

7 ❖ Women and Political Representation in Contemporary Ukraine¹

Sarah Birch

The overall trend in female legislative recruitment in Ukraine is similar to that of most post-communist states, but even by Eastern European standards the absolute numbers have been small. There was a sharp decline in the proportion of parliamentary seats occupied by female deputies with the opening up of the electoral process to competition in the semi-competitive elections of 1989 and 1990. There has since been a gradual increase in women's representation, but following the 1998 elections women made up only 7.9 per cent of the Ukrainian parliament (see Table 7.1), well below the regional average. The reasons for Ukraine's relatively poor performance in this domain may be sought in the nature of the transition process.

The correlates of post-communist change include economic, cultural, and political factors. As is the case across Eastern Europe, women in Ukraine have suffered disproportionately from the declining levels of production and under-employment that have accompanied economic restructuring (ILO-CEET 1995: 62–3; Burmistenko 1996). They make up 70 per cent of the unemployed, and two-thirds of these women have higher education (Pavlychko 1997: 225). The state-run enterprises on which women had relied to meet many of their basic needs often ceased to be able to provide for them in situations of economic hardship. At the same time, private enterprises have been very slow to get off the ground, which has meant that women have had few alternative income options.

Developments on the cultural front have also led to changes in women's place in Ukrainian society since the end of the Soviet period. As in many former communist countries, political democratization was accompanied by a swing in cultural values back toward traditional gender roles, which focused on women as child-bearers and keepers of the private sphere. In Ukraine the

Table 7.1. Overview of the recent history of female representation in Ukraine

| | Men | | | | Women | | | |
|---|-------------------|------|------------------|------|------------------|------|------------------|------|
| | Candidates | | Deputies elected | | Candidates | | Deputies elected | |
| | N | % | N | % | N | % | N | % |
| 1985 Ukrainian republican parliament | 400 | 61.5 | 400 | 61.5 | 250 | 38.5 | 250 | 38.5 |
| 1989 All-Soviet Congress of People's Deputies | 257 | 82.4 | 157 | 90.2 | 55 | 17.6 | 17 | 9.8 |
| 1990 Ukrainian republican parliament | 2489 | 91.8 | 425 | 97.0 | 222 | 8.2 | 13 | 3.0 |
| 1994 Ukrainian parliament | 5172 ¹ | 92.6 | 381 ² | 95.7 | 412 ¹ | 7.4 | 17 ² | 4.3 |
| 1998 Ukrainian parliament | 5215 | 89.5 | 410 | 92.1 | 612 | 10.5 | 35 | 7.9 |
| List seats | 3214 | 89.2 | 204 | 90.7 | 391 | 10.8 | 21 | 9.3 |
| Single-member seats | 3585 | 90.5 | 206 | 93.6 | 375 | 9.5 | 14 | 6.4 |

¹ Candidates in March 1994.

² As of 1995 (308 men and 11 women were elected in March/April 1994).

Sources: *Pravda Ukrainy* 8 Feb. 1985, pp. 1-4; Potichnij, 1992, p. 200; *Khto ye khto v yukraïns'kii politytsi*, Kiev: K.I.S.: 1995; Birch, 2000; *Uryadovyi kyr'yer* 9 April 1998, p. 5; 21 April 1998, pp. 4-10; *Holos Ukrainy* 18 April 1998, pp. 3-9; 28 April 1998, p. 3; 18 August 1998, p. 2.

rejection of socialism and socialist values was linked also to the rise of nationalism in the late 1980s and early 1990s, which entailed a reconsideration of the gender egalitarianism that had been part of official Soviet ideology (Pavlychko 1996; Rubchak 1996; Wanner 1998: 112-18).²

Both economic and cultural imperatives thus have been instrumental in pressuring women to leave the sphere of public activity and return to the home. Under these circumstances they have been poorly represented in the upper echelons of the elite. It is estimated that in 1996 women occupied a mere five per cent of 35,000 top managerial and governmental positions in Ukraine (Burmistenko 1996: 16), and another estimate put the percentage of women in government and administration at less than one per cent (Bohachevshy-Chomiak 1995: 12). In this context it is not surprising that women's representation in legislative structures should have fallen dramatically since the Soviet days of rubber-stamp parliaments. The dire economic conditions in which women

in Ukraine have found themselves in the post-Soviet years, combined with culturally induced inhibiting factors, undoubtedly explain much of their unwillingness and/or inability to become involved in politics.

It is also necessary to consider the role of political organization and political institutions in legislative recruitment. In theory, the introduction of electoral competition should have provided opportunities for women, but in practice these were limited, especially in the early years, by the lack of extensive social and political infrastructures outside the control of the Communist party that could provide support for aspirant female politicians. The workings of the electoral system interacted with political organizational structures to further reduce the chances that women would achieve electoral success.

As outlined in Chapter 2, majoritarian electoral systems are generally less conducive than proportional representation to electing women, largely because of the winner-take-all competitive scenario they establish. It may be hypothesized that this will be especially true under conditions of weak party organization, when those aiming to hold office are obliged to rely mainly on the resources they can command as individuals. Since women typically have access to fewer material resources than men, are less well linked into informal networks of power and influence, and find it more difficult to mobilize the help of their friends and peers in support of their political aspirations, they will be disadvantaged by non-partisan competitive situations or situations in which parties are weak. These factors can be expected to be especially relevant in the context of post-communist economic collapse and social dislocation.

A quick overview of the summary data on female legislative recruitment in Ukraine suggests that these hypotheses are not too wide of the mark. Since 1989 there has been a steady rise in the *absolute* numbers of women contesting elections in Ukraine, a rise that has gone in tandem with increasing civil society and political organization. There was also a marked increase in female *success rates* at the time of the 1998 elections when Ukraine abandoned its majoritarian system in favour of a semi-proportional formula. The ratio of the proportion of female winners to the proportion of female candidates gives some indication of the trends in the electoral strength of women relative to men. From a baseline of 1.0 in 1985 when all candidates, male and female, were elected, this figure fell to 0.56 in 1989, and further to 0.37 in 1990. But in 1994 it rose slightly to 0.58, and in 1998 it jumped to 0.75. Another way of interpreting these numbers is to say that the chances of a woman candidate getting elected were only two-fifths those of a man in 1990, whereas they rose to over one-half in 1994, and to three-quarters in 1998 (see Table 7.1 for full data).³ Women in Ukraine are still not on par with men in terms of electoral competition, but their relative success rate has risen in recent years. The thesis of this chapter is that this rise has been linked to three factors: increased party

organization, electoral reform, and the partisan distribution of electoral support.

As described in Chapter 2 the literature on legislative recruitment identifies three hurdles that any potential electoral contestant must cross to achieve success: self-selection, selection by nominating agent, and selection by voters. Individuals first have to make a decision to enter the electoral arena, they then have to be nominated for a seat, and finally the voters must select them from among the pool of nominees. This model provides a useful device in structuring the discussion that follows. Focusing on the first two parliamentary elections held after independence in 1991, the analysis draws on a number of different data sources including a database compiled by the author of demographic and political details of all successful and unsuccessful candidates for elections to the 1994 and 1998 parliaments, and two nation-wide sample surveys conducted by the author in 1998—a survey of citizens conducted shortly before the March 1998 parliamentary elections and a simultaneous survey of candidates.

