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Author(s): Alexander Shulgin

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UKRAINE AND ITS POLITICAL ASPIRATIONS

NEW geographical conceptions, to say nothing of political ideas, penetrate very slowly into the human mind. It had become such a habit to look at the geography and history of the Russian Empire through the official glasses of the government of the Tsars, that it was very difficult in 1918, at the moment when that Empire collapsed, to realise that so far from forming a national Russian block, it was composed of a great number of peoples differing very greatly in culture and numerical importance—in short, that in this Empire, besides Poland and Finland, which were better known in the outside world, there existed also an Estonia, a Lithuania, a Latvia, a White Russia and the many peoples of the Caucasus and of Turkestan, and last and most important of all, if we judge a people by the numbers, area and richness of the territory which it inhabits, Ukraine. Sixteen years have passed since then, and if the knowledge of Eastern European problems has made a certain progress both in England and on the Continent, we have seen once more at Geneva that the supreme argument produced to justify the admission of the USSR to the League of Nations was the allegation that it represents a people of a hundred and sixty million souls, who cannot be left in isolation.

At Geneva, on 18 September, 1934, at the moment of the admission of the Soviet Union, the authorised representatives of the peoples of the Caucasus, Turkestan and Ukraine presented a protest which supplies the answer to this argument.

“We feel bound to emphasise that according to Soviet statistics the Russians properly so called only make up 52.9 per cent. of the total number (and in this are included the Cossacks of the Don and Kuban), while the rest of the population, in other words almost one-half, is composed of other nationalities—the peoples of the Caucasus, the Ukrainians, the Turkomans, the Tartars of Crimea and the Volga, the White Russians, etc. . . . Of this number the populations of Caucasus, Turkestan and Ukraine represent about sixty millions. All these peoples have no other aspirations than to separate from Moscow and overthrow the iniquitous régime imposed upon them by the brutal force of the invader, against whom they will always struggle steadily until their national liberation.”

In those few lines is raised the burning problem of the oppressed peoples of the USSR. Among them all it is certainly Ukraine that has provoked the liveliest polemics and anxiety. Moscow finds it difficult to accept the idea of Ukrainian separation from her, while the Ukrainians themselves insist upon their independence with that obstinacy which distinguishes their national character. Besides

the two nations primarily concerned, there are others also keenly interested in the problem of Ukrainian independence.

Even without entering upon the detailed history of the proclamation and organisation of the Democratic Ukrainian Republic in 1917-18, of its struggle against the aggression of Moscow, and finally of its occupation by Red troops in 1920, it will be clear how difficult it was to maintain the independence of Ukraine amid the general anarchy which then prevailed. While Poland, Finland, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania have succeeded in preserving their independence, Ukraine, the Caucasian republics and Turkestan fell before the assault of the Red troops. How is this painful phenomenon to be explained? Was the former group of peoples better organised or more skilful in its resistance? Or were there perhaps deeper causes which drove the new rulers of Moscow to concentrate all their efforts on breaking the fierce resistance of the Ukrainian peasants, the Caucasian mountaineers and the nomads of Turkestan?

In actual fact these countries have a very great attraction for Moscow, which has made of them colonies of incomparable wealth. The fertility of Ukraine has throughout history been both its good fortune and the chief cause of its misfortunes in the form of countless invasions.

The struggle for its possession from 1918 to 1920 was very fierce, no less on the side of the population than on that of the invaders. It would certainly be impossible to claim that Ukraine at that moment was perfectly organised: amid the prevailing anarchy and disorder the task of organising a great state without help from outside was anything but easy. And it is all the more so because all the efforts of Moscow were directed towards its conquest, not merely for reasons of an economic nature, but also because it formed the natural base for the expansion of communist ideas towards the West. The long resistance of Ukraine and the guerilla warfare maintained by the peasants interfered with these plans on the part of Moscow. The propitious moment for a world revolution was lost, Europe had time to rally after the War and survived that period of acute unrest during which the centre of the Continent seemed peculiarly susceptible to an onslaught from Russian Bolshevism. Thus the psychological moment passed, and with it the high-water-mark of communist enthusiasm.

