlampovich and Mykola Kostomarov.¹ Their focus was mostly on the role of the Ukrainian clergy in establishing the Muscovite monarch's protectorate over Cossack Ukraine as well as the Moscow Patriarch's control over the Ukrainian Orthodox Church. The scholarly consensus was that despite a certain reluctance to accept the patronage of the Moscow Patriarch over the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, a majority of the leading Ukrainian Orthodox hierarchs favoured the Tsar's patronage over Cossack Ukraine. At the same time very little attention was paid to other political agendas. In particular, no research has been done on the political program of the Metropolitan of Kyiv, Iosyf Neliubovych-Tukal's'kyi—a top hierarch of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (1664–1675)—who chose the Muslim Ottoman Empire's protection over Cossack Ukraine instead of the Christian powers, i.e., the Roman Catholic Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and the Orthodox Muscovite state. This study is meant to reconstruct Metropolitan Tukal's'kyi's biography and investigate both the genesis and essence of his political views and agenda.

¹ See Sergei Ternovskii, "Akty, otnosiashchiesia k delu o podchinenii kievskoi mitropolii moskovskomu patriarkhatu (1620–1694)," *Arkhiv iugo-zapadnoi Rossii*, part 1, vol. V (Kiev: V Gubernskoi tipografii, 1879); Vitalii Eingorn, *O snosheniakh malorossiiskago dukhovenstva s moskovskim pravitel'stvom v tsarstvovanie Alekseia Mikhailovicha* (Moskva: Universitetskaia tipografiia, 1890); Konstantin Kharlampovich, *Malorossiiskoe vliianie na velikoruskuiu tserkovnuiu zhizn'*, vol. 1 (Kazan': Izdanie M. A. Golubeva, 1914); Mykola Kostomarov, "Galiatovs'kyi, Radyvilovs'kyi i Lazar Baranovych," in *Istoriia Ukrainy v zhytpepsiakh vyznachniishykh ei diiachiv* (L'viv: Z drukarni NTSh, 1918) 357–386.

This paper has been inspired in part by Frank E. Sysyn's book on Adam Kysil'.² While studying the Ruthenian (i.e., early-modern Ukrainian and Belarusian) nobility, Sysyn undertook an in-depth analysis of the worldview of A. Kysil', a senator in the Diet of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, the palatine of Kyiv, a patriot of his *ojczyzna* (fatherland), and a representative of the Ruthenian nobility of the Greek Orthodox faith. Sysyn explored Kysil's "dilemma" of choosing among conflicting loyalties: namely, his Polish-Lithuanian "fatherland," his Ruthenian kin and the Orthodox faith. Another source of inspiration was an article on the political and cultural vision of Archbishop Lazar Baranovych by David A. Frick.³ Last, but not least, I found intellectual stimulus in the recent studies by Zenon E. Kohut on the origins of the idea of a "Ukrainian Fatherland" during the second half of the 17th century, in which the author investigates the emergence of new political concepts as well as responses to them by members of various social strata of Ukrainian society during that time.⁴

I. THE BIOGRAPHY OF IOSYF NELIUBOVYCH-TUKAL'S'KYI

Biographical data on Iosyf Neliubovych-Tukal's'kyi⁵ is scarce and dispersed over the occasional biographical articles compiled predominantly in the 19th century. Tukal's'kyi is also mentioned in several studies on Hetman Petro Doroshenko, who was the metropolitan's confidant and political ally.⁶ The exact date and birthplace of Iosyf Tukal's'kyi are unknown. All we know is that he was born in the Pinsk region of present-day Belarus to a local noble family.⁷ From

² Frank E. Sysyn, *Between Poland and the Ukraine: The Dilemma of Adam Kysil' 1600–1653* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1985).

³ David A. Frick, "Lazar Baranovych, 1680: The Union of Lech and Rus," in *Culture, Nation and Identity: The Ukrainian-Russian Encounter, 1600–1945*, edited by Andreas Kappeler et al (Edmonton and Toronto: CIUS Press, 2003) 19–56.

⁴ See Zenon E. Kohut, "Vid Hadiacha do Andrusova: osmyslennia 'otchyzny' v ukrains'kii politychnii kul'turi," in *Hadiats'ka uniiia 1658 roku*, edited by Pavlo Sokhan' (Kyiv: KMA; Edmonton and Toronto: CIUS, 2008) 228–239; and also his "The Birth of a Ukrainian Fatherland: Civil War, Foreign Intervention, and Innovation in Political Culture (1650s–1660s)," which is to be published by the Polish Academy of Arts and Sciences.

⁵ Henceforth I will use either his shortened name ("Iosyf Tukal's'kyi") or prefix his name with the titles he held in the Orthodox hierarchy (for example, "Archimandrite Tukal's'kyi" and "Metropolitan Tukal's'kyi").

⁶ See Dmytro Doroshenko, *Hetman Petro Doroshenko: ohliad ioho zhyttia i politychnoi diial'nosti* (New York: UVAN u SSHA, 1985); Jan Perdenia, *Hetman Piotr Doroszenko a Polska* (Kraków: Universitas, 2000). The most recent study on the subject is the article "Mytropolyt Iosyp Neliubovych-Tukal's'kyi" by I. Lysenko in *Kyivs'ka starovyna* 6 (1994): 67–72, which is based upon a rather limited collection of primary sources.

⁷ Doroshenko 124.

1654 to 1657, he was the archimandrite of the Holy Spirit Monastery in Vilnius (Lithuania), and since 1657—the archimandrite of the Leshchyns'kyi Monastery (Belarus).⁸ Tukul's'kyi's tenure in Belarus proved to be hazardous. On 9 January 1657,⁹ Hetman Bohdan Khmel'nyts'kyi in his letter to Tsar Aleksei Mikhailovich informed the latter that the Poles “burned monasteries in Pinsk county and would have killed the Orthodox archimandrite of Leshchyns'kyi [monastery] Father Iosyf had he not escaped, however [they] killed all his monks [there] [...]”¹⁰ It is also known that in the 1657 Archimandrite Tukul's'kyi participated in the election of a successor to the deceased Metropolitan Sylvestr Kosov. In early February 1658 Tukul's'kyi's name was mentioned in an account that dealt with the confirmation of Ivan Vyhovs'kyi as Hetman at the Cossack Council of Pereiaslav.¹¹

What were Iosyf Tukul's'kyi's views and political sympathies at that time? As of 1658 Archimandrite Tukul's'kyi posed as a supporter of the Muscovite political cause. According to Ukrainian historian Dmytro Doroshenko, the archimandrite supported the Muscovites as long as there was hope that they would liberate all Ukrainian lands from the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth's rule and unite them under the protectorate of the Tsar.¹² At that time defending the Orthodox Church and its faithful in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth was, of course, a vital issue. On 17 January 1658, the Archimandrite of the Caves Monastery (Kyiv), Inokentii Gizel', and the Archimandrite of Leshchyns'kyi Monastery, Iosyf Tukul's'kyi, collaborated in writing a letter-homily¹³ to Tsar Aleksei Mikhailovich, asking His Majesty to take control over