❖ THE 1994 ELECTIONS

Ukraine held its first post-Soviet elections unusually late. During the period between the achievement of independence in 1991 and the elections of 1994 political actors had little incentive to form mass political parties. The Ukrainian system was thus severely under-developed at the time of the 1994 elections; organized politics tended to take the form of small groupings of elite individuals who projected potential mass support bases rather than attempting to mobilise concrete sectors of the electorate.⁴ Thus, when it came to engaging in electoral competition, they were poorly equipped to mount organized campaigns. This left the way open to well-known local individuals and those already in power to sweep a large proportion of the seats; indeed, half those elected to the parliament in the spring of 1994 were members of no political party whatsoever (see appendix). There was a clear relationship between the gender and the occupation of candidates (see Table 7.2). A significantly larger proportion of the female candidate corpus came from the liberal professions (lawyers, architects, accountants, etc.) and the social sector, whereas those involved in business—enterprise heads and workers—tended to be almost exclusively men. This distribution undoubtedly reflects differences in the gender composition of those groups in general, differences which mean that smaller numbers of women find themselves in occupational positions that give them the wherewithal to compete for political office.

Selection by organized political groups was not particularly important in the 1994 contest. In order to be registered as a candidate, one had to obtain the signatures of only 300 voters. For parties to nominate candidates the

Table 7.2. Occupational distribution of 1994 candidates by gender¹

| Occupation | Women | | Men | | All | |
|----------------------|----------|-------------------|----------|-------------------|----------|------|
| | <i>N</i> | % | <i>N</i> | % | <i>N</i> | % |
| Liberal professions | 138 | 33.7 ² | 1131 | 22.2 ² | 1269 | 23.0 |
| Government officials | 75 | 18.3 | 1089 | 21.3 | 1164 | 21.1 |
| Heads of enterprises | 35 | 8.6 ² | 828 | 16.2 ² | 863 | 15.7 |
| Social sector | 83 | 20.3 ² | 710 | 13.9 ² | 793 | 14.4 |
| Workers | 9 | 2.2 ² | 388 | 7.6 ² | 397 | 7.2 |
| Other | 69 | 16.9 | 956 | 18.7 | 1025 | 18.6 |
| All | 409 | 100 | 5102 | 100 | 5511 | 100 |

¹ Excludes 86 cases for which data were missing.

² Difference significant at the 0.001 level.

Source: Calculated from the Vybory-94 database constructed by the Petro Mohyla Scientific Society, Kiev.

process was much more complicated. A local party branch had to have at least 100 members to be eligible to nominate a candidate, and at least two-thirds of all the branch members had to be present at the nomination meeting. The names and addresses of all those present were then sent to the electoral commission along with details of the nominee. This arrangement provided a strong incentive for freelance politicians to try their hand at the electoral lottery. Of the more than five thousand candidates who stood, political parties nominated only 643 (11.0 per cent); the rest had their names placed on the ballot through the good graces of groups of voters (62.3 per cent) or workers' collectives (26.7 per cent). This was in part due to the fact that, as noted above, the grass-roots networks of parties were generally under-developed in Ukraine at this time, and partly due to the difficulty many parties had in fulfilling the requirements for nomination. Party membership was printed on the ballot, but because few who were labelled as party members on the ballot were actually nominated by the party in question, parties had only weak control over the use of their label and scarce opportunity to exercise constraint over the nomination process. Many candidates who were party members chose to stand as independents instead of attempting to have themselves nominated through their party, and in other cases parties supported candidates who were not formally their members. Given this discrepancy between party membership and mode of nomination, it makes sense to analyse the two separately.

Women do not appear to have been disadvantaged by the party nomination process; if anything, they benefited from it. Approximately a quarter (26.9 per cent) of all female candidates were party members, almost the same figure as for men

(27.3 per cent). For almost all parties, women were a higher percentage of the candidates who were formally nominated by the party, than they were of all candidates associated with the relevant party (i.e., both those who are formally nominated and those who are members, but running independently) (see Table 7.3). This may be due to the greater willingness of male candidates to stand for election without the formal backing of their party, but certainly there is no indication the parties discriminated against their female members in choosing nominees. Unfortunately data on the mode of nomination of Communist party members were unavailable, but among the other parties, only the far right-wing Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists had a smaller percentage of women among its nominees than among its member candidates overall.

When we aggregate up to the level of ideological party ‘camps’, it is evident that a larger proportion of the candidates from the leftist and centrist parties were women than their counterparts in right-wing parties.⁵ More female candidates were members of the Communist party than any other; indeed, Communist party members represented nearly a third (32.4 per cent) of all female candidates who were party members. When combined with their Socialist counterparts and the eight women nominated by the Rural party, they made up almost half of all the female candidates in these elections who were associated with political parties (either through membership or through nomination). All three of the left-wing parties were successors to the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), and the tradition of female involvement in party affairs appears to have been passed on (if in somewhat diluted form). Several of the liberal and social-democratic parties of the centre had sizeable groups of women among their parliamentary hopefuls, but the small absolute numbers represented by these candidacies meant that centrist women did not figure large in the candidate pool overall. Moreover, many of these parties had relatively narrow and geographically concentrated organizational bases, such that they were not even a potential vehicle for women in many parts of Ukraine (see Birch 1998). The parties on the right of Ukraine’s ideological spectrum were mostly nationalist or what is referred to in Ukrainian parlance as ‘national-democratic’—the successors to Ukraine’s movement for independence in the late Soviet period. The leading organization in this camp is Rukh, whose toll of female candidates was, at 5.6 per cent, typical of right-wing parties. The social conservatism associated with traditionalist and nationalist views most likely accounts for the relative dearth of women among these parties’ candidates.