In placing its body across the path, Ukraine rendered an inestimable service to Europe, but this known fact became all the more tragic and has been marked by terrible events such as few nations can recall in their history. But our present purpose is not to write

the history of those events, but to survey the present situation as a key to Ukrainian policy and future prospects.

The Soviets have conquered Ukraine, but they did not dare to suppress the Ukrainian State, which still exists in theory. The legal government of Ukraine left the country when it was invaded by the Red troops, and the new government acted in the name not of Moscow, but of the " Socialist Soviet Ukrainian Republic " *de jure*. It is as though Ukraine had merely changed its form of government, and from a democratic republic had become a Soviet republic, while retaining its theoretical independence. Till 1923 there were Legations of the Soviet Ukraine in the countries which at that period had recognised the Soviets (Germany, Austria, Poland, etc.). Soviet Ukraine concluded several treaties, which the government of Harkov signed almost independently of Moscow—for instance with Poland at Riga in 1921, with Germany in 1923, with Turkey, etc. Moreover, since the Soviet Union was constituted in 1923, Ukraine, side by side with six other Soviet Republics (Russia, White Russia, the Transcaucasian federation, Turkmenistan, Uzbekstan and Tadzshikstan) forms part of this Union. *De jure* each of these republics remains a foreign state; Article IV of the Constitution recognises the right of each of them to withdraw freely from the Union. They possess Ministries (or Commissariats of the People) of their own, except those for defence, finance and foreign affairs, which were from the outset assigned to the super-government of Moscow. In course of time the free republics of the Union have been deprived of several other commissariats to the advantage of Moscow. Even this greatly restricted autonomy which still remains to Ukraine (the second of the six states in importance) is not respected, for in reality it is the Communist Party which dominates in Ukraine as in the whole Union. This party was also at first only a federation of the communist parties of the peoples comprising the Soviet Union, each of these being a branch of the Third International and enjoying a certain autonomy. But the attitude of the Ukrainian Communists rendered them increasingly suspect in the eyes of Moscow, and it was, therefore, decided to tighten up the connection between the centre and the circumference. After several " purges " the Ukrainian Communist Party became a docile instrument, completely subordinated to the will of Moscow. The Communist Party of the Union is being more and more centralised, and its direction is concentrated in the hands of a single person, Stalin, the real dictator of the whole Union.

Ukraine has become a real colony of Moscow, a country under military occupation and cruelly exploited by its masters. To gild the

pill and tone down the servitude to which Ukraine is subjected, concessions of a cultural nature are made to it. The Soviet administration of this territory, which is for the most part foreign to the country or selected among the national minorities, is being "Ukrainianised." This means that the officials are obliged to talk the language of the country, which is recognised as the official language of Ukraine. In the days of Tsarism not a single school with Ukrainian language and instruction was tolerated on Ukrainian territory; but after 1917 during the short period of independence the old educational system was radically reorganised, and Ukrainian became the language of instruction in the primary, secondary and higher schools. As a certain concession to national feeling, the Soviets, on seizing the country, did not suppress this new state of affairs, and the Ukrainian schools continued to exist, their number having risen to 90 per cent. of all the schools in the country (the remainder belonging to the minorities). The Ukrainian Academy of Kiev received subsidies; Ukrainian scholars set themselves to work with enthusiasm despite the disastrous conditions of material life; but this illusion of the possibility of cultural work under a régime of occupation was brutally destroyed. The Ukrainian language was only to serve as an instrument for proclaiming devotion to Moscow, loyalty to the doctrine of Lenin and afterwards of Stalin; no freedom of speech, of the press, of scientific research, of conscience was to be tolerated.