⁸ Evgenii (Bolkhovitinov), Metropolitan of Kyiv, *Opisanie Kievosofiiskogo sobora i kievskoi ierarhii s prisovokupleniem raznykh grammat i vypisok, ob'iasniaiushchikh onoe, takzhe planov, i fasadov konstantinopol'skoi i kievskoi Sofiiskoi tserkvy i iaroslavova nadgrobiia* (Kiev: V Tip. Kievopecherskoi Lavry, 1825) 190; “Zapiski igumena Oresta,” *Arkheologicheskii sbornik dokumentov otnosiashchikhsia k istorii severozapadnoi Rusi, izdavaemyi pri upravlenii Vilinskago uchebnago okruga*, vol. 2 (Vil'na: Pechatnia Gubernskago pravleniia, 1867) xix-xx. It must be noted that Iosyf Tukul's'kyi kept his title as “the Archimandrite of Leshchyns'kyi Monastery” even after his election as Metropolitan of Kyiv (as confirmed by the decree of the Patriarch of Constantinople in 1668). See *Akty, otnosiashchiesia k istorii Zapadnoi Rossii, sobrannye i vydannye arkheograficheskoiu kommissieiu*, vol. 5 (St. Petersburg: E. Pratz, 1853) 114–116.

⁹ All dates in this paper are given according to the Julian Calendar.

¹⁰ *Dokumenty Bohdana Khmel'nyts'koho 1648–1657* (hereafter—*DBKh*), edited by I. Kryp'iakevych et al (Kyiv: Vyd. AN URSR, 1961) 554.

¹¹ Doroshenko 124–125.

¹² Doroshenko 125.

¹³ On the definition and use of “letters-homilies” by the Orthodox clergy in Ukraine during this historical period see Roman I. Shiyan, “Preaching Politics: Anti-Muslim and

Poland and Lithuania in defence of the Orthodox Rus' people from the "barbaric oppression" coming from the Roman Catholics and the Church Unionists (*Uniaty*).¹⁴ These two churchmen, who enjoyed unrivalled moral authority among Orthodox Ukrainians during this time, pleaded:

[...] We hope that Your Majesty the Tsar will want to save Christ's Israel [i.e., Orthodox Ukraine and Belarus—R.Sh.]... [T]his will happen not only through God's hand and due to the prayers of the Holy Birth-Giver of God... [Once] in [His Majesty the Tsar's] firm hand, the people of the Orthodox faith and their towns will become resolute in the holy Orthodox faith, and the unpunished enemies, who had fallen away from the Holy Eastern Church will come to their senses, weep over their wrongful heresy, and will either renounce their heresy against the wheat, that is, the Orthodox people, coming together as the Lord's harvest, or [they] will burn in the fire of the righteous fury [as chaff] [...]¹⁵

However, later (17 October 1660), Archimandrite Tukul's'kyi did not directly object to Hetman Iurii Khmel'nyts'kyi's pledge of allegiance to the Polish king (neither did he support it overtly).¹⁶ Though it had only been three years since the Polish attack against his monastery and just two years since Tukul's'kyi expressed high hopes for the Tsar's protection, in 1660 the archimandrite must have simply accepted the new military and political reality.

Tukul's'kyi's career struck a high note immediately after siding with Iurii Khmel'nyts'kyi and the Polish king. On 3 August 1661, Archimandrite Tukul's'kyi became the Archbishop of Mahiloŭ and Mstsislaŭ.¹⁷ After the passing of the Metropolitan of Kyiv, Dyonisii Balaban (10 May 1663), the members of Ukrainian clergy gathered at the Church Council in Korsun' and elected the "bishop from Belarus" Tukul's'kyi as Balaban's successor (19 October 1663).¹⁸ Tukul's'kyi's contemporary, Ukrainian cleric-chronicler

Pro-Muscovite Rhetoric in the Sermons of the Ukrainian Orthodox Clergy (1660s–1670s)," *The Historian* 71.2 (Summer 2009): 318–338.

¹⁴ *Akty, otnosiashchiesia k istorii Iuzhnoi i Zapadnoi Rossii. Sobranie i izdannye arkhograficheskoi kommissiei*, vol. 4 (St. Petersburg: P. Kulish, 1863) 83–87.

¹⁵ *Akty, otnosiashchiesia k istorii Iuzhnoi i Zapadnoi Rossii* 4: 85.

¹⁶ Doroshenko 125. Iurii Khmel'nyts'kyi's political shift was caused by the defeat of the Cossack army at Slobodyschi (8 October 1660). After that the Cossack state was split along the Dnipro into two parts: the Right-Bank Ukraine under the patronage of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, and the Left-Bank Ukraine under the patronage of the Muscovite state.

¹⁷ For Archimandrite Tukul's'kyi's elevation see Archbishop Filaret (Gumelevskii), *Obzor russkoi dukhovnoi literatury 862–1720*, vol. 1 (St. Petersburg: Izdanie I. L. Tuzova, 1884) 202; "Zapiski igumena Oresta," xix.

¹⁸ Nikolai Kostomarov, *Ruina 1663–1687 (istoricheskaiia monografiia): get'manstva Briukhovetskogo, Mnogogreshnago i Samoilovycha* (St. Petersburg and Moscow: Izdanie M.O. Volfa, 1882) 11–12; Illarion Chistovich, *Ocherk istorii zapadno-russkoi tserkvi*, part II (St. Petersburg: Tipografiia Departamenta udelov, 1884) 139.

Feodosii Sofonovych, wrote in his work that the newly elected metropolitan was not supported by some of the bishops, but was widely popular with lower-rank clergy, Cossacks, burghers and peasants.¹⁹

Metropolitan Tukul's'kyi at once sent the Colonel of Bratslav, Ivan Serbyn, to Constantinople “so that the Patriarch of Constantinople would bless him [Tukul's'kyi] to [lead] the Metropolitan see of Kyiv.”²⁰ However, Serbyn's mission was cut short by the Patriarch of Jerusalem, Melethius, and the nobility of Walachia, who told Tukul's'kyi's envoy about the success of the alternative Muscovite mission and the appointment of Bishop Methodius (Fylymonovych) as the caretaker of the Metropolitan see of Kyiv.²¹ Serbyn was also scorned along with all those individuals, who reneged from the oath of loyalty to the Muscovite tsar and recognized the authority of the Polish king (like Hetman Iurii Khmel'nyts'kyi and Metropolitan Iosyf Tukul's'kyi).²²