Finally, it is necessary to consider the results of the elections and the impact of voters’ choices. Of the successful women in the March/April rounds, only a minority (four of eleven) were party members—all members of the Communist party. This pattern contrasts sharply with that for male winners,

Table 7.3. Women in the 1994 elections: party members, party-nominated candidates, and deputies

| Party | Party membership of female candidates | | Nominating party of female candidates | | Party membership of successful female candidates | |
|------------------------------------|---------------------------------------|----------------|---------------------------------------|----------------|--|----------------|
| | <i>N</i> | % ¹ | <i>N</i> | % ² | <i>N</i> | % ³ |
| LEFT | | | | | | |
| Communist | 36 | 9.7 | N/A | N/A | 4 | 4.7 |
| Socialist | 12 | 7.1 | 11 | 11.5 | 0 | 0.0 |
| Rural (SelPU) ⁴ | 0 | 0.0 | 8 | 7.5 | 0 | 0.0 |
| Other left | 0 | 0.0 | 0 | 0.0 | 0 | 0.0 |
| | 48 | 8.0 | N/A | N/A | 4 | 3.3 |
| CENTRE | | | | | | |
| Greens | 8 | 22.9 | — | — | 0 | 0.0 |
| Liberal Party | 8 | 7.6 | 5 | 14.3 | 0 | 0.0 |
| Socialist Democratic Party | 4 | 13.8 | — | — | 0 | 0.0 |
| Civic Congress | 2 | 8.7 | — | — | 0 | 0.0 |
| Other centre | 7 | 7.1 | 2 | 8.7 | 0 | 0.0 |
| | 29 | 9.0 | 7 | 11.5 | 0 | 0.0 |
| RIGHT | | | | | | |
| Rukh | 13 | 5.6 | 6 | 6.2 | 0 | 0.0 |
| Republicans | 6 | 4.8 | | | 0 | 0.0 |
| Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists | 5 | 9.8 | 1 | 3.3 | 0 | 0.0 |
| Org. of Ukrainian Nationalists | 3 | 27.3 | 3 | 33.3 | 0 | 0.0 |
| Democratic Party | 2 | 2.8 | 1 | 8.3 | 0 | 0.0 |
| Conservative Republicans | 2 | 8.0 | | | 0 | 0.0 |
| Christian Democratic Party | 2 | 6.1 | 1 | 9.1 | 0 | 0.0 |
| Other right | 1 | 4.8 | — | — | 0 | 0.0 |
| | 34 | 5.6 | 12 | 7.0 | 0 | 0.0 |
| Independents | 301 | 7.4 | 345 | 7.1 | 7 | 4.2 |
| All | 412 | | N/A | | 11 | |

¹ The proportion of the total number of candidates in this category (male and female) who were members of the party in question.

² The proportion of the total number of candidates in this category (male and female) nominated by the party in question.

³ The proportion of the total number of candidates in this category (male and female) elected from the party in question.

⁴ The Rural party nominated 79 candidates who were not members of the party; eight of these were women, of which one won a seat.

Source: Calculated from the Vyborg-94 database constructed by the Petro Mohyla Scientific Society, Kiev.

half of whom were members of political parties from across the spectrum. The Communists alone provided women with an effective vehicle to power at this time.⁶ Although the small and generally badly organized parties of the centre had proportionately more female members standing for election than the parties of the better-organized left and right, the poor overall showing of the centre meant that candidacies did not translate well into victory. Only 15 centrist deputies were elected total, and none of the centrist winners were women. It is less clear why no women from right-wing parties won; though candidates from the nationalist and national-democratic right were less likely to be women than those of the centre and the left, there were nevertheless enough of them that their complete failure is somewhat of a surprise. It might be thought that this phenomenon could be attributed to the growing social conservatism of right-wing voters, yet multivariate analysis of the determinants of candidate success in these elections reveals no evidence of gender bias among voters (Birch 2000, Ch. 6).

Women as a whole fared worse at the polls than men: only one in 17 female candidates was elected, as against one in 10 males (a difference significant at the 0.001 level). The tendency of women to concentrate in lower occupational categories accounts in large measure for their lower success rate. Male candidates more often come from occupational categories associated with business (workers and enterprise heads), which generally have easier access to the resources necessary to win elections. The working-class candidates tended to have the support of one of the left-wing parties behind them, and enterprise heads could command economic support, not to mention the votes of their employees. Of those women who had by the end of the 1994 by-elections been successful in winning seats, five were government officials, nine were professionals, and only two were enterprise directors. By contrast, over a fifth of male deputies were enterprise directors. In sum, whereas business interests were increasingly positions from which men could gain legislative seats, they rarely propelled women to power.

Nevertheless, the 1994 electoral contests were the first step in the involvement of women in genuine multi-party competition, and they paved the way for greater success in years to come. Two of the women deputies elected in 1994 subsequently split from the left-wing parties that had promoted them and formed new political organizations—the Progressive Socialists on the far left under the leadership of Nataliya Vitrenko, and the Agrarians in the centre under Kateryna Vashchuk. In 1997, Yaroslava Stets'ko, leader of the far-right Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists, was elected to parliament in a by-election, raising the number of women party leaders in the parliament from none in 1994 to three at the time of Ukraine's second parliamentary elections in 1998. Multiparty elections may not have been successful in promoting large numbers of women to positions of legislative power, but they

did provide a mechanism whereby a small number of well-known women could get their foot in the door and establish themselves at the top of the political elite.

❖ THE 1998 ELECTIONS

After the election of 1994, there was a general consensus that a move to a semi-proportional mixed electoral system would be desirable for a number of reasons: the introduction of proportional list voting would strengthen Ukraine's weak party system, it would help to reduce the dependence of parties on regional fiefdoms, and it would give more power to party leaders. The result was an electoral law which stipulated that half (225) of Ukraine's deputies in the 1998 elections would be elected from single-member constituencies by simple majority, and half would be elected from closed national lists by the largest remainders method with a four per cent threshold. The top five names on each list were printed on the ballot, together with the occupation and place of employment of each candidate. This information was also printed next to the names of the candidates in the single-member constituency races, along with their party membership.

Although political parties did not provide women the most effective means of achieving success in 1994, the introduction of a proportional list component to the ballot represented new opportunities. One such opportunity was the explicit mobilization of female voters on the basis of their sex. Prior to the 1998 elections two specifically women's parties formed—Women of Ukraine, and Women's Initiatives—evidently in the hopes of repeating the success on the list ballot of Women of Russia in 1993, when that party won 8.1 per cent of the list vote in the Duma elections and 21 list seats. These hopes were disappointed. Of the two new Ukrainian parties, only Women's Initiatives succeeded in collecting a sufficient number of valid signatures to have its name put on the ballot at all, and on election day it received a mere 154,650 list votes, or 0.6 per cent of the total.

The other type of opportunity was increased representation of women through the agency of mainstream parties. The existing literature suggests the type of list system adopted in Ukraine is one that should favour women: the single nation-wide constituency means more potentially winnable places on each individual list, and thus more opportunities for women to be put on the lists for the purposes of gender balance. For the same reasons, women should be advantaged by the moderately high threshold, which translates into a minimum of nine seats for any party that clears it (see Chapter 2 for a review of these arguments).⁷

Eight parties managed to cross the threshold on the list ballot (see results in the appendix). The consequence was a doubling in female representation

from 17 in 1994–5 to 35 in 1998. Reform of the electoral system was clearly one of the main reasons for this change. Twenty-one women were elected from party lists as opposed to fourteen from single-member constituencies. There was also a rise in the proportion of *single-member* seats filled by women—from 17 of 338 in 1994 (5.0 per cent) to 14 of 220 in 1998 (6.4 per cent).⁸ It appears the electoral system contributed to the overall result both directly, through the list component of the ballot, and indirectly through its strengthening of parties. It is noteworthy that women fared far better as members of parties than as independents. Only slightly over a quarter (4 or 28.6 per cent) of women elected in single-member constituencies were elected as independents, vs. half (107 or 51.9 per cent) of the men who were so elected.⁹ This contrasts sharply with the situation in 1994, when two-thirds of the successful women were not members of any party. This is probably attributable to the parties being more active in 1998 in nominating candidates, partly as a consequence of easier nomination procedures, and partly due to an increase in the grass-roots development of party organization.