Terror reigns, the Cheka, afterwards the OGPU, watches every gesture of Soviet citizens, who live in a permanent state of fear, never sure of tomorrow. Religion, which in these troublous times has become particularly dear to the people, is persecuted; compulsory anti-religious propaganda desolates the population, a large proportion of the churches have fallen into disuse, the priests are persecuted, deprived of their livelihood or deported. Death is often the alternative to betraying a man's religious convictions.

The power which boasts of having suppressed all social classes has divided the population into various categories, each of which enjoys different rights:—

1. Privileged persons, members of the Communist Party, and above all its chiefs.
2. Members of the OGPU or organisations which replace it.
3. Persons more or less privileged—the Army
4. Persons much less privileged—industrial workers.
5. Persons without privileges—poor and collectivised peasantry.
6. Intellectuals, except certain categories of specialists who are particularly necessary to the State.

7. The true Pariahs—the kulaks, the clergy and “ former capitalist classes.”

The juridical position of each of these categories is very unequal, but it is above all from the point of view of rationing that the difference is so noticeable. If salaries already vary despite equalitarian Communist principles, the value of the rouble varies still more, for it depends upon the social position of the individual. Each category supplies its wants in special co-operative shops, and 300 roubles in the hands of a Communist leader are worth far more than 500 roubles in the hands of an intellectual or above all of someone belonging to the seventh category. The price, quality and quantity of the products supplied differ according to the category of the co-operative. Certain shops in the big cities are, according to the testimony of travellers, provided with all necessary goods, but at what price are these sold, and to what class of the population? The question of rationing has become under the Soviet régime the primary and vital question for every citizen. It forms the main subject of conversation between the best educated persons, and this is confirmed by all who have lived in USSR. Talk turns above all round the problem of food for today or tomorrow.

The further a town lies from the centre of the Union, the more disquieting becomes the problem of rationing. In the great centres of Ukraine, the situation is tolerable, at least for the privileged class, but in the small towns it is more and more difficult, and in the villages it is positively disastrous.

A very curious phenomenon must be pointed out. At the beginning of the Soviet régime, when the regular exploitation of the “ Sister Republics ” had not yet been organised, and when it was not possible to overcome the resistance of a population which jealously retains its wheat for itself and its family, it was Russia, the centre of the Union, which was the least well supplied, and it was then in the towns that people died of hunger, whereas life was easier in a rich country like Ukraine and especially in the villages. But all this was changed ten years after the establishment of Soviet power.

It was just the districts richest in wheat—Ukraine and Northern Caucasus—which were affected by the famine. In 1933 life was quite supportable in Russia, and above all in its Capital. But at the same time millions of Ukrainians died of hunger, feebleness and epidemics, abandoned by the central power, which thinks only of its own citizens and will not even grant permission to international humanitarian organisations to come to the aid of the victims. Numerous testimony of foreign correspondents, hundreds of letters which have

reached the Ukrainians of East Galicia and the *émigrés* further west, and the stories of refugees from across the frontier—all give a terrible picture of the misery which prevails in this country since 1932. There are whole villages where every inhabitant has died or which have been abandoned.

It is evident that this famine is not the result of natural causes, but is due in the first instance to the fact that excessive quantities of wheat have been taken away by the State for purposes of foreign trade, for rationing the great cities and above all for the Red Army. On the other hand, compulsory collectivisation has diminished the output of grain : the peasants are absolutely hostile to a system which runs counter to all their habits for centuries past and which transforms them into workmen deprived of all freedom. It is a new form of serfdom. The Ukrainian peasant has always been an individualist, knowing nothing of the Russian " Mir " : he is hostile to every form of collective work, and sees no reason why he should work for the profit of others without having enough corn left to feed his family till the next harvest.

Ukraine has been " industrialised " : in other words, to the factories which it already possessed on the eve of the Great War there have been added several enormous modern factories in the district of Harkov, and a great dam on the Dnieper—Dneprostroy. But people in Ukraine are well aware of the cost of these enterprises, the sacrifices imposed upon the Ukrainian people by the Five Year Plan of Moscow. These new industries do not compensate for the sacrifices demanded, for the Soviets are not capable of maintaining them upon a business footing. It is uncertain what will be the value of the Dneprostroy in the future, but at present full use is not made of the energy obtained from this vast hydro-electric station. In short, the economic situation in Ukraine is altogether lamentable.

