V. Lypyns'kyj's Idea of Nation

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His article "Vjačeslav Lypyns'kyj's Idea of Nation," based on a series of three lectures presented at the Seminar in Ukrainian Studies at Harvard University in November and December of 1972, is published here for the first time. Had its author lived, he would certainly have presented this work, or some revision of it, at the V. Lypyns'kyj Centennial Conference in 1982.

Vjačeslav Lypyns'kyj maintained that there exist three basic sociopolitical formations: *state, society,* and *nation.* His definition of the state is fundamentally in agreement with that advanced by modern political theory: the state is that human collectivity which successfully claims within a given territory the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical coercion, or, to use the classical phrase of Bodin, "societates quae superiorem non recognoscunt." Society—*hromadjanstvo* (Lypyns'kyj admits that he dislikes the term *suspil'nist'*)—he defines as "all those people on the given territory who do not have as a source of their livelihood the exercise of state functions and who do not possess the direct possibility of using the physical coercion of the state for the realization of their wishes."[1] For nation Lypyns'kyj advanced a number of definitions. To quote one of his descriptive rather than explanatory definitions: "I regard the nation as being the product of the complex reciprocal relationship between state and society. Nation is the realization of the will to be a nation. When there exists no will expressed in the form of an idea, there exists no nation. But a nation does not exist when this will and idea are present but are not realized in the material form of a

[1] V. Lypyns'kyj, *Lysty do brativ-xliborobiv* (Vienna, 1926), p. 377.

state.''[2] Allegorically, he defines the relationship between the three political entities as follows: the state is the father, society is the mother, and the nation is the child of both of them.[3]

Before proceeding to an elaboration of Lypyns'kyj's idea of nation per se, let us look more closely at his fundamental views about the nation: (a) Of the three basic entities of political life and the historical process—state, society, and nation—Lypyns'kyj ascribes the highest value to the last. (b) However, nowhere does he provide a direct or elaborated answer as to why he attaches this highest social value to the nation. Indirect answers can be found in his writing with relative ease, but they are equivocal and therefore can give rise to controversy. (c) His idea of nation stands in direct opposition to the concept of nation dominating Ukrainian political thought before and, I would argue, after his time. (d) The most characteristic feature of his idea of nation lies in the two following circumstances: he advances a far-reaching identification of nation with the state; in turn, in opposition to the ethnic factor, he considers national territory as undoubtedly the most essential factor of a nation. (e) Following from such premises, he decisively divides the existing ethnic communities into peoples with and without traditions of statehood (*nederžavni i deržavni narody*). (f) Consequently, he admits the possibility of the existence of ''non-nation-based'' nationalism, explaining it by reference to a specific example. Ukrainian nationalism exists, but as to the existence of a Ukrainian nation, it is still in a process of formation that is far from complete. (g) Lypyns'kyj's own theory of the formation of a nation emphasizes—or one may say overemphasizes—the role of monarchy in the process of a given nation's formation out of heterogeneous ethnic elements. (h) While he is unreservedly committed to the nation, ascribing to it the highest social value, he later declares himself an irreconcilable adversary of modern nationalism, which he regards as a destructive political force. In other words, Lypyns'kyj, like Renan, considers it as given that mankind is divided into a number of nations, and he rejects the idea of one unified humanity in any near or distant future. Nevertheless, he would like to see a situation in which the existing nations do not germinate individual nationalisms. These points form his basic theses on the essence of nation.

We must recognize that it is extremely difficult to offer a satisfactory definition of nation and that contemporary scholars almost unanimously agree that no one has succeeded in devising a definition of nation and

[2] Lypyns'kyj, *Lysty do brativ-xliborobiv*, p. 387.
[3] Lypyns'kyj, *Lysty do brativ-xliborobiv*, p. 382.

nationalism so concise and complete that it needs no "ifs" and "buts."[4] This, of course, applies to Lypyns'kyj's own definition of nation. The first attempts to define nation came from German Romantic scholars, especially Johann Gottfried von Herder.[5] Herder was understood to say that language is the most important factor in the identity of a nation, a key to the national self, because words are the "companions of the dawn of life." Hence even if a nation loses its political independence, it will survive if its linguistic traditions are preserved. Conversely, a sufficiently large ethnic group, never having attained statehood but possessing a distinct language, may be considered at least potentially a distinct nation. It is true that Herder did not conclude that language is the only criterion for distinguishing a nation. The humanitarian thought of the Enlightenment that permeates his thought focused on anthropology as much as on language. However, the notion that nations are really language groups, and that nationalism is therefore in some sense a linguistic political movement, derives from Herder.