Certainly the advent of lists helped women get elected, but what is interesting about the 1998 results is that almost as many women got elected from single-member constituencies as had been elected in this manner in 1994, despite the fact that the total number of such constituencies had fallen by half. How do we explain this result? Let us once again analyse selection by self, by nominating agents, and by the electorate. There was a rise in the proportion of women contesting the single-member races from 7.4 per cent in 1994 to 9.5 per cent in 1998. This is most likely the effect of three factors: (1) the development of political parties devoted specifically to women's concerns, (2) greater women's involvement in civil society organizations (see Bohachevsky-Chomiak 1995), and (3) increased economic security among certain sectors of the elite.

Social change during the 1994–8 period may well account for more women being in positions to be able to raise campaign funds in 1998 than had been the case four years previously. When we examine the occupational structure of the candidates in the single-member constituency races in 1998 (see Table 7.4), we see there are fewer significant differences between women and men than in 1994 (cf. Table 7.2). The gender differences in the categories of social sector and manual workers have declined. On the other hand, the differences that remain significant have gotten larger. A 5.5 per cent drop in the proportion of men from the liberal professions, coupled with an 8.2 per cent increase in the proportion of men who are head of enterprises means an expanding gap despite a small drop in the proportion of women from the liberal professions (3.0 per cent) and a noticeable increase (4.7 per cent) in the proportion of women who are enterprise heads. The move of several well-known female figures into positions of political authority may also have

Table 7.4. Occupational distribution of 1998 candidates by gender¹

| Occupation | Women | | Men | | All | |
|----------------------|----------|-------------------|----------|-------------------|----------|------|
| | <i>N</i> | % | <i>N</i> | % | <i>N</i> | % |
| Liberal professions | 115 | 30.7 ² | 597 | 16.7 ² | 712 | 18.1 |
| Government officials | 79 | 21.1 | 753 | 21.1 | 832 | 21.1 |
| Heads of enterprises | 50 | 13.3 ² | 869 | 24.4 ² | 919 | 23.3 |
| Social sector | 61 | 16.3 | 472 | 13.2 | 533 | 13.5 |
| Workers | 10 | 2.7 | 133 | 3.7 | 143 | 3.6 |
| Other | 60 | 16.0 | 742 | 20.8 | 802 | 20.4 |
| All | 375 | 100 | 3566 | 100 | 3941 | 100 |

¹ Excludes 20 cases for which data were missing.

² Difference significant at the 0.001 level.

Source: Calculated from *Vybory '98: Yak Ukraina holosyvala*, Kiev: K.I.S., 1998, and the Website of the International Foundation for Electoral Systems at www.ifes.kiev.ua.

boosted women's perceptions of their own chances of rising in the political world, attracting competent women who might otherwise have shunned politics.

Lacking sufficient mass survey data with which to analyse self-selection, the next-best option is to ask people who do choose to stand for office about their motives and to trace differences among different groups. Data from a candidate survey conducted in the two weeks prior to the 1998 elections in 25 randomly selected constituencies throughout Ukraine can be used to elucidate these questions.¹⁰ Candidates were generally disillusioned with political life in their country in early 1998. When we asked respondents 'To what extent do you think the political situation has improved since the passing of the constitution in 1996, a lot, some, not much, or not at all?', 42.7 per cent responded 'not at all'. Women overall were even less sanguine about the general political situation than men. Whereas 41.0 per cent of men gave this response, the figure for women was 57.7 per cent. If answers to this question are positioned on a scale—where 'not at all' = 0, 'not much' = 1, 'some' = 2, and 'a lot' = 3, the mean response among women who answered the question is 0.58, and for men 0.89 (difference significant at the 0.06 level).

This general gloominess about politics among female candidates renders all the more striking their relative enthusiasm about the recent electoral reforms. We asked the candidates to evaluate the new electoral system in comparison with the old.¹¹ Two-thirds of the 27 women who responded said the new electoral system would be more democratic. Nineteen per cent said it would be the same, while only 11 per cent thought the new system would be less

democratic. Among the 229 male candidates who responded, on the other hand, there was general support for the reforms, 62 per cent said the new system was more democratic, but there was also greater scepticism, 21 per cent said the system was less democratic, while 13 per cent said it would be the same. Although the number of female respondents is too small for these findings to be conclusive, the responses are compatible with the hypothesis that women should favour a system that includes an element of proportional representation over one that does not.

In light of these results, it is worth asking the question of whether the new system encourages women to stand for office who would not previously have done so. There is actually little evidence that this is the case. The men in our candidate sample were slightly more likely than the women to say they had held elected office before (24.0 per cent vs. 18.5 per cent), but the women were more likely to admit to having stood unsuccessfully for office in the past (33.3 per cent as opposed to 32.8 per cent). The small numbers represented by these percentages caution against drawing any firm conclusions, but certainly they suggest there is little reason to suspect that female entrants in 1998 were more likely to be new to politics than male entrants.

One might think that greater approval for the semi-PR system among women would coincide with an approach to representation that stresses the role of parties as aggregative mechanisms and policy-forming agents within the structures of parliament rather than an approach that focuses on the link between the representative and the individual voter. Interestingly, however, female candidates were more likely to emphasise the importance of catering to voters' needs than were male candidates. When we asked 'Which of a deputy's roles do you think is most important, 'work in the structures of parliament' or 'dealing with voters' problems', a plurality of both genders replied that 'both are equal', and among the rest more opted for work in parliament than dealing with voters problems. But there was a decided difference between men and women. Male candidates were nearly four times as likely to choose work in parliament (40.6–11.4 per cent), whereas women were only slightly more likely to give this answer (25.9–18.5 per cent). These differences are not statistically significant due to the small N involved, but they are suggestive nonetheless. The finding may be linked to the tendency of women to view the sub-group rather than citizenry as a whole as the appropriate object of representation. In answer to the question 'Which of the following reasons comes closest to describing your own reason for standing for election?', nearly two-thirds of men (64.6 per cent) replied 'I want to help Ukraine', whereas fewer than half (48.1 per cent) of women chose this response. Conversely, less than a third of men answered 'I want to promote the interests of people like me', while 48.1 per cent of women gave this answer.¹² Although these differences again fail to reach statistical significance, it seems

that women are more likely to take a particularistic view of representation, whereas men tend to favour the wider view. This may well be because men have a greater tendency to universalise their views than women, who are constantly reminded of their particularity as the 'second sex'.