Meanwhile, neither the successor to Hetman Iurii Khmel'nyts'kyi in the Right-Bank Ukraine, Pavlo Teteria (Hetman since January 1663), nor the Polish-Lithuanian government accepted the election of Tukul's'kyi as Metropolitan.²³ According to the Polish historian Jan Perdenia, Tukul's'kyi's election happened contrary to the will of both the Polish king and Hetman Teteria.²⁴ Also, among Tukul's'kyi's chief adversaries in the Commonwealth was its Chancellor, Mikołaj Jan Prażmowski, mainly because the new Metropolitan was known as a staunch opponent of the Church Union (i.e., the union between the Roman Catholic and the Ruthenian Orthodox Church).²⁵ In 1664, the Polish-Lithuanian government recognized Antonii Vinnyts'kyi as Metropolitan of Kyiv, forbidding the Orthodox clergy within the borders of the Commonwealth to acknowledge Tukul's'kyi as such.²⁶ In the Right-Bank Ukraine at the time there was a group of Cossack officers (including the former Hetmans I. Vyhovs'kyi and Iu.

¹⁹ Feodosii Sofonovych, *Khronika z litopysiv starodavnikh* (Kyiv: Naukova dumka, 1992) 238.

²⁰ Chistovich 139.

²¹ Chistovich 139.

²² *Akty, otносиашchiesia k istorii Iuzhnoi i Zapadnoi Rossii. Sobranye i izdannye arkheograficheskoi kommissiei*, vol. 5 (St. Petersburg: E. Pratz, 1867) 204–205; Chistovich 139–140.

²³ As late as the 1670s, the Polish authorities failed to come to terms with Tukul's'kyi's election as Metropolitan, even to the point of calling him “pseudo-Metropolitan.” See Ambroż Grabowski, *Ojczyście Spominki w Pismach do Dziejów Dawniej Polski. Diaryusze, Relacye, Pamiętniki...tudzież Lysty Historyczne do Panowania Królów Jana Kazimierza i Michala Korybuta oraz Listi Jana Sobieskiego, Marszałka i Hetmana Wielkiego Koronnego* (W Krakowie: Nakładem Józefa Cypcera, 1845) 224.

²⁴ Kostomarov, *Ruina* 12; Perdenia 60.

²⁵ Doroshenko 125.

²⁶ Chistovich 140.

Khmel'nyts'kyi, as well as a very popular associate of the late Hetman Bohdan Khmel'nyts'kyi, Colonel Ivan Bohun), who only pretended to accept Teteria's authority, while contemplating (allegedly) separation of the Right-Bank Ukraine from the Commonwealth. And it was the newly elected Metropolitan Iosyf Tukul's'kyi, who was (also allegedly) conspiring with that group in their plot.²⁷ Hetman Teteria accused Tukul's'kyi of high treason against the Polish-Lithuanian government, specifically for stirring up the Cossacks against the Crown. Consequently, in June 1664 Tukul's'kyi was taken to Warsaw by the Polish general Stefan Czarnecki and, together with the former Hetman, Iurii Khmel'nyts'kyi, and Cossack Colonel Hryhorii Hulianys'kyi, was arrested and interned in the fortress of Marienburg (Malbork) in Prussia.²⁸ According to Ukrainian historian Mykola Kostomarov, Czarnecki was at first very friendly with the Metropolitan, asking Tukul's'kyi to placate the rebellious Orthodox subjects of the Commonwealth. In response to this request Tukul's'kyi told the general that he deemed it improper for a cleric to be engaged in secular (i.e., political) matters. This response almost certainly convinced Czarnecki of Tukul's'kyi's secret sympathies for the anti-Commonwealth Cossack party, which led to the Metropolitan's arrest and incarceration.²⁹

The arrest and incarceration of both Tukul's'kyi and Iurii Khmel'nyts'kyi triggered a very negative reaction in Ukraine. Even Hetman Teteria, who had been directly involved in Tukul's'kyi's arrest, changed his stance on this matter and pleaded before the King to pardon the Metropolitan. The Commonwealth's authorities listened to those pleas, but took a precautionary measure. On 5 December 1665, Metropolitan Tukul's'kyi was forced to swear that he would not harm the Polish Crown and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania in any way.³⁰

The date of Tukul's'kyi's release was moved forward as a result of important political changes in Right-Bank Ukraine. On 18 August 1665, the Tatars repudiated Hetman Stephan Opara, who had become Teteria's successor thanks to Tatar support, and imposed the candidacy of Petro Doroshenko as the new Hetman of Right-Bank Ukraine.³¹ Immediately upon taking office, Hetman Doroshenko petitioned the King to pardon Metropolitan Tukul's'kyi (as well as

²⁷ Perdenia 63.

²⁸ Evgenii (Bolkhovitinov) 191; Chistovich 140; Perdenia 64; Kostomarov, *Ruina* 56. Other plotters in question were not so lucky: Ivan Bohun, together with some other Cossack colonels, was executed by the Poles at Olchowec (27 February 1664), followed by the execution of the former Hetman Ivan Vyhovs'kyi on 26 March 1664. See Perdenia 63–64.

²⁹ Kostomarov, *Ruina* 56.

³⁰ Fr. Iurii Mytsyk, “‘Kozats'kyi viddil fondu ‘arkhiv koronnyi u Varshavi AGAD’,” in *Istoriia i osobystist' istoryka: zbirnyk naukovykh prats', prysviachenykh 60-richnomu iuvileiu profesora Hanny Kyrylivny Shvyd'ko* (Dnipropetrovs'k: Natsional'nyi hirnychy universitet, 2004) 86–87.

³¹ *Akty, otmosiashchiesia k istorii Iuzhnoi i Zapadnoi Rossii* 5: 308.

Iu. Khmel'nyts'kyi and Colonel H. Hulianys'kyi). Those pleas were supported by Doroshenko's Zaporozhian Cossack Host as well as by his ally, the Khanate of Crimea.³² This intervention paid off. Both Metropolitan Tukul's'kyi and Iurii Khmel'nyts'kyi (who had by then chosen the monastic life and taken the name of "monk Gideon") had their incarceration in the fortress changed to a voluntary detention in Warsaw and, eventually, to outright freedom, which occurred probably shortly before February 1666.³³

The approximate date of Iosyf Tukul's'kyi's liberation is corroborated by his renewed activity administering the Metropolitan's office. For example, on 11 February 1666, Tukul's'kyi wrote from the Leshchyns'kyi Monastery to Prince Bogusław Radziwiłł requesting the latter to confirm the appointment of one priest to a parish in Sluts'k. Also, on 14 February 1666, Tukul's'kyi as the "Metropolitan of Kyiv, Halych and of all Rus'" issued a charter of forgiveness to the residents of Mahiloŭ, absolving them from the anathema imposed upon them "unjustly" by the Patriarch of Moscow.³⁴

As for Hetman Doroshenko, not only did he work persistently to free the Metropolitan, but he also made sure that Tukul's'kyi's high office remained secure. In Doroshenko's "Instruction" from 20 February 1666 to the Cossack envoys at the Commonwealth Diet, the Hetman wrote that the election of the Orthodox Metropolitan of Kyiv would be invalid without the free vote and approval of the Zaporozhian Cossack Host. If the Polish side regarded the previous election of Metropolitan Tukul's'kyi no longer legal, then a new free election had to be held for a new shepherd of the Orthodox people.³⁵ As further events would show, Hetman Doroshenko had in mind specifically the election (or re-election) of Metropolitan Iosyf Tukul's'kyi.