The Soviet Government is well aware of this and keeps the population under the closest observation. Many thousands have been shot for rebellion against the régime of occupation, as " kulaks " who would not accept collectivisation. Many thousands have been deported northwards to the neighbourhood of the White Sea, where they have been compelled to work under inhuman conditions in the forests or in constructing the canal which now unites the Baltic and White Seas.

This situation only strengthens the resolve of the Ukrainians to recover their independence. The traditions of the Cossack period, of the Ukrainian Republic in the days of Bohdan Hmelnitsky and of Mazepa, have not been forgotten. The Ukrainian national renaiss-

sance of the 19th century raised the problem of autonomy. Today two ideas compete with each other—the reorganisation of Russia on a federal basis, and complete Ukrainian independence. Up till 1917 it was the former which predominated: an understanding with Russia was still regarded as possible. The year 1917 brought the first disillusionment. The Communist régime has definitely compromised the whole idea of federation. Independence is now the sole watchword of Ukrainian opinion.

It is necessary to create a stable and well-defined frontier between Russia and Ukraine, with a view to defence against the secular claims of Moscow, to oppose an obstacle to all the maladies of the huge body of the Russian Empire—maladies of reaction, of communism, etc.¹ Political and economic independence, without excluding the possibility of amicable collaboration with all neighbouring peoples, alone offers a guarantee of liberty and normal development for the Ukrainian nation. Such is the standpoint of all Ukrainian parties and politicians, and of the whole people.

It must now be asked on what the Ukrainians found their hopes, and whether the restoration of their independence rests on real foundations. They are very optimistic, and give the following answers to these questions.

1. The present régime in USSR is not a stable one. The criticisms to which it has been subjected ever since its establishment still remain fully justified. It has not succeeded in solving its principal task; for the life of the workmen and peasants, instead of greatly improving, has become miserable and disastrous. They were promised paradise—they find themselves in the very opposite condition. What, then, is it that enables the régime to maintain itself under such conditions? Three main causes can be detected—the enormous passivity of the Russian people, the great skill shown in organising the necessary instruments of oppression (Cheka, OGPU, etc.), and the assistance given to Moscow from abroad.

To the first of these causes, Russian passivity, may be opposed the extreme nervousness and constant tendency towards revolt among the border peoples—Ukraine, Caucasia, Turkestan, etc.—representing a total of 60 millions. For the present, separated by wide distances, closely watched by the very numerous Soviet police, they do not move; but it is easy to anticipate a formidable explosion at the suitable moment.

Secondly, the police organisations—OGPU and what has taken

¹ In the opinion of many it is precisely the question of frontiers, their demarcation and their defence, that makes this solution impracticable:—B.P.

its place—have known how to benefit by the experience of the old Tsarist policy, and at the same time that of the revolutionaries—to study these methods intelligently and to apply them without mercy. The system of provocation and of terror has given rise to a horde of secret agents who penetrate everywhere and know everything. By a special educational method recruits are collected among the children, while among the young Communist “pioneers” excellent agents are found, who often do not hesitate to report to their chiefs even what passes in the family, or to betray their own parents. There is no lack of brute force to suppress any occasional outbreak.

In Ukraine and the other border countries the regiments are always reinforced by soldiers from Russia proper and other remoter districts of the Union, and the army of occupation is always on the watch for rebellion. It is difficult to fight against an enemy so armed, but at the first foreign complications, the arms supplied to the population on mobilisation will assuredly be turned against the enemies of national liberty. The withdrawal of the troops of occupation, if they had to meet a foreign foe, might well be the signal for a general rising of the border peoples.

