A STUDY OF IDENTITY CHANGE IN THE EASTERN BORDERLANDS OF UKRAINE

By

Peter William Rodgers

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ABSTRACT

Since Ukraine gained independence in 1991, issues of nation and identity have become highly debated topics in Ukrainian academia, 'politics' and society as well as being ever-expanding topics of interest for Western social scientists. This thesis aims to examine the ways in which identity change in Ukraine is being contested at a variety of different levels. The thesis explores not only how national identity is being (re)constructed by the Ukrainian state, but also the processes by which it is consequently negotiated through society. The thesis relies on primarily qualitative research methods, which were chosen so as to enable the researcher to uncover and unpack the complexities within the processes of identity change.

The thesis argues that whilst much academic attention concerning issues of identity in post-Soviet Ukraine has focused on the markers of ethnicity and language, in fact this has been exaggerated and misplaced. Instead, the thesis advocates a regional approach, engaging with how Ukraine's regional differences affect nation building processes. The thesis critically engages with the stereotypical view of Ukraine's regional diversity as a simplistic 'West versus East' divide. In particular, the thesis attempts to deconstruct the concept of 'Eastern Ukraine' by choosing three study areas, all adjacent to the Ukrainian/Russian border as ideal sites for comparative in-depth research, and in doing so examines how individuals in each of these areas engage with the politics of identity. In such a fashion, the thesis aims to identify and examine not just regional differences, but focuses on the meanings that individuals attach to these differences and in doing so, further our understanding of the dynamics of identity change across not only Ukraine, but across the whole post-Soviet space. The thesis finds that there are subtle nuances within and between the three study areas, with individuals in each area, providing 'their' own understanding of the place of their region within the wider processes of nation building across Ukraine. Furthermore, regarding Ukrainian state attempts to (re)construct national identity in the educational system, the results of the thesis demonstrate clearly how in practice at the micro-level, these attempts are constantly in the process of contestation and negotiation, with individuals themselves choosing which parts of the 'contents' of state-led nation building processes to accept or reject.

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For my parents,

Thanks for everything

NOTE ON TRANSLITERATION

The thesis uses the Modified Library of Congress system for the transliteration of Russian and Ukrainian names and titles. Place names and other titles are given in the Ukrainian language, unless Russian language sources are being quoted, apart from Kiev (translated from the Russian language), as this remains the most commonly used version in the English language.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

KGB	*Komitet gosudarstvennoi bezopasnosti* (The Committee of State Security)
KPU	*Kommunistychna Partiya Ukraini* (The Communist Party of Ukraine)
NEC	National Education Systems
NKVD	*Narodnyi Kommissariat vnutrennix del* (The People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs)
OUN	*Orhanizatsiya Ukrains'kykh Natsionalistiv* (Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists)
SDPU-o	*Sotsial-Demokratychna Partiya Ukraini* (*ob'yednana*) (The Social-Democratic Party of Ukraine–united)
SPU	*Sotsialistychna Partiya Ukraini* (The Socialist Party of Ukraine)
UNA	*Ukrains'ka Narodna Respublika* (The Ukrainian People's Republic)
UPA	*Ukrains'ka Povstans'ka Armiya* (Ukrainian Insurgent Army)
ZUNR	*Zakhidna Ukrains'ka Narodna Respublika* (West Ukrainian People's Republic)
ZYU	*Za yedinuyu Ukrainu* (For One Ukraine)

CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

This thesis seeks to explore the processes of identity change which have been occurring across Ukraine in the post-1991 period. Rather than seeing national identity as something given, preordained or constant, instead the thesis respects the fluidity, dynamism and ever-evolving nature of national identities change in post-1991 Ukraine, where simultaneous economic, cultural, social and political transformations are taking place. For the purposes of this research, a multidimensional approach is utilised which explores ways that national identity is not only (re)constructed by the Ukrainian state, but also how it is contested and negotiated at a variety of different levels by different actors.

1.1 The Research Gap

Regarding the issues of national identity and identity change, much research has been undertaken concerning Ukraine by both Ukrainian and Western academics, particularly in the post-Soviet period. However, whilst much of the results of this body of thought are illuminating and have enhanced our understanding of the issues in hand, nevertheless there are some shortcomings and 'gaps' which this thesis seeks to address. In particular, much research examining what is the chief determinant in defining self-identification in Ukraine, has tended to concentrate on the role of ethnicity and language use. As demonstrated in chapter Three, whilst much of this research is useful, nevertheless such attention paid to these two single determinants has been to the expense of a thorough evaluation of the role of the region in individuals' self-identification processes. In particular, there needs to be a better understanding of not just the role of such determinants in isolation, but a further engagement into how contours such as ethnicity, language use and region interact, crosscut and reinforce each other in a whole myriad of ways across Ukraine.

Thus, this thesis takes a **'regional'** approach to the examination of identity change across Ukraine. In particular, whilst much academic attention during the post-1991 period has been applied to the so-called 'west-east' divide across Ukraine, this research seeks to uncover and unpack such conceptualisations. In particular, this research seeks to further understanding of the the meta-region of 'Eastern Ukraine'. To do this, a comparative approach is taken, in which three areas, adjacent to the Russian-Ukrainian state border are chosen for the location of empirical research. In these areas 'mixed' Russian-Ukrainian identities exist today,

resulting from the erosion of linguistic and cultural boundaries between Russians and Ukrainians under Tsarist and more particularly Soviet 'russification' policies.[1] Such identities with a lack of historical consciousness and a weak sense of difference from Russia present a great challenge to the Ukrainian state. Much academic attention has devoted itself to examining how national identity is constructed, with the focus being on what it means to be 'Ukrainian'. This research assesses not only ways that the Ukrainian state aims to make Ukraine's population understand 'who they are' but also to understand simultaneously 'who they are not'. Thus, the thesis aims to examine the importance of the 'other', namely Russia in the identity politics of Ukraine.

Whilst the Ukrainian state has many different 'tools' through which it can aim to (re) construct national identity across Ukraine, this thesis has chosen to concentrate on how identity change has been occurring in the realm of education.[2] This thesis explores whether and how the state has used this 'tool' to achieve its goal of a unified Ukrainian identity and in particular reformulating the interpretation of historical relations with Russia. It also studies to what extent central policies have been adopted or adapted at the local state level. It takes into account how national identity is constructed. Further, it looks not only at official rhetoric and policy but also at its subsequent implementation. Thus, this research is innovative, while recognising the importance of 'top-down' processes for identity construction, in particular the role of the state, propagated by existing models, it examines such processes as part of a wider interaction between 'top-down' and 'bottom-up' processes.[3] This responds to calls to understand how popular notions of identity are produced through, against and within state discourse.[4] The Soviet practice of fixed attribution of 'passport ethnicity' failed and still fails today to capture the enormous degree of flexibility and identity in terms of both language and ethnic identities in areas such as the Russian-Ukrainian borderlands.[5] Thus, this research responds to calls for an understanding of the multi-layered, dynamic, and ever changing nature of identity particularly in the context of the vast political and societal transformations

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[1] Pirie, P.S., "National Identity and Politics in Southern and Eastern Ukraine", in *Europe-Asia Studies*, 48(7), 1996, pp.1079-1104.
[2] For a thorough overview of the use of education as a tool of the state see, Bourdieu, P., "Rethinking the State: Genesis and Structure of the Bureaucratic Field", *Sociological Theory*, 12.1, 1994, p.18.
[3] Brubaker, R., "Nationhood and the National Question in the Soviet Union and Post-Soviet Eurasia: An Institutionalist Account", *Theory and Society* 23, pp.47-78; Breuilly, J., *Nationalism and the State,* Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1982, p.7.
[4] Jackson, L. "Identity, Language, and Transformation in Eastern Ukraine: A Case Study of Zaporizhzhia", in Kuzio, T., *Contemporary Ukraine: Dynamics of Post-Soviet Transformation*, Armonk, NY: M.E.Sharpe, 1998, pp.99-113.
[5] Chizhikova, L., "Russko-ukrainskoe pogranich'e: istoriia i sud'by traditsionno-bytovoi kul'tury (XIX-XX vv.)", Moscow: *Nauka*, 1988, pp.14-69.

taking place in post-Soviet societies.[6] In terms of methodology, this thesis is based mainly on qualitative research methods. Much research has been conducted across the post-Soviet world in general and Ukraine in particular using large-scale opinion polls and surveys.[7] The results of such work have provided a clearer general picture of changes taking place. However, there is a clear need for more in-depth qualitative research at the micro level which can provide a greater understanding of the nuances within the more wider societal processes.

1.2 Research Questions

This thesis has approached the task of examining the politics of identity in Ukraine by attempting to examine how individuals subjectively attempt to answer three overarching questions. Regarding the first question, ***'where are we from'*** the thesis has investigated how 'historical' identities are affecting wider national identities across Ukraine at a variety of different levels by different actors. The second question, ***'where are we'*** has necessitated a thorough examination of the importance of the 'regional' factor within processes of identity change across Ukraine. In particular, the thesis chose to undertake empirical research in three study areas in Ukraine's eastern borderlands, in order to gain a picture of how individuals view the importance of spatial politics across Ukraine. Finally, the third question, ***'who we are not'*** seeks to explore to what extent Russia is perceived as Ukraine's real 'other' in the politics of identity. Whilst these three questions provide an overarching framework for the thesis, below are outlined more specific research questions which this thesis addresses.

- What kind of nation-building policies have the central authorities introduced in education?

Focus here is on the field of history, exploring to what degree a revised, Ukrainian historical narrative has evolved in school textbooks across Ukraine since 1991. Moreover, this textbook analysis examines not only key events in Ukraine's history, but also to what degree Russia is represented as an 'other'.

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[6] Miller, A.H., Klobucar, T.F., Reisinger, W.M. and Hesli,V.L., "Social Identities in Russia, Ukraine, and Lithuania", *Post-Soviet Affairs* 14, 1998, pp.248-286.
[7] Arel, D. and Wilson, A., "The Ukrainian parliamentary elections", *RFE/RL Research Report*, 3(26), 1994, pp.6-17.

- How are these centrally constructed narratives received at the regional and local levels in the three chosen study areas in the eastern borderlands of Ukraine?

This section involves the reception of the state narrative at a variety of different local scales. Firstly, there is a thorough analysis of regional history and geography textbooks, utilised in schools in the three study areas. In particular, the focus here is to assess to what extent such regional narratives seek to accelerate or dilute central state narratives or even to reject them. Secondly, the role of school history teachers in this process is explored, questioning whether they are simply the passive 'transmitters' of information or whether they actively negotiate and contest the state narrative. Finally, the thesis examines how have schoolchildren in the three study areas negotiated the state historical narrative?

- What importance is attached to the 'region' in the three study areas?

Here, the study seeks to understand how both schoolteachers and schoolchildren perceive the spatial politics of Ukraine, studying the importance of their 'region'. In particular, attention focuses on perceived differences between 'eastern' and 'western' Ukraine and also to what degree is Russia seen as an 'other', a foreign country, by analysing opinions concerning the usefulness of the Russian/Ukrainian state border.

1.3 Locating the study

This thesis can be placed within the field of 'area studies'. Within this field, the thesis forms part of a growing field of academic study, specialising on the post-Soviet world. Within this field, the opening of borders and reduced restrictions to travel and undertake research since the fall of the USSR in 1991 have necessarily led to a vast new area of potential academic scrutiny. Within 'post-Soviet studies', this thesis finds itself within two fields. Firstly, the thesis adds to a growing volume of work studying nationalism and national identity across the region. Secondly, the thesis finds itself within the field of 'Ukrainian studies'. Ukraine was chosen for the object of enquiry of this thesis for many reasons. First of all, the author had previously gained an interest in Ukraine during his earlier intellectual development. Subsequently on completion of a Master's course, the author had spent two years teaching English in Kiev. During this time spent in Ukraine, the vast potential and need for academic

Map 1: The territorial-administrative structure of post-Soviet Ukraine



Source: Solchanyk, R., Ukraine and Russia: The Post-Soviet Transition, Rowman and Littlefield, Oxford, 2001.

enquiry became clear to the author. This understanding formed a backdrop for an appreciation of the vast importance of Ukraine for the future development of the pan-European space. Whilst during the 1990s, to the 'west' many of Ukraine's neighbours were busy preparing themselves for a 'return to Europe' and inclusion into the European Union, Ukraine was left to decide for itself its place in the geopolitical space of post-Soviet Eurasia. Furthermore, internally there commenced simultaneous processes of state and nation-building.

Furthermore, whilst this research is found within the field of 'area studies', intellectually many of the core areas of enquiry within the study are part of the school of 'cultural politics'.[8] In this field of academic interest, great attention is placed not on examining political change in an institutional context, but instead on seeing how issues within the culture of any specific country, group or organisation are actually open to constant negotiation and contestation. Culture is understood here as a contested space and cultural politics concerns itself with how different societal groups vie for the power to define meanings. Thus, the study of cultural politics is *per se* a study of the politics of inclusion and exclusion, in which different groups struggle to 'fix meanings'. This struggle involving fixing, (re)defining and legitimating highlights how identities are constantly being (re)formed and fought over. In the realm of education, therefore, there is a constant 'politics' being played out, with different voices trying to be heard, and trying to have 'their' ideas utilised as 'official' state policy. In this respect, this thesis's examination of how the Ukrainian state is aiming to (re)construct a sense of Ukrainian national identity and then how such portrayals and representations are actually contested through society is a clear example of cultural politics being played out in the real world.

1.4 Thesis Structure

This thesis is structured by way of a set of chapters. The general content of each of these is outlined briefly below.

Chapter Two aims to provide the conceptual and theoretical underpinnings of the research. In particular, it commences with a wide-ranging discussion of theories of the nation and national identity. The second half of the chapter centres on debates regarding education as a

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[8] For a sound overview of 'cultural politics', see Jordan, G. and Weedon, C., *Cultural Politics, Class, Gender, Race and the Post-Modern World*, Oxford: Blackwell, 1995.

'tool' of socialisation and its importance in the construction and contestation of national identity.

Chapter Three places the theoretical background concerning national identity contained in chapter Two onto the contemporary context of post-Soviet Ukraine. In particular, it attempts to 'map' identities in Ukraine, arguing that while academic debate has focused on the importance of ethnic and linguistic differences across Ukraine, such assumptions have been demonstrated to be misplaced. Instead, the chapter posits a thorough engagement with the 'regional' differences across Ukraine, and their effects on the state's nation-building policies.

Chapter Four places such 'mappings' of identity within the wider context of the conceptualisation of identity change across the post-Soviet space. The chapter critiques existing models, which place too much attention on the role of the state in moulding identity change in a 'top-down' fashion, whilst simultaneously failing to take into account the dynamic nature of identity change. Instead, the chapter proposes an adjustment and adaptation of such frameworks so as to formulate a more interactive model. The application of such a model allows for the investigation of not only how the politics of identity are espoused at the state level, but how they are actually negotiated and perceived by sub-state actors at a variety of different levels. Such a framework forms the basis for the empirical investigations of the contemporary situation in Ukraine, laid out in the later chapters of this study, which examine the implementation of educational policies at the regional level and the reactions to them and their impact on the wider politics of identity across Ukraine.

Chapter Five examines the significance of regional diversity across Ukraine. It is argued that owing to the diversity of historical legacies of many regions of modern-day Ukraine, regionalism is a far more complex phenomenon than a simple, dichotomous 'west versus east' divide. The inherent peculiarity of the Ukrainian version of regionalism is not that it represents a danger of imminent state disintegration in the face of secessionist claims or a split along the river *Dnipro*, but rather the challenge it presents in creating an all-embracing modern, civic Ukrainian national identity. In an attempt to move beyond the standardised perception of Ukraine, neatly divided between 'west' and 'east', the chapter took as a point of departure an eight-region framework, which was further modified by the author to create a framework of ten regions. Furthermore, in an effort to illuminate the inherent nuances and subtleties within and between regions in Ukraine, this chapter aimed to deconstruct the

concept of 'Eastern Ukraine' as a unitary, homogenous space, assessing how it relates to the ten region model. Three oblasts, all situated adjacent to the Ukrainian-Russian border, are chosen as ideal 'sites' for the focus of the study. Here local, in-depth qualitative research took place, examining people's perceptions of regional divisions at the micro level and the meanings attached to them.

Chapter Six engages with the methodological and ethical issues encountered during the thesis. The whole research project is viewed as a dialogic, iterative process which has developed over time within different contexts. Its parts therefore consist of, not just this final written thesis but also research questions and time spent preparing the fieldwork, accessing the 'field' and experiencing fieldwork, analysing 'data', writing up the data and finally the dissemination of information.

Chapter Seven assesses how history textbooks are utilised by the state as 'tools' to introduce school-children to key historical episodes around which a modern Ukrainian national identity can be molded. The study aims to examine to what extent, since the gaining of independence in 1991 has there been a crystallisation of a single state-sponsored historical narrative in Ukraine? Secondly, the study aims not only to look at how the Ukrainian nation is presented but to examine to what degree Russia is presented as a distinct 'other'. Finally, the chapter assesses to what degree there has been a standardisation of history textbooks used in schools across the whole of Ukraine or to what extent regional variations have continued to exist across the country.

Chapter Eight focuses on 'ordinary people's' perceptions of Ukraine's past. Whilst the previous chapter provided an in-depth exploration of how the Ukrainian state is espousing an 'official' historical narrative through a set of school history textbooks, this chapter examines how this state-sponsored historical narrative is actually *negotiated and contested at the local level* in the three study areas. The results of qualitative in-depth interviews with university lecturers, school history teachers and directors are used to examine to what extent the central message of the history textbooks is clearly transferred or whether any dilution, contradictions or open avoidance of certain issues is occurring. The chapter continues with an analysis of group interviews with school children. Here, particular attention is placed upon how the historical narrative is 'perceived' at the local level, and to what extent such perceptions

coincide with the content of the historical narrative. A thematic approach is adopted concentrating on the key issues, which arose during the fieldwork.

Chapter Nine focuses attention on the importance of the regional factor in Ukraine's identity politics and secondly that of Russia as Ukraine's 'other'. The chapter commences with an assessment of regional historical narratives, used in Ukrainian secondary schools, exploring to what extent they complement or contradict the state's 'official' narrative. This is achieved by a content analysis of various 'regional' geography and history textbooks. In such a fashion, one can gauge to what extent the view of education elites in the regions actually corresponds to the 'official' view of Ukraine's history, laid out by the centre in Kiev. Secondly, empirical data generated during fieldwork in the study areas is utilised to examine how individuals reflect on the importance of the 'region' in Ukraine today and also to what extent Russia is perceived as the 'other' in the identity politics of Ukraine.

Chapter Ten attempts to draw together the various strands of this thesis and make some concluding remarks. From the onset, the key findings of the thesis are outlined. Subsequently there is an examination of how the results of this thesis work back into the theoretical and conceptual debates within academic study of the post-Soviet space in general and Ukraine in particular. The chapter concludes with an evaluation of the limitations within the whole research process and finally a discussion of future research trajectories.

CHAPTER TWO: THEORETICAL AND CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORKS FOR RESEARCHING IDENTITY CHANGE

2.1 Introduction

Within the social sciences, national identity, nationalism, the nation and nationhood are heavily debated concepts. To fully appreciate and make sense of identity changes taking place in Ukraine, a wide body of theory must be addressed. This chapter provides the more general conceptual and theoretical underpinnings of the research. The nation-state is taken as the point of departure.[9] From here debates surrounding the 'ethnic' and 'civic' versions of nationalism are discussed, in particular highlighting how they emerged with the varied paths of national development across Europe. This provides the backdrop for a wider discussion concerning ways that the nation is elucidated. How such theories are applied to the post-Soviet and in particular to the Ukrainian context will form the basis of Chapter Four.

The debate over what constitutes a nation is reviewed with an evaluation of different schools of thought including the primordialists, modernists, neo-primordialists and the constructivists. From here it is demonstrated how ideas of the nation as discourse have become prevalent in the social sciences in the 1990s. It is suggested that attempts at seeing the nation discursively and as dynamic are particularly useful for understanding identity change in the post-Soviet space. It is argued that nationhood cannot effectively be defined objectively on cultural or social structural grounds. Nations are seen to exist only to the extent that the members understand themselves through the discursive framework of national identity. The second half of the chapter centres on debates regarding education as a 'tool' of socialisation and its importance in the construction and contestation of national identity.

Nation-state

The nation-state is based on the desire for the cultural and political to be in alignment with each other. Every nation is seen to have the right to demand a state to express its nationhood and every state should be based on a nation. If the nation does not exist, then the state should build one.[10] What sorts of nation-building processes should be taken raise the question

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[9] The nation-state is defined here as "an ideal where all self-governing units – states – correspond with cultural distinctive units – nations". See McCrone, D., *The Sociology of Nationalism*, London: Routledge, 1988, p.9.
[10] Parekh, B., "Ethnocentricity of the nationalist discourse", *Nations and Nationalism*, 1(1), 1995, pp.25-52.

concerning what sort of nation is to be found within the nation-state. The nation-state can be based around a nation seen in *ethnic* terms as a cultural entity, held together by a common language, traditions, folklore, mores and religion. This involves the belief that each ethnic group has the right to organise a state of its own. Here, nation-building projects will involve the symbols and traditions of the titular nation becoming equated with the symbols and traditions of the state.[11] The state will strive to create a high correspondence between the ethnic and the political 'nation'- by way of assimilation processes and/or the emigration of minorities.

Conversely, the nation can be viewed in *political* terms as the sum of all citizens or inhabitants of a state. Here, the nation is held together by a common territory and government authority. Civic nation-building projects seek to secure the allegiance of all inhabitants, without however encroaching on any one individual's cultural distinctiveness. Political traditions and symbols are sought which are common for all ethnic groups, inhabiting the state.

2.2 Conceptualising the nation

Primordialists

This school argues that nations are primordial entities, which are embedded in human nature and history and can be identified through distinctive cultures expressed through language, culture and religion. Thus, children are born into national communities and identities are 'fixed'.[12] Primordialists see humanity as naturally divided into discrete nations and everyone belonging to one specific nation. Ethnic nations are perceived as social groups that exist prior to and independently from particular states. Nations offer individuals a sense of unconditional belonging akin to that characteristic of pre-industrial local communities. Individuals do not have to fulfil any qualifications for membership other than having a specific ancestry and culture supposedly shared by all members of the nation. Therefore, ancestry and culture are the organising principles around which boundaries are drawn.

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[11] By 'titular' nation, I mean the ethnic group that has given the state its name - the French in France.
[12] For a broader view of 'primordialism' sees Shils, E., "Primordial, Personal, Sacred, and Civil Ties", *British Journal of Sociology,* 8, June 1957, pp.130-145.

Primordialists are critiqued from the modernist or instrumentalist perspective. For example, Ella and Coughlan contend that the fact that primordial attachments are 'given', *a priori* makes the concept inflexible and therefore vulnerable to the host of studies which have shown that ethnicity rests on a variable definition of self and others.[13] Here therefore, one witnesses the use of modernists of 'othering' that is to say defining themselves by what they are not, a key element of the study of national identities which is further elaborated upon later in this chapter. Furthermore, the primordial school is criticised for the fact that in one case a particular cultural trait distinguishes one nation from another, yet in another case, it does not. Take the example of language. Why is it that in Spain, language is a crucial factor in defining membership of a nation whilst in Switzerland it is not?

Modernists

Modernists see the nation as a distinctly modern phenomenon, primarily an instrument of the socio-economic development of state building. The nation is not seen as organic or primordial, but rather as a social construct, often the result of social engineering projects by political elites within the modern state. Modernists believe that nationalism is a cultural and political ideology of modernity, a crucial part of the monumental shift from traditional to modern societies, within which the modern state plays a crucial role. As Llobera notes, "The nation, as a culturally defined community, is the highest symbolic value of modernity: it has been endowed with a quasi-sacred character equalled only by religion. In fact, this quasi-sacred character derives from religion."[14]

The nation is viewed as a community of people who inhabit a common territory and are citizens of a common state. The nation is created through allegiance to specific political values and institutions rather than through a sense of belonging to an organic ethnic group. In sum, whilst boundaries within the more ethnic, primordial conceptions based boundary construction around ethnicity, modernists see the boundaries of a nation defined through territory and politics. The modernist school has a number of different approaches. Yet, there remains an underlying belief that nations and nationalism are essentially modern constructs.

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[13] Eller, J.D. and Coughlan, R.M., "The poverty of Primordialism: The Demystification of Ethnic Attachments", *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, vol.16, no.2, 1993, p.189.
[14] Llobera, J., *The God of Modernity: The Development of Nationalism in Western Europe*, Oxford: Berg, 1994, p.86.

Amongst key modernist thinkers, the above basic principles are shared, however within this broad school of thought, there are important differences, with certain thinkers arguing for the prominence of certain factors. For example, Kedourie was the first to attempt to deconstruct nationalism and move away from the essentialist notions of the nation.[15] Using a more *sociological* approach, Kedourie explained the rise and spread of nationalism by drawing on factors such as institutional change, conflicts over social values and inter-generation conflict.

Moreover, another significant thinker within this school is Gellner who believes that nationalism is largely a mechanism for the construction of modern *industrialised* societies. He argued that the modern state needed a literate, culturally homogenous population to meet the needs of the division of labour of modern industrial production.[16] Gellner provides a strong attack on the essentialist strands within primordialism.

> Nations as a rational, God-given way of classifying men, as an inherent though long delayed political destiny, are a myth; nationalism, which sometimes takes pre-existing cultures and turns them into nations, sometimes invents them, and often obliterates pre-existing cultures- that is reality for better or worse.[17]

Furthermore, modernist writers such as Hobsbawm place emphasis on *political* factors. He argues that nations and nationalism are thoroughly modern concepts, brought about by the development of the modern state.[18] Nationalism, born in the time of the Enlightenment derives its legitimacy from the will of the people rather than from God. Hobsbawm argues that nations do not make states, in fact it is the other way around.[19] Hobsbawm moves forward from Gellner's view that nationalism actually creates –imagines - nations. In fact nations are ideological constructs of the state. The explanatory legitimacy runs from the political (the state) to the cultural (the nation).

Finally, Breuilly aims to show that nationalism is always political. Nationalism is said to be built on three assumptions: that a nation has a distinct character, political identity and loyalty to the nation take precedence over other interests, and the nation should have political

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[15] Kedourie, E., *Nationalism*, London: Hutchinson, 1960.
[16] Ibid.
[17] Gellner, E., *Nations and Nationalism*, Oxford: Blackwell, 1983, pp.48-49.
[18] Hobsbawm, E.J., *Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth and Reality*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990.
[19] Ibid, p.10.

sovereignty in the form of a separate state.[20] He shifts the focus from the requirements of industrial capitalism to those of the modern state. By defining nationalism as 'a form of politics', he argues for its usefulness for the 'objective of obtaining and using state power'. A political movement hoping to obtain control of the state requires 'co-ordination, mobilization and legitimacy'. Nationalism serves as a powerful tool for these purposes.[21]

Neo-primordialists

Neo-primordialists, such as Anthony Smith have tried to bridge the gap between primordial and modernist conceptions of the nation.[22] Rejecting crude primordialism, he accepts the modern nature of nations. However, he insists that nations have long prehistories which have evolved out of ethnic cores. The so-called 'ethnies' consist of a set of myths, symbols and cultural practices. Such common ethnic roots are required to integrate socially and culturally diverse groups. Llobera criticizes the modernist idea that nations simply arrived as a result of the Enlightenment, by saying

> The idea that nationalism is invented, so dear to Hobsbawm, Gellner and other contemporary observers, is patently untrue. Modern nationalisms are re-creations of medieval realities; in fact, they can only be truly successful if they are rooted in the medieval past, even if the links with it may often be tortuous and twisted.[23]

Neo-primordialists believe that modernists over-emphasise the shift between traditionalism and modernity and the impact of industry and bureaucracy in shaping the modern state. In doing so, they necessarily fail to take into account the continuity of the ethnic roots of the nation. Smith's definition of the nation conflates both civic and ethnic elements. He sees the nation as a social group, which combines the hallmarks of ethnic nations, common history and descent, with the possession of common citizenship rights and obligations, a common territory and economic system.[24]

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[20] Breuilly, J., *Nationalism and the State*, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1993, p.7.
[21] Breuilly, J., *Nationalism and the State*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985, pp.1-2.
[22] Smith, A., "The myth of the 'modern nation' and the myths of nations", *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 11(1), 1988.
[23] Llobera, J., *The God of* Modernity..., op.cit., p.86.
[24] For a more in-depth appraisal of Smith's ideas, see Nieguth, T., "Beyond dichotomy: concepts of the nation and the distribution of membership", *Nations and Nationalism* 5(2), 1999, pp.155-173.

Within the debate between modernists and neo-primordialists, both sides have strengths and weaknesses. The modernists demonstrate the connections between the rise of nationalism with processes of social and economic change and in particular the political interests generated by modernisation. Yet modernists fail to realise the importance of culture and how it can become a site for political contestation. Culture is defined here objectively as the customs, habits, traditions, values, beliefs, ways of life, manner of thinking and behaviour in a community; subjectively, as a feeling of belonging to a society which shares the same history.[25] As Schlesinger notes, Gellner assumes that once the dominance of the 'high' national culture has been attained, then there will be no problems in maintaining its superiority.[26] Gellner, by assuming that all industrial societies are homogenous, fails to take into account how within society, many different groups who have various identities and cultures may conflict or compete with the national 'high' culture. Modernists by focussing extensively on the role of nationalism in pressing forward the shift from traditional to modern societies offer scant explanation for the expressions of nationalism, which have emerged in recent times, particularly since the demise of communism.

The neo-primordialists chief strength is to recognise the cultural dimensions of nationalism, highlighting the emotional power of a nation's history. However, allied with this comes the criticism that little explanation of the discontinuities between the past and the present is provided. Smith gives central importance to the genesis of the nation. Yet while it may be true that many nations did form around an ethnically homogenous population core, it does not follow from this that they must continually be defined in ethnic terms. Moreover, Smith's focus on the static, though historically developed, attributes of an *ethnie* fails to realise that the ethnic and national identity of a group is highly influenced by the dynamic interplay between the ethnic group in question and other significant groups.

Constructivists

Within the constructivist school of thought, Anderson's evocation of nations as 'imagined communities' moves away from the primordial belief in the basis of the nation as race,

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[25] See Keating, M., *Nations against the State: The new politics of nationalism in Quebec, Catalonia and Scotland*, Palgrave: New York, 2001, p.10.
[26] Schlesinger, P. "On national identity: some conceptions and misconceptions criticized", *Social Science Information* 26(2), 1987, pp. 219-264.

language or geography.[27] Instead Anderson points to the *creative* contingent character of national identity, as well as to its adaptability to different social and political contexts within the modern world. He supports the view that one can differentiate communities from each other, not by way of their authenticity but how they are imagined

> Because the members of even the smallest nations will never know most of their fellow members, meet them, or even hear of them: yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion... The nation is imagined as *limited* because even the largest of them, has finite, if elastic, boundaries, beyond which lie other nations. No nation imagines itself coterminous with mankind... It is imagined as 'sovereign' because the concept was born in age in which the Enlightenment and Revolution were destroying the legitimacy of the divinely and ordained, hierarchical dynastic realm... The gauge and emblem of this freedom is the sovereign state.[28]

Anderson argues that during the Enlightenment the development of industry and commerce, combined with the opening up of markets, led to increased urbanization and social mobility. Such factors, together with the rise of a vernacular and the spread of 'print capitalism' made people perceive and 'imagine' themselves to be members of a national community. How the nation comes to be *represented* and how its origins and claims are narrated has led to a shift from the previous structural and materialist analyses of nationalism to approaches which stress meaning and the effects of a sense of nationality.

This shift has occurred in an era of increased awareness of the problems of grand narratives in the social sciences. Recent writers have attempted to understand nationalism more in terms of its *dynamism*.[29] There has been a shift to 'deconstruct' the way in which nationalist discourse previously saw nations as unified, culturally homogenous communities. Brubaker in his study of the recent history of nationalism in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union explains how particular representations of nations are being institutionalized as part of a process of nation-building.[30] In such a way he attempts to portray how public and private life is 'nationalised'. Similarly Billig is interested in the narrativist accounts of history as a means for managing a publicly rendered national memory.[31] Billig has drawn attention to the

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[27] Anderson, B. *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, London: Verso, 1991.
[28] Ibid, pp. 15-16.
[29] See Hall, S., "The Question of Cultural Identity", in Hall, S. et al, *Modernity: An Introduction to Modern Societies*, Cambridge Mass and Oxford: Blackwell, 1996, p.612.
[30] Brubaker, R., *Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.
[31] Billig, M., *Banal Nationalism,* London: SAGE Publications, 1995.

'banality' of nationalism so that, "the flags melt into the background as 'our' particular world is experienced as *the* world".[32] Billig's account is useful, as it does not view nationalism as simply a top-down process. The everyday affirmation of national identity is an active process, reinforced by the banal symbolism.

Both Brubaker and Billig have been strongly criticized by Smith, who argues that both have a fundamental weakness in their lack of a historical framework.[33] Whilst this criticism has some value, Billig is more concerned to understand how nationalism has managed to remain a social force for so long. Billig argues that instead of trying to understand the factors, which cause the rise of nationalism, it is worthwhile turning our attention towards the national societies in which we live. He argues that the 'nation' is a basic tool used as a means to give meaning in the social world.[34]

Calhoun also has argued that nationalism and the modern sense of nation cannot be understood entirely in terms of the cultural distinctiveness of various nations, nor of the modern states that have given nationalism its most distinctive political significance.[35] He instead argues that the key is to focus on nation as a *form*, and not merely on the *content* of national identities, denoting the need to constitute nations *discursively*. Such theoretical work has been supplemented by empirical studies, such as Verdery's case study looking at the use of 'national imagery' in Ceaucescu's Romania in the 1980s.[36] If a nation is an 'imagined community', a mental construct, a complex set of ideas containing at least the defining elements of collective unity, of boundaries and autonomy, then this image can only be real if individuals believe in it and identify with it. Cohen rejects the assumption that ethnic indentities are bounded and from this it is implied that boundaries are fixed. Instead he focuses attention on the self-conscious expression of identity which is constantly being negotiated and renegotiated between individuals.[37] This 'imagined community' becomes instilled in the minds of the masses by the way of *discourse.*

> National culture is a discourse, a way of constructing meanings which influences and organizes both our actions and our conceptions of ourselves...National cultures construct identities by producing meanings

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[32] Billig, M., *Banal Nationalism,* op.cit., p.50.
[33] Smith, A.D., *Nationalism and modernism*, London: Routledge, 1998, p.225.
[34] Billig, M., *Banal Nationalism*, op.cit., p.23.
[35] Calhoun, C., *Nationalism*, Minneapolis, MN: University of Minneapolis Press, 1997.
[36] Verdery, K., *National Identity under Socialism: Identity and Cultural Politics in Ceaucescu's Romania*, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1995.
[37] Cohen, A.P., "Personal nationalism: a Scottish view of some rites, rights and wrongs", *American Ethnologist*, 23(4), 1996, p.120.

> about the 'nation' with which we can identify; these are contained in the stories which are told about it, memories which connect its present with its past, and imagines which are constructed of it.[38]

Bhabha conceptualises the nation as a process of cultural narration. Whilst the origin of the nation is obscure, great weight is afforded to the power of the nation to mobilise senses of identity.[39]

2.3 National identity - 'routes' rather than 'roots'

Whilst for nationalists and racists, identity is seen as given and stable, for critics of such essentialism identities must be seen as far more *relational* and always existing in discourse. As Graham Smith notes, we need to look at the 'processes' by which each 'group' represents the 'other'.[40] National identity is thus seen through a prism of negation. It is dynamic, defined by the rejection and exclusion of groups deemed not to belong. Triandafyllion underscores the need for scholars to examine more closely the role of the 'other' in national identification. She argues that the history of all nations is marked by the presence of 'significant others' who have influenced the development of the identity of the 'in-group'.[41] The importance of the role of the 'other' in identity construction has its origins in the work of Bakhtin and Levinas. Bakhtin, the great Soviet linguist and literary theorist calls for the ontological need to encompass 'otherness' in the construction of order. Traditional dialectical modes of analysis of identity formation are rejected in favour of a dialogical model, which respects difference. In his theory of dialogism, the very capacity to have consciousness is based on 'otherness'. For Bakhtin, communication therefore is essential for the functioning of the self,

> I achieve self-consciousness, I become myself only by revealing myself to another, through another, with another's help. The most important acts, constitutive of self-consciousness, are determined by their relation to another consciousness (a 'thou'). Cutting oneself off, closing oneself off, those are the basic reasons for loss of self... It turns out that every internal experience occurs on the border, it comes across another, and this essence resides in this intense encounter... The very being of man (both internal and external) is a *profound communication. To be* means to *communicate*...To be means to be for the other, and through him, for oneself. Man has no internal sovereign territory; he is all and always

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[38] Cohen, A.P., "Personal nationalism: a Scottish view of some rites, rights and wrongs", op.cit., p.613.
[39] Bhabha, H., (ed.), *Nation and Narration*, London: Routledge, 1990.
[40] Smith, G., "Post-Colonialism and Borderland Identities", in Smith, G., Vivien, L., Bohr, A. and Allworth, E., *Nation-Building in the Post-Soviet Borderlands. The Politics of National Identities*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998, pp.1-20
[41] Triandafyllion, A., "National Identity and the 'other'", *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, vol.21, no.4, July 1998.

> on the boundary; looking within himself, he looks *in the eyes of the other* or *through the eyes of the other*... I cannot do without the other; I cannot become myself without the other; I must find myself in the other, finding the other in me (in mutual reflection and perception).[42]

These thoughts have important implications, pointing to the limitations of the metaphor of a 'boundary'. As Bakhtin notes,

> One must not, however, imagine the realm of culture as some sort of spatial whole, having boundaries but also having internal territory. The realm of culture has no internal territory: it is entirely distributed along the boundaries, boundaries pass everywhere, through its every aspect.[43]

Levinas also highlights the importance of 'otherness' in identity formation. He sees the other emerging as a social entity most clearly within the sphere of everyday life,

> If the relationship with the other involves more than relationships with mystery, it is because one has accosted the other in everyday life where the solitude and fundamental alterity of the other are veiled in decency. One is for the other what the other is for oneself; there is no exceptional place for the subject. The other is known through sympathy, as another (my)self, as the alter ego.[44]

The ideas of Bakhtin and Levinas today have come to be termed 'philosophical anthropology'. Philosophical anthropology is the ethos, Todorov argues, which refers to Bakhtin's, "general conception of human existence, where the *other* plays a decisive role. This is then the fundamental principle: it is impossible to conceive of any being outside of the relations that link it to the other."[45] For Todorov, the 'otherness' in Bakhtin's articulation of the dialogical principle comes to assume prime importance. The 'other' ceases to be an object and becomes a subject. The theoretical underpinnings of the 'philosophical anthropological' school can be seen to be operationalised in the work of Stuart Hall. He argues that the other actually defines who 'we' are when he states, "the English are racist not because they hate the blacks, but because they don't know who they are without the blacks."[46] National identity therefore is neither natural nor stable. While it undoubtedly

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[42] Bakhtin M., "Towards a Reworking of the Dostoyevsky Book", quoted in Todorov T., *Mikhail Bakhtin: The Dialogical Principle*, trans. by Godzich, W., Minneapolis: Minneapolis University Press, 1984, p.96.
[43] Quoted in Ibid.
[44] Levinas, E., *The Levinas Reader*, Oxford: Blackwell, 1989, p.47.
[45] Todorov T., "*Mikhail Bakhtin: The Dialogical Principle*", trans. by Godzich, W., Minneapolis: University of Minneapolis Press, 1984, p.94.
[46] Hall, S., "The new ethnicities", in Hutchinson, J. and Smith, A.D., (eds.), *Ethnicity*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996, p.345.

involves a set of distinctive collective experiences, it is ultimately an invention, involving the establishment of 'others', who are used as yardsticks for self-definition.

2.4 Narrating the nation

The novelty of 'national culture' requires an examination of its invented character rather than its deep historical roots. In his work on the creation of the Irish nation-state, Hutchinson notes how in some cases, there is already a mass national consciousness on which to build. In others, members of the nation-to-be do not yet view themselves as a group. In the latter case, the role of the intelligentsia is to create a sense of collective consciousness amongst dispersed individuals, possibly holding conflictual 'little traditions', dialects and religious groups.[47] In this sense, *creative* political action is needed to transform disjointed societies into nations. Most fundamentally, political actors such as intellectuals or governing elites attempt to manipulate and manufacture a view of the past of the nation as a *myth* of origins which aims to establish and legitimate the claims to cultural autonomy leading to further political independence. Such a process has proved to be very important in the jumbled ethnic geography of Central and Eastern Europe. In these regions, respective nationalities vie with each other with their own mobilized rival versions of the past.

Such myths are what Hobsbawm and Ranger have called the 'invention of tradition'. They argue that a fundamental role for political elites is to create legitimacy for the state through invented traditions. Tradition is not a matter of a fixed or given set of beliefs which are handed down or accepted passively. Tradition is very much a matter of present-day politics, about the way in which powerful institutions function to select particular values from the past, and to mobilise them in contemporary practices.[48] As Barthes states history is

> Like a 'rag and bone shop' which can be ransacked at certain key political moments for usable garbage which is then dusted off, refitted and worn to meet particular needs. If the desired result is a form of collective memory, it can only work by insisting on a form of collective amnesia as well. The end result is a 'myth', in the sense of reality purged of history and politics and rendered as some kind of commonsense.[49]

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[47] Hutchinson, J., *The Dynamics of Cultural Nationalism*, London: Allen and Unwin, 1987, p.22.
[48] Hobsbawm, E.J and Ranger, T., *The Invention of Traditions*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1983.
[49] Barthes, R., *Mythologies*, London: Paladin, 1973, p.15.

In this degree historical memory is a fundamental prerequisite for national identity. The content of it is actually not important, whether it is true, partly true or legendary. The further into the past the real or imaginary memories reach, the more securely the national identity is supported. Therefore, some recently formed nationalities simply invent an artificial reaction to the past without the existence of real, tangible connections.[50] Chatterjee thus argues that the principal task of nationalist historians is to claim for the indigenous group the privilege of making their own histories. They must shift from being passive objects of history to being subjects of history.[51]

National History can therefore be considered as an institutionalisation of memories. In this way, a nationalising project which utilises history in its cause will also mandate that national subjects will selectively remember and forget certain events. As Ernest Renan stated, "collective forgetting is an essential part of the creation of a nation. It reveals an intimate and dependent relationship between nationalism and history".[52] Political and cultural elites working on a reservoir of cultural meaning is at the heart of the process of building a nation. This involves the formation and operation of what has been described as the 'national symbolic',

> ...The order of discursive practices whose reign within a national space produces, and also refers to, the 'law' in which the accident of birth within a geographic/political boundary transforms individuals into subjects of a collectively-held history. Its traditional icons, its metaphors, its heroes, its rituals, and its narratives, provide an alphabet for a collective consciousness or national subjectivity; through the National Symbolic the historical nation aspires to achieve the inevitability of the status of natural law, a birthright.[53]

Berlant tries to demonstrate how national culture becomes localized through the numerous images, narratives and monuments that permeate through both personal and collective consciousness.

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[50] For an insightful account of this, see Halbwachs, M., "Collective Memory", in *La Memoire Collective*, Paris, 1997.
[51] Chatterjee, P., *The Nation and its Fragments: Colonial and Postcolonial Histories*, Princeton, NJ: University of Princeton Press, 1993, p.37.
[52] Hobsbawm, E.J., *Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality,* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990, p.12.
[53] Berlant, L., *The Anatomy of National Fantasy: Hawthorne, Utopia, and Everyday Life*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991, p.20.

2.5 Identity Construction: a move beyond the State?

Many authors have emphasised the contribution of the state to the generation of national identities. As Bourdieu states,

> Through classification systems (specially according to age and sex) inscribed in law, through bureaucratic procedures, educational structures and social rituals (particularly salient in the case of Japan and England), the state moulds mental structures and imposes common principles of vision and division...And it thereby contributes to the construction of what is commonly designated as national identity.[54]

The state invests in the creation and the sustenance of a national identity. It carries out actions and organisations of national space-time, population and territory, which it expects, will result in greater expressions of belonging to the nation. The state has many 'tools', including cilitizenship laws, the military, the media and the education systems, which can be used to create the desired 'imagined community'. The state may, via such activities, succeed in fixing certain key features on the 'horizon' of subjects' national identities. As Breuilly reminds us, the pace and nature of the process of producing and institutionalizing a national culture operates in tandem with the existing state.[55]

The importance of the state in processes of identity formation should not be underestimated. However there is a need to critically analyze the state expressions of identity project as an image of homogeneity. By looking beyond such expressions, there is revealed complex and contingent processes and identities. For example, Papadakis in his study of Greek Cypriot society has attempted to look at the diverse expressions of nationalism, formulated by the state, political parties and individual social actors. He examines how nationalism is articulated on these levels. He proposes an understanding of the dialectical process between 'above' and 'below' that account for the appeal of specific constructions of nationalism.[56] He places no analytical primacy on either the 'above' or 'below' processes. He is more interested in their interactions. A similar study, which examines this dialectical interplay, is

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[54] Bourdieu, P., "Rethinking the State: Genesis and Structure of the Bureaucratic Field", in *Sociological Theory*, 12:1, 1994, p.18.
[55] Breuilly, J., *Nationalism and the State,* New York: St. Martin's Press, 1982, p.361.
[56] Papadakis, Y, "Greek narratives of history and collective identity", in *American Ethnologist* 25(2), pp.149-165.

Kapferer's comparative study of Australian and Singalese nationalisms.[57] He argues that state rhetoric manipulates popular values to transform everyday 'legends of people' into 'myths of state'. He argues that nationalism is not a 'sui generis' term, but rather is adapted in and expressed through local idioms.

Radcliffe and Westwood found in their study in Latin America popular ways of articulating national identities are relatively structured, rather than being a process of passive consumption. The national calls into play, among individuals, a diversity of evaluations, exclusions and self-awareness. Not only are states engaged in processes of nation building but also individual and collective subjects are involved, albeit from within the diverse and contradictory sites they are found within. The co-existence of diverse affiliation trajectories inevitably means that individuals continually take part in a process of re-stating their position vis-à-vis the nation.[58] To reassert, whilst physically, national culture may be bounded by the territorial limits of a given state, the national characteristics are not static. National cultures are not perceived and understood by the entire population in an identical fashion. Instead, they are *sites of contestation,* in which competition over definitions takes place. One of the main sites is the sphere of education, which will be discussed in the following section.

In this fashion, this thesis aims to move towards a deeper understanding of the 'imagined community', which does not simply accept state or elite centred notions of national identity and the nation-building project. The fluidity of identity in this approach, while recognizing the importance of 'top-down' state-led processes for identity (re)construction, allows the researcher to explore attempted state policies, and the reactions to them, at various levels, not in terms of fixed groups who react in predetermined ways, but in terms of evolving processes, responses and identities.

2.6 The role of education in the construction of national identity

As outlined in Chapter One, this study examines how the Ukrainian state has tried to reinvent and recodify social boundaries, which distinguish 'us' from 'them', in particular, looking at how Russia as the 'significant other' is represented. This research analyses how such processes are occurring at one main site of contestation, the education system. By reviewing

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[57] Kapferer, B., *Legends of People, Myths of State: Violence, Intolerance, and Political Culture in Sri Lanka and Australia,* Washington DC and London: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1988.
[58] Radcliffe, S. and Westwood, S., *Remaking the Nation: Place, Identity and Politics in Latin America*, London: Routledge, 1996, pp.164-164.

the literature, a theoretical framework allows the researcher to view to what extent the state's attempts at influencing issues surrounding national identity are contested and how such processes need to be viewed within the prism of identities produced through, against and within state processes. Thus follows a brief overview of the historical development of 'national' educational systems so as to provide a backdrop to the theoretical discussions which follow.

The rise of 'national' education systems

The development of National Education Systems (NESs) in nineteenth century Europe, Japan and North America, though occurring at different times, invariably overlapped with the process of nation-building. The first sign of the growing importance of education in Europe came not from the advent of the French Revolution, but during the later years of Absolutist rule.[59] The 1648 Treaty of Westphalia marked the beginning of the modern European system of independent states. The development of principles of sovereignty and bounded territory under administrative control inevitably led to increased bureaucratisation. Within these changes, the first national fiscal policies were introduced in countries such as Austria and Prussia and schools began to play an increasing role in the education of engineers and administrators.[60]

However, the period following the French Revolution saw a rapid rise in the importance and development of NESs across Europe. It was during this period that the 'people' and the 'Nation' were brought into the equation of the sovereign, territorial state. Under absolutist rule, sovereignty resided in the hands of the absolutist ruler as supreme authority over territory and the subjects in it. Yet, the impact of the Enlightenment and the French Revolution transformed the notion of sovereignty so that the nation itself became constitutive of that authority. The nation became the body of citizens whose collective sovereignty constituted them as a state, which was their political expression.[61]

States had to prove their legitimacy with reference to the people. The old guarantors of popular loyalty, dynastic legitimacy, divine ordination, historic right of rule all were severely weakened by the revolution. New sources of legitimacy had to be constructed. States

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[59] Schleicher, K., (ed.), *Nationalism in Education*, Frankfurt: Peter Lang, 1993.
[60] Green, A., *Education, Globalization and the Nation-State*, Basingstoke: MacMillan Press, 1997, ch.7.
[61] Hobsawm, E.J., *Nations and Nationalism since* 1780..., op.cit., p.12.

attempted to create legitimacy and a loyal citizenry by numerous methods. Conscription was introduced in national defence, movement across borders was monitored and births, deaths and marriages were registered. But the main 'tool' of the state was the education system. As Baron Dubin wrote in 1826

> Practically all modern nations are now awake to the fact that education is the most potent means of development of the essentials of nationality. Education is the means by which people of retarded cultures may be brought rapidly to the common level. Education is the means by which small and weak nations may become strong through their cultural strengths and achievements. Education is the only means by which the world can be 'made safe' for the national type of organization. [62]

There was a sharp break from the former particularistic and essentially clerical educational forms of the early modern period. Schools began to be state-funded, teachers were trained by the state and the state took control over the inspection of educational establishments and control over curricula and examinations. The NES created national languages and literatures, popularized myths and histories and explained the ways of the state to the people and the duties of the people to the state.[63] National education became a huge integrative engine assimilating the local to the national and in turn playing a major role in the creation of civic identity and national consciousness which would bind each individual to the state and reconcile each to the other. Education was used by states to provide legitimacy and ensure their survival both at home and within the European inter-state system. As Ramirez states,

> European states became engaged in authorizing, funding and managing mass schooling as part of an endeavour to constitute a unified national polity...Military defeat or a failure to keep pace with the industrial development in rival countries stimulated the state to turn to education as a means of national revitalization to avoid losing power and prestige in the inter-state system. [64]

Each state whilst seeing education as important in economic and technological development, saw the overriding importance of education in the increase of extensive and cultural and ideological transformations to establish and popularise new notions of national identity. Durkheim argued this, stating that the main reason for creating NESs was to foster social solidarity and national cohesion. The dominant classes through education aimed to create a

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[62] Fuller. B. and Robinson R., (eds.), *The Political Construction of Education*, New York: Praeger, 1992.
[63] Keisner, E., *Nationalism and Education since 1789*, New York: MacMillan, 1922.
[64] Ramirez, F and Boli, J., "The Political Constitution of Mass Schooling: European Origins and Worldwide Institutionalisation", *Sociology of Education*, 60, 1987, p.67.

'national-popular' cultural hegemony.[65] The major impetus for the creation of NESs lay in the need of states for trained administrators, engineers and military personnel to spread the dominant culture and to incalculate popular ideologies of nationhood.

Gellner argues that modern nations are industrial societies with a high degree of cultural and economic integration, which do not tolerate significant cultural inequalities.[66] Modern societies require high levels of social mobility and hence more pervasive levels of literacy. The education system comes to play an all-important role in society.

> Modern societies possess a very homogenous educational system which provides a basically common generic training for the whole population, or for as much of it as possible, and on the basis of which a much more specialized and extraordinarily diversified system of occupations is erected, as a kind of second stage. [67]

Schools: deliverers of 'cultural capital' wrapped in a 'national' form

Bourdieu sees schools as a critical arena where individuals learn the cultural currency facilitating communication among members of a group.[68] The structural requirements of modern society mandate individuals to be mobile and capable of communicating in impersonal situations by trading on common cultural capital. Schools transmit cultural knowledge in the form of values, symbols and myths. One of the chief methods of transmitting such social and political values in an effort to create the 'national culture' is through school textbooks. As Apple and Christian-Smith argue, textbooks signify through their content and form a particular construction of reality.[69] Similarly Venezky argues that textbooks contain not only the 'manifest curriculum' which provides factual knowledge about the subject matter, but also a 'latent curriculum', aiming to socialize pupils as young citizens.[70] Many schools have daily rituals and symbolic paraphernalia of nationhood in the form of flags and anthems. As Billig states, the 'banality of nationalism' occurs in the USA with the morning pledge to the national flag,

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[65] Durkheim, E., *Education and Sociology*, New York: Free Press, 1956.
[66] Gellner, E., *Nations and Nationalism*, Oxford: Blackwell, 1983, p.32.
[67] Gellner, E., "Scale and Nation", *Philosophy of the Social Sciences*, 3, 1973, p.84.
[68] Bourdieu, P., "Systems of Education and Systems of Thought", *International Social Science Journal*, 19(3) 1967, pp.338-358.
[69] Apple, M.W. and Christian-Smith., *The Politics of the Textbook*, New York: Routledge, 1991, p.3.
[70] Venezky, R., "Textbooks in School and Society", in Jackson, P.J., (ed.), *Handbook of Research and Curriculum*, New York: MacMillan, 1992, p.438.

> The ceremony is a ritual display of national unity. Children, in knowing that this is the way in which the school day starts, will take it for granted that other pupils, the length and breadth of the homeland, are also beginning their day similarly; and that their parents and grandparents, if schooled in the United States, did likewise; they might even suppose that all over the world the school day starts thus.[71]

In some countries such as Singapore, such symbolism has been used to emphasise a *civic* form of nationalism, aiming to integrate multi-ethnic cultures and religions into a single, though diverse national identity. In contrast, schools in other countries have been used to promote the culture and language of the dominant ethnic group whilst simultaneously excluding and marginalising minority groups and cultures. For example, Kazi in a study of the effects of the education system on nation-building processes in Pakistan found that post 1971, the new ruling elite implemented policies to promote the political and cultural hegemony of Mushal, whilst marginalising the cultures of the Sindhi, Baluchi and Pathan peoples.[72]

In the post Second World War years, Green notes how nation-building through education has occurred in new states which have emerged through decolonisation, the collapse of former 'empires' and other forms of national transition.[73] In newly independent states, which are not yet nations, but nations in the being, the major task of school curricula is to enhance the national culture and value system, along with the goals of learning. This task assists in the process of creating a national consensus, which in turn contributes to the strengthening of national integration.

Makulu in his discussion of the role of education in nation-building processes in Africa in the 1960s states how there was a common shift in policy towards a reassertion of African culture.[74] He notes at a meeting of independent African states in 1960, that leaders called for education to rest on a foundation of a specifically African culture. As the directorate of the conference clearly states,

> Education should sharpen the child's awareness of his cultural heritage and be a means by which culture is revitalized. This process will form an important element in the school as an ideal African

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[71] Billig, M., *Banal Nationalism*, op.cit., p.50.
[72] Kazi, A.A., *Ethnicity and Education in Nation-building: The Case of Pakistan*, London: University Press of America, 1987.
[73] Green, A., *Education, Globalization, and the Nation State*, Basingstoke: MacMillan Press, 1997.
[74] Makulu, H.F., *Education, Development and Nation-Building in Independent Africa*, London; SCM Press, 1971.

> social system, in which the child will learn the business of living in changing social structures, and of accepting and discharging social and political responsibilities which the nation gives him. Education, then, must help the child to develop national consciousness. [75]

Similarly, Fosse studies how political elites are using education as a tool to create a collective national identity in independent Namibia.[76] Having become independent in 1990, Namibia is hardly a 'natural' cultural unit. Whilst as a state, it has become a territorially and politically defined unit, it is far from being a collective cultural unit. Fosse looked at how a primary condition for nation-building to succeed in Namibia is for official agendas to be related credibly to local, regional and ethnic issues. In the sphere of education, it is seen how national history is being reconstructed, employing national symbols to unite people at a level above that of loyalties to ethnic categories.

2.7 Conclusions

Whilst national culture may be bounded by the territorial confines of nation-states, the 'national' characteristics are not given. National cultures are not simply repositories of shared symbols to which the entire population stands in identical relation. Rather, they are to be understood as *sites of contestation,* in which competition over definitions takes place. It allows 'us' to define ourselves against 'them', understood as those beyond the boundaries of the nation. It has been shown how education can play an extensive role in the (re)constructing of national identities. It has argued that it is one of the major 'tools' at the disposal of states in their efforts to impose a desired definition of the 'national consciousness' onto the people. Simultaneously it exists as a 'site' or arena in which state attempts are constantly being negotiated and contested. Such an approach with its attention to the dynamic nature of identity will prove fruitful in the post-Soviet context where rapid social, economic and political transformations are simultaneously taking place. It provides a sound framework from which to engage in how social boundaries are being recodified and reinterpreted in Ukraine's eastern borderlands. Chapter Three follows, which involves a thorough investigation into the various ways that national identity can be mapped in post-Soviet Ukraine.

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[75] Makulu, H.F., *Education, Development and Nation-Building in Independent Africa,* op.cit., p.38.
[76] Fosse, J., "Negotiating the nation: ethnicity, nationalism and Nation-Building in independent Namibia", *Nations and Nationalism*, 3(3), 1997, pp.427-450.

CHAPTER THREE: MAPPING IDENTITIES IN UKRAINE

> ...[N]ations living in this region lacked what was naturally, clearly precisely and concretely present in everyday life and community consciousness of nations in Western Europe: A reality in their own national and state framework, a capital city, a harmony between economy and politics, a unified social elite etc...In Eastern Europe...a national framework was something that had to be created, repaired, fought for, and constantly protected, not only against the power factors existing in the dynastic state, but also from the indifference exhibited by a certain proportion of the country's own inhabitants, as well as the wavering state of national consciousness.[77]

3.1 Introduction

This chapter places the theoretical background concerning national identity contained in chapter Two onto the contemporary context of post-Soviet Ukraine. The fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, coupled with the rise of the nation-state being seen as the ultimate expression of the 'right for national self-determination', led to the post-Soviet states commencing processes of redefining their relations with their neighbours and simultaneously forging an internal coherent 'body politic' out of often highly diversified populations. In Ukraine, these processes have been far from straightforward. Ukraine is not a nation-state in the classical understanding of the term, yet it is not unique in this respect.[78] Its peculiarity lies not in the fact that there are sizeable national minorities within her citizenry, but more in the fact that the ethnic Ukrainian titular majority does not constitute a unified, homogenous and coherent nation. The historical legacies of various regions of today's Ukraine being part of various Empires such as the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, Habsburg, Ottoman, Tsarist and Soviet Empires, has left modern day Ukraine, a state riddled with competing and contradicting patterns of ethnic, linguistic, religious and regional diversity. As a result of such diverse historical experiences, what it means to be 'Ukrainian' and what are the chief determinants of a Ukrainian national identity vary across the country. Such cleavages have inevitably made the task of the Ukrainian state of creating a unified Ukrainian national identity based on an understanding of who 'we' are and who 'we are not' extremely tenuous yet nevertheless urgent in the country's first thirteen years of independence post-1991.

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[77] Bibo, I., "The Distress of the East European Small States", in Nagy, K., (ed.), *Democracy, Revolution and Self-Determination: Selected Writings of Istvan Bibo*, Boulder, CO: Social Science Monographs, 1991.

[78] The nation-state is defined here as "an ideal where all self-governing units – states – correspond with cultural distinctive units – nations". See McCrone, D., *The Sociology of Nationalism*, London: Routledge, 1998, p.9. The author draws the reader's attention to the fact that most states are not nation-states, but 'present' themselves as such.