According to another version, Tukul's'kyi was released from prison in 1667.³⁶ En route to Ukraine via Vilnius he allegedly forbade Orthodox church bells to ring while the remains of Iosafat Kuntsevych, the Uniate hierarch killed by the Cossacks in 1623, were being carried through this town.³⁷ Upon hearing

³² Doroshenko 126.

³³ Doroshenko 127.

³⁴ The anathema was imposed because during the war between the Commonwealth and the Muscovite state the residents of Mahiloŭ decimated the Muscovite garrison stationed there. See Doroshenko 127.

³⁵ Mykola Krykun, *Mizh viinoiu i radoiu: kozatstvo Pravoberezhnoi Ukrainy v druhii polovyni XVII–na pochatku XVIII stolittia* (Kyiv: Krytyka, 2006) 215.

³⁶ Another contemporary of Tukul's'kyi—the author of *The Eyewitness Chronicle*—listed the Metropolitan's liberation under the year 1667, which might have referred to the time when the Metropolitan actually left Poland. See *Litopys Samovydtisia*, edited by A. D. Skaba et al, prepared by Ia. I. Dzyra (Kyiv: Naukova dumka, 1971) 102.

³⁷ Chistovich 142. In another version of Metropolitan Tukul's'kyi's escape from Vilnius we find a slightly different interpretation: the described event happened on the day of St.

this, the Uniates and the Roman Catholics wanted to arrest the Metropolitan, but Tukul's'kyi escaped from Vilnius to Mahiloŭ, where he stayed throughout the winter of 1667–1668. In the spring of 1668, Iosyf Tukul's'kyi travelled to Kyiv. However, he must have found Kyiv either too dangerous or too unwelcoming at that time and spent only “a quarter of an hour at the Brotherhood Monastery” in Kyiv before departing for Chyhyryn, the capital of Hetman Doroshenko. Tukul's'kyi remained there until his death in 1675.³⁸

II. THE POLITICAL AGENDA AND ACTIVITY OF METROPOLITAN TUKAL'S'KYI

Above I mentioned that Metropolitan Tukul's'kyi refused the Polish general Czarniecki's request (or, rather, demand) to help mollify the Commonwealth's Orthodox subjects. I explained that he declined to “engage in secular matters” (i.e., politics). That encounter took place in 1664 and, perhaps, back then Iosyf Tukul's'kyi was indeed not yet actively involved in politics. However, this seems very unlikely: being one of the Church's topmost hierarchs, Tukul's'kyi's involvement with secular authorities and in various political matters would have been unavoidable. After all, as early as 1658 then Archimandrite Tukul's'kyi wrote the abovementioned letter pleading with Aleksei Mikhailovich of Moscow to defend the Orthodox people of the Commonwealth and to unite all Ukrainian lands under His Majesty's sceptre.³⁹ This means that Tukul's'kyi had been involved in politics at least since the late 1650s and that Czarniecki was not entirely incorrect in assuming that Tukul's'kyi's refusal to act on his request was prompted by his dislike of the Commonwealth government.

By the early 1660s, Iosyf Tukul's'kyi had few illusions about Polish plans for Ukraine and the Orthodox Church, which included Ukraine's pacification, restoration of its *antebellum* status, and forceful promotion of the Church Union. Tukul's'kyi's hopes that the Tsar would offer protection to a unified Ukraine were shattered by the Polish-Muscovite accord, which was at Ukraine's expense. On 30 January 1667 an Armistice between the Muscovite state and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth was signed in the village of Andrusovo. This armistice provided for the division of Ukraine along the Dnipro into two parts: Right-Bank Ukraine was placed under Polish protectorate, and Left-Bank Ukraine under the protectorate of the Tsar.⁴⁰ Cossacks on both banks of the Dnipro were shaken by the news and stated publicly that Muscovy was planning

Iosaphat, with Iosyf Tukul's'kyi forbidding the monks of the Orthodox monastery to ring the tower bells. See “Zapiski igumena Oresta,” xix-xx.

³⁸ Chistovich 142.

³⁹ *Akty, otnosiashchiesia k istorii luzhnoi i Zapadnoi Rossii* 4: 85; Doroshenko 125.

⁴⁰ For the articles of the Armistice of Andrusovo and Cossack reaction to those conditions see *Polnoe sobranie zakonov rossiiskoi imperii* (hereafter *PSZRI*), vol. 1 (St. Petersburg: V Tipografii II otdeleniia sobstvennoi ego Imperatorskago Velichestva kantseliarii, 1830) 656–669; Zbigniew Wójcik, *Traktat Andruszowski 1667 i Jego Geneza* (Warszawa: Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe, 1959) 255.

to turn them over to the Poles, who had supposedly agreed at the Diet to destroy all Orthodox churches and the Orthodox people, and to remove the holy relics from Kyiv, distributing them among various Polish towns. At that point most of the Orthodox clergy manifested their distrust of both the Muscovite state and the Commonwealth.⁴¹

As for Hetman Doroshenko, after his 1667 abortive campaign against the Polish-Lithuanian forces he was compelled to sign a peace treaty with the King in Pidhajcy (October 1667), even though he did not intend to uphold its provisions.⁴² Instead, Doroshenko was planning to become the ruler of a “unified Ukraine” under the patronage of the Ottoman Porte similar in status to the rulers of Moldavia and Walachia.⁴³ Historian Orest Subtelny has provided the following portrayal of the Hetman: “[...] Doroshenko was probably the most altruistic of the Cossack hetmans,” the one, who “[...] had a well-earned reputation for placing the general welfare of Ukraine above narrow, personal interests,” and it was Doroshenko’s conviction that Ukraine’s “political interests could best be served as an Ottoman protectorate.”⁴⁴ Subtelny then draws a comparison between the views of Bohdan Khmel'nyts'kyi and Petro Doroshenko, saying that like Bohdan Khmel'nyts'kyi, Doroshenko “found the arrangement that Moldavia had with the Porte to be the most attractive option” available to Ukrainians.⁴⁵ The “Ottoman alternative” must have been perceived as the most appealing political course in a situation, when any reconciliation with either the Commonwealth or Muscovy (or both) went counter to the vital interests of Cossack Ukraine.