Herder's definition of nation, modified by Johann Gottlieb Fichte and other German Romantics, dominated the political thought of Eastern Europe during the entire nineteenth century and later. The linguistic criterion took hold in Eastern Europe and even influenced Marxist analysis, Lenin's as much as Otto Bauer's.[6] The founders and continuators of the Ukrainian national revival welcomed the Herderian linguistic criterion with open arms. The embrace is understandable because the criterion of statehood as a factor in the continuity of the existence of the Ukrainian people was problematic. Equating the preservation of the Ukrainian language with the preservation of the identity of the Ukrainian nation has continued to our own day. Other criteria having primarily a political nature, such as statehood, were either consciously or implicitly underplayed, at least up to the Revolution of 1917.

Vjačeslav Lypyns'kyj's departure from this political tradition came long before the 1917 Revolution. Against the ethnic concept of nation, based primarily on the criterion of language, he presented his own concept of nation, referring primarily to territory and culminating in an unconditional demand of statehood for the Ukraine. His concept of nation, unlike that of the Ukrainian populists, deliberately emphasized factors other than ethnic ones, indeed, those primarily political.

[4] R. Emerson, *From Empire to Nation* (Boston, 1966), pp. 89–104.
[5] A. D. Smith, *Theories of Nationalism* (London, 1971), pp. 164, 180ff.
[6] Smith, *Theories*, p. 182.

Analysis of the idea of nation, difficult in itself, becomes even more difficult when we confront Lypyns'kyj's concept of nation, for two reasons. One is that his concept underwent a significant evolution. The second is that in his classification of political systems in *Lysty do brativ-xliborobiv* (Letters to fellow farmers) he tied the concept of the nation with individual political systems to such an extent that only a rather weak common denominator can be established for the idea of nation per se. In Lypyns'kyj's thought, each of the three political systems influences the very essence of nation in a definite way.

Let us deal briefly with the first problem, namely, the evolution in Lypyns'kyj's notion of a nation, and postpone the explanation of the second problem for a time. A controversy exists on the question whether Lypyns'kyj experienced an evolution of his political *Weltanschauung*— in other words, whether he held fast to conservative views and remained a decisive opponent of democracy throughout his life. Lew Bilas supports the idea that evolution in Lypyns'kyj's political thought, if any really occurred, was insignificant. Jaroslaw Pelenski, on the other hand, asserts that Lypyns'kyj became a conservative only under the impact of bitter political experience and disappointment during the Ukrainian Revolution. This problem of steadfastness or evolution in Lypyns'kyj's political views, combined with his never fully explained adolescent conversion from being a Pole to being a Ukrainian, is in itself a topic for a monograph. It should be pointed out here that in his personal (as yet unpublished) notes written after the Revolution, Lypyns'kyj emphatically denies that he was ever a democrat in the authentic sense, stating that before the Revolution he understood democracy as an ideology obliging only service to his people. In the sense that people should be governed justly and well he always was and remained a "demophile," but in the sense that people should govern themselves he was never a democrat.

Without accusing Lypyns'kyj of blatant misidentification, I nevertheless suggest that before the Revolution he had great sympathy toward democracy, and that he connected the national revival of the Ukrainian people with the process of democratization. But unlike the Ukrainian *xlopomany*, Lypyns'kyj did not combine his decisive conversion from Pole to Ukrainian with any sort of "declassification." The *xlopomany*, while identifying themselves with the Ukrainian people, attempted to shed their class status (how successfully is another question). Tadej Ryl's'kyj, who took as his second wife a peasant girl from his village, is a good example. Lypyns'kyj's actions were different. While consciously turning from being a Pole into being a Ukrainian, he did not attempt to become a *déclassé*, but remained a landlord, maintained the lifestyle of a nobleman, and retained

his Roman Catholic faith. "I have become a Ukrainian," he wrote in his notes, "not because I considered myself to be weaker and lower than the people, but because I considered myself to be better [in terms of culture] and also stronger."[7] The retention of aristocratic status made Lypyns'kyj's break with Ukrainian democracy, which worshipped the rebellious peasant, inevitable. Yet his sympathetic attitude toward democracy was discernable up to the Revolution, a time when, taking into account the brilliance of his political mind, there is little doubt that he knew the real political meaning of democracy.