This chapter assesses the significance of these societal divisions in an attempt to distinguish what is the chief determinant of national identity in Ukraine. It is argued that while academic debate has focused on the assumed importance of ethnicity and language as markers of identity in Ukraine, such attention may have been misplaced or insufficient. Instead, the chapter posits the need for a more thorough examination of regional cleavages across Ukraine. As a result of the aforementioned diverse historical experiences of different regions of Ukraine, one's place of residence acts as the key determinant in national identity, crosscutting, rather than reinforcing other cleavages such as ethnicity and language. Such issues are further explored in chapter Four. The chapter commences with a critical engagement with the literature concerning ethnicity as marker of identity, in particular drawing attention to the existence of mixed Russian/Ukrainian identities in Ukraine. From here, it is demonstrated how language has been seen as the chief determinant of identity, which is also problematised. Finally, the chapter attempts to move the debate forward, stressing the need for a wider acknowledgement of the importance of regional divisions across Ukraine.

3.2 Ukrainian/Russian nexus

This section attempts to assess the relative importance of ethnic divisions as a marker of national identity in Ukraine. Ukraine's 'national question' has often been portrayed in the context of a titular ethnic majority (Ukrainian) and large numbers of national minorities, of which Russians form by far the largest number. The results of the 2001 census show that Ukrainians comprise 77.8 percent (37.7 million) of the population, with Russians making up 17.3 percent (8.3 million).[79] The other main ethnic groups in Ukraine are Jews, Belarussians, Moldovans, Crimean Tatars, Bulgarians, Poles, Hungarians, Romanians and other small groups (all of which claim less than 1 percent of the population). These figures are indeed highly significant when compared with the figures from the 1989 census. Over this twelve year period, whilst there has been negligible migration of ethnic Russians back to Russia, overall three million ethnic Russians have seemingly 'disappeared', or in fact, by 2001, come to define themselves as Ukrainians. This is evidence of the fluidity of identities in Ukraine and the difficulties encompassed when forcing individuals into choosing between two

[79] The census was conducted in December 2001 with the data being released by the State Committee of Statistics of Ukraine in early 2003. In comparison, from the 1989 census, Ukrainians comprised 72 percent of the population and Russians 22.1 percent, see Ministry of Statistics of the USSR, "Natsional'nyi sostav naseleniya SSSR po rezultatam vsesouznoj perepisi naselenia 1989", (National Composition of the USSR according to the results of the All-Union 1989 census), Moscow: *Finansy i Statistika*, 1991.

separate categories of 'Ukrainian' or 'Russian' in a national census, when in reality, for many people, these two categories are more blurred, with no clear lines of distinction.

As a result of the fact that Ukrainians and Russians are by far the most numerous ethnic groups in Ukraine, comprising over 95 percent of the population, much attention has been paid to this nexus. In particular, during Ukraine's early years of independence, commentators assumed that Ukraine's large 'Russian minority' would not accept Ukraine as a sovereign state and thus severely hamper the nation-building projects of the Ukrainian state. For example, in 1994, a US intelligence community's assessment of Ukraine found that there were grave dangers that the large Russian national minority might secede or put a great deal of pressure on Kiev to re-enter a union with Russia.[80] However, in many respects Russians have been misconceived as representing a classical 'national minority' and a 'diaspora'. Clifford defines a diaspora as characterised by a group experiencing a "shared, ongoing history of displacement".[81] Similarly, Safran also attempts to define diasporas as, "Expatriate minority communities...that maintain a memory, vision, or myth about their original homeland...that see the ancestral home as a place of eventual return...(and whose) consciousness and solidarity are importantly defined by this continuous relationship with the homeland."[82] Yet, many Russians, especially in the southern and eastern regions, argue that Russians have lived in Ukraine for centuries and therefore form a legitimate part of Ukraine's land and history. From this, comes the group's dislike of being classified as a 'national minority', or as a 'diaspora', as they claim to be in fact, 'indigenous'.[83]

To fully understand the Russian/Ukrainian identity nexus in Ukraine today, one must take into account the legacies of Soviet nationality policy. In the Soviet Union, nationality was defined ascriptively, with a strong bias towards either one's father's nationality or to the republic of residence.[84] This official practice of privileging blood ancestry over actual cultural/social practices and self-identification, allied to the official policy of 'national in form, socialist in content', served to undermine the meaning of nationality. In Ukraine, this is

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[80] Williams, D. and Smith, R.J., "Dire U.S Forecast for Ukraine Conflict", *International Herald Tribune*, January 26th, 1994.
[81] Clifford, J., "Diasporas", *Cultural Anthropology*, 9, 3, 1994, p.306.
[82] Safran, W., "Diasporas in modern societies: Myths of Homeland and Return", *Diaspora: A Journal of Transnational Studies*, 1, 1, 1991, p.8.
[83] Szporluk, R., "Russians in Ukraine and Problems of Ukrainian Identity in the USSR", in Potichny, P.J., (ed.), *Ukraine in the 1970s*, Oakville, Ontario: Mosaic, 1975, p.196.
[84] For thorough examinations of the Soviet nationality policy and its legacies, see, Simonsen, S.V., "Inheriting the Soviet policy toolbox: Russia's dilemma over ascriptive nationality", *Europe-Asia Studies*, 51 (6), 1999, pp.1069-87.

especially the case where the rates of intermarriage between Russians and Ukrainians were extremely high.[85] As such, census figures do not offer an adequate method to understand the contradictory and complex nature of national identities in Soviet Ukraine, in particular in its southern and eastern regions. The results of ethnographic research in the Ukrainian-Russian bi-cultural belt clearly demonstrate this with several respondents describing their ethnicity as "under one regime, we were Ukrainians, under another we were Russians, but frankly speaking we do not know who we are."[86]

In independent Ukraine, surveys have highlighted the fact that the legacy of Soviet nationality practice remains. A survey, undertaken in December 1997, found that 69 percent of respondents viewed themselves as Ukrainians, 20 percent as Russians and 6 percent as 'Ukrainian and Russian', results similar to the 1989 findings.[87] However, when in the same survey, respondents were given the opportunity to see their identities in more situational or dualistic terms, the results were very different. 56 percent saw themselves as Ukrainians, 11 percent Russians and 27 percent as both Ukrainian and Russian. This mixed/dual identity was heavily concentrated in the urban areas of southeastern Ukraine, accounting for 51 percent in the Donbas region (Luhans'k and Donets'k) and 43 percent in Kharkiv, Dnipropetrovsk and Zaporizhzhia.[88]

To understand the origins of such mixed identities, Ukraine's role in the Soviet Union needs to be addressed. Despite the fact that Ukraine developed rapidly under Soviet rule, modernization, in its Soviet version, did not create an 'imagined community'.[89] As a result of Soviet policies, particularly in the areas of culture, history and language, Ukrainian national identity was weakened and increasingly submerged into an all-embracing 'Soviet' identity. In the area of historiography, from the 1930s the official Soviet version of historical events shifted to a schemata of history which integrated much of the old Russian imperial 'statist' historical narrative into a dogmatic Marxist methodology, ready to legitimate the current political demands and realities of the Soviet state. History was used to serve the

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[85] See Silver, B., "The ethnic and language dimensions in Russian and Soviet censuses", in Clem, R, (ed.), *Research Guide to the Russian and Soviet Censuses*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, pp.70-97.
[86] Chizhykova, L.N., "Russkoe-Ukrainskoe pogranich'e. Istoria sud'by tradisionno-bytovoi kul'tury (19-20) veka)", Moscow: *Nauka*, 1988, pp.14-69.
[87] Pogrebinskii, M., (ed.), "Politicheskie nastroeniia nakanune vyborov", Ukraina, 1997, Kiev Centre for Political Research and Conflictology, 1997.
[88] Ibid.
[89] For a thorough overview of modernisation and how it can be applied to Ukraine, see, Krawchenko, B., *Social Change and National Consciousness in Twentieth Century Ukraine*, Basingstoke and London: Macmillan, 1985.

policy of unifying non-Russian peoples around the Russian 'elder brother'. In 1947 and 1954 new policies in historical education codified the eastern Slavs as historically being part of one *Russkii narod* (Russian people).[90] The East Slavic peoples were propagated as having common origins in the proto-state of Kiev Rus'. From then on, political alliance between the Eastern Slavs was deemed natural. Soviet historiography portrayed the Pereiaslav Agreement in 1648 between the Ukrainian Cossacks and the Tsarist authorities as the natural culmination of a desire by the Ukrainians to reunite with their Russian brothers.[91]

Any challenges to this scheme of historiography were banned, which became the fate of the work of the Ukrainian historian Mykhailo Hrushevskyi. Hrushevskyi in his *Istoriya Ukrainy-Rusy* (History of Ukraine-Rus) provided a counter-claim to the traditional Russian views concerning the origins of the east Slavic peoples. He argued that Ukraine was a direct and sole successor to the medieval state of Kiev Rus'. His 'statist' approach saw the Galycian-Volynian princedom and the Cossack state of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries as embodiments of Ukrainian statehood.[92] Such ideas had been adopted by Ukrainian national elites at the time of the Ukrainian Revolution and in the following period of *natsionalne vidrodzhennya* (national regeneration) under the Soviets in the late 1920s. However, the period was short-lived, leaving the project of promulgating the 'national idea' across Ukraine incomplete. Instead, from the 1930s, the Soviet authorities stated that the Soviet Union was following a unique modernisation path with the end result being a 'socialist commonwealth'. It was asserted that ethnic differences would decline as a result of intermarriage and assimilation processes, with the result being the "steady convergence of all nations and peoples of the Soviet Union, and the molding of a new, historical community, the Soviet people."[93]

The interaction of such processes in the realm of history, together with the erosion of linguistic and cultural boundaries between Russians and Ukrainians, led many people to hold mixed identities, despite the fact that formally, as recorded on their passports, their 'official' nationality may have been 'Ukrainian' or 'Russian'. Thus, it is worth noting that in the

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[90] Velychenko, S., "The Official Soviet View of Ukrainian History", *Journal of Ukrainian Studies*, vol.10, no.2, 1985, p.84.
[91] Morrison, J., "Pereyeslav and after: the Russian-Ukrainian Relationship", *International Affairs*, 69, 4, 1993, pp.677-703.
[92] For an overview of Hrushevskyi's work and its influence on the Ukrainian national movement, see Prymak, T., *Mykhailo Hrushevsky: The Politics of National Culture*, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1987.
[93] For a classic statement of this ideology, see Bromlei, I., (ed.), "Present-day Ethnic Processes in the USSR", *Progress*, Moscow, 1982, pp.414-452.

USSR, Russians were as strongly influenced by local Ukrainian culture as Ukrainians were by Russian culture. In particular, territorial identities were promoted not only to the expense of Ukrainian national identity, but also to Russian ethnic and national identities. For example, it is often argued that Russians in Ukraine are different from the *moskali* (muscovites), a derogatory term used by Ukrainians for Russians in general. Instead, Russians "have taken on certain local values and attitudes, which have created clear differences between them and the Russians in Russia."[94] This, together with the economic factor, has been used to explain why large numbers of ethnic Russians voted for Ukrainian independence in December 1st 1991.[95]

The prevalence of such fluid and competing identities in Ukraine has meant that there have been extremely low levels of political support for parties advocating the 'Russian idea' except in Crimea. For example, the Russophile Party, SLOn, which advocated an economic union of Ukraine and Russia, the status of the Russian language in Ukraine to be upgraded to the level of a second state language and rejected attempts to legalise the 'political division of one people' was unsuccessful, in the 1998 parliamentary elections, gaining only 0.9 percent of the vote.[96] Similarly the Union Party which supported Ukraine entering into an "inter-state union" with Russia and Belarus, gained 0.7 percent of the vote.[97] Also it argued that "nationalist ideology [that is] forced upon society" was one of the chief reasons for the desperate situation in Ukraine and again called for the legalisation of Russian as a second state language.

Similarly in the 2002 parliamentary elections, the explicitly pro-Russian party, *Rus'kii blok* (Russian bloc), gained over four percent of the vote only in Crimea (4.76 percent) and the City of Sevastopol (8.83 percent).[98] Instead, Russians have tended to vote for left wing parties such as the Communist Party of Ukraine (KPU) which has called for greater links between Russia and Ukraine, utilising ideas of 'pan-Slavism' and 'East Slavic Unity'. As the results of the 2002 parliamentary elections highlight, in Crimea and in the eastern and southern regions of Ukraine where the majority of Russians reside, there was strong support

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[94] Hrytsak, Y., "Ukraina, 1991-1995 rr: nova politychna natsiia", *Skhid*, no.4, 1996, p.15.
[95] Nemiria, G., "Regionalism: An Underestimated Dimension of State-Building", in Wolchik, S.L. and Zviglyanich, V., *Ukraine: The Search for a National Identity*, Lanham, MA: Rowman and Littlefield, 2000, pp.183-198.
[96] Wilson, A., *The Ukrainians: unexpected nation*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000, p.216.
[97] For the full results of the 1998 parliamentary elections, see *Holos Ukrainy*, 8th April 1998, quoted in Solchanyk, R., *Ukraine and Russia: The Post-Soviet Transition*, Lanham, MA: Rowman and Littlefield, 2001, p.143.
[98] For a statistical breakdown of the results by regions, see http://www.cvk.ukrpack.net.

for the KPU. In Luhans'k region, KPU polled the highest percentage with 39.7 percent, whilst in Crimea it polled 33.9 percent. In Donets'k, Kharkiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Zaporizhzhia, Kherson and Mykolaiv, the figures were approximately 30 percent.[99] Such findings clearly demonstrate that Ukraine's internal diversity is far more complex than a simplistic Russian-Ukrainian ethnic divide. This issue will be further investigated in the later chapters, particularly in Chapter Five.

3.3 Language: a marker of identity?

The lack of importance attached to a distinct 'ethnic' marker in identity issues in Ukraine led many commentators to forward a notion that to fully understand societal divisions and issues of identity across Ukraine, one must examine language use. For example, Arel has argued that the "private use of language is closer to the issue of [national] identity" than any other group indicator.[100] It is purported that Ukrainian society can be split into three groups, Ukrainophone Ukrainians, Russophone Russians and Russophone Ukrainians.

The debate over the actual numbers of Russian and Ukrainian speakers has been a subject hotly disputed. Firstly, from the 1989 census figures, it is shown that 12.3 percent of ethnic Ukrainians perceive Russian to be their *ridna mova* (native tongue in Ukrainian) or *rodnoi yazyk* (in Russian).[101] However, such figures must be treated with a degree of caution. The census idea of 'native tongue' is highly ambiguous. It can be interpreted to mean the language of one's ancestors, the language one learnt in childhood or the language one is comfortable in at the present moment. As a result of the processes of russification, the language chosen for each category may well be different.[102]

This has led to recent studies looking at the *language of preference*, meaning the language that an individual will most commonly choose to use in everyday circumstance. Here, the results are rather different with the Ukrainophone Ukrainians comprising approximately 40-45 percent of the population, Russophone Russians 20-22 percent, Russophone Ukrainians

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[99] It is not argued that support for the KPU is solely based on its 'East-Slavic Unity' ideas. Policies of social welfare may also prove attractive to voters in regions of Ukraine, undergoing vast economic transformations. For a statistical breakdown of the results by region, see http://www.cvk.ukrpack.net.
[100] Arel, D., "The temptation of the Nationalising State", in Tismaneanu, V., (ed.), *Political Culture and Civil Society in Russia and the New States of Eurasia*, Armonk, N.Y: Sharpe, 1995, p.169.
[101] Kaiser, R., *The Geography of Nationalism in Russia and the USSR*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, p.273.
[102] See Khmelko, V. and Arel, D., "The Russian Factor and Territorial Polarisation in Ukraine", *Harriman Review*, vol.9, nos. 1-2, Spring 1996, pp.81-91.

30-35 percent and Ukrainophone Russians a mere 1-3 percent.[103] Such figures denote that a minority speaks Ukrainian across Ukraine. Whilst in rural areas, Ukrainophones still predominate, in urban areas, they are an outright minority, continually being compelled to defend their rights *vis-à-vis* the dominant Russophone groups.[104] Here also, major regional differences in language practice were found. Surveys conducted between 1991-1994 found that whilst 77 percent of the population of 'west Ukraine' use Ukrainian as the language of preference, only 18.5 percent of the population of 'east Ukraine' do so.[105] In the capital, Kiev, where 72 percent of the city's population is Ukrainian (Soviet census), only 23.6 percent use Ukrainian as the language of preference.[106] However Ryabchuk argues that the *language of preference* like the *native language* category does not explain fully the complexities of language use in Ukraine. It is argued that nearly a third of Ukraine's population constantly move in and out of using Ukrainian and Russian owing to *circumstance* and their surroundings.[107] Ryabchuk therefore states the *language of preference* methodology hides the real language use as many Ukrainophone Ukrainians, in the semi-formal situation of an interview, may feel it best to reply in Russian, and thus give an artificially high figure for Russophone Ukrainians.[108]

Other studies argue that the ethnolinguistic divides across Ukraine are highly important in explaining the population's socio-political orientations and Ukraine's relations with Russia.[109] Furthermore, it was argued that the results of the 1994 presidential elections showed that support for the two key candidates split according to linguistic lines. This led to Kuchma gaining power, with the support of the densely populated and heavily russified regions of southeastern Ukraine.[110] Such an analysis fitted well with the alarmist scenarios of deep national cleavages in Ukraine, which were said to inevitably lead to Ukraine splitting into an 'east' and 'west' along linguistic lines.[111] Suffice it to say such commentaries fail to delineate where the country would be split, failing to take into account that divisions in Ukraine are not always overlapping, and also that there is a graduation and merging of

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[103] Pogrebinskii, M., (ed.), "Politicheskie nastroeniia nakanune vyborov", op.cit., p.17.
[104] Ryabchuk, M., "Civil Society and Nation Building in Ukraine", in Kuzio, T., (ed.), *Contemporary Ukraine: Dynamics of Post-Soviet Transformation*, Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 1998, p.89.
[105] Arel, D. and Khmelko, V., "The Russian Factor and Terriotorial Polarisation in Ukraine", op.cit., p.81.
[106] Arel, D., "Ukraine: The Temptation of the Nationalising State", in Tismaneanu, V., (ed.), *Political Culture and Civil Society in Russia and the New States of Eurasia*, Armonk, N.Y: Sharpe, 1995, p.170.
[107] Ryabchuk, M., "Civil Society and Nation Building in Ukraine", op.cit., p.96.
[108] Ibid, p.89.
[109] Arel, D. and Khmelko, V., "The Russian Factor and Territorial Polarization in Ukraine,", op.cit., pp.81-91.
[110] See Arel, D. and Wilson, A., "Ukraine: Back to Eurasia?" *RFE/RL Research Report*, vol.5, no.32, 19th August 1994.
[111] "Ukraine: The Birth and Possible Death of a Country", *The Economist*, 7th May 1994.

differences, rather than one divide in Ukrainian society.[112] The great difficulties in assessing language use in Ukraine highlight the fact that the three competing ethno-linguistic groups cannot be seen to be separate and distinct groups as there is a great deal of crossover between them. In place of any concrete linguistic boundaries, individuals continually move in and out of the two languages depending on circumstances and on occasions, or at all times, use *surzhyk,* the hybrid Russian/Ukrainian mixture.[113] Such difficulties in assessing language use have led to a strong critique of the importance given to language in determining national identity in Ukraine. It is argued that language is important but not the over-riding and all-embracing factor in national identity. Connor argues that language use has never been a key issue in Ukrainian politics, when he states, "Would not the Ukrainian nation...be likely to persist even if the language were totally replaced by Russian, just as the Irish nation has persisted after the virtual disappearance of Gaelic, despite 1920s slogans that described Gaelic and Irish identity as inseparable."[114] Furthermore, a study published in 2002 using the results of surveys based on attitudes towards Russia provocatively argues that a Ukrainian nation building policy, concentrating on narrowing ethnic and linguistic divides throughout Ukraine, may prove extremely divisive and ultimately self-defeating.[115] Instead the author argues that if the goal of the state-led projects is to create political consensus, then the Ukrainian state should advocate the establishment of an 'East-Slavic' identity, which emphasizes not the distinctions, but the closeness of Ukrainians and Russians.

3.4 Turning to discourse: the social construction of group boundaries

The dual ethnicity model and ethno-linguistic models have highlighted the inherent ambiguities and contested nature of national identities in Ukraine, yet have proved inconclusive in fully mapping national identities in Ukraine. Therefore, there have been further attempts to move forward our understanding. In particular, there has been an attempt

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[112] Garnett, S.W., *Keystone in the Arch: Ukraine in the Emerging Security Architecture of Central and Eastern Europe*, Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1997, pp.18-21.
[113] For more detailed discussions of the phenomenon of *surzhyk,* see Flier, M.S., "Surzhyk: The Rules of Engagement", in Gitelman, Z., Hajda, L., Himka, J-P. and Solchanyk, R., *Cultures and Nations of Central and Eastern Europe, Essays in Honor of Roman Szporluk, Harvard Ukrainian Studies*, vol.XXII, 1998; and Bilaniuk, L., "Speaking of Surzhyk: Ideologies and Mixed Languages", *Harvard Ukrainian Studies*, vol.XXI, nos.1-2, June 1997, pp.93-118.
[114] Connor, W., *Ethnonationalism: The Quest for Understanding*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994, pp.43-44.
[115] Shulman, S., "The Internal-External Nexus in the Formation of Ukrainian National Identity: The Case for Slavic Integration", in Kuzio, T and D'Anieri, P., (eds.), *Dilemmas of State-Led Nation Building in Ukraine*, Westport, CT: Praeger, 2002, pp.103-130.

to understand such ambiguities through the use of *discourse* as the constitutive feature of emerging group identities.[116]

Wilson attempts to demonstrate how the concept of the 'nation' in Ukraine and 'Ukraine' itself is constituted *discursively*. It is shown how various groups narrate a discourse, illustrating their 'imaginations' of what a Ukrainian nation is and what Ukraine is. It is purported the way that a 'group' attempts to represent itself and the 'other' is highly relevant in the process of boundary construction and maintenance in the construction of national identity. Such groups are 'social constructs' erected by ethnic entrepreneurs.[117]

Ukrainophone Ukrainians

The discourse of the ethnic entrepreneurs of the 'Ukrainophone Ukrainian' group pays attention to the role of the 'titular nationality', arguing that whilst an inclusive Ukrainian nation must be built, Ukrainians are the core founders of the *Ukrains'kyi narod*, the Ukrainian people. Discourse focuses on the 'indigenousness' of the Ukrainians whilst Russians are seen as 'colonisers', 'immigrants', or 'settlers'. The long history of the Russophone identity in Ukraine is rejected, arguing that it is an 'artificial' product of forced russification during the Tsarist and Soviet eras.[118] In the Law on Citizenship adopted in 1991, political rights are given to all citizens, not just the titular nation.[119] However, in practice, Ukrainian 'national-democrats' have followed a far more ambiguous line on this matter, sometimes promoting the Ukrainian political nation, whilst at other times, calling for sovereign power to reside with the titular majority, the *Ukrains'kyi narod,* as in Estonia and Latvia.[120] Historical relations between Ukraine and Russia by this group are seen often in terms of cultural subjugation, economic exploitation, forced assimilation and even genocide.[121] Ukrainophones argue that the 1654 Treaty of Pereiaslav led to the colonisation

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[116] This approach was first forwarded by Wilson, A., "Redefining ethnic and linguistic boundaries in Ukraine; indigenes, settlers and Russophone Ukrainians", in Smith, G. et al, *Nation-building in the Post-Soviet borderlands: The Politics of National Identity*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998, pp.119-138.
[117] Ibid, p.121
[118] Ibid, p.121.
[119] Ibid, p.122.
[120] Pas'ko, I., "Natsional'na ideia: varianty na tli ievropeis'koi kul'tury", *Skhid,* nos. 4, 5-6, 1996.
[121] The 1932/33 Famine in Ukraine still provides heated debate within academic circles, with some authors using the term, 'genocide' to describe the actions of the Soviet state. The standard work on this period is, Conquest, R., *The Harvest of Sorrow: Soviet Collectivization and the Terror-Famine*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1986. See also, Mace, J.E., "Famine and Nationalism in Soviet Ukraine", *Problems of Communism*, vol.33, no.3, 1984, pp.37-50.

of Ukraine.[122] It is argued that Russians arrived in Ukraine, not voluntarily during the Tsarist and Soviet regimes, but as a result of planned and purposeful attempts by Moscow to russify Ukraine and repress Ukrainian culture. The legacy, which remains is of Ukraine trying to breathe as a nation, whilst still experiencing 'quasi-colonial' conditions, especially in the southeastern regions. As a result, Ukrainophones call for 'national-cultural autonomy' to be given to only those national minorities which have no external homeland, thus excluding Russians.[123]

Ukrainophone discourse equates language with ethnicity.[124] Even those calling for a 'civic' nation, argue that it should be constructed around an ethnolinguistic 'core'. For example, Pavlo Morchan, the head of *Prosvita,* the society for the advancement of the Ukrainian language argues,

> Language is the foundation of any national identity. It's impossible to imagine the French without the French language, or the English without the English language. Even the Irish and the Scots are trying to revive their language. It is just as impossible to imagine Ukraine without the Ukrainian language. Ukraine must speak in Ukrainian.[125]

Regarding Russophone Ukrainians, mainstream Ukrainophone discourse denies their 'otherness'. Instead, it is argued that they were 'denationalised' as a result of the artificial policies of russification by the Tsarist and Soviet regimes. As an article in a L'viv nationalist newspaper, *Za Vilnu Ukrainu,* (For a Free Ukraine) states, many Ukrainians are 'infected' with a Russian mentality and identify themselves with Russia and Russians. Living in a *chuzhonatsionalne* (foreign national) environment, these russified Ukrainians, are said not to see any difference between themselves and Russians. The imagery of a mixed Russian/Ukrainian identity as a disease attests to the perceived *unnaturalness* of Russians in Ukraine.[126] The Russian language is seen to have no traditional base in Ukraine. As such, Ukrainophones argue for increased 'ukrainisation' of the education system and the media. Many Ukrainophones criticize the 'Little Russian' mentality of many Ukrainians, co-opting their discourse from the ideas of their forefathers such as Malaniuk, who saw Little Russianism as a 'national disease' resulting from the terror-police state of the tsars and

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[122] Wilson, A., "Redefining ethnic and linguistic boundaries in Ukraine; indigenes, settlers and Russophone Ukrainians", op.cit., p.124.
[123] "Prohrama i Statut Narodnoho Rukhu Ukrainy", pp.12-13.
[124] Soldatenko, et al., (eds.), *Ukrains'ka ideia: pershi rechnyky*, Kiev: Znannia, 1994.
[125] See Wilson, A., *The Ukrainians: unexpected nation*, op.cit., p.207.
[126] "Navishcho potribna derusifikatsiia Ukrainy", *Za Vilnu Ukrainu*, No.65, 1993.

Dontsov who saw the 'Little Russian' mentality, as the key reason for the weak Ukrainian national consciousness and the failure of the national uprisings between 1917-1922.[127, 128]

Russophone Russians

Russians consider themselves as indigenous in Ukraine, especially in the southern and eastern regions. Therefore they argue that they should enjoy equal rights to the Ukrainians in terms of language and culture. Russians argue that they are not 'foreigners' as claimed by the Ukrainophone Ukrainian ethnic entrepreneurs. Instead, they argue that Russians have lived in Ukraine for centuries and therefore form a legitimate part of Ukraine's land and history. As one post-independence survey shows, 57 percent of Ukraine's Russians were born in Ukraine.[129] Furthermore, Russians who moved to Ukraine during Soviet rule did not experience any sense of radical discontinuity. It was seen as internal migration, and not moving to a 'foreign' state. For this reason, the idea of 'homeland' to Russians in Ukraine is also extremely ambiguous. As the results of a poll undertaken in 1990/1 demonstrate, 75 percent of Russians in Ukraine no longer identified with the Russian *nation*.[130] The ambiguity of what is 'home' for many Russians in Ukraine is summed up by Kornilov, the leader of the pro-Russian International Movement of Donbas organization, who sees "Russia as the *otechestvo* (fatherland) and Ukraine as the *rodina* (motherland).[131]

Russophone Ukrainians

Various attempts have been made to define the 'Russophone Ukrainian' group. Kolsto states that, "Russophone covers all those members of society who regard Russian as their mother tongue or who use Russian as their daily language of communication, privately or professionally."[132] However, alternative definitions involve a recognition of the shared culture as well as language with ethnic Russians. Arel argues that Russophones will join Russians against the 'west Ukrainian' language elites. Therefore, the real split in Ukrainian

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[127] Malaniuk, I., "Malorosiistvo", NY: *Visnyk*, ODFFU, 1959, pp.10-13.
[128] Dontsov, D., *Rosiis'ki vplyvy na ukrains'ki psykhiku*, Lviv: Russica, 1913.
[129] Shulga, N.,A., "Ethnicity in Ukrainian Society as a Possible Source of Conflict", in Ehrhart, H, and Thranert, O., (eds.), *European Conflicts and International Institutions: Cooperating with Ukraine*, Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1998, p126.
[130] Kuzio, T., *Ukraine: State and Nation-building*, London: Routledge, p.92.
[131] Kornilov, D.V., "Dukh pereiaslavskoi rady i obshchestvenno-politicheskaia mysl' Ukrainy kontsa 19-20 veka", *340 rokiv Pereiaslavkoi rady: Mizhnarodna naukova konferentsiia. Tezy dopovidei. Vypusk I*, Donets'k, 1994, pp9-10.
[132] Kolsto, P., *Nation-Building and Ethnic Integration in Post-Soviet Societies. An Investigation of Latvia and Kazakhstan*, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1999, p.22.

society is not between Russians and Ukrainians, but between Ukrainophones and Russophones.[133] Similarly Laitin calls the 'Russian speakers' a 'new' category of identity in the post-Soviet states, including Ukraine.[134] However, whilst it is undoubtedly correct that as a result of similar experiences of Soviet rule, *some* Russophone Ukrainians and Russians share similar cultural orientations, it is an erroneous assumption to state that *all* Russophone Ukrainians hold such views. This misses the different cultural orientations available to the Russophones and fails to understand the full complexities of identity politics in post-Soviet Ukraine.

The discourse of this group rejects the Ukrainophone Ukrainian view of Russophone Ukrainians as simply Ukrainians who were 'denationalised' as a result of the 'artificial' 'russification' policies of Russian 'colonisers' in the Tsarist and Soviet regimes. Hrynov denies that, "Ukraine was ever a Russian colony, the Ukrainian people the people of a colonized country, or just the same, that the Russian people were the 'conquerors' of Ukraine".[135]

Instead, according to Russophone Ukrainian discourse there are deep historical roots of Russophone culture in Ukraine. Russian and Ukrainian cultures are seen to have throughout history interpenetrated each other on a *voluntary* basis and as such there is still a great deal of overlap between Russian and Ukrainian identities. Russophones argue that there are no sharply defined boundaries between Ukrainians and Russians and as such, between these two poles, they have created their own cultural space. As Gordienko, a Dnipropetrovsk professor stated in 1993, "there exists a unique, Russophone Ukrainian culture that can be seen as a link between the Russian and Ukrainian cultures."[136] Also, in a survey in Luhans'k region in 1992, it was found that 49 percent of the sample (48 percent of Ukrainians and 49 percent of Russians) agreed "a special community has been created in the Donbas, linked equally with both Ukraine and Russia."[137] Some activists have also argued that centuries of Russian and Ukrainian interaction has created a fourth east Slavic nation, which involves a mix of Ukrainian and Russian cultures.[138] It is argued that the dual language situation in Ukraine

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[133] Arel, D., "Ukraine: The Temptation of the Nationalising State", op.cit., p.166.
[134] Laitin, D., *Identity in Formation: The Russian Speaking Populations in the Near Abroad*, Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1998, p.292.
[135] Hryn'ov, V., *Nova Ukraina: yakoiu ya ii bachu*, Kiev: *Abrys*, 1995, p.61.
[136] Gordienko, V., *Rabochaya Gazeta*, Kiev, 13th January 1993.
[137] Vilens'ka, E., Poklad, V., "Natsional'no-kul'turni oriientatsii meshkantsiv Luhans'koi oblasti", *Filosofs'ka i sotsiolohichna dumka*, no.4, 1993, p.52.
[138] Wilson, A., *The Ukrainians: unexpected nation*, op.cit., p.209.

did not arise from forcible russification policies by the Tsarist and Soviet regimes, but in fact has deep historical roots.[139] Russophone activists have co-opted the slogan used by the Tamil minority in Sri Lanka after independence in 1948, 'One language, two nations. Two languages, one nation.'[140] They argue that the forced imposition of one official language (Ukrainian) onto a bilingual society is divisive. Far more productive would be to build a civic nation based on equal participation by both linguistic groups. Radicals even argue that the Russian language is more natural on Ukrainian soil than Ukrainian, which was formed as a result of interactions with Polish imports into the Old Rus' dialects. Therefore, ukrainianisation policies are seen as the 'Galicianisation' of southern and eastern Ukraine, with Galicia and the Ukrainian integral nationalism, attached to that region, being seen as the real 'other' in Ukraine's identity politics, heavily influenced by Polish traditions. The Party of Slavic Unity of Ukraine advocates this position, seeing Galicians as the true 'fifth columners' of Ukrainian society.[141] As Lieven notes, it is interesting to note how 'east Ukrainians' often call Ukrainians from Galicia derogatorily 'Pany', the Polish word for mister, or *banderovtsi*.[142, 143]

Whilst Russophone discourse can put a case forward for its 'origins' arguing that there is no need to make an unnatural choice between Ukraine and Russia, it has far greater difficulties creating any coherent future identity trajectories in contemporary Ukraine.[144] As a result of figures such as Gogol and Khmelnytsky being co-opted by the proponents of a Ukrainian 'national revival', Russophones have been left with a dearth of ideological material to use to generate support and legitimacy for its position. The absence of a clearly defined identity, articulated by a strong and forceful intelligentsia, has meant that it is likely to remain difficult to prove any characteristic of this group other than its amorphous nature.[145]

Wilson attempts to justify this model of three ethno-linguistic groups, demonstrating how it is useful to see how each group defines itself *vis-à-vis* the others. Whilst the separateness and distinctiveness of these groups is asserted, there is no examination of whether or not such

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[139] Zheleznyi, A., "Ukraina: kak vozniklo dvuiazychnie", *Donetskii kriazh*, 18-24 June 1993.
[140] Wilson, A., *The Ukrainians: unexpected nation.* Op.cit., p.209.
[141] Popov, V., "Prishla pora ob''ediniat'sia", *Brat'ia slaviane*, no.9, 1996.
[142] Lieven, A., *Ukraine and Russia: A fraternal rivalry*, Washington D.C: U.S Institute of Peace, 1999, p81.
[143] This derogatory reference is to Stefan Bandera, the leader of the Ukrainian Organization of Nationalists (OUN), which during the Second World resisted the German and Soviet 'occupying' forces in western Ukraine in their attempt to create an independent Ukraine. As such, west Ukrainians are stereotyped as supporters of the ultra-nationalist 'fascist' policies of these movements.
[144] Wilson, A., "Redefining ethnic and linguistic boundaries in Ukraine: indigenes, settlers and Russophone Ukrainians", op.cit., p.134.
[145] Ibid.

groups actually are bounded, self-contained units, or whether in fact there is a great deal of fluidity between them. Furthermore, there is made the assumption that necessarily each group holds a unified political standpoint, without it being thoroughly investigated.

3.5 The 'other' Ukraine: ambivalent ambiguity or ambiguous ambivalence?

It has been demonstrated that a straight dichotomy between Ukrainian and Russian identities fails to take into account the inherent complexities of identity politics. The attempt to construct ethno-linguistic groups has been also shown to be problematic. The option of Russophone Ukrainians in particular has proved extremely difficult to define and from this gauge the loyalties of this group. This has led to further attempts to define this amorphous and undefined mass known as the 'other' Ukraine. Ryabchuk argues that attempts to divide Ukraine into two parts, a 'west' and an 'east' are deeply problematic.[146] Whilst statistics demonstrate that the socio-economic, political differences between cities such as L'viv, in 'western Ukraine' and Luhans'k in 'eastern Ukraine' are striking, one cannot extrapolate these figures onto the rest of Ukrainian society in an attempt to argue the inevitability of a splitting of Ukraine into two halves. Reality is far more complex. It is hypothesized that these 'two Ukraines' have overlapped and fused, leaving the vast areas between them often holding characteristics of both of them, to varying degrees. In these regions, 'Ukrainian' and 'Russian' and 'Soviet' and 'European' identity trajectories have interacted, leaving many Ukrainians holding very fluid and ambivalent identities which are subsequently very much still 'up for grabs' to which ever political force can forge a coherent set of identity markers for these individuals to grasp hold of.[147] The ambiguities of this 'other' Ukraine have been highlighted in opinion polls. In 1998, 36 percent supported the restoration of the USSR, whilst 27 percent were undecided. However, in the same poll, 61 percent agreed that Ukraine must stay independent, 19 percent disagreed and 20 percent remaining undecided.[148] Thus, the number of people wanting a Union to be restored (36 percent) was nearly twice as high as the number who were against Ukrainian independence (19 percent). Such figures show a misunderstanding of a significant part of society that somehow the restoration of the USSR and Ukrainian independence could be combined. Such a state of ambivalence has been described as a characteristic 'post-Soviet schizophrenia', which occurs in transitional periods where different political models are in competition with each other. On the basis of this so-

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[146] Ryabchuk, M., "Ambivalence to Ambiguity: Why Ukrainians remain undecided?" *CERI-Sciences*, pp.1-7.
[147] Ibid. Of course, it may well be the case that some individuals may not want to 'grab' onto any identity option, preferring to remain deeply ambivalent to political issues.
[148] Ibid.

called 'ambivalence' amongst the population, Ryabchuk introduces the idea of 'creole nationalism,' seen under Kuchma's regime, with the post-Soviet *nomenklatura*, using old Soviet tactics of 'divide and rule' to intimidate society.[149] The argument a 'bad peace' is always better than 'a good war', has been utilized to play on the fears of the population of the differences and divisions in Ukrainian society leading to a bloody civil war.[150] In doing so, the incumbent leaders managed to hold onto power and continued the *status-quo.*

Whilst Ryabchuk places great emphasis on the ambivalence of the population, there is a need to question such an assumption. One must question whether the population are in fact so ambivalent to the political issues surrounding them, or in fact it is the methodology utilised itself which is 'ambivalent' to the real issues on the ground. Whilst many such studies of change across the whole post-Soviet space on the macro-scale involving large scale surveys and opinion polls have provided valuable information regarding trends and patterns, such studies often fail to capture some of the subtleties within the wider processes and test the theoretical assumptions upon which they were based.[151] One study in Zaporizhzhia directly addressed these issues, examining how nuances at the local level were interacting with debates surrounding national identity at the regional and state levels.[152] The author drew the conclusion that whilst the population may not seem to be active in the *formal* national debates surrounding national identity, as a result of economic problems and disillusionment with the current political regime, in actual fact they are heavily involved in the politics of identity. Furthermore, Jackson calls for more such in-depth research using qualitative research methods, including interviews, as a method to examine how the population is living out the tensions inherent in the contestation of a new post-Soviet Ukrainian identity in their daily lives.

3.6 A regional approach?

With the assumed importance attached to ethnic and linguistic markers seemingly misplaced and often exaggerated, the importance of other factors such as region of residence and socio-economic standing have been increasingly investigated. Pirie in his study of southern and

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[149] Leonid Kuchma, former director of *Yuzhmash*, the giant missile factory in Dnipropetrovsk, was first elected as President of Ukraine in 1994 and re-elected in 1999.
[150] Ryabchuk, M., "Ambivalence to Ambiguity: Why Ukrainians remain undecided?", op.cit., pp.1-7.
[151] Pilkington, H., *Russia's youth and its culture*, London: Routledge, 1994.
[152] Jackson, L., "Identity, Language and Transformation in Eastern Ukraine: A Case Study of Zaporizhzhia", in Kuzio, T., (ed.), *Contemporary Ukraine: Dynamics of Post-Soviet transformation*, Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1998, pp.99-113.

eastern Ukraine found that many respondents held shifting or multiple national identities. [153] He found that categories such as 'Russian' or 'Ukrainian' were over simplifications of a complex reality in which historic and demographic factors as well as language use and ethnicity were highly relevant in understanding forms of self-identification. Pirie's work was extremely relevant in dismissing the assumption that each individual holds one, overarching identity, which stays absolute across time. Instead, the study demonstrated the dynamism of processes of self-identification and the possibility that each individual can possess simultaneously several competing identities.

Recent studies also further question conceptualising identity in Ukraine solely in terms of ethnicity or language. A study of election results published in 2000, concluded that the division between those in favour and those against Ukrainian statehood does not coincide with ethnic, nor linguistic divisions.[154] Instead, the divide may be explained with reference to regions. Moreover, Barrington analysed the results of public opinion surveys conducted in 1998 in Ukraine, which sought to examine people's support for Ukrainian independence.[155] He found that rather than ethnicity and language use being the key determinants of people's attitudes towards Ukraine as an independent state, the region of residence emerged as the chief factor. As the author states,"the results indicate that, unlike other former Soviet states but like many countries in the West, the real impediments to unity in Ukraine may be related to where in the country one lives and how one is doing economically rather than who one is ethnically or what language one speaks."[156]

Moreover, in his study of Donbas in eastern Ukraine, Meyer argues that in this region socio-economic cleavages have been far more important than ethnic criteria for understanding processes of self-identification.[157] As he states,

> Russified Ukrainians, who share many of the concerns and demands of the ethnic Russian minority, dominate the Donbass institutions. They have used their resources and institutional/infrastructural power to co-opt the Russian minority in an alliance which makes political and economic demands in Kiev.

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[153] Pirie, P.S., National Identity and Politics in Southern and Eastern Ukraine, in *Europe-Asia Studies*, 48(7), 1996, pp.1079-1104.
[154] Birch, S., *Elections and Democratisation in Ukraine*, London: MacMillan, 2000.
[155] Barrington, L.W., "Region, Language, and Nationality: Rethinking Support in Ukraine for Maintaining Distance from Russia", in Kuzio, T. and D'Anieri, P., (eds.), *Dilemmas of State-Led Nation Building in Ukraine*, Westport, CT: Praeger, 2002, pp.131-146.
[156] Ibid, p.133.
[157] According to the 1989 Soviet census, Russians comprised 44.8 percent and 43.6 percent of the populations of Luhans'k and Donets'k oblasts respectively.

> However, their demands are not particularistic nor parochially ethnic in nature. Rather, the Donbass's Russians demands are regional, economic, cultural and political (but not ethno-political). Therefore the Russians of the Donbass, find it not necessary to mobilize as Russians *per se*, but as part of a larger, multiethnic, political alliance. Indeed, it seems that the Russian minority has found it more effective to pursue their ends by mobilizing around *social* ends, rather than ethnicity.[158]

The conclusions of such studies reinforce the view of Sasse that ethnic and regional fissures often crosscut rather than coincide with each other.[159] In such a way, often deep-rooted regional or sub-regional cleavages such as multi-ethnicity, cultural, historical or socio-economic factors that crosscut ethnic boundaries are disguised. Such results call into question previous attention on ethnic and linguistic divides.

3.7 Conclusions

This chapter has endeavored to 'map' identities in Ukraine. Whilst much focus has been on ethnic and linguistic differences across Ukraine and the need to overcome these fissures in order to create a coherent Ukrainian national identity, which will promote the country's future development, such assumptions have been demonstrated to be misplaced. This chapter argues for an examination of the 'regional' differences across Ukraine, and their effects on the state's nation-building policies. Research is thus required so as to investigate how the presence of such regional diversity may affect the role of the state in nation-building and what sort of policies may or may not be most suitable to implement. Chapter Five addresses these issues. Beforehand, chapter Four attempts to understand identity change in the post-Soviet space in general and Ukraine in particular are examined.

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[158] Meyer, D.J., "Why have Donbass Russians not ethnically mobilised like Crimean Russians have? An Institutional/Demographic Approach," in his *State and Nation Building in East Central Europe: Contemporary Perspectives*, NY: 1996, p.320.
[159] Sasse, G., "The 'New' Ukraine: A State of Regions", *Regional and Federal Studies*, vol.11, Special Issue no.3, Autumn 2001, pp.69-100(32).

CHAPTER FOUR: UNDERSTANDING IDENTITY CHANGE IN THE POST-SOVIET SPACE

> Only by moving grandly on the macroscopic level can we satisfy our intellectual curiosities. But only by moving minutely on the molecular level can our observations and explanations be adequately connected. So, if we would have our cake and eat it too, we must shuttle between the macroscopic and the molecular levels in instituting the problem *and* in explaining it.
>
> C. Wright Mills

4.1 Introduction

Whilst chapter Three sought to analyse the identity situation in Ukraine, this chapter places such 'mappings' of identity within the wider context of theoretical discussions concerning identity change across the post-Soviet space. It is highlighted how the role of the state in engineering identity change, theorized and conceptualised in chapter Two, certainly is given prominence in the existing dominant models of identity change within the specific context of the post-Soviet space.

The chapter argues that whilst the existing models place a great deal of attention on the role of the state in moulding identity change in a 'top-down' fashion, such one-dimensional frameworks simultaneously fail to take into account the dynamic nature of identity change. Thus, the chapter attempts to adjust and adapt such frameworks so as to formulate a new, interactive model, which illuminates the inherent complexities, contestations and contradictions within the dynamism between state and societal levels. In particular, it is demonstrated how much empirical research into identity change in post-Soviet Ukraine, particularly in the area of historiography, formed within the context of such state-led models, has concentrated on an analysis of the 'contents' of state-led projects. This has been to the detriment of any empirical scrutiny regarding how such projects are actually perceived by the population at large. Thus, the chapter posits a framework, which allows for the investigation of not only how the politics of identity are espoused at the state level, but how they are actually negotiated and perceived by sub-state actors at a variety of different levels. Such a framework forms the basis for the empirical investigations of the contemporary situation in Ukraine, laid out in the later chapters of this study, which examine the implementation of educational policies at the regional level and the reactions to them and their impact on the wider politics of identity across Ukraine.

4.2 Why do states attempt to engineer identity change in the post-Soviet space?

Before analysing the existing theoretical models, it is imperative to understand 'why' states attempt to affect national identity. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the emerging successor states all lacked the commonly held values, which underpin the overarching societal culture and identity of separate political communities. Therefore, the demise of the Soviet Union has necessitated a reconfiguration of the political space and a (re)forging of identities within the parameters of the new successor states.[160] As Tolz notes, all the post-Soviet states are engaged in two simultaneous and inter-linking processes. Whilst states have aimed to define state boundaries and create new political institutions which can inspire the loyalty of the citizenry, 'state building', also they have begun the process of determining the boundaries and characteristics of their specific national identity, 'nation building'.[161] As Geertz writes concerning the politics of identity as the chief question facing such states,

> It consists in defining, or trying to define, a collective subject to whom the actions of the state can be internally connected, in creating, or trying to create, an experiential 'we' from whose will the activities of government seem spontaneously to flow. [162]

Of particular relevance when studying such processes across the post-Soviet space, is the need to examine the fact that these processes of some sort of 'building' or 'construction' are also taking place simultaneously with the deconstruction of identities attached to the previous political order. As Beissenger notes, "the deconstruction of the former USSR remains an ongoing and potentially endless process, even after the USSR formally ceased to exist."[163]

Furthermore, one must take into account the importance of the representation of the 'other' in self-identification. Within the process of creating a coherent understanding of 'who *we* are' and what are *our* characteristics, there exists the simultaneous task of codifying and maintaining boundaries with the 'other'. Such a task is made even more important when there are no large ethnic and cultural differences between two national groups and where the two groups contest territory, history and cultural heritage. As Triandafyllidou argues, the

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[160] Wolczuk, K., "History, Europe and the 'National idea': The 'Official' Narrative of National Identity in Ukraine", in *Nationalities Papers*, Vol.28, No.4, 2000, pp.671-694.
[161] Tolz, V., "Forging the nation: National Identity and Nation Building in Post-Communist Russia", *Europe-Asia Studies*, vol.50, no.6, 1998, pp.993-1022.
[162] Geertz, C., *The interpretation of Cultures*, London: Harper Collins/Fontana, 1993, p.240.
[163] Beissenger, M., "Demise of an Empire-State: Identity, Legitimacy and the Deconstruction of Soviet Politics", Young, C., (ed.), *The Rising Tide of Cultural Pluralism, The Nation-State at Bay?* Madison: The University of Wisconsin, 1993, p.110.

existence of such 'significant others' can blur the distinctiveness of the in-group and pose a serious threat to the identity of that group.[164] As Prizel states, regarding the situation in Ukraine,

> Ukraine did not inherent a uniform national identity. Its post-Soviet nation and state building project is therefore bound up with a debate about how this identity will be constituted and in what manner its neighbours will be 'others'. Tensions with the neighbouring states shape this national identity because all identities require 'others' that are constantly evolving over time.[165]

Thus, when considering the theoretical models to understand national across the post-Soviet space, one needs to understand that whilst there are processes of 'making of nations' underway, these are taking place amidst processes of 'unmaking' and the 'untangling' of mixed identities, resulting from the historical legacies of the specific states.[166]

4.3 Defining 'nationalising' regimes

Brubaker states that the Soviet legacy of ethnoterritorial federalism conveys to state elites a powerful sense that the successor states of the USSR of which they were now in charge, 'belonged' to a particular ethnocultural nation of which the new states each bore the name.[167] These states were perceived as unrealised 'nation-states', that is states *of* and *for* a particular nation. Consequently, elites felt that they had the obligation to 'nationalise' these states, (re)fashioning national identities along ethnocultural lines. From such a justification, emerges the 'compensatory' 'national' policies in the fields of culture and language in particular, intended to overcome centuries of injustice, brought about by the lack of historical statehood of the nation and/or discrimination against by a dominant external group in the past. Whilst Brubaker's model certainly is useful for a generalised application to the 'national question' across post-communist states, when one attempts to extrapolate it onto specific case study states, some inherent inconsistencies emerge. The chief difficulty lies in the fact that the model assumes that there will necessarily be a full congruence between state discourse and

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[164] Triandafyllidou, A., "National Identity and the 'other'", *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 21(4), pp.593-612.
[165] Prizel, I., *National Identity and Foreign Policy: Nationalism and Leadership in Poland, Russia and Ukraine*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998, p.18.
[166] As Szporluk indicated, the making of a Ukrainian nation necessarily forces the remaking of the Russian nation, Szporluk, R., "Ukraine: From an Imperial Periphery to a Sovereign State," *Daedalus*, vol.126., no.3, 1997, pp.85-119.
[167] Brubaker, R., *Nationalism Reframed*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996, p.79.

policies actually implemented in practice, in the areas of economics, politics and culture, simultaneously providing no framework to utilise if such a situation is not the case.[168]

Smith develops Brubaker's concept, whilst examining only the case of post-Soviet states. Here, 'nationalising' elites are said to be engaging in reinventing and recodifying social boundaries that differentiate the homeland nation from other minorities.[169] In this regard, three boundary marker tendencies of the 'nationalising regime' can be identified, to historicise, essentialise, and totalise national identity.[170] Firstly, states attempt to *historicise* the nation; this involves dissecting from history particular events, personalities and places which symbolise the 'golden age' of the titular nation in an attempt to unify the population. Emphasizing one common trait defining the nation *essentialises* identity. This trait "is defined in terms of oppositions by either a common origin (our homeland, language, community) or a common structure of experience (colonisers/colonised, immigrants/indigenous) or both."[171] Finally the 'nationalising' elites endeavour to *totalise* differences. Relative differences are portrayed as absolute and irreconcilable. In such a way, the nation-builders are trying to manufacture distance between the titular nation and the national minorities, using the 'tools', which they have in hand. They try to create a 'national culture' by following policies of linguistic and cultural homogenisation, in an attempt to reverse the former colonial 'other's' policies.[172]

Smith's account of nation-building processes in post-Soviet states is useful in attempting to explain the desires and (in)actions of elites across this space. However Smith's framework follows Brubaker in making the dangerous assumption of a causal link between discourse and policy.[173] Both frameworks are also somewhat determinisic by making the assumption that post-communist elites necessarily will endorse 'national' policies to 'indigenise' the population along ethnocultural lines.

Such frameworks emphasising the role of the state as the main actor in the (re)fashioning of national identities across the post-Soviet space represent part of the dominant paradigm of state-centred 'top-down' approaches. They are utilised to assess changes occurring across

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[168] Wolczuk, K., "History , Europe and the 'National Idea'..., op.cit., p.675.
[169] Smith, G., "Post-Colonialism and Borderland Identities", in Smith, G. *et al.*, *Nation-building in the Post-Soviet Borderlands: The Politics of National Identity*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998, pp.1-20.
[170] Ibid.
[171] Ibid, p.15.
[172] Ibid, p.13.
[173] See Wolczuk, K, "History, Europe, and the 'National Idea'..., op.cit., pp.671-694.

post-communist Central and Eastern Europe. With the demise of communism, the emergence of new, independent states led to much research, focusing on politics at the state level. This work was heavily informed theoretically by political science, which previously was used to explain the 'transitions' across Latin America in the 1970s, an area where issues such as national identity and nationhood were less relevant than across post-communist Central and Eastern Europe.[174] Attention was thus paid to areas such as the development of political party systems and electoral results. These issues were overwhelmingly researched using quantitative research methods such as opinion polls, in which all-state results were statistically aggregated so as to allow cross-country comparisons.[175] However, a major shortcoming of such research has been its inability to examine politics at the sub-state level. Studies of the sub-state level so far have tended to focus on 'top-down' institutional change with the dominant approach being to assess the one-dimensional process of reforms of regional institutions, whilst omitting any reference to the issue of the dynamics of identity politics.[176]

4.4 'Tools' of the trade: state attempts at creating the 'nation' in the post-Soviet space

As argued in chapter Two, states have a variety of different options and tools available so as to engineer identity change and mould a coherent 'nation'. These include citizenship laws and what has been described as 'cultural symbolism', anthems and flags "with which nationalist regimes seek to imbue the population."[177] However, across the post-Soviet space, states have paid particular attention to two further areas, firstly the 'historicisation' of national identities, the (re) interpretation of historical events, myths and personalities; secondly, 'linguistic consolidation', in particular by way of the standardisation of the use of the state language in the public arena and in the education system.

Nationalist historians articulate a particular narrative of the past so as to rejuvenate and legitimate the new 'imagined community' and strengthen the important perceptions of boundaries, dividing 'us' from 'them'. Therefore, history is necessarily used in the projects

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[174] See Linz, J and Stepan, A., *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation*, Baltimore, MD: John Hopkins University Press, 1996; and O'Donnell, G., Schmitter, P., and Whitehead, L., (eds.), *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule. Prospects for Democracy*. Baltimore, MD: John Hopkins University Press, 1986.
[175] See Rose, R, and Haerpfner, C., *New Democracies Barometer V.A 12-Nation Survey*, Glasgow: Centre for the Study of Public Policy, University of Strathclyde, 1998.
[176] Hanson, P. and Gibson, J., (eds.), *Transformation from Below: Local Power and the Political Economy of Postcommunism*, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 1996; Kirchner, E., (ed.), *Decentralisation and Transition in the Visegrad*, Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1999.
[177] Breuilly, J., *Nationalism and the State*, 2nd edition, University of Chicago Press, 1994, p.277.

of present-day identity politics. Friedman explains this, "the politics of identity consist in anchoring the present in a viable past. The past is, thus, constructed according to the conditions and desires of those who produce historical textbooks in the present."[178]

As mentioned in chapter Two, states often use 'myths' as a means to legitimise the desired historical narrative.[179] Myths are seen as, "integrating phenomenon through which symbols of national identity acquire a coherent meaning."[180] Such myths are what Hobsbawm and Ranger have called the 'invention of tradition'. They argue that a fundamental role for political elites is to create legitimacy for the state through invented traditions. Tradition is not a matter of a fixed or given set of beliefs which are handed down or accepted passively. Tradition is very much a matter of present-day politics, about the way in which powerful institutions function to select particular values from the past, and to mobilize them in contemporary practices.[181] As Barthes states, history is,

> Like a 'rag and bone shop', which can be ransacked at certain key political moments for usable garbage which is then dusted off, refitted and worn to meet particular needs. If the desired result is a form of collective memory, it can only work by insisting on a form of collective amnesia as well. The end result is a 'myth', in the sense of reality purged of history and politics and rendered as some kind of commonsense.[182]

Plausible myths provide often diverse and politically passive populations with a sense of a collective past with which the muddled present can be more clearly elucidated. However, in the project of identity politics, it is not important whether myths are wholly true or not. What is important is that certain myths are selectively identified and utilised to legitimise present day political realities. As Freidman clearly states, "objective history may be what historians should strive to write, but in reality, objective history is as much a myth as states being wholly civic."[183] However, it is imperative to state that historians or political elites cannot simply 'invent' myths. There must be some legitimacy of the myths used by the 'official' narrative within contemporary popular historical memory. As Wanner argues, the crafting of

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[178] Freidman, J., "Myth, History and Political Identity", *Cultural Anthropology*, vol.7, no.2, 1992, p.207.
[179] For a thorough examination of the use of myths within the construction of national identity, please refer back to chapter Two, in particular, section entitled, 'Narrating the nation'.
[180] Armstrong, J., "Myth and History in the evolution of Ukrainian consciousness", in Potichnyi, P.J., (ed.), *Ukraine and Russia in their Historical Encounter*, Edmonton, 1992, p.133.
[181] Hobsbawm, E.J and Ranger, T., *The Invention of Traditions*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1983.
[182] Barthes, R., *Mythologies*, London: Paladin, 1973, p.15.
[183] Freidman, J., "Past in the future: History and the Politics of Identity", *American Anthropologist*, vol.94, no.4, pp.837-859.

the nation through the use of historical myths and symbols involves not only the 're-interpretation' of previous historical personalities and events, but also their 'authentication'.[184] The aim is for popular experiences and memories to mirror the state-led narratives of the 'national history'. This creates a strong and essential link between the state and its citizenry, providing the cultural underpinning of state legitimacy.[185] A difficulty in Ukraine as well as across the whole post-Soviet space is that the public space is highly discredited as history was heavily manipulated throughout the Soviet period so as to legitimate the Soviet state's own historical narrative and overall political and ideological project.