Thirdly, there remains the question of foreign assistance, which has contributed greatly towards upholding the régime. The collaboration established by the Treaty of Rapallo has had enormous results; indeed it was thanks to it that the Five Year Plan could be conceived; and that a reality could be made of the Red Army and of Russian aviation. So long as one group of states or another desires the support of the USSR, so long as the peoples of Western Europe are disunited, the third party will continue to rejoice: and the Soviets have been able to prolong their revolutionary existence.

It lies outside the scope of this article to consider the burning question whether an understanding between these different Powers is altogether impossible. But it is at least possible to affirm that if the Soviet Union should once be involved in a war, no external aid would be of much assistance. The experience of 1905 and 1917 has shown that a war is almost always disastrous for the Russian Empire. The enemy is as little in a position to conquer its vast spaces as in the days of Napoleon: but the real danger lies at home, and has been rendered all the more acute by the régime of the last sixteen years. A revolt of the Russian people and above all of the oppressed nations—this spectre always haunts the rulers of the Kremlin and imposes upon them, at any rate for the present, an ultra-pacific foreign policy.

2. If, then, the Soviet régime is not to be regarded as stable, it is not that régime which at the right moment will prevent the

restoration of Ukrainian independence. The suggestion that other forces exist which might attach Ukraine to Russia, is altogether denied by Ukrainian politicians. The present unity of USSR is solely due to terror and military force. The Tartars, Cossacks, Karelians, White Russians are not a whit more loyal to Moscow. The moment the régime falls, a general dislocation will logically follow.² For the successors of the Bolsheviks to establish a fresh régime of oppression will be a still more difficult task than that of Lenin and Trotsky in 1919. The oppressed peoples would be more resolved than ever after these sixteen years, not to remain in bondage. Tsarist Russia was the creation of long centuries, but it could not crush the national spirit of all these subject races, while their national consciousness is far stronger today than in the nineteenth century, and Russia, exhausted by the long communist experiment, would be less able to impose her will on them.

3. If all the subject races of USSR have made great progress in the matter of national consciousness, this is especially true of the Ukrainian people. If in 1917, without possessing a single school of its own, it was able to organise a new state and offer a strong resistance to the preponderant and far better organised forces of its enemies, it will certainly be all the better able to resume the struggle after a period when the Ukrainian school has functioned (at any rate after a fashion) and in spite of all drawbacks has created a generation brought up at least in the *literary* tradition of Ukraine. The national school is an excellent antidote to the dogma of unrestricted internationalism. In 1917-19 all the elections in Ukraine—for instance for the Constituent of the whole Empire, and then for the Ukrainian Constituent—gave eighty per cent. of votes for Ukrainian nationalist parties: and the proportion would probably be still higher in the case of free elections today. In 1917, in 1920, in 1921, and even as late as 1922, the Ukrainian army under Simon Petlyura, without any help from outside, was able to resist all the onslaughts of the Red armies commanded by General Frunze. The Soviets required to place nearly a million men under arms in order to overcome the resistance of a small regular Ukrainian army and of the insurgent masses scattered throughout the country.

In subsequent years the passive resistance to grain requisitioning and to collectivisation was specially energetic in Ukraine: there is no part of the Union where Moscow has had to encounter so many difficulties. Every year the Soviets undertake the "purging" of the Communist party in Ukraine and of all their institutions, by

² This forecast is strongly challenged by many:—Ed.

expelling the Ukrainian "nationalists," or "Petlyurians" as they are called. Every year it is announced that nationalism has been "liquidated" in Ukraine, and every year they resume the struggle, thus recognising that all is not in perfect order. Such perseverance in opposition to the régime proves that Ukrainian popular sentiment is very deeply rooted. Thus the belief in future independence rests on a triple basis—the instability of the Soviet régime, the impossibility of its successors restoring the unity of the Empire, and the firm will of the Ukrainian people itself.