Given women's more group-oriented understanding of the representative process, it is not surprising that political parties should be seen as attractive vehicles for their candidacies. Although only slightly more female than male candidates claimed to identify with a party (55.6 per cent vs. 46.7 per cent), more indicated links with party as a factor in the decisions surrounding their nomination, even among those who chose to stand in single-member constituencies. When we asked an open question about reasons for choosing a given mode of nomination, half the 18 female candidates in single-member constituencies gave answers in some way linked to political party membership: parties offered to nominate them for a constituency seat, or they had been nominated both on lists and in constituencies, or they had not obtained a high enough place on their party list, so they had opted to stand in a constituency instead. Only 19 of the 155 male constituency candidates (13 per cent) gave answers that were in any way linked to party membership. Parties clearly figured larger in the nomination prospects of female candidates than those of their male counterparts.

At the time of the first multiparty election in 1994, most candidates were, as we have seen, nominated as independents—by groups of voters or by work collectives—whether or not they were party members. As argued above, this was due to limited grass roots party organization, to popular antipathy towards parties, and to the exigencies of the electoral law then in force.

In 1998 the situation was to an extent the same in single-member constituencies, where over half of all candidates were nominated without the help of a political party and half of those elected to these seats were independents (approximately the same proportion as in 1994). Although parties failed to increase their penetration of the SMDs, the gender composition of the SMD races was rather different from what it had been four years previously. For those with limited personal resources parties represented in some senses a substitute, especially for women. Thus we find that more female candidates were party members than male candidates; 66.7 per cent as opposed to 52.7 per cent. The only major occupational category for which this discrepancy does not hold is enterprise directors, where the proportion of male party members actually slightly outnumbers that of women (52.3–50.0 per cent). It seems those women who have their own resources are no more likely than men to seek the assistance of a party in planning a political career; it is women who are in less fortunate positions who tend to do so. If party membership is an asset to women, then it is as much a matter of women choosing parties, as it is parties choosing women.

On the party list component of the ballot the situation was obviously different.¹³ It was here the parties had the power to include and to exclude, though the procedures through which the lists were drawn up varied considerably from organization to organization. Ironically, the parties with the most 'democratic' procedures generated lists containing the fewest women, while those that relied on the tried-and-tested methods of selection by a handful of elites resulted in more feminine lists.

Of the major parties, Rukh and the Popular Democratic Party (NDP) have the most formal and democratic nomination procedures; their lists contained 9.8 per cent and 10.1 per cent women candidates, respectively (see Table 7.5). The most elite-dominated and informal procedures were those of the

Table 7.5. Female candidates on lists by party, 1998

| Party | Number of women on list | Women as a proportion of list candidates (%) | Number of women in the top five of list | Number of women in the top 20 of list | Number of women in the top 50 of list | (Average) place of top woman on the list | Proportion of all women on the list in the top half (%) |
|----------------------|-------------------------|--|---|---------------------------------------|---------------------------------------|--|---|
| LEFT | | | | | | | |
| Communists | 27 | 12.0 | 1 | 1 | 6 | 5 | 37.0 |
| Soc./Rural | 20 | 10.0 | 0 | 2 | 4 | 10 | 35.0 |
| Prog. Soc. | 20 | 24.1 | 1 | 5 | 11 | 1 | 40.0 |
| <i>All left</i> | 87 | 11.5 | 3 (10.0%) | 12 (10.0%) | 30 (10.0%) | 9.0 | 39.5 |
| <i>Left >4%</i> | 67 | 13.2 | 2 (13.3%) | 8 (13.3%) | 21 (14.0%) | 5.3 | 36.5 |
| CENTRE | | | | | | | |
| Popular Democrats | 19 | 10.1 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 30 | 31.6 |
| Social Democrats | 17 | 9.2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 54 | 17.7 |
| Greens | 9 | 11.7 | 0 | 2 | 5 | 14 | 44.4 |
| Hromada | 15 | 6.7 | 0 | 2 | 4 | 6 | 46.7 |
| <i>All centre</i> | 211 | 11.6 | 9 (10.6%) | 36 (11.3%) | 75 (10.3%) | 13.7 | 32.5 |
| <i>Centre >4%</i> | 60 | 8.9 | 0 (0.0%) | 4 (5.0%) | 12 (6.0%) | 26.0 | 34.3 |
| RIGHT | | | | | | | |
| Rukh | 22 | 9.8 | 0 | 3 | 4 | 8 | 50.0 |
| <i>All right</i> | 93 | 9.0 | 3 (8.6%) | 8 (5.0%) | 25 (6.3%) | 10.3 | 36.7 |
| <i>Right >4%</i> | 22 | 9.8 | 0 (0.0%) | 3 (15.0%) | 4 (8.00%) | 8 | 50.0 |
| <i>All</i> | 391 | 10.8 | 15 (10.0%) | 56 (9.3%) | 130 (9.1%) | 12.0 | 35.2 |
| <i>All >4%</i> | 149 | 10.6 | 2 (5.0%) | 15 (9.4%) | 37 (9.3%) | 16.0 | 37.6 |

Sources: *Vybory '98: politychnyi Kompas vybortsya*, Kiev: K.I.S., 1998; *Politychnyi kalendar 6* (February 1998), *Vybory 98: yak holosyvala Ukraina*, Kiev: K.I.S., 1998.

Hromada party, which gave only 6.7 per cent of its places to women. The lists with the largest proportion of women were the Communist and Progressive Socialist parties—12.0 per cent in the first instance and 24.1 per cent in the second. The nomination procedures of these parties were in theory highly democratic, but evidence suggests that they were in practice orchestrated from the top in much the same way as candidate-selection had been conducted during the Communist period.¹⁴ As can be seen from these data, it is parties with top-down decision-making procedures that allowed the most women a chance to compete.

These are interesting findings, in as much as they challenge the literature on candidate selection, which suggests that more formalized procedures ought to favour the selection of female candidates. Though the party with the least formalized procedure did indeed nominate the smallest proportion of women, the converse was not true. There are two possible reasons for this. First, pressure has to be put on institutional mechanisms in order for them to favour women. In the absence of sufficient impetus from below, even the most democratic mechanisms will be of little avail. Second, it may well be that women were chosen with greater frequency by the left-wing parties because women tend to adapt well to the organizational style of these parties: the tight discipline exercised over parliamentary deputies affords the individual legislator relatively little autonomy, and it may well be that women have proved easier to discipline than men. Party ideology could thus be a key intervening variable here.

But the 'ideology' that makes left-wing parties in Ukraine more favourably disposed to promoting female candidates is a matter of organizational ethos rather than policy position. None of Ukraine's parties seriously engaged with the discrimination against women which is rampant in Ukrainian society, and virtually all viewed women first and foremost as procreators. The Communist party programme claims that '[if the Communists come to power] women will stop being afraid of having children, and will be able to bring them up in peace, sure of their future'. The programme of the Socialist/Rural bloc, for its part, contented itself with aiming 'to guarantee women a worthy place in society'. The Progressive Socialists, who were led by a woman and who had, of all the major parties, the largest proportion of women candidates on their list, made no mention of women in their programme at all. Nor did the Agrarian party, the other main political organization in Ukraine to be headed at that time by a woman.