⁴¹ Evgenii (Bolkhovitinov) 193.

⁴² Hetman Doroshenko continued fighting against the Commonwealth despite the Armistice between the king and the tsar, which was reached earlier that year. This indicates that the Right-Bank Ukraine’s Cossacks did not see themselves bound by the Armistice’s provisions.

⁴³ The Polish commander in charge of Chyhyryn, Żebrowski, attested to the fact that Doroshenko was contemplating the status of becoming a vassal of the Ottoman Porte. Similar reports were delivered to Hetman Ivan Briukhovets'kyi of the Left-Bank Ukraine by colonels Lyzohub and Mihalevs'kyi (“[...] нынѣ онѣ [Дорошенко] королю Полскому измѣнивши, на вѣрность хану Крымскому [...] со всѣми своими тамобочными измѣнниками присягу совершивши, хотя себѣ, что Волоской воевода, воеводство себѣ удѣльное укрѣпить [...]”). See *Akty, otnosiashchiesia k istorii Zapadnoi Rossii, sobrannye i vydannye arkhograficheskoiu kommissieiu*, vol. 6 (St. Petersburg: E. Pratz, 1869) 160; also see Doroshenko 98–99.

⁴⁴ Orest Subtelny, “Cossack Ukraine and the Turco-Islamic World,” in *Rethinking Ukrainian History*, edited by Ivan L. Rudnytsky (Edmonton: The Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 1981) 128.

⁴⁵ Subtelny 128.

Hetman Doroshenko was not alone in his pro-Ottoman position. The 19th-century Russian imperial historian Dmitrii Bantysh-Kamenskii believed that by 1667–1668 Doroshenko already had “the famous Kyivan Metropolitan” Iosyf Tukul's'kyi as his “chief adviser.”⁴⁶ As might be expected, both Doroshenko and Tukul's'kyi enjoyed remarkable support among Ukrainians. In December 1667, a commander of the Muscovite garrison in Kyiv, boyar Petr Sheremet'ev, attested in a letter to the Tsar to the popularity of both Metropolitan Tukul's'kyi and Hetman Doroshenko: “Townsppeople and Cossacks and even more simple people on both banks of the Dnipro very much like and respect the Metropolitan and Doroshenko [...]”⁴⁷ Sheremet'ev wrote directly to Metropolitan Tukul's'kyi urging the latter to ensure that Doroshenko would not accept “traitors to His Majesty the Tsar” in his domain, while threatening the Hetman himself with God's justice at the Last Judgment. According to the boyar, Metropolitan Tukul's'kyi responded by saying that Hetman Doroshenko had done nothing bordering on the accusations, but rather exercised his authority over the people on the Left Bank (then under the authority of the pro-Muscovite Hetman Ivan Briukhovets'kyi) at their own request. Moreover, according to the Metropolitan, Hetman Doroshenko did not enter the Left Bank “as an enemy, but as a true servant of both Christian monarchs and as a courageous Hetman, delivering Christians of the same faith from captivity [and] not fighting against His Majesty's soldiers [...]”⁴⁸

At that time Sheremet'ev genuinely believed that he could use Tukul's'kyi as an agent of influence. The boyar reported to the Tsar that “Tukul's'kyi is persuading Doroshenko into submitting to the authority of the great monarch [the tsar], because he wants to become Metropolitan [in Kyiv] and signs [letters, documents] as the [Metropolitan of] Kyiv [...]”⁴⁹ Sheremet'ev might have been correct about Tukul's'kyi's desire to be the Metropolitan of Kyiv “in Kyiv” (i.e., over the entire canonical territory of the Metropolitan see of Kyiv), however, the boyar misjudged the Metropolitan's character and convictions.

According to another 19th-century Russian historian, Vitalii Eingorn, Tukul's'kyi never planned to keep his promise to Moscow, i.e., he would not counsel Doroshenko against an alliance with the Ottomans “so that he would serve both Christian rulers” against the Muslims. Eingorn based his conclusions on the following: 1) Tukul's'kyi had endured immense sufferings at the hands of the Poles; 2) the Polish authorities forbade Tukul's'kyi to use the title of “Metropolitan of Kyiv”; and 3) Tukul's'kyi did not have much hope that the

⁴⁶ Dmitrii Bantysh-Kamenskii, *Istoriia Maloi Rossii ot vodvoreniiia Slavian v sei strane do unichtozheniia Get'manstva* (St. Petersburg, Kiev and Kharkov: F. A. Ioganson, 1903) 265.

⁴⁷ *Akty, otmosiashchiesia k istorii Iuzhnoi i Zapadnoi Rossii* 6: 245.

⁴⁸ *Akty, otmosiashchiesia k istorii Iuzhnoi i Zapadnoi Rossii* 6: 256–257.

⁴⁹ *Akty, otmosiashchiesia k istorii Iuzhnoi i Zapadnoi Rossii* 6: 245.

Muscovite government would recognize him as Metropolitan of Kyiv because of his role in the anti-Muscovite rebellion, led by the late Hetman Ivan Briukhovets'kyi (January-June 1668).⁵⁰ Even if the Muscovite government overlooked that fact, which was highly unlikely, it would still be difficult to imagine Tukul's'kyi supporting the Muscovite government's policy aimed at placing the Metropolitan see of Kyiv under the benediction of the Patriarch of Moscow. That is why Eingorn concluded that Metropolitan Tukul's'kyi had been convincing Hetman Doroshenko to submit to the authority of the Turkish sultan.⁵¹

Unsurprisingly, the Muscovite court had also been receiving reports that indicated Doroshenko and Tukul's'kyi opposed any political settlement based on the terms of the Armistice of Andrusovo. According to Bantysh-Kamenskii, on 15 December 1667 the Muscovite envoy to Hetman Doroshenko's headquarters, Vasili Dubenskii, overheard this hetman saying: "His Great Majesty has concluded a peace treaty with the King and according to that treaty Kyiv must be given to the Poles; but I, Hetman together with all of the [Cossack] Host would rather give our lives than see Kyiv given to the Poles."⁵² As Bantysh-Kamenskii concluded, "from Doroshenko's words [one] can see that he, not relying solely on his own resources, counted on the Tatars, sought independence, but not dependence, and was irritated by the Polish tyranny. Tukul's'kyi, protecting the [Orthodox] faith, supported him in this policy [...]."⁵³

Likewise, from Sheremet'ev's reports to the Tsar comes a very lucid picture of both Tukul's'kyi's and Doroshenko's dissatisfaction with the Muscovite-Polish armistice, which was made at the expense of the Cossack Host and all of Ukraine. In their own words:

[H]ad the Zaporozhian Host [Cossacks] not been warned through God's intercession about the harmful [treaty] articles agreed to by His Majesty the Tsar and His Majesty the King... they would have lost Kyiv. The only reason the official Roman Catholic priest came to Kyiv was to secure a seat for his bishop in the Greek Orthodox churches, especially in St. Sophia, rather than in the ruined Roman Catholic churches... Were this to happen, God forbid, it would lead to the eternal damnation of all Orthodox people. [Thus], it would be better to cede Kyiv without any bloodshed and resentment to the Zaporozhian Host [i.e., to Hetman Doroshenko—R.Sh.], and not to the tormentors of Orthodoxy [...].⁵⁴

⁵⁰ In his letter to Sheremet'ev, Tukul's'kyi approved of Briukhovets'kyi's rebellion, indicating that "The Zaporozhian Host was forced to protect itself upon seeing harm to itself in the articles of Andrusovo [...]." See Eingorn 511.