Thus, the post-Soviet states have been seen to be in the throes of reclaiming their pasts and reviving national historiographies, which aid the consolidation of the national state.[186] In particular, these states search for their 'lost' history in order to confirm that a 'golden era' once existed, upon which the legitimation of the new, independent state can be based.[187] However, it is important to note that the degree and rate of such changes have varied considerably across the various states, owing to the specific legacies of each state. The former Soviet states all inherited populations, to varying degrees, divided by fissures such as ethnicity, religion and language. As a result, in the area of historiography as in wider discussions concerning how national identities should be constructed, there has been a great deal of contestation. In particular, commentators have described how in each of the post-Soviet societies, some people have been supportive of the promotion of the titular, core culture (nativists). At the same time, others who during the period of Soviet rule, had assimilated into the dominant culture of the former imperial power, have resisted the nationalization of historiography (assimilados).[188] Thus, Kuzio states how in Ukraine and Kazakhstan, national historiography is being revived simultaneously with the rejection of former Soviet historical myths whilst in Belarus, a Russian/Soviet historiography is being maintained so as to support the pan-Slavic ideology of Lukashenko's regime.[189] Similarly, it has been argued that one of the distinguishing features of post-Soviet states has been the political and ideological relationship in each state between the former Communist elites and

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[184] Wannner, C., Historical narratives, Personal narratives: ethnographic perspectives on nation-ness in post-Soviet Ukraine, *Harriman Review*, vol.8, no.2, Spring 1996, pp.11-15.
[185] Ibid.
[186] Kuzio, T., "History, Memory, and Nation Building in the Post-Soviet Colonial Space", *Nationalities Papers*, vol.30, no.2, 2002, pp.241-264.
[187] Eriksen, T.H., *Ethnicity and Nationalism. Anthropological Perspectives*, London: Pluto Press, 1993, p.69.
[188] Kuzio, "History, Memory, and Nation Building in the Post-Soviet Colonial Space, op.cit., p.250.
[189] Ibid, p.241.

the nationalists.[190] Abdewal divides the post-Soviet states into three groups. The first of which, includes the three Baltic republics, in which the nationalist movements' desires for a 'return to Europe' and a portrayal of Russia as a distinct 'other' has been relatively uncontested and formed the main ingredients of government policies. The second group consists of Ukraine, Georgia, Azerbaijan and Moldova, states where the nationalists and Communists have remained comparatively equal in force, each side buttressed by societal support divided along regional lines. As a result, government policy has been immobile, unable to decisively follow a political course, either to the East or West. Finally, the third group consists of Belarus and the Central Asian republics. In these societies, the nationalist movements have been effectively marginalised, with their political ideas rejected by the state elites and society at large.[191]

4.5 Integrating Ukraine's historical past(s)

Upon gaining independence in 1991, as was examined in chapter Three, the Ukrainian state inherited a population, which was divided across cultural, linguistic, religious and regional lines. Such a situation necessarily makes the state's tasks of creating an all-embracing 'national history' highly difficult. Issues include whether the former centre, Russia, is to be seen as an 'other' and what sort of historical representations are to be used in the state's historical narrative.[192]

The state's difficulties derive from its various regions all having been parts of Ukrainian 'national history' at various times and to varying degrees over the previous centuries, but never together as one over any significant period of time. The diverse historical narratives of various regions of Ukraine have simultaneously, whilst playing roles in Ukrainian 'national history', played no less insignificant roles in the histories of several of Ukraine's historical neighbours in their own identity projects, namely under Austro-Hungarian, Russian and finally Soviet rule.[193] The major task for the state is how to integrate competing narratives of the past across Ukraine into a coherent, single, uniting national history. The state faces the

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[190] Abdewal, R., "Memories of nations and states: Institutional history and national identity in Post-Soviet Eurasia," *Nationalities Papers*, vol.30, no.3, 2002, pp.459-484.
[191] Ibid, pp.459-460.
[192] For a wide-ranging discussion of these issues, see Kuzio, T., "History, Memory and Nation-Building in the Post-Soviet Colonial Space", op.cit, 2002; and Abdewal, R., "Memories of Nations and States, op.cit., pp.459-484.
[193] See Wilson, A., *Ukrainian Nationalism in the 1990s: A Minority Faith*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1997, p.25

challenge of reconciling different interpretations while simultaneously avoiding the creation of new myths and narratives which pull apart a diverse population unsure of its past.

As Janmaat outlined, as a result of the diverse historical experiences of various regions of Ukraine, events, symbols and personalities, which could be utilised to unite the population, are few and far between.[194] The task of the state however becomes even more complicated when it is seen that precisely the few historical events, individuals and symbols, which could become the backbone of a Ukrainian national historiography clash with Soviet/Russian versions. The state elites are faced with a dilemma. On the one hand, they may be reluctant to create a radical Ukrainian 'national history' and incorporate it into the education system for fear that there may be a strong backlash from the areas of Ukraine, mainly in the east and the south.[195] Here, the population may not be ready to see Russia as a real 'other', as something distinct, separate and foreign. However, at the same time, there remains the danger that if some sort of split away from the Russian/Soviet version of events is not promulgated, then this will greatly reduce the legitimacy of the Ukrainian nation and state.[196]

Regarding Ukraine's relationship to Russia, no real agreement has been reached at elite or societal levels. As Kuzio states in his study of Ukrainian political parties' relationship to Russia as an 'other', there remains a great deal of disagreement.[197] Whilst the right-wing more nationalistically minded parties portray Russia as a foreign 'other', left wing parties such as the Communist Party of Ukraine and the Socialist Party of Ukraine instead see the West as the real 'other'. In the centre, things, unsurprisingly, become more complicated. The Centrists tend to see Russia as an 'other' in simple territorial terms, but not in the more contested ethnic and cultural terms. The centre-right, whilst supporting an inclusive, civic state, nevertheless, agree with the nationalist right that the Tsarist and Soviet past must be portrayed in a negative light.

Such a lack of consensus highlights the fact that across Ukraine, rival historical narratives are at work, each with different interpretations of Ukraine's past and its relations with Russia. Commentators have attempted to simplify these debates by stating that there are two key

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[194] Janmaat, J.G *Nation-Building in Post-Soviet Ukraine. Educational Policy and the Response of the Russian-Speaking Population*, Netherlands Geographical Society, 2000, p.86.
[195] An idea strongly promulgated by Wilson, see Wilson, A., *Ukrainian Nationalism in the 1990s,* op.cit., pp.157-161.
[196] Ibid.
[197] Kuzio, T., "Identity and nation building in Ukraine: Defining the other", *Ethnicities*, vol.1, no.2, pp.233-255.

historical narratives, which hold sway in Ukraine today. These have been called things, such as the 'Soviet' camp versus the 'Ukrainian traditional' camp.[198] The two groups hold competing discourses, the former tending to form a more pro Russian/Soviet interpretation of Ukrainian-Russian historical relations, in particular highlighting the cultural, linguistic and religious closeness which has developed between the two groups over the centuries. The latter is critical of the Tsarist and Soviet past in respects to Ukraine, and instead aims to highlight the ancient and 'golden' history of the Ukrainian nation, as distinct from Russia.

Concerning concrete state attempts to 'historicise' national identity in Ukraine, much academic attention has been placed on the shifting nature of the 'content' of school history textbooks.[199] The results of such studies attest to the fact that the Ukrainian state has indeed shifted away from Soviet versions of Ukrainian historiography towards more 'national' narratives of Ukrainian history. However, reacting to the results of such research, there has been a somewhat 'self-congratulatory' response by certain advocates of the imposition of Ukrainian national historiography.[200] Similarly Popson argues that the fact that similar history textbooks are utilised across different regions of Ukraine testifies to the fact that "there is little opposition to the introduction of a more national history for Ukrainian youth education."[201]

Such commentators seemingly consider the shifting content of school textbooks and their widespread use across the whole territory of Ukraine, as sufficient evidence that the state-led policies are well on course and such attempts are bound to succeed over time. However, there is surely a further necessity to empirically scrutinise to what extent such shifts in historical narrative are really bringing about changes in individuals' view of Ukraine's past. This 'gap' in the research field has indeed been taken up by one study, which examined how in the Ukrainian army, the Ukrainian state used historiography in an effort to increase national

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[198] Hrytsak.Y., "Yak vikladati istoriyu Ukraini pislya 1991 roky?", in *Ukrainsk'a Istorychna Dydaktyka: Mizhnarodni Dialog*, Kiev, Geneza, 2000, pp.63-75.
[199] Please see the numerous contributions of Ukrainian textbook authors and Ukrainian commentators in the above, *Ukrains'ka Dydaktyka*. In the English language, Janmaat, J.G., *Nation-Building in Post-Soviet Ukraine: Educational Policy and the Response of the Russian-Speaking Population*, University of Amsterdam, Netherlands Geographical Society, 2000, especially chapter 4 and Popson, N., "The Ukrainian History Textbook: Introducing Children to the "Ukrainian nation.", *Nationalities Papers*, vol.29, no.2, 2001.
[200] See Kuzio, T., "The Nation-building Project in Ukraine and Identity: Toward a Consensus", in Kuzio, T. and D' Anieri, P., (eds.), *Dilemmas of State-Led Nation Building in Ukraine*, Westport, CT: Praeger, 2002, p21.
[201] See Popson, N., "Conclusion: Regionalism and Nation Building in a Divided Society", in Kuzio and D'Anieri, *Dilemmas of State-Led Nation Building*, op.cit., p.201.

consciousness within the ranks.[202] The author demonstrates how efforts to 'ukrainianise' the armed forces were divisive, introducing myths and symbols, which were rejected in many regions of Ukraine. Using qualitative research methods including interviews as well as content analysis of various textbooks, the results highlighted how many servicemen rejected outright the state-led efforts to focus on key moments of Ukrainian 'national-liberation struggle' such as the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) during and after World War II. Similarly, Fesiak draws attention to the real problem of 'how' the 'message' in the textbooks was actually transferred to the servicemen. He states how a major problem occurred with the teaching staff who, often according to their region of residence, would present the materials in different ways. The author concludes that regional differences represent great obstacles to the creation of any overarching identity. Secondly, the author states that a state policy which reflects Ukraine's varied historical, cultural and regional traditions may prove far more beneficial for the state in the long term, than assertive 'nationalising' programmes, which do more to divide than unite.[203] Such research provides an example of the need for similar research which attempts to move beyond analysis of the 'contents' of state-led nation building policies, towards an examination of how such policies are negotiated and contested at a variety of sub-state levels.

4.6 Language as a tool in the politics of identity

Turning to the area of cultural standardisation, special importance has been attached to the creation of a common national language across the post-Soviet space. The institutionalisation and promotion of the state language in the state bureaucracy, government and education system is bound up with the desire to reverse the former Soviet policies of 'russification'.[204] Thus, whilst the titular nations were compelled to learn Russian, Russian migrants who moved into the Soviet republics had no need to learn the titular language. As in the area of historiography, there has been a great deal of variance across the post-Soviet states in respect of the promotion of the national language. To take two extreme examples, whereas in Belarus, Belarus and Russian are both state languages, in Latvia and Estonia a knowledge of Latvian and Estonian is taken as a condition of citizenship with the Russian language having

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[202] Fesiak, A., "Nation Building in the Ukrainian Military", in Kuzio, T., and D'Anieri, P., (eds.), *Dilemmas of State-Led Nation Building*, op.cit, pp.147-170.
[203] Ibid, p.166.
[204] Smith, G., "Post-Colonialism and Borderland Identities," in Smith, G. et al., *Nation-building in the Post-Soviet Borderlands: The Politics of National Identity*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998, p.17.

no official status, leading to these states being labelled as 'ethnic democracies'.[205] In these states, the titular nation, thanks to this particular form of state 'nationalising', has been able to take up a superior position for itself – in the political legislature, legal and education systems – to the expense of the Russian settlers who are deprived of certain political rights. In the remaining states, whilst such 'extreme' policies have not been introduced, nevertheless there has been a high degree of variance from state to state. For example, in the Central Asian republic of Kazakhstan, policies in this regard have been highly ambiguous. Whilst in 1995, the Russian language in the Kazakh Constitution was afforded 'official' status, in an effort to appease the Russians living in the republic, there has been sparse evidence suggesting that this policy has been fully implemented.[206] Yet evidence points to policies privileging the titular nation in areas such as the gaining of public sector employment at the expense of the Russian minorities, in particular.[207] Also, in terms of political representation in the Kazakh parliament, there is a growing over-representation of the titular nation. Whilst, Kazakhs make up only 28 percent of the electorate, the proportion of Kazakh deputies grew from 53 percent in 1990 upto 65 percent in 1995, whereas the Slavic representation fell from 37.5 percent to 33 percent.[208]

Language in Ukraine: the politics of identity

As demonstrated in the previous chapter, Ukraine is a state which inherited upon the fall of the Soviet Union, a population divided on the issue of language, with not only large numbers of ethnic Russian, but also ethnic Ukrainians, seeing the Russian language as their native tongue. Such a situation has led to heated debates in Ukraine concerning state attempts to 'ukrainianise' the population linguistically.[209] Essentially, there are two opposing camps, offering extremely different perspectives on the politics of language in Ukraine. Firstly, one camp argues that there is a need to reverse the homogenising and assimilating policies which

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[205] Smith, G., "The ethnic democracy thesis and the citizenship question in Estonia and Latvia", *Nationalities Papers*, 24(2), 1996, pp.199-216.
[206] Kolsto, P., (ed.), *Nationbuilding and Ethnic Integration in Bipolar Societies. The Cases of Latvia and Kakazhstan*, Oslo: University of Oslo, 1998.
[207] Smith et al., *Nation building in the Post-Soviet borderlands...*, op.cit., p.142.
[208] Kolsto, (ed), *Nationbuilding and Ethnic Integration in Bipolar Societies. The Cases of Latvia and Kazakhstan*, Oslo: University of Oslo, 1998.
[209] For thorough and wide-ranging discussions of these issues, see Janmaat, J.G., *Nation-Building in Post-Soviet Ukraine: Educational Policy and the Response of the Russian-Speaking Population*, Amsterdam, University of Amsterdam, 2000; Solchanyk, R., *Ukraine and Russia: The Post-Soviet Transition*, Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2001, pp.135-158; Arel, D., "Language Politics in Independent Ukraine: Towards One or Two State Langauges? *Nationalities Papers*, no.3, pp.597-622; Ryabchuk, M., "Culture and Cultural Politics in Ukraine: A Postcolonial Perspective", in Kuzio, T. and D'Anieri, P., (eds.), *Dilemmas of State-Led Nation Building*, pp.47-70.

promoted the Russian language throughout the Tsarist and Soviet periods, at the expense of the now threatened Ukrainian language.[210] Such a specific, state-led programme is said to have led to the artificial 'de-Ukrainianisation' of large segments of Ukraine's population. Thus, the Ukrainian state is said to have the duty and the moral right to reverse such processes. Making Ukrainian the sole state language in Ukraine is the only way of guaranteeing its long term survival, and repairing the damage done in the past. In this way, promotion of the Ukrainian language can bring about consensus and commitment to the broader changes which are required to ensure Ukraine' future development.[211] Reacting to critics of such a policy who see it as 'illiberal' in that it favours the titular majority (Ukrainians) over other ethnic groups in Ukraine's population, Kuzio asserts that nation and state building at varying junctures in all states has always favoured the titular culture and language.[212] Kuzio argues that pure, civic states simply do not exist, and that the Western 'civic' states, are to varying degrees, based on the culture, traditions and language of the dominant titular ethnic group.

Ryabchuk has argued that despite the rhetoric of the state elites in Kiev, state policies have not gone far enough to shift the language situation in Ukraine. Riabchuk argues that Ukraine is in a classic post-colonial condition, where its indigenous local culture is still being compelled to compete with the former imperial culture, emanating from Moscow. Ukraine has been left scarred by the "domination of the 'first world' of urban, modern, Russian-language civilization, over the 'third world' civilization of village, backward, Ukrainian-language."[213] This has led to the legacies of 'Ukrainophobia' or more exactly, 'Ukrainophonophobia', still being used by the local nomenklatura, ensuring that Ukrainophone Ukrainians continue to see themselves as second-class citizens in Ukraine. Ryabchuk argues that such individuals are enticed to the 'bright lights' of the large Ukrainian cities, where in a predominantly Russian cultural milieux, Russophone Ukrainians are the key players in the fields of media and politics. Here Ryabchuk states that a 'creole' nationalism exists among Ukraine's post-Soviet Russophone elite which,

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[210] Wurm, S.A., "Languages in Danger. The Life and Death of the World's Languages", *Multiethnica*, 24-25, pp.28-35.
[211] Kuzio, T., "The Nation-Building Project in Ukraine and Identity: Towards a Consensus", in Kuzio, T. and D'Anieri, P., (eds.),*Dilemmas of State-Led Nation Building*, op.cit., pp.9-28.
[212] Ibid, p.15.
[213] Ryabchuk, M., "Vid Malorosii do Ukrainy. Paradoksy zapizniloho natsiietvorennia", Kiev: *Krytyka,* 2000, p.140.

> In political terms...are quite "Ukrainian", i.e. quite supportive of state independence, territorial integrity and many historical myths and symbols shared with Ukrainophones. In cultural and linguistic terms, however, it is rather "Russian" in nature, i.e. unsympathetic to Ukrainophones (with their allalleged "western Ukrainian nationalistic obsession") and is thoroughly biased against the Ukrainian language and culture.[214]

However, at the same time, is "anti-Ukrainian":

> We can compare this creole elite with the Latin American elite, which did not win independence for itself to unite with local Indians and build for their benefit a state of Aztecs, Mayans or Quechuas – or to once again unite with Spain or Portugal. In some cases this creole elite was able to completely destroy the Indians, in others- for the struggle with the [former] metropol and the legitimization of its rule – to incorporate Indian leaders in its ranks, to pillage their symbolism, to pronounce the Quechuan language the 'state' [language] and even begin to use it for ritual purposes – but of course this elite will never speak the Indian language with their 'white' wives, children and grandchildren, and in general will never treat their native entourage seriously.[215]

Ryabchuk here is referring to the half-hearted 'ukrainisation' policies undertaken by President Kuchma's regime. It is argued that 'national-democrats' are given ministries in education and the cultural spheres, in an attempt to 'keep the nationalists happy', whilst the pro-presidential Russophone elites holding real power can be left to carry on keeping the anti-Ukrainian *status-quo* in place, and hence their own political power.[216]

In stark contrast, the opposing viewpoint sees the Ukrainian/Russian language question as a potential source of conflict in Ukraine.[217] Thus, in order to avoid alienating the large number of Russian speakers in Ukraine, of Russian and Ukrainian ethnic origin, a policy of *status-quo* is advocated. This rejects the state-led promotion of the Ukrainian language at the expense of the Russian language and instead calls forward a 'liberal' toleration of linguistic pluralism. Furthermore, in a recent provocative essay, it is argued that if the goal of state-led policies is to create political consensus, then the Ukrainian state should veer away from policies aimed at highlighting the differences between Ukrainians and Russians.[218] Instead,

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[214] Ryabchuk, M., "A Future Ukraine: One Nation, Two Languages, Three Cultures?", *The Ukrainian Weekly*, 6th June 1999.
[215] Ibid, p.8.
[216] Ryabchuk, M., "Dve Ukrayini", Kiev: *Krytyka*, 10, 2001.
[217] For an overview of such a position, refer to Laitin, D. *Identity in Formation: The Russian-speaking Populations in the Near Abroad*, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998, pp.178-180.
[218] Shulman, S "The Internal-External Nexus in the formation of Ukrainian National Identity: The Case for Slavic Integration", in Kuzio, T. and D'Anieri, (eds.), *Dilemmas of State-Led Nation Building*, op.cit., pp.103-130.

Shulman, relying on survey results regarding attitudes to Russia, proposes the promotion of a 'East-Slavic' identity, focusing on the closeness of the two ethnic groups. Moreover, the claim by proponents of the state-led linguistic 'ukrainisation' programme that during the Tsarist and Soviet periods, many ethnic Ukrainians were simultaneously 'de-ukrainianised' and 'russified' is questioned. Wilson avoids the term 'russification' as he states, "it assumes loyalty to Ukrainian language and culture which may not have existed. Many Russophone Ukrainians have indeed been deprived of access to their native language and culture; others have always existed in a Russophone environment."[219] As Lieven argues, regarding the history of interaction of Russians and Ukrainians in Donbas, it is important to realise that many of the Ukrainians *and* Russians in the Donbas in the Soviet times, were not actually 'denationalised', as they did not have any real national consciousness in the first place. Much of the population was illiterate and the entire cultural and educational shaping of the newly urbanised populations took place in a Soviet context. To coin, the famous Soviet phrase, their identities were truly 'cooked in the worker's pot'.[220]

As regards the state's actual actions and policies in the education system, there have been concerted efforts to promote the Ukrainian language. In 1991, the Ministry of Education established the plan for the State programme of developing Ukrainian and other National Languages in Ukraine until 2000.[221] Also, Ukrainian language would become a compulsory subject in all education establishments with the proportion of children learning in Ukrainian corresponding to the actual percentage of ethnic Ukrainians within the population. In the period 1991/2-1998/9, the percentage of schoolchildren instructed in Ukrainian rose from 49.3 to 65 percent. Similarly in this same period, the percentage of children instructed in Russian fell from 50 to 34 percent.[222] However, such results hide large regional differences in the take-up of the ukrainisation project, shown by the very low proportion of children learning in the Ukrainian language in Luhans'k and Crimea in 1998 at 13.2 percent and 0.4 percent respectively.[223] As Stepanenko notes, there is a need to try and look beyond the statistics, which sometimes mask realities on the ground.

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[219] Wilson, A., *Ukrainian Nationalism in the 1990s: A Minority Faith*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997, p214, 256.
[220] Lieven, A., Ukraine and Russia: A fraternal rivalry, 1999, Washington D.C: U.S Institute of Peace, p.51-52.
[221] Shevchenko, V., "Zakon pro movy: shliakhy realizatsii," (The Act on Languages: Ways of Implementation), *Osvita*, 9th July 1991. Referenced in Stepanenko, V., "Identities and Language Politics in Ukraine: The challenges of Nation-State Building," in Daftary, F. and Grin, F., (eds.), *Nation-Building, Ethnicity and Language Politics in Transition Countries*, Budapest: Open Society Institute, 2003, pp.109-135.
[222] Prybytkova, I., (1998) "Movu namo dano...(The Language was given to us...).", *Sociologia: Teoria, metody, marketing*, 1-2: p.240, referenced in the above article by Shevchenko, V.
[223] Ibid.

> There is much evidence pointing towards the formally administrative character of nationalization reform, which often relies merely on the formal re-naming of Russian schools into Ukrainian ones. The situation where the majority of subjects are taught in Russian in nominally Ukrainian (or bilingual) schools is common practice, particularly in the regions of southern and eastern Ukraine.[224]

As the author notes, statistical accounts would be more reliable if they were based on the number of teachers who actually teach their subjects either in Ukrainian or Russian.[225] Further research also highlights that many children attending Ukrainian schools in central, southern and eastern Ukraine, prefer to communicate with friends and family in Russian.[226] Whilst much academic attention has been devoted to analysing the aggregated statistics of the shifts in language use in the educational system at the macro level, more in-depth qualitative research is required to confirm such results and identify any trends which were failed to be observed by such methodology.[227]

4.7 Contestation and negotiation: the need for a regional 'dynamic' nexus

This research is informed by an understanding of the need to move beyond one-dimensional, top-down approaches towards a more, fluid and dynamic approach to our understanding of the politics of national identity. In particular, attention should be focused on the *dynamic nexus* between the state and the sub-state levels.[228] Research must examine not only national-level policies, but also how the sub-state politics of identity simultaneously inform developments at the state level. An emerging body of work, which recognises the regional dimension to questions surrounding identity, informs this approach, examining how regional responses to national and European-level developments are articulated.[229]

In the case of Ukraine, there have been calls for such an approach to be taken. As pointed out above, in the conclusions of her study of the Zaporizhzhia region in Southeastern Ukraine, Jackson argues that whilst most of the population may not be actively involved in the formal

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[224] Stepanenko, "Identities and Language Politics in Ukraine: The Challenges of Nation-State Building", in Daftary, F and Grin, F., (eds.), *Nation-Building, Ethnicity and Language Politics in Transition Countries*, Budapest: Open Society Institute, 2003, pp.109-135.
[225] Ibid, p.125.
[226] Masenko, L., (1999) *Mova i polityka* (Language and Politics), Kiev: Soniashnyk, quoted in Ibid, p.126.
[227] See Janmaat, J.G., "Language Politics in Education and the Response of the Russians in Ukraine," *Nationalities Papers*, vol.27, no.3, 1999, pp.475, 478.
[228] Wolczuk, K., "Conclusions: Identities, Regions and Europe", in Batt, J and Wolczuk, K., (eds.), *Region, State and Identity in Central and Eastern Europe (The Case Series in regional and federal studies)*, London: Frank Cass, 2002, p.204.
[229] Ibid.

debate of national identity, they are still heavily involved in the politics of identity.[230] The results of her study indeed highlighted how whilst the impact of questions of national identity on formal politics such as influencing voting patterns has been readily researched in Ukraine, scant attention was paid to how the debates surrounding national identity at the state level were being played out at the local level, where the inherent tensions and complexities in the process of national identity construction were being contested.[231]

Furthermore, in Ukraine, a state which has been viewed in many respects as weak and ineffective, the effectiveness of state policies aimed at 'nationalising' a population cannot be presupposed.[232] Instead, research should take into account the three hypotheses, formulated by Kubicek.[233] The first hypothesis states that over time, regional differences can be eradicated by the efforts of the 'nationalising' state. The second scenario, on the contrary, downplays the ability of the state to alter regional differences, which have developed over time through different historical experiences. Finally, the third hypothesis seeks a compromise between the two contrasting positions. It agrees with the first hypothesis that people's identities can be reformulated whilst living in a single state. However, such processes cannot be seen as a simplistic one-way process, leading to an integrated national community over a short period of time. Rather, state efforts to affect identity change will be negotiated by individuals.

Thus, attention must be paid to the active, dynamic and contested nature of such identities. As Schlesinger states, 'national culture' is a site of perpetual *contestation*, both intra and inter-nationally. The achievement of a national culture cannot be seen as a one-off task which having been completed could as easily be undone. Instead, it must be viewed as a continuous problematic process. Thus, in this study, there are assessed state attempts to institutionalise a 'national culture' in the education system and how such attempts have been ***perceived*** and ***negotiated*** by a variety of different sub-state actors. In this way, this research modifies part of Brubaker's theoretical model. Brubaker argues that post-Soviet states implement 'nationalising' policies in response to the 'perceived' threat of an organised and self-

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[230] Jackson, L., *The Construction of National Identity in Ukraine: A Regional Perspective*, PhD thesis, University of Birmingham, 1998, pp.182-193.
[231] See Arel, D. and Wilson, A., "The Ukrainian parliamentary elections", *RFE/RL Research Report*, 3(26), 1st July, 1994, pp.6-17; and Holdar, S., "Torn between East and West: The regional factor in Ukrainian politics", *Post-Soviet Geography*, 36(2), February 1995, pp.112-132.
[232] Nordberg, M., "State and Institution Building in Ukraine", Kuzio, T (ed.), *Contemporary Ukraine: The Dynamics of Post-Soviet Transformations*, Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1998.
[233] Kubicek, P. "Regional Polarisation in Ukraine: Public Opinion, Voting and Legislative Behaviour", *Europe-Asia Studies*, vol.52, no.2, 2000, pp.273-294.

conscious national minority, which may have the protection of an external kin state to rely on.[234] The issue of 'perception' is central to Brubaker's thesis, where the author states how a state can be seen to be 'nationalising' by national minorities even if it is not in reality. However, in the case of Ukraine, where the titular ethnic Ukrainian majority is certainly not a unified, homogenous nation, it is posited that it may be worthwhile to examine how state 'national' policies are perceived not only by the national minorities, but across the whole of the population. Thus, this work seeks to improve understanding of processes of nation building across the post-Soviet space. Rather than solely debating theoretically whether a state can be classified as 'nationalising' or not by analysing the 'contents' of its policies, it may be beneficial to investigate how the state-led nation-building policies are 'perceived' across the society in different regions. From this, one can gain an insight into what constraints such 'perceptions', whether true or not, pose for the state. This research moves forward ideas expressed in Wanner's work, where the author examined how the 'national idea' is articulated, contested, negotiated and perhaps institutionalised, in Ukrainian schools.[235] In this study, a more systematic approach is utilised, involving research in a number of schools across specific study regions, thus allowing for a comparative perspective to be gained.

In particular, chapter Seven concerns itself with the revised state narratives of Ukrainian history, now taught in Ukrainian schools, paying attention to how the historical evolution of the Ukrainian nation is described. Here attention is placed not only on how an understanding of a 'we' is generated, but also how the 'other' is defined. In chapters Seven and Eight, it is examined how the portrayal of the 'Ukrainian nation' and the 'other' found in the textbooks is negotiated and perceived, by regional actors, that is by history teachers and pupils in schools across three chosen case study regions of Ukraine. In particular, attention is focused on how the Ukrainian nation is conceptualised by these actors, drawing attention to what extent these conceptions complement or contradict the 'official' message.

4.8 Conclusions

This chapter has critically examined existing approaches to understand identity change in the post-Soviet space. The conclusion drawn is that such existing models fail to fully take into

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[234] Brubaker, R., *Nationalism Reframed*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996, pp.55-76.
[235] Wanner, C., *Burden of Dreams: History and Identity in Post-Soviet Ukraine*, University Park, PA: Pennsylvania University Press, 1998, pp.79-120.

account the dynamism and fluidity of national identity. The chapter demonstrates how in the case of Ukraine, the dominance of such theoretical models has led to academic study focussing on the 'contents' of state-led nation-building projects, specifically in the areas of history teaching and language policy. Yet, this has been at the expense of in-depth micro studies, examining the implementation and reception and impact of such policies at the local and individual levels. Thus, such frameworks are modified to provide a more interactive model, taking into consideration the dynamism between state and sub-state levels. It is envisaged that such a model can provide the framework for the empirical scrutiny of not only state policies aimed to affect national identity, but also how popular attitudes towards the Ukrainian state affect processes of identity construction. The findings of such empirical enquiry are discussed in chapters Seven, Eight and Nine. Furthermore, with the research, taking place at specific sites in three distinct regions, one can gain a greater understanding of the importance of the 'regional' factor in national identity construction in Ukraine. This factor is taken up in the following chapter Five.

CHAPTER FIVE: HOW MANY UKRAINES? REGIONALISM AND THE POLITICS OF IDENTITY

> No one can really say what is happening in Ukraine, or where the country as a whole is heading – as you can in Poland, for example – because no one can grasp the country as a whole. The different areas are totally different. The people in some of them hardly know each other, and the politicians have completely different priorities. That doesn't mean that the country will break up – what happens is that the center and the regions circle slowly around each other, trying to extract concessions. What it does mean, though, is that it makes it even more difficult to carry out economic reform – coherent economic reform, let alone radical reforms. There are just too many different interests involved all of them powerful, and none of them capable of gaining overall dominance.[236]

5.1 Introduction

This chapter examines in detail the role that the 'region' plays in Ukraine. Although much attention has focused on the 'west-east' divide, generating a series of broad generalisations, such a depiction fails to illuminate the inherent regional nuances across the country and thus highlight the actual idiosyncrasies of regional diversity across Ukraine. Instead, it is argued that as a result of Ukraine's pronounced historical diversity, there is a need to deconstruct the state into more specific, smaller regional units. However the task of defining regions in Ukraine has been far from straightforward, in a country where regional boundaries are more fluid than rigid. Various frameworks have been forwarded, dividing Ukraine according to a variety of different criteria, such as socio-economic characteristics, political persuasion, ethno-linguistic characteristics and experiences of historical rule. One of these frameworks, an eight-region model is used here as a 'skeleton' for defining regions in Ukraine.[237] Yet, to this model, the existence of a further two separate regions are justified, creating a model of ten regions. This chapter in particular attempts to deconstruct the notion of 'Eastern Ukraine' as a single, homogenous space. Three oblasts, all situated adjacent to the Ukrainian-Russian border, are chosen as ideal 'sites' for the focus of the study, in which local, in-depth qualitative research can take place. Whilst macro-level studies provide a general overview of mass political attitudes, they do not explain the subtleties within the wider processes of identity change. This study aims to provide an in-depth study, which seeks to examine

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[236] Lieven, A., *Ukraine and Russia: A fraternal rivalry*, Washington DC: Institute of Peace Press, 1999, p.79, author's interview with a Western diplomat in 1994.
[237] Barrington, L.W., Herron, E.S., "One Ukraine or many? Regionalism in Ukraine and its Political Consequences", *Nationalities Papers*, vol.32, no.1, March 2004, pp.53-86.

people's perceptions of regionalised notions of nationhood at the micro level and the meanings attached to them.

5.2 Difficulties in defining Ukrainian regionalism: beyond the 'east-west' divide?

The most common manifestation of regionalism in Ukraine used by commentators has been the so-called 'east-west' divide, in which Ukraine is portrayed as a state divided between a 'Ukrainian-speaking and nationalist west' and a 'Russian speaking and separatist east.' It is argued that such divisions have resulted from 'western Ukraine's' long interaction with Polish and Austro-Hungarian rule, and 'eastern Ukraine's' long association with Russian and Soviet rule.[238] Such a depiction of Ukraine's regional diversity became more frequent following the 1994 presidential elections, in which it was argued voting patterns could be explained by a neat divide along the River *Dnipro*, between Ukrainian speakers to the west and Russian speakers to the East.[239] Leonid Kuchma who campaigned on a platform of increasing ties with Russia won a majority in every oblast east of the river, whilst the incumbent Leonid Kravchuk who supported Ukraine's distancing from Russia won in all oblasts to the west. Overall, Kuchma won the election, thanks largely to the pure demographics of Ukraine, with many more people living in the east than in the western regions of the country.

Furthermore, the 'west-east' divide was to a certain degree substantiated by research which tended to concentrate on the two cities of L'viv in the west and Donets'k in the east, seen as symbols of the two opposite poles of political mobilisation in Ukraine.[240] The results of these studies highlighted how the residents of both cities hold dichotomous opinions on economic, political and geo-political preferences, thus corroborating the thesis that Ukraine is a country inextricably divided along an east-west axis. From this, ideal-type profiles of the 'east and 'west' could be drawn up, summarised in Table 5.1 overleaf.

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[238] For an explanation of regional variations based on ethno-linguistic differences, see Arel, D. and Khmelko, V., "The Russian Factor and Territorial Polarisation in Ukraine", *Harriman Review*, 9, 1-2, 1996, pp.81-91.
[239] Arel, D, and Wilson, A., "The Ukrainian parliamentary elections", *RFE/RL Research Report*, 3, (26) 1994.
[240] Zastavnyi, F.D., *"Naselennya Ukrainy"*, Lviv: *Prosvita*, 1993, p.192, cited in Liber, G., "Imagining Ukraine: regional differences and the emergence of an integrated state identity, 1926-1994", *Nations and Nationalism*, 4(2), 1998, pp.187-206; also Shulman, S., "The cultural foundations of Ukrainian national identity," *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, vol.22, no.6, November 1999, pp.1011-1036.

Table 5.1: Ideal-type profiles of 'east and the 'west' Ukraine[241]

Characteristics	'West'	'East'
Density of population	Low	High
Urbanisation	Low	High
Ethnic Composition	Ukrainian	Ukrainian and Russian
Language Spoken	Ukrainian	Russian
Religion	Catholicism	Orthodoxy
Economic Profile	Agriculture	Industrial
Political Orientation	Moderate or radical nationalism, and liberal pro-European	Communist or liberal
Geopolitical preferences	Pro-European	Pro-Russian/CIS
Historical memories	Soviet Union as 'invader', Russians as 'enemy'	Soviet Union as legitimate state, Russians as 'Slavic brothers'

The depiction of Ukraine as a state irretrievably divided along a west-east axis, led to commentators stating that civil war was inevitable along with the disintegration of the Ukrainian state.[242] However, what such surveys fail to do is to examine why these 'allegedly' insurmountable differences in political orientations have not manifested themselves in concerted political action. Secondly, by researching at the two opposite ends of the spectrum, such studies fail to examine where one 'side' ends and the 'other' starts. Indeed, Ryabchuk argues that whilst statistics demonstrate that the socio-economic, political differences between cities such as L'viv, in 'western Ukraine' and Luhans'k in 'eastern Ukraine' are striking, one cannot extrapolate these figures onto the rest of Ukrainian society so as to argue the inevitability of Ukraine's splitting into two halves.[243] Instead, it is hypothesised that these 'two Ukraines' have overlapped and fused, leaving the vast areas between them often holding characteristics of both of them, to varying degrees. In these regions, called the 'other

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[241] Wolczuk, K., "Catching up with 'Europe'? Constitutional Debates on the Territorial-Administrative Model in Independent Ukraine", Working Paper 2001, *One Europe or Several? Project.*
[242] See Seely, R., "Ukraine's Identity Crisis", *Moscow Times*, 12th June 1994.
[243] Ryabchuk, M., "Ambivalence to Ambiguity: Why Ukrainians remain undecided?" *CERI-Sciences*, pp.1-7.

Ukraine', 'Ukrainian' and 'Russian' and 'Soviet' and 'European' identity trajectories have interacted, leaving many Ukrainians holding very fluid and ambivalent identities.[244]

Furthermore, recently it has been evocatively argued that this 'myth of two Ukraines' has persisted in popular usage in Ukraine as it merely acts as a re-construction of the political and cultural realities of Ukraine, to fit a particular viewpoint of what 'Ukraine' is and where it should be headed.[245] Zhurzhenko argues that the use of the discourse of 'Two Ukraines' has neatly fitted the bill for eastern Ukraine to act as the 'fall guy' for difficulties encountered in nation-building processes in Ukraine post-1991. The author points to a recent article in which Ukraine has been depicted as a mixture of Estonia and Belarus, in which the inherent assumption is made that without eastern Ukraine, Ukraine would be well on its way down the 'European' path of integration. Commentating on the results of the 2002 parliamentary elections, Kuzio states,

> Nevertheless, the elections showed that west-central Ukraine voted for "Estonian-style" radical reform and a pro-Western orientation, while southern and eastern Ukraine voted along "Belarusian" lines for either a return to the communist past or for oligarchs who favor an authoritarian-corporatist state.[246]

Zhurzhenko argues that this represents an implicit effort to draw an artificial divide between 'European' Ukraine, in which civil society and democratisation are embraced against an Eastern Ukraine where a primordial political culture, inherited from the tsarist and Soviet times, prevails. As Kuzio states, "as national identities are largely absent in eastern-southern Ukraine it is little wonder that civil society is also weakest in the regions."[247] Indeed, Kuzio sees the identities of eastern Ukrainians as essentially pre-modern with their ultimate transference into a Ukrainian national one necessary as "national identities...are indispensable for political reform because only in nation-states have democracies been traditionally created."[248] However, such a deterministic approach exaggerates the importance of national identity as the only means to join the democratic European way of life. Furthermore, such simplistic over-generalisations confirm Kuzio's view of regional identities

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[244] Ryabchuk, M., "Ambivalence to Ambiguity, op.cit., pp.1-7.
Of course, it may well be the case, that some individuals may not want to 'grab' onto any identity option, preferring to remain deeply ambivalent to political issues.
[245] Zhurzhenko, T., "The myth of two Ukraines", can be found at: www.eurozine.com.
[246] Kuzio, T., "Election reveals Ukraine's geographic political divisions", *RFE/RL Newsline*, vol.6, no.73, Part II, 18th April 2002.
[247] Kuzio, T., *Ukraine: State and Nation Building*, London: Routledge, 1998, p.162.
[248] Ibid, p.144.

as an "indicator of an incomplete identity in transition."[249] Such an approach, whilst turning regional differences into a transitionary phenomenon, sees nation-building as a homogenising and assimilatory process, underestimating the potential for the co-existence of multiple identities in modern societies. In contrast, one must shy away from assuming that the process of nation-building is a one-dimensional process with a preordained end. Instead, there is a need to respond to calls to take into account the complex, dynamic and multidimensional character of national identity, which cannot be reduced to a single element.[250]

5.3 Election results in post-Soviet Ukraine[251]

Whilst election results have often been utilised to legitimate the so-called 'east-west' divide, on closer inspection, results in parliamentary and presidential elections since 1994 have in fact demonstrated that regionalism in Ukraine is a highly complex phenomenon. For example, starting with the 1994 parliamentary elections, many commentators noted how Leftist forces were successful in the south and the east, with the nationalist forces gaining more support in the western regions.[252] Such differences were assumed to result from the ethno-linguistic differences across Ukraine, thus creating a picture of regional divisions, coinciding with ethnic and linguistic divisions. However, when the party support was examined in greater detail, indeed the results were more mixed. Birch discovered that Leftist support was not easily predicted by language or ethnicity, but by variables such as age and education levels.[253]

Turning to the 1998 parliamentary elections, whilst leftist forces dominated in the south and east and the nationalist parties gaining their support mostly from the west, a closer analysis yields interesting findings. In particular, the notion that the nationalists received most of their support from the 'Ukrainian speakers' in the western regions needs qualification. In fact, other factors including economic and demographic characteristics of these regions proved

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[249] Kuzio, T., "National Identity in Independent Ukraine: An Identity in Transition", *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics*, vol.2, no.4, pp.582-608.
[250] Smith, A.D., *National Identity*, London: Penguin, 1991, p.14.
[251] The author would like to make it clear that the usage of election results in order to analyse political and social change must take into account the fact that manipulation of results at the local and national levels since 1991 has not gone unnoticed by international observers. Indeed, this factor adds further legitimacy for the author's choice of using qualitative methodologies during the empirical research stage.
[252] See Bojcun, M., "The Ukrainian Parliamentary Elections in March-April 1994," *Europe-Asia Studies*, 47, 2, March 1995, pp.229-249, and Holdar, S., "Torn between East and West: The Regional Factor in Ukrainian Politics," *Post-Soviet Geography*, 36, 2, February 1995, pp.112-132.
[253] Birch, S., "Party System Formation and Voting Behaviour in the Ukrainian Parliamentary Elections of 1994", in Kuzio, T., (ed.), *Contemporary Ukraine: Dynamics of Post-Soviet Transformation*, Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1998, pp.139-160.

greater factors than language use. Thus, whilst language and ethnicity undoubtedly play a role in the regional variation across Ukraine, other socio-economic factors cannot be overlooked.[254] Other analyses of these elections have drawn the conclusion that whilst historical experience plays a strong role in voting patterns in the western regions, in the eastern regions, socio-economic factors play a major role.[255] This is especially true regards support for the Communist Party of Ukraine (KPU), where support is greatest in the old, industrialised oblasts in the east such as Luhans'k, and Donets'k, whose local economies have been struck hard by the economic turmoil since the collapse of the USSR. The situation is neatly summed up by Sasse, "the lesson is that regional factors are significant in voting behaviour, but the regional effect on party preferences depends on the party."[256]

Results from the 1999 presidential elections add further weight to the notion of Ukraine's regional diversity being more complex than the two-dimensional 'east-west' model. Whilst Kuchma had been propelled to power in 1994 by the majority of voters in the populous eastern regions, in 1999, he held onto power yet with very different regional support patterns. Kuchma on this occasion proved popular in the west, whilst in the east the Communist Party of Ukraine (KPU) leader, Petro Symonenko, eroded his share of the vote. In particular, the results from three regions in western Ukraine and eastern Ukraine are extremely revealing (see Table 5.2). In 1994 Kuchma gained 3.9 percent, 3.86 percent and 3.75 percent in L'viv, Ivano-Frankivs'k and Ternopil oblasts respectively.[257] Yet, by 1999, his share of the vote here had risen to 91.59, 92.3 and 92.17 percent respectively. In contrast, in Donets'k, Luhans'k and Kharkiv oblasts in 1994, he had gained 79, 88 and 71.01 percent of the vote respectively. Again though, by 1999 and the second round of the presidential elections, these figures had altered dramatically, dropping to 52.9, 40.74 and 46.64 percent respectively, with Symonenko winning in many of the central areas. Such a turnaround epitomises the 'eclectic' nature of Ukrainian politics and the 'jackdaw' nationalism espoused by Kuchma's regime in power.[258] Wilson uses such terms to describe how Kuchma has given out different political signals to different political audiences at different times of his presidency, a policy seemingly

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[254] Craumer, P.R. and Clem, J.I., "Ukraine's emerging Electoral Geography: A Regional Analysis of the 1998 Parliamentary Elections", *Post-Soviet Geography and Economics*, 1999, 40, no.1, pp.1-26.
[255] Birch, S., "Interpreting the Regional Effect in Ukrainian Politics", *Europe-Asia Studies*, vol.52, no.6, pp.1017-1042.
[256] Sasse, G., "The 'New' Ukraine: A State of Regions," *Regional and Federal Studies*, vol.11, Special Issue 3, Autumn 2001, pp.69-100(32), p. 77.
[257] See data compiled by Ukraine's Central Elections Commission. The 1994 results can be found at, http://www.brama.com/ua-gov/el-94pre.html. The 1999 results can be found at http://www.skrobach.com/ukre1999.html. Both accessed 29th April 2004.
[258] Wilson, A., *The Ukrainians: unexpected nation*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000, p.221.

lacking in any real ideological and political goals, apart from holding onto power and protecting one's interests. Thus, whilst in 1994 Kuchma's campaign using the 'Russian card' was supported in the east and wholly rejected in the west, by 1999, faced with the threat of the Communists returning to power, the west wholeheartedly backed Kuchma as 'the lesser of two evils' and the guardian of Ukrainian statehood.[259] In contrast, the vote in the east was more evenly spread. The erosion of Kuchma's support by Symonenko can be partly explained by the industrialised east's continuing economic downturn and Kuchma's shift to a supporter of ukrainisation at the expense of his earlier promises regarding the status of the Russian language in Ukraine.

Furthermore, as regards the 2002 parliamentary elections, the results here were not as 'black and white' as assumed by some commentators.[260] For example, Kuzio argues that in the west-centre region, an 'Estonia' style situation was seen, with reformers in the form of *Nasha Ukraina* (Our Ukraine), led by Yushchenko sharing the majority of the vote with nationalists, under the umbrella Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc. In contrast, a 'Belarus' situation prevailed in the south and east, with the vote massed around the left-wing KPU and SPU (Socialist Party of Ukraine) and the two oligarchic pro-statehood parties, ZYU (For One Ukraine) and SDPU–o (Social and Democratic Party of Ukraine–united). Whilst, such overviews provide a general picture, nevertheless they fail to illuminate revealing features within the general trends. For example, an interesting continuation from the 1998 parliamentary elections was a lack of support for pro-Union with Russia parties such as *Russ'kyi blok* (Russian bloc) and the Union of Ukraine, Belarus and Russia bloc, which gained only 1.16 percent of the countrywide vote. Excluding Crimea, these parties failed to gain 4 percent in any oblast, not even in the previously perceived 'pro-Russian' eastern areas of Donets'k, Luhans'k and Kharkiv, all border areas and with large Russian minority populations. *Russ'kyi blok* even only gained 8.83 and 4.76 percent in the City of Sevastopol and the Autonomous Republic of Crimea respectively. Moreover, whilst the KPU gained large support in the eastern regions recording 39.69, 30.69 and 31.86 percent in Luhans'k, Kharkiv and Dnipropetrovs'k oblasts, in Sumy, it received only 16.49 percent. Furthermore, whilst it is certainly true that ZYU(For One Ukraine) gained highly 'impressive' results in Donets'k oblast, receiving a massive 36.83

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[259] The author recalls a popular joke in Ukraine at the time of these elections, which sums up this situation: "The president's secretary meets the president and tells him that she has good and bad news, the good news being that he has won the election. However, the bad news was that nobody voted for him!"

[260] Kuzio, T., "Election reveals Ukraine's geographic political divisions", *RFE/RL Newsline*, vol.6, no.73, Part II, 18th April 2002.

Table 5.2: Results from the second round of the 1994 and 1999 Presidential Elections. Kuchma's percentage share of the vote in three western and three eastern oblasts

	1994	*1999*
Western oblasts:		
L'viv	*3.9*	*91.59*
Ivano-Frankivs'k	*3.86*	*92.3*
Ternopil	*3.75*	*92.17*
Eastern oblasts:		
Donets'k	*79*	*52.9*
Luhans'k	*88*	*40.74*
Kharkiv	*71.01*	*46.64*

Data compiled by Ukraine's Central Elections Commission.
The 1994 results can be found at http://www.brama.com/ua-gov/el-94pre.html.
The 1999 results can be found at http://www.skrobach.com/ukre1991.html. both accessed 29th April 2004.

percent, this does not represent a "landslide victory in the Donbas" when the ZPU's return in Luhans'k (also part of the Ukrainian Donbas) of only 14.38 percent is taken into account.[261] Finally, whilst the ZPU faired quite well in the southern oblasts of Odes'ka, Mykolaivs'ka and the City of Sevastopol, receiving 14.34, 14.14 and 13.11 percent respectively, in other parts of the south such as Kherson and the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, it gained only 7.16 and 5.92 percent respectively.[262]

5.4 The need to go deeper: the search for a regional framework?

There thus seems a necessity for regionalism to be seen within the prism of a graduation between the two opposing poles, with more attention placed towards an in-depth analysis of regionalism in Ukraine. Barrington analysed survey results, collected from Ukraine in late 1998, testing the effects of language use, ethnicity and region of residence on respondents' support of Ukrainian independence.[263] The results are conclusive in demonstrating the critical importance of 'region' over ethnicity or language in shaping attitudes within Ukraine as an independent country. Relating to the question of state independence, whilst the western regions were found to be more supportive than other regions, the results did not yield to a dichotomous, 'east-west' divide of the country, along the river *Dnipro*. Of particular interest, the results of Barrington's study suggested that the notion that Russophone Ukrainians think more like ethnic Russians than Ukrainophone Ukrainians was in need of re-examination.

Such a finding is highly significant in undermining the importance of language within the politics of identity in Ukraine. Previous studies have been quick to simplistically reduce national identity in Ukraine, to a single marker, that of language and in doing so, place both ethnic Russians and Russophone Ukrainians into a single, political grouping. For example, Arel and Wilson in their analysis of the 1994 presidential elections chose to explain the outcome of the elections by language use with Ukrainophones, supporting Kravchuk and Russophones, supporting Kuchma.[264] Also, Janmaat in his study of language politics across four different cities of Ukraine, chose to analyse only the reaction of the Russophone population, making the casual assumption that on the basis of language usage, Ukrainians

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[261] Kuzio, T., "Election reveals Ukraine's geographic political divisions", op.cit.
[262] Ibid.
[263] Barrington, L., "Region, Language, and Nationality: Rethinking Support in Ukraine for Maintaining Distance from Russia", in Kuzio, T. and D'Anieri, (eds.), *Dilemmas of State-Led Nation Building in Ukraine*, Westport, CT: Preager, 2002, pp.131-146.
[264] Arel, D. and Wilson, A., "Ukraine: Back to Eurasia?", *RFE/RL Research Report*, vol.3, no.32, 1994.

and Russians alike, hold similar political outlooks and thus would react in the same ways to state 'nationalising policies'.[265] In general, the importance of Barrington's study is that it shed light on the blurred nature of ethnic, linguistic and regional divisions across Ukraine and in doing so highlighted the need for further detailed analysis in this area. As regards the main finding of the study, the fact that ethnic Russians in Poltava and Luhans'k may not *per se* hold similar political orientations, with instead their strongest identities being formed around their region of residence, formed through historical experience, is of great relevance.

One of the main difficulties encountered when discussing regionalism in Ukraine has been defining what actually constitutes a 'region.' Any discussion of regions in Ukraine must commence with an evaluation of the administrative structure of the country. Post-Soviet Ukraine comprises the same territorial administrative units, introduced during the Soviet period, oblasts (regions). This creates a territorial-administrative system in Ukraine comprising twenty-five oblasts and the two cities of Kiev and Sevastopol (see Map 1). However, such a system does not match the 'historical' regions of Ukraine, which often cut across the boundaries of two or more oblasts, such as Galicia, Donbas, Bukovyna and Transcarpathia.[266] However, this lack of congruence has not prevented the terms 'region' and oblast being used interchangeably in Ukrainian society. Researchers have attempted to better understand the 'regional' factor in detail by defining and delineating regions on the basis of a variety of different measurements. For example, Roper and Fesnic in a study of voting behaviour, chose to divide Ukraine into only two regions, on the basis of historical legacies, concentrating their analysis on differences between Galicia and the rest of Ukraine. Also Birch uses historical experience, coupled with economic development to argue for Ukraine to be split up into five regions, including, 'the former Habsburg regions in the far west', 'Western Volhynia', 'The Right Bank', 'The Left Bank' and 'The former Ottoman lands of the Black Sea littoral'.[267] Finally, Nemyria splits Ukraine into eleven regions, according to geopolitical preferences.[268] Such a variety of different schemata to define regions in Ukraine *per se* demonstrates how drawing regional boundaries in Ukraine is fraught with difficulties in a country where such boundaries are often more fluid than rigid.

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[265] Janmaat, J.G., *Nation-Building in Post-Soviet Ukraine. Educational Policy and the Response of the Russian-speaking population,* Netherlands Geographical Society, 2000.
[266] Wolczuk, K., *Catching up with 'Europe'?*, op.cit.
[267] Roper, S.D, and Fesnic, F., "Historical Legacies and their Impact on Post-Communist Voting Behaviour", *Europe-Asia Studies*, vol.55, pp.119-131; Birch, S., "Interpreting the Regional Effect in Ukrainian Politics", *Europe-Asia Studies*, vol.52, no.6, pp.1017-1041.
[268] Nemyria, G., "Regionalism: An Underestimated Dimension of State-Building", in Wolchik, S.L. and Zviglyanich, V., (eds.), *Ukraine: The Search for a National Identity*, Lanham, MA: Rowman and Littlefield, 2000, pp.183-198.

In a recent study, Barrington and Herron have presented a new adapted framework dividing Ukraine into eight distinct regions.[269] They argue that divisions of Ukraine into macro regions such as 'Eastern Ukraine' and 'Western Ukraine' fail to illuminate inherent differentiation among areas with contrasting historical, economic and demographic profiles. The strength of their framework is the recognition of the legacies of Ukraine's historical regional diversity. It takes account of the contrasting historical experience across the territories, which comprise post-1991 independent Ukraine, which have belonged to different political entities including the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, the Habsburg Empire, the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union. As Wilson sums up,

> The various regions that make up modern Ukraine have moved in and out of Ukrainian history at different times, but have never really interacted together as an ensemble...There are therefore serious difficulties in imagining Ukrainian history either as a temporal or a geographical continuum.[270]

As highlighted in chapter Three, upon gaining independence, the post-1991 Ukrainian state found itself presiding over a citizenry whose sense of national identity was often highly fractured along ethnic, linguistic and regional lines. This framework here is used as a 'skeleton' for defining regions in Ukraine. It is critically engaged with and when deemed appropriate is adapted and/or adjusted with the reasoning fully explained.

Crimea is designated as a specific region in its own right. Joining the UkrSSR in 1954, it represents the last piece in the formation of the territorial jigsaw of Ukraine in the twentieth century. According to the 1989 Soviet census, this was the only area of Ukraine, with an ethnic Russian majority, and was the only part of Ukraine, which did not wholeheartedly support independence in 1991. Since that time, the region has witnessed the formation of secessionist movements, seeking to split their allegiance away from Kiev to Moscow.[271] Indeed, the very legal status of the region, together with questions over the ownership of the Black Sea Fleet continued to sour Russian-Ukrainian relations throughout the early 1990s. According to the 2001 census, ethnic Russians remain in the majority, comprising 58.5

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[269] Barrington, L.W. and Herron, E.S., "One Ukraine or many?"..., op.cit., pp.53-86.
[270] Wilson, A., *Ukrainian Nationalism in the 1990s: A Minority Faith*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1997, p.25.
[271] For wide-ranging discussions on this issue, see Solchanyk, R., "The Crimean Imbroglio I: Kiev and Moscow" and "The Crimean Imbroglio II: Kiev and Simferopol," in his *Ukraine and Russia: The Post-Soviet Transition*, Lanham, MA: Rowman and Littlefield, 2001; and also, Sasse, G., "The New 'Ukraine'..., op.cit., pp.69-100.

percent of the population with Ukrainians only 24.4 percent.[272] Amongst the local Ukrainian population, only 40.4 percent deem Ukrainian to be their native language. Moreover as the figures for the uptake of linguistic ukrainisation in schools demonstrate (see tables 5.5 and 5.6) there has been an almost rejection of this state policy. Also of note, Crimean Tatars form 12.1 percent of the population, with their continuing resettlement on the peninsula a further issue for Kiev to deal with. Today, whilst local separatist claims have seemingly been quelled, nevertheless the area remains the most problematic, and least supportive of Ukraine's state independence.[273]

The **southern** region in the eight-region framework comprises Kherson, Odesa and Mykolaiv oblasts. These lands were absorbed into the Russian Empire in the late eighteenth century, following the conquest of Ottoman-ruled Crimean Khanate. The region's status as 'New Russia' emerged with its rapid settlement and industrialisation, which led to large numbers of Russian migrants together with other nationalities such as Greeks, Bulgarians, Jews and Moldovans. Also, many Ukrainians migrated to the newly conquered lands, mainly to settle in the countryside. In the urban areas, Russian culture and language came to dominate. As a result of the different patterns of migration and industrialisation, the region today is less urban, and ethnically Russian than other parts of Ukraine to the east. Whilst the issue of regional autonomy briefly surfaced in 1990/1, it has failed to grow in force in the ensuing years, other than regional elites sporadically calling for greater control over regional economic affairs. Regarding the uptake of linguistic ukrainisation in schools, of the three oblasts, only Odesa remains below the all-Ukrainian average.

The **north-central** region, comprises Poltava, Kirovohrad, Cherkasy, Kiev, Chernihiv and Sumy oblasts, together with Kiev City. Upto the mid-seventeenth century, these lands were mainly part of the Lithuanian-Polish Commonwealth (*Rzeczpospolita*), which was formally created at the Union of Lublin in 1569. However, Poland had great difficulties in controlling these lands, which were inhabited by Cossacks loyal to the Orthodox faith. In 1648 began a revolt aimed at defending Orthodoxy from Catholicism and against the Polish landlord-tenant system of serfdom. This revolt, however, led by Bohdan Khmelnytskyi, was unable to defeat Poland without any assistance. At the Union of Pereiaslav in 1654, the Cossacks entered into a union with Muscovy, one in which the Cossacks recognised the authority of the Muscovite

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[272] See, www.ukrcensus.gov.ua, accessed 29th April 2004.
[273] Barrington, L., "Region, Language, and Nationality...", op.cit., pp.131-146.

state in return for protection and an autonomous status.[274] However, the ensuing Russian-Polish War ended with the Treaty of Andrusovo (1667), meaning this region was left under Russian control. It was allowed nominal certain rights from the onset, yet by the late eighteenth century, most of these had been taken away, in the process of fully integrating into the Russian Empire. Although these areas were under Moscow's control for a similar period of time as lands to the east and in the south, they have always retained a more 'Ukrainian' political outlook. Whilst the lands in southern and eastern Ukraine, were heavily industrialised from the late eighteenth century, the region lacked mineral resources. In contrast, their one resource of note, was the land, which was of high quality and meant that agriculture played a leading role in their local economies. As such, the region was inhabited by predominantly Ukrainian peasants and saw little in-migration. During the late tsarist and Soviet periods, the main cities in these areas came to be russified, however, barring Kiev, the cities are small in size. Overall, the population is predominantly ethnically Ukrainian, rural, and predominantly Ukrainian-speaking.

The **west-central** region, comprises Zhytomyr, Vynnytsia, Khmelnytskyi, Rivne and Volyn. This region differs from the north-central region, in regard to the length of time spent under Russian and Polish rule. These areas upto the end of the eighteenth century, whilst belonging to the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, underwent certain Polonising processes. However, in the years 1793-1795, with the second and third partitions of Poland, they fell under Russian rule. Thus, they have been under the influence of Russian rule for much less time than those areas to the east of the river *Dnipro*. Regarding population structure, this region is predominantly rural in character. Ukrainians make up the vast majority of the population and are in the main Ukrainian speakers. Attempts at linguistic ukrainisation since 1991 have been embraced, with this region having scarcely any schools at all which remain using Russian as the language of instruction. (see Tables 5.5 and 5.6). Regarding political outlook, this region is strongly supportive of Ukrainian independence. In elections since 1991, the electorate has demonstrated a rather mixed political outlook, similar to the north-central region, apart from its support for nationalist forces, although this has not been unconditional, like in the areas to its west. Also of significance, in the recent 2002 parliamentary elections, a certain shift occurred with this region veering away from left wing forces, still popular in north-central

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[274] Various conflicting interpretations of this event and its importance in Russian-Ukrainian relations can be found in Russian, Soviet and Ukrainian historiography. For a thorough overview of the various standpoints and the continued relevance of this period in contemporary Russian-Ukrainian relations, see Plokhy, S., "The Ghosts of Pereyaslav: Russo-Ukrainian Historical Debates in the Post-Soviet Era, *Europe-Asia Studies* 53, no.3, 2001, pp.489-505.

region and instead strongly supporting Yushchenko's reform minded *Nasha Ukraina* (Our Ukraine) bloc. Whilst in the past, perhaps support for nationalist forces was fractured by the crude anti-Russian nature of some extremes of Ukrainian nationalists, *Nasha Ukraina* perhaps has provided a voice for this politically moderate yet pro-Ukrainian region.[275]

Of particular relevance here, whilst Barrington and Heron include Volhyn in the **west-central** region, there are important historical distinctions from the remaining lands, providing ample justification for it to stand alone in its own right. Notably, following World War I and the creation of the USSR, the western part of **Volhyn**, fell under Polish rule. In 1944, it was then incorporated into the UkrSSR, together with the former Habsburg ruled territories. Thus, in this inter-war period, whilst areas such as Zhytomyr were being subjected to the brutal policies of Soviet modernisation, here, the traditional links with Galicia to the west were revived. These had been forcibly cut following the second partition of Poland in 1793, yet soon led to the national cause gaining a firm social base of support.