Lypyns'kyj's flirtation with democracy had a definite influence on his idea of nation, or more exactly, on his idea of the relationship of nation to state. He drew a clear line between the phenomenon of nation and the institution of state, foreseeing that the national revival of the Ukrainian people would be connected with the process of democratization. In the programmatic essay "Szlachta na Ukrainie" (The nobility in the Ukraine), published in 1909, he reminded his fellow Poles living in the Ukraine that "there exists no force which can stop the revival of these [Ukrainian] people, now when all, even the most aristocratic nations, are undergoing the process of democratization, as we see in the case of Polish society, now when people in the entire world are gaining the right to express themselves and to determine for themselves."[8] Three years later, in his draft of a program for the prospective *Sojuz vyzvolennja Ukrainy* (Union for the Liberation of the Ukraine), entitled "Memorijal do Ukrajins'koho komitetu pro naše stanovyšče suproty napruženoji sytuaciji v Evropi" (Memorandum to the Ukrainian Committee concerning our position with regard to the tense political situation in Europe), Lypyns'kyj stated (in article 2): "The development of the Ukrainian nation, which is deprived of a strong wealthy class, is closely connected with the growth of political democracy and the carrying out of social reforms advantageous to the broad masses from the economic viewpoint."

As long as Lypyns'kyj placed some hope in democracy, he made a clear distinction between nation and state as two essentially different entities, from the sociopolitical point of view. Once he rejected and then violently condemned democracy as a political system, this delineation collapsed. The *Lysty* reflect the ideological consequences: "Recently much confusion regarding this problem [namely, the concept of nation] has been caused

[7] "Notatky V. Lypyns'koho z joho arxivu," unpublished, vol. 1, p. 2 (hereafter "Notatky").
[8] W. Lipiński, *Szlachta na Ukrainie* (Cracow, 1909), p. 36.

because scholars started to distinguish nation from state,"[9] which, if taken literally, would indicate that to Lypyns'kyj a complete identification between state and nation was desirable.

There are, however, three elements in his concept of nation that Lypyns'kyj never revised: (1) that a nation, specifically the Ukrainian people, is by definition entitled to possess an independent state, which in turn carries the political ideal of a nation-state; (2) that the most basic element of a nation is not ethnicity—e.g., language, customs, race, etc.—but territory; (3) that nationhood is not granted by nature or Providence, but is always the product of a historical and political process. Let us look at these three elements one by one.

It is not difficult to explain why Lypyns'kyj, unlike most contemporary Ukrainian leaders, was from 1902—that is, from his becoming a Ukrainian—a staunch advocate of statehood for the Ukraine who rejected any less ambitious solution, e.g., autonomy or federation. From childhood Lypyns'kyj felt the spiritual impact of Polish national strivings to regain independence for the Polish nation. Surely this helped to influence his view that, once there exists a people who possess a distinct national identity, they are entitled to possess their own independent state. For him this view was axiomatic, without need of proof. He borrowed the idea from the Polish political tradition, and with all his intellectual force, long before the Revolution of 1917, he tried to convince the Ukrainian intelligentsia of its expediency. Statehood for the Ukraine was a kind of dogma to which he remained faithful until the end of his life. In propagating this idea he saw his own personal mission: "I have willed the Ukrainian state, and not the possibility of reading Vynnyčenko's writings in Ukrainian, or of playing pranks on Russians or Poles. The Ukrainian state enraptured me by its majesty; I was, however, not excited about poetry solely because it was written in Ukrainian, or because of feeling hatred toward Russia or Poland. Therefore, I have remained entirely alien from the majority of Ukrainians, even when they praise me."[10]

Let us examine the role of territory as a component of Lypyns'kyj's idea of nation. Speaking broadly, there can be no serious doubt about the close relationship between the nation and the national territory with which it identifies itself. No single theme recurs more constantly in national anthems, songs, legends, and symbolism than the reference to the peculiar virtues and the beauty of the lands and waters with which each nation has happily been endowed. But in contrast to the modern state, whose

[9] Lypyns'kyj, *Lysty do brativ-xliborobiv*, p. 209.
[10] "Notatky," 1:9, fn. 39.

boundaries are fixed (although at any moment they can become the object of bitter dispute), the territory of the nation is characteristically less sharply defined. The so-called national territory is rarely a separate, well-defined geographic entity. In our day the definition of national territory derives primarily from the ethnic one, although few states can claim that their boundaries follow exactly the frontiers of settlement of a given nationality. Nonetheless, as a rule, the national territory is considered to be the geographical area on which the specific nationality lives in a sizeable majority.