The problem of independence is however further complicated by the question of the extent of territory comprised under the name of Ukraine. In this article we have been considering the régime under Soviet rule—in other words "the Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic" and certain districts with a Ukrainian majority lying farther to the East. But there are over seven million Ukrainians outside the Soviet Union—in Roumania, Czechoslovakia, and above all Poland, which includes nearly six out of these seven millions, in Eastern Galicia, Volhynia, and the districts adjacent to the USSR. Formerly Volhynia formed part of the independent Ukraine, and East Galicia, after breaking away from Austria in 1918, formed the "West Ukrainian Republic," which entered a federal union with Greater Ukraine.

In 1919, while the Ukrainian army led by Petlyura was fighting the Red troops, the army of Eastern Galicia was overpowered by Polish Legions, and its country conquered by Poland. Petlyura was left without munitions, without contact with the outside world, ringed in by hostile forces. He understood that if such a situation continued, there could be no real hope of Ukrainian independence, and that a choice must be made between East and West. In other words, he must either agree with Moscow and by its aid recover the western territories of Ukraine, but in that case it would be necessary to abandon the idea of independence and to remain at the mercy of Moscow: or at all costs he must come to terms with the West, and in particular with his neighbours, Poland, Roumania and Czechoslovakia. The Treaty which Petlyura signed with Poland in 1920, was an act of great importance in Ukrainian history. He did not renounce the moral claim upon these western lands, but at the same time he did not hesitate to recognise the existing frontiers, which corresponded more or less with the line established at Riga in 1921 between Poland and Soviet Russia (with this difference that the frontiers of 1920 were recognised as partly provisional). As for Eastern Galicia, its fate was at this time in the hands of an international tribunal, the Council

of Ambassadors. The representatives of East Galicia hoped that the judgment would be in their favour and that they would obtain provisional independence. In the conditions in which the government and army of Ukraine then found themselves—hard pressed on all sides by the Russians—there was no possibility whatsoever of Petlyura recovering Eastern Galicia, and he was obliged to do what its own representatives had done and leave a solution of the problem to the international forum. In 1923, the Council of Ambassadors announced its decision; but so far from giving satisfaction to the Ukrainians, the whole of Galicia was assigned to Poland.

For some years this problem of Eastern Galicia had become as it were the neuralgic point of Ukrainian policy, paralysing the will of the nation in its struggle against Moscow. The disaster which overcame the Government of the democratic Ukrainian Republic in 1920, when after the Polish armistice with Moscow it was left alone in face of a powerful enemy, provoked strong criticism, above all against Simon Petlyura. Looking back upon these events in calmer retrospect, we may recognise that Petlyura performed the impossible in defence of his country in a really disastrous situation. The people understood him better than the politicians, and made of him even in his lifetime a legendary hero, to whom his tragic death gave the halo of martyrdom. Today his name has become the symbol of independence, and even his political opponents show respect for his memory. But at the time of the treaty of 1920 criticism was of the harshest.

The situation in East Galicia was indeed gloomy. There was no agreement with the Polish Government, at that time the promised autonomy was not accorded, the Ukrainian University remained a mere project, the number of Ukrainian schools steadily diminished: and these facts formed the basis of conflict between the partisans of a national Ukrainian Government and their opponents. The former continued to argue that an understanding with the West was the only possible basis for a struggle against Moscow, and that "if again we are hedged in on all sides by enemies, we should be ruined as in 1919." In reply, the latter painted a black picture of the situation in Galicia and Volhynia.

Those who favoured co-operation with the West and consequently with Poland, answered that they did not deny the need for a struggle in defence of legitimate rights, in Galicia and Volhynia no less than elsewhere. They argued that all legal means must be employed for improving step by step the situation of this powerful Ukrainian minority, but that to raise the question of these frontiers seemed absolutely impossible. Besides, the creation of a Ukrainian state

on the Dnieper would *ipso facto* solve the problem of the minorities, who would thus at least obtain a powerful protector and find themselves in a more favourable position.