The **western** region comprises the three oblasts of L'viv, Ternopil and Ivano-Frankivs'k, which are often referred to as Galicia. As Barrington and Herron rightly note, these are the areas researchers normally consider as 'western Ukraine'. Following the downfall of the Galicia-Volhynian Princedom in 1340, these lands fell into Polish hands and by 1772, had been incorporated into the Habsburg Empire.[276] Under Habsburg rule, the national movement grew in strength as a result of the religious freedoms allowed by the authorities as well as an education system in Ukrainian and the right to use Ukrainian in public institutions. Ukrainians were allowed to develop a distinctive Ukrainian identity while maintaining a loyalty to the Habsburgs, which did not necessitate assimilation.[277] As Subtelny states, "nationally conscious Ukrainian intellectuals took advantage of the relative freedom allowed by the Habsburgs to engage in the cultural politics of nation making."[278]

Following World War 1 and the failed attempts to create not only an independent Ukrainian state, but also an independent West Ukrainian People's Republic (ZUNR), the region fell back under Polish rule. The Poles tried to extinguish the Ukrainian nationalist fervour, reneging on its promises in 1923 to grant Galicia a degree of autonomy and the permission to

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[275] Data was compiled by Ukraine's Central Elections Commission, see http://www.cvk.ukrpack.net.
[276] Wilson, A., *Ukrainian Nationalism in the 1990s...*, op.cit., pp.8-9.
[277] It should be noted that in the Habsburg Empire upto 1890, Ukrainians were known as 'Rusyns', or 'Ruthenians'.
[278] Subtelny, O., *Ukraine: A History*, 2nd edition, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1992, pp.241-242.

use Ukrainian language in public affairs and in the education system. However, such a policy backfired with the Galician Ukrainians reacting by remaining fiercely loyal to the Uniate Church, and radical nationalism only grew in force. The onset of the Second World War again saw the region changing its territorial status. As a result of the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact in 1939 between Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union, the region was incorporated into the UkrSSR. During the War years, in this region attempts were made to create an independent Ukrainian state and oppose Soviet rule. The Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) and Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA), led by Stepan Bandera, amalgamated and led a bloody campaign against both Nazi German and Soviet forces during the early 1940s. The actions of these groups still remains a highly controversial part of Ukraine's history today, which is examined in greater detail in the following chapters, especially in chapters Seven and Eight. In the post-War years Stalin tried to suppress the nationalist movement in this region by using harsh repression tactics, deportations and the forced dissolving of the Uniate Church into the Russian Orthodox Church in 1946. Yet, nationalist ideas, originating from Galicia slowly began to circulate across other areas of Ukraine, and whilst large regional differences remained, this region began to play an active role in the contestation of national identity in the UkrSSR. As Szporluk notes, the Soviet annexation of western Ukraine "may have been one of Stalin's most fateful decisions during the years from 1939 to 1945."[279]

Since 1991, this region has gained the reputation of supporting Ukrainian nationalists, whatever their levels of radicalism. Indeed, there have been worrying trends of support for the 'integral' nationalism associated with the 1930s and Dmytro Dontsov. Consequently, radical Ukrainian nationalism is often seen by Ukrainians elsewhere as a Galician product, highly influenced by its Uniate traditions and relations with Poland. In general, the region has continued to see itself as the 'Piedmont' of Ukraine, as the true keeper of national identity on behalf of the rest of Ukraine and a firm supporter of an 'away from Moscow' stance.[280] However, recently there have been growing signs of frustration with the lack of wider support for ukrainisation policies across the rest of Ukraine and the lack of movement towards Europe at a time when the region's neighbours such as Poland have been queuing up to join the European Union. The region, whilst exerting a great deal of influence on Ukrainian politics, nevertheless on the basis of its small demographic weight, is condemned

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[279] Szporluk, R., "The Soviet West-or Far Eastern Europe?", in *East European Politics and Societies*, vol.5, no.3, 1991, pp.466-482.
[280] This refers to the model of Italian unification by the House of Savoy in 1860.

to being a secondary player, trying to influence from the periphery rather than from the centre. Finally, one must be careful not to equate the superficial notion 'western Ukraine' solely with this region. The high levels of nationalist support here are linked to this region's specific historical characteristics and for varying reasons do not gain the same levels of appeal across other neighbouring regions.

In Barrington and Herron's eight region framework, a **south-west** region is denoted, comprising the Chernivtsi and Zakarpatia oblasts. The authors are correct in stating that here owing to historical reasons, the levels of "Ukrainianness" are lower than in Galicia.[281] Both oblasts share similarities in having long external borders and subsequently, large numbers of national minorities, including Hungarians, Slovaks, and Romanians. Nevertheless, the author feels that also there are strong reasons, as a result of divergent historical experiences, to legitimate splitting it into two, distinct regions, as explained below.

Bukovyna has long been a disputed territory. Upto 1918, it along with Galicia, was part of the Habsburg Empire. However, whilst in the late nineteenth century in Galicia, the Ukrainian national idea rapidly gained strength, here with the emergence of an independent Romanian state in 1858, a viable alternative national project was available for the region's inhabitants. Also, in contrast to Galicia, the Orthodox Church remained in the ascendancy.[282] Following World War I, these lands were incorporated into the Romanian state, which quickly began to pursue stringent 'romanianisation' policies in the cultural and linguistic spheres. However, as a result of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, in 1940, it joined the UkrSSR, an administrative change which was made permanent in 1945. Since 1991, the region has witnessed the co-existence of a reviving Ukrainian nationalism and also a strong minority, Romanian nationalism. In particular, some autonomous trends have been exhibited, with local Romanian nationalists calling for the establishment of a Romanian university in Chernivtsi and even joint Romanian-Ukrainian citizenhip. In areas where a Romanian and Moldovan population predominates, local self-government has been granted.[283]

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[281] Barrington, L.W, and Herron, E.S., "Region, Language, and Nationality...",op.cit., p.59.
[282] Wilson, A., *The Ukrainians: unexpected nation*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000, p.115.
[283] Bugajski, J., "Ethnic Relations and Regional Problems in Independent Ukraine", in Wolchik, S.L. and Zviglyanich, V., *Ukraine: The Search for a National Identity*, Lanham, MA: Rowman and Littlefield, 2000,p.178.

Zakarpatiya was also previously part of the Habsburg Empire, and was part of Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Romania and Nazi Germany, before joining the UkrSSR in 1945.[284] Indeed, in 1938-9, the region even flirted with outright independence forming the Republic of Carpatho-Ukraine. The chief distinguishing feature of this region is its ethnic diversity, with over one hundred representatives of different nationalities residing in the oblast.[285] According to the 2001 census, Ukrainians comprise 80.5 percent of the population, with Hungarians making up 12.1 percent, representing the largest minority group.[286] However, the Ukrainian population is itself split between Ukrainians and Rusyns, who argue that they are a separate ethnic identity and thus demand political recognition of this fact. However, internal splits within the Rusyn community along cultural, political and generational lines have hampered their political development since 1991.[287] Autonomist tendencies have also arisen here, with various groups calling for varying degrees of self-determination. Indeed, in a special referendum in December 1991, over 78 percent of the population voted for the creation of a "special self-governing administrative territory", yet within the overall framework of an independent Ukraine. The Hungarian minority has also been extremely active, calling for greater autonomy in the Berehiv (Berehovo) *raion* (district), where Hungarians are compactly settled.[288] Such demands are also supported by the Hungarian government, which has built friendly bilateral relations with Ukraine, on the proviso that this minority is given certain rights and protection. The mixed nature of the population to an extent is mirrored in the voting patterns of the electorate. In contrast to the neighbouring western region, where nationalists have been strongly supported, here the nationalist support is much more lukewarm, with the centrist parties instead gaining much support.

The **eastern** region comprises Donets'k and Luhans'k oblasts, which represent the Ukrainian part of the Donbas coal basin, which spans the Russian and Ukrainian border. Nemyria, focusing on the Donbas region, argues that territorial and economic factors have been more important than ethnic and linguistic factors in explaining factors of self-identification.[289] He states how there exists a specific regional identity in Donbas, which has been heavily

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[284] Sasse, G., "The 'New' Ukraine: A State of Regions"..., op.cit., p.82.
[285] See, www.ukrcensus.gov.ua, accessed 18th May 2004.
[286] Ibid.
[287] Batt, J., "Transcarpathia: Peripheral Region at the 'Centre of Europe'", in Batt, J and Wolczuk. K., (eds.), *Regions, State and Identity in Central and Eastern Europe*, London and Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 2002.
[288] Berehiv is the name of the district in Ukrainian, whilst Berehovo is the Hungarian name.
[289] Nemyria, G., A Qualitative Analysis of the Situation in the Donbas", in Segbers, K. and De Spiegelaire, S., (eds.), *Emerging Geopolitical and Territorial Units. Theories, Methods and Case Studies. Post-Soviet Puzzles. Mapping the Political Economy of the Former Soviet Union*, vol.2, Baden and Baden: Nomos Verlagsgellschaft, 1995, pp.57-58.

conditioned by the history of its development in the USSR. Donbas in the USSR was the showcase of socialism, a privileged place which led to its inhabitants proudly stating that they were from the *Vsyesoyuznaya Kochegarka* (boiler room of the whole union).[290] He defines the peculiarity of this Donbas identity when he states,

> For the Donbas, the real economic and political center was the Soviet one, in Moscow. Kiev was just the regional administrative center, not of great importance. So when we became independent, there had to be a major and very difficult re-evaluation of which center to look to. It was made even more complicated by the fact that for us here, regional identity was always more important than national identity. The fact that you came from the Donbas was more important than that you were Russian or Ukrainian; so of course the breakup of the Soviet Union also meant a raising of this regional identity and loyalty...In any case, most people here honestly couldn't say what they are ethnically, because most families, like mine, are mixed.[291]

Indeed, the interaction of Russian Ukrainian culture in this region has meant that often many people speak the Russian-Ukrainian mixture known as *surzhyk*. Also, the blurred nature of Russian and Ukrainian identities in this region is shown in the results of an ethnographic research in which several respondents described their ethnicity as "under one regime, we were Ukrainians, under another we were Russians, but frankly speaking we do not know who we are".[292] Whilst this region certainly has a strong 'Russian' influence to it, it would be mistaken to simplistically see the region as a unilaterally 'pro-Russian, Russian speaking' region. Indeed, election results since 1991 have shown that there has been hardly any support for pro-Russian nationalist parties in both Luhans'k and Donets'k oblasts. From such results, two other tendencies can be seen. Firstly, the electorate has supported 'hard left' political forces, in great numbers, in particular the KPU (Communist Party of Ukraine). Secondly, there has been a total lack of support for any national-democratic forces in this region.

The **east-central** region, constitutes Zaporizhzhia, Dnipropetrovs'k and Kharkiv oblasts. In contrast to the Donbas region to the east, in these areas, there is little dispute that they were once part of a historical Ukrainian or proto-Ukrainian state. Secondly, although this region is highly industrial and russified in both cultural and linguistic terms, it is not to the same high levels as the Donbas. Moreover, the agricultural sector plays an important role in the local

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[290] Nemyria, G., "Regionalism: An Underestimated Dimension of State-Building", in Wolchik, S.L, and Zviglyanich, V., *Ukraine: The Search for a National Identity*, Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2000, p.190.
[291] Nemyria is quoted in Lieven, A., *Ukraine and Russia: A fraternal Rivalry*, Washington, DC: Institute of Peace Press, 1999, p.80.
[292] Chizhykova, L.N., "Russkoe-Ukrainskoe pogranich'e. Istoria sud'by tradisionno-bytovoi kul'tury (19-20) veka)", Moscow: *Nauka*, 1988, pp.14-69.

economies. Consequently, whilst the region has consistently voted for left-wing forces, there has been more of a mixture of moderate and 'hard left' forces gaining support in elections. Similarly, as portrayed in tables 5.5 and 5.6, whilst these three oblasts are still below the all-Ukrainian average, nevertheless, since 1991, there has been a steady embrace of linguistic ukrainisation.

To sum up, Barrington and Herron provide a generally sound framework, which importantly takes into account the divergent historical experiences of Ukraine's regions. In particular, the strength of the framework is that it deconstructs concepts such as 'western Ukraine' and 'eastern Ukraine' with sound justifications. However, as argued above, it does have shortcomings, requiring adjustments. In particular, the author has argued that Volhyn, Zakarpatiya and Bukovyna, while holding similarities with neighbouring areas, nevertheless owing to specific historical and demographic reasons, merit the status as regions in their own right. Overall, this framework and the modifications to it, provide a useful point of reference for research into regionalism in Ukraine. However, it is also imperative to take into account Birch's argument for the need to find ***explanations*** for, and the ***meanings*** of, regional differences.[293]

5.5 From the macro to the micro: meanings and perceptions at the local level

Jackson argues that rather than scientifically measuring the effect of regional differences in countrywide opinion polls and surveys at the macro level, more research should focus on the *perceptions* of these differences at the micro level.[294] In doing so, important insights can be gained into how the state-led nation-building project is negotiated and shaped at the local level. Jackson within her study of Zaporizhzhia, found that the area was not quintessentially 'pro-Russian, anti-Ukrainian language and history', as is stereotyped in the 'east-west' divide. Instead, it was noted how the specific Cossack heritage of the city was being used to increase the sense of affiliation to Ukrainian culture and language. Similarly, Jackson argues that subtle differences exist within and between regions at the local level, often in politically considered 'less active' areas such as Zaporizhzhia but are often masked by the macro-level

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[293] Birch, S., "Interpreting the Regional Effect in Ukrainian Politics", op.cit., p.1023.
[294] Jackson, L., *The Construction of National Identity in Ukraine: A Regional Perspective*, PhD thesis, University of Birmingham, 1998, pp.182-183.

studies.[295] As regards the significance of such findings, the consequences for the Ukrainian state in its nation building project are unclear. On the one hand, one can argue that the complex nature of regional divisions in Ukraine and a lack of a real dichotomous 'east-west' divide should bring greater stability to the country and reduce fears of a potential split of the country along the Dnipro river. However, the presence of such fuzzy and blurred regional identities, which crisscross not only oblast boundaries, but also possibly international state boundaries, makes the state's task of providing an all-embracing all-Ukrainian national identity far from straightforward.

It may be the case that there exists a type of *'transnational regionalism'* in areas close to Ukraine's state borders, defined by a high level of social interaction across the state boundaries.[296] Regional studies, for example, in Russia have highlighted the emergence of transnational regions and regional identities.[297] Indeed, a survey undertaken in 1996 demonstrated that the majority of the citizens of Ukraine and Russia do not identify with their new states as their homelands, with regional identities and Soviet identities instead proving highly popular.[298] As such, whilst the vast majority of citizens in Ukraine hold a territorial attachment to Ukraine, nevertheless the state boundary does not necessarily coincide with borders symbolically constructed by the population itself. As Laba states,

> Borders are supposed to be focal points for conflicting historical memories and political wills of nations and states. They make concrete: what is my country and who is the other. They are physical manifestations of national and state identity. The peculiarity of the Ukrainian-Russian relationship is that there is a physical state border, while a large minority in Ukraine and an overwhelming majority on the Russian side see no significant reason for its existence. For many people, there is no difference to express, no reason for the borders.[299]

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[295] Jackson, L., "Identity, Language and Transformation in Eastern Ukraine: Case Study of Zaporizhzhia," in Kuzio, T., (ed.), *Contemporary Ukraine: Dynamics of Post-Soviet Transformation*, Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1998, pp.99-113.
[296] Hurrell, A., "Explaining the resurgence of regionalism in World Politics", *Review of International Studies*, vol.21, no.4, October 1995, p.333.
[297] Bradshaw, M, and Makarychev, A., "Globalization and Fragmentation: The Impact of the International Relations of Russia's Regions", in Ruble, B., Koehn, J. and Popson, N., (eds.), *Fragmented Spaces in the Russian Federation*, Washington DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2001.
[298] Holovaha, Y. and Panina, N., "Tendentsii Rozvytku Ukrainsko-Rosiyskykh Vidnosyn u Hromadskyi Dumtsi Rosii ta Ukrainy," 1998, http://niurr.gov.ua/ukr/zbirka/golovpan.html, quoted in Wolczuk, K., "History, Europe and the 'National Idea'..., op.cit., pp.671-694.
[299] Laba, R., "The Russian-Ukrainian Conflict: State, Nation and Identity", *European Security*, vol.4, no.3, 1995, p.478.

In particular, it will be very interesting to place such an argument under empirical scrutiny, which is one of the tasks of chapter Eight. This chapter progresses with an examination of three chosen study areas, the cities of Luhans'k, Kharkiv and Sumy, capitals of their respective oblasts, all situated along the Ukrainian-Russian borderland yet situated in different regions according to the '8 -10' classification. Luhans'k is situated in the eastern region, Kharkiv in the east-central and Sumy in the north-central region. The reasons why these three areas have been chosen as sites for empirical research, laid out in the following chapters, is explained from the onset.

5.6 Ukraine's eastern borderlands

In an attempt to deconstruct the notion of 'Eastern Ukraine' as a single and homogenous space, this study instead focuses research at the local level in three oblast capitals, namely Luhans'k, Kharkiv and Sumy. These three oblasts are all situated close to the Russian/Ukrainian border. (see Map 1). Following Ukraine's independence in 1991, the number of oblasts which hold external borders rose from five to sixteen.[300] Such changes have instigated a realignment of how regions define themselves and perceive their interests *vis-à-vis* the centre in Kiev. In particular, these areas have external borders with Russia and also are regions where 'multiple' or 'hybrid' identities prevail.[301] Such identities have resulted from the erosion of linguistic and cultural boundaries between Russians and Ukrainians under tsarist and more particularly Soviet 'russification' policies. As demonstrated in chapter Four, a key component of the state-led nation-building project in Ukraine has been the state's efforts to reinvent and recodify social boundaries that distinguish 'us' from 'them', portraying Russia as the 'other'. Thus, these three oblasts provide an ideal testing ground to see to what extent Russia is perceived as the 'other' at the micro level and how state representations of Russia as the 'other' are negotiated and contested. Moreover, the research in particular focuses on people's *perceptions* of regional and national divisions and the meanings attached to them. In this way, one can provide a comparative perspective, evaluating the dynamics of the nation-building project. The results from this study will feed into state-wide debates surrounding the politics of identity in Ukraine and the role that the 'region' plays in such debates.

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[300] Birch, S. and Zinko, I., "The dilemmas of regionalism", *Transition*, November 1998, pp.22-25.
[301] Szporluk, R., "Ukraine: from an imperial periphery to a sovereign state", *Daedalus*, vol.126, no.3, 1997, pp.85-119.

Moreover, this research responds for calls, outlined in chapter Two, for a more interactive approach to the study of identity change. In particular, by choosing these three borderland areas necessarily contributes to a body of work, centred around the work of Sahlins, which looks at the role of borderlands within processes of national identity formation and change.[302] Furthermore, this study aims to add to the body of work regarding the importance of borderlands as constituents of collective identities, which recognise the social construction of boundaries.[303] Indeed, recent surveys have also demonstrated strong differences between perceptions of the border, at the elite and popular levels in Ukraine. Whilst 87.5 percent of Ukrainian elites saw a transparent border with Russia "negatively, as a proof of Ukraine's exposure to potential risks," at the popular level, 59.75 percent of the poll saw such a transparent border "positively, as a proof of a special relationship between Russia and Ukraine." Furthermore, 46.7 percent would like to see the eastern border "more open than the western one."[304]

Since the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the imposition of an international border between Ukraine and Russia, the Russian and Ukrainian borderland regions have begun to face two contradictory processes. On the one hand, there have begun concerted attempts to 'nationalise' the borderlands, a process in which the state invests symbolically so that public perceptions coincide with realities regarding the extent of state territories. However, simultaneously there has commenced a drive in the local areas towards (re) building economic and social ties with their neighbouring areas on the basis of cross-border co-operation and also a reinterpretation of regional histories and identities.[305] Thus, of particular relevance, whilst the Ukrainian state is attempting to produce a unified Ukrainian historical narrative, nevertheless such efforts may not be insulated from competing narratives of Russian-Ukrainian historical relations, present in Russia and prevailing in these borderland regions.

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[302] Sahlins, P., *Boundaries: The Making of France and Spain in the Pyrenees*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989.
[303] Donnan, H. and Wilson, T.M., *Border Approaches: Anthropological Perspectives on Frontiers*, Lanham, MA: University Press of America, 1994; Paasi, A., *Territories, Boundaries and Consciousness: The Changing Geographies of the Finnish-Russian Border*, New York: John Wiley, 1996.
[304] "Expert Assessments and Public Opinion Concerning the Border Policy of Ukraine," *Borders of Ukraine. Effective policy implementation*, Kiev: Project of the Centre for Peace, Conversion and Foreign Policy of Ukraine, http://borders. Cpcfpu.org.ua/eng/analytics/index.shtml.
[305] Zhurzhenko, T., "Part 1: Cross-border Cooperation and Transformation of Regional Identities in the Ukrainian-Russian Borderlands: Towards a Euroregion 'Slobozhanshchina' ", *Nationalities Papers*, vol.32, no.1, March 2004, pp.207-231.

Luhans'k – the red pole of Ukraine?

Luhans'k is geographically Ukraine's most eastern oblast and forms along with Donets'k the eastern region in the 8-10 classification. It holds borders with the Ukrainian oblasts of Donets'k and Kharkiv and on the Russian side with Rostov, Belgorod and Voronezh regions. According to the 2001 Ukrainian census, it has a population of 2.546 million inhabitants, who in the vast majority live in urban areas (86 percent).[306]

However, to fully understand the socio-political dynamics of Luhans'k oblast today, it is important to take into account significant differences between its southern and northern parts. The southern parts of the oblast are highly urbanised area, a factor explained by the highly industrialised nature of this area, which form part of the famous Donbas region straddling the Russian-Ukrainian border of which 85 percent is situated in the Ukrainian oblasts of Donets'k and Luhans'k. Industrialisation here began at the beginning of the end of the eighteenth century with the opening up of numerous coalmines and the development of urban centres around them such as Holubivka (Kirovsk), Shubinka (Stakhanov), Petro-Mar'yika (Pervomaisk) and Krasnodon.[307] Throughout the tsarist times and on into the period of Soviet rule, the area was further industrialised.

In contrast, the northern part of the oblast, historically part of the *Slobozhanshchina* region is more rural with their local economies predominantly based around agriculture. In fact, pre 1917, whilst the northern parts of today's oblast were part of the Kharkiv *guberniia* (province) from 1835, the southern parts were part of the Katerynoslav (Ekaterinislav) *guberniia*. However after 1919, the majority of the area became part of the Donets'k *guberniia*, which became the Donets'k oblast in 1932. By 1938, the administrative boundaries had changed again, with the division of Donets'k oblast into Stalino (now Donets'k) and Voroshylovhrad (now Luhans'k) oblasts.[308] As noted here, Luhans'k was called Voroshylovhrad between 1935-1958 and 1970-1980. In 1935, under Stalin's orders, the city was renamed after Voroshilov, a staunch Communist and Stalin supporter born in the city. However, in the post-war years the critical reassessment of Stalinist methods particularly during the War and the shifts in Soviet historiography led to the constant renaming of the city. The confusion remains with the statue erected to commemorate the

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[306] See, www.ukrcensus.gov.ua, accessed 29th April 2004.
[307] The names here in brackets are the previous Soviet names.
[308] Kuromiya, H., *Freedom and Terror in the Donbas: A Ukrainian-Russian Borderland, 1870s-1990s*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998, p.xii.

Marshall, still standing in the centre of Luhans'k. Also in the post-war years, Luhans'k was the object 'russification' processes coupled with Soviet urbanisation and industrialistion. In particular, figures regarding the proportion of children learning in Ukrainian language schools in the region demonstrate a fall from 40.5 percent in 1951/2 to only 8.5 percent in 1985/6. In city of Luhans'k itself, by 1986, there were no Ukrainian language schools remaining.[309]

The history of the settlement of the Donbas region remains disputed by different Ukrainian and Russian versions of local historiography.[310] The Ukrainian version argues that Ukrainians were the first people to settle in these areas. Only after the eighteenth century did tsarist immigration policies lead to the influx of large number of other nationalities including Russians. Thus, Russian influence in the area is portrayed as a relatively recent phenomenon, leading to the 'de-ukrainisation' and 'russification' of the region, which was a natural part of the Ukrainian ethnographic territory. Such trends ensued throughout the Soviet period, with the cultural and linguistic boundaries between Russians and Ukrainians continually being eroded. However, the Ukrainian historical narrative stresses that such a situation is 'artificial'. With the aid of state-led ukrainisation policies, these areas can soon be 're-ukrainianised'. Unsurprisingly, local Russophile historical narratives argue that Russian cultural influence has not been artificially imposed, but rather has roots here and has developed freely over the centuries. They argue that the Zaporizhzhian Cossacks never held any influence as far south and east as the modern day Donbas. In fact, it is even cited that the Donbas in particular and Ukraine in general has never suffered 'russification,' but rather its own identity is being threatened by *Galitsizatsiia*, (Galicianisation), referring to excessive nationalist proposals for 'ukrainisation' emanating from Galicia.[311] Thus, the real 'other' in Ukrainian politics of identity are not the peoples of the Donbas, but rather the Galicians who were 'polluted' by Polish influence.

Regarding the role of the area in Ukrainian politics, it is first worthwhile stressing that in the uncertain years preceding the collapse of the Soviet Union, a local movement known as the Democratic Movement of Donbass, was formed in Luhans'k in 1990. It called on the

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[309] Arel, D., *Language and the Politics of Ethnicity: The Case of Ukraine*, University of Illinois (PhD dissertation), 1993.
[310] Wilson, A., "The Donbas between Ukraine and Russia: The Use of History in Political Disputes", *Journal of Contemporary History*, London: SAGE Publications, vol.30, 1995, pp.265-289.
[311] See the round table discussion between leading Donbas politicians in, *Donetskii kriakh.*, 33., 24-30 Sept 1993., quoted in Wilson., A., "The Donbas between Ukraine and Russia: The Use of History in Political Disputes", *Journal of Contemporary History*, London: SAGE Publications, vol.30., 1995, pp.265-289.

electorate to reject Ukrainian independence and instead proposed the formation of an autonomous Donets'k-Krivoi Rog region as a constituent part of a federated Ukraine within the USSR.[312] However, the results of the December 1991 referendum, were unexpected by the analysts. The population of Luhans'k oblast along with all the other eastern areas strongly voted in favour of Ukrainian independence, a result in hindsight which was put down to the expectation that independence would bring greater prosperity and stability.[313]

However, during the initial years of independence, the deteriorating economic situation led to regional activism sprouting in the Luhans'k and Donets'k regions. Demands included more regional autonomy, particularly in the economic sphere, closer links with Russia and the neighbouring Russian regions and calls for the Russian language to be elevated to the status of a state language alongside Ukrainian.[314] Such demands created an element of fear in Kiev that the region would break away from Ukraine and join Russia. In particular, such fears were exacerbated during the run-up to the 1994 parliamentary elections, when both Donets'k and Luhans'k oblast councils voted overwhelmingly for the state status for the Russian language.[315] However, post-1994 such fears have increasingly come to be seen as unjustified with political mobilisation in Donbas generally calling for greater political, economic or cultural autonomy rather than outright secession. Yet simultaneously regional elites in Donbas have used such sentiments as a bargaining card during interactions with the political centre. Indeed the failure of a secessionist movement has been explained by the region's peculiar characteristics.[316] Sasse argues that political mobilisation in the Donbas region has been linked to Soviet institutional legacies, the region's socio-economic profile and the specifics of the regional elites. In the Soviet times, the regional elites formed an integral part of the Soviet *nomenklatura* and thus looked primarily to Moscow for career elevation and central state subsidies for the large industrial enterprises under their tutelage. However, in the post-Soviet years, whilst the regional elites have had to orientate themselves more to Kiev in the bargaining process for continued subsidies, nonetheless close links to Russia have remained. In Luhans'k oblast, regional authorities have indeed been keen to maintain strong

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[312] *Vechirnii Kyiv*, 4th October 1991, quoted in Solchanyk, R., "The Politics of State Building: Centre Periphery Relations in Post-Soviet Ukraine", *Europe-Asia Studies*, vol.46, no.1, 1994, pp.42-68.
[313] In Luhans'k region, 83.3 percent of people voted for independence. For the other regional results and a comprehensive overview of the period leading upto Ukrainian independence, see Nahaylo, B., *The Ukrainian Resurgence*, London: Hurst, 1999.
[314] For an in-depth examination of the developments at this time in Donbas, see Wilson, A., "The Growing Challenge to Kiev from the Donbas", *RFE/RL Research Report*, 20th August 1993, pp.8-13.
[315] Jung, M., "The Donbas Factor in the Ukrainian Elections", *RFE/RL Research Report*, 25th March 1994, pp.52-53.
[316] Sasse, G., "The 'New' Ukraine: A State of Regions"..., op.cit., p.86.

links with the neighbouring Russian regions, leading to analysts calling Luhans'k the "eastern gates of Ukraine."[317] Also, the old links with Moscow remain, highlighted by the latest visit by the Mayor of Moscow, Yurii Luzhkov to the 2003 celebrations of the 65th anniversary of the foundation of Luhans'k oblast.

In fact, the peculiar nature of multiple identities in Luhans'k, as opposed to clear-cut ethnic or ethnolinguistic identities, has led to a near-total lack of support for Russian nationalist agendas in election since 1994. Thus, descriptions of parts of eastern Ukraine being bastions of 'pro-Russian separatists' have proved to be misplaced. Instead, the population has strongly backed left-wing forces, notably the hard left KPU, gaining the reputation as being the 'red pole of Ukraine'.[318] To understand such results, one needs to take into account the socio-economic characteristics of the region. Since 1991, the economy has declined considerably suffered, with numerous closures of old Soviet behemoth industrial complexes and coalmines and decline in the Ukrainian agricultural sector. Such changes have left much of the population living in severe poverty, a situation which the Communists have been quick to exploit, advocating a return to the Soviet economic system and a decent welfare system. For example, in the 1998 parliamentary elections, KPU polled 45.98 percent in the region, the highest figure recorded across Ukraine.

In the most recent parliamentary elections in 2002, the results in Luhans'k were extremely revealing.[319] Whilst across many regions of Ukraine, there was strong support for Viktor Yushchenko's *Nasha Ukraina* (Our Ukraine) bloc, which advocated political and economic reforms and a strong 'European' orientation in foreign policy, in Luhans'k support was virtually non-existent. Only in Luhans'k, in neighbouring Donets'k oblast and the City of Sevastopol did *Nasha Ukraina* not gain 4 percent of the vote. In fact, of significance has been the total lack of support for any national-democratic forces in any of the elections. In contrast, KPU (Communist Party of Ukraine) received 39.69 percent of the vote, the highest vote in any region of Ukraine, with the remaining vote spread out across the pro-Presidential oligarchic parties ZYU (For One Ukraine) (14.38 percent) and SDPU–o (Social Democratic Party of Ukraine–united) (9.44 percent).

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317 " 'Skhidni vorota Ukraini': kudi voni vedut?", *Ukrains'kii rehional'nii visnik*, no.38, 1st November 2001, *Institut Skhid-Zakhid.*

318 "Politichni obrii Luhanshchyni," *Ukrains'kii rehional'nii visnik*, no.38, 1st November 2001, *Institut Skhid-Zakhid.*

319 The results can be found on Ukraine's Central Elections Committee webpage, http://www.cvkukrpack.net, accessed 7th August 2002.

Such results seemingly point to the local population's general apprehensive stance towards the ukrainisation policies, proposed by national-democratic forces. This fact is backed up by the results of attempts to ukrainianise the education system since 1991. In Luhans'k oblast, in 1991/2, the proportion of children attending Ukrainian language schools was 6.7 percent, but by 2000/1, it had only risen to 17 percent, still well below the proportion of ethnic Ukrainians in the local population.[320] (see Tables 5.4 and 5.6). Even more striking were the figures concerning language of instruction in pre-school education establishments for 2000.[321] Whilst across Ukraine, there had been a dramatic increase in the use of Ukrainian, and also in other 'russified' regions, such as Zaporizhzhia and Donets'k, where 62.9 percent and 34.5 percent of children were being taught in Ukrainian, Luhans'k was lagging a long way behind at only 19.7 percent. (see Tables 5.3 and 5.5).

The region's strong attachment to the Russian language and stuttering embrace of ukrainisation is again seen in the results of the recent 2001 National Ukrainian Census.[322] In terms of nationality, Ukrainians comprise 58 percent of the population, an increase of 6.1 percent from the previous 1989 Soviet census, with the proportion of Russians falling from 44.8 to 39 percent. However, the results concerning native language, (*ridna mova* in Ukrainian and *rodnoi yasyk* in Russian) are extremely revealing. Ukrainian is regarded as the native language for only 30 percent of the region's population, representing ***an actual fall*** of 4.9 percent since 1989. In direct contrast, Russian is regarded as the native language for 68.8 percent of the population, a rise of 4.9 percent since 1989. Within these figures, the percentage of Ukrainians who view Ukrainian as their native language stands at only 50.6 percent with 49.4 percent seeing Russian as their native language. Thus, these results seemingly reveal two trends in the region. In the post-1991 period of Ukrainian independence, many people have renegotiated their identities, increasingly seeing themselves as Ukrainians. However, such shifts have not coincided with a shift towards the Ukrainian language. Thus, seemingly one can draw the tentative conclusion that whilst people may be coming to view themselves as 'Ukrainian', a specific regional version of Ukrainian identity exists here, which is not viewed in solely linguistic terms.

Indeed, the peculiarities of the language situation represent the ambiguous nature of identities here. These are symbolically represented in the urban landscape of Luhans'k, where Russian

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[320] "Sistema osviti v Ukraini: stan ta perspectivi posvitku," in *National'na bespeka I oborona*, no.4, (28), 2002, p.8., Ukrains'kyi tsentr ekonomichnix i politichnix doslidzhen' imeni Oleksandra Pazumkova.
[321] Ibid, p.5.
[322] Results can be found at, www.ukrcensus.gov.ua, accessed 29th April 2004.

and Ukrainian signs co-exist. Of particular interest is a large wall in the city centre, painted by the local authorities in the yellow and blue colours of the national flag. Here the words, *Eto nash gorod* (this is our city), are written not in Ukrainian, the state language, but in Russian. (see Plate 5.1).

Also, whilst in many other cities across Ukraine, since independence there have been concerted efforts to destroy the past signs of Russian/Soviet influence involving the changing of street names and the pulling down of statues, commemorated to Communist heroes, in Luhans'k, this process has not occurred. The city's main thoroughfare, *Ulitsya Sovetskaya* (Soviet Street) remains so does the hotel also of this name. Also, Soviet monuments including those to Lenin and also Feliks Dzerzhinsky, the infamous founder of the NKVD (forerunner to the KGB) are still intact. Furthermore, the city's close links with Russia are highlighted in the name of the main supermarket in the city being simply *Rossiya* (Russia). (see Plate 5.2).

As this brief overview demonstrates, the history of the settlement of the region is still highly contested. During the Soviet times, the region, in the main being part of the Donbas, received the full force of Soviet modernisation processes, particularly in terms of linguistic and cultural 'russification.' Yet, this region should not be seen as holding an exclusive 'Russian' character, but rather a blurred mixture of Russian and Ukrainian identities, with association with the Soviet Union, still strong amongst the older generations and the economically least well-off. Of note, please refer to plate 5.3, which commemorates the 14th February as the day that Soviet forces liberated Luhans'k region from fascist occupiers.

However, in elections the population has emphatically failed to support explicitly pro-Russian nationalist forces. Instead, the region has supported hardline leftist forces and simultaneously rejected national-democratic forces. Such results, coupled with the historical legacies of the region's specific role and development under both tsarist and Soviet rule explain the population's negotiation of state-led linguistic ukrainisation. Whilst the region has not wholly rejected it, it has been more backward than forward in its uptake. The fascinating questions which leads from here is how have other state-led nation building projects in the education system aimed at 'historicising' a Ukrainian identity been contested in this region and where do the region's inhabitants see Luhans'k's place within the Ukrainian nation?

Kharkiv – the capital of Ukrainian-Russian co-operation?

Kharkiv, the capital of its name-bearing oblast is situated in northeastern Ukraine and is situated in the east central region in the 8-10 classification. It has internal borders with Luhans'k and Donets'k to the south, Poltava to the east and Sumy to the north. Also, the area borders the Russian region of Belgorod. In 2001, the area's population stood at 2.9142 million people, of which 78.5 percent lived in urban areas.[323]

The history of this area is closely tied with the history of *Slobozhanshchya*, one of Ukraine's historical regions. Located south east of the Hetmanate and to the south and west of the Belgorod defensive line, it was settled in the mid seventeenth century by Ukrainian peasants and Russian settlers on the borderlands of Muscovy, Poland and the Tatar Khanate.[324] As a result of Muscovy's territorial expansion into the steppe under Peter I, this region was brought closer into the core provinces of the empire, a process completed by Catherine II's "Statute on the Provinces" in 1779. The provincial reforms were finished in 1782, with four of the regimental towns in the region, Kharkiv, Sumy, Akhtyrka and Izium, forming the new Kharkiv *guberniia*.

As a border region, *Slobozhanshchyna* attracted many peasants and Cossacks, fleeing from religious and social violence in the Polish controlled regions of today's Ukraine. In exchange for military service, the Cossacks received a limited amount of autonomous administration. Also, owing to the lack of wealthy landed nobility in the region, developed an unusual system of free homesteading. Also the Cossacks were given some economic privileges such as tax free trade, which allowed the lively trade sector in the local economy to flourish. During the nineteenth century, Kharkiv in particular grew into an important academic and cultural centre. In 1805 the city's university was founded and academics formed a group of Kharkiv Romantics, whose work regarding the free-spirit of the Cossacks provided the foundations of the nascent Ukrainian national intelligentsia movement, within the Brotherhood of Saints Cyril and Methodius. Under tsarist rule, Kharkiv developed rapidly, being considerably larger than Kiev for much of this period. During the twentieth century, Kharkiv was the first capital of the UkrSSR from 1918-1934 and grew to become a major centre for the military-industrial complex and also a major cultural, transportation and

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[323] www.ukrcensus.gov.ua, accessed 29th April 2004.

[324] Leckey, C., "Provincial Readers and Agrarian Reform, 1760s-1770s: The Case of Sloboda Ukraine", *Russian Review*, 61, October 2002, pp.535-559.

intellectual centre. Also the national composition of the region's population in this period changed greatly. As a result of the influx of Russian migrants and 'russification' policies, between 1959 and 1989, the proportion of Ukrainians fell from 82.2 to 63.1 percent. In contrast, the proportion of Russians rose from 17.2 percent to 33.4 percent. Also, in terms of language instruction in schools, the proportion of children in Ukrainian language schools fell from 71.8 percent in 1951/2 to only 27.9 percent in 1985/6.[325] Indeed, an ethnographic study of the the Russian-Ukrainian borderlands in the late 1980s found that the population of the region had a culture, local traditions and a mentality, which is difficult to define as either Russian or Ukrainian.[326]

The historical settlement of this region has been hotly debated since the nineteenth century with key issues including to what extent is *Slobozhanshchyna* was from the onset, a truly 'Ukrainian' land. Was the region 'russified' by forced pressure from the tsarist and Soviet regimes, or does the history's multiethnic character stem from the joint and natural settlement of the region by both Russians and Ukrainians? However, in the post-1991 period, such debates have become far more vocal. Indeed, Zhurzhenko notes how whilst the 'Ukrainian' character of the region has been expressed in certain circles, this has come to be contested by a powerful 'multicultural' discourse.[327] This version of historical events has been co-opted by regional elites who have used it to create a compromised version of the 'national idea' for the region. *Slobozhanshchyna* has been (re) invented as an alternative to a 'national idea' determined by solely ethnic and linguistic markers. In particular, it provides a strong counter-argument to those who claim that blurred identities in eastern Ukraine represent the pollution of Ukrainian identities by Russian/Soviet influence, and highlight the unfinished nature of the nation building project.[328] In contrast, the 'multicultural' discourse rejects the claims that imperial and colonial masters forcibly imposed Russian influence in the region. In this way, a specific regional identity is being espoused which while endorsing the original 'Ukrainian' character of the region, highlights the traditional Russian-Ukrainian friendly relations in the region. This therefore justifies Kharkiv's role as the mediator of relations between Russia and Ukraine and significant regional efforts to create further cross-border co-operation. In particular, the pro-presidential ZYU (For One Ukraine) party's slogan in the region at the

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[325] Arel, D., "Language Politics in Independent Ukraine: Towards One or Two State Languages?" *Nationalities Papers*, no.3, 1994, pp.597-622.
[326] Chizhykova, L.N., "Russkoe-Ukrainskoe pogranich'e...", op.cit., p.49.
[327] Zhurzhenko, T., "Cross-border Cooperation and Transformation of Regional Identities in the Ukrainian-Russian Borderlands: Towards a Euroregion "Slobozhanshchya?", Parts 1 and 2, *Nationalities Papers*, vol.32, no.1, March 2004, pp.207-231 and the following issue.
[328] Kuzio, T., *Ukraine: State and Nation Building*, London: Routledge, 1998, p.162.

recent 2002 parliamentary elections was "Kharkiv is the capital of Ukrainian-Russian co-operation." Such slogans were adorned around the centre of the city when the author visited it in 2002 (see Plate 5.4). Of interest, the slogan was written on one side in the Ukrainian language and on the other, in Russian, highlighting also the specific linguistic situation of the city.

Regarding voting patterns since 1991, Kharkiv has generally supported left-wing forces, yet subtle differences can be seen in comparison to the results from Luhans'k. In the 1998 parliamentary elections, whilst the KPU gained 35.4 percent of the vote, other more moderate left-wing forces and centrist forces also gained substantial support.[329] Similarly in the 2002 parliamentary elections, whilst the KPU vote still led with 30.69 percent, the pro-presidential parties of ZYU and SDPU-o (Social Democratic Party of Ukraine–united) gained 15.38 and 10.35 percent respectively.[330] In contrast to its appalling showing in Luhans'k, *Nasha Ukraina* gained 5.92 percent of the vote, which can probably be put down to votes from the city's large intelligentsia.

Concerning changes in the composition of the population, in 2001, Ukrainians comprised 70.7 percent a rise of 7.9 percent from the previous 1989 census, with Russians in contrast comprising 25.6 percent, down from 33.2 percent in 1989.[331] Regarding language, across the oblast, 53.8 percent saw Ukrainian as their native language, a rise of 3.3 percent from 1989. Amongst Ukrainians, 74.1 percent saw Ukrainian as their native language and 25.8 percent Russian. Also, in terms of language instruction in schools, whilst in 1985/6, only 27.9 percent of children went to Ukrainian language schools, by 2000/1, this figure had risen to 55 percent. (see Tables 5.4 and 5.6). Also, in the pre-school establishments, by 2000, 82.7 percent of children were instructed in Ukrainian, a figure in fact higher than the proportion of Ukrainians in the local population.[332] (see Tables 5.3 and 5.5).These figures show, in comparison to those from Luhans'k, a much more enthusiastic uptake of linguistic Ukrainian. Such trends are supported by the results of some qualitative research, undertaken in Kharkiv

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[329] Craumer, P.R. and Clem, J.I., "Ukraine's emerging Electoral Geography..., op cit., p.16.
[330] Results at Ukraine's Central Elections Commissions website, http://www.cvk.ukrpack.net, 7th August 2002.
[331] www.ukrcensus.gov.ua, accessed 29th April 2004.
[332] "Sistema osviti v Ukraini: stan ta perspectivi rosvitku,"..., op.cit., p.5.

Plate 5.1 Example of the continued use of the Russian language in the public sphere by Luhans'k City Council (P.W.Rodgers, January 2003).

Plate 5.2 Main supermarket in the centre of Luhans'k – *Rossiya* (Russia) (P.W.Rodgers, February 2003).

Plate 5.3 Billboard in the centre of Luhans'k, in the Russian language, *"The heroic deeds of the veterans are in the hearts of everyone"*. (P.W Rodgers, January 2003).

Plate 5.4 Banner hanging across the main thoroughfare in central Kharkiv, *Sumskaya*, with a quotation by President Kuchma, *"It is possible to call Kharkiv the capital of Ukrainian-Russian co-operation"*. (P.W.Rodgers, March 2003).

in 2003.[333] The author found after carrying out in-depth interviews with teenagers that although the Ukrainian language was not being fully embraced, nevertheless certain trends were becoming apparent. In particular, Sovik argues that certainly for some interviewees the Ukrainian language had taken on the role as a symbol of Ukrainian identity, even though these individuals continued to use the Russian language in everyday life. Other individuals stated how whilst their use of the Russian language formed a part of their 'personal' identity, something that linked them to a wider East-Slavic community, nevertheless, the Ukrainian language was still seen as significant, as representing the Ukrainian state. In this manner, one can see a slight difference in attitudes in Kharkiv compared to Luhans'k. Whilst in Luhans'k, there was seen strong resistance to state attempts at linguistic ukrainisation, in Kharkiv, whilst the majority of the population still continues to use the Russian language in their everyday lives, nevertheless, they are more open and willing to embrace the state's linguistic ukrainisation project.

Sumy

This area is situated in northeastern Ukraine, straddling the Russian border along its eastern and northern limits and in the north-central region in the 8-10 classification. The oblast borders Kharkiv, Chernihiv and Poltava oblasts in Ukraine and the Russian 'black earth' regions, notably Kursk. According to the 2001 Census, the oblast's population stands at 1.2997 million people with the urban-rural divide being 64.9 to 35.1 percent.[334]

Beginning from the ninth century, part of Sumy oblast were part of the Pereiaslav and Chernihiv prinicpalities in the kingdom of Kiev Rus' and in the mid twelvth century, part of the Novgorod-Siversky principality. During these times, many settlements were created, but a century later many had suffered severely at the hands of the Tatar invaders. By the mid fourteenth century, much of present day Sumy oblast had been captured by the Lithuanian principality, which stayed under their tutelage until the peace treaty of 1503 when much of the land was absorbed into the Muscovite state.[335] The sixteenth and seventeenth centuries witnessed the growth of many settlements in this area, often fortresses acting as important

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[333] Sovik, M., "Who am I? Perceptions of language and identity among students in Kharkiv", paper presented at a conference, organised by the Centre for Border Studies, at the University of Glamorgan, entitled, 'Crossing Borders: History, Theories and Identities, December 2-4 2004.
[334] See; www.ukrcensus.gov.ua, accessed 29th April 2004.
[335] Information regarding Sumy can be found at http://online.sumy.ua/eng/history/index.html, accessed 3rd May 2004.

border points between the Polish and Russian controlled parts of modern day Ukraine. The city of Sumy itself, was established in this period in 1655, where the tsarist authorities chose to build one of the largest forts in the whole of *Slobozhanshchyna*, the home of the Slobidsky Kozak regiment. Under tsarist control, the area was absorbed into the Kharkiv *guberniia* and the city slowly developed with its industrial enterprises engaged in agricultural production and processing, providing for the needs of the surrounding rural, agricultural area economies. In particular, in 1869 the Pavlovsky sugar refinery was opened, the largest in Ukraine. With the onset of Soviet rule, parts of today's oblast formed part of the neighbouring Poltava, Chernihiv and Kharkiv oblasts. However, in 1939, the Sumy oblast was created, the boundaries of which have remained stable ever since. With Sumy now being an administrative centre, in the post-war years Soviet planners developed many industrial enterprises especially in the chemical and machine building sectors in the city. Thus, the economic profile of Sumy itself shifted away from its traditional association with agriculture and became more diversified. With these shifts, came an influx of people, leading to the population of Sumy to stand at around the 300,000 mark today.

Whilst this area was absorbed into the Russian Empire at around the same time as much of the eastern parts of Ukraine, including Kharkiv and Luhans'k, nevertheless the political orientation of the area has always been slightly different. Whilst in regions to the south in Luhans'k and Donets'k in the Donbas, the existence of minerals had led to their rapid industrialisation and the influx of migrants from Russia to fill the workplaces in the factories and coalmines, here the situation was different. The area kept its predominantly rural character. The urban areas were small, often having a mixed Ukrainian, Russian and Jewish population. Such differences are mainfested in the statistics regarding the language of instruction in schools in the post-war years. In contrast to the very low proportion of children being taught in Ukrainian by the mid 1980s in Kharkiv and especially Luhans'k, in Sumy, even after decades of 'russification' pressure from the centre, the figure was still 49.7 percent.[336]

Turning to election results since 1991, the oblast has wholeheartedly supported left wing forces in all the elections. However, a distinction here needs to be made. Whilst in Luhans'k it was noted how the 'hard left' policies of the KPU were popular, here the vote has been more diversified across a range of leftist forces. For example, in the 1998 parliamentary

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[336] Arel, D., "Language Politics in Independent Ukraine: Towards One or Two State Languages?", *Nationalities Papers,* vol.23, no.3, September 1995, pp.597-622.

elections, whilst 25.43 percent voted for KPU, the Progressive Socialists also gained 20.89 percent and the Socialist/Peasantry Party 13.05 percent of the vote.[337] Four years later at the 2002 parliamentary elections, the results perhaps even more so, depicted the area as being highly diverse in its political orientation, yet with different political parties on this occasion gaining support. The leading party here was *Nasha Ukraina*, notably led by Viktor Yushchenko, who was born in the region, with 18.6 percent.[338] Four other parties also received significant proportions of the vote including ZYU (17.04 percent), KPU (16.49 percent), SDPU-o (15.08 percent) and Yulia Tymoshenko's anti-presidential party gaining 7.5 percent. These results indeed demonstrate that cumulatively whilst around a quarter of the votes went to Yushchenko and Tymoshenko, who both advocated political and economic reforms, in contrast over 30 percent voted for the pro-presidential oligarchic 'parties of power' and maintenance of the *status-quo*.

Finally, regarding the national profile of the area and language use, figures from the 2001 census demonstrate that Ukrainians comprise 88.8 percent of the population, an increase of 3.3 percent since 1989 and Russians 9.4 percent, a decrease of 3.9 percent.[339] Turning to language use, 92.4 percent of Ukrainians view Ukrainian as their native language, whilst intriguingly only 89.6 percent of Russians view Russian as their native language. The remainder, 10.4 percent, sees Ukrainian as their native language. Such figures therefore if taken in direct comparison with those of the other two study areas, indicate that Sumy has a far higher ethnic Ukrainian population, which is in the vast majority, Ukrainian-speaking. In contrast, the Russian influence here, certainly in terms of population and language use, is far less. Indeed, the 10.4 percent of Ukrainophone Russians perhaps demonstrates the dominance of Ukrainian in the local environment, a fact certainly confirmed by the hegemony of Ukrainian language signs and advertising around the city of Sumy (see Plates 5.5 and 5.6).

Such findings are confirmed by the changes, which have been occurring in the education system. The figures clearly demonstrate that linguistic ukrainisation is being embraced in this area, with the proportion of children learning in Ukrainian jumping from 46.1 percent in 1991/2 to 83 percent in 2000/1.[340] (see Tables 5.4 and 5.6). Also in the area of pre-school

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[337] Craumer, P.R. and Clem, J.I., "Ukraine's emerging Electoral Geography..., op cit., p.18.
[338] See Ukraine's Central Elections Commission website, http://www.cvk.ukrpack.net, accessed 7th August 2002.
[339] See www.ukrcensus.gov.ua, accessed 29th April 2004.
[340] "Sistema osviti v Ukraini: stan ta perspectivi rosvitku,"..., op.cit., p.8.

education, by 2000 97.7 percent of children were taught in the Ukrainian language, a figure higher than the proportion of Ukrainians in the local population (see Tables 5.3 and 5.5). Overall, such results point to the fact that Sumy differs greatly from the simplistic 'west-east' image of Ukraine, with eastern areas seen as politically pro-Russian and Russian speaking areas. Whilst Sumy is a border area, and as a result of this had throughout its history long interaction with Russians and Russian culture, nevertheless the area owing to its lack of mineral resources was never highly industrialised and 'russified'. As such, today the area has a very different socio-political outlook than both Kharkiv and especially Luhans'k.

5.7 Conclusions

This chapter examined the significance of regionalism within the politics of identity in Ukraine. It was argued that owing to the diversity of historical legacies of many regions of modern-day Ukraine, regionalism is a far more complex phenomenon, than a simple, dichotomous 'west-east' divide. The inherent peculiarity of the Ukrainian version of regionalism is not that it represents a danger of imminent state disintegration in the face of secessionist claims or a split along the river *Dnipro*, but rather the challenge it presents in creating an all-embracing modern, civic Ukrainian national identity.

To gain a fuller picture of Ukraine's regional diversity and move beyond the neat 'east-west' split, the chapter took as a point of departure an eight-region framework, which was further modified by the author to create a framework of ten regions. In particular, concepts such as 'Western Ukraine' were found to fail to take into account the contrasting historical, demographic and economic profiles of the lands, which comprise the historical regions of Galicia, Volhynia, Transcarpathia and Bykovyna. Furthermore, in an effort to illuminate the inherent nuances and subtleties within and between regions in Ukraine, this chapter aimed to deconstruct the concept of 'Eastern Ukraine' as a unitary, homogenous space. In particular, three study areas, all adjacent to the Russian-Ukrainian border, were chosen as sites for a local, comparative study. From a brief analysis of these three study areas, significant variations were found to exist, notably in their varied responses to the state-led linguistic ukrainisation project since 1991. These initial findings, however, must be placed under empirical scrutiny, which is the focus for chapters Eight and Nine. In particular, focus will be on another aspect of the nation-building project; state attempts to 'historicise' a Ukrainian national identity in the education system. In particular, it will be examined how the 'official'

narrative is negotiated by the various local actors themselves and to what extent regional historical narratives correspond to; or contradict, the state's 'official' narrative. This will feed into wider debates regarding the interactions between the centre and regional levels within the dynamics of the state-led nation-building project. Chapter Seven involves an examination of the 'official' narrative of the history of Ukraine, espoused by the state authorities. However, first of all chapter Six examines the methodological and ethical issues which arose during the process of undertaking this study.

Plate 5.5 Banner, in the Ukrainian language, in the centre of Sumy, *"Sumy: the city of our hopes"*. (P.W. Rodgers, April 2003).

Plate 5.6 Banner in the Ukrainian language, in the central square in Sumy, *"Sumy region: Our motherland, Ukraine: Our motherland"*. (P.W.Rodgers, April 2003).

Table 5.3: <u>The Language of instruction in pre-school education establishments in the three study areas 2000/1</u>

Oblasts	% Ukrainian	% Russian
Kharkivs'ka	*82.7*	*17.3*
Luhans'ka	*19.7*	*80.3*
Sums'ka	*97.7*	*2.3*

Source: "Sistema osviti v Ukraini: stan ta perspectivi rosvitku", in *National'na bespeka i oborona,* no.4, (28), 2002, p.5.

Table 5.4: <u>The Language of instruction in education establishments in the three study areas 2000/1</u>

Oblasts	% Ukrainian	% Russian
Kharkivs'ka	*55*	*45*
Luhans'ka	*17*	*83*
Sums'ka	*83*	*17*

Source: "Sistema osviti v Ukraini: stan ta perspectivi rosvitku", in *National'na bespeka i oborona,* no.4, (28), 2002, p.5.

Table 5.5: <u>The Language of instruction in pre-school education establishments in Ukraine 2000/1</u>

Oblasts	% Ukrainian	% Russian
Autonomous Republic of Crimea	*2.8*	*96.3*
The City of Sevastopol	*1.6*	*98.4*
Cherkas'ka	*99.1*	*0.1*
Chernihivs'ka	*99.5*	*0.5*
Chernivets'ka	*93.6*	*0.2*
Dnipropetrovs'ka	*84.5*	*15.5*
Donets'ka	*34.5*	*65.5*
Ivano-Frankivs'ka	*100*	*0*
Kharkivs'ka	***82.7***	***17.3***
Kheml'nyts'ka	*99.9*	*0.1*
Khersons'ka	*83.2*	*16.8*
Kirovohrads'ka	*98.2*	*1.8*
Kyivs'ka	*99.6*	*0.4*
L'vivs'ka	*99.7*	*0*
Luhans'ka	***19.7***	***80.3***
Mykolaivs'ka	*90.4*	*9.6*
Odes'ka	*62.9*	*35.4*
Poltavs'ka	*98.3*	*1.7*
Rivens'ka	*99.9*	*0.1*
Sums'ka	***97.7***	***2.3***
Ternopil's'ka	*100*	*0*
Vynnyts'ka	*100*	*0*
Zakarpats'ka	*90.2*	*0.6*
Zaporiz'ka	*62.9*	*37.1*
Zhytomyrs'ka	*99.8*	*0.2*

Source: "Sistema osviti v Ukraini: stan ta perspectivi rosvitku", in *National'na bespeka i oborona*, no.4, (28), 2002, p.5.

Table 5.6: The Language of instruction in education establishments in Ukraine 2000/1

Oblasts	% Ukrainian	% Russian
Autonomous Republic of Crimea	*0.9*	*97*
The City of Sevastopol	*2.0*	*98*
Cherkas'ka	*96*	*4*
Chernihivs'ka	*94*	*6*
Chernivets'ka	*81*	*2*
Dnipropetrovs'ka	*68*	*32*
Donets'ka	*14*	*86*
Ivano-Frankivs'ka	*99*	*1*
Kharkivs'ka	*55*	*45*
Kheml'nyts'ka	*98*	*2*
Khersons'ka	*76*	*24*
Kirovohrads'ka	*89*	*11*
Kyivs'ka	*97*	*3*
L'vivs'ka	*98*	*2*
Luhans'ka	*17*	*83*
Mykolaivs'ka	*74*	*26*
Odes'ka	*47*	*51*
Poltavs'ka	*93*	*7*
Rivens'ka	*99.7*	*0.3*
Sums'ka	*83*	*17*
Ternopil's'ka	*99.7*	*0.3*
Vynnyts'ka	*97*	*2*
Zakarpats'ka	*86*	*2*
Zaporiz'ka	*45*	*55*
Zhytomyrs'ka	*96*	*4*

Source: "Sistema osviti v Ukraini: stan ta perspectivi rosvitku", in *National'na bespeka i oborona*, no.4, (28), 2002, p.8.

CHAPTER SIX: METHODOLOGICAL AND ETHICAL ISSUES

> The questions raised by conducting fieldwork in...at once invoke boundaries and blur borders. Where are the boundaries between 'the research' and everyday life; between the 'fieldwork'and doing fieldwork; between the 'field' and not; between 'the scholar and the subject? Under contemporary conditions of globalisation and post-positivist thought in the social sciences, we are already in the field–multiply positioned actors, aware of the partiality of all of our stories and the artifice of the boundaries drawn in order to tell them.[341]

6.1 Introduction

This chapter discusses the methodological and ethical issues encountered during this research project. This is understood as a dialogic, iterative process which develops over time within different contexts. Its parts include not just the final, written text but also research questions and time spent preparing the fieldwork, accessing the 'field' and experiencing fieldwork, analysing 'data', writing up the data and finally the dissemination of information. Empirical data was collected during time spent in the three study areas in Ukraine in 2003, from both primary and secondary sources. Primary sources included ethnographic interviews undertaken at schools and universities in each of the three study areas. These involved education officials, school directors, school history teachers, pupils and students. Secondary sources included the analysis of official documents, newspaper articles, social surveys and opinion polls, and other published research undertaken by both Ukrainian and western academics. Furthermore, content analysis of history textbooks was undertaken. The chapter commences with an examination of why qualitative data methods were chosen. This is followed by a description of these methods and how the results were analysed. Finally, the chapter concludes with a discussion of the main methodological and ethical considerations which have been thrown up during the research project.

6.2 A qualitative approach

Most of the methods used in this research can be classified as *qualitative* in nature. Qualitative research can be defined as, "an attempt to present the social world, and perspectives on that world, in terms of concepts, behaviours, perceptions and accounts of the

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[341] Katz, C., "Playing the field: questions of fieldwork in geography", *Professional Geographer*, 46(1), 1994, p.67.

people it is about."[342] The choice of qualitative methods is based on the ontological belief that people create and maintain a social world and interact through language. Thus, language enables interaction between the researched and the researcher. There is no assumption of the notion of the researched simply being a repository of data and all the researcher must do to get good results is to ask the right questions. Instead, there is a desire for a 'dialogue' to be created and maintained between the researched and the researcher. This is based on the belief that knowledge is created and constructed within the interaction between the researched and the researcher.[343] Epistemologically, this study lies in the school of interpretivism. It is believed that social phenomena do not exist independently of our interpretation of them. The world is thus 'discursively' constructed. The interpretation and understanding, by actors and observers, is crucial. This thesis places emphasis on the dynamic, constructed and evolving nature of social reality. It seeks to understand the social reality through the eyes of those being studied.[344] The methods to be used to *generate* data are flexible and sensitive to the social context in which they are produced.