⁵¹ Eingorn 510.

⁵² Bantysh-Kamenskii 266.

⁵³ Bantysh-Kamenskii 266.

⁵⁴ *Akty, otnosiashchiesia k istorii Zapadnoi Rossii* 6: 258.

In January 1668, when Hetman Ivan Briukhovets'kyi of Left-Bank Ukraine rebelled against Moscow, he began corresponding with Hetman Doroshenko, Metropolitan Tukul's'kyi and Fr. Gideon (Iurii Khmel'nyts'kyi). Months later, in October 1668, the Muscovite agent Archpriest Simeon Adamovych informed Moscow that both before and at the early stages of Briukhovets'kyi's rebellion "Tukul's'kyi began writing to Briukhovets'kyi deceiving him [by saying that] [Hetman] Doroshenko wanted to give the sceptre of the Hetman of both banks to him, Briukhovets'kyi; and since then the correspondence between Doroshenko and Briukhovets'kyi had begun, and Tukul's'kyi was constantly sending letters [to Briukhovets'kyi] [...]."⁵⁵

Boyar Petr Sheremet'ev also informed the Tsar about the new political developments.⁵⁶ In his report the boyar wrote about the Cossack council, at which Hetman Doroshenko, Metropolitan Tukul's'kyi, Iurii Khmel'nyts'kyi, Cossack colonels and officers agreed upon uniting both banks of the Dnipro, and

to live in sovereignty paying tribute to the Turkish tsar and the Crimean khan, similar to how it is done by the ruler of Walachia and absolutely not to be ruled by either his Great Majesty [the tsar] or the king so that the Turkish tsar and the Crimean khan would protect them, stand together and wage war on Your Majesty's Muscovite border towns [...].⁵⁷

In this regard, what indeed was Tukul's'kyi's influence on Hetman Doroshenko? In his October 1668 report, Archpriest Adamovych informed Muscovite officials about Metropolitan Tukul's'kyi's political role at Doroshenko's headquarters:

All [Cossack] officers in Chyhyryn are offended by Metropolitan Tukul's'kyi because Hetman Doroshenko seeks advice from no one other than Metropolitan Tukul's'kyi himself and [Doroshenko] pledges allegiance to the Turkish [sultan] on advice from Metropolitan Tukul's'kyi, and for this many are upset and curse him [Doroshenko].⁵⁸

Adamovych's reports about Tukul's'kyi must be taken with a grain of salt: this agent of Moscow was very much interested in posing as the most valuable and trusted supporter of the "Muscovite cause" in Ukraine and was prone to casting suspicion on both the opponents and allies of the Tsar. However, his information about the extent of Tukul's'kyi's influence on Hetman Doroshenko is not far off the mark and is confirmed by other reports about Metropolitan Tukul's'kyi's influence in Chyhyryn and conforms with his political views.

⁵⁵ *Akty, otnosiashchiesia k istorii Zapadnoi Rossii, sobrannye i vydannye arkhograficheskoiu kommissieiu*, vol. 7 (St. Petersburg: V. Pratz, 1872) 92.

⁵⁶ *Akty, otnosiashchiesia k istorii Zapadnoi Rossii* 7: 30.

⁵⁷ *Akty, otnosiashchiesia k istorii Zapadnoi Rossii* 7: 30–31.

⁵⁸ *Akty, otnosiashchiesia k istorii Zapadnoi Rossii* 7: 93.

Apparently, on one occasion Adamovych talked to Tukul's'kyi and the latter, trying to turn Adamovych into his supporter, allegedly said:

[...] [W]e want to submit to neither the Muscovite ruler nor to the Polish king, but to the one who loves us; and [he] showed me the grant to the Metropolitan see of Kyiv from the Turkish [sultan]; and both [Tukul's'kyi] and [Hetman Doroshenko] were trying to convince me [to join them] promising me numerous manors in compensation for what I had lost in exchange only for me not supporting Your Majesty the Tsar, and so that I would live with them agreeably and care for my fatherland [...] But I have always cherished allegiance to Your Majesty in my heart [...].⁵⁹

The Commonwealth's authorities also saw Metropolitan Tukul's'kyi as the chief adviser to Doroshenko, the person who led the Hetman into an alliance with the Ottomans. Polish-Lithuanian documents from the early 1670s stated that "Father Tukul's'kyi is the main force behind [or reason for] such a deviation of Ukraine and Christian souls."⁶⁰ Around 1671, the Muscovites had learned of the Polish king's displeasure with the role Tukul's'kyi played in Hetman Doroshenko's policy making: "[Tukul's'kyi] is the source of evil advice in Ukraine. [He] stirs up that country and the Zaporozhian Host, participates in military councils [...]."⁶¹

It is quite clear that neither the Muscovite nor the Polish-Lithuanian authorities doubted that Metropolitan Tukul's'kyi was behind Hetman Doroshenko's alliance with the Ottomans. However, the roots of Tukul's'kyi's pro-Ottoman political views still remains to be explored. Several factors likely contributed to his pro-Ottoman stance. First of all, Metropolitan Iosyf Neliubovych-Tukul's'kyi was by no means the original architect of the idea of a Cossack-Ottoman alliance. The honour of designing and negotiating this alliance belonged to Hetman Bohdan Khmel'nyts'kyi, who devised it sometime between 1648 and 1651.⁶² Therefore, the notion of having a sultan as a patron, though hardly the most popular one, was not an entirely new concept in Cossack politics—and Tukul's'kyi almost certainly was aware of it. Tukul's'kyi also frequently communicated with Bohdan Khmel'nyts'kyi's son, Iurii, who was likewise known for his pro-Ottoman sympathies, expressed as early as 1662: just before his abdication Iurii Khmel'nyts'kyi "...warned against an alliance with

⁵⁹ *Akty, otnosiashchiesia k istorii Zapadnoi Rossii* 7: 93–94.

⁶⁰ "Ociec Tukalski nauwiekszym iest powodem takiego zawiedzenia Ukrainy y dusz chriescianskich." See Eingorn 764.