Of the centrist parties, Hromada and the NDP also omitted mention of women from their campaign platform, while the SDP(u) alluded briefly to 'state care for the family, motherhood, and childhood'. Most depressingly of all, even the Party of Women's Initiatives saw women mainly as mothers; the opening lines of its programme were: 'Responsibility for the future of the human species naturally lies with women. Bearing and rearing children is

the highest goal and content of their lives.' The text goes on to argue that responsibility for children can be equated with responsibility for society, and for this reason women have an obligation to play an active role in politics. Apart from calling for higher levels of female representation at all levels and in all branches of government, however, the programme does not address any issues faced by women as a social group. The right-wing Rukh was arguably less sexist when it asserted that 'woman is the basis of the family. The family is the basis of society', but also vowed to 'promote the activity of women in civil society organizations and the participation of women in [commercial] enterprises'. It was left to the Green party, which of all the main parties had the smallest absolute number of women on its list, to take up the female cause directly. It devoted the largest amount of text to women's issues and though it described women as 'mothers of society', it also called for them to 'have the same rights as men to work in leadership positions' and supported the idea that time spent bringing up children should be considered work which would entitle women to pension benefits.¹⁵ It was clearly not parties' position on women's issues that accounted for differences among them in their promotion of female candidates. Women's issues did not play a prominent role in the electoral campaign, policy differences among the parties were meagre, and none took a strong stand against the gender stereotyping that in all likelihood accounts for the paucity of women active in Ukrainian politics.

Nevertheless, the advent of list voting did provide moderately greater opportunities for women to be elected to parliament in Ukraine. The question arises as to whether they were able to take as great an advantage of these opportunities as men. The discrepancy between the proportion of women among those who obtained list slots (10.8 per cent) and the proportion of those elected through this means (9.3 per cent) suggests either that women were either not always on the right lists, or that they were less likely to be placed in winnable positions. Upon inspection, the latter explanation appears to be the correct one. On most measures, the parties that won representation represented women as well as those that were failed to win seats (see Table 7.5). The lists that crossed the threshold had 10.6 per cent women among them vs. 10.8 per cent among all parties; 9.3 per cent of the top 50 places on the winning lists were occupied by women, compared with 9.1 per cent of the top 50 positions on all 30 lists, and 37.6 per cent of all the women from winning parties were in the top half of their respective lists, as against 35.2 per cent of all women on lists generally.

This last measure gives some indication as to why women on lists performed worse overall than men: more of them were clustered in the lower reaches. There were two groups of slots that were of key importance in these elections: the top five names which appeared on the ballot alongside the name of the party/bloc, and the top twenty 'mandate' or 'fighting' slots

whose holders would be well positioned to get a place in parliament if the list cleared the four per cent mark. Eleven lists had women in the top five places. The Women's Initiatives party was the leader with three women in the top five, including the number one place. Four other lists from across the political spectrum were also headed by women: the Progressive Socialists on the far left, the Agrarians and the Union party in the centre, and Fewer Words on the far right. Most of the eleven were minor parties, however, and only two parties with women in the top five crossed the threshold—the Communists and the Progressive Socialists. Almost all the lists had women among the top 20 candidates. The only major exceptions were two of the main centrist parties, the National Democratic Party, whose top female candidate was in the thirtieth position and the Social Democratic (united) party, whose highest-placed woman was to be found at number 54.

When we analyse these data in terms of Ukraine's main party camps, some interesting patterns emerge. The centre slightly outperforms the left in terms of both number of candidates and number of women in top positions, but this is due almost exclusively to the strong showing of the Women's Initiatives list. Among the centrist parties that won list seats, the picture is quite different. The winning centrist lists had only 8.9 per cent female representation, and women filled only five per cent of their top positions. Only one had a woman among its top ten, and none had a female name showing on the ballot. These parties have strong links with various branches of Ukraine's emerging business community, and their failure to include significant numbers of women on their lists corresponds to the tendency in evidence since 1990 of candidates from the business sector to be almost exclusively male. It is clear the parties on the left of the political spectrum offered the greatest opportunity to women in terms of winnable placements. Women filled approximately one in eight of their list slots, and the same share of the key winning places.

The choices made by the different parties are reflected in electoral outcomes (see Table 7.6). We observe relative consistency in the pooled results of the parties of the left. The proportion of left-wing list seats won by women was, at 12.6 per cent, only slightly higher than the proportion of female list candidates on the left (11.5 per cent), and not much higher than the proportion of seats won by left-wing women in single-member constituencies (8.9 per cent). The advent of party list voting benefited left-wing women candidates partly because it benefited the parties of which they were members. A total of 16 women of the left entered parliament through the list ballot, whereas only four were elected in single-member constituencies. The figures for other party camps vary considerably more. As might be guessed from the tendency of the major centrist parties to place few women in top positions on their lists, the female portion of the centrist list take is the lowest of any of the three party camps (three winners, or 4.5 per cent of all successful centrists). Centrists did

Table 7.6. Female winners by party, 1998

| Party ¹ | List | | Single-member seats | | All | |
|--|----------|----------------|---------------------|----------------|----------|------|
| | <i>N</i> | % ² | <i>N</i> | % ² | <i>N</i> | % |
| LEFT | | | | | | |
| <i>Communists</i> | 9 | 10.7 | 3 | 7.8 | 12 | 9.8 |
| <i>Socialist/Rural</i> | 3 | 10.3 | 0 | 0.0 | 3 | 8.8 |
| <i>Progressive Socialists</i> | 4 | 21.4 | 1 | 50.0 | 5 | 31.3 |
| Other | 0 | 0.0 | 0 | 0.0 | 0 | 0.0 |
| | 16 | 12.6 | 4 | 8.9 | 20 | 11.6 |
| CENTRE | | | | | | |
| <i>Popular Democratic Party (NDP)</i> | 0 | 0.0 | 0 | 0.0 | 0 | 0.0 |
| <i>Social Democrats (united)</i> | 0 | 0.0 | 0 | 0.0 | 0 | 0.0 |
| <i>Hromada</i> | 1 | 6.3 | 2 | 28.6 | 3 | 13.0 |
| <i>Greens</i> | 2 | 10.5 | — | — | 2 | 10.5 |
| Agrarian Party | 0 | 0.0 | 3 | 37.5 | 3 | 37.5 |
| Women's Initiatives | 0 | 0.0 | 0 | 0.0 | 0 | 0.0 |
| Other | 0 | 0.0 | 0 | 0.0 | 0 | 0.0 |
| | 3 | 4.5 | 5 | 13.9 | 8 | 7.8 |
| RIGHT | | | | | | |
| <i>Rukh</i> | 2 | 6.3 | 0 | 0.0 | 2 | 4.4 |
| Reforms and Order | 0 | 0.0 | 1 | 33.3 | 1 | 33.3 |
| National Front | 0 | 0.0 | 1 | 20.0 | 1 | 20.0 |
| Other | 0 | 0.0 | 0 | 0.0 | 0 | 0.0 |
| | 2 | 6.3 | 2 | 7.4 | 4 | 6.8 |
| Independent (elected from a single-member constituency and not a party member) | — | — | 3 | 2.7 | 3 | 2.7 |

¹ Parties in italics are those that cleared the four per cent threshold on the list vote.