Qualitative methods were chosen for this research project as they provide a depth and a richness which fails often to be highlighted in many quantitative studies. Concerning academic research in the post-Soviet space, qualitative research methods are particularly useful as they permit the researcher to remain flexible in a rapidly changing environment, also not being forced to stay within the bounds of questions and categories, constructed before the fieldwork, in a different cultural environment. Many opinion polls and surveys have been carried out, with their results shedding light on many interesting trends at the macro level. However, such studies often fail to capture some of the subtleties within the wider processes and test the theoretical assumptions upon which they were based.[345] Regarding research in Ukraine, Jackson's study in Zaporizhzhia directly addressed these issues, examining how nuances at the local level were interacting with debates surrounding national identity at the regional and state levels.[346] The author drew the conclusion that whilst the population may not seem to be active in the *formal* national debates surrounding national identity, as a result of economic problems and disillusionment with the current political

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[342] See the handout authored by Liz Ross given to her students at the University of Birmingham on the post-graduate course entitled, "Basic Qualitative methods", Autumn 2001.
[343] Mason, J., *Qualitative Researching*, London, SAGE Publications, 1996.
[344] Bouma, G.D. and Atkinson., B. J., *A Handbook of Social Science Research: A Comprehensive and Practical Guide for Students*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995.
[345] Pilkington, H., *Russia's youth and its culture*, London: Routledge, 1994.
[346] Jackson, L., "Identity, Language and Transformation in Eastern Ukraine: A Case Study of Zaporizhzhia," in Kuzio, T., (ed.), *Contemporary Ukraine: Dynamics of Post-Soviet transformation*, Armonk, NY, London: M.E. Sharpe, 1998, pp.99-113.

regime, in actual fact they are heavily involved in the politics of identity. Furthermore, Jackson calls for more such in-depth research using qualitative research methods, including interviews, to examine how the population is living out the tensions inherent in the contestation of a new post-Soviet Ukrainian identity in their daily lives.[347] The aim of this thesis is to examine the construction and negotiation of national identity in Ukraine. Qualitative methods allow individuals themselves to express how they feel about a certain issue and how it impacts on their daily lives, rather than being forced into choosing from categories, provided by the interviewer. Thus they provide an ideal way to assess the *meanings* and *perceptions* people place on notions of identity.

A *case study approach* was utilised in this research project. Three case study areas were chosen in Ukraine, namely the oblast capitals, Luhans'k, Kharkiv and Sumy. These places, as was briefly outlined in chapter One, are all situated in Ukraine's eastern borderlands adjacent to the Russian border. As such, they provide a spatial dimension for comparative research assessing how identity change is occurring in Ukraine. Detailed information regarding each of the case study area's specifics can be found in chapter Five. The case study approach facilitates the study of identity change to take place at both the micro and macro levels, and between them, focusing our attention on how identities are constructed and contested at a variety of different levels by a number of individual actors. This method thus generates the empirical findings of micro-level research to inform the wider theoretical understandings of the politics of identity in Ukraine.[348]

6.3 Choice of methods

A variety of different methods were utilised in order to facilitate the generation of 'rich' data. The methods used included; in-depth expert interviews, group interviews with schoolchildren and content analysis. All the interviews were taped and later transcribed.

Expert interviews

Interviews were conducted with a range of experts in 2003 in the cities of Kiev, Luhans'k, Kharkiv and Sumy. These experts included academics, regional education officials,

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[347] Jackson, L., "Identity, Language and Transformation in Eastern Ukraine: A Case Study of Zaporizhzhia,"..., op.cit., pp.99-113.
[348] Burawoy, M. et al., *Ethnography Unbound*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991, pp.10-11.

university history lecturers, school history teachers and school directors. Contacts with Ukrainian academics specialising on regionalism and identity politics were made via the Internet in the initial stages of this PhD in 2001 and 2002 and during a pilot project to Kiev and Kharkiv during Spring 2002. Such contacts proved highly valuable in the accessing of relevant individuals and institutions, particularly the Department of Education in each of the study areas and led to a 'snowballing' of contacts, being the most effective means of gaining access.

The interviews were semi-structured: with the academics, they focused on wide ranging issues involving regionalism and national identity in Ukraine. With the remaining experts, interviews focused on the changes taking place in the Ukrainian education system; the new Ukrainian history textbooks and how they differed from the previous Soviet textbooks; the representation of specific periods of Ukraine's history; issues surrounding regionalism in Ukraine; opinions concerning Ukraine's relationship with Russia and the Ukrainian-Russian state border. These themes were used as a prompt for the interviewer rather than a strict, structured guideline for the interviews. For each of these interviews, no formal list of questions was prepared, instead the respondents were encouraged to speak about what they deemed was important, allowing a real 'dialogue' to be created between the interviewer and the interviewee with both being 'active' in meaning and knowledge production.[349] Also the use of such interviews aimed to fulfil one of the key aims of qualitative research, "to understand parts of the world as they are experienced and understood in the everyday lives of the people who actually 'live them out'."[350] These interviews proved highly valuable sources of data. However, whilst in most cases, interviewees were content in discussing the issues at hand, others were not and proved highly reticent, especially in stating their personal opinions regarding politically sensitive issues. In particular, this issue arose when discussing highly contentious periods of Ukraine's history, with individuals criticising state policies, yet in a highly guarded fashion. In general, such situations more commonly arose when conducting interviews with individuals holding more powerful positions. Such 'blocking' techniques, whilst proving to a certain degree 'annoying' to the avid researcher, were respected with the researcher forever aware of the ethical issues involved here.

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[349] Holstein, J.A. and Gubrium, J.F., "Active Interviewing", Silverman, D., *Qualitative Research: Theory, Method and Practice*, London, SAGE Publications, 1997.
[350] Cook, I and Crang, M., *Doing Ethnographies*, Norwich: University of East Anglia, 1995, p.4.

Group interviews

Group interviews also took place in the three study areas in 2003. Schoolchildren in grades ten and eleven of the Ukrainian education system (sixteen-seventeen year olds) were chosen for this research for several reasons. Firstly, from a practical point of view, these groups of fifteen to seventeen year olds were finishing their school years and also their formal and compulsory historical education. Thus, data generated from this group could indicate how the 'official' historical narrative was being negotiated at the micro level. Secondly, as previous ethnological studies have highlighted, whilst individual understandings of self-identification occur in certain stages, at this age an individual takes on a deeper awareness of their national consciousness.[351] Thirdly, this age group has grown up in a period of rapid social, economic, cultural and political transformations in their country. In particular, they were born in the Soviet Union, yet are the first generation of children to have been totally schooled in independent Ukraine. Thus, it will be extremely interesting to examine to what extent these children's reflections on Ukraine's past coincide or differ not only from the new 'official' state narrative, but also from their parents' generation's views.

In each of the study areas, interviews were conducted at five secondary schools. For the interviews, the author had in advance agreed with teachers in each individual school for a group of ten to fifteen children from grades ten and eleven to be assembled for a group interview. It should be noted that these groups of children were taught by the teachers, who were also interviewed as part of the research process. During these interviews, the author specifically asked all teaching staff to leave the room, so as to create an atmosphere in which individuals felt more open to discuss their personal opinions. In a similar fashion to interviews with teachers, these group interviews had a general thematic approach, outlined by the author. However, at all times, the author aimed to create an environment in which individuals could fluently discuss issues amongst themselves, and only at critical junctures, were interrupted and 'guided' towards new themes for discussion. Whilst all efforts were made to create 'representative' groups in each of the schools, with the author asking for groups to comprise of a mixture of children by way of gender and ability, nevertheless, there remains the real possibility that such a situation in certain instances, may not have occurred. During the interviews, the researcher was aware of the potential problem of one or two

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[351] Snezhkova, I.A., "K probleme izuchenia etnicheskogo samosoznani u detei i iunoshestva", *Sovetskaya etnografia*, 1982, no.1, quoted in, Filippova, O., "Ukrainians and Russians in Eastern Ukraine: Ethnic Identity and Citizenship in the Light of Ukrainian Nation-Building, http://www.unl.ac.uk/ukrainecentre/WP/12.html, accessed 8th October 2001.

'strong' characters talking too much, and not allowing other, more 'quiet' individuals from expressing their opinions.[352] In an effort to assist the smooth running of these interviews, a general discussion was normally commenced with, where all interviewees were encouraged to take part and then the 'proper' interview simply ran into this over time.

Content analysis

A thorough analysis of the content of textbooks used in Ukraine's 'History of Ukraine' course was undertaken. The results are outlined in chapter Seven. Also various regional textbooks, in each study area, used in the 'History of the native region' or 'Geography of the native region' were analysed with the results highlighted in chapter Nine. Also of interest, whilst in the 'field', the author also picked up different pieces of literature including school course outlines, pamphlets and maps. Also, the author took several photographs in the cities of particularly interesting sights or places. These are included and referred to in the text, in the outline of each of the study areas in chapter Five.

Analysis of the data

Like the whole research project, analysis of the data was seen as a dialogic and creative *process*, which changed and developed over time. In particular, the author became aware of how whilst in the 'field', analysis of the growing volume of data generated began in earnest, whether consciously or not. In particular, as the interviewing process progressed, the author began to concentrate the focus on certain key themes, which arose time and again in the interviews. Similarly in the process of analysing history textbooks, over time, it became clear several key themes which were present in all the textbooks and lent themselves towards comparative research. The interviews were all taped. After each interview, the author spent time listening to the tape and often issues which arose in an interview led to a new question or new slant on a theme being introduced in following interviews.

Following the fieldwork phase, slightly different approaches to data analysis occurred. Regarding the school textbooks, these were read in detail and over time several key themes arose, which were highlighted in the text. These sections were then translated. The results of this analysis of the 'History of Ukraine' textbooks are found in chapter Six and the regional

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[352] A detailed discussion concerning this issue, can be found within, Bryman, A., *Social Research Methods*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001, pp.335-351.

textbook analysis in chapter Eight. The interview tapes were transcribed, yet not in their entirety, with only the relevant parts of the interview being written down, which related to the key issues chosen for examination in the 'History of Ukraine' course. This data was stored in a word processed format and analysed using a colour coding scheme to represent specific key themes. The bulk of the information gained from these interviews can be found in chapters Eight and Nine. Chapter Eight examines how teachers, students and schoolchildren in each of the study areas negotiate and perceive the historical narrative, represented in the history textbooks. Chapter Nine concentrates on assessing the importance of the region in the politics of identity in Ukraine and also Russia's relationship to Ukraine. By structuring chapters Eight and Nine according to the themes which arose during the empirical stage of the research process, using direct citations, it was possible to give a voice to individuals at the micro level, examining the perceptions and meanings attached to certain notions of identity in Ukraine. In general, whilst analysing data, the author remained aware of one of the key criticisms of qualitative research, the possibility of selective plausibilisation.[353] This occurs when interpretations and results are weaved together in a particular way by the researcher in an effort to back up the main argument. This issue was taken into account by the author at all times and by constant re-assessment of the work through its stages of production, it is hoped that such situations have not arisen. Furthermore, as outlined in both chapters Seven and Eight, certain 'inconvenient' data is discussed.

6.4 Methodological and ethical issues

During the research process, which entailed the periods before, during and after the time spent in the 'field' in Ukraine, many practical, methodological and ethical issues emerged and are outlined below. One major issue whilst undertaking research in Ukraine was the language issue. For the interviews and analysis of the textbooks, the author considered himself sufficiently capable in the Ukrainian and Russian written and spoken word not to require a translator. Whilst no problems emerged concerning this issue, nevertheless one must take account of the possibility that certain subtleties of the data generated may have been missed owing to the fact that the language was not the 'native' language of the author. Nevertheless, despite being aware of this possibility, it was still felt that more was being gained by having a direct interaction with the interviewees myself than was potentially lost in any mistranslations or misunderstandings. Also of particular note, as outlined in chapter

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[353] For a discussion of this issue see, Flick, U., *An Introduction to Qualitative Research*, London: SAGE Publications, 1989, p.221.

Three, language use in Ukraine is a highly charged political issue. Therefore, the researcher always asked at the start of interviews in which language people felt most comfortable. In all cases, Russian was chosen. Nevertheless, it is important to take into account to what extent the author's greater fluency in the Russian language may have affected the students' choice. Whilst of course, in the group interviews, some inconsistencies may have occurred with an individual privately preferring to speak in Ukrainian but being hesitant to 'speak out' and vent these feelings, nonetheless, the author at all times tried to minimise the risk of offence.

Whilst in the 'field' itself, I aimed to engage in the 'ethics of negotiation' by creating dialogic relationships with all the people I met.[354] The customary rules of confidentiality and anonymity were taken into account at all times. At the start of all interviews, individuals were asked whether they wished to remain anonymous. As such, throughout this PhD there is a mixture of named authors of quotations and also anonymous ones. As regards interviews with the schoolchildren, owing to the group nature of these interviews, they were often conducted without any reference to personal names. Thus, in the majority of cases in the text in the empirical chapters Seven and Eight, respondents are named as either 'boy' or 'girl'. Throughout the process of 'dialogue' during the interviews, the researcher was aware that the interviewer and the interviewees were both mutually involved in creating 'meanings.' The interviewees, in this fashion, were not viewed as 'repositories' but rather as 'constructors' of knowledge in conjunction with the interviewer.[355] In an effort to maintain rapport and create a real atmosphere of 'dialogue' and openness in the interviews, I was very conscious of the need to provide a bit of 'give and take' in the process. Whilst undertaking the interviews, I was aware of the fact that individuals were aiding me greatly in my personal study and, potentially (!!), future career advancement. These individuals in their different capacities had chosen to give up their time to aid me. I was fully aware of the fact that,

> no matter how welcome, even enjoyable, the fieldworker's presence may appear to 'natives', fieldwork represents an intrusion and intervention in a system of relationships that the researcher is freer than the researched to leave. The inequality and treacherousness of the relationship seems inescapable.[356]

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[354] For a thorough account of this phenomenon see Kindon, S., and Latham, A., "From Mitigation to Negotiation: Notes on Ethics and the Geographic Imagination in Aotearoa New Zealand", *New Zealand Geographer*, vol.58, no.1, April 2002.
[355] See Holstein, J.A. and Gubrium J.F., "Phenomenology, ethnomethodology, and interpretive practice", in Denzin, N.K. and Lincoln., Y., (eds.), *Handbook of Qualitative Research*, Newbury Park, CA: SAGE Publications, 1994, pp.262-72.
[356] Stacey, J., "Can there be a feminist ethnography?", Gluck, S. and Patai, D., (eds.), *Women's words: The feminist practice of oral history*, London: Routledge, 1991, pp.21-7.

Throughout the period in the 'field' I was acutely conscious of my '*positionality*' being seen as an 'outsider' and a 'rich westerner', who whilst being interested in political and social issues in Ukraine, was here primarily to generate data and then leave. This luxury was not so openly available to many of the respondents who faced the day to day practical problems of living in post-Soviet Ukraine. In an attempt to lessen the inequality in the process of interviewing, from the onset I stated that I did not want the interview to run as a standard, 'I ask the questions, you answer them, and then I simply vanish, having gained all I wanted'. Instead, I proposed undertaking the interview and then having a time at the end allocated for general questions. This system seemed to work well, particularly in the group interviews with schoolchildren and students. They were very keen to ask me questions about my background, about my country involving everyday topics such as music, football etc.

Similarly in one of the schools in Luhans'k, where I undertook a few interviews over a few weeks, I offered to teach a few English lessons free of charge, providing some extra classes for some schoolchildren preparing to take part in the *Olympiadi* (all-Ukrainian school championships). I found this experience very enriching and allowed a degree of 'reciprocity' to occur. In fact, in hindsight I would have liked to have done the same thing across all the schools I visited in each of the three study areas, yet time resources were limited. Whilst reciprocity was desired to aid an atmosphere and environment of interaction to be created, nevertheless I had to be careful to 'overdo' some people's expectations, with some individuals quickly assuming that I could fix them or their children up in employment in UK, being unaware that I was a mere PhD student!

During the fieldwork, a number of other specific issues arose. As stated earlier in this chapter, I used several contacts in order to 'get around the door' and make my first useful contacts in each of the study areas. This normally involved being given a 'personal' introduction to an official at the Department of Education in each of the study areas. Whilst in all three cities, the authorities were happy to be of assistance, nevertheless certain issues arose. In each city, the main official assigned a more junior figure to 'look after' me and organise the meetings and interviews in the various schools and higher education establishments as I wished. I stated from the outset that I wanted the study to be as 'representative' as possible, thus involving schools in different socio-economic neighbourhoods and also Russian and Ukrainian language schools. In reality, these specific sites were designated for me and I had no choice concerning which schools I was visiting.

Theoretically therefore, there emerged the possibility that I was simply being shown the 'good' schools at the expense of a more 'representative' picture of the schools across each city. This issue emerged in Luhans'k, for while undertaking the research and interacting with local people, I was told that the schools I had been given were all 'good, clean, well thought of schools.' Similarly whilst in the schools, I asked for a group of schoolchildren to be gathered, between eight and fifteen people. The possibility remains that these individuals were not 'representative' of the school's pupils, as they may have been 'handpicked' by the teachers based on their intellectual capabilities or political beliefs. Regarding this issue, if the aims of the research were to produce 'representative', 'generalisable' 'hard' data which could provide the basis for 'reproducable' models, then quantitative research methods would have been utilised. However 'representativeness' was not a major aim. As stated earlier, the aims of this research project were to supplement the existing body of mainly quantitative research concerning national identity in Ukraine, by focussing on the subtleties, peculiarities and idiosyncrasies within and between the wider, general processes. Thus, the study placed particular focus on the micro level, examining the meanings and perceptions of various notions of identity by various individuals. The data generated from these interviews therefore can provide some extremely interesting and illuminating insights into these issues.

6.5 Conclusions

Over the last three years, the process of doing this research project has not been a linear one, following the traditional triumvirate of reading around your thesis in the first year, doing some fieldwork in the second year and writing up in the final year. Instead, the author is aware of how the research has been *negotiated* through its many stages, with these three traditional stages of 'read, do and write' often being extremely muddled and interlinked. This, however, in no sense, is seen to have been detrimental to the project itself. On the contrary, such fluidity, involving a high degree of flexibility and reflexivity on the part of the author has allowed the project to develop organically. Qualitative research methods were utilised in an effort to generate rich, high quality data. The use of a case-study methodology also provided the possibility of comparative research to take place.

CHAPTER SEVEN: CONTESTING HISTORY: STATE NARRATIVES OF THE NATION

> The first step in liquidating a people is to erase its memory. Destroy its books, its culture, its history. Then have somebody write new books, invent a new history. Before long, the nation will begin to forget what it is and what it was. The world around it will forget even faster.
>
> - Milan Kundera

7.1 Introduction

The theoretical debates surrounding national identity and regionalism in Ukraine were discussed in the previous three chapters. This chapter examines how the Ukrainian state has used history to reforge collective identities in Ukraine. The chapter assesses how history textbooks are utilised by the state as 'tools' to introduce school-children to key historical episodes around which a modern Ukrainian national identity can be moulded. Attempts to 'historicise' Ukrainian national identity must answer fundamental questions; Who are we? Where have we come from? Where are we going? Who are we not? The final question is pertinent. As was explained in Chapter Two, a key part of understanding 'who you are' is the ability to distinguish from others. Thus, it is considered how the Ukrainian state is attempting to form an all-encompassing Ukrainian identity by distancing itself from Russia.

Since Ukraine's gaining of state independence and the emergence of a range of new Ukrainian history textbooks, there has been a subsequent expansion of academic study within this area.[357] This study aims to complement these in a number of ways. Firstly, the study aims to answer the following questions; Do the contents and values in the new textbooks differ from those more dated textbooks, and if so, in what directions? Since the gaining of independence has there been a 'crystallisation' of a single state-sponsored historical narrative? Secondly, the study aims not only to look at how values concerning the Ukrainian nation are presented but to examine to what degree Russia is presented as a distinct, 'other'. Thirdly, does the latent narrative presented to Ukraine's children complement or contradict

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[357] Please see the numerous contributions of Ukrainian textbook author and Ukrainian commentators in the above, *Ukrains'ka Dydaktyka*. In the English language, please refer to two studies; Janmaat, J.G., *Nation-Building in Post-Soviet Ukraine: Educational Policy and the Response of the Russian-Speaking Population*, University of Amsterdam, Netherlands Geographical Society, 2000, especially chapter 4 and Popson, N., "The Ukrainian History Textbook: Introducing Children to the 'Ukrainian nation' ", *Nationalities Papers*, vol.29, no.2, 2001.

the existing 'official' rhetoric of state elites? Finally, is there a standardisation of history textbooks used in schools across the whole of Ukraine or are their any regional variations?

7.2 Teaching the Ukrainian past

The chapter commences with an examination of state's efforts to consolidate Ukraine's national consciousness through the use of school textbooks. Textbooks are a key educational 'tool' through which the desired values and norms of a political system are presented to young members of society. Venezky argues that the contents of textbooks can be divided into a "manifest curriculum", which provides raw facts and figures and the "latent curriculum", which aims to instil certain social and political understandings in the recipients.[358] This comes in the form of "a series of secondary messages, transmitted on top of the manifest curriculum through omission and commission."[359] Thus, textbooks provide an ideal method to examine if and how the state has attempted to weave a national historical narrative. The existing literature on the use of textbooks by states to forge collective identities is varied and wide-ranging, and has expanded with the emergence of new states with the collapse of communism across Europe.[360] In particular, trends in academic study have found the necessity for states to 'populise' history for schoolchildren, for each nation to have one or several 'glorious' moments in their history and more generally, the concept of the nation. For example, Solonari studied how history textbooks are being utilised in post-Soviet Moldova where a key debate focuses on whether Moldova is a separate nation or a part of a wider Romanian nation, formed by external Russian power.[361] Matzung explores how the contemporary German state is attempting to interpret the socialist past within German history, being careful to provide a narrative, which is not too much at odds with popular memories and lived experiences of the period.[362] Finally, Furrer examines the national

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[358] Venezky, R., "Textbooks in School and Society", in Jackson, P.W., (ed.), *Handbook of Research and Curriculum*, New York: MacMillan, 1992, p.438.
[359] Ibid, p.438.
[360] Interested readers may note that the Georg Eckert Institute in Braunsweig (Germany) is dedicated to the study of textbooks. An international seminar was held there in 1999, with participants from Germany, Lithuania, Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia and Azerbaijan. Many of the papers can be found in the Ukrainian language in *Ukrains'ka Istorychna Dydaktyka: Mizhnarodnyi Dialog,* Kiev, Geneza, 2000.
[361] Solonari, V., "Narrative, Identity, State: History Teaching in Moldova", in *East European Politics and Societies*, vol.16, no.2, pp.414-445.
[362] Matzing, H.C., "Sotsialistichnye minulye v nimets'kix pidruchnikax- do pitannya pro vivchennya neprostoi temi", in *Ukrains'ka Istorichna Dydaktyka*, pp.291-307.

history taught in Switzerland, concluding that much emphasis is placed on Switzerland being an 'exception' in the international order.[363]

To fully understand present realities in Ukraine, it is imperative to recognise how recent changes have arisen. In the 1980s, the Soviet authorities only allowed 'History of Ukraine' to be an 'additional' subject, *ictorychnye krayezhnavstvo*, (the history of a 'region'). However, in light of continuing calls for a reappraisal of historical events in the late 1980s, the incumbent Ukrainian Communist leadership was forced to take note. In October 1988, the first secretary Shcherbytskyi called for an improvement in the teaching of history.[364] Following this a programme was initiated to develop historical research in Ukraine, which by 1989/1990, had led to a single 'History of Ukraine' course being introduced into schools across Soviet Ukraine. This course began to be taught in parallel with the 'History of the USSR' course.[365] Also, the name of the publishing house was transformed from *Radyans'ka Shkola* (The Soviet School) to *Osvita* (Education). From 1991/2, the Ministry of Education in independent Ukraine radically changed the structure of historical education in Ukrainian schools, bringing in two separate subjects, 'History of Ukraine' and 'World History' to be taught in a parallel and synchronised fashion. The clear understanding of the new state elites of the importance of education in the projects of Ukrainian nation and state building were summed up by Anatoly Pohribny, the deputy education minister under Kravchuk between 1992-1994 when he stated, "Education should be directly subordinated to the demands of building an independent Ukrainian state."[366] By the middle of the 1990s, the publishing house *Osvita*, which continued to produce textbooks by historians working at the Institute of Ukrainian History was joined by a second publishing house, *Geneza,* although its publications were still predominantly based on the work of the same historians. However, by the year 2000, numerous other publishing houses, based in cities across Ukraine, had begun to publish 'History of Ukraine' textbooks.

However, the education system, despite such developments, remains highly centralised. The Ministry of Education produces programmes and guidelines, which schools and teachers

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[363] Furrer, M., "National History and Exceptionality – the image of Switzerland as a country of exclusive fate in the light of changes in presenting this topic in school textbooks on history", in *Ukrains'ka Istorychna Dydaktyka*, op.cit., pp.313-332.
[364] For a detailed overview of this period, see Stanislav Kulchytskyi's comments in the seminar, "Vitchiznyana Istoriya v shkolax i vuzax Ukrainy: Ostannye Desyatyrychchya", Kiev: Kennan Institute, 2002, pp.3-13.
[365] For a detailed comparison of the Soviet Ukrainian textbooks and the later textbooks used in independent Ukraine, see Janmaat, J.G, *Nation-Building in Post-Soviet Ukraine*, op.cit., Chapter 4.
[366] Quoted in Wilson, A., *Ukrainian Nationalism in the 1990s: A Minority faith*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1997, p.157.

must adhere to and textbooks for use in schools must be 'recommended' by the Ministry.[367] Also the education system and the teaching of separate subjects, such as history, must adhere to the 'National Doctrine of Educational Development', which introduces the state project, 'Education: Ukraine in the twenty-first century'.[368] Within the national doctrine, it is stated how the state should ensure,

> The preservation and enrichment of Ukrainian cultural and historical traditions, cultivation of a respectful attitude to national sacred objects, the Ukrainian language, history and culture of Ukraine's rooted peoples and national minorities, and formation of inter-ethnic and interpersonal relations.[369]

The following section specifically focuses on how such proclamations are interpreted and presented in history textbooks.

7.3 Narrating the 'History of Ukraine'

The role of this chapter is not to judge whether the state's narrative is 'true' or 'truer' than competing narratives. Rather it is revealing to witness how the state has used history and textbooks as 'tools' to forward present-day political projects. As Armstrong states,

> I am utterly incompetent to judge whether the version of Kiev and its successors that Hrushevskyi presents is 'truer' than other versions. The basic insight provided by the anthropological approach is that such questions are irrelevant for identity except insofar as they affect a constitutive myth.[370]

Textbooks used for analysis are all on the Ministry of Education's list of recommended textbooks and cover Grades 5, 7, 8, 9, 10 and 11 of the Ukrainian educational system.[371] For each of the grades, there is a choice of textbook available for individual teachers and schools to utilise. Indeed, an interesting development in recent years has been the emergence of the *Prem'er* publishing house based in Zaporizhzhiya. Whilst textbooks published in Kiev by *Geneza*, A.S.K and *Osvita*, are all solely printed in the Ukrainian language, *Prem'er* publishes in both the Ukrainian and Russian languages. Therefore, the author chose to use a

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[367] See, *Kalendarno-tematichnye planuvannya z Istoriyi Ukrayini, Vsesvitnyoi Istoriyi, Pravozhavstva, za novimi (2001 roku) navchal'nimi prohrami*, Prem'er, Zaporizhzhya, 2001.
[368] For confirmation of this, see "Pro Natsional'ny doktrinu rozvitku osviti", No.347, 17th April, 2002, which can be found at, www.kuchma.gov.ua/main/?whatto-557, accessed 1st March 2005.
[369] Ibid, p.36
[370] Armstrong, J., "Myth and History in the Evolution of Ukrainian Consciousness", in Potichnyi. P.J., (ed.), *Ukraine and Russia in their Historical Encounter*, Edmonton, 1992, p.128.
[371] Grades 5-11 cover chidren from the ages of 10/11 upto 16/17 years old.

variety of textbooks, from a variety of publishing houses, in an effort to ascertain to what extent there are any emerging *regional* variations in the historical narrative as regards the location of the publishing house and/or the language the textbook is printed in. The books used are:

Grade 5: Vlasov, V.S., Danilevs'ka, O.M., *Vstup do istorii Ukrainy*, Kiev: Geneza, 2002.
Grade 7: Ladichenko, T.V., Sviderskaya., V.V., Sviderskiy, Y.Y., *Istoriia Ukrainy; 7 klas*, Zaporozh'ye: Prem'er, 2002.
Grade 8: Vlasov, V.S., *Istoriia Ukrainy: 8 klas*, Kiev: "A.S.K", 2002.
Grade 9: Turchenko, F.H., Moroko, V.N., *Istoriia Ukrainy: konets XVIII-nachalo XX veka*, Kiev: Geneza, 2001.
Grade 10: Danilenko, V.M., Husenkov, S.H., Kolodyazhnyi, N.N., *Istoriia Ukrainy: 10 klas*, Zaporozh'ye: Prem'er, 2002.
Grade 11: Shevchuk, V.P., Taranenko, N.G., Levitas, F.,L., Gisem., A.V., *Istoriia Ukrainy: 11 klas*, Zaporozh'ye: Prem'er, 2001.

In grade 5 (eleven to twelve year olds), children are introduced to the history of Ukraine through a set of 'stories' from ancient times to the present.[372] Only in grade 7 does the 'synchronised' system of historical education in Ukraine commence, with pupils taking the two parallel courses of 'World history' and 'History of Ukraine'. Popson argues that this introduction in grade 5 of 'History of Ukraine' before world history later in grade 7 is significant in stressing the idea of it being 'our' history and something special and unique, separate from 'other' history.[373] Also, one must note, this separation at an early age of 'one's own' history from wide world history is in fact perhaps a legacy from the Soviet period, where in grade 4 children were introduced to the history of the USSR, before a world history course later.

The analysis focuses on the (re)interpretation of significant events, personalities and periods in Russian-Ukrainian history. Therefore, in each of the separate grades, the author has chosen key themes for specific attention. In particular, in grade 7 focus is on the existence of the Kiev Rus' state. In the Grade 8 textbook, analysis concentrates on the Cossack period in particular examining the role of Bohdan Khmelnytsk'yi. Ukraine in the nineteenth century is

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[372] See Popson, N., "The Ukrainian History Textbook: Introducing Children to the 'Ukrainian nation' ", *Nationalities Papers*, Vol.29, No.2, 2001.
[373] Ibid, p.328.

the backdrop for the Grade 9 textbook, with special attention on how Russian-controlled Ukraine fared under the Tsars. The final two grades turn to events of the turbulent twentieth century. Analysis of the Grade 10 textbook focuses on the portrayal of the Ukrainian revolution, Ukraine's subsequent entering into the Soviet Union and famines in 1921 and in particular 1932/3. The final grade textbook covers the period from 1939 to the present day. Particular attention is paid to the portrayal of the Second World War.

Grade 5 (eleven to twelve year olds)

Throughout the book, fairy-tales are utilised to make the historical events, understandable and interesting. The book commences with a fairy-tale of Hrushevskyi's daughter receiving her first history lesson from her father, called a 'journey into history'.[374] This is clearly aimed to directly relate to the children just starting their historical education. The history of Ukraine is seen like a 'journey' with a discernible beginning and ending. As the story unfolds, it becomes clear that a linear, teleological narrative, directly related to the ideas of Hrushevskyi will be used throughout. The aim of the journey is explained immediately, when Katrus'ya asks her father whether the journey will be interesting. Her father answers, "Of course, there we will find the answer to the questions, asked by our great poet, Taras Shevchenko: Who are we? Whose sons are we? Who are our parents?"[375] The history of the development of the Ukrainian people then unfolds, with it being idealised as a thousand-year long struggle for freedom under terrible conditions. The story tells how Katrus'ya, "saw the long path of the Ukrainian people, which has come out of the gloom of darkness through a thousand years to freedom."[376] The long history of the Ukrainian people possessing statehood is also introduced to the children, "the daughter heard that the Ukrainians are a very old nation, which for a long time have lived on their own land. Already in the ninth century, Ukrainians had their own state, Kiev Rus'."[377] The text presents the medieval state in an idealistic way before describing how even with its downfall, the traditions of it were passed onto not Muscovy, but to the Galycian-Volynian Princedom, which 'thus regenerated the Ukrainian state'.[378] This key idea of the 'regeneration' of Ukrainian statehood continues throughout. It makes clear that Ukrainian statehood has been continually ruined by foreign interference and obstruction, only for the Ukrainian people to have subsequently bounced

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[374] Vlasov, V.S., Danilevs'ka, O.M., *Vstup do istorii Ukrainy*, Kiev: Geneza, 2002.
[375] Ibid, p.13.
[376] Ibid, p.14.
[377] Ibid, p.14.
[378] Ibid, p.15.

back and regenerated their state. The story ends with a clear message stating that Katrus'ya 'never forgot her first journey into history'. In this way, the book aims to highlight the importance of learning the history of Ukraine. The authors pay attention to the ancient national emblems of Ukraine today in an attempt to legitimate the current independent state by focusing on its ancient past.[379] The text states how for, "more than a thousand years ago, Ukraine had its own emblem, the trident...now it is a symbol of the renewed Ukrainian state, showing the thousand-year history of our land."[380]

The authors subtly introduce to the readers how certain geographical territories 'belong' to certain ethnic groups. Hence, the children are introduced to a key theme running throughout the textbook that the history which is being told, is the history of the ethnic Ukrainian nation, which has the unique 'ownership' of their land and state. As the authors state, "the names of nations are closely related with geographical names: the name of a territory can be transformed into the name of a nation, which lives there, or in the opposite case, the name of a nation can become the name of the land, where they have settled."[381] After introducing children to Kiev Rus' as a 'Ukrainian state' in the introduction, it is explained how the modern Ukrainian state has full ownership rights of the legacy of ancient Rus'. The authors state that over time the tribes who lived there grouped together to form a distinct group called 'Ruthenians' seen as proto-Ukrainians; "thus the oldest names used by our descendants for the name of our land and for ourselves were Rus' and Ruthenians. The name Rus' preceded the name Ukraine, as the land settled by the Ukrainian-Ruthenians."[382] The authors fail to include any recognition that Belarusians and Russians may also lay claim to the legacy of Rus'. In fact, the authors answer the question concerning whose history is being retold when they state, whilst referring to a map, "the modern names of the rivers and seas give us the possibility to see where our ancestors lived and the ancestors of the Russians and Belarusians."[383] 'Our' here means Ukrainian whilst the Russians and Belarusians are deemed as distinct 'others'. The children are reminded that the history of Ukraine is 'our' history, the history of the Ukrainian ethnic nation.

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[379] Wilson clearly argues that all states need to make their history and their national emblems seem as ancient as possible to gain the most legitimacy in his article, "Myths of National History in Belarus and Ukraine", Hosking, G. and Schopflin, G., (eds.), *Myths and Nationhood*, London: Hurst and Co., 1997, pp.182-197.
[380] Vlasov, V.S., Danilevs'ka, O.M., *Vstup do istorii Ukrainy*, op.cit., pp.31-35.
[381] Ibid, p.36.
[382] Ibid, p.36.
[383] Ibid, p.40.

The Cossacks are idealised as peace-loving proto-Ukrainians. They formed their own state, the Zaporizhzhian Sich', which was a democratic republic, with each Zaporozhian having the right to vote for the members of the *Rada* (Council). However, Ukrainian lands were constantly being attacked by foreigners, such as the Poles, Russians and the Turks. In response, the Ukrainian people were forced to begin a 'national-liberation war', led by Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytskyi, "A wise politician, a military talent and the great authority of Bohdan Khmelnyts'kyi facilitated the recognition of the Ukrainian state by other states."[384] The key event of this era, the Pereiaslav Treaty when Khmelnyts'kyi signed a Treaty with Muscovy is given particular coverage. Previously seen in Soviet historiography as the natural 'reunion' of the Ukrainians to their Russian brothers, the emphasis here is somewhat different.[385] Khmelnyts'kyi's decision to call on Tsarist Muscovy as an ally and protectorate against the Poles is seen as a last-ditch decision, forced upon the Hetman by his lack of alternatives. The dire consequences of the Treaty for Ukraine are explained by the Russians 'tricking' Khmelnyts'kyi to sign up to a Treaty, promising equal rights and continued Ukrainian independence. However, with the Treaty signed, then began colonial attempts to liquidate the Cossack-Ukrainian state, the Hetmanate and force the Ukrainians under the subjugation of the Russians.

Whilst in Soviet textbooks, Mazepa was called a 'traitor', here he is exalted as a heroic son of the Ukrainian people, when he chose to side with a Swedish king and fight against the Russian Tsar Peter I in 1709 at the battle of Poltava.

> A new effort to acquire freedom and restore the state independence of Ukraine took place under Hetman Ivan Mazepa. In order to liberate Ukraine, Mazepa decided to use the war between Muscovy and Sweden and take the side of the Swedish king Charles XII, who promised to fulfil the independence of Ukraine.[386]

The discussion of Ukraine in the nineteenth century concentrates on retelling how the 'cruel' Russian and Austro-Hungarian Empires, under whose control the Ukrainian lands were split, attempted to rid in the Ukrainians any sense of national distinctiveness. This took the form of numerous methods; most prominent was the banning of the Ukrainian language and instruction in this language in schools in Russian-controlled Ukraine. However, the text

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[384] Vlasov, V.S., Danilevs'ka, O.M., *Vstup do istorii Ukrainy*, op.cit., p.145.
[385] For an analysis of the Soviet portrayal of Khmelnyts'kyi and Mazepa, see Janmaat, J.G., *Nation-Building in Post-Soviet* Ukraine..., op.cit., pp.91-92.
[386] Vlasov, V.S., Danilevs'ka, O.M., *Vstup do istorii Ukrainy*, op.cit., p.161.

states how the 'national revival' took place across Ukraine with intellectuals asserting the rights of the Ukrainians for national self-determination, with their ideas slowly reaching the masses below.

This portrayal of the linear development of the national cause forms the backdrop for the portrayal of events in the early twentieth century. Ukrainians are described as having reached such a level of national consciousness that they began to realise that their ultimate goal was their own independent state. With the onset of World War One, the Ukrainians, fighting for their imperial masters, were compelled into fighting against each other. The unnaturalness of this forced situation is described as,

> Halycian-Ukrainians and Dnipro-Ukrainians died in their thousands for foreign interests as they did not have their own state, which would have looked after them...Neither the Russian Tsar nor the Austro-Hungarian Caesar intended to look after the interests of Ukraine.[387]

Efforts to create a Ukrainian state in the turbulent years of the Ukrainian revolution are seen as the natural culmination of the growth of the national revival and the unnaturalness of Ukrainian lands being ruled by foreign 'others'. The creation of the Ukrainian People's Republic (UNR) in 1919 is again seen as the 'regeneration' of the Ukrainian state. However, the consolidation of this state was prevented by the rise of Bolshevism, which is represented as a political force, which through the use of terror destroyed the Ukrainian state and seized power for itself, against the wishes of the Ukrainian population. Bolshevism is portrayed as a distinctly alien 'Russian' phenomenon, with its roots in the cruel, autocratic history of Russia. The section retelling Ukraine's role in the USSR upto the 1930s is entitled 'Famine and terror'.[388] Here the text emphasises simultaneously the magnitude of the victims in Ukraine and the levels of inhumanity of the Bolshevik regime.

> From 1918 there lasted a war of Bolshevik Russia against Ukraine. Already the first battles had bore witness to the incredible cruelty of the new Russian power. Ukraine flowed with blood, but by the end of 1920 Dnipro Ukraine was established under Bolshevik power.[389]

The famine in the early 1920s gains particular prominence, with the cause being solely given to desire of the Bolsheviks to export bread from Ukraine. As the authors state,

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[387] Vlasov, V.S., Danilevs'ka, O.M., *Vstup do istorii Ukrainy*, op.cit., p.209.
[388] Ibid, p.209.
[389] Ibid, p.216.

> From the very start in the stolen Ukrainian lands, bread interested the Bolsheviks. Threatening force, they demanded the villagers to hand over the harvest for free. Only in the second half of 1922 from Ukraine was exported 320,000 tonnes of grain. In this period, more than two million Ukrainian children died of starvation.[390]

Similarly the great Famine of 1932/3 is blamed in its entirety on the Bolshevik leaders, who used it to quell any nationalist discontent in Ukraine. The authors state how,

> In order to break the stubbornness of the Ukrainian peasantry, the Bolshevik leaders in Moscow decided to organise in Ukraine an artificial famine. In only one winter/spring of 1932/3 on the most fertile Ukrainian lands died from starvation between seven and ten million souls. Whilst destroying the Ukrainian countryside, the Bolshevik government fought against Ukrainian education, science, art. Officials of the state, culture, church, doctors, teachers who disagreed with the actions of the Bolshevik party were arrested, sent to Siberia, jailed and shot. Consequently, any manifestations of Ukrainian state self-rule were annihilated. From then on, Moscow had to decide everything.[391]

It is important to note here two issues. Firstly, the authors do not make any mention that the Famine of 1932/3 occurred in other agricultural regions of the USSR, thus furthering the portrayal of the famine as an attempt by the Bolsheviks to commit genocide against the Ukrainian nation. Secondly, it is revealing that the word 'Moscow' is used twice here and in doing so, can easily play on popular sentiments in certain segments of Ukrainian society where all Russians are called in a derogative sense, *Moskali.* The use of the term 'Moscow' can be explained as an attempt to heighten the frenzied feeling, especially in nationalist circles in Ukraine, that all the ills of Ukraine can be firmly rested at Moscow's door, the centre of eternal Russian attempts to control Ukraine.

Turning to the Second World War, the approach taken is again revealing. Whilst it has been shown that a strong nationalist line has been espoused surrounding events upto the 1940s, here the evaluation of events is not so straightforward. Whilst the conflict between USSR and Nazi Germany is called simply the 'Soviet-Nazi' war, no mention is made of the traditional term used in Soviet historiography the 'Great Patriotic War'. However, the text does not attempt to belittle the importance of Ukrainians in the Soviet Union's war machine. Rather the opposite as the following demonstrates,

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[390] Vlasov, V.S., Danilevs'ka, O.M., *Vstup do istorii Ukrainy*, Kiev, op.cit., p.216.
[391] Ibid, pp.216-7.

> The contribution of Ukraine to the victory of the USSR in the Soviet-Nazi war is difficult to overestimate. In the Soviet Red Army fought over four million Ukrainians. Two and a half million Ukrainians received Soviet military rewards and 2069 the title of Hero of the Soviet Union... For these people the happiest day will always remain Victory Day, the ninth of May 1945.[392]

The text then diverts from the glories of the Soviet victory and describes how for other people, the Second World War in Ukraine took on a very different meaning. It is described how the *Organizatsiia Ukrainskyh Natsionalistiv* (Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists), OUN, was set up by patriotic Ukrainians so as to defend their native land. The text describes how, "neither the Soviet Union, nor Germany considered the liberation of Ukraine and the building in her an independent state. Conscientious Ukrainians realised that they could wait for help no longer, they themselves had to decide the fate of Ukraine."[393]

However, the text explains one of the most tragic pages of Ukraine's history when the OUN/UPA ended up in a civil war with fellow Ukrainians fighting for the Soviet Union in a fashion which seems intent on rehabilitating the OUN/UPA. As the text states,

> The UPA freed Ukrainian towns and villages from the Fascist occupants and defended the peaceful population. However the Soviet government did not want Ukraine to have her own army. Thus, in 1943 when the Nazis had been chased out of Ukrainian lands, the Bolsheviks began a war with UPA. This shameful war against one's own people lasted upto 1953; it led to new victims and became yet one more piece of evidence of Bolshevik terror.[394]

Such a crude portrayal of highly complex events, whilst proving popular within certain nationalist circles, may prove highly unpopular with large swathes of Ukraine's population. Popular memories of these events remain to this day highly contested and laden with emotion.[395] The use of such events here in such an overtly political fashion has the potential to cause further divisions within Ukraine rather than unite. The section here portrays the OUN/UPA as Ukrainian heroes, standing up patriotically for their native land with the Bolsheviks being the cruel and evil 'other' which started the 'shameless' war on UPA. However, one must ask why then did so many Ukrainians fight for the USSR, gain awards and some even become heroes of that country? Furthermore, stating, 'this shameless war

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[392] Vlasov, V.S., Danilevs'ka, O.M., *Vstup do istorii Ukrainy*, op.cit, p.224.
[393] Ibid, p.224.
[394] Ibid, p.225.
[395] For a discussion of OUN/UPA in WWII, see Snyder, T., *The Reconstruction of Nations. Poland, Ukraine, Lithuania, Belarus, 1569-1999*, London: Yale University Press, 2003, pp.154-178.

against their own people' is at best clumsy and at worst inept in implicitly making the point that some Ukrainians *per se* were Bolsheviks. This fundamentally counters the entire rest of the portrayal of Ukrainians represented as a collective, downtrodden 'us' forced under the Bolshevik external and evil 'other'. Such attempts at rehabilitating OUN/UPA are continued in a fairy-tale telling of two young boys getting ready to join the UPA. In this story, the authors likened the UPA fighters to Cossacks, "just like Cossacks, the UPA fighters take anyone on into their Army, who has a weapon and who believes in God and wants to live his life in a Ukrainian state."[396] This association of the UPA to God continues when the story ends with a local priest giving the boys and the UPA a blessing. As the text describes,

> The Father lifted his eyes upto heaven, "Let the sweethearted God bless the arms of our underground Army and send it forth a full victory over all the enemies of our much-suffering motherland. Amen...From a thousand voices the prayer went up to heaven with the following words; God, great united one, keep for us Ukraine."[397]

The UPA are represented as patriots whose actions were justified and legitimised in God's eyes and in doing so draws a sharp contrast to Soviet forces, behind which lay a foreign atheist ideology. In the penultimate section of the book the authors look back on the twentieth century and argue how the foreign interference in Ukraine, not only ruined Ukrainian culture and led to millions of deaths, but also led to the ruin of Ukraine' nature, "foreign masters who without punishment stole and annihilated the riches of our land, completely not considering the plight of future generations...The most valuable gift of nature, the land, became unfertile and useless."[398] The unnaturalness of the foreign occupation is further highlighted with the catastrophe at Chornobyl' in 1986. This led to large swathes of Ukraine's population finally realising that the time had come to save their land, get rid of the foreign interference and reclaim their native land in the form of self-independence. As the text states, "life convincingly led to the conclusion that it was impossible to improve the situation from faraway foreign capitals. Thus in front of Ukraine stood the demand to struggle for independence."[399]

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[396] Vlasov, V.S., Danilevs'ka, O.M., *Vstup do istorii Ukrainy*, op.cit., p.228.
[397] Ibid, p.229.
[398] Ibid, p.234.
[399] Ibid, p.235.

The book closes with a section telling of the gaining of independence and attention being given to the Ukrainian state having a legal basis, bound up in the Constitution finally sealed in 1996. The conclusion outlines the 'civic' nature of the Ukrainian state.

> In Ukraine there lives 50 million people, 37 million of which have Ukrainian ancestry. Together with Ukrainians in Ukraine live Russians, Poles, Belarusians, Hungarians, Jews, Bulgarians, Greeks, and Tatars...All these together - we are the Ukrainian people and the land of Ukraine, this is our motherland.[400]

This final conclusion, whilst consistent with the legal basis of the state and rhetoric of state officials as highlighted above calling for a civic nation to be exalted, does not fit squarely with the narrative throughout the rest of the book. The authors have painted a picture of the history of the 'Ukrainian people', implying the ethnic Ukrainian nation which has struggled over centuries to maintain its right for national self-determination in the face of constant interference from foreign states, notably Russia. However, there is an exclusion of any recognition of the contribution of non-Ukrainians to the 'Ukrainian project'. Whilst the narrow, Hrushevskyi line taken is consistent in many parts with the rhetoric of Ukrainian state elites over the past decade, this is only upto a point. As previously described, state elites are content to idealise the struggle of the Ukrainian people in medieval and the middle ages, particularly drawing on the Cossack period. Yet, they prove far more reticent about more recent events in the twentieth century, which remain highly contested in popular memory across. However, this book wholeheartedly criticises the Soviet period as one where not only the foreign Bolshevik 'other' attempted with all possible means, including artificial famines to destroy the Ukrainian nation, but also simultaneously set about annihilating the fertile land of Ukraine. Ukraine and Ukrainians are seen as victims throughout, apart from the highly ambiguous and confusing depiction of the events of World War Two. In this way, this book takes a more 'nationalist' stance than the other textbook for grade 5.[401] This is seemingly a highly significant finding, rendering the question to what degree has the centre advocated these different historical narratives and if so, for what political purposes. Further research is required into examining the use of these textbooks across Ukraine, studying any regional variations in the usage of the different textbooks.

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[400] Vlasov, V.S., Danilevs'ka, O.M., *Vstup do istorii Ukrainy*, op.cit., p.247.
[401] See the analysis in, Popson, N., "The Ukrainian History textbook...", op.cit.

Now the history textbooks for the higher grades will be analysed. These textbooks cover the history of Ukraine chronologically from grade 7 upto grade 11.

Grade 7 (twelve to thirteen year olds) Kiev Rus'

The legacy of this medieval state will continue to be contested by Russian and Ukrainian historians for the foreseeable future, such is the importance ascribed to it for the legitimacy of statehood in both respective countries.[402] Hence it comes as no surprise that the legacy of Kiev Rus' plays a prominent role in the Grade 7 textbook. The authors like Danilevs'ka/Vlasov place great emphasis on the significance of Christianity for the Ukrainian nation's development and joining to Europe, in an effort to legitimate Ukraine's present day European credentials.

> The introduction of Christianity played an enormous role in the subsequent fate of the Ukrainian people. Found at the crossroads of the Christian West and the Muslim East, Kiev Rus' connected itself with Europe. Christianity introduced Rus' to a circle of European states.[403]

Importance is also attached to the 'rule of 'law' with *'Rus'kaya Pravda',* the first written code of laws in Rus', given prominence. However, this book departs from the Danilevs'ka/Vlasov representation of Kiev Rus' as the first Ukrainian state. The approach is subtler arguing that Kiev Rus' was only ever a loose amalgam of the forefathers of the East Slavic peoples, who had yet to fully develop their linguistic and cultural differences. These differences began to emerge following the collapse of the kingdom, "the collapse of Kiev Rus' into separate princedoms speeded up the ethnic development of Ukrainian, Russian and Belarusian nationalities and facilitated the formation and strengthening of the state and their territories."[404] The text argues that the chief inheritor of the legacies of Kiev Rus' was not Muscovy as argued by Russophile historiography, but the Galycian-Volhynian Princedom. In this way, there is followed the linear line of Ukrainian statehood, first promulgated by Hrushevskyi. As the authors state,

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[402] For a highly balanced appraisal of the issues, see Franklin, S. and Shepard, J., *The Emergence of Rus 750-1200*, London: Longman, 1996.
[403] Ladichenko, T.V., Sviderskaya, V.V., Skiderskiy, Y.Y., *Istoria Ukrainy: 7 klas,* Zaporozh'ye: Prem'er, 2002, p.67
[404] Ibid, p.109.

> After the collapse of Kiev Rus' was activated the process of the political unification of lands, on which Ukrainian nationality dominated. Apart from the Princedoms, situated along the Dnipro and the Desnya (Kiev, Pereyaslav, Chernihiv, Seversk), the Halycian-Volhynian Princedom became the centre of such an association in the region surrounding the Dniester river. Statehood became the essential form of the existence of Ukrainian nationality.[405]

The authors *a la* Danilevs'ka/Vlasov, emphasise the longevity of the term 'Ukraine'.[406] The first recorded usage of the term 'Ukraine' is said to have been in 1187 when a Pereyaslav Prince died and the 'whole of Ukraine grieved for him.'[407] Here the intention is to demonstrate the ancient nature of the Ukrainian nation. The text links Ukraine to Rus', thus increasing the legitimacy of the Ukrainian nation being consolidated on the land of Rus', centred on Kiev, "as seen, the name 'Ukraine', was already dispersed into the neighbouring lands of Pereyaslav, lands which formed the nucleus of the former Rus' land. It is by no means an accident that for a long time the names 'Ukraine' and 'Rus' existed in parallel."[408] The ancient nature of present-day state symbols is also highlighted. The authors clearly state that, "the state symbols of Ukraine, the trident and the flag had their beginnings in the times of Kiev Rus' and the Galycian-Volhynian state."[409] The text explains how the trident came to be an emblem of the Ukrainian People's Republic in 1918 and finally was confirmed as a national symbol of Ukraine in the constitution in 1996. Thus the authors point out, 'In this way, our national symbols reflect the historical traditions and beliefs of the Ukrainian people'.[410] In its concluding remarks, the text reiterates the importance of Kiev Rus' for understanding the genesis of the Ukrainian nation and state, using the words of Hrushevskyi;

> In the period of Kiev Rus', [Ukrainian nationality] received a powerful stimulus for its political, economic, cultural and ethnic development. The well-known Ukrainian historian Mykhailo Hrushevskyi wrote, "Kiev Rus' is the first form of Ukrainian statehood." In modern historiography there are different evaluations, but all historians agree that the roots of the Ukrainian people come from Kiev Rus'.[411]

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[405] Ladichenko, T.V., Sviderskaya, V.V., Skiderskiy, Y.Y., *Istoria Ukrainy: 7 klas,* op.cit., p.110.
[406] For a discussion of the importance of national symbols in creating national consciousness see, Firth, R., *Symbols: Public and Private*, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1973.
[407] Ladichenko, T.V., Sviderskaya, V.V., Skiderskiy, Y.Y., *Istoria Ukrainy: 7 klas,* op.cit., p.111.
[408] Ibid, p.111.
[409] Ibid, p.111.
[410] Ibid, p.111.
[411] Ibid, p.119.

Overall, this textbook provides an interpretation of Kiev Rus', which does not give Ukrainians full ownership of its legacy like the Danilevs'ka/Vlasov text. Nonetheless ample material is used to highlight the historical importance of the period for today's Ukrainian nation and state. The book follows the example of previous books analysed in highlighting key myths of the 'rule of law' and the 'European nature' of Ukraine which both had their origins in this period. Interestingly, both the books analysed in this research and text, analysed by Popson previously,[412] place great emphasis on the continuity between Kiev Rus' and the Galycian-Volhynian Princedom; a linkage not used in the textbook analysed by Janmaat.[413] This leads one to the conclusion that the state has centred its ideas of this period around those of Hrushevskyi. Also of relevance are the inclusion of the two sections, concerning the origins of the name 'Ukraine' and the national symbols, sections unused in the previously analysed textbooks. Thus, one can argue that the state elites again have included these sections in both books in an attempt to *consolidate* the narrative, designed to legitimise the present-day Ukrainian state, by demonstrating how it and its symbols are directly linked to an ancient 'glorious past'.

Grade 8 (thirteen to fourteen year olds) The Cossack period

The Cossack period provides the backdrop for the history of Ukraine taught in grade 8. The textbook follows Vlasov/Danilevs'ka in idealising the Cossack period as a time when the Ukrainian people struggled for their right for an independent state,

> Thus, the appearance of a new layer of Ukrainian society – Cossackdom, gave evidence of the enormous ability of our ancestors in life...The Cossacks grew stronger, ably defended their native land from foreigners so as to uphold the ethnic distinctiveness and also to create one's own state...The colonisation of the land was the result of the economic activity of the Cossack, and consequently, widened the living space of the Ukrainian people, which occurred peacefully, without the conquering of foreign territories.[414]

Cossacks are introduced as a 'peaceful' people who had no desire to conquer others' lands, but just a desire to look after their own land and people. This theme is held in sharp contrast to their neighbours, the Poles, the Turks and the Russians, portrayed as warring peoples, ever eager to grab some more lands. The Cossacks are explicitly seen as the forefathers of the

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[412] Popson, N., "The Ukrainian History Textbook...", op.cit.
[413] See Janmaat, J.G., *Nation-Building in Post-Soviet Ukraine*, op.cit., ch.4.
[414] Vlasov, V.S., *Istoriia Ukrainy: 8 klas*, Kiev: "A.S.K", 2002, p.31.

Ukrainian nation, "the input of the Cossacks into the culture and history of Ukraine is heavy, which is why now Ukrainians are called the 'Cossack people'."[415] The linear nature of the history of Ukrainian statehood here focuses on the Cossack state, the Zaporizhzhian Sich'. This is seen as a state, in which many traditions of the 'Ukrainian' proto-state of Galycian-Volynian princedom are represented. The author also highlights the democratic and law-abiding nature of the Ukrainian people,

> The Zaporizhzhian Sich' played an exceptionally important role in the history of the Ukrainian people...It was, as academics note, an intermediary link between the Halycian-Volynian Kingdom and the Ukrainian separate Cossack republic under the Hetman, Bohdan Khmelnytsk'yi...In the Sich' was formed their own organs of power and the powers of the government and a legal system. It was a Christian Cossack republic, one of the first republics in Europe at that time. [416]

The text introduces the 'national-liberation war' of the Ukrainian people against the Polish state, *Rzeczpospolita* (1648-1658), a war seen as 'just' for the Ukrainians' rightful gaining of state independence. Using the term, 'regeneration', readers are left in no doubt that some sort of Ukrainian statehood existed previously. The link is made more explicitly when the author tells of the Ukrainian Hetman, Khmelnytsk'yi discussing with the Poles the plight of his people in 1649,

> In discussion with the Polish envoys, it was clearly outlined the right of the Ukrainian people for the creation of their own state in its ethnic borders. Concerning this point, (Khmelnytskyi) underlined that the Ukrainian Cossack state was a successor of Kiev Rus'.[417]

As regards the Treaty of Pereiaslav in 1654, the author provides a subtle account. Whilst it is argued that Khmelnytsk'yi signed the union with Muscovy because he had no choice, the text makes explicit that not all of Ukraine was supportive of this stance. The author using documentary evidence quotes a Ukrainian noble, who stated, "I see the misfortune, that Khmelnytsk'yi betrayed us all unintentionally to the Muscovite Tsar."[418] Here there is a subtle criticism, which illustrates the more nationalistically orientated view that Khmelnytsk'yi under no circumstances can be viewed as a hero for the Ukrainian people as

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[415] Vlasov, V.S., *Istoriia Ukrainy: 8 klas*, Kiev: "A.S.K", 2002, p.31.
[416] Vlasov, V.S., *Istoriia Ukrainy*, op.cit., p.40.
[417] Ibid, p.121.
[418] Ibid, p.147.

he made the cardinal sin of joining up with Muscovy.[419] However, the text soon refers back to the line, used in previous post-Soviet Ukrainian textbooks of Khmelnytsk'yi being a genuine Ukrainian hero.

> Bohdan Khmelnytsk'yi is one of the brightest figures of Ukrainian history...The main achievement of Khmelnytsk'yi was the regeneration of the Ukrainian state. The results of the national-liberation war, headed by the Hetman are regarded as the restoration of an independent state, which united all the Ukrainian lands and would become an inheritor of Kiev Rus'.[420]

Russia as an 'other' is also introduced. The real problem of the Pereiaslav Treaty is portrayed in the fact that the Tsar, in entering into the 'union', had very different intentions from those of the Cossacks. Here begins a narrative of Tsarist Muscovy 'tricking' the Ukrainians to join them, and then once under their power, utilising their wealth for the needs of the Muscovite Empire. Furthermore, the author introduces a revealing table of comparison between the Cossack Ukrainian state and Muscovy. (see table 7.1).