⁶¹ Eingorn 769.

⁶² *Dokumenty Bohdana Khmel'nyts'koho, 1648–1657* (later—*DBKh*), edited by I. Kryp'iakevych and I. Butych (Kyiv: AN Ukrain's'koi RSR, 1961) 114; Omelian Pritsak, "Soiuz Khmel'nyts'koho z Turechchynoiu 1648 roku," *Zapysky naukovohto tovarystva imeni Shevchenko* (later in text—*ZNTSh*), vol. 156 (München, 1948) 145–147, 151–152.

either Muscovy or Poland and advised alliance with the Ottoman Empire.”⁶³ I have emphasized earlier that the Muscovite-Commonwealth armistice created a very negative reaction among Ukrainians, both Cossacks and non-Cossacks. It appears that Hetman Doroshenko’s and Metropolitan Tukul's'kyi’s decision to forge an alliance with a leading Muslim polity was dictated by political circumstances that offered no other options.

For Tukul's'kyi personally the pro-Ottoman political vector carried certain benefits. On 6 March 1668, the Patriarch of Constantinople, Methodius, issued an edict in which he confirmed Iosyf Tukul's'kyi the “Archbishop [and] Metropolitan of Kyiv, Halych and of all Rus', the eparch of the Constantinople throne [Patriarch], the Bishop of Belarus, the Archimandrite of the Leshchyns'kyi [Monastery]” and “the “Metropolitan and pastor” to all the clergy.”⁶⁴ According to the patriarch’s edict, Tukul's'kyi was to “exercise authority over the elevation to the orders of bishop, archimandrite [...] other hierarchical positions, bless the abbots and pastors, who listen to confessions, and, overall, to exercise his authority in the blessed Crown of Poland, the Great Duchy of Lithuanian and [the Duchy of] Rus' [...]”⁶⁵ This patriarchal decree was recognized by many of the Ukrainian Orthodox clerics, who highly respected Tukul's'kyi.⁶⁶ Metropolitan Tukul's'kyi soon issued his own edict to all “Lithuanian-Rus’” Orthodox clerics demanding that they were not to follow, under the threat of anathema, “that evil man, father Antonii Vynnyts'kyi, who had fallen under the spell of the lawless schism.”⁶⁷ That attack was clearly aimed against the candidate supported by the Commonwealth.

Yet another strike by Tukul's'kyi was meant to undermine Moscow’s influence on the Ukrainian Orthodox Church. Several years prior to the abovementioned appointment of Tukul's'kyi by the Patriarch of Constantinople, the Muscovite authorities, in their bid to establish control over the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, decided to appoint monk Methodius (a former archpriest of Nizhyn, Maksym Fylymonovych, and an active pro-Muscovite agent of influence in Ukraine) as “the keeper of the Metropolitan see of Kyiv.” On 4 May 1661, the “keeper of the Patriarch see of Moscow,” i.e., Metropolitan Pitirim, in accordance with His Majesty the Tsar’s and the Church Council’s approval, had Methodius elevated to the position of the Bishop of Mstislaŭ and Orsha and the “caretaker of the Metropolitan see of Kyiv.”⁶⁸ However, in the spring of 1668 a

⁶³ Hans-Joachim Torke, “The Unloved Alliance: Political Relations between Muscovy and Ukraine in the Seventeenth Century,” in *Ukraine and Russia in Their Historical Encounter*, edited by Peter J. Potichnyj et al (Edmonton: CIUS Press, 1992) 49.

⁶⁴ *Akty, otmosiashchiesia k istorii Zapadnoi Rossii* 5: 114–116.

⁶⁵ *Akty, otmosiashchiesia k istorii Zapadnoi Rossii* 5: 116.

⁶⁶ Eingorn 509.

⁶⁷ *Akty, otmosiashchiesia k istorii Zapadnoi Rossii* 5: 72; Chistovich 142–143.

⁶⁸ Oleksandr Morozov, *Nizhyns'kyi protopop Maksym Fylymonovych* (Nizhyn:

representative of the newly-confirmed Metropolitan Tukul's'kyi stripped Methodius of his mantle and bishop's insignia, saying that Methodius was not worthy of his office because he had received it from the Muscovite Metropolitan and, secondly, because Methodius had not sent wishes of well-being to Hetman Doroshenko and Metropolitan Tukul's'kyi.⁶⁹ In my opinion, these actions clearly demonstrated Tukul's'kyi's political platform.

After the fall of the Polish fortress of Kamieniec (today's Kam'ianets'-Podil's'kyi) to the Ottomans (August 1672) news reached the Muscovite government about the participation of Hetman Doroshenko and Metropolitan Tukul's'kyi in this campaign alongside the Ottoman-Tatar forces. On 4 March 1673, the Muscovite military commander Prince Iurii Trubetskoi reported to the Tsar that according to various testimonies submitted to him by the former prisoners of war, who had been at the fortress during its capture,

[...] the Cossack colonels and officers from the towns beyond the Dnipro came to Chyhyryn to the traitor Petro Doroshenko to greet him with [Christmas] [...] and three weeks after Christmas the Turkish sultan's and the Crimean khan's envoys came to Chyhyryn to receive the oath of allegiance [from Doroshenko and his men]. And that Petro, and all the colonels and officers kissed the cross pledging undying loyalty to the Turkish sultan. And the oath, with kissing of the cross, was administered by Iosyf, Metropolitan Tukul's'kyi [...].⁷⁰

From the early 1670s and until his resignation in 1676, the embattled Hetman Doroshenko was gradually losing his grip on power not only over Right-Bank Ukraine, but also in his attempt to reclaim Left-Bank Ukraine from the pro-Muscovite Hetman. After the capture of Kamieniec and the Podillia region, Ottoman military help was not forthcoming and the Crimean Tatars tended to support not Doroshenko, but rather his challenger, Petro Sukhovii. Moreover, the Ottoman invasion and constant warfare left the larger part of Right-Bank Ukraine in ruins, costing Doroshenko his popularity and support.

From the late 1660s to the early 1670s, Metropolitan Tukul's'kyi was also experiencing difficulties. For one thing, the Cossacks and most of the clergy of Left-Bank Ukraine under Muscovite control did not recognize him as Metropolitan of Kyiv. An ambitious rival to Tukul's'kyi, the Archbishop of Chernihiv Lazar Baranovych, became a Moscow-appointed "caretaker of the Metropolitan see of Kyiv" (July 1670) and led clergy in this dissent.⁷¹ In

Nizhyn's'kyi derzhavnyi pedahohichnyi universytet im. Mykoly Hoholia, 2000) 63.

⁶⁹ Morozov 115.