² The proportion of the total number of candidates in this category (male and female) elected from the party in question.

Sources: *Politychnyi kalendar 6* (February 1998), *Vybory 98: yak holosyvava Ukraina*, Kiev: K.I.S., 1998.

better in single-member constituencies, but the three seats won by Kateryna Vashchuk's Agrarian party largely explain this. On the right of the party spectrum, the one successful list contained two women among its winners (6.3 per cent), and two right-wing female deputies were elected in the single-member constituencies. All in all the parties of the centre and the right promoted only 12 women to parliamentary seats, whereas the left-wing parties secured seats for 20 women, partly because they won more seats as parties, but also because they placed more female candidates in winnable slots.

What role did the electorate play in generating these outcomes? Did they hold gender against female candidates? Because the PR component of the ballot operated on the basis of closed lists, this question is of greatest relevance to the single-member constituency races. When asked what qualities influenced their choice of candidate in single-member seats, voters were extremely reluctant to admit that gender was a major consideration. Only eight (four men and four women) of 1741 citizens surveyed in Ukraine in the last two weeks before the 1998 elections listed the sex of the candidate as the principal factor influencing their choice.¹⁶ But these findings do not exclude the possibility that gender indirectly affected the way candidates' other qualities were evaluated by voters. Over half of all voters (62.4 per cent of women and 55.4 per cent of men) listed 'honesty' as the most important quality for a candidate to possess, and a further third (28.8 per cent of women and 33.2 per cent of men) listed 'professionalism'. It may be that perceptions of these two attributes were coloured by gender stereotypes. Yet a regression (not shown) of candidate vote share on candidate characteristics—gender, age, occupation, incumbency, and party membership—for all 3961 candidates who stood in the single-member constituencies in 1998 demonstrates that gender had no significant effect on candidates' ability to win votes, once other factors are taken into consideration. It appears that the role of gender in influencing electoral outcomes has more to do with its effect on a person's chances of attaining desirable occupational and party political positions than its impact on voter perceptions and choices. Once women have gained access to the economic and political resources that favour electoral success, they are at no disadvantage with respect to men.

❖ CONCLUSIONS

During the heady years surrounding the movement for independence, the political rhetoric that set the tone in Ukraine was one that was politically radical but socially conservative. This, combined with the collapse of organized politics, led to a virtual eclipse of women from the structures of national representation. The subsequent construction of a competitive party system in independent Ukraine brought with it new opportunities for women, and as the party system has gained in strength, women have found increased potential to compete for and be elected to parliamentary seats. The change from a single-member to a semi-proportional electoral system enhanced the political role of parties and prompted their organizational expansion, leading to a larger number of women being elected to parliament than at any time since the introduction of electoral competition.

The revival of the organized left starting in 1994 was especially helpful in this regard, as left-wing parties have been most diligent in promoting the

candidacies of women. There is some irony in the fact that it was the parties least supportive of radical political reform and least reformed in terms of their own party organization that have gone furthest in propelling women to positions of legislative power. At the same time, there is evidence that the profile of women is becoming more prominent across the political spectrum. A small handful of women from all three of Ukraine's main party camps have risen to positions of influence, often by breaking with established political organizations and forging new structures. These include Nataliya Vitrenko of the Progressive Socialist Party, Kateryna Vashchuk of the Agrarian Party, and more recently, Yulia Tymoshenko, head of the Fatherland party. It is also noteworthy that women have *not* been most successful in rising to positions of leadership when they have championed explicitly female causes. None of the women's parties that has formed has met with electoral success, and none of the female party leaders has made a point of championing women's issues. Female politicians in Ukraine are clearly using the institution of the political party to their advantage; the question remains as to whether they are using it to the advantage of Ukrainian women. But that is a question for another study.

This chapter has concentrated on the quantitative dimension of representation. It has shown that, though the number of women who have attained positions of legislative power in Ukraine is relatively low, it is on the rise. This rise can be attributed to three interlocking factors: a gradual increase in the institutionalisation of political parties since 1990, the move toward a more proportional electoral system in the 1998 elections, and the improving political fortunes of left-wing parties. The last of these factors is conjunctural and may thus be subject to change, but current trends suggest that the first two factors will remain prominent and may even become more so. The rigours of electoral competition are prompting parties to develop their infrastructures, and many members of the Ukrainian parliament support a move to an even more proportional electoral system. Thus, we can expect to see a slow but steady rise in the number of women in representative roles. We can also expect to see an increase in gender-related differences among the parties as their internal organizational structures become more clearly defined.

The next logical step for researchers is an analysis of the quality of representation offered to women in Ukraine by both male and female legislators. What do Ukrainian women want? How well does the Ukrainian parliament serve their interests, and which sectors of the parliament are most effective in catering to the needs of women? Much work remains to be conducted in this field, and such research has an important role to play in helping Ukraine's 27 million women to make the institution of political representation work for them.