The pupils must analyse the tables and answer the questions: Was there any possibility of an equal union between Ukraine and Muscovy? Did Ukraine have a perspective for her own development in a union with Muscovy? As the tables clearly demonstrate, the author is attempting to strengthen the claim that Muscovy is an alien 'other' for Ukrainians for a whole host of reasons. The table provides a clear explanation of why from one side; Ukrainians were unable to develop on their own accord under the Tsars. On the other side, it explains why a 'backward' Muscovy had to 'colonise' Ukraine for its own purposes as this was the only way possible to control the more 'progressive' Ukraine. The table thus gives the reader a clear lead-in to the subsequent sections, regarding the forced 'russification' of Ukraine and the continual degradation of elements of Ukrainian statehood. The idea of Russia as an 'other' is continually conveyed to the reader with the Russian Orthodox Church coming in for particular attention.

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[419] For an excellent discussion of the different viewpoints on this complex issue, see Plokhy, S., "The Ghosts of Pereyaslav: Russo-Ukrainian Historical Debates in the Post-Soviet Era", in *Europe-Asia Studies,* vol.53, no.3, 2001, pp.489-505

[420] Vlasov, V.S., *Istoriia Ukrainy: 8 klas*, op.cit., p.153.

Table 7.1 Comparison between the Hetmanate Ukraine state and Muscovy[421]

Hetmanate Ukraine	***Muscovy***
1. Republic	1. Absolute monarchy
2. Feudal land ownership and serfdom abolished. Developing Cossack land ownership on the basis of freely hired labour.	2. Basis of economic order – feudal land ownership and serfdom. Land ownership and serfdom.
3. City self-rule	3. Cities without self-rule
4. Free relations with the entire cultural world. Aspiration towards European education, strong tendencies to gain freedom of speech, thought, printing.	4. Culture contained features of being closed and stern, full non-recognition of anything foreign. Great religious fanaticism, impatience to foreign beliefs.
5. Influence of Western European culture in the areas of rights, science and education.	5. Almost devoid of any cultural links with Western Europe.

> The subordination of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church to the Moscow patriarch was a heavy blow for the Ukrainians. By 1686, the Church did not grant anymore ideological support in the battle for state Independence of Ukraine and quite the opposite, constantly became an 'obedient tool' of the aggressive policy of Tsarism. It was transformed into a means of the russification of Ukrainians.[422]

The final area of interest in the Grade 8 textbook concerns Ivan Mazepa. Whilst in Russophile and Soviet historiography, the 'treachery' of Mazepa is witnessed in his betrayal of the Tsar, here a profoundly different version of events is given.[423] Here he is represented as a Ukrainian hero, who attempted to improve the lot of his fellow countrymen by whatever means possible.

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[421] Vlasov, V.S., *Istoriia Ukrainy: 8 klas*, op.cit., p.155.
[422] Ibid, p.199.
[423] See Janmaat, J.G., *Nation-Building in Post-Soviet Ukraine...*, op.cit., ch.4.

> The aspiration of Mazepa to create one'e own elite, his far-sighted policy in the sphere of culture and education provided another 80 years existence of the Hetmanate state. It influenced on the future development of the Ukrainian people and her state traditions and on the formation of a national culture. The epoch of Mazepa – is a time of the regeneration of Ukraine, an epoch of her political, economic and cultural progress.[424]

The Swedish king's approach to Muscovy through Ukraine to fight the Tsar, Peter the first at the battle of Poltava in 1709 is said to have "compelled Mazepa to decisive actions for the liberation of Hetmanshchina."[425] Mazepa's actions are justified for the greater good of protecting his own state. The concluding remarks of the author uphold the narrative of Mazepa as a national hero. However, there is a subtle touch here also, when the author expresses the possibility that the defeat at Poltava and the subsequent dire consequences for Ukrainians living under Tsars were to, a small degree, a result of personal mistakes of Mazepa himself.

> The Hetmanship of Ivan Mazepa is a heroic page of the struggle of the Ukrainian people for independence. The manifestation of this struggle was the anti-colonial uprising against the Muscovite state, headed by Mazepa. A wise and sensible politician, Mazepa began the uprising step by step. The stabilisation of internal life, the directed policy of the creation of an elite and the development of culture and education, the uniting of the Ukrainian lands of the Right and Left bank under one Hetman's mace, all this had to ensure Mazepa a victory in his liberation war. However the difficulties of the situation and also his mistakes led to defeat. [426]

Therefore, whilst the aims of Mazepa to create a Ukrainian state, with a strong national culture and education are strongly praised, there is an admittance that the means to such highly respectable ends could have been different.

Overall, the Grade 8 textbook provides a similar portrayal of the Cossack period as does Danilevs'ka/Vlasov's book for grade 5. The Cossack state is idealised as a direct successor of Kiev Rus' and providing a key part of the linear history of Ukrainian statehood. The text demonstrates some of the virtues of the Ukrainian people, peace-loving, democratic and law-abiding, in spite of having to live in terrible conditions forever 'struggling' for their right for an independent state. Such virtues are held in direct contrast to Ukraine's neighbours who are vilified as warring peoples, forever intent to capture 'foreign' lands from the Ukrainian

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[424] Vlasov, V.S., *Istoriia Ukrainy: 8 klas*, op.cit., p.212.
[425] Ibid, p.216.
[426] Ibid, p.221.

people and use it for their own ends. The harsh policies of Tsarist Muscovy towards Ukraine come in for particular criticism, which only highlights the fundamental 'otherness' of Muscovy in its cultural and political traditions. Concerning two controversial figures, Khmelnytsk'yi and Mazepa, there are similarities and differences from their portrayals in previous textbooks in post-Soviet Ukraine. The portrayal of Khmelnytsk'yi as a national hero who had no choice in signing the Treaty with Muscovy in 1654 follows the trends found in previously analysed textbooks. However, the portrayal of Mazepa differs in being far more enthusiastic of his place as a national hero of Ukraine.

Grade 9 (fourteen to fifteen year olds) Ukraine in the nineteenth century

The Grade 9 textbook concentrates on how Ukraine, divided into two parts, one under Austro-Hungarian rule and the other under Russian Tsarist rule, fared through the nineteenth century. Here the focus will be on Russian-controlled Ukraine, in particular paying attention to how the Tsarist rule is evaluated. Is the assimilation of large segments of Ukraine's population to the ruling, Russian culture, viewed as voluntary and natural, or is it portrayed as forcibly imposed? Concerning the question of language, was the linguistic russification which occurred in this period, a result of an imperial policy aimed to denationalise Ukrainians, or did it occur naturally through the interaction of Ukrainians and Russians over time? The author clearly indicates in the introduction that the book continues the story of the teleological triumph of the Ukrainian people in their struggle for national self-determination,

> The downtrodden, illiterate Ukrainian population was transformed into the Ukrainian nation with all those features, which characterise other European societies. And this took place in conditions when the Ukrainians with all possible means were forced to forget their past; there were attempts to rid of them any feelings of being Ukrainian. However, it was in vain. Not by accident, namely in the nineteenth century, was born the Ukrainian national hymn, "Ukraine has not perished yet"... In the beginning of the twentieth century, the Ukrainian people created political parties and began an open struggle for the regeneration of her state. Without this struggle, without the intense search for their Ukrainian way in history, there would not be a modern Ukrainian state.[427]

The Tsarist regime is portrayed repeatedly as an evil empire, using Ukraine for her own personal ends, irrespective of the needs of the Ukrainian people. The grave consequences of the lack of statehood for the Ukrainians becomes a key theme, summed up as follows,

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[427] Turchenko, F.H., Moroko, V.N., *Istoriia Ukrainy: konets XVIII-nachalo XX veka*, Kiev: Geneza, 2001, pp.3-4.

"having lost their statehood, Ukrainians were doomed the role of 'tools'... the role of the source of replenishments for the imperial Treasury and the reservoir of cannon fodder. This was the price for a state-less existence."[428] The narrative then turns to the forced cultural and linguistic russification of large swathes of the Ukrainian people. Concerning the education system in Ukraine the authors make clear that,

> The Tsarist government planted in Ukraine such a system of education which was summoned to satisfy the demands of the state and simultaneously helped to extinguish in Ukrainian people their national consciousness, fasten a feeling of inadequacy, create the impression of the leading role of the 'Russian nation' in the life of Ukraine.[429]

As regards the ethnic composition of Ukraine, the text significantly goes to great lengths to explain how over the century, the proportion of people calling themselves Ukrainians significantly declined. One reason given for this is the above-mentioned attempts to 'russify' the population and 'extinguish' national consciousness. However, the authors also argue that migration also played a significant role. The text portrays the Tsarist regime as callously using the 'immigration' of other nationalities, predominantly Russians into Ukraine as a further means to extinguish any feelings amongst the local Ukrainian population of national resurgence. The text recalls how the Russian empire,

> Strove to weaken the resistance of the 'rooted' people, with the help of a migration policy 'diluted' it with representatives of different nations... If by the end of the 18th century, in Russian-controlled Ukraine, 80 percent of the population were Ukrainian, then a 100 years later, the proportion of Ukrainians had fallen to 72.6 percent. The reason for this was the anti-Ukrainian migration policy of the Russian Empire, directed at strengthening control over Ukraine. The consequence of this policy is that the proportion of Russians, Jews and other nationalities rose to 27.4 percent.[430]

In particular the authors draw attention to the russification of southern and eastern Ukraine, arguing that the Tsarist regime used the incoming Russian migrants as 'tools' in their battle with the Ukrainian national movement. The text makes a clear judgement that the Russian language was 'imposed' onto all Ukrainian lands by imperial and colonial means and certainly did not emerge as a result of the natural interaction of Russians and Ukrainians.

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[428] Turchenko, F.H., Moroko, V.N., *Istoriia Ukrainy*..., op.cit., p.127.
[429] Ibid, p.108.
[430] Ibid, p.12.

Whilst large parts of the text focus on the negativity of the Tsarist regime and the consequences of its actions in Ukraine, the text also concentrates on the reaction of Ukrainians, showing a 'national revival' slowing emerging. The text recalls the Cyrylo-Methodius Brotherhood of Ukrainian intellectuals, founded in the 1840s, which was set up to fight for the rights of the Ukrainian people,

> The great achievement of the Ukrainian national-liberation movement of the first half of the nineteenth century was the organisation and activity of the Cyrylo-Methodius brotherhood. This national, patriotic organisation grew in the traditions of Ukrainian socio-political movements of previous generations and opened a new stage in the struggle of the Ukrainian people for their national and social liberation.[431]

The authors also concentrate on the literary figure of Taras Shevchenko, as a genuine Ukrainian national hero. The importance of Shevchenko is explained in that,

> At last, the people themselves from their secret depths put forward their own prophet and genius- Taras Shevchenko. He said more about Ukrainians, about their past, present and future than all of his predecessors, taken together ever had. Shevchenko lifted the Ukrainian language and literature to such a level of perfection that he allowed one to make the conclusion – a people possessing such things, can not disappear from the face of the earth.[432]

The text continues in explaining how despite the cruel imperial policies placed upon them, the Ukrainian people did not disappear but in fact began to organise themselves with the help of the intelligentsia in a more concerted way.

This book portrays this period in a remarkably similar way to that represented in the Danilevs'ka/Vlasov text for grade 5 and the textbook previously analysed by Janmaat. The text concentrates on the teleological struggle of the Ukrainian people to fight foreign interference and uphold their right for national self-determination. The reader is left in no doubt that russification was imposed on the population of Ukraine, by state-led migration, educational and cultural policies by the Tsarist 'other' regime. With the concentration on the plight of ethnic Ukrainians comes a simultaneous omission of the role of other ethnic groups, namely Russians, Jews, Poles in the history of this period, bar some crude references to them as 'migration tools' of the Tsarist regime. Similarly, the concentration on the work of the

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[431] Turchenko, F.H., Moroko, V.N., *Istoriia Ukrainy...*, op.cit., p.66.
[432] Ibid, p.114.

'national' intelligentsia is mirrored by the dearth of references to the parallel discourses of federalist and regionalist political thought, which also played a role in the political scene in Ukraine in the nineteenth century.[433]

Grade 10 (fifteen to sixteen year olds) Ukraine in the twentieth century: 1915-1939

The textbook for grade 10 covers historical events in Ukraine in the twentieth century. Attention focuses on the portrayal of the Ukrainian Revolution and the coming to power of the Bolsheviks in Ukraine. Are the Bolsheviks seen as an ideological force which grabbed power in Russia and subsequently Ukraine so as to forward their ideological pursuits, or were the Bolsheviks essentially a new, different form of Russian autocracy simply dressed in different clothes?

As regards the role of Ukraine in the World War I, the rhetoric used previously in grade 8 portraying the Russians as forever trying to 'trick' Ukrainians into relinquishing their distinctiveness progresses. The authors explain how Russia in an effort to gain Western Ukrainian lands, thought up the idea of 'pan-Slavism'. The author of the textbook states how "Pan-Slavism – this is the name of the idealistic tendencies, which strive to unite the Slavic peoples into one state under the governance of Russia."[434] This understanding of the term reminds readers of the supposed 'real' motives of pan-Slavic rhetoric, which is commonly used in Ukraine today.[435] In this way, children are reminded of the constant need to remember the lessons of history. Also the authors recount how Ukrainians, forced to fight on both sides for the Austro-Hungarian Empire and the Russian Empire, finally realise that their future lies not under foreign power but now is the moment for them to seize back their rightful statehood. Whilst the attempts at establishing a Ukrainian national government are seen as drawing together the historical traditions of Ukrainian statehood, the text does not attempt to idealise them. For example, the initial Ukrainian government set up in Kiev, the Central Rada, whilst built on democratic ideas is also criticised for lacking decisiveness. In the uncertain atmosphere, the authors tell how Bolshevism with its authoritarian roots in

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[433] This point is made and expanded upon by Von Hagen, M., "Does Ukraine have a History?" *Slavic Review*, 54, no.3, Fall 1995, p. 666.
[434] Danilenko, V.M., Husenkov, S.H., Kolodyazhnyi, N.N., *Istoriia Ukrainy: 10 klas*, Zaporozh'ye: Prem'er, 2002, p.6.
[435] For an informative discussion of pan-Slavic rhetoric in Ukraine today, see Shulman, S., "The Internal-External Nexus in the Formation of Ukrainian National Identity: The Case for Slavic Integration", in Kuzio, T. and D'Anieri, P., *Dilemmas of State-Led Nation Building in Ukraine*, Westport, CT: Praeger, 2002, pp.103-130.

Russia began to assert control in Ukraine. Bolshevism is seen as a foreign imposition, which did not organically develop in Ukraine:

> The political situation in Ukraine was different from in Russia. Here the influence of the Bolsheviks was limited. Here the programme was orientated to the proletariat, among which the Ukrainians were poorly represented. The Ukrainian national movement was viewed by the Bolsheviks with hostility. This is explained by the fact that the Bolsheviks in general were represented by Russians and by the russified proletariat.[436]

Whilst there is some admission of support from within Ukraine, these people are seen to have only supported the Bolsheviks as they themselves under the former Tsarist regime had been forcibly russified. However, whilst Bolshevism is seen as a foreign force, inherently related to the Russian 'other', there is an admission of the Party's ideological beliefs. Again, the subsequent failure of the Central Rada to hold onto power is explained not simplistically as Ukraine being seized by the marauding Bolsheviks from Russia like Danilevs'ka/Vlasov. Instead it is seen to have occurred as a combination of the indecisiveness of the Ukrainian leadership, passivity of the population and the astute political eye of the Bolshevik power. They witnessed the chaos in society and offered a bright future and order, which proved highly popular within large parts of Ukraine's population. On the one hand, the authors strive to present the new Soviet power in Ukraine as an extension of former Russian imperial power, making the implicit understanding that the USSR as a union of equal republics was a sham right from the onset. As the authors state,

> The insertion of the UkrSSR into the configuration of the USSR – a single, multinational state with strong central power, orientated in the interests of Russia - for many decades placed the fate of the Ukrainian people in a state of dependence on the policy of the Union leadership.[437]

However, on the other hand, the authors argue that the creation of the UkrSSR should not one-dimensionally be viewed as just a puppet state, completely controlled by Russia. Instead, whilst attempts to create an independent Ukrainian state had failed, this failure was not all in vain. As the authors state,

> The legal position of the UkrSSR at the beginning of the 1920s was formally an independent state according to the Constitution of 1919. The official independence of Ukraine was a concession of the

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[436] Danilenko, V.M., Husenkov, S.H., Kolodyazhnyi, N.N., *Istoriia Ukrainy*..., op.cit., p.39.
[437] Ibid, p.144.

> Bolsheviks to the Ukrainian national movement. Without the Ukrainian revolution and the national state of 1917-1919, there would have been no Soviet Ukrainian state.[438]

In such a fashion, the authors cleverly incorporate these events into the wider scheme of Ukraine's history, portraying the everlasting attempts to gain statehood. The importance of the gaining of the recognition as a 'national republic' within the configuration of the USSR for Ukraine is emphasised.

> However the proclamation of the USSR strengthened several gains of the Ukrainian people. The territorial integrity of Ukraine was recognised and Ukraine had its own administrative apparatus…The Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic became a clearly defined national and territorial whole with its own administrative centre and apparatus. In such a way, Ukrainians in the end, gained the territorial-administrative frameworks, which reflected their national distinctiveness, that is to say, which they had been without since the time of the Cossack Hetmanate of the 18th century.[439]

The remaining sections deal with some of the most tragic parts of Ukraine's history. Interestingly, in both the famine of 1921 and the subsequent Great Famine of 1932/3, the authors endeavour to highlight that a reason for the tragedies was the lack of real Ukrainian statehood. In both cases, the authors aim to make clear that in both cases, the Ukrainian leadership did turn to the central Soviet leadership for assistance when people began to perish in large numbers. This effort to condone, to a certain extent, the Ukrainian leadership implicitly portrays to the reader the real dangers and consequences of Ukraine being dependant on foreign 'others'. Concerning the key debate whether the Great Famine of 1932/3 was a policy by the central Soviet leadership explicitly against the Ukrainian people or simply part of the ideological battle to gain support for their collectivisation drive, the authors fail to demonstrate full support for either view. The authors state that the famine of 1921 against the Ukrainian people "was the first time 'famine' was applied as a method of state power", thus making an implicit understanding that the subsequent famine of 1932/3 was the second, more highly orchestrated attempt.[440] Similarly the text omits any reference to the fact that members of other nationalities other than Ukrainians also died from starvation in Ukraine. Yet, the authors do remain on the whole, impartial,

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[438] Danilenko, V.M., Husenkov, S.H., Kolodyazhnyi, N.N., *Istoriia Ukrainy*…, op.cit., p.138.
[439] Ibid, p.143.
[440] Ibid, p.130.

> The Ukrainian people have lived through many tragedies, but the history of Ukraine does not know anything more destructive than the Great Famine of the 1930s. The reasons for it are as yet still not totally clear. Some consider that the famine was planned by Stalin and his comrades earlier in order to destroy the Ukrainian peasantry, which was seen as the stronghold of nationalism and private-ownership psychology. Others prove that (the famine) was the consequence of a thoughtless policy to acquire means for industrialisation, in which no attention was paid to the fate of the peasantry. One thing is evident – the famine in Ukraine arose not as a result of drought, but was organised artificially.[441]

Also, the authors recognise that the famine also occurred in other agricultural regions of the USSR, although Ukraine was hardest hit. In general, blame is apportioned to the Stalinist high leadership with the Great Famine seen as "the most horrific of the many crimes of Stalinism."[442]

The Grade 10 textbook provides an assessment of some of the most debated parts of Ukraine's history, which is far more even-handed than the Danilevs'ka/Vlasov text. Whilst some of the positive aspects of the Ukrainian attempts to build a state between 1917-1919 are highlighted, the authors do not shy away from criticism. This attempt at the regeneration of the Ukrainian state is applauded but not idealised. Whilst there are attempts to view Bolshevism and the USSR as 'foreign', the text veers away from drawing a completely negative picture. Importantly, the text emphasises how the UkrSSR whilst not being the desired independent Ukrainian state, nevertheless provided the Ukrainians with a 'quasi-state', which when the opportunity arose in 1991 became fully independent. Thus, the events of this period are interwoven into the wider historical scheme of Ukraine's statehood continually being regenerated. Similarly, with regards to, the highly emotive topic of the Great Famine a relatively impartial view is maintained. Here, the authors make clear that the Famine was artificial but restrain from claiming that it was an attempt by Stalin to destroy the Ukrainian nation as forwarded by Vlasov/Danilevs'ka. The real blame is given to the Stalinist leadership who is seen as agents of an inhumane regime. Significantly, the authors pay attention to the Ukrainian leadership's attempts to improve the situation, which turned out to be in vain. This can be viewed as an attempt to further the underlying argument for the need for the Ukrainians to have their own independent state.

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[441] Danilenko, V.M., Husenkov, S.H., Kolodyazhnyi, N.N., *Istoriia Ukrainy*..., op.cit., p.175.
[442] Ibid, p.179.

Grade 11 (sixteen to seventeen year olds) Ukraine and World War Two

The Grade 11 textbook places a large amount of emphasis on the period of the Second World War. Readers are constantly reminded that there were more than one resistance force to Nazi Germany's occupation of Ukraine, these being the Ukrainian Nationalists, OUN/UPA and Ukrainians loyal to the Soviet Union. The authors tell how the OUN/UPA saw their role as defending their motherland, "the attack of Nazi Germany on the USSR brought hope of the restoration of Ukrainian statehood amongst participants of the OUN."[443]

However, the text however does not shy away from explicitly stating how the OUN colluded with the Nazis in the hope of reviving the Ukrainian state. The actions of the OUN are explained as simply the latest example of repressed Ukrainians trying to gain their statehood whilst being obstructed by the trickery of foreign powers. Such an assessment of the OUN/UPA tries to explain their actions, without attempting to glorify them. The appraisal of the Soviet Ukrainian partisans bravely fighting the Nazi occupiers is similarly neutral. The authors argue that whilst many Ukrainians fought against the Nazis in Soviet ranks, they did so for very simple and understandable reasons. It states "the absolute majority of the citizens of Ukraine considered that they were fighting not for the interests of the Kremlin high leadership but to defend their land from occupants."[444]

In this fashion, the actions of large numbers of Ukrainians who supported the Soviet regime are also explained. The underlying point made is that the tragedy for Ukraine was a resistance movement, split and thus severely weakened. Of particular significance is how the text changes its tact during the description of the bloody civil war, which took place in western Ukraine in 1943/5. In particular, the text emphasises how the OUN/UPA under the leadership of Roman Shukhevych had the motto,

> The aim, so that not one village has recognised Soviet power. OUN must act so that all who recognise Soviet power are destroyed. Don't frighten but physically annihilate. There is no need to worry that people will hound us for our cruelty. Let out of 40 million of the Ukrainian population, only a half remain, there is nothing terrible in this.[445]

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[443] Shevchuk, V.P., Taranenko, N.G., Levitas, F.L., Gisem, A.V., *Istoriia Ukrainy: 11 klas,* Zaporozh'ye: Prem'er, 2001, p.47.
[444] Ibid, p.62.
[445] Ibid, p.78.

Here the authors highlight how the previous aims of defending the homeland and the Ukrainian nation had been cast aside for a far more cruel and irrational ideology. The authors' concluding remarks regarding the War reinforces the shift in tone. The previous impartiality changes to a warm if not full backing of the role of Ukrainians fighting in Soviet ranks. The text states how over two and a half million Ukrainians fought in the Red Army with large numbers gaining awards for their efforts and some even becoming Heroes of the USSR. Also, the concept of the 'Great Patriotic War' is introduced together with a veiled criticism of 'nationalist' accounts of the War which denigrate the role of Ukrainians in Soviet colours whilst glorifying the nationalist heroes of the OUN/UPA. The text clearly states,

> ***4.3 Futile attempts to falsify history:*** Several modern historians are making an effort to revise the character of the 'Great Patriotic War', to give it a new evaluation stating that it was only a stand for the interests of Stalinist Empire. It is impossible to agree with this. The people defended their land from aggressors. Therefore for them the war really was ***patriotic, liberating and just.*** The Ukrainian soldiers for example showed the best features of character, courage, heroism, sacrificing in the name of their native land. The victory achieved in the Second World War had an inestimable significance for the future fate of our state.[446]

In comparison with the previously analysed textbooks and the Vlasov/Danilevs'ka text, this appraisal of the Second World War is significantly different. It provides a less normative representation of events, including large sections concerning the OUN/UPA and also the Soviet resistance in Ukraine. Yet the narrative is itself not devoid of any underlying message. There is a concerted attempt to reassert the importance of the concept of the 'Great Patriotic War' together with an effort to steer away from a crude 'nationalist' line, which paints the OUN/UPA as the 'good guys' and the Soviets as the 'baddies'. Instead, the line taken here has realigned itself with more traditional Soviet accounts, bar a far more objective appraisal of the role of the OUN/UPA.

7.4 Conclusions

The textbooks concentrate on the Ukrainian ethnic nation and how its path towards national self-determination has continually been thwarted by foreign obstruction, notably Russia. However in the textbooks for the final two grades 10 and 11 which deal with history in the twentieth century, the narrative loses its simplistic and one-dimensional edge. Whilst Russia

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[446] Shevchuk, V.P., Taranenko, N.G., Levitas, F.L., Gisem, A.V., *Istoriia Ukrainy*..., op.cit., p.81.

is portrayed as an external 'other' throughout, the portrayal of the USSR is far more ambiguous. As regards the appraisal of the Second World War, the narrative reverts to a more Soviet-friendly interpretation of events.

The narrative within these textbooks in many respects reflects the 'official' narrative of state officials under Kuchma.[447] It aims to idealise the ancient nature of the Ukrainian nation and Ukrainian statehood while simultaneously disentangling Ukraine's history from the Russian 'other' at every opportunity. However, as regards the highly contested and still 'living' nature of many of the historical events of the twentieth century a far more cautious path has been set. The main difference between the 'official' narrative and the textbook narrative is in the portrayal of the role of non-Ukrainians in the history of Ukraine. Whilst the 'official' rhetoric espouses an inclusion of the role of all national groups living in Ukraine as part of the history of Ukraine, the textbooks provide a glaring omission of their role.

Within academic circles, there have been calls for the 'History of Ukraine' course to take into account the role of non-Ukrainians in its historical development, to provide a history of the 'people of Ukraine' rather than just the 'Ukrainian people'.[448] Hrytsak argues that it is impossible to see Ukraine today as the triumph of the historical actions of a single, united and organic Ukrainian mass.[449] Rather there is a need to understand that Ukraine today is far more a complex interaction of a wide number of different ideologies and political movements. Within the English language literature concerning the history of Ukraine, this question is also relevant. There have been published two concise volumes of the History of Ukraine.[450] Subtelny provides an essentially 'ethnic' history of the Ukrainian people, in which only five of nearly 700 pages are given to the role of non-Ukrainians. Magosci however takes a more territorial approach, arguing that,

> Until now, most histories of Ukraine have been histories of the Ukrainian people. While this book also traces the evolution of Ukrainians, it tries as well to give judicious treatment to the many other peoples who developed within the borders of Ukraine, including the Greeks, the Crimean Tatars, the Poles, the

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[447] For a detailed discussion of the 'official narrative', see Wolczuk, K., "History, Europe and the 'National Idea' : The 'Official' narrative of National Identity in Ukraine", *Nationalities Papers, vol.28, no.4, 2000,* pp.671-694.
[448] For example, see Shapoval, Y., in *Vitchyzhyana Istoriya v shkolax i vusax Ukrayini: Ostannye desyatirichchya*, Kiev: Kennan Institute, 2002, p.21. and Kas'yanov, H., p.19.
[449] Hrytsak, Y., "Yak vykladaty istoriyu Ukrayiny pislya 1991 roku?" in *Ukrains'ka Istorychna Dydaktyka: Mizhnarodnyi Dialog*, Kiev: Geneza, 2000, pp.63-75.
[450] Subtelny, O., *Ukraine: A History*, 2nd edition, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1988, and Magsoci, P.R., *A History of Ukraine*, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1996.

> Russians, the Jews, the Germans, and the Romanians. Only through an understanding of all their cultures can one hope to gain an adequate introduction to Ukrainian history.[451]

Interestingly though, as Kuzio notes, it is the Subtelny text which has proved the most widely used textbook in Ukraine.[452] The prominent Ukrainian historian, Kas'yanov sums up the dominance of the 'ethnic' version of Ukraine's history in official circles,

> If, we are trying to speak about the general picture, the general trend is obviously the nationalization of history, creating national anthem, myths, symbols etc. But in general, as a rule, the history of Ukraine is considered by the majority of historians as an *ethnic* history, as a history of Ukrainians, their ethnic origins. And in this case, a lot of people are neglected, at least 10 million Russians.[453]

Rather than debating which of the various interpretations is 'true' or 'truer' the aim here again is rather to see why one of them has become dominant in school textbooks, whilst the other has been cast aside. The reason may be found by looking more closely at the historians in charge of the current (re)writing of history books in Ukraine. As Lieven states, there is a clear trend in Ukraine of historians who previously taught Soviet history using Marxist-Leninist methodologies now continuing their extremely dogmatic approaches to history. The only change being the criticism which previously was warranted for the 'enemies of socialism', now is reserved for anyone slightly critical of the eternal nation.[454] Von Hagen also argues that the dogmatic approach of Marxist-Leninism found in Soviet historiography has found itself a new home in the 'nationalist' historical narrative, today resonant in Ukraine.[455] He explains how one of the legacies of this approach to history was, and is, a faith in one, true history. Certainly Stanislav Kul'chits'kyi, the Deputy Director of the Institute of History of Ukraine, provides an example of this dogmatic approach. He argues that people who are critical of the new historical narrative simply demand a return to the old Soviet textbooks, stating how in many discussions such antagonists have no credible alternative to the current narrative other than a 'return to the past'.[456] This argument in essence tries to legitimate the existing order, by creating the myth that there is no real choice,

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[451] Magosci, P.P., *A History of Ukraine*, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1996.
[452] Kuzio, T., "Historiography and the National Identity among the Eastern Slavs: Towards a New Framework," *National Identities*, vol, 3, no. 2, 2001, p.126.
[453] Interview with the author, 28th January 2003, Kiev.
[454] See Lieven, A., *Ukraine and Russia: A Fraternal Rivalry*, Washington D.C: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1999, p.62.
[455] Von Hagen, M., "Does Ukraine have a History?" *Slavic Review*, 54, no.3, Fall 1995, p.665.
[456] See Kul'chits'kyi, S., in *Vytchiznyana Istoriya v skholax i vuzax Ukraiyiny*, p.8.

safe in the knowledge that the 'return to the past' to a 'Soviet' history has been far too highly delegitimated for it to have any chance of a real comeback.

In reality there is a genuine alternative to the current 'ethnic' history of Ukraine, one, which takes into account the role of non-Ukrainians in the historical development of Ukraine. However one must conclude that this narrative has been sidelined, as it does not fit the overall political project of the state. As demonstrated, whilst the rhetoric of state elites calls for a 'civic' Ukrainian state to be built, nonetheless the contents of the historical narrative in textbooks is far more 'ethnic' in its contents. A prime reason for this is explained by Kas'yanov,

> So, here, what is interesting is that when somebody at the top level, I mean academicians, historians, - when they are trying to impose or introduce their alternative views of the history of Ukraine – as a history of a multi-ethnic state, of a multi-ethnic community, there are certain *psychological obstacles* because ethnic Ukrainians believe that they were repressed, or that they were deprived of their rights of self-determination. From one side, you will see that Ukraine is a multi-ethnic state, but simultaneously, when you say Ukrainian history, at an official level, a Ukrainian past, it is about ethnic Ukrainians, *it is a kind of hidden agenda, but it will never be manifested publicly*, because sometimes, it is probably subconsciously done.[457]

This point refers to the Ukrainians' so-called 'Pereiaslav Complex', the fact that some Ukrainians hold deep psychological scars which perhaps explains to some degree why state elites once in power cannot hold back from maybe unconsciously purporting highly 'uncivic' and 'ethnic' historical narrative.[458] However, this can perhaps be in part explained by the necessity for any nationalising project to be *perceived* to be organic, natural, 'making right yesterday's wrongs', for it to be successful in practice.

Furthermore, this chapter has brought to attention a highly significant, **politics of the textbook,** which is emerging in Ukraine. As stated earlier, the Ukrainian state on the one hand provides a list of recommended texts, the aim here being to provide schoolchildren across Ukraine, irrespective of their place of residence, with a single, historical narrative. However, on closer inspection, in recent years there has been a rapid growth in various publishing houses, based in Kiev and elsewhere, providing alternative history textbooks. As

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[457] Interview with the author, 28th January 2003, Kiev.
[458] Morrison, J., "Pereyaslav and after: The Russian and Ukrainian Relationship", *International Affairs*, vol.69., no.4, 1993, pp.677-703.

highlighted here, the textbooks published in the Zaporizhzhian based *Prem'er* publishing house, provide a far more Soviet and Russian friendly narrative of Ukraine's history. Moreover, of significant note, these books are published in both the Ukrainian and Russian languages. During my fieldwork in predominantly Russian-speaking areas, these Russian language versions were used in the majority of the schools visited.[459] Further research is required to explore to what extent these tentative findings are replicated across Ukraine.

This situation leads one to the conclusion that to some degree, Ukraine's inherent diversity has implicitly been allowed to flourish. Whilst the state preaches the need for an all-Ukrainian textbook with one united historical narrative, rejecting previous calls for 'regional' textbooks, nevertheless such a situation is perhaps slowly emerging. In such a fashion, some of the inherent idiosyncrasies of the Ukrainian state and nation-building projects reveal themselves. The state is publicly striving toward creating a new, revised Ukrainian historical narrative, which shifts from previous Soviet interpretations and views Russia as a foreign other' to Ukraine. However, at the same time, other interpretations are being allowed to emerge which are much closer to previous Soviet historiography, which are likely to be more readily acceptable in Ukraine's predominantly Russian-speaking eastern regions. It is perhaps no coincidence that these textbooks are being printed in Zaporizhzhia, itself a large, Russian-speaking city in south-eastern Ukraine. To a certain degree, such a situation could be justified by the fact that creating a Ukrainian historical narrative, which is more 'ethnic' rather than 'civic' in nature, may alienate large segments of the Russian-speaking eastern regions, dividing rather than uniting the people. However, conversely if 'alternative' narratives are allowed to emerge, in essence the *status-quo* may remain, with the state *per se* legitimating the continuation of Ukraine's present regional diversity. The following chapters Eight and Nine attempt to tentatively explore this in the three study areas in Ukraine's eastern borderlands, examining how indeed the historical narrative purported in the history textbooks is 'perceived' by not only the teachers who transmit the message but also the children who receive it. Furthermore, from the onset, regional historical narratives from each of the three study areas are examined to see to what degree they complement or contradict the message in the all-Ukrainian textbooks.

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[459] Indeed the author would like to add that on arrival to Luhans'k and entering the local bookshop, he found the 'History of Ukraine' section filled with Ukrainian language versions. However, after a minute he was promptly told by the shopkeeper that nobody ever bought the Ukrainian language copies! Furthermore, the Russian language versions had, as always, sold out immediately and they were waiting for some extra copies to be sent across from Zaporizhzhia!

CHAPTER EIGHT: 'WHERE ARE WE FROM?' : NEGOTIATING 'HISTORY' IN THE REGIONS

8.1 Introduction

As argued in chapter Four, rather than utilising a one-dimensional top-down approach, which assumes that the state-led nation building project in Ukraine will simply sweep away regional differences, a more interactive approach is required to fully uncover the dynamics of identity change in Ukraine. This chapter focuses on 'ordinary people's' perceptions of Ukraine's past and on this basis makes conclusions about individuals' self-understanding of being 'Ukrainian' today and also what meanings are attached to the concept 'Ukraine' itself. Whilst the previous chapter provided an in-depth exploration of how the Ukrainian state is espousing a new and revised, 'official' historical narrative, through a set of school history textbooks, this chapter moves the analysis to a deeper level, examining how this state-sponsored historical narrative, used in school textbooks, is actually *negotiated and contested at the local level*, in the three study areas. The results of qualitative in-depth interviews with university lecturers, school history teachers and directors are used to examine how the state narrative has actually been 'transferred' to the children in the classroom. In particular attention focuses on to what extent the central message of the history textbooks is clearly transferred, or whether any dilution, contradictions or open avoidance of certain issues is occurring. The chapter continues with an analysis of group interviews with school children. Here, particular attention is placed upon how the historical narrative is 'perceived' at the local level, and to what extent such perceptions coincide with the content of the historical narrative. A thematic approach is adopted concentrating on the key issues, which arose during the fieldwork. Whilst the results from these study areas do not claim to be representative, nonetheless the means by which they may influence macro-level processes in Ukraine are analysed in the conclusions.

8.2 Linking the macro and the micro: the role of teachers in the Ukrainian classroom

This section focuses on the role of teachers in the implementation of state policy and their perceptions of it, in an effort to deepen understanding of the dynamics within the processes of identity change across Ukraine. Teachers were selected as a target group for this research as they occupy a key communicating link between the state-led policies, outlined in history

textbooks and the schoolchildren who are seen as the 'recipients' of the information. As Piirainen states,

> It is the task of a schoolteacher to teach the coming generations to sing the national anthem and to pledge allegiance to the national flag. The past of the nation, the birth of the state, the victories and defeats in national wars, the geography of the Fatherland, the glorious deeds of the national heroes, the genius of the national artists, poets, and scientists, - all this is learnt at school.[460]

Information used here, in the main is the result of interviews which took place in a number of schools and higher education establishments in each of the three study areas during 2003. In these in-depth interviews, with school directors, history teachers and university lecturers, a thematic approach was taken, with teachers encouraged to express their opinions and perceptions of shifts in the contents of historical education. The interviews were later transcribed and subjected to qualitative analysis. The author has attempted to select, verify and present cases that not only provide accurate reflections of each teacher's feelings and thoughts, but also illuminate relevant issues within the context of nation-building in Ukraine. A brief theoretical background is provided from the onset.

Within education studies much attention has focused on social and cultural change and the role of teachers in such processes. For example, it is stated, "The place of schooling in social changes continues to be problematical. We can neither decide in advance that teachers are willing or oblivious henchmen of the social system or creators of social change."[461] Other studies have concentrated on the inconsistencies in the education system with teachers faced with 'competing imperatives' ending up being "caught between different versions of how they ought to act."[462] Schweisfurth, in a comparative study of the role of teachers in the process of democratisation in Russia and South Africa focused in great detail on how teachers in their own situations interact with the new forces of political, social and cultural change.[463] The study highlights how teachers situated at the interface between policy and practice, "are themselves agents who, interpret, mediate and transform policy or interfere,

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[460] Piirainen, P., "The Fall of an Empire, the Birth of a Nation: Perceptions of the New Russian National Identity", in Chulos, C.J., and Piirainen, T., *The Fall of an Empire, the Birth of a Nation. National Identities in Russia,* Aldershot: Ashgate, 2000, pp.161-196.
[461] Berlak, A. and Berlak H., *Dilemmas of Schooling: teaching and social change*, London: Methuen, 1981, p.134.
[462] Alexander, R.J., *Versions of Primary Education*, London: Routledge, 1995, p.23.
[463] Schweisfurth, M., *Teachers, Democratisation and Educational Reform in Russia and South Africa*, Oxford: Symposium Books, 2002.

resist, and confound its aims, depending on how one views the process and its outcomes."[464] In particular, concerning changes to history education, the author highlights the difficulties faced by teachers in Russia, who found the entire rejection of communism distorted the historical perspective,

> There is less politics, if we can say so. The ideas and ideals of the former state, Lenin for example, things like that. The children have new wishes, new wants. New ideals, a new outlook. In the former days, we tried to bring the children up in the way of Lenin. The image of him is lost...People shouldn't now encourage us to avoid the name of Lenin because he was a part of our history. Of course, it is not so popular as it was in the old days, but still we are to acquaint our children with history and to tell that he was a leader of the Communist Party.[465]

In the Ukrainian context, recent research has also highlighted the inherent difficulties in teachers adapting to the demands of new social and political realities, with some teachers protesting in the face of retraining, being ideologically opposed to the curriculum changes.[466] This issue certainly arose in many of the interviews. In particular, many teachers noted how previously they had taught a Soviet interpretation of history, whilst today the 'History of Ukraine' course had been specifically tailored so as to foster a sense of loyalty to the Ukrainian state and foster national consciousness amongst Ukraine's children. As one history teacher in Sumy remarks,

> The interpretation of various events has changed... The history of Ukraine now is directed at the creation of individual consciousness, which wasn't the case for many years. We are building a state and it is necessary to start with people, with their self-identification. There won't be a state, if we don't educate our young to be proud of their country and the fact that they are Ukrainians. Then they will do everything in their powers to develop their country.[467]

In this research, particular attention was given to this issue of the changing environment in which history teachers worked. For this reason, the author chose to administer interviews with methodological specialists, working at teacher 'retraining' centres in all three study areas. In the Ukrainian education system, each teacher every five years must spend at least one month working at their oblast's *Naukovo-metodichnyi institut bezperervnoi osviti*

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[464] Schweisfurth, M., *Teachers, Democratisation and Educational Reform...*, op.cit., p.10.
[465] Ibid, p.73.
[466] The difficulties in teacher retraining was noted in an interview with Oleg Skuratovych, former official at the Ministry of Education, Kiev, 14 September 2000, quoted in Popson, N., "The Ukrainian History Textbook: Introducing children to the 'Ukrainian nation' ", *Nationalities Papers*, vol.29., no.2, 2001.
[467] Sheveleva, Irina, Mikhailovna, History teacher, School No.27, Sumy, 19th March 2003.

(Institute for uninterrupted education). As one experienced methodologist from Luhans'k, recently retired, notes,

> For teachers the previous ten years have been difficult, especially those who are middle-aged. Thus it is clear that for these people it is difficult to change the point of view from the previous times to those of today. It is necessary to state that the textbooks for History of Ukraine in the mid-1990s had a tendency towards a nationalist stance and this antagonised some teachers. The system is the same as the previous one, what needs to be taught is what the state needs to be taught. The teacher must fulfil the desire of the state. I worked at the Institute for continued education, and the teachers found this work of re-orientation very difficult. For many, it is an internal rupture.[468]

In many of the interviews, teachers expressed the difficulties they faced in teaching a new historical narrative, which 'negates' the interpretations of historical events, which they had previously taught throughout their careers.

> I think that the school programme is overweighed with details. And in the textbooks there is no overall agreed representation. Before the collapse of the USSR, there was one history, which was agreed upon by the Party forces. Now in the textbooks there is a total negation of what happened in society in those times. There is a lot of negativity. I think that this is incorrect and unjust. For example, take the 1920s and 1930s, when our country went from being poor and agrarian to being industrial and agrarian. And who did this? People, our people. Therefore, history must leave behind a footprint and a memory of these forefathers who made this history. Take again, the Second World War, on whose shoulders was the war won? On the shoulders of our people. And the post-war reconstruction? It is not fair that the feats of our people are forgotten. I in the lessons try and recall these events. Of course, there were a lot of negative things, the Famine and the repressions, but to highlight the negatives is unjust, but unfortunately this takes place in our textbooks. Here there is an 'angry' history.[469]

Whilst there was an understanding of the need for a new historical narrative to move forward shifting away from previous Soviet interpretations, nevertheless, this was difficult to take on board.

8.3 History as a Ukrainian 'political football'

In particular, many teachers disliked the overt use of 'history' for 'political' ends but

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[468] Turyanskaya, Olga Fyodorovna, Senior Lecturer of social pedagology at Luhans'k Taras Shevchenko State Pedagological University, also methodologist of training of History teachers at Luhans'k oblast's Institute for Continued Education, 12th March 2003.
[469] Gaikov, Anatoliy Afanasievich, Reader of methodological training, Ukrainian People's Academy, Kharkiv, 22nd March 2003.

nonetheless, saw this process as inevitable. As one history teacher in Luhans'k notes, "History, this is an ideology and every state makes her own historical myth so as to facilitate the upbringing of the citizen."[470] Whilst many teachers understood the key role of the state in refashioning identities and the importance of a historical narrative in schools, nevertheless, they remained weary and unsure of the changes, and their consequences.

> After the Ukraine's independence was gained, the Soviet textbooks were abolished, yet there were no new textbooks and there was no real programme of sorts. Then there appeared textbooks, which were heavily politicised. We are not happy with these textbooks, ***as they are not scientific.*** As a result of all these things, I decided to write a history of Ukraine textbook myself, so as to provide ***an objective account of events.***[471]

> I think that the programme is very hard because much time is allocated to politicised information, and not to the development of a world-view. This is happening because Ukraine is a young country, which needs to create its statehood.[472]

Such a critique of the new history textbooks implies that to a large extent, teachers still adhere to the notion of history as a scientific discipline. This in many respects demonstrates the legacy of a Soviet upbringing and values instilled into these individuals. For many teachers, interviewed throughout the fieldwork, Soviet history seemingly is still considered the 'true' or 'real' history on account of its 'scientific' nature. In this fashion, the revised narrative now being crafted by the Ukrainian state is delegitimated in the eyes of these teachers for being 'unscientific' and therefore 'untrue.' From this, individuals gain ample reasons why they may choose to passively or actively contest its message.

Indeed many teachers repeated the assertion that they had been trained in one state, the Soviet Union, with its own specific ideological aims and tasks. However, with the collapse of the USSR and Ukraine's gaining of independence, suddenly they have been called upon to teach the same historical events, yet with differing interpretations, some of which they deem nationalist in content and find difficult to teach.

> Now the narrative is different from the Soviet one, although very little time has passed so as to give a totally objective evaluation of all events. A lot of documents are still not accessible. Although I lived in

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[470] Surname withheld, Nikolai Vsevdorovich, History teacher, State Gymnaziya, Luhans'k, 18th March 2003.
[471] Dentsova, Lubov' Pavlovna, History teacher at School No.45, Kharkiv, 4th April 2003.
[472] Ageeva, Taisiya Egorevna, History teacher at School No.5, Kharkiv, 4th April 2003.

the Soviet times, and saw myself how in reality took place these events. And now these events are narrated so as to be advantageous to certain politicians and this is wrong.[473]

In the Soviet textbooks, Ukrainian history is portrayed in the context of Russian history. In the Ukrainian textbooks, there are efforts make one's own history. Upto 1998, there were replacements and juggling, shuffling so as to create this task. Were introduced new textbooks with a new nationalistic ideology. And often there are incorrect interpretations of historical facts. Our task is not to 'judge' history but to take on facts. Now this is a real problem, like in the Soviet times, there were attempts to judge history.[474]

Whilst many teachers found their role as the 'transferors' of this new historical narrative difficult at some instances, many also were aware of how the changes taking places in the Ukrainian education system were ones of 'accent', rather than 'structure'. Many teachers noted how the structure of the historical narrative, as used throughout the Soviet times, as an eternal struggle of humanity towards a communist utopia, had been cleverly adapted to take into account the particular circumstances in Ukraine, with now the eternal struggle relating to the Ukrainian people's struggle to achieve statehood. As one history teacher in Luhans'k wryly notes,

> We compare the Soviet and Ukrainian textbooks upto 1998. In actual fact the structures are very similar. In the Soviet books, the people strove towards communism from the first days of existence, in the days of feudalism and bourgeisism. But the main theme throughout the books was the aspiration to create communism. Now we can look at the Ukrainian books upto 1998. In these, Ukrainians who actually did not know as yet that they were Ukrainians already were thinking about how to create a Ukrainian state. In the process of thousands of years, there continued a 'struggle' for Ukrainian statehood. The idea is again the same, the history of a struggle. In these books and the Soviet ones, the means of giving information practically don't differ. There is the conceptual opinion of the author and in the given tasks and documents, these are directed so that the author's position is confirmed and reinforced.[475]

Whilst many teachers, as demonstrated above, had difficulties in adapting to the demands of the new historical state narrative in Ukraine, nevertheless there was also a groundswell of opinion that some changes occurring were definitely for the better, with a desire for greater choice and greater respect for the individual. Although the state still had a strong control over

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[473] Butylkina,Tatyana Leonidovna, teacher, Ukrainian People's Academy, Kharkiv, 23rd March 2003.
[474] Senik, Natalya Germanovna, History teacher, Specialised school for the deepened study of languages, Luhans'k, 5th March 2003.
[475] Freiman, Grigoriy Arkadevich., History teacher, Specialised school for the deepened study of languages, Luhans'k, 5th March 2003.

the historical narrative taught across Ukraine, still individuals noted how more choice and opportunity for personal initiative was being slowly introduced into the Ukrainian education system. Indeed, as the following passage amply demonstrates, there was a growing understanding on the part of the teachers of their 'active' role in the reform process and how they themselves, could in some important respects dictate change.

> The changes in the education system must be looked onto as a state-led process and as an objective process, an everyday process, where is found the teacher. At the state-level, the reforms were directed at the widening of creativity of the teacher. Now the teacher has more freedom and so the pupils can have more creativity also. Actually the reforms ***occur more from below*** and the Ministry generalizes the positive moments which take place and tries to pull them out onto the state-level. I consider that this isn't such a bad thing. From the other side, there are not enough prognoses and coordinated reforms. But our state is young, and the process continues.[476]

Across the three study areas, all teachers were in full agreement of the need for teachers not to force their opinion of history upon the schoolchildren, but rather transfer to the children different interpretation of a historical event and allow the individual to make up his or her own mind. As one teacher in Kharkiv comments, "In the lessons, I give the children the different opinions of different academics and then allow them to make their own minds up. This teaches the children to think. We don't have the right to force onto them our own personal opinions."[477]

The chapter now continues with an insight into teachers and university lecturers personal opinions about the narratives of the historical events, which the author chose to focus on in the previous chapter's assessment of the textbooks themselves. These are discussed in chronological order: the period of Kiev Rus'; the Cossack period with particular attention given towards the two Ukrainian leaders, Bohdan Khmelnytskyi and Ivan Mazepa; Ukraine's time as part of the Soviet Union with attention focusing on the Great Famine of 1932/3 and World War Two. Finally, teachers provide some opinions concerning to what extent Russia is depicted as the 'other'.

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[476] Freiman, Grigoriy Arkadevich., History teacher, Specialised school for the deepened study of languages, Luhans'k, 5th March 2003.
[477] Shishko, Yelena Alexeyevna, History teacher, School No.45, Kharkiv, 4th April 2003.

Kiev Rus'

As outlined in the previous chapter, this period and its relevance to the origins of the Ukrainian nation is still highly contested across Russia and Ukraine. Soviet historiography defined this period as the beginnings of the Russian state with Kiev, being the 'mother of Russian cities'. However, as demonstrated in the previous chapter there have been efforts in the Ukrainian history textbooks to introduce an interpretation, which focuses on the importance of the period for the origins of the Ukrainian nation. An approach is taken, following the work of Hrushevskyi, which sees Kiev Rus' as a proto-Ukrainian state. However, teachers across all of the three study areas were in consensus of the need to tread carefully, veering away from such an understanding. Many teachers felt that such an interpretation was potentially divisive. Instead, teachers expressed the view that children in Ukrainian schools should learn that from Kiev Rus', the roots of all three of the eastern Slavic peoples, the Russians, Ukrainians and Belarussians, can be drawn.

> Kiev Rus' is taught in the 'History of Ukraine' course. In Russian schools, it is taught in the course, 'History of the Russian people'. Although any understanding at that time of what constitutes the 'Russian nation' or the 'Ukrainian nation' did not exist. If we are to divide the history of Kiev Rus' into the history of Russia or Ukraine, then only arguments emerge and we will not make any concrete decisions.[478]

Some teachers went further, openly criticizing the new narrative, as a means to try and delegitimate the interactions of Russia and Ukraine over the centuries.

> The new approach to the origins of Kiev Rus'. Many historians think that the history of Kiev Rus', its traditions after its collapse were transferred to the Galician-Volhynian Kingdom. And Moscow herself later developed on her own. That is to say the opinion of Hrushevskyi is renewing itself. With this they are trying to split the ties between Russia and Ukraine. Yet, all is inter-connected. You have to approach this carefully and not overdo things.[479]

Overall, many teachers in the interviews were highly aware of the importance of this period within Ukraine's historical development and their feelings on the issue ranged from being slightly cautious to openly anxious of how the revised historical interpretation attempted to cut ties and links with Russia and in such a fashion, portray her as an inalienable 'other'.

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[478] Surname withheld, Irina Semyonovna, history teacher, School No.57, Luhans'k, 25th April 2003.
[479] Gaikov, Anatoliy Afanasievich., Reader of methodological training, Ukrainian People's Academy, 22nd March 2003.

The Cossack Period

Concerning this period, many teachers expressed the fact that they enjoyed teaching this period of history. Concerning the depiction of Bohdan Khmelnytskyi and Ivan Mazepa, again there was an overall agreement with the narratives in the history textbooks. Many teachers stated that whilst such figures were controversial in Ukrainian society, the role of the teacher was to provide the schoolchildren with an overview of different interpretations, so that they could decide for themselves.

> Give the child a chance to make his own choice and give a quality appraisal of occurring events. For example, the position of Bohdan Khmelnytskyi in the years of battle against Poland. Today there exists a number of different opinions of historians, who differently evaluate the role of Bohdan Khmelnytskyi in these events. In Poland, there is an opinion which is totally different from the Ukrainian opinion. In Ukraine, there is an opinion which states that signing the treaty with Moscovia was a betrayal of his people, and also an opinion that Bohdan Khmelnytskyi, finding himself in this situation took the correct decision, because he kept the state which had been created. My task as a teacher is to give the child the Polish point of view, and the Ukrainian different points of view so the child made his own choice.[480]

As regards Ivan Mazepa, the situation was very similar. Indeed, one methodologist at Kharkiv oblast's centre for continued education, spoke about some trial lessons which had taken place in schools across the oblast.

> This figure is ambiguous in Ukraine's history, is he a hero or a traitor? For several hundred years he was considered a traitor, and straightaway to now call him a hero is not convincing. When I worked in a school, we worked on this issue. The lesson ended with the children stating that it is impossible to make any definite conclusions. One lesson was not enough and the children requested another lesson be spent on this subject. These are the lessons of history, which don't end with the sound of the class bell, but instead force the individual to think about the issues at hand. This is the development of a sense of national consciousness.[481]

In these lessons, schoolchildren were given a special project with the aim to evaluate the personality of Ivan Mazepa. The results were found to be very encouraging, with children learning how to analyse different sources and from these, decide upon their own personal opinions.

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[480] Katashov, Anatoliy Ivanovich, Director of the School of foreign languages, Luhans'k, 19th February 2003.
[481] Svyatokum, Oksana Yevgenievna, methodologist at the Centre for uninterrupted education, Kharkiv Oblast', 6th April 2003.

Holodomor: The Great famine of 1932/3

Turning to the depiction of historical events in Ukraine in the twentieth century, teachers expressed the view that this period, taught in the final two school years, of grades 10 and 11, were the most difficult to teach. This was the case for some understandable reasons. Firstly, the teachers felt that this was the period in Ukraine's history where the state textbooks utilized a very 'negative' historical narrative. Teachers, the vast majority of whom had had been educated in the Soviet Union and then taught history in Soviet schools for many years, often found this difficult to teach, stating that although mistakes were made during the Soviet times, not everything can be painted in a simplistic 'black and white' fashion, with the Soviet Union and Russia in particular receiving the bulk of the blame. Finally, teachers stated that this period of history was so difficult to teach as it was still so contested in society at large, with the memory of events throughout the twentieth century still fresh in many people's minds. In particular, many stated the difficulties of teaching certain historical narratives, which were soften questioned by children, who gained alternative perspectives of such events from outside sources, in particular real witnesses of history, in the form of their parents and grandparents. The *Holodomor* (Great Famine) of 1932/3 was found to be a particular case in hand. Many teachers expressed the view that previously when they had taught during the Soviet period, in the Soviet history textbooks, coverage of this event was sparse if at all, the tragedy being overlooked for political and ideological reasons. Thus, on the one hand, they saw the lengthy coverage of the event in the new Ukrainian history textbooks being a step in the right direction, with the population gaining an opportunity to learn about a tragic event in their country's history. However, simultaneously, several teachers expressed a deep unease at the use of this event by the Ukrainian authorities for political purposes. Whilst they were in agreement that this event was a prime example of the cruelty of the Stalinist regime, they felt that there was no need for a more 'nationalist' slant to be added, with the coverage making a subtle underlying argument that the Soviet government in Moscow, seen as a pseudo-Russian state used this method to break the back of the Ukrainian nation. As the director of a school in Luhans'k strongly argues,

> Today, there are lots of problems concerning the Great famine. There is an opinion that the famine was caused by the Russians. But the famine was ideological. In the textbooks is written that *Moskali* (Russians) ruined the Ukrainian people. But here together with Ukrainians were ruined Russians themselves, millions of people perished. The ideology formed this situation. Somebody earned some money from this. You know, bread was sold to Europe. Europe bought this bread. It is possible to

> make a question, why did Europe, knowing we had a famine, buy this bread? And we say that it was the Russians. I am also a *Moskal*, a Russian, a Don Cossack, therefore should I be kicked every year because the famine took place?[482]

Many other teachers felt that this period needs to be remembered and the reasons for it understood by Ukrainian schoolchildren, but not at the expense of (in)tolerance towards other national groups. From this passage, one can also examine the issue of nationality or ethnicity and how this relates to views held towards the Ukrainian state's nation-building process. Certainly in this case, there is a clear depiction of an ethnic Russian, who was born and lived all his life in Luhans'k feeling that the Ukrainian state is shifting towards a more 'ethnic' rather than 'civic' understanding of the history of Ukraine, in which the 'Ukrainian people' are given precedence over the 'people of Ukraine'. In this passage, the individual is clearly showing how he feels, that on the basis of his ethnicity, he is being 'disenfranchised' or alienated from the education reform process, occurring in Ukraine.

The Second World War/Great Patriotic War?

Turning our attention to the final theme, this period was found to be the most emotionally charged, with teachers holding highly divisive viewpoints. Teachers repeatedly stated how the interpretation of this period was constantly 'under review' with the historical narrative found in the history textbooks changing throughout the 1990s, making their task even greater. Interestingly, many teachers stated their personal dislike of recent Ukrainian attempts to describe this period as Ukraine's participation in the Second World War, thus rejecting the Soviet understanding of the War as the 'Great Patriotic War'.

> In the textbooks, the interpretation is the Soviet Union and fascist Germany are placed together, as both fighting against humanity. In my opinion, this is not a correct interpretation of the evidence. This should never happen. The ***Great Patriotic War*** for Ukraine, Russia and Belarus, irrespective of changes in the textbooks, remains as the Great Patriotic war.[483]

Moreover, many respondents found such changes not only going against the wishes of the vast majority of Ukraine's population, but also were highly contradictory to different messages, transmitted by the Ukrainian state. In particular, one respondent noted how whilst in the school curriculum, there were ongoing attempts to move away from the Soviet

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[482] Katashov, Anatoliy Ivanovich, Director of the School of foreign languages, Luhans'k, 19th February 2003.
[483] Tsytsylina, Galina Georgievna., History teacher, School No.3, Luhans'k, 6th March 2003.

conception of this period as the 'Great Patriotic War', at the same time, across Ukraine, May 9th, remained a state holiday, Victory Day, where the population was encouraged to celebrate the victory of the Soviet Union. Interestingly, however, teachers spoke of a slow shift back towards a Soviet understanding of the war being both 'great' and 'patriotic', shifts which were confirmed in the analysis of recent textbooks, discussed in the previous chapter.

Whilst this issue proved controversial, the interpretation of the role of the OUN/UPA in western Ukraine, during the war years was an issue which sparked passionate and often heated debate. As discussed in the previous chapter, during the Soviet years, this movement and their leader, Stepan Bandera, were depicted in the most negative of terms, being classed, as 'traitors' and 'bandits.' In contrast, the new Ukrainian historical narrative has tried to provide a more objective interpretation of events, highlighting for example the noble aims of the OUN/UPA in trying to gain Ukraine's independence. However, many of the interviewees, especially those from Luhans'k and Kharkiv, were deeply critical of this new historical narrative. Again, individuals repeatedly highlighted the need for a more objective appraisal of such highly contested political events and understood the needs for the Ukrainian state to create a 'united' view concerning events during the war across the whole of Ukraine. However, many felt that there had been a great 'overdoing' of the reappraisals, seeing the new interpretations as attempts to 'rehabilitate' the OUN/UPA so that they are seen as national 'heroes' across Ukraine, just like the veterans of the 'Great Patriotic War'. As one Kharkiv teacher notes,

> This is a painful question in our society. The majority of veterans of the War defended the interests of the country as a part of the USSR. Today, many are still living. Any new appraisal of OUN/UPA creates a sharp and negative reaction from people, who were brought up with Soviet consciousness. But this movement existed and we have to give it an objective appraisal. But it is a different matter, when in the new textbooks and publications give OUN/UPA three pages and the Soviet underground movement only half a page. This is unfair. We need to look attentively at these things. OUN/UPA without doubt had their own aim, and right for existence. They had a good task, the creation of an independent Ukrainian state, but the methods which they used were inappropriate. And the mechanism of the realisation of this idea was not fulfilled. Imagine, Hitler allowing the formation of an independent Ukrainian state! This couldn't have happened. Maybe I am going against the 'official' opinion in Ukraine but I do not agree with the conclusions about the role of OUN/UPA after the battle with the German fascist occupiers.[484]

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[484] Gaikov, Anatoliy Afanasievich, Reader of methodological training, Ukrainian People's Academy, Kharkiv, 22nd March 2003.