⁷⁰ *Akty, otnosiashchiesia k istorii Zapadnoi Rossii, sobrannye i vydannye arkheograficheskoiu kommissieiu*, vol. 11 (St. Petersburg: M. Ettinger, 1879) 152.

⁷¹ Evgenii (Bolkhovitinov) 194–195. Also, Baranovych acted through the Archimandrite of the St. Michael's Monastery in Kyiv, Feodosii Sofonovych, ordering the Left-Bank clergy to obey Sofonovych, and not Tukul's'kyi (July 1672). See Eingorn 693.

addition, Tukul's'kyi's health was deteriorating due to age and life's upheavals. Tukul's'kyi's "Polish" challenger, Bishop Josef Szumfianski, was only too happy to point out this fact while pleading with the Polish king for appointment as the caretaker of the Metropolitan see of Kyiv.⁷² Apparently, as of 1674, Metropolitan Tukul's'kyi had completely lost his eyesight and command of his legs, the evidence for which can be found in an August 1674 reports about the Muscovite attack against Doroshenko's capital.⁷³ Beginning in the early 1670s, Tukul's'kyi became more and more tormented by the division of Ukraine and Ukrainians on both sides of the Dnipro, and, possibly, by the alliance with the Muslim Turks and Tatars, forced on Ukraine by political circumstances. The signs of Tukul's'kyi's moral suffering are evident in his letter to a Muscovite official, Afanasii Ordin-Nashchokin (21 April 1670), in which the Metropolitan writes: "Due to my innumerable transgressions I do not see myself as a soul, which suffers for its piety [...] My soul is filled with trouble [...] How can I call myself a shepherd if the flock is lost? Let it be gathered by the Creator and the Redeemer, who redeemed us with His own blood!"⁷⁴

Closer to the end of his life, Metropolitan Tukul's'kyi, like many other supporters of Hetman Doroshenko's Ottoman policy, became disillusioned with it. After the fall of Kamieniec, the Muscovite authorities learned about insults against Tukul's'kyi coming from certain Turks, who even wanted to take off the Metropolitan's mitre. Doroshenko himself had to intervene, persuading the Ottoman soldiers not to harass the Metropolitan and saying that the sultan himself had promised to defend all Ukrainian freedoms and customs. Tukul's'kyi purportedly told Doroshenko around that same time: "We have made a mistake submitting to the Turks because they clearly want to do in our land what they did in Kamieniec—turn our churches into mosques. We have to rid ourselves of Ottoman protection in some way."⁷⁵

Metropolitan Iosyf Tukul's'kyi died on 26 July 1675 before Hetman Doroshenko finally severed his alliance with the Ottomans. Less than a year after the death of his close friend and chief advisor, the disheartened Doroshenko laid down his insignia and chose comfortable Muscovite captivity over the continuation of his fight for a unified Ukraine, which by then was all but lost.

CONCLUSION

Metropolitan Iosyf Neliubovych-Tukul's'kyi's ecclesiastic career took place in the midst of a severe political struggle and conflict of ideologies in Cossack Ukraine during the 1650s–1670s. His was the time of fast-changing loyalties and

⁷² Evgenii (Bolkhovitinov) 195.

⁷³ Eingorn 997.

⁷⁴ Archbishop Filaret (Gumelevskii) 202.

⁷⁵ Eingorn 887.

difficult political choices. As the archimandrite of the Orthodox monasteries in Lithuania and Belarus, Tukul's'kyi established himself as one of the steadfast champions of Orthodoxy and pleaded its case before the Muscovite tsar. At the same time, he was enough of a realist not to oppose Iurii Khmel'nyts'kyi's alliance with the Polish king (October 1660). During the 1660–1664 period, Tukul's'kyi enjoyed a career boost, which culminated in his election to Metropolitan of Kyiv. However, the subsequent opposition to Tukul's'kyi's election from the Commonwealth's authorities, intrigues against him by the pro-Polish Hetman of the Right-Bank, Pavlo Teteria, and, finally, Tukul's'kyi's imprisonment for “state treason” by the Poles made him an opponent of Ukrainian-Polish reconciliation.⁷⁶ The Commonwealth's role in the Armistice of Andrusovo (1667), which cemented the partition of the Hetmanate, served to further entrench Tukul's'kyi's critical attitude towards the Polish-Lithuanian government.

Metropolitan Tukul's'kyi was against the partition of Ukraine. He would have embraced the power of the Muscovite Tsar had the latter taken both Left- and Right-Bank Ukraine under his sceptre.⁷⁷ But if the Tsar was not ready to do so, then Tukul's'kyi preferred to support an alliance with any other sovereign who promised his patronage over a unified Ukraine. Tukul's'kyi also was against placing the Metropolitan see of Kyiv under the authority of the Patriarch of Moscow. He would likely have settled for the Tsar's protection over a united Cossack polity (the Hetmanate) and the preservation of the “ancient” ecclesiastical status of Ukrainian Orthodox Church under the authority of the Patriarch of Constantinople. However, these hopes did not correspond to the Muscovite plans regarding Ukraine and the Ukrainian Orthodox Church. Therefore, Tukul's'kyi, like Doroshenko, saw no other option than to pay homage to the Ottoman Porte. That was the price the Metropolitan was prepared to pay for the unification of his country and the independence of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, and in this respect Tukul's'kyi demonstrated the integrity of his convictions.

Considering Tukul's'kyi's status within the Christian Orthodox hierarchy, this decision may appear strange at first glance: a topmost Greek Orthodox hierarch advocates patronage by a Muslim ruler over his Orthodox Christian country. However, this decision undoubtedly came as a result of political analysis and understanding of how limited Ukraine's options were at that time. It is likely that, to Tukul's'kyi, the attacks by Poles on the Orthodox faith and the

⁷⁶ Ukrainian historian Dmytro Doroshenko explains Metropolitan Tukul's'kyi's political platform as follows: “In any case, Tukul's'kyi and [Iurii] Khmel'nyts'kyi brought with them [from the Polish prison] drastically anti-Polish sentiments.” See Doroshenko 129.

⁷⁷ Archimandrite Gizel' wrote about Tukul's'kyi's attitude in one of his letters to Archbishop Lazar Baranovych. See “Pis'ma Innokentiiia Gizelia,” in *Trudy Kievskoi dukhovnoi akademii*, vol. 2 (Kiev, 1865) 360.

Muscovite's objective of placing the Metropolitan of Kyiv under the benediction of the Patriarch of Moscow outweighed the potential hazards of the patronage by a Muslim power. In all likelihood, Tkal's'kyi had also considered the situation of the so-called "eastern patriarchs" (Alexandria, Antioch, Jerusalem and others), who remained under the authority of Muslim sultans of the Ottoman Porte. This situation might not have been ideal or desirable from many perspectives, yet seemed to offer a way out for Ukraine and its Orthodox Church after all other options had been exhausted.