Appendix: Parliamentary Elections: 27 March–10 April 1994; 29 March 1998

| Party | 1994 | | 1998 | | | | | | | Total | % Total |
|-----------------------------|--------------------|------|------------|------------|--------------|------------|-----------------------|------------|-----|-------|---------|
| | Seats ¹ | % | List votes | List seats | % List seats | % SM votes | SM seats ² | % SM seats | | | |
| Communist | 86 | 25.4 | 24.7 | 84 | 37.3 | 14.7 | 37 | 16.9 | 121 | 27.2 | |
| Socialist/Rural | 33 | 9.8 | 8.6 | 29 | 12.9 | 4.5 | 5 | 2.3 | 34 | 7.6 | |
| Progressive Socialists | | | 4.1 | 14 | 6.2 | 1.0 | 2 | 0.9 | 16 | 3.6 | |
| Working Ukraine | 2 | 0.6 | 3.1 | — | — | 0.5 | 1 | 0.5 | 1 | 0.2 | |
| Other left | | | 1.1 | — | — | 0.3 | — | — | — | — | |
| Total left | 121 | 35.8 | 40.6 | 127 | 56.4 | 21.0 | 46 | 20.9 | 173 | 38.9 | |
| Greens | | | 5.4 | 19 | 8.4 | 0.8 | — | — | 19 | 4.3 | |
| Popular Democrats | | | 5.0 | 17 | 7.6 | 4.2 | 11 | 5.0 | 28 | 6.3 | |
| Hromada | | | 4.7 | 16 | 7.1 | 3.7 | 8 | 3.6 | 24 | 5.4 | |
| Social Democrats (united) | | | 4.0 | 14 | 6.2 | 1.9 | 3 | 1.4 | 17 | 3.8 | |
| Agrarians Together | | | 3.7 | — | — | 3.3 | 9 | 4.1 | 9 | 2.0 | |
| NEP | 4 | 1.2 | 1.9 | — | — | 1.3 | 1 | 0.5 | 1 | 0.2 | |
| Social Liberal Union (SLOn) | 2 | 0.6 | 1.2 | — | — | 1.2 | 1 | 0.5 | 1 | 0.2 | |
| Party of Reg. Revival | | | 0.9 | — | — | 0.5 | 1 | 0.5 | 1 | 0.2 | |
| Union | | | 0.9 | — | — | 0.9 | — | — | — | — | |
| Other centre | 6 | 1.8 | 2.4 | — | — | 0.9 | — | — | — | — | |
| Total centre | 12 | 3.6 | 30.9 | 66 | 29.3 | 16.9 | 41 | 18.6 | 98 | 22.0 | |
| Rukh | 20 | 5.9 | 9.4 | 32 | 14.2 | 6.3 | 14 | 6.4 | 46 | 10.3 | |
| Reforms and Order | | | 3.1 | — | — | 1.9 | 3 | 1.4 | 3 | 0.7 | |
| National Front | 15 | 4.4 | 2.7 | — | — | 2.7 | 5 | 2.3 | 5 | 1.1 | |
| Forward Ukraine | | | 1.7 | — | — | 0.6 | 2 | 0.9 | 2 | 0.4 | |
| Christian Democrats | | | 1.3 | — | — | 0.8 | 2 | 0.9 | 2 | 0.4 | |
| Fewer words | | | 0.8 | — | — | 0.3 | 1 | 0.5 | 1 | 0.2 | |
| Other right | 2 | 0.6 | 0.9 | — | — | 0.7 | — | — | — | — | |
| Total Right | 37 | 11.0 | 19.4 | 32 | 14.2 | 13.3 | 27 | 12.3 | 59 | 13.3 | |
| Independents | 168 | 49.7 | — | — | — | 46.9 | 111 | 50.5 | 111 | 24.9 | |
| All | 338 | 100 | 100 | 225 | 100 | 100 | 220 | 100 | 445 | 100 | |

¹ A total of 112 seats remained vacant following the March/April rounds of voting.

² A total of five single-member seats remained vacant following the elections.

Source: Database of Central and Eastern European Elections at www.essex.ac.uk/elections.

❖ NOTES

1 Research for this chapter was funded by Economic and Social Research Council Grants No. R000222380 and I.213252021.

2 For comparative Eastern European perspectives, see Funk and Mueller (1993), Rueschemeyer (1998*a*), Marsh (1996), and Buckley (1997).

3 These findings are not the result of incumbency bias (a factor which generates apparent gender effects in some other countries). The proportion of incumbents in the candidate pools for these elections was small, and though incumbency helped candidates, the over-representation of men in the 1990 and 1994 parliaments is not in either case a significant direct cause of the gender imbalance of subsequent parliaments: when re-calculated for non-incumbents alone, the figures cited above were nearly identical.

4 See Wilson and Bilous (1993), Bilous (1993), Bojcun (1995), Birch (1998).

5 The tendency of right-wing parties to select women in fewer numbers than their counterparts in other segments of the political spectrum is consonant with the findings of cross-national studies (Rule 1981, 1987; Norris 1985; Caul 1999).

6 Of the six female deputies elected in by-elections later in 1994, one was a Socialist and the remainders were independents at the time of their election.

7 In practice the minimum was bound to be higher for two reasons. First, in as much as not all parties cross the threshold, the list seats are distributed to parties that collectively represent less than the total number of list votes (65.8% in Ukraine in 1998), which will lead to the magnification of each party's seat share relative to its vote share. Second, individual candidates were allowed to stand both on lists and in single-member constituencies in these elections. If elected in a single-member constituency, they would be removed from the list and their place allocated to the next name down. Most parties had candidates removed from their lists in this way. The net result was that even the Social Democrats and the Progressive Socialists, who barely scraped past the threshold with 4.01 and 4.05% of the vote, respectively, each saw the top 17 names on their list enter parliament.

8 Of the 14 women elected from single-member districts in 1998, six were incumbents, of whom three were party leaders, and a fourth (Yulia Tymoshenko) was a well-known member of the leadership of the Hromada party. The remaining women were mostly either enterprise directors (4) or academics/teachers (3). The three successful independent candidates were all enterprise directors.

9 Turning the figures round, we find that 10.1% of those who won in the constituencies as party nominees were women—an even greater proportion than among those who won party list seats (9.3%).

10 The constituencies were selected through stratified random sampling from among Ukraine's 225 single-member seats. The aim was to interview all 483 candidates standing in these constituencies, as well as 326 candidates randomly selected from among the top 100 candidates on each of the 30 party lists. Interviews were carried out in the two weeks prior to the election, but unfortunately the interviewers experienced

considerable difficulties contacting the respondents. Of the 483 candidates in the constituencies only 172 were successfully interviewed (63.2% of those contacted, and 35.6% of the target sample). Of the 326 candidates in the list sample, 81 were successfully interviewed (45.3% of those contacted and 24.9% of the target sample). A total of 256 interviews were therefore conducted with 255 candidates (one respondent was selected as part of both the constituency and the list sample and was interviewed twice), an overall response rate of 32.8%, or 56.8% of those contacted. The response rate was disappointing, and there are reasons to believe that the candidates interviewed might not be in all respects representative of the total candidate corpus. But there is little grounds for suspecting that the sample would not be representative as far as gender differences are concerned. Further details of survey design and of the gender composition of the achieved sample are available from the author upon request.

11 The precise wording of the question was 'As you know, a new system of voting is going to be used in the elections this March. Each voter will have two votes, one for a candidate in your constituency, and one for a party list. Half of the deputies will be elected from the candidate ballots, and half from the party list ballots. Do you think this electoral system will be more or less democratic than the old one?'

12 The third option was 'I want to establish contacts'. This may have been a plausible motivation for standing, but only two candidates in our sample (both men) were willing to admit to it.

13 Of the 1738 candidates who stood both in single-member seats and on lists, 8.9% were women, as against 9.5% of single-member constituency candidates overall and 10.8% of the list candidates. Women thus had slightly fewer opportunities than men to contest both types of seat, but the difference is not great.

14 For an overview of the nomination practices of Ukraine's parties, see Wilson and Birch, n.d.

15 The descriptions of party programmes contained in this paragraph refer to the one-page programmes that were printed and distributed by the state free of charge at the time of the election and posted in polling stations. Although most of the parties also had longer programmes, these abridged versions are the texts that voters are most likely to have been familiar.

16 The survey referred to here employed a multi-stage clustered probability sample design. The population sampled consisted of adults eighteen years or older on 29 March 1998 (the day of the elections). The primary sampling units were the 25 constituencies employed in the candidate survey described above. For the total sample size of 2050, the response rate was 1741 or 85.0%. The data were weighted to compensate for under-representation of the western region in the achieved sample. Further details of the survey design and execution are available from the author upon request.