The 'anger' shown by many respondents towards the new narrative clearly demonstrate the grave difficulties the state faces in trying to unite rather than divide the population on this highly emotive issue and the 'regional' nature of this problem. As one teacher in Luhans'k states,

> When it became clear what the outcome of the Great Patriotic War would be, the Banderites could not do anything. Western Ukraine, Halychyna, Zakarpattya' and Bukovyna came under Soviet control. And then, they began to fight with teachers, nurses, medical teams, specialists, Party workers. The Banderites fought with peaceful people, not with the KGB. For example, Lugansk Regional Party Committee sent to L'viv nine times a group of people, who were all then murdered in L'viv region. These people were instructors, Party workers. Yes, they brought the Party's order words and orders, but their aim was to help the peaceful construction. Young men and women were killed, and it is impossible to justify this. Not everyone agrees with this, but this is how such events occurred. I think that in the coming years, the participants of OUN and UPA will not manage to be rehabilitated. The people will not forgive. This is still a living and actual theme. History should never be rewritten and re-evaluated. ***It needs to be evaluated, like it is and only in this way.***[485]

Again, the final sentence of the above passage highlights the insistence on the part of many teachers interviewed that there is only one 'true' history, and thus the new, revised version is simply untrue and thus merits at least contestation if not open rejection. Teachers in these study areas in the eastern borderlands of Ukraine certainly seemed to 'perceive' these changes as a direct outcome of 'western Ukrainians' gaining political power in Kiev and using it to expand 'their' own historical interpretations onto the rest of Ukraine, at the expense of their 'own' historical viewpoint. This idea is well documented in the following quotation by a school director in Luhans'k,

> We are going towards an absurd situation at present. It is known in only one way in the memory of the Soviet people, (and if you like it or not, we are Soviet people, because we grew up in the Soviet Union), Russians, Belarussians and Ukrainians, that the Banderites shot in the back their own people. And today we are making a patriot out of Bandera. And we try to equate them as forces of the freedom of the whole of Europe. ***Today, eastern Ukraine does not understand this. Eastern Ukraine considers this to be a big mistake.*** I am not saying that we should punish Banderites, it was in the past. Today, it is necessary to unite the Ukrainian people, forget everything which was fifty or sixty years ago, ***but history must be kept in its place and not be meddled with. If we will change history, then what sort of people are we going to bring up? Lies do not educate a citizen.***[486]

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[485] Tsytsylina, Galina Georgievna, History teacher, School, No.3, 6th March 2003.
[486] Katashov, Anatoly Ivanovich, School Director, School for foreign languages, Luhans'k, 19th February 2003.

Such viewpoints provide ample evidence of the existence of opposing regional understandings of historical events in Ukraine. An interesting point to consider at this juncture is the importance of 'perception' as mentioned in chapter Four. As previously stated, the success or failure of state attempts to engineer identity change depends greatly on the perception of state policies as on their actual contents. As such statements illustrate, in Ukraine's eastern borderlands there is a definite feeling amongst teachers that the history which they are now being forced to teach is not only 'untrue' but also unbalanced. In such a fashion, one witnesses a clear demonstration of the spatial dimension of identity politics in Ukraine and of how the 'regional' factor is playing a significant role in Ukraine's education reforms. The rhetoric of several teachers here is viewing 'Eastern Ukraine' as a 'regional construct' whose ideas and views on Ukraine's past are simply not being taken into account and instead rejected as a result of 'western Ukrainian nationalists' gaining power in the government ministries in Kiev. Whilst such results are not representative, nevertheless they provide a highly illuminating picture of how identity change is actually being negotiated in Ukraine.

8.4 Russia as the 'other'

The final section here examines how the interviewees in general assess the depiction of Russia within the new Ukrainian historical narrative. As outlined in chapter Three, a key part of the Ukrainian state's attempts to refashion identities is not only to create an understanding of what it means to be a citizen of Ukraine, also it is important that individuals understand who they are not. In chapter Six, it was found that indeed the Ukrainian state had endeavoured to portray Russia as Ukraine's inalienable 'other' throughout the textbooks. Regarding this issue, interviewees often spoke of their worries. Many stated how the role of education was to create tolerant and civil citizens. However, many interviewees expressed their anxiety that the depiction of Russia in a negative sense often led to children taking on more 'nationalistic' views towards Russia and Russians.

> When I start to teach the children I straightaway tell me that I am not guilty for the fact that we have different motherlands. I have the Soviet Union and they have Ukraine. How we understand the world is different. But because we live in one country, we have to find a common language. I think that it is not correct to put information in textbooks that all that happened which was bad came from Moscow. In the textbooks, it is portrayed that Moscow decided everything and Ukraine suffered.[487]

[487] Ostakhova, Ekaterina Viktorevna, History teacher, Ukrainian People's Academy, Kharkiv, 22nd March 2003.

> There are different types of history teacher. Some have a creative approach, some simply teach straight from the textbook. And there are also different textbooks. And some are very aggressive towards Russia. And children who haven't learnt how to analyse facts, begin to take the information on at face value. This is very dangerous, even amongst our pupils, in the essays there are some nationalist undertones. I am afraid that this process will go further.[488]

In particular, individuals often stated that whilst they understood that Ukraine needed as a young country to create its own historical narrative so as to foster national consciousness, nevertheless the state should be extremely cautious in legitimating the rise of crude nationalism with Russia and Russians being stereotyped as the cause of all Ukraine's ills. As a history teacher in Sumy notes,

> Russians come in different guises. We were oppressed by the Communist Party but the Russian people were not guilty here. If we are to separate from them now, then what does the future hold? Maybe they will help us or we will help them? And we also have our brothers in Belarus'. In Ukraine, there lives people of many nationalities. We will educate a sense of national identity, but we should never propagade nationalism. [489]

Similarly many teachers, whilst in full support for a new historical narrative which allows children to learn about the history of their country, simultaneously felt that this history should not be aimed at negating the long history of interaction between the Russian and Ukrainian peoples.

> In the textbooks, there occurs a one-sided tendency. And this is not just in my opinion. If the parents could take a part in the process, then things would be different. But the state decides everything and dictates her tendencies and teachers have to simply fulfil these desires. But teachers in eastern Ukraine see this and try and soften the process. And in western Ukraine, the teachers make a special reference to these tendencies. In western Ukraine the process and the task of the education programme is to show how through history Ukrainians are so poor, so oppressed, so hurt. ***Here with us in eastern Ukraine, we don't have this aim.*** We are very close to Russia, and we naturally absorbed Russian culture... ***Eastern Ukraine has its own mentality.*** We have a great closeness to Russia and are a border region. And the tendency which appears in the textbooks is very difficult taken on board in schools. Now teachers in Luhans'k region choose which textbook to use, according to their position about disputed historical events.[490]

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[488] Butylkina, Tatyana Leonidovna, teacher, Ukrainian People's Academy, Kharkiv, 23rd March 2003.
[489] Sheveleva, Irina Mikhailovna, School No.27, Sumy, 18th April 2003.
[490] Turyanskaya, Olga Fyodorovna, Senior lecturer in social psychology at Luhans'k Taras Shevchenko State Pedagogical University, also former methodologist for history training for the Institute for continued education, Luhans'k oblast, 12th March 2003.

Again such views bear witness to the construction of a regional identity in 'Eastern Ukraine' which *per se* defines itself *vis-à-vis* 'Western Ukraine'. Within this identity option, contrary to the desires of the central state which seeks to portray Russia as Ukraine' 'other', instead the teachers themselves are explicitly stating that in fact the real other for 'Eastern Ukraine' is not Russia, but in fact 'Western Ukraine'.

Moreover, the above passage leads us to some further tentative conclusions. Certain commentators have stated that the new Ukrainian historical narrative has seemingly been a success owing to its widespread usage across Ukraine and the lack of outright, open rejection to it.[491] In this way, it is argued that this is ample evidence to reject previous worries expressed that the Russophone population of eastern and southern Ukraine would reject the new, more 'nationalist' orientated Ukrainian historical narrative. However, as argued in chapter Four, there is a need to look deeper at these issues at the micro level.

Such a situation in which teachers in eastern Ukraine simply 'try and soften the process' leads one to conclude that there is in fact a great deal occurring at the micro level. Whilst there is no outright rejection of the new historical message in the eastern borderlands of Ukraine, this does not equate to outright acceptance of the 'official' state narrative. In fact, the results from this research leads one to judge that teachers, rather than being seen as simply 'transmitters' of information, in fact play a much more significant and active role in the politics of identity in the Ukrainian classroom. To move this scenario on a step further, if such trends were occurring across the whole of Ukraine, then contrary to the desires of the Ukrainian state, regional differences may not be disappearing, but in fact being reinforced. Teachers have the ability to subtlety shift the focus of the historical narrative so as to suit the political and historical outlook of the region in which they reside.[492] Whilst such conclusions are in themselves not representative, nevertheless, they justify and illustrate the usefulness of using such micro-level qualitative research methods. Simultaneously they provide a 'regional' perspective upon how identity change in Ukraine can be gauged, which rejects the notion that the results of wide-scale quantitative research can be simply extrapolated onto the

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[491] Popson, N., "Conclusion: Regionalism and Nation Building in a Divided Society", in Kuzio, T. and D'Anieri, P., (ed.), *Dilemmas of State-Led Nation Building in Ukraine,* Westport, CT: Praeger, 2002, p201.
[492] Whilst in the 'field', I spent many hours 'observing' history lessons in the schools in the study areas. Certainly in several instances, in my opinion, teachers followed a clear 'pick and choose' methodology when utilizing the history textbook in which a slightly different accent was placed on events than which the textbook's architects may have wished. In one instance in a school in Luhans'k, one history teacher, whilst wishing to remain anonymous stated openly how she simply ignored much of the discussions concerning OUN/UPA and instead concentrated on the role of the Soviet forces in liberating Ukraine.

whole of the country. Instead, the results of this research demonstrate the need for further and deeper examinations of these issues across other areas of Ukraine.

8.5 Schoolchildren's reflections on the 'history of Ukraine'

Kiev Rus'

Regarding this period in Ukraine's history, throughout the interviews it was noticeable that this was an issue which was being constantly negotiated in the classroom. From the data generated, one can witness two main lines of argument emerging. Firstly, some children and students understood Kiev Rus' as a proto-Ukrainian state, thus taking on the line of historical thought promulgated by Hrushevskyi and outlined in the history textbooks. As one boy in Luhans'k states,

> They say that it was the beginning of Russia, the Russian politicians, and most of the books that were printed in the time of Soviet rule they said that Kiev Rus' was the beginning of Russia but actually it was Kiev Rus' and Kiev is the capital of Ukraine and we are in the territory of Kiev Rus'.[493]

Similarly a schoolboy in Sumy states how the origins of the Ukrainian nation are found within this period and also 'blames' the fall of Kiev Rus', on outside forces.

> From the beginning, Kiev Rus' was a prosperous and developing state. Then Russia and Poland began to divide us. But the Ukrainian people is free-willed. There have been many efforts; our destiny has been difficult and we have forever struggled for our independence. Kiev Rus' was the first manifestation of the Ukrainian nation.[494]

Whilst many interviewees held such a view, there was also strong and perhaps stronger support for the view held by many of the teachers as highlighted above, as seeing this period as the birthplace of all three eastern Slavic peoples. As one schoolgirl states, "I cannot say that this state was our Ukraine itself, it was a long time ago, there weren't as yet the Russian and Ukrainian nations, simply Slavic people."[495] Similarly, Artem, an eleventh grade pupil summed up, concluding, "Kiev Rus' is the motherland of all the Slavic countries, Russia,

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[493] Schoolboy, Luhans'k School of foreign languages, 14th February 2003.
[494] Schoolboy, School No.27, Sumy, 19th March 2003.
[495] Schoolgirl, Kharkiv School No.78,

Belarus and Ukraine."[496] Many respondents were aware of how hotly disputed this issue yet displayed a desire for it not to become a symbolic tool for those political forces in Ukraine, attempting to divide the Ukrainian and Russian peoples. Interestingly, at this juncture the question arises as to whether there exists any link between the language of instruction of a school and children's views. Certainly in Luhans'k, whilst I undertook group interviews with schoolchildren in five schools, of which four were Russian language schools, there was a noticeable difference in the views of schoolchildren in the fifth school, which was a special *Gymnasiya*, all Ukrainian-language instruction and attracted children from all over Luhans'k oblast. In the four Russian-language schools, children saw Kiev Rus' as the founding part of some sort of 'East Slavic' nation involving Russia, Ukraine and Belarus. However, in the *Gymnasiya* children held far more Ukraino-centric views concerning the origins of Kiev Rus'. Of course, whilst such views are clearly not representative, nevertheless, they indicate the potential for further research along this avenue.

The Cossack Period

Whilst during many of the interviews there emerged differences of opinion surrounding certain historical events, in general the respondents were united in their appraisal of the Cossack period of Ukraine's history. The author found that the schoolchildren, in particular, found this period one which they could be proud of. Children about how much they had enjoyed learning about the Cossacks and some had even dressed up as Cossacks in school plays. Concerning the role of Bohdan Khmelnytskyi, the responses were united in rejecting the view held in 'nationalist' circles that he was a traitor for entering into a union with Russia. Instead, the respondents were in full agreement with the narrative, found in the new historical textbooks, stating that Khmelnytskyi was forced into joining with Russia at Pereyaslav in 1654 as he had no other alternatives available at that time.

> Bohdan Khmelnytskyi was in a very difficult situation because he had two enemies, Russia and Poland, which were very important. Bohdan Khmelnytskyi did not conquer all of Poland and Russia was becoming stronger and stronger. He chose to unite with Russia, it wasn't really a correct idea, but at that time he had no choice.[497]

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[496] Artem, schoolboy, Ukrainian People's Academy, Kharkiv, 19th March 2003.
[497] Schoolgirl, Luhans'k School of foreign languages, 14th March 2003.

Instead of laying the blame at his feet, respondents saw Russia as the real culprit 'cheating' Ukraine into joining a union, under conditions which Russia was never going to abide by. Nevertheless, all were in agreement that Khmelnytskyi holds an important part in Ukraine's history and should be regarded as a truly national hero. As one schoolgirl states, "I want to talk about Bohdan Khmelnytskyi, he was a great Hetman. Maybe he was the first leader of the Ukrainian people, he was a real leader, he formed his own state and nation."[498]

Concerning the political figure of Ivan Mazepa, here there was a more contested set of views, with many schoolchildren being aware of how the interpretation of him in today's Ukrainian textbooks differs greatly from the interpretation of him, provided in Soviet history textbooks. As one boy in Sumy remarks regarding Mazepa, "He is a hero of the Ukrainian people, because he tried to create an independent Ukraine. But from the point of view of Soviet historiography, he was a traitor as he betrayed the Russian Tsar."[499] The majority of interviews regarded Mazepa as a Ukrainian hero, for not only trying to make Ukraine independent by infamously siding with the Swedish king against the Russians at the battle of Poltava in 1709, but for greatly investing in the country's future, in particular improving education across the country. As one schoolboy states, "When Mazepa came to power, Russia greatly put pressure on Ukrainian culture, Mazepa began to defend it. I consider that Mazepa greatly helped Ukraine in her history and culture."[500] At the same time, Mazepa was also seen in a negative light. As an eleventh grade schoolgirl in Kharkiv makes clear, "Mazepa wasn't a hero, maybe he did something good, but he wasn't an honest man. In the war with Peter the First, he changed sides and helped the Swedish king." Such views represented a continuation of legitimacy in society for the previous Soviet historical understanding of Mazepa as a 'traitor'.

Holodomor: The Great Famine of 1932/3

Regarding this tragic event in Ukraine's history, within the group interviews there emerged two highly divisive lines of thought. Firstly, there was an opinion which saw the Famine of 1932/3 as a direct consequence of actions by the Russian government in Moscow, so as to destroy the Ukrainian nation. The following two quotations demonstrate this extremely vividly.

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[498] Schoolgirl, Luhans'k School of foreign languages, 14th March 2003.
[499] Schoolboy, School No.29, Sumy, 18th March 2003.
[500] Schoolboy, Kharkiv Technical Lycee, School No.173, 4th April 2003.

> It was genocide against the Ukrainian people. Yes, the harvest was not very good, yet there was still a harvest. The grain was collected and transported to Russia. An awful lot of grain was left to rot. Then the repressions began, against cultural figures. They were sent to Siberia or were shot.[501]
>
> It was against Ukraine. Stalin wanted to conquer Ukraine because of our land, our soil and mineral wealth. Just as Germans wanted to kill Jews, so Russians needed Ukrainians. Russia needed our territory, our people, our nature and that is why they made such a horrible thing as a famine.[502]

Such strongly felt views with the understanding that this was an event of *Russians versus Ukrainians,* was the outcome which many of the teachers had feared may occur. Whilst such individuals were highly vocal and passionate in expressing such viewpoints, there were also voices equally anxious to express a different view on events; "I want to appease the Russian people. The Russian people also greatly suffered at the hands of this state order. The problem was not that either a Russian was bad or a Ukrainian. Everyone suffered. The problem was in the state apparatus."[503]

As such differing opinions highlight, opinions on this event are still being contested in Ukraine today. On the one hand, it is certainly a positive contribution of the new Ukrainian textbooks that children can learn about this tragedy, which previously was washed over by Soviet historiography. However, there is a danger, expressed by many teachers in the interviews that the Ukrainian state's search for a historical narrative to legitimate the current state itself, means that at certain junctures, such as this one, the narrative is highly negative towards the influence of other nations, in the most part, Russians on Ukraine's development.

The Second World War/Great Patriotic War?

Whilst, as described above, many teachers expressed their view that the term, the 'Great Patriotic War' as used in the Soviet times should not be discarded, amongst the younger generation, opinions were more divided, with opinions split between two opposing viewpoints.

> For us, Ukrainians and Russians, this was the Great Patriotic War. I know that at present there is a movement in Ukrainian society, which thinks that for Ukraine it was WWII from 1941 to 1943, when

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501 Schoolgirl, Kharkiv Technical Lycee, School No.173, 4th April 2003.
502 Sveta, student, 15th March 2003, Luhans'k.
503 Schoolboy, Kharkiv Technical Lycee, School No.173, 4th April 2003.

> the Germans left the territory of Ukraine. I think that this is wrong. *Our Ukrainians* fought in Ukraine, in the Caucasus, and in Russia, and then fought all the way across Europe to Berlin, in which fought Ukrainians, Russians, Armenians, all nationalities.[504]

Whilst this opinion was in agreement with the teachers for the continued use of the term, 'Great Patriotic War', the opposing opinion which emerged was one in which again, Russia was highly critical; "Russia betrayed Ukraine in this war. Ukraine could have fought for herself if her people had not suffered during the Famine and the repressions. There weren't any supplies of arms to Ukraine, nor military forces."[505]

Such differences concerning the war, were reflected in the next theme under consideration, namely the role of OUN/UPA in western Ukraine during the war years. Here, as with the teachers, emerged heated and extremely emotionally laden debates. Here, three main viewpoints emerged during the interviews. Firstly, there was expressed the opinion many times that the role of OUN/UPA in Ukraine's history needs to be understood. The opinion was expressed that it was very difficult to 'judge' the actions of these people today, for on the one hand their goal of the creation of a Ukrainian state was noble, however their means of achieving this were less admirable. As one schoolboy remarks, "Concerning OUN/UPA, I don't have a definite point of view. They sort of struggled for independence, a good deed. Yet on the other side, they fought against their own people, burnt villages, killed people and took the food. It is difficult to say if they are heroes or not."[506] Alongside this neutral evaluation of events, the remaining two viewpoints are far less neutral. The first is highly supportive of the role of OUN/UPA seeing them as 'freedom fighters' and this period as yet more evidence of the never ceasing desire of the Ukrainian people to build their own independent state. As one schoolgirl in Kharkiv notes,

> If to look onto history as a whole, then Ukraine has overcome all difficulties. There was always a national independence movement. Even when we were part of *Soviet Russia*, during the Second World War, OUN/UPA tried to create an independent Ukraine, although it turned out not to be possible.[507]

This viewpoint also highlights a theme which occurred occasionally throughout the interviews with schoolchildren of mixing up the 'Soviet Union' with 'Soviet Russia'. Such a mistake is highly significant in demonstrating the effects of the new historical narrative's

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[504] Schoolgirl, School. No.78, Kharkiv, 3rd April 2003.
[505] Ibid.
[506] Schoolboy, School No.5, Kharkiv, 4th April 2003.
[507] Schoolgirl, School No.45, Kharkiv, 4th April 2003.

negative evaluation of the Soviet period, in which, as illustrated in chapter Six, the Soviet Union is described as a *pseudo*-Russian state and Ukraine as her oppressed, internal colony.

In contrast, many schoolchildren expressed the old Soviet understanding of OUN/UPA and its leader, Bandera, as enemies of the people and 'traitors', in vivid terms.

> Western Ukraine in the period of World War Two made an attempt to break away from the USSR, but it failed. Banderites joined with the Germans who helped them to kill their own people, Ukrainians, who the Banderites pointed out to be killed. Banderites tried to make a new country on the corpses of their fellow-countrymen.[508]

> In western Ukraine there has been brought up the idea of equating the Banderites with veterans of the Great Patriotic War. It has been said that they were heroes and fought for independence of Ukraine, but in my own opinion, this is absurd. They wanted independence not at the right moment and wanted to build this independence on the bones of their own people. I consider that this question is disgraceful even to discuss. ***But here, there exists a problem in that western and eastern Ukraine do not understand each other.***[509]

Similar to the teachers's evaluations of this period, here also is demonstrated the regional nature of historical consciousness in Ukraine. Efforts to justify the actions of OUN/UPA are seen by many schoolchildren and students as unjustified, and being pushed forward by a 'western Ukrainian' lobby who desire their rehabilitation. As one schoolboy openly states, "now in the government there is a group of people from western Ukraine, they look to the west and not to the east."[510] Also of real significance, the regional understanding of spatial politics in Ukraine seemingly is being passed on here from generation to generation, with children just like their teachers seeing the real 'other' for them to be 'western Ukraine' and not in fact Russia.

In general, children expressed a desire to learn about the history of their country and many stated how they enjoyed it and realized that they were now able to learn about events and political figures which were previously 'blank spots' in the Soviet historiography. However, several individuals also stated the difficulties and pressures they themselves faced as children learning history in a period of such large changes within their country, stating how as well as gaining a historical perspective from the textbooks, they also gained often an alternative

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[508] Schoolgirl, Special School for the deepened study of foreign languages, Luhans'k, 5th March, 2003.
[509] Schoolgirl, Ibid.
[510] Schoolboy, School No, 5, Kharkiv, 4th April 2003.

perspective from their parents and grandparents at home, thus being forced to decide which narrative to support.

> That is the most difficult thing about the present day history books is that earlier about fifteen years ago, our parents were taught about different things from what we learn now and we have to make a big decision. Whether it be this way or that way, or maybe somewhere in the middle.[511]

Furthermore, individuals also expressed a disillusionment with the new Ukrainian historical narrative, drawing specific attention to the fact that no real changes have occurred in terms of methodology, with the state, either Soviet or now Ukrainian, simply using history specifically for its own political ends. As one schoolboy in Luhans'k succinctly sums up,

> I have read the Soviet and new Ukrainian textbooks. Soviet textbooks state that The Party is the brightest and best. Bourgeiosie and capitalism is bad. In the dictionary the word 'patriotism' was explained as a love for one's motherland. But in bourgeise capitalist society it does not exist. People are bad and they do not understand patriotism. In the modern Ukrainian textbooks, it is stated that the Party, this is bad. It killed many people and under her rule, nothing good at all happened. It is not clear who to believe, it is very difficult. The society has become democratic, but we do not have real freedom of speech. What the authors were told to write, they then wrote.[512]

Such statements in themselves demonstrate that the schoolchildren are far from mere passive recipients of a state narrative fed to them from above. Instead, they are actively negotiating the historical narrative, receiving information from various sources, including their school textbook, their schoolteacher as well as their family and friends. Even more revealing are remarks of schoolboys in Kharkiv, who stated, "In many textbooks, Russia is portrayed as a hostile enemy of us. And even if I don't agree with the narrative of the textbook, in an exam, I am forced to write down the narrative from the textbook. If I don't, I will gain low marks."[513] After this comment in this particular interview, when the author asked the remaining children about this viewpoint, the vast majority were in full agreement. Overall this particular occasion serves as an illustration of a wider held feeling amongst the vast majority of the schoolchildren, who participated in the group interviews in Luhans'k, Kharkiv and Sumy, which is summed up by the following remark by a schoolchild in Kharkiv. "In our universities, there are Arabs, Indians, Chinese, Americans and nobody has a go at them. So why do we have to hate our near neighbours, with whom we have interacted

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511 Schoolboy, Luhans'k School for foreign languages, 14th February 2003.
512 Schoolboy, School for the deepened study of foreign languages, Luhans'k, 5th March 2003.
513 Schoolboy, Kharkiv Technical Lycee, School No.173, 4th April 2003.

for years and centuries?"[514] Whilst many children were prepared to accept some of the Ukrainian state narrative's representations of the Russian *state* as being hostile towards Ukraine over the centuries, nevertheless they saw no need on account of previous perceived historical injustices to hold an open dislike of Russians as a *people*.

8.6 Conclusions

This chapter provides a perspective on changes in historical education in Ukraine in particular and identity change on a wider scale, from two important viewpoints, namely that of teachers and schoolchildren. It is felt that the data generated fully justifies the use of qualitative research methods within this thesis, discovering subtleties and nuances within wider processes, which quantitative research methodology would have failed to uncover. In particular, the assumption that history education in Ukraine is progressing very well on account of the fact that 'the same textbooks are used across the whole of Ukraine' and there has been a lack of outward protest to the changes is rejected.[515] On the contrary, this chapter has demonstrated that in these study areas, teachers and children alike are highly active in negotiating the new historical narrative. Whilst the new Ukrainian historical narrative upto the twentieth century is generally accepted, the depiction of events such as the Famine of 1932/33 and the role of OUN/UPA in the war years come under great scrutiny as does the overall negative representation of Russia's influence on Ukraine's history. It was found that teachers were not always simply 'transferors' of the state's desired historical message. They themselves often held opinions concerning debated historical events, which were contrary to the 'official' version of events.

In particular, this research has not only demonstrated that the 'official' historical narrative is being contested, but perhaps more importantly, has attempted to highlight the *mechanisms and processes* through which such negotiation and contestation takes place. In the case of the teachers who disagree with certain historical interpretations, it has been found that they have not chosen to openly reject this historical message, but rather to selectively appropriate certain 'messages'. This phenomenon could be called **'inclusion without exclusion'** in which individuals *subtly change the accent or focus* away from a 'nationalist' or 'negative' stance towards Russia to a more tolerant stance, which aims to promote rather than negate

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[514] Schoolboy, Ukrainian People's Academy, Kharkiv, 4th April 2003.
[515] Popson, N, "Conclusion: Regionalism and Nation Building in a Divided Society", in Kuzio, T., and D'Anieri, P., (ed.), *Dilemmas of State-Led Nation Building in Ukraine*, Westport, CT: Praeger, 2002, p.201.

Ukraine's historical interactions with Russia. In doing so, they simultaneously reinforce a particular 'regional' understanding of past events. In this fashion, rather than the state message 'from above' simply smoothly 'replacing' regional identities, in fact there is occurring a contestation, in which certain parts of the state's message are received and taken on board, certain messages are outwardly rejected and many messages are being adapted so as to fit in with the existing regional understandings of Ukraine's past. Teachers contested the 'official' narrative on the grounds that it was not 'scientific' in comparison to previous Soviet historiography and also for the fact that they felt that the content of the historical narrative was becoming too 'nationalistic' owing to influence from western Ukrainians, now controlling certain ministries in Kiev. In this respect, the term 'Eastern Ukraine', which was used on numerous occasions throughout the interviews, can be seen here as a constructed regional identity, which acts to 'protect their views'. Rather than viewing Russia as the 'other' it instead sees 'Western Ukraine' as the 'other' in terms of culture, language and historical memory.

Turning to the younger generations, whilst certain individuals have 'received' the state narrative and accepted it at face value, others are highly critical of it, seeing it as a crude attempt to (re)construct identities in Ukraine, using a highly negative representation of Russia as a cruel 'other.' In such a fashion, many children in these study areas, in Ukraine's eastern borderlands were making two interconnected arguments. Firstly, on a general level, they were happy to learn about the history of Ukraine and understand what it means to be 'Ukrainian' today. However, simultaneously they were unwilling to fully accept the 'official' narrative which seeks to negate the role of Russia and Russians throughout Ukraine's history. Here, again, we see a clear 'regional' perspective emerging and one in which their imaginations of what is 'Ukraine' today differ from the 'official' state doctrine. Interestingly, one can witness to some degree generational differences between the teachers and the schoolchildren regarding certain contentious issues, with children engaging issues and events with, understandably, less 'ideological baggage' than their adult counterparts. However, simultaneously, it was also highly relevant to witness how on many other issues the children held very similar and strongly-held views like their teachers, for example concerning the negation of Russia's role in Ukraine's history and also the role of OUN/UPA in the war years of the 1940s.

One can conclude that children and teachers alike are willing to (re)fashion their own identities, learn about 'their' past, but *actively pick and choose* which interpretations they accept or reject. In particular, an understanding of Russia as Ukraine's 'other' is highly contested and often rejected. Such empirical findings, in full measure, demonstrate that contrary to certain viewpoints, 'regional' historical viewpoints are very much still present in the politics of identity across Ukraine. Regarding some of the most hotly disputed parts of Ukraine's history, teachers and children alike in Ukraine's eastern borderlands have different understandings of *where they are from*, from the 'official' state version. In particular, many individuals, of both generations are extremely unhappy about the contents of some of the 'official' narrative, feeling that it is work of 'western Ukrainian nationalists' who have taken over some Kiev ministries. In this fashion, the results of this research indeed highlight an implicit desire of people in these areas 'for their voice' to be heard, for 'their' understanding of the past to be heard and also to make explicit their feelings of disenfranchisement from the state-led process of 'nation building' in Ukraine. Children as well as the adult teachers in their schools are highly active in these processes, not simply passive absorbers of information and are constantly (re)evaluating their place in the spatial dimension of identity politics across Ukraine.

From one angle these results demonstrate the fact that the task of (re)fashioning identities across Ukraine is one which will take a great deal of time with the task of creating a unifying, rather than divisive 'national history' extremely difficult, yet simultaneously vital. However, whilst certain events as illustrated above, are still highly contested, it is important not to forget that there are many strands of Ukraine's history which teachers and children alike, agree upon. The results reveal a deep desire to learn about their country's past and in this manner understand what it means to be 'Ukrainian' today. Thus, in this manner, one can witness a slow 'nationalisation' of the 'official' historical narrative in Ukraine's eastern borderlands, yet significantly, such a process will certainly not be straightforward, with many individuals actively seeking to engage with this process *on their own terms*.

Finally, the results indicate the importance of taking into account 'perception' towards state policies when judging their relative success or not. As highlighted in chapter Six, the evaluation of OUN/UPA in the new historical textbooks does not take such a crude 'nationalising' stance that many teachers and schoolchildren alike spoke about. In many respects, such a reaction demonstrates the fact that the Soviet understanding of 'nationalism'

as a dirty word, still remains today in Ukraine's eastern borderlands. However, such findings are highly relevant for the success or failure of the Ukrainian state's efforts to instigate identity change. For example, if a small minority perceives a state policy as 'nationalising' and this minority is spread across the whole country, then its influence on events will be negligible. However, if such a view is held in a concentrated area by a large mass of people, then the state faces a much greater danger. The results outlined in this chapter certainly demonstrate that the population of Ukraine's eastern borderlands are highly critical of the 'official' depiction of certain events in Ukraine's past, in particular events during the war years of the early 1940s. Whilst no major protests have emerged, the Ukrainian state nevertheless needs to be aware that the historical narrative aims to promote 'uniting' rather than 'dividing' Ukraine's population. Chapter Nine follows in which there occurs a thorough analysis of teachers and schoolchildren's reflections on two main themes, the importance of the 'regional' factor in Ukraine's identity politics and Russia's role as Ukraine's 'other'. In this fashion, we can engage further with how the dynamics of identity change are actively being engaged with across Ukraine's eastern borderlands.

Regarding the issues of ethnicity and language use, which were conceptualised earlier in chapter Three, the results of this empirical research demonstrate the failure of Wilson's depiction of Ukraine as split between three ethno-linguistic groups to have any relevance to actual realities. Whilst such a conceptualisation in its abstract form may have some usefulness, it is clearly unsuccessful in uncovering some of the inherent complexities within Ukrainian society. Furthermore, as described in chapter Five, Kuzio's depiction of 'Eastern Ukraine' as a region desiring to follow a 'Belarussian' option and support a return to the Communist past is proven to be at best highly simplistic and palpably false.[516] This research has shown how in Ukraine's eastern borderlands, there is not a total rejection of the Ukrainian state's shifts in the 'contents' of historical education, with a desire to simply return to a Soviet understanding of Ukraine's history. Rather, teachers and school teenagers demonstrated how the past was being constantly negotiated. Whilst in certain instances, a 'return to the past' was called for, in particular regarding depictions of the Second World War/Great Patriotic War, regarding large areas of Ukraine's history, individuals were happy to embrace the new historical narrative. This leads us to openly reject Kuzio's assertion that

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[516] Kuzio, T., "Election reveals Ukraine's geographic political divisions", RFE/RL Newsline, vol.6, no.73, Part II, 18th April 2002.

national identities are largely absent in southern and eastern Ukraine.[517] Rather, people in Ukraine's eastern borderlands do have national identities and do have a clear understanding of 'where they are from' and their place within the processes of Ukrainian nation and state building. This is a highly regionalised understanding, which gives much less importance to markers such as ethnicity and language, contrary to the hypotheses of the bulk of academic attention regarding identity politics in Ukraine outlined in chapter Three.

[517] Kuzio, T., *Ukraine: State and Nation Building*, London: Routledge, 1998, p.162.

CHAPTER NINE: 'WHO WE ARE' AND 'WHO WE ARE NOT': UNDERSTANDING THE IMPORTANCE OF THE 'REGION'

9.1 Introduction

Whilst chapter Eight focused on teachers and schoolchildren's reflections on the 'official' historical narrative, this chapter seeks to examine perceptions and understandings at the present time, of the importance of the 'regional' factor in Ukraine's identity politics and secondly that of Russia as Ukraine's 'other'. The chapter commences with an assessment of regional historical narratives, used in Ukrainian secondary schools, exploring to what extent they complement or contradict the state's 'official' narrative. This is achieved by a content analysis of various 'regional' geography and history textbooks. In such a fashion, one can gauge to what extent the view of education elites in the regions actually corresponds to the 'official' view of Ukraine's history, laid out by the centre in Kiev. From this, the aim is to discern how spatial politics across Ukraine is played out. Secondly, data generated from the in-depth interviews, introduced in chapter seven, are analysed further to examine how individuals reflect on the importance of the 'region' in Ukraine today. Finally, the chapter concludes with an evaluation of individuals' reflections on Russia, evaluating to what degree such viewpoints compare with the representation of Russia espoused in history textbooks. Here, individuals in particular were encouraged to discuss how they view the state border between the two countries, and wider Russian-Ukrainian relations.

9.2 Regional narratives: complementing or contradicting the state narrative?

Since 1991, the curriculum in state-sponsored schools across Ukraine has changed significantly from that previously issued under Soviet rule. In particular, one recent study highlighted that one important change has been regarding the number of optional subjects, individual schools and teachers can choose.[518] One of these subjects involves schoolchildren learning about their native region in Ukraine, called *Geohrafiya ridnoho krayu* (Geography of the native region). From fieldwork in my three study areas, it was found in all the schools in which research took place, this subject was taught starting from grade 5, with a one-hour slot allotted for it each week. The content of these textbooks is now analysed.

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[518] Janmaat, J.G., *Nation-Building in Post-Soviet Ukraine: Educational Policy and the Response of the Russian-Speaking Population,* Netherlands Geographical Studies: University of Amsterdam, 2000, p.73.

Luhans'k

In Luhans'k, the author discovered that the local education officials had introduced another subject, which was compulsory for all schools in the oblast, along with the *Geografiaya ridnoho krayu* course. This course was entitled *Istoriya i kul'tura ridnoho krayu. Luhans'ka oblast* (History and culture of the Luhans'k region).[519] It was again allocated one hour's study per week and was for the 8th and 9th grades. Therefore, the following three textbooks are analysed, all published in the Ukrainian language.

- Pankrat'ev, O.A., *Geografiya ridnoho krayu: Luhans'ka oblast, 5 klas*, Luhans'k: Yantar, 2001. (Geography of the native region: Luhans'k region).
- Horelik, A.F., Virova, T,V., Krasil'nikiv, K.R., *Istoriya ridnoho krayu (Luhans'ka Oblast'), Ch.1*, Luhans'k: Luhan', 1995. (History of the native region: Luhans'k region, part 1).
- Horelik, A.F., Namdarov, H.M., Bashkina, V.Ya., *Istoriya ridnoho krayu (Luhans'ka Oblast'), Ch.2*, Luhans'k: Luhan', 1997. (History of the native region: Luhans'k region, part 2).

Commencing with the textbook, used in grade five, particular attention is given to the settlement of the region, which, as highlighted in chapter Five, is a highly contested issue. The portrayal here is of a joint settlement by Russians and Ukrainians. In doing so, the narrative veers away from the Ukrainian nationalist narrative (examined in chapter Five), which excludes the possibility of Russians settling this region, seeing them rather as the products of tsarist and Soviet immigration policies. In contrast, the text argues that Russians are indigenous settlers, especially in the south-eastern parts of the oblast when it states,

> The western part (of the region) was settled by Zaporizhzhian Cossacks. The south-east became the land of the *Vyis'ka Donsk'oho*, (the Don Cossacks). Cossacks were brave and experienced fighters and reliably defended their land...For a long time here have lived the descendants of the Zaporizhzhian and Don Cossacks, the Ukrainians and Russians.[520]

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[519] *Prohrama spetskursi z istorii ta kul'turi ridnoho krayu Luhans'koi oblasti (z naidavnishix chasiv do poch. XXst) dlya uchniv 8-9 klasiv*, Luhans'k, 2002. This document was given to the author by a history teacher at one of the schools, in which interviewing took place.

[520] Pankrat'ev, O.A., *Geografiya ridnoho krayu: Luhans'ka oblast, 5 klas*, Luhans'k: Yantar, 2001, p.76. (Geography of the native region: Luhans'k region).

Similarly regarding the industrialisation of the region, the influx of people to the newly emerging coal mines and factories, is not portrayed as 'waves of Russian immigrants', but rather as a natural process. Indeed, the text highlights the 'multinational' nature of the Donbas, when it states,

> In the twentieth century at the time of the Great Patriotic War, the economy of our region was totally ruined. In order to rejuvenate the mines and factories after the war arrived people from all over the huge Soviet Union. Ossetians and Belarussians, Kazaks and Uzbeks shoulder-to-shoulder worked in construction, in the mine shafts and in the steelworks. Many remained here. Our grandfathers and great-grandfathers together built a multinational house – the Donbas, in which we all now live.[521]

This depiction strongly adheres to the Soviet image of the region as the '*kochegarka*', the boiler house of the whole Soviet Union. This regional identity, which arose in Donbas through the Soviet years, had its roots in the ideology of 'Soviet internationalism,' with the importance of national identities substituted by identities strongly linked to work and heavy industry. Also, of interest is the notable omission of Russians, amongst the nationalities, arriving in the region in the post-war period. Similarly, the text concludes that, "our multinational culture was created in the main by two Slavic peoples – the Russians and Ukrainians. Much has come into our culture from the first inhabitants of the 'wild fields' – the Cossacks."[522] In this fashion, the text continues focusing attention on the 'free-living' nature of the Cossacks, seen as founders of the region. Yet, whilst the 'Cossack myth' is utilised here, it is not solely to justify Ukrainian national mythologies. Instead, it is used to justify the joint settlement of the region by Russians and Ukrainians and highlight the roots of the region's multinational nature.

Regarding the sensitive topic of language use, the narrative here is extremely ambiguous. The text begins, by stating, "Our region is multi-lingual. The inhabitants of our cities traditionally speak the Russian language. The population of most of the villages speak the Ukrainian language." The narrative continues by quoting from the Ukrainian Constitution, of the state guaranteeing "the right for the learning of the native language and the instruction of the native language." The text states, "the native language is transferred in families from parents to children. The family itself chooses the language for speaking. In multi-national families, several languages are spoken; Russian, Ukrainian, the native language comes from

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[521] Pankrat'ev, O.A., *Geografiya ridnoho krayu...*, op.cit., p.76.
[522] Ibid, p.79.

the parents."[523] The narrative by highlighting the 'natural' nature of the choice of native language represents perhaps an implicit attack on efforts to 'impose' language use by state authorities. Yet, the narrative continues by underlining another part of the Constitution which states that, "The state language in Ukraine is Ukrainian. A citizen of Ukraine must not have difficulties in using the state language. The Ukrainian language is taught in all of the schools in our region." Nonetheless the section concludes by using the old Soviet-style legitimation of the use of Russian, thinly veiled behind the rhetoric of 'the language of international communication.' As the text states, "The state facilitates the learning of languages of international communication. With the development of international business, in people there arises the demand to possess foreign languages, therefore children learn them and so do adults."[524]

Overall this narrative regarding language use is intriguing. It represents a 'balancing act' in arguing that the continued use of Russian and instruction in Russian in the region is legitimated by the Ukrainian Constitution. Yet, at the same time, it is also extremely careful not to veer too far away from the 'official' state rhetoric. As such, this narrative supports the conclusions regarding the current ambiguous situation concerning language use in the region, which was outlined in chapter five. Whilst there is not an *open* rejection or protest against linguistic ukrainisation, nevertheless, the process is not especially welcomed. In general, this textbook's depiction of the history of the region also rejects the 'official' narrative's desire to represent Russia and Russians as an 'other', highlighted in chapter six. In contrast, the text purports a regional historical narrative, concentrating on the joint interaction and settlement of the region by both Russians and Ukrainians. Also the rapid development of the region under Soviet rule is not symbolised as being a period of oppression, or colonisation. Instead, the 'multinational' nature of the region developed as a result of 'natural' processes, brought about by Soviet modernisation processes.

Turning to the two books regarding the history of Luhans'k oblast, part one concentrates on the settlement of the region in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. To a large degree, the narrative complements that of the grade five textbook in presenting the joint role of both Russian and Ukrainian Cossacks in settling the 'wild field'. However, the text goes into further detail. For example, it depicts the historical relations between the Zaporizhzhian and

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[523] Pankrat'ev, O.A., *Geografiya ridnoho krayu...*, op.cit., p.82.
[524] Ibid, p.82.

Don Cossacks as symbolising the roots of the friendly co-existence of Russians and Ukrainians in the region. As the text states,

> The history of the relations between the Zaporizhzhian and Don Cossacks in the 17th century bears evidence that between them there existed a genuine military bortherhood, a union. Although the relations between them were not always ideal, friendly relations were not broken off. Between these two fellow free people, lay ethnic, religious kinship, the same tasks; guard their lands from Tatar raids and defend their independence from the Muscovite (and for the Zaporizhzhians from the Polish) government. The historic importance of our lands in the 17th century is concluded in the fact that they were a major bridge, uniting the Zaporizhzhian Sich' and the Don Cossacks.[525]

Furthermore, the narrative analyses the different patterns of settlement of the northern and southern parts of the region. In particular, the narrative focuses on the 'Ukrainian' nature of the northern parts, which were part of the *Slobozhanshchyna* region, with its centre in Kharkiv.

> In the history of our region the role of Ukrainian peasants and Cossacks, who arrived in the Izium and Ostrogozhskiy *slobodi* regions, was enormous. The *Slobodi* did not just defend our lands from attacks from Crimean Tatars. Most importantly, they laid the foundation for the future peaceful life and created the varied agricultural production. The *Sloboda* colonisation was agricultural and many settlements founded by the *Slobodi* peasants and Cossacks, exist to this day. Although they were from the start subordinated to the Moscow government, the Slobodi upheld the traditions and culture of the Ukrainian people in this land. [526]

In contrast, the rooted nature of Russian influence in the region, especially in its south-east parts is explained by the role of the Don Cossacks

> The Don Cossacks in the 18th century played a remarkable influence on the path of the history of our region. The colonisation by the prosperous Dons of the south-east territories of modern day Luhans'k region, laid the way for their wide agricultural opening up. Here lies the specific characteristic for the Donbas, a mixed population, including Russians and Ukrainians.

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[525] Horelik, A.F., Virova, T,V., Krasil'nikiv, K.R., *Istoriya ridnoho krayu (Luhans'ka Oblast'), Ch.1,* Luhans'k: Luhan', 1995, pp.122-123.
[525] Ibid, p.133.

In this fashion, the narrative repeats the claims of the Grade five textbook, concerning the rootedness of both the Russian and Ukrainian peoples in the region. Overall, 'region' in this textbook is defined as corresponding to the contours of Luhans'k oblast today.

Finally in part two, the region's history through the nineteenth century up to 1917 is examined. This book throughout paints a picture of class unrest growing in the region leading to the 'inevitable' social revolutions of 1905 and 1917. In essence, it provides a classical Marxist account, describing the growing exploitation of the workers by the factory owners leading to an increase in class consciousness at the beginning of the twentieth century. For example, in the opening pages the narrative explains the key role played by the region, as part of the wider Donbas region, in instigating the revolutions in 1905 and 1917.

> The bloody tragedy of the three Russian revolutions of the early twentieth century, in which Donets'k region played the role as centre and vanguard, is seen as unexpected and sudden. Actually, it wasn't like this...During the nineteenth century there broke loose the upshoots of the future social explosion, which shook not only the tsarist government, but also the whole world.[527]

Moreover, the narrative explains how by the early twentieth century, the main political parties became increasingly against the autocracy of the tsar and instead, demanded radical social changes. The text in particular, concentrates on the role of Klement Voroshilov, whose political legacy in Luhans'k, as noted in chapter four, remains contested. However, here the text states,

> The activity of K.E. Voroshilov in the Lugansk committee of the RSDRP in no small measure enabled the transition of social democracy in the Lugansk region into hard Bolshevik positions. From the summer of 1904, Lugansk social democrats put forward their aims- the struggle not for a reformation of the existing order, but for its decisive crushing.[528]

Thus, the narrative represents Bolshevism as being a political force with local roots. The narrative concludes by stating how other left wing forces joined the Bolsheviks, representing all parts of the region's society united in their desire for change.

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[527] Horelik, A.F., Namdarov, H.M., Bashkina, V.Ya., *Istoriya ridnoho krayu...*, op.cit., p.7.
[527] Ibid, pp.182-183.

> The necessity of the annihilation of the state itself, created not only conscious Bolsheviks, but also representatives of other socialist parties of the Donbass, especially the socialist-revolutionary party, whose positions, were strong in the agricultural parts of Luhans'k regions. By the beginning of 1905, in all layers of our region was formed a wide opposition to autocracy, which insistently demanded a change. The revolution became imminent.[529]

Thus, the text portrays Bolshevism not as an 'alien and foreign force imposed from Russia' as depicted in some of the all-Ukrainian history textbooks, analysed in the previous chapter. In contrast, the text describes how Bolshevism was firmly rooted in the local Luhans'k region. Furthermore, the all-Ukrainian textbooks, for grade 9, concentrated on the period as one of 'national awakening' of the Ukrainian people, leading to the revolutions of 1917. In contrast, this textbook provides a very 'Soviet style' specific regional history excluding any mention of a 'national revival' amongst the Ukrainians and instead concentrates on the growing class unrest leading to the 'social' revolutions of 1917.

Overall, these three textbooks provide a distinct, regional perspective, which concerning key issues, contradict the narrative found in the all-Ukrainian historical textbooks. They focus on the co-founding and the peaceful co-existence of Russians and Ukrainians in the region over the centuries and in doing so, severely problematise the desire of state-led nation-building project to represent Russia as an 'other.' In this fashion, this discourse attempts to legitimate the current mixed Russian-Ukrainian nature of identities in the region, seen as the natural culmination of historical processes. In contrast, the Ukrainian national historical narrative which sees such a situation as 'unnatural' with the local population having been 'de-ukrainianised' during tsarist and Soviet times is wholly rejected.

Kharkiv

The following textbooks were analysed:

- Sadkina, V, I., *Geografiya rodnogo kraya, 5 klas*, Khar'kov: Skorpion, 2001. (The geography of the native region: 5th grade).
- Shyl'zhenko, L, S, *Geografiya rodnogo kraya: Slobozhanshchina, 5 klas*, Khar'kov: Ranok, 2001. (The geography of the native region: Slobozhanshchyna, 5th grade).

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[529] Horelik, A.F., Namdarov, H.M., Bashkina, V.Ya., *Istoriya ridnoho krayu (Luhans'ka Oblast'). Ch.2*, Luhans'k: Luhan', 1997, p.183.

- Kononenko, O. Ye., Shul'zhenko, L, S., *Kharkivshchynoznavstvo*, Kharkiv: Gymnaziya, 2002. (Knowledge about the Kharkiv region).

Commencing with Sadkina's textbook, attention is paid to the settlement of the region, by both Russians and Ukrainians.

> In order to defend her southern borders, the Muscovite government at the end of the sixteenth and beginning of the seventeenth centuries sent to the 'wild field' servicemen the *streltsov*, (shooters). They and the Ukrainian Cossacks were the founders of the region, the *slobodi*, (this word is derived from the word 'freedom', that is to say the region was settled by free people).[530]

The narrative describes the founding of the city of Kharkiv and the city' s development in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, becoming an industrial, transport and trading centre. Also, the opening of the city's university in 1805 leading to the cultural development of the region is underlined. Regarding events in the twentieth century, the narrative focuses on Kharkiv's period of being the capital of the UkrSSR from 1919 to 1934. It is stated, "For Kharkiv it was an incredibly important fact that it was the capital of Ukraine from 1919 to 1934. With this was linked the grandiose construction of industrial enterprises, the opening up of cultural and social life, of science and the enlightenment of our region."[531] Also, the narrative focuses on the Great Patriotic War between 1941 and 1945.

> A tragic imprint on the history of Kharkiv region left behind the "Great Patriotic War" of 1941-45. For Kharkiv, there were fought hard and bloody battles and the city several times passed into different hands. From October 1941 until August 1943, Kharkiv as well as other cities and parts the region, was occupied by the fascists. The occupiers set up in the Kharkiv region a regime, of bloody terror, there were killed 280,000 peaceful citizens; the elderly, women and children. Also thousands of Kharkivites died from hunger and disease. 160,000 people were taken to the forced labour camps in Germany...The liberation day of Kharkiv, the 23rd August 1943, has become a joyous celebration of victory for Kharkivites of all generations.[532]

Such an account clearly demonstrates a rejection of Ukrainian national historical narratives, which attempt to discard the Soviet term, "Great Patriotic War." Instead, for this region, a 'Soviet' narrative of this period holds sway with the German fascists the only 'other'. This was demonstrated in 1995, when in commemoration of fifty years since the end of the war, a

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[530] Sadkina, V, I., *Geografiya rodnogo kraya, 5 klas*, Khar'kov: Skorpion, 2001, p.15.
[531] Ibid, p.18.
[532] Ibid, p.18-19.

monument to the Soviet war hero, Marshal Zhukov, was erected in the city, along with a metro station being renamed in his honour.

Regarding the national composition of the region, the importance of tolerance of other nationalities and civil values are underlined.

> Probably, in your class there are children of different nationalities, and this totally does not hinder you all learning together, participating in games, sport competitions and in general being friends. The class- this is a small part of the Kharkiv region. And it has representatives of over 100 nationalities. The largest number of course are Ukrainians, 63 people out of every 100. For the most part, they live in rural districts, in Valkovsk, for example, 92 people out of 100 are Ukrainian. But in those districts where there have grown large industrial enterprises, (factories and electric power stations), where the population arrived for construction, from far away, the national composition is mixed. [533]

Finally, the role of Russians in the region is described, with their large numbers in the region, explained not as the product of Tsarist and Soviet immigration policies, but owing to other factors, in particular the borderland status of the region throughout its history.

> The second place, by numbers, is taken up by the Russians. They constitute a third of the population of the Kharkiv region (Remember the history of the settlement of our region). This is explained not only by historical reasons, but also by the closeness of the state border with Russia.[534]

The second textbook provides an alternative narrative for children in grade five. In particular, as the title suggests, the textbook makes the direct association of Kharkiv region with the historical region of *Slobozhanshchyna*. Indeed the lack of correlation between the 'historic' and 'administrative' boundaries of regions in Ukraine is implicitly highlighted when the text states,

> As the most important city in Slobozhanshchina, Khar'kov has the most influence on the nieghbouring oblasts - Sumy, Poltava and also Donetsk and Lugansk – territories of which were previously part of Slobozhanshchina. In connection to the fact that the 'Sloboda' region does not have any generally recognised borders, when people write the address of a city, they indicate only the name of one of the oblasts, and the name of the country, Ukraine.[535]

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[533] Sadkina, V, I., *Geografiya rodnogo kraya, 5 klas...*, op.cit., p.85.
[534] Ibid, p.85.
[535] Shyl'zhenko, L.S., *Geografiya rodnogo kraya: Slobozhanshchina, 5 klas*, Khar'kov: Ranok, 2001, p.7.

Regarding the settlement of the region, the narrative here subtly varies from the previous one. Instead of highlighting the joint efforts of Russians and Ukrainians, here only the Ukrainian Cossacks are mentioned, symbolised as peaceful and free-living people. As the text states,

> The historic fate of our freedom-loving and able people was heroic. Our ancestors mastered previously uncultivated land, defended it from warring and cruel neighbours and kept for us our native land. From the onset, the free Cossacks were the first to come and settle here from Ukraine to the so-called 'wild field'. Then, the people of Ukraine in our region created a modern civilisation, that is to say, that everything which was built, was by the *Ukrainian people* –cities, schools, churches and roads.[536]

Furthermore, the narrative asserts the importance of an attachment to one's native region. As the text states, "For many of us the understanding of the *rodina* (motherland), is invisibly connected with the house, where you were born and grew up...It is necessary for everyone together to guard and love the motherland – the land, which feeds us, our native region." [537] Finally, the multinational nature of the region is embraced.

> Together with the Cossacks have also settled here Russians, Belarussians, Germans, Poles, Jews, Tatars...They all put something of their own way of life into the way of life and unrepeatable culture of the Sloboda region, enriched it with their own national celebrations, traditions. In recent times, have settled here also Azeri, Georgians, Ossetians, etc. The majority of them speak Russian, but each also holds their own native language. Learn languages, as each new language – this is new friends...It is necessary to know and to respect the customs and traditions of each people – then each person will be a real friend to you and help in times of misfortune.[538]

Thus, in a similar vein to the previous textbook, children are called upon to respect and tolerate all national groups.

The 'knowledge of Kharkiv region' textbook differs from the previous two, in that it is written in the Ukrainian language, and is designed for use in grades eight and nine, thus providing a more detailed history of the native region for the older children. The narrative commences, telling the reader of the border status of the region, drawing attention to the lack of any 'natural' or visible border in the region along its state border with Russia. Regarding the key period of its settlement, the joint efforts of both Ukrainians and Russians are denoted,

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[536] Shyl'zhenko, L.S., *Geografiya rodnogo kraya: Slobozhanshchina, 5 klas*..., op.cit., p.3.
[537] Ibid, p.4.
[538] Ibid, p.41.

> Nearing the seventeenth century, the mutual influence of Ukrainian and Russian cultures became important for the historic fate of the region. The Ukrainians and Russians with joint efforts settled and maintained the territory of *Slobozhanshchyna* in a cruel struggle with raiders. They created a spiritual and cultural life, which arose from the cultural and national trends of both the Ukrainians and the Russians.[539]

Regarding political activity in the region prior to 1917, the text provides a detailed description of the rise of a 'national movement' in the region, whilst underlining its own distinctiveness.

> The political national movement in Sloboda Ukraine had its own distinctiveness. It rested on a federal position. This is explained by the close, almost 250 year integration of these Ukrainian lands into the economic and cultural life of the Russian Empire. Because of this, the political life of Sloboda Ukraine depended upon events in Russia.[540]

Moreover, the text continues by describing in the bloody years between 1917-1921, whilst the ultimate victory of the Bolsheviks in the region, was aided by forces arriving from Soviet Russia, nonetheless, Bolshevism already had support in the region. Whilst in the all-Ukrainian history textbooks, Bolshevism and the onset of Soviet rule is portrayed as a 'foreign force' and an 'other', here the picture is more ambiguous. Similarly, the text in great detail describes the war years 1941-45, a war still remembered as the "Great Patriotic War".

> The Great Patriotic War has finished. But the population of the Kharkiv region remembers and long will remember the days, when the fate of the city was sealed, it still remembers those, who gave their lives for the future of our people. There is no city, no village, where there have not been immortalised the feats of the heroes of the war.[541]

Finally, the narrative continues the discourse of the other textbooks, in focusing on the co-existence and mutual influence, both Russians and Ukrainians have had in the region.

> The phenomenon of *Slobozhanshchyna* is a result of the history of the interaction of Ukrainian and Russian cultures. *Slobozhanshchyna* holds a unique place for the formation of close Ukrainian-Russian relations- and the city of Kharkiv – has its own place in international affairs as one of the corners of the

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[539] Kononenko, O.Ye., Shul'zhenko, L.S., *Kharkivshchynoznavstvo*, Kharkiv: Gymnaziya, 2002, p.68.
[540] Ibid, p.188.
[541] Ibid, p.213.

> triangle of international relations between *Ukrainian Kiev, Russian Moscow and Ukrainian-Russian Kharkivshchyna (Kharkiv region).*[542]

This quotation sums up succinctly the fact that Kharkiv defines its regional identity in respect to Russia, seeing itself as a 'special' case owing to its 'bridging role' between Russia and Ukraine. Overall, these three textbooks readily highlight the importance given to a regional historical narrative in Kharkiv. In fact, the narratives in these textbooks coincide to a great degree with the discourse surrounding the identity of Kharkiv, outlined in chapter Five. The regional identity which is being espoused, whilst embracing the Ukrainian character of the region and the importance of Ukrainian Cossacks in its development, nevertheless also gives attention to the role of Russians in the region's settlement and subsequent development. Thus, it acts as an alternative to state-led attempts to portray Russia as an unalterable 'other' and legitimates the desires of regional elites to maintain economic and cultural links with Russia.

Sumy

Here, only one textbook was analysed as this was the only textbook currently in use in schools across Sumy oblast.

- Leont'eva, H. H., Tuleneva., V. O., Yatsenko, D. I., Cherepanova, Ye. O., *Heohrafiya ridnoho krayu: 5 klas*, Sumy: Nota bene, 2002, pp.1-74. (The geography of the native region: 5th grade).

In contrast to the situation in Luhans'k and Kharkiv study areas, the textbook pays little attention to the previously described key issues such as settlement of the oblast and national composition. The only point of relevance is how the geographical position of the region is analysed, with it being part of the historic *Slobozhanshchyna* region. The text states,

> Ukraine is divided into historical-ethnic regions. They are determined by the character of historical development, the geographical position of the territory and the links with other people. Therefore, the north-eastern part of Ukraine is a part of a region called *Slobozhanshchyna*, from the word 'freedom'.