This discussion dragged on for years. But both in Ukraine, and among the political refugees throughout the world, moderate and reasonable ideas gained the upper hand. The nervous attitude of Moscow, the political trials directed against "Petlyurians," the speeches and articles of Soviet leaders, testify to the importance attached in the country itself to the realist views of the national Ukrainian Government.

The Ukrainian emigrants in Europe and Asia form a federation, or supreme Council, of local organisations in eleven countries, thus including almost 80 per cent. of all the exiles. The successive congresses of this organisation—the last of which was held at Prague in 1934—showed very clearly the ardent support accorded to the ideas and action of the exiled government.

Finally there has been a certain change of outlook at Lwów itself since 1932. Formerly the whole attention of the politicians in East Galicia was directed against Poland and her minorities policy : while the attitude, even of the more moderate section, towards Soviet Ukraine, was far from clear. There was even a current which based certain hopes upon the Soviets in their struggle against Poland. But since 1932, and especially in 1933, public opinion in Galicia, while maintaining its opposition to Polish policy at home, has taken up an openly hostile attitude towards Moscow. Two facts created a decisive impression—the suicide of Skrypnik in July 1933 and the famine in Ukraine during the summer of that year.

Skrypnik was one of the most prominent personalities among the Communists of Ukraine, known as an Old Bolshevik, a friend of Lenin and at the same time a man who supported, or at least assured a certain latitude to, Ukrainian nationalism. But Stalin delegated his *alter ego*, Postychev, a Russian, as Secretary of the Communist Party in Ukraine : and this man became its dictator, conducting a merciless struggle against all those Communists who in his opinion were merely nationalists in disguise. Party "purges," dismissals, arrests, deportations and capital punishments terrorised the population. Skrypnik also was attacked, and being unwilling to yield, shot himself through the head.

The other decisive factor for Galician opinion was the terrible famine of 1933. The harrowing letters which came from across the Soviet frontier, the stories told by those who managed to cross the frontier, horrified everyone. "The famine," it was said on all sides,

“is the result of a deliberate policy of the Soviet Government. Moscow aims at the physical destruction and enfeeblement of the Ukrainian people. Moscow is the real enemy.”

A committee of assistance for the victims of Soviet famine was formed in Lwów, and Ukrainian deputies in the Polish Diet came to Geneva during the 14th Assembly of the League, and undertook a joint *démarche* with the delegate of the exiled Ukrainian Government and with representatives of Bukovina and other Ukrainian organisations. A common front was set up to combat the famine.

In the same way in 1934 a protest against the admission of the USSR to the League of Nations was presented by all the Ukrainian organisations in Europe and America, and hundreds of telegrams and letters poured into Geneva. The most important were the memorandum of the exiled government and the protest of the Ukrainian deputies of Eastern Galicia.

The exiled government continues to be the centre of Ukrainian effort for the liberation from Moscow, while the deputies remain the chief defenders of the Ukrainian cause in Poland. No formal agreement exists between these groups, but pending the possible convocation of a Pan-Ukrainian Congress, a moral entente does incontestably exist, and it is tacitly recognised that the key to the Ukrainian question is to be found at Kiev. Without in the least neglecting Ukrainian rights in Poland, Roumania and elsewhere, the main effort must be concentrated upon the essential task of the present generation—the achievement of independence and the detachment of the Great Ukraine from Moscow.

This summary would not be complete without a reference to the group which regards Mr. Skoropadski as hereditary Hetman of Ukraine. But his adherents are not only insignificant in number, but in the main passive: indeed in fourteen years of exile their only real activity has been the publication of a review in English during 1932-33, and this has now been discontinued.

The great mass of the nation prefers the principle laid down by the Ukrainian government in exile, and in particular by its chief, Andrew Livitsky: namely, an entente between all parties—democratic, monarchist, socialist and fascist—for the liberation of the country from the control of Moscow. It is only in a free Ukraine that the people will have the right to choose its form of government. In the meantime it is well to avoid premature discussions, such as would merely injure the prospects of liberation.

ALEXANDER SHULGIN.