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[542] Kononenko, O.Ye., Shul'zhenko, L.S., *Kharkivshchynoznavstvo*, op.cit., p.226.

> *Slobozhanshchyna* is closely connected with Russia. Here have interacted Ukrainian and Russian customs, ways of life, and even language.[543]

Whilst the existence of regional historical narratives in Kharkiv and Luhans'k may demonstrate a desire on the part of these regional authorities to contest the all-Ukrainian historical narrative, in Sumy, in contrast, the absence of a coherent regional historical narrative may indicate the exact opposite, with local elites *per se* demonstrating a full acceptance of the 'official' state narrative. Also, the lack of any explicit contestation of the 'official' state narrative may be linked to the weakness of a specific regional identity in Sumy and the area's political passivity in contrast to Kharkiv and Luhans'k. A further factor here which cannot be excluded is the issue of financial resources. In relation to Luhans'k and Kharkiv, Sumy is very much a 'rural backwater' with much less financial resources available to utilize on political projects.

The results indicate that to a large degree, the narratives differ to one another, and sometimes directly contradict key parts of the narrative, found in the all-Ukrainian history textbooks. This is especially the case in the Luhans'k and Kharkiv oblasts. Here, the interaction and co-existence of Russians and Ukrainians is portrayed in a positive manner, seen as key parts of the 'multinational' cultures of oblasts, which must be tolerated, respected and celebrated. In Kharkiv, great attention is placed on the historical myth of *Slobozhanshchyna*, and a regional identity involving Russian and Ukrainian interaction. In Luhans'k, attention is placed on the specific Donbas regional identity, which arose in the Soviet times, idealising in truly Soviet internationalist style, the multinational and working class nature of the population. Attention now turns to how issues surrounding the importance of the 'region' and Russia as the 'other' in Ukraine's politics of identity, seen through the lens of the individual, from school classrooms, located in these three study areas.

9.3 The importance of the 'region': reflections from the classroom

The data outlined below are the results of a qualitative analysis of the in-depth interviews which took place in 2003 across the three chosen study areas. In a similar fashion to that of the previous chapter, from the onset, it must be expressed that the author has attempted to select, verify and present cases that not only provide accurate reflections of each teacher's

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[543] Leont'eva, H.H., Tuleneva., V. O., Yatsenko, D.I., Cherepanova, Ye.O., *Heohrafiya ridnoho krayu: 5 klas*, Sumy: Nota bene, 2002, pp.4-5.

feelings and thoughts, but also elucidate key positions concerning the importance of 'place' in Ukraine's domestic identity politics.

Commencing with the opinions of school director, teachers and lecturers, many interviewees were acutely aware of the regional differences across Ukraine, with two main themes emerging. Firstly, several of the teachers expressed the opinion that indeed regional differences play a huge role in domestic politics in Ukraine and the so-called 'east-west' divide was real and was not about to disappear, with 'western' and 'eastern' Ukraine being irrevocably different. In particular, as the quotation below illuminates, holders of such a viewpoint were very keen to stress that eastern Ukrainians should not be 'blamed' (as Ukrainian nationalist discourse does) for failing to reject any associations with all-things Russian and/or Soviet. On the contrary, this viewpoint stresses the idea that 'western' Ukrainians also need to better understand eastern Ukraine's historical interactions with Russia as a state and Russians as a nation. In this way, such individuals are demonstrating that indeed monuments of Lenin are a part of 'their' history, part of the way they visualise 'where they are from' and in this way are fully justified. As argued by Zhurzhenko, such individuals simply have a different historical perspective of what it means to be Ukrainian, than people in different parts of Ukraine.[544]

> For only 60 years we have been a whole Ukraine and previously we were part of different territories. Therefore because of this, we are totally different people. People from western Ukraine come here and do not understand our mentality. Why don't we get rid of the monuments to Dzherzhinsky and Lenin. Why? It is because the monuments do not get in our way, they are a part of our history and why should we get rid of it?[545]

Alongside such a viewpoint, there was a second viewpoint which whilst acknowledging the existence of such differences across Ukraine, saw them to a certain extent as being 'artificially constructed' by the media and political forces so as to legitimate their own political ends.

> I think that this idea about the differences between East and West Ukraine is thought up *naddumannl* (a little far-fetched). It happened in the Soviet period, when I was at school. We travelled to western Ukraine and they knew straightaway that we were from Donbas. We don't speak the Russian letter 'g'

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[544] Zhurzhenko, T., "The myth of two Ukraines", can be found at; www.eurozine.com, downloaded, 25th September 2004.
[545] Zhevskina, Natalya, assistant lecturer at faculty of Social Work, Luhans'k Taras Shevchenko State Pedagogical University, 24th February 2003.

> we speak *surzhyk*,using the letter 'h' instead! We got a boy in our class who spoke Ukrainian well and clearly and asked the local people directions and they helped him because when we asked they gave us the wrong directions on purpose. Now this does not happen and there are more friendly relations. We have an exchange programme here in Lugansk, connected to the *Narodnyi Rukh*, who organise exchanges between eastern and western Ukraine.[546]

Indeed, many individuals strove to highlight the fact that in recent years, there has been much discussion of language politics in Ukraine, with people in eastern Ukraine gaining the impression that if they travelled to western Ukraine and spoke the Russian language, this would create tensions with the local population. As highlighted in the passage below, individuals were surprised upon travelling to western Ukraine to find that such a 'representation' of events was not in fact, correct.

> Yes, we were told that in L'viv, if you ask directions in Russian, then they will give you the wrong directions. This wasn't the case. If you speak with local people in Russian, they also will speak back in Russian so you can understand them. Maybe in some deep villages, where the level of civilisation is very low, then maybe this is the case, but I personally haven't encountered this.[547]

Moreover, many teachers spoke of such successful exchanges between their cities and ones in western Ukraine, which in many ways greatly assisted in the breaking down of 'stereotypes' of people from the 'east' and the 'west' of Ukraine.

> For four years in a row, the Luhans'k region team in the (Ukrainian) schools Olympics, have held close links with the L'viv team. The spectators were astounded, 'how is it that the most eastern and most western areas are friends'. Maybe this is more important than the actual results of the competition. The children have the skills to speak to each other, find a common language. These two teams are still keeping in touch. I think that facts are facts, but it is important how you take them on and use them in history education.[548]

In particular, the importance of 'perceptions' of regional differences across Ukraine was outlined in the passage below:

> By the way, not long ago, I travelled on a train with a lady from L'viv. Her roots were from St. Petersburg. She said that in L'viv, there are Russian language schools in each *raion* (district). It is not true that there is taking place full measured Ukrainization. I myself have been a few times to L'viv,

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[546] History teacher, Luhans'k School of foreign languages, 14th March 2003.
[547] Butylkina, Tatyana Leonidovna, teacher, Ukrainian People's Academy, Kharkiv, 23rd March 2003.
[548] Serdonenko, Tatyana, History teacher, School No.57, Luhans'k, 25th Aprl 2003.

> spoke with people in Russian. And they answered my questions and helped me out. This is to say that we still have here in eastern Ukraine prejudice, strengthened by our old relations to western Ukraine.[549]

Whilst regional differences certainly exist between the western and eastern parts of Ukraine, for example between the cities of L'viv and Luhans'k, such comments bear evidence to the significance of 'misperceptions' having the real potential of constantly reinforcing such differences in the eyes of the general population, making the task of the state to engineer an all-embracing Ukrainian identity even greater to achieve.

Turning attention to the schoolchildren, here it was found that the interviewees readily engaged with the issues at hand, with several key issues emerging which directly relate to some of the wider dynamics of identity change in Ukraine, outlined in previous chapters. In particular, the majority of the views surrounding the importance of the 'region' in Ukraine here, centred around the highly sensitive issue of language. Firstly, in a similar fashion to their teachers, many children stated how before actually travelling to western Ukraine, they had felt a degree of apprehension concerning their use of the Russian language.

> I was in the Carpathians not long ago and it is interesting to think about the relations between western and eastern Ukraine. We thought that they would call us *moskali*, but a man we met in L'viv, said that they only call *moskali*, those people who live in L'viv and speak Russian and that we shouldn't worry.[550]

Whilst this opinion was voiced on several occasions, many children expressed a negative representation of 'western' Ukraine, to a great degree, defined by its relation to the Russian language. As one Kharkiv schoolgirl notes, "Western Ukraine has a very negative attitude towards the Russian language. There it has been banned to listen to Russian music on public transport."[551] Many children expressed a dislike to such an open dislike of Russia, with 'western Ukraine' negatively perceived as the hotbed of Ukrainian nationalism; "Ukraine is made up of two parts, western and eastern Ukraine. Western Ukraine has a more sharp politics, she is against Russia. There should be a sensible nationalism, and not fanaticism."[552]

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[549] Freiman, Grigorii Arkadevich, History teacher, Luhans'k Special School for the deepened study of foreign languages, 5th March 2003.
[550] Mariya, schoolgirl, Luhans'k School of foreign languages, 14th March 2003.
[551] Schoolgirl, School No.45, Kharkiv, 4th April 2003.
[552] Schoolboy, School No.78, Kharkiv, 4th April 2003.

Western Ukraine is criticised not only for its dislike of the Russian language, but also for the fact that as a region of Ukraine, it has been 'polluted' by foreign neighbouring countries, in the most part Poland. As Artem, a schoolboy in Kharkiv notes, "We have differences between the western and eastern parts. In the western part they don't speak the Ukrainian language, they speak Polish combined with Ukrainian."[553]

> Lots of people in western Ukraine think that they are more Ukrainian than we are as they speak Ukrainian. Yet their culture is a mix of Polish and Ukrainian cultures. They have Catholic churches, it is not pure Ukrainian culture, it is very mixed. All they have is their language. To hear real Ukrainian, you must go to Poltava Oblast.[554]

In such a fashion, these children are outwardly expressing a support for the discourse outlined in chapter Three, which purports that, in fact, the real 'other' in Ukraine's identity politics is 'western Ukraine' with its great influences from Poland, Hungary and Slovakia, not 'eastern Ukraine' as Ukrainian nationalists seek often to claim. In particular, many individuals spoke of how people in 'western' Ukraine saw themselves as 'more' Ukrainian on the basis of language use, than 'eastern' Ukrainians. As one schoolgirl in Luhans'k states, "They think that they are real Ukrainians and we are Russians. I disagree. I am Ukrainian, I was born in this country and I live in this country. It doesn't matter what language you speak."[555]

> In the eastern part of Ukraine, we don't have clean Ukrainian, we have a Russian accent. And in western Ukraine, they have strong Czech and Polish influences. When I was in western Ukraine, they say that they are real Ukrainians. I don't think that it is true because they have lots of Polish culture in western Ukraine. I think that now we have to build our nation from the very beginning. We have to unite and to develop our different regions.[556]

Such efforts to understand identity solely using a 'language' marker were wholly rejected by the vast majority of the schoolchildren, with many individuals feeling such a view as deeply insulting.

> I think that this is stupid. We are one people, but history has turned out that western Ukraine and eastern Ukraine are against each other. This is not clever. We are one country. Simply for us, Russian

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[553] Artem, schoolboy, Ukrainian People's Academy, Kharkiv, 19th March 2003.
[554] Schoolgirl, ibid.
[555] Schoolgirl, Luhans'k School of foreign languages, 14th March 2003.
[556] Ibid.

> is as much 'our' language as Ukrainian is for people in western Ukraine. In western Ukraine, they have even tried to ban Russian language and because of this, there were many protests. We since birth have spoken Russian. And it turns out, that just because of this, that we speak Russian and not because of other reasons, such a love for Russia or personal convictions, they in western Ukraine consider that we are *chuzhyi* 'foreign' people, although we live in one country.[557]

The underlying message, which emerged was that many schoolchildren in Ukraine's eastern borderlands felt that they were 'misrepresented' with commentators making the bold jumps in logic that on account of speaking the Russian language, people in eastern Ukraine were 'Russian-loving' and simultaneously deeply sceptical of Ukraine as an independent state. As Zhurzhenko argued, such individuals expressed a desire for their understanding of being 'Ukrainian' to be listened to and understood, instead of being dismissed at the earliest opportunity. As a boy in Luhans'k claimed, "We are just the same Ukrainians as they are, we are one nation, one country."[558] Many children wanted to express the view that they were Ukrainian and were proud of this. Whilst they spoke the Russian language, they did not consider this to make them less a 'Ukrainian,' rather they defined their identities using markers, other than solely language usage.

9.4 Reflections on 'Russia' as Ukraine's 'other'

The final section of this chapter centres on how Russia and Russians are perceived by individuals at the micro level in the three study areas. As outlined in chapter three, an important part of self-identification is not only to understand 'who you are' but also 'who you are not'. As demonstrated in the previous chapters, a key part of the Ukrainian state's attempts to (re)fashion identities is to create an understanding of Russia as Ukraine's 'other'. The analysis of history textbooks in chapter six certainly found that the state was creating a historical narrative in which Russia was represented in a wholly negative way. The aim, therefore, of this section, is to empirically investigate reflections on Russia, from a different level, the micro level, in the school classroom. In particular, during the interview process, individuals were 'guided' into discussing two key themes; namely the relevance of the state border between Russia and Ukraine and general relations with Russia.

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[557] Schoolboy, Luhans'k Special School for the deepened study of foreign languages, 5th March 2003.
[558] Schoolboy, Luhans'k School of foreign languages, 14th February 2003.

The Russian-Ukrainian border

Whilst engaging with issues surrounding regionalism in Ukraine, it is useful to consider that patterns of regional and national identities often do not coincide with state borders. As described in chapter five, all three of the study areas are situated adjacent to the Russian-Ukrainian state border and thus may be open to the forces of 'transnational regionalism.'[559] In particular, as a result of Ukraine's historical closeness with Russia, individuals may still identify with people living on the other side of the border, in 'foreign' territory. Concerning this issue, research, undertaken in the 1990s demonstrates, at that time, that indeed on both sides of the Ukrainian-Russian border, the state boundary does not necessarily coincide with borders constructed symbolically by the population itself.

Thus, it will certainly be significant to compare and contrast feelings towards this border, from 2003, in the eyes of both school directors and teachers and lecturers and also, the schoolchildren themselves. Concerning opinions of the older generation, there was a near or total consensus of disapproval of the need for such a border. Many of these respondents expressed the view that there was simply no need to make such a symbolic demarcation, where in reality, no divisions actually existed. A common view is illustrated in the following remark, "For us it is not necessary to strengthen the border. On the contrary, the border needs to be opened. The majority of my relatives live in Russia. For us, it will be a tragedy if a visa regime is installed with external passports."[560] In particular, the issue of visiting relatives arose time and again. Indeed, the real consequences of the border, being implemented are highlighted by the laments of a educational methodologist in Luhans'k, who tells of her family, now living on both sides of the Russian-Ukrainian border.

> My husband is from Chertkova (border crossing) in Russia but my niece got married in Milovoye in Ukraine but her parents still live in Chertkova. We go to visit them and give her a chicken and some sour cream and then on the border crossing they ask her where are you taking this food? Why does she need this border? There everything is *rodnoi* (native).[561]

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[559] Hurrell, A., "Explaining the resurgence of Regionalism in World Politics", *Review of International Studies*, vol.21, no.4, October 1995, p.333.
[560] Zhevakina, Natal'ya, assistant of Faculty of Social Work, Luhans'k Taras Shevchenko State Pedagogical University, 12th March 2003.
[561] Turyanskaya, Olga Fyodorevna, Senior lecturer of social psychology, Luhans'k Taras Shevchenko State Pedagogical University, also, retired methodologist of training of school history teachers, Institute of Continued Education, Luhans'k Oblast, 12th March 2003.

Whilst amongst the older generation, there was agreement on this issue, amongst the younger generation this issue was far more controversial. One school of thought emerged which repeated the stance of the older generation, arguing that the border serves no purpose as they see no divisions between Ukraine and Russia. Such a viewpoint is illustrated in the following three passages: "Over the centuries, Belarus, Ukraine and Russia have lived together, then they abruptly split up. But we don't see any borders between ourselves. We were always one family and remain so today."[562] Similarly a schoolboy in Sumy remarks, "We don't need any border at all. We have relatives in Russia, and to strengthen the border would be like building a wall between brothers."[563] Furthermore, another schoolboy states, "They are 'our' people, Slavic people. It is our nation, Belarus, Russia and Ukraine – it is a Slavic nation.[564]

However, there also existed an opposing viewpoint which argued that the border was necessary, on the basis of preserving Ukraine's territorial integrity. As one schoolboy states, "We cannot just get rid of the border with Russia because Ukraine is a smaller state and if we rejoin with Russia, Ukraine will lose its nationality and Russia would be left as a unitary state."[565] Such comments were repeated in numerous interviews. Here, individuals were expressing a fear that if the border was allowed to disappear, this would certainly hinder Ukraine, allowing Russia to take control over Ukraine. For these schoolchildren, the border symbolised a necessary defensive 'tool', used by Ukraine to preserve its state independence.

Regarding the importance of the border, for the older generation educated in the Soviet Union the border has no relevance other than being a hindrance. For the younger generation, the issue is more hotly disputed. Here, one can witness the results of the Ukrainian state's efforts to re(engineer) a sense of Ukrainian identity over the last thirteen years. These schoolchildren, as mentioned previously, have spent their entire formative years within independent Ukraine and have a greater sense of where 'our' territory ends and where the 'other' begins. The negotiation of the issue of the border, demonstrates that in this new generation, a sense of territorial identity, feelings of being part of a political entity, called Ukraine, which has clear demarcated boundaries, is slowly emerging.

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[562] Schoolboy, Kharkiv Technical Lycee, School No.173, 4th April 2003.
[563] Schoolboy, School No.27, Sumy, 19th March 2003.
[564] Schoolboy, Ukrainian People's Academy, Kharkiv, 19th March 2003.
[565] Schoolboy, Luhans'k School for foreign languages, 26th February 2003.

Russian-Ukrainian relations

Concerning general relations between Russia and Ukraine, the data generated followed a similar pattern to that regarding the border issue. From the interviews with the older generation, emerged a dislike, as expressed in the previous chapter, of efforts to 'artificially' divide Ukraine and Russia. As one school history teacher in Kharkiv states,

> I was born in Kharkiv. But my father was a serviceman, thus we lived in Russia a lot. We never encountered a bad relationship to Ukrainians. In Ukraine, upto 1991, also there was never hostility towards Russians. I think that the problem of relations between Russians and Ukrainians is made up by politicians, only so as to gain more personal power. To show that only now they can do things for the people, for previously they were under the control of Russia. This does not correspond to reality.[566]

> Definite political forces are interested in breaking ties between Russia and Ukraine. They try to erect some sort of barrier. But for many centuries, both our peoples have had single roots, everything was inter-connected, and artificially to break these connections is not possible. All the more, in the world at present is taking place processes of integration. And what will we, as Slavic nations, break apart? History will not allow this.[567]

Many respondents voiced such an opinion, seeing attempts to represent Russia as an 'other' in a perennial negative light, artificial and ultimately self-defeating. Of particular relevance here, many individuals expressed the opinion, that if any 'other' needed to be defined for people in eastern Ukraine, then in place of 'Russia', 'western Ukraine' was closer to the mark.

> We don't have a clear picture of 'we are *khokhli* and they are *moskali*.' We look onto Russia in a normal fashion, like towards a neighbour. More often we can hear, 'we are from Eastern Ukraine' and 'they' are Banderites and nationalists. Although our population is very apathetic. Western Ukraine is closer to the western countries and they have a mentality of the individual, which is more developed. Here, in eastern Ukraine, we have influences from Asia and Russia. At the everyday level, we have greater problems with relations with western Ukraine than with Russia. In eastern Ukraine, nobody is bothered if you are Russian or Ukrainian, we all speak the Russian language.[568]

In this way, individuals were demonstrating that for them, there were no boundaries between them and Russians living on the other side of the border, with internal regional differences

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[566] Butylkina, Tatyana Leonidovna, teacher, Ukrainian People's Academy, Kharkiv, 23rd March 2003.
[567] Gaikov, Anatoliy Afanasievich, Reader of methodological training, Ukrainian People's Academy, 22nd March 2003.
[568] Teacher, Sumy, Pedagogical Institute, 10th April 2003.

across Ukraine seen as more relevant. Furthermore, it is interesting to witness the 'language issue' again being used as a legitimating tool in this argument. This once again provides evidence of the way that divisions in Ukraine, cannot be simplistically out down to single factors, such as language or ethnicity or region. Instead, these identity markers overlap and cross-cut continually.

Turning to the reflections of the schoolchildren, here the issue again proved highly contested. One viewpoint, reiterated that of the older generation, seeing Ukraine and Russia as occupying one, single cultural, political space and thus there was simply no need to 'create' boundaries, where none were necessary. As a schoolgirl states, "Ukraine and Russia are two sisters and their people are brothers. The relations of Russians to Ukrainians and vice versa is friendly, and even when we hear something negative about Russia, we worry. They are not foreigners."[569] Also, holders of such an opinion also explained their dislike of Russia and Russians being continually represented in a negative light. As a schoolboy states, whilst he accepts that Ukrainians were oppressed during the Soviet times, this for him, does not equate for a justification to hate Russians as a nation *per se*; "We have to develop friendly relations with Russia because it is our neighbour, they are Slavic people, the people are not to blame for the fact that in Soviet times someone in Moscow oppressed the Ukrainians."[570] Moreover, such negative attitudes are understood as 'created artificially' by political elites who want to impose 'their' own understanding of Ukraine's relations towards Russia, a relationship which many schoolchildren view as unnecessary, overtly nationalist and divergent from their own viewpoint. As Zhenya, a schoolgirl from Kharkiv notes,

> About the question whether to go to Europe or Russia, I think that we should turn to Russia. I think that Russia could be even better than Europe, it has a great potential no European country can compete with Russia. In culture and religion, we are almost the same as Russia. The big problem is now there are some nationalists in our politics and these angry people will make big problems in our relations with Russia. They want to be separate from Russia, but we should be together. [571]

Here, again, emerges a certain sense of frustration that 'their' voice is not being heard, drowned out by 'nationalist' interpretations of Russian-Ukrainian relations. Whilst strong emotions emerged in support of maintaining close ties with Russia, also there emerged a discourse amongst the schoolchildren which again demonstrated an emerging territorial

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[569] Schoolgirl, School No.78, Kharkiv, 3rd April 2003.
[570] Schoolboy, Luhans'k School of foreign languages, 14th February 2003.
[571] Zhenya, schoolgirl, Ukrainian People's Academy, Kharkiv, 19th March 2003.

Ukrainian identity, rejecting overtures to rejoin with Russia, as boy states; "Uniting with Russia will be negative, especially concerning the national question, Ukrainians would lose their national pride, traditions, language."[572]

In particular, individuals argued that Ukraine 'needed to stand up on her own two feet', and cease to regard Russia as an 'elder' brother, with 'special' status in Ukrainian political and societal life. This is highlighted in the following two passages;

> It is not important what sort of relations we have with Russia. She is not a 'special' country for Ukraine. Yes, we were once part of Russia, but we were also part of the USSR, where there were many other different countries. I think that there shouldn't be any special relations with Russia. She is only one of the countries, which Ukraine should cooperate with.[573] I do not agree with the policy of our President, who tries to please Russia, in whatever way he can. He forgets that we are already a separate country. We can develop ourselves and make our own links with other countries.[574]

Overall, the author gained an impression throughout the interviews, that amongst this younger generation, there was a real understanding and awareness of the fact that they were growing up in a rapidly changing world, one in which Ukraine, as an independent country in her own right, certainly had a large role to play. As one girl succinctly sums up, "We were born in the USSR, but we were not conscious about life. But we have grown up and been educated in Ukraine. And Russia for us is already a different country."[575]

9.5 Conclusions

This chapter has sought to shed light on two main areas; namely understandings of the importance of the 'regional' factor in the politics of identity in Ukraine, and representations of Russia as Ukraine's 'other'. To achieve these aims, data was generated from a variety of sources, including regional historical textbooks, and in-depth interviews with school directors and teachers and university lecturers and group interviews with schoolchildren, across the three study areas. Regarding the regional textbooks, it was found that certainly in the case of Luhans'k and Kharkiv, regional elites were attempting to create an 'alternative' version of historical events to the 'official' state narrative, in particular involving a 'softer' line towards Russia and Russians, in which rather the language shifts from one of 'blame' and 'negation'

[572] Zhenya, schoolgirl, Ukrainian People's Academy, Kharkiv, 19th March 2003.
[573] Schoolgirl, School No.45, Kharkiv, 4th April 2003.
[574] Schoolgirl, ibid.
[575] Schoolgirl, School No.78, Kharkiv, 4th April 2003.

to a celebration of 'mutual understanding' and 'peaceful interaction'. Significantly, in Sumy, there was scant attention paid to such issues, which one can conclude to reflect an implicit acceptance by Sumy's elites of the 'official' narrative and also a result of Sumy's greater political passivity compared to the other two study areas. This therefore demonstrates the existence of clear regional differences within 'Eastern Ukraine'.

Concerning reflections on the issue of 'regionalism' at the local level, both generations, young and old, expressed a clear understanding of the regional differences across Ukraine, with differences between the 'east' and the 'west' receiving much attention. This demonstrates the fact that subjective and objective markers of regions across Ukraine do not coincide. Whilst the 8-10 classification system which was described in chapter Five is an extremely useful analytical tool for outlining the objective regional differences across Ukraine, it is certainly extremely relevant to witness how individual perceptions of Ukraine's regional diversity are far different. In Ukraine's eastern borderlands, at the grassroots level, there is constructed a simplistic division of Ukraine into 'western' and 'eastern' halves, with the 'Eastern Ukraine' identity held onto as a certain 'barrier' to the perceived negative influence of 'Western Ukraine' in the government based in Kiev.

The findings of this empirical research also feeds back into conceptual debates outlined previously in chapter Three. In particular, whilst Ryabchuk argued that the so-called 'other' Ukraine did not know who they were, had difficulties in self-identification and were 'ambivalent' about the political processes occurring around them.[576] The results from this empirical research reject such a viewpoint and highlight on the contrary, individuals in these three study areas had a clear understanding of 'who they were' and were highly involved in the politics of identity in Ukraine, desiring 'their voice to be heard'. Many felt disillusioned and apathetic towards the political process which they felt did not represent their views. In particular, any individuals expressed a dislike at being classified as 'bad' Ukrainians on account of speaking the Russian language and holding sympathetic views towards Russia. Here, emerges a clear illustration of the way that 'regional' understandings of self-identification are implicitly mixed and blurred with linguistic identifications. For individuals in these 'eastern borderlands', whilst 'western Ukrainians' may place the role of language at the top of the list of determinants of self-identification, for them, language plays a far less prominent role. These people feel that they are 'no more and no less' Ukrainian than

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[576] Ryabchuk. M., "Ambivalence to Ambiguity: Why Ukrainians remain undecided?" *CERI-Sciences*, pp.1-7.

Ukrainian-speakers from L'viv, rather what it means to be Ukrainian is understood in different ways.

Such ideas were also reflected in opinions regarding the state border with Russia and Russians as a people. Interestingly, amongst the older generation, there existed a determination to reject attempts to represent Russia as Ukraine's eternal 'other'. Whilst many schoolchildren also repeated such a viewpoint, also significantly, there also emerged a distinct 'position', which felt that Ukraine needed to 'defend' its independent status, and a delineated border was the necessary means of achieving this. Many schoolchildren also expressed a view that re-joining with Russia would be a tragedy for Ukraine and its people, allowing Russia to once again control Ukraine for her own ends. However, simultaneously, whilst such ideas reflect a growing sense of difference and 'otherness' felt towards the Russian *state,* nevertheless, schoolchildren were keen to demonstrate how they still desired close and friendly relations with their Russian neighbours.

Finally, the empirical results outlined above provide a critique to Kuzio's oversimplistic view of nation-building as a homogenising and assimilatory process, which underestimates the potential for the co-existence of multiple identities in modern societies.[577] Instead, the existence of 'regional' identities, demonstrated in this chapter, clearly illustrates the need to take into account the dynamic interaction between such regional and state-led understandings of the nation and nationhood, when examining identity change.

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[577] Kuzio, T., "National Identity in Independent Ukraine: An Identity in Transition", *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics*, vol.2, no.4, pp.582-608.

CHAPTER TEN: CONCLUSIONS

The aim of this thesis was to examine the processes of identity change taking place in Ukraine, in the post-1991 period. This concluding chapter seeks to draw together the key findings of the thesis, and suggest ways in which this study can aid further understanding of national identity not only in Ukraine, but across the whole of the former Soviet space and more generally.

10.1 Key empirical findings

This thesis has approached the task of examining the politics of identity in Ukraine by setting itself three overarching questions, which arose during the research process. Regarding the first question, 'where are we from?' the thesis has investigated how 'historical' identities are affecting wider national identities across Ukraine at a variety of different levels by different actors. The second question, 'where are we?' has necessitated a thorough examination of the importance of the 'regional' factor within processes of identity change across Ukraine. In particular, the thesis chose to undertake empirical research in three study areas in Ukraine's eastern borderlands, in order to gain a picture of how individuals view the importance of spatial politics across Ukraine. Finally, the third question, 'who we are not?' seeks to explore to what extent Russia is perceived as Ukraine's real 'other' in the politics of identity.

This thesis has critically engaged with the literature regarding the 'mapping' of identities. In chapter Three, it was demonstrated that whilst much academic rigour has devoted itself to examining ethnic and linguistic differences across Ukraine, assumptions about their significance have been exaggerated and misplaced. Instead, the thesis calls for a deeper engagement with the relevance of the 'regional' factor in the politics of identity in Ukraine. Chapter Five devoted itself to this issue, explaining the historical reasons for regional differences across Ukraine and also calls for a more rigorous examination of not just the regional differences themselves, but how they actually affect identity change in Ukraine. Instead, the chapter provides a framework in which such 'meta-regions' can be deconstructed. In this fashion, the researcher can begin to examine the subtleties and nuances occurring at the micro-level and simultaneously compare and contrast these to wider societal processes. Thus, the study chose to focus attention on the eastern borderlands of Ukraine, involving a comparative study of three study areas, all located adjacent to the Russian-

Ukrainian border. In this manner, the thesis has provided a clear 'regional' framework through which identity change can be analysed at a number of different sites and levels.

In order to attempt to answer the first question, ***'where are we from'*** chapter Seven focused exclusively on how the Ukrainian state has revised the historical narrative, taught in schools. By analysing a variety of new school history textbooks, it was found that indeed the Ukrainian state is actively engaged in the politics of national identity in this arena, continually focusing the schoolchild's attention on the longevity of the Ukrainian nation and its eternal struggle for state independence. As highlighted in chapter Seven, however, in comparison with other history textbooks, which were published in the early 1990s, just after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the creation of the Ukrainian state, textbooks analysed in this thesis, in the main, are returning to a more 'Soviet friendly' version of historical events of the twentieth century. Also of great relevance, whilst formally, the state has total control over the contents of these textbooks and their publishing, thus creating the possibility to create 'one' historical narrative, taught across the whole of Ukraine, in reality, the thesis uncovered the beginnings of a **regional politics of the textbook**, in which publishing houses, located in various regional centres, were allowed to publish history textbooks, which often had differing interpretations of key events in Ukraine's history. Thus, whilst the state is 'formally' espousing the need for one overarching historical narrative to be used across the whole of Ukraine, aimed at uniting the population, at the same time, the implicit allowance of such regional interpretations to emerge and be utilised in the Ukrainian classroom renders the possibility that the status-quo in terms of regional diversity may continue.

Chapter Eight engaged with how the revised 'historical narrative' was negotiated in the study areas themselves. This involved in-depth interviews with history teachers, university lecturers and school directors and also group interviews with schoolchildren. The results of the empirical research demonstrate that school history teachers were far from being simply implicit 'transmitters' of knowledge from the state to its citizenry. Instead, the results demonstrate that school history teachers are inherently 'active' players. Indeed, whilst reflecting on the changes in historical education from the Soviet times to the present day, many individuals expressed the personal difficulties they had encountered and were encountering. Many of these individuals had been educated and trained in the Soviet system and taught the previous Soviet historical narrative which celebrated the 'eternal union' of the Russian and Ukrainian peoples. Today, they were teaching a new, revised historical narrative

which rejected and openly criticised much of the previous Soviet interpretations. Of relevance, teachers whilst finding this process arduous, nevertheless were in full agreement of the need for Ukraine's children to learn a 'real' history about their country and learn 'where they were from' and at the same time, were in full understanding of the role of the 'History of Ukraine' course as a key state 'tool' aimed at (re)fashioning national identities. This support for the current reforms, however, was dampened by anxieties and worries concerning some of the elements in the new narrative, which were deemed overtly nationalistic. In this regard, whilst teachers were extremely pleased with how Ukraine's children were now able to learn about the 'glorious' deeds of the Cossacks, they were far more concerned regarding events of the tumultuous and recent twentieth century.

In particular, two events here deserve special mention, which are the Famine of 1932/3 and the War years of 1941/4. Many teachers expressed real concerns that the interpretation in the textbooks regarding the Famine was overtly 'negative', with blame being placed wholly at the feet of the 'Russian' government. Similarly regarding the War years, many individuals expressed concerns that the Ukrainian state was trying to dispense with the Soviet-era understanding of the war with Nazi Germany as the 'Great Patriotic War'. Similarly the actions of the OUN/UPA created heated debates and discussions. Again, whilst teachers were in full agreement that all the activities which took place in the war years across Ukraine should be discussed and documented in the history textbooks, many individuals felt that the new state narrative had taken an unnecessary slant towards trying to 'rehabilitate' the OUN/UPA movement and portray them as 'Ukrainian freedom-fighters'. Of particular note here, the issue of 'perception' is deemed extremely relevant. Whilst many individuals were deeply critical of the 'nationalistic' and 'pro-Banderite' slant of the new textbooks, such exclamations did not fully coincide with the reality of the contents of the textbooks, analysed in chapter Six. As outlined in chapter Seven, there was an appraisal of events in Ukraine in the war years, yet this appraisal was far from being unduly 'one-sided' and 'nationalistic' in content. Here, seemingly one can witness the reality that 'perceptions' of what is happening in the sphere of historical education do not match with actual realities, with such misinterpretations, fuelled by existing 'regional stereotypes' of these historical events and figures. Whilst this is relevant in itself, of greater significance is the fact that 'perception' here is all-important and demonstrates the fact that this period of Ukraine's history is still highly disputed across Ukraine. In Ukraine's eastern borderlands, a particular 'regional'

interpretation of these events, which is very close to previous Soviet interpretations, is still very much alive.

In general, school teachers whilst understanding the importance of their role in creating a new generation of Ukrainian citizens who were proud of being 'Ukrainian' and the need of the state to use 'history' for such political ends, were nevertheless concerned about the overtly 'negative' representation of all things Russian and Soviet. In this respect, many individuals expressed concerns that the fundamental aims of historical education was to unite the population of Ukraine, yet such 'negativity' had the real danger of still further deepening existing divisions. As a reaction to such changes, interestingly, certain individuals implicitly stated how rather than openly rejecting the state message, they instead chose to subtly 'pick and choose' the accent they gave to certain historical events. This phenomenon of selective appropriation of 'messages' can be described as **'inclusion without exclusion'.** In this manner, one can conclude that it is clearly possible that teachers, acting as rational individual actors, play a highly significant role in the process of identity change, having the possibility rather than simply 'transferring' the state message to the schoolchildren, of adapting it to suit particular 'regional' interpretations of certain disputed historical events or figures. Thus, one witnesses the emergence of a paradoxical interplay between top-down processes, in which efforts are being made to 'unite' the population using a single, historical narrative, and simultaneously bottom-up processes, in which this message is being contested and adapted so as to reflect a specific 'regional' understanding of Ukraine's past. In particular, it was found that teachers chose to contest the state narrative for two main reasons. Firstly, many individuals saw the new, state narrative as being 'unscientific' compared with the 'true' and 'scientific' Soviet historiography which they had previously taught. Secondly, many teachers felt that the 'nationalist' and 'anti-Russia' undertones of the new, state narrative were the product of 'western Ukrainian nationalists' influence in Kiev. As a reaction to this current situation, many individuals were keen to express the 'regional' differences across Ukraine and also exalt their endorsement of an 'East Ukrainian' regional identity, which rejected attempts to portray Russia as the 'other' in Ukraine's identity politics, instead seeing 'Western Ukraine' as the real 'other'.

Turning to the schoolchildren themselves, like the school history teachers, rather than being 'passive' recipients of the state's historical message, they were heavily engaged in the politics of identity. Regarding all the chosen key historical events and figures, which were

analysed, schoolchildren demonstrated differing interpretations on all of them, as highlighted in chapter Eight. Of note, one can clearly see an emerging division in the understanding of history between the events learnt upto the twentieth century and then the twentieth century itself. Regarding pre-twentieth century history, the state's historical narrative was generally taken on board at face value, with the children very interested in learning about the history of 'their' country and they were overtly aware of how they today had the opportunity to learn about figures and events in Ukraine's history, which previously were omitted from the history learnt by their parents and grandparents.

However, regarding history taught in the twentieth century, like the teachers, the reflections of the schoolchildren demonstrated that this period is still very 'real' in Ukrainian society. In the interviews, many children spoke of the influence of their parents and relatives and how often they found it difficult to judge which historical narrative to accept, the state's version taught at school, or an alternative version, told by their parents and relatives. Again, the Famine and the period of 1941-45, provoked the greatest amount of debate and disagreements within the interviews with many schoolchildren reinforcing the 'Soviet' interpretation of OUN/UPA as 'traitors', whilst at the same time, rejecting attempting to portray Russia as Ukraine's 'other'. Like the teachers, many children expressed a great desire to learn about 'where they are from', yet not at the expense of accepting an overtly negative historical narrative. Here, we see that whilst generational differences do exist with the younger generation more willing to embrace the new Ukrainian historical narrative, nevertheless such differences are not clear cut. Results in this thesis demonstrate that 'Soviet era' memories are not totally rejected by the younger generation. This seemingly proves the life experiences of families, including parents and grandparents have a profound impact on their children's understanding and interpretations of the Soviet past.

The results of this thesis demonstrate and justify the usefulness of in-depth micro level studies which can uncover some of the subtleties, found within the wider processes, and demonstrate that in fact, the process of the state's efforts to engineer identity change in the realm of education is highly contested, with the results, at present, far from clear. Rather than the lack of 'open protest' highlighting an acceptance of the state narrative, instead this thesis has found that many individuals are deeply concerned about the shifts in accent, yet have chosen to 'engage' with the issue, not by outright rejection, but by more implicit protest, choosing themselves, which parts of the narrative to accept or reject.

Turning our attention to the second question of ***'where are we'***, and the importance of the 'region' in the politics of identity in Ukraine, the results of the empirical research, outlined in chapter Nine are extremely revealing. Firstly, the analysis of a number of 'regional' textbooks, used in the three study areas indicated that indeed, the local authorities were actively involved in this key area of identity change. Of great interest, the research found that there were differences across the three study areas. Firstly, in Kharkiv and Luhans'k the 'regional' textbooks certainly provided a *competing* narrative to the all-Ukrainian textbooks. In particular, whilst chapter Seven had concluded that the Ukrainian state was endeavouring to glorify the antiquity of the Ukrainian nation and state whilst representing Russia as a clear 'other' for Ukraine, in these two areas, much attention was placed onto highlighting the joint settlement and co-operation between the Russian and Ukrainian peoples of these areas and also legitimating the continued use of the Russian language. In contrast, in Sumy, the lack of any real engagement with such issues can be read as an implicit acceptance of the all-Ukrainian historical narrative and demonstrates the inherent differences of this area from Kharkiv and Luhans'k and as such the existence of regional diversity within 'Eastern Ukraine'. From such results, the use of in-depth qualitative research at the micro-level is justified, uncovering nuances, which larger, quantitative research would have failed to uncover.

Moreover, the results of the interviews are also highly illuminating. The empirical findings from chapter Nine highlight that individuals living in the eastern borderlands have a clear 'regional' understanding of their place in Ukraine. Many individuals were keen to express the differences which exist across Ukraine, often comparing 'eastern' and 'western' parts of Ukraine. Whilst individuals were aware of such diversity, they desired 'their' own interpretation of the importance of the 'regional' factor to be heard. Many individuals expressed deep regret that 'eastern Ukraine' was stereotyped as 'pro-Russian and sometimes anti-Ukrainian' solely because of the use of the Russian language there. Here we witness the actual cross-cutting nature of 'regional' and 'linguistic' identities in Ukraine. Many individuals spoke about how much rhetoric from western Ukraine represented 'eastern Ukraine' as 'less Ukrainian' than 'western Ukraine' on account of the wide usage of the Russian language in the eastern regions of the country. However, individuals in the interviews in this thesis rejected this view, arguing that whilst people used the Russian language this did not automatically correspond to 'being less Ukrainian'. Implicitly, many individuals were demonstrating the multiplicity and diversity of ways how individuals define

their national identities across Ukraine. Whilst individuals in western regions, may see the 'linguistic' marker as a key determinant in self-identification, this is not the case in Ukraine's eastern borderlands. In these areas, 'what it means to be Ukrainian' and 'what is Ukraine' are seen in different ways, with different accents being given to different markers such as region and language.

Finally, the third question which this thesis has sought to address is ***'who are we not'*** To answer this question, attention has been placed on the state's attempts to represent Russia as the real 'other' for Ukraine and also individuals' own reflections on this issue. As demonstrated in chapter Seven, the Ukrainian state has made a clear attempt to represent Russia as Ukraine's 'other' in the revised historical narrative, now taught in Ukrainian schools. In chapter Nine, this question was engaged with from different angles, involving individual opinions gained from school directors and history teachers, university lecturers and the schoolchildren themselves. Regarding this issue, individuals were encouraged to discuss two separate themes, namely the Russian-Ukrainian state border and more generally Russian-Ukrainian relations. Concerning thoughts about the Russian-Ukrainian border, the results demonstrate that in the study areas, close to the state border with Russia, the majority of respondents in this study did not see any need for a border to exist, seeing instead the border as a physical hindrance to their daily lives, often prohibiting individuals visiting their relatives living on the other side of the border in Russia. This was particularly the case amongst the interviewees of older generations. These people, who have spent the formulative years of their lives living in the 'multinational' Soviet state clearly find it extremely difficult to comprehend the necessity for a physical delineation between Russia and Ukraine, arguing that there is no need for one as there are no differences to mark. These results clearly indicate that there is the possibility of 'transnational regionalism' existing in these areas, which may hamper the overall aims of the Ukrainian state. In particular, many individuals spoke about the brotherhood between the Russian, Belarussian and Ukrainian peoples, supporting the rhetoric of an 'east-Slavic' identity, whose existence delegitimates any physical borders between the three nations.

However, of significance, the results of interviews with the schoolchildren show that in this younger generation, there is more understanding, although still contested, of the need for the state border. This certainly demonstrates the effects of the Ukrainian state's attempts to engender an increased sense of national consciousness since 1991. These schoolchildren,

aged between fifteen and seventeen years old, are the first generation of children to have been educated solely in an independent Ukrainian state and from these results, we can witness a gradual growth in the sense of 'territorial' identification with the Ukrainian state. Concerning general reflections on Russia, similarly many individuals of the older generation were very weary of seeing Russia as a 'foreign' 'other', instead arguing that whilst Ukraine needed to find its own place in the world, this did not necessarily mean a total rejection of links with Russia. Many schoolchildren were also in agreement with such a viewpoint, yet also there were also other 'voices' who clearly viewed Russia as an 'other', expressing a desire for Ukraine to move away from Russia's influence. Again, such results can be seen as a 'measured' success of the state's nation building efforts. However, whilst many schoolchildren were wary about the Russian *state*, and its intentions vis-à-vis Ukraine's state independence, nevertheless, these children still desired close and amicable relations with their Russian neighbours at the everyday, local level. Thus, one can conclude that in Ukraine's eastern borderlands, whilst there have been some shifts in terms of territorial identity, especially amongst the younger generation, nevertheless, Russia, on a mass level, is far from being perceived as a real 'other'. Instead, as highlighted in chapter nine, when pressed on the issue of 'otherness' in Ukraine's internal politics of identity, many individuals felt that 'western' Ukraine was much more of an 'other' than Russia, thus again highlighting the daunting and arduous task for the Ukrainian state in these areas.

Overall the thesis has provided a 'regional' framework through which identity change in Ukraine can be gauged. By 'deconstructing' the meta-definitions such as in this instance 'eastern Ukraine' and instead conduct research at the micro-level at three different study areas within Ukraine's eastern borderlands, the study has revealed local responses and negotiation of wider processes of identity change.

Finally, since this research was undertaken, the presidential elections of 2004 in Ukraine and the 'Orange Revolution' have taken place and again highlighted the relevance of the regional factor in Ukrainian politics and society. The findings of this thesis contribute to explanations for the 'Orange Revolution'. As the results of the empirical chapters highlight, in Ukraine's eastern borderlands, people are still highly sceptical of fully embracing the Ukrainian state-led nation building project. One of the reasons for this is that in these areas, the Soviet era understanding of terms such as 'nationalism'still hold negative connotations. Thus, one can see the ease with which such anxieties were exploited by certain political forces in the run-up

to the 2004 presidential elections. Yushchenko's representation as a nationalist greatly diminished his support in these areas, even though he was actually born in Sumy oblast. Secondly, as the findings of this thesis ably demonstrate, individuals in Ukraine's eastern borderlands see no reason for Russia to be represented as an 'other' and to a certain degree are willing to resist attempts of the Ukrainian state to distance itself from Russia. This again can be seen as a reason for the lack of support for Yushchenko in oblasts such as Luhans'k and Donets'k and conversely support for Yanokovych, who advocated close ties between Russia and Ukraine. The appointment of the new government, which has called for further integration into pan-European political and security structures is likely to deepen the sense of exclusion in eastern Ukraine. The results of this thesis show that many people in these regions are not overly supportive of state-led nation building projects and attempts to move towards Europe and simultaneously away from Russia. However, at the same time, there are no open protests either. Such a situation should be noted by the 'powers that be'. Introducing fundamental reforms and shifts in issues concerning sensitive topics such as language, culture and education need to be carefully thought out and introduced with care in these regions so as to prevent the potential of an unfavourable response and subsequent further delegitimation of the Ukrainian nation and state building projects.

10.2 Theoretical implications

This thesis has focused on the study of identity change in Ukraine. Rather than seeing national identities as constant, pre-ordained or 'given', they are seen as fluid, dynamic and ever open to change. In this way, national cultures are seen as 'sites of contestation', in which competition concerning what are its contents constantly occurs. As a result of this, a multi-dimensional approach was adopted, which aimed to capture the inherent dynamism within identity change in Ukraine. In particular, theoretical frameworks used to study identity change in the post-Soviet world were critically engaged with in chapter Four and modified. In particular, whilst this thesis accepts the role that the state plays in engineering identity change in the post-Soviet space, nevertheless such one-dimensional approaches, proposed by Brubaker and Smith, fail to take into account of the fact that the state's efforts to invoke identity change are constantly negotiated and contested throughout society in a variety of different settings. Thus, in chapter Four, an alternative framework was outlined. This involved, firstly an analysis of the content of the state efforts. In the case of this thesis, this involved an analysis, in chapter Seven, of state history textbooks, used in Ukrainian schools.

Secondly, the thesis called for an in-depth qualitative study of how both teachers and schoolchildren alike were negotiating these school textbooks in particular and in a wider sense, how their identities, if at all, were being (re)shaped. The results of this empirical research are outlined in chapters Seven and Eight.

Furthermore, regarding the issue of 'identity studies', this thesis has also posited that of fundamental importance is not only how the 'we' or the 'us' is defined, but also simultaneously how we define the 'other'. In the case of national identities to fully understand who we are, we must not only identity the key determinants which draw us together, but also what factors make us different from the 'other'. Such a framework was utilised in this thesis, in which Russia was seen as Ukraine's real 'other'.

Regarding the 'mapping' of identities in Ukraine, this thesis has provided a 'regional' framework through which, state and nation building processes in Ukraine can be examined. In this fashion, the thesis adds to a growing volume of work which calls for added attention to be given to the importance of the 'regional' factor in politics and society of not only Ukraine, but more generally across the whole of the post-Soviet space and around the globe. In this case, this the results of this research demonstrate that in Ukraine key determinants of self-identification such as ethnicity, language and region of residence cannot be treated in isolation from each other, but instead often are implicitly cross-cutting each other, to varying degrees. Also, the research has moved on the debate regarding 'regionalism' in Ukraine. Whilst large-scale quantitative research studies have identified the existence of a 'regional' factor in the politics of identity in Ukraine, this thesis has moved on the debate, asking us to consider the actual *meaning* of such regional differences and how they affect state and nation building processes in Ukraine.

Moreover, the thesis has paid attention to the importance of *perception* within the study of identity change. As explained in chapter Eight, this issue is of the utmost importance and potentially more important than the actual contents of a state policy. For example, regarding the issue here of state attempts to (re)fashion national identities, the point here is, irrespective of whether or not the state is pursuing 'nationalistic' policies or not, if the population perceives the state is, then this will inevitably affect the success or failure of the state policies. As demonstrated in this thesis, in Ukraine's eastern borderlands the new educational

'content' is to a large degree seen as imposed by the centre and alien to local understandings of Ukraine's past.

Furthermore, the empirical research in this study has been located in the eastern borderlands, in three selected study areas, all very close to the Russian-Ukrainian state border. Thus, the results from this thesis can feed into a growing body of work which assesses the role of borders in the formation of national identities. Secondly, the issue of 'trans-national regionalism' has been addressed, with results from this thesis again adding to research, being undertaken in this field.

10.3 Limitations

Firstly, this thesis has suffered from the problems of time and resources. In a perfect world, more time would have been spent on all parts of the research process. However, in particular, more time in the 'field' generating empirical data may have added to the results of this work. In particular, more interviews could have taken place at a greater number of schools. Secondly, whilst the author sees himself as fluent in the Russian language, and during the research process, seemingly no linguistic problems arose, that is not to say that no such issues were present. In particular, whilst at the commencement of all interviews, all interviewees, adults and children alike were asked which language they would like to communicate in, the very fact that the initial question by me was asked in the Russian language may have considerably affected people's decision-making process. Nevertheless, whilst the author is aware of this potential limitation, it is still felt that using a professional interpreter in other important ways would have detracted from the quality of the data generated. A third limitation is that at the onset of the thesis, the author was planning to undertake research in each of the study areas in both the oblast capital and also in a rural area so as to gain a rural/urban comparison. However, as the research evolved, it became clear that neither resources nor time were available. Nevertheless, such an approach is certainly one which could be investigated within future research projects.

10.4 Future research trajectories

The results of this thesis demonstrate the need to move forward and undertake further qualitative research into how the nation-building projects of the Ukrainian state, are being

contested and negotiated in society at large. There are a number of avenues to be developed outlined below:

There is a need for more comparative research, undertaken at the micro-level. Thus, the scope of my research could be widened to include other regions of Ukraine. In particular, it is felt that the central regions of Ukraine, situated along the River *Dnipro*, which are historically far more politically passive than the regions to the east and the west, provide an ideal testing ground to determine to what extent the Ukrainian state's attempts to (re)fashion national identities is proving successful or not.

Furthermore, there is an urgent need for such in-depth research to take place, in Ukraine and more generally, across the whole of the post-Soviet space, not only in the cities and urban areas, but also in more rural areas. The scant research which has been undertaken in this area demonstrates considerable and growing rural and urban divides as Ukrainian society struggles during the throes of economic, cultural and political transformations. In this fashion, my doctorate work could easily be extended to encompass a comparative rural/urban element.

Other *sites of contestation* could be explored, other than the education system. For example, research could be conducted into how local and national media represent the key issues in Ukraine's past examined in this thesis.

This work can be widely placed not only within Area Studies and the study of identity change in the post-Soviet world, but also within a growing school called 'Border Studies'. As outlined above, this study has encompassed an in-depth investigation of how identities are being transformed in three areas, close to the Russian-Ukrainian border. The results have clearly indicated that there would be much scope in carrying out a similar project in western Ukraine, studying how identities are changing in areas close to the Polish, Belarusian, Slovak, Romanian and Hungarian borders. Furthermore, there is also a need to expand the existing results of my doctorate onto a more international level and compare how identities are being (re)shaped on the Ukrainian side of the border, with individuals living in the Russian Federation on the other side of the new Russian-Ukrainian international border. In this fashion, this potential research could certainly add to the growing field of work, engaged in judging how borders affect identity formation and cross-border socialisation.

My research has involved analysis of history textbooks, used in Ukrainian schools with the purpose of determining to what extent the Ukrainian state is using history education as a 'tool' to engineer identity change. The potential for further research on this area is enormous, with comparisons with other states, potentially a very fruitful area of study. In particular a comparative study analysing how 'neighbour' states, such as Ukraine, Poland and Russia, each interpret the same historical events, may shed a great deal of light onto how these three countries are balancing their present realities with the memories of the past and how they themselves are (re)fashioning national identities themselves.

In the sphere of education, whilst this thesis engaged with schoolchildren of a certain age group, it would be highly valuable to undertake similar research on children of differing ages, possibly including a comparison with students at higher education establishments. Also of relevance, further research may seek to investigate any links between the language of instruction of a school and the views held by the schoolchildren. As stated in chapter Seven, in this research, elements of such a phenomenon could be witnessed, certainly in Luhans'k. Moreover, another fruitful avenue of investigation would be to engage with the relationship between an individual's ethnicity and the views held on Ukraine's nation-building processes.

As regards the process of educational reform and the role of schoolteachers within it, whilst this thesis has revealed that teachers are far from mere 'passive transmitters' of information, nonetheless there is ample scope for future work, concentrating on the actual 'mechanisms and processes' through which individuals engage with and negotiate the state's central narrative. Such research would involve in-depth interviews with teachers as well as a long period of ethnographic study, involving participant observation.

Finally, the thesis has uncovered the significance of regional perceptions within the spatial politics of identity in Ukraine. This demonsrates that future work should engage with how other 'regions' view themselves, how they view the concept of 'Ukraine' and their relationship to it and finally their relationship to other 'regions'. Without this examination of micro-level processes, we cannot begin to understand the dynamics of identity change in the post-Soviet space.

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APPENDICES

This section is divided into two parts. The first part lists the qualitative interviews with education officials, school directors, history teachers and schoolchildren across the three study areas of Luhans'k, Kharkiv and Sumy, from which the vast bulk of empirical data used in this thesis was generated. These interviews took place between January and April 2003. Below are listed the schools which were used in each city and where possible, the names of individual interviewees. In cases where individuals did not want to be named, they are anonymously referred to, for example, 'history teacher'. Also are listed interviews which took place with academics in Kiev. The second part is an example of the set of thematic questions which were asked by the author during the interviews.

APPENDIX I: QUALITATIVE INTERVIEWS

Luhans'k

Skhola inozemnikh mov (School of foreign languages), (private)

- Schoolchildren, grades 10 and 11, 14th February 2003.
- Alexeyeva Ludmilla Alimovna, History teacher, 14th February 2003.
- Katashov, Anatoliy Ivanovich, School director, 19th February 2003
- Zelenova, Anastasiya, History teacher, 14th February 2003.

School No. 5

- Schoolchildren, grades 10 and 11, 24th February 2003.
- Savkina, Anna Valentinovna, History teacher, 24th February 2003.
- Vasileva, Elena Yurevna, 24th February 2003.

Specialised school: Level 1-3 for the deepened learning of foreign languages

- Schoolchildren, grades 10 and 11, 5th March 2003
- Freiman, Grigoriy Arkad'evich, 5th March 2003.
- Senik, Natal'ya Germanovnya, 5th March 2003.

School No. 3

- Tsytsylina, Galina Georgievna, History teacher, 6th March 2003.

Gymnaziya (Lycee)

- Schoolchildren, grades 10 and 11, 18th March 2003
- Ol'chenko, Larisa Nikolaiyevna, School director and history teacher, 18th March 2003.
- Surname withheld, Nikolaiy, Vsevolordovich, History teacher, 18th March 2003.

School No. 57

- Schoolchildren, grades 10 and 11, 18th March 2003.
- Serdorenko, Tatyana, History teacher, 25th April 2003.
- Surname withheld, Irina Semyonovna, History teacher, 25th April 2003.

Kharkiv

School No. 78

- Schoolchildren, grades 10 and 11, 3rd April 2003.
- History teacher, 3rd April 2003.

School No. 5

- Schoolchildren, grades 10 and 11, 4th April 2003.
- Ageeva, Taisiya Egorevna, History teacher, 4th April 2003.
- Kuz'mina Svetlana Anatolevna, History teacher, 4th April 2003.

School No. 45

- Schoolchildren, grades 10 and 11, 4th April 2003.
- Dentsova, Lubov' Pavlovna, History teacher, 4th April 2003.
- Shishko, Yelena Alexeyevna, History teacher, 4th April 2003.

School No. 173

- Schoolchildren, grades 10 and 11, 4th April 2003.
- Netos, Grigoriy Stepanovich, 4th April 2003.

Ukrainskaya Narodnaya Akademiya (Ukrainian People's Academy) (private)

- Schoolchildren, grades 10 and 11, March 29th 2003.
- Butylkina, Tatyana Leonidovna, Vice-director of work concerning the economic and legal school, 23rd March 2003.
- Gaikov, Anatoliy Afanasievich, Reader of methodological training, 22nd March 2003.
- Kostakov, Gennadiy, Assistant director of the faculty of history and political science, 23rd March 2003.
- Ostakhova, Yekateryna Viktorovna, Reader, Professor, History teacher, 22nd March 2003.

Kharkiv State University

- Chorniy, Dmitri Nikolaiyevich, Senior lecturer of 'Ukrainian studies' faculty, 20th March 2003.

Kharkiv City Council

- Lytsenko, Aleksandr Sergeevich, Vice-director of Education Department, 7th April 2003.

Kharkiv Oblast's Post-diploma training centre

- Svyatokum, Oksana Yevgenievna, methodologist at Kharkiv Oblast's post-education training centre, 7th April 2003.

Sumy

School No. 22

- Schoolchildren, grades 10 and 11, 18th April 2003.
- Valentina, Ivanovna, History teacher, 18th April 2003.

School No. 27

- Schoolchildren, grades 10 and 11, 18th April 2003.
- Podchin, Oksana Anatolevna, History teacher, 18th April 2003.
- Serdnak, Tamara Vladimirovna, History teacher, 18th April 2003.
- Sheveleva, Irina Mikhailovna, History teacher, 18th April 2003.

"Skazka" (fairy-tale) (private)

- Schoolchildren, grades 10 and 11, 18th April 2003.
- History teacher, 18th April 2003.

School No. 29

- Schoolchildren, grades 10 and 11, 19th April 2003.
- History teacher, 19th April 2003.

Klassicheskaya gymnaziya (Classical Lycee)

- Schoolchildren, grades 10 and 11, 19th April 2003.
- History teacher, 19th April 2003.

Kiev

- Hryhoriy Nemyria, Director of the Centre for European and International Studies, 28th
- Georgij Kasianov, Education Programs Director, International Renaissance Foundation, 28th January 2003.

APPENDIX II: INTERVIEW QUESTIONS

- What changes have taken place in the 'History of Ukraine' course since 1991?

- What do you think about these changes?

- How does today's History of Ukraine course compare with the history course, taught in the Soviet period?

- What specific parts of today's 'History of Ukraine' course do you like? Why?

- What specific parts of today's 'History of Ukraine' course do you not like? Why?

- What do you feel about the depiction of the period of Kiev Rus' in the new Ukrainian textbooks?

- What do you feel about the depiction of the role of the Hetmans Khmelnytskyi and Mazepa in the new Ukrainian textbooks?

- How do you think the Soviet years are represented in the new Ukrainian textbooks?

- What do you feel about the depiction of the 'Great Famine' in the new Ukrainian textbooks?

- What do you feel about the depiction of the war years between 1941-1945 in the new Ukrainian textbooks?

- How do you think that Russia and Russians are represented in the 'History of Ukraine' course?

It needs to be reiterated, as previously outlined in the methodological chapter, these questions were not all used and in this order, in a 'list format' during each interview. Rather they acted as a 'guide' for the author. Thus, in different interviews, depending on the interaction between the interviewer and interviewee(s), various topics were given greater or less

attention. At all times, the author tried to allow the interviewees to have 'their voice' heard, dictating the pace and content of each interview themselves, to a certain degree.