Lypyns'kyj elevated national territory to the status of a nation's paramount attribute. The elevation prompted these observations by Dmytro Čyževs'kyj:

> Lypyns'kyj's regarding *territory* as an attribute of nation is not original. What is original, and simply unprecedented in contemporary literature, is Lypyns'kyj's considering territory a basic and constructive component of a nation's being. "Territory" is perhaps an inadequate word, for it implies only the amount of space that a nation occupies. A better word, and one that Lypyns'kyj uses intermittently, is land (*zemlja*) in its concrete being (*danist'*): that is, territory, with all its geological, topographical, economic, and even aesthetic proprieties. One's attachment to the land, to one's own native land, supports and strengthens national consciousness. . . . The unusual definition that Lypyns'kyj gives of who is a Ukrainian is well known: "A Ukrainian, one's fellow man, an individual of the same nation, is everyone who is organically (place of abode and work) connected with the Ukraine; a non-Ukrainian is an inhabitant of another land. . . ."

Čyževs'kyj concluded:

> This definition has given rise to endless arguments. Nevertheless, the definition, for all its unusualness, is based on a deep, metaphysical sense of the organic unity of the nation that lives on the land, grows from the land, and is physically influenced by the natural geographic environment. . . . This definition of the nation as a unity resulting from the unity of "territory" or land has an extraordinary originality.[11]

This emphasis on territory as a basic attribute of nation Lypyns'kyj advanced from the very outset of his Ukrainian political activity, that is, from about 1908. He advanced his idea of nation against the dominant one based on ethnic elements, primarily on a distinct language. He considered all people permanently settled within the boundaries of a specific national territory to be members of one and the same nation, regardless of their language, race, religion, or class status. They are all citizens of equal value to the country. He named his idea "territorialism" and, basing a political

[11] D. Čyževs'kyj, "Vjačeslav Lypyns'kyj jak filosof istoriji," *Dzvony*, 1932, no. 6 (15), pp. 453ff. (English translation published in this issue).

program on it, he hoped to win the Polish upper class living in the Ukraine over to the Ukrainian national cause. He wanted this Polish class to identify politically with the Ukrainian people, without giving up their social status or Polish culture. He called upon the Poles living in the Ukraine to pay their debt to the Ukrainian masses by cultural and social work on their behalf. In return for their loyalty to the country in which they were living, they would retain their social and cultural status. As we well know, his attempt ended in failure. Yet, to his idea of nation, projected primarily on a territory, he remained steadfast to the end of his life. He explained the idea most succinctly in the collection of his articles entitled *Religija i cerkva v istoriji Ukrajiny* (Religion and church in the history of the Ukraine):

> In order that we could understand our spiritual way and advance along it, our intelligentsia should decisively give up the chaotic mixture of the German and French (also in its poor Polish and Russian versions) understanding of the phenomenon of nation: the German one, based on the tribal concept, on the concept of common racial origin, on reduction of the notion of nation to a "natural fact"; such a notion, in our colonial conditions, with periodic migration of peoples on our territory (in intervals of ca. 200 years), is a complete absurdity: there have never been and never will be "pure-blooded Ukrainians" in a sense of common origin from one tribe, and the nationalist antipodal positing of such "pure-blooded" against "unpure-blooded" [Ukrainians] is in our condition a historical deception which under some conditions may easily turn into a ruinous political charlatanry. Also [we should give up] the French notion, based on "free national self-determination," on transference of the nation into a realm of "free coniousness" and ... turning the notion of nation into an "ideological fact," because this is tantamount to the lifting up of the individual historico-cultural, in our case also confessional, attributes to an absolute. In view of our innate anarchic individualism [such a notion] must logically lead to a variety of "self-determinations" of individuals and diverse groups in the Ukraine and eventually, after a shorter or longer duration of anarchy, to the victory of Byzantine-Orthodox–All-Russian or Roman-Catholic–Polish self-determination. This is the usual ending of their careers by our nationalists of this kind.
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> Instead, in my opinion, acceptable for us is an understanding of nation close to the English one. " 'Normans, Saxons, Danes—we are,' say the Englishmen." It could be formulated in our own way as follows: whoever settled in our country (and is not a nomad) and therefore became part and parcel of the Ukraine is Ukrainian, regardless of tribal or cultural origin, of "racial" or "ideological" genealogy.[12]

Important, farsighted motivations prompted Lypyns'kyj to advocate the notion of nation based on his concept of "territorialism." He explained them thoroughly in his article "Kraj i naród" (Country and people), published in *Przegląd Krajowy* (no. 3) in 1909. Here he declared himself an

[12] V. Lypyns'kyj, *Religija i cerkva v istoriji Ukrajiny* (Philadelphia, 1925), p. 57.

uncompromising adversary of contemporary nationalism, while admitting that at the beginning of the nineteenth century until about 1848, nationalism was a positive political force. With the passing of time, however, nationalism has increasingly become a destructive political force, germinating intolerance and hatred among nations and national minorities. Lypyns'kyj foresaw that this type of nationalism would bring political ruin for all of Europe. He considered nationalism, operating from the concept of nation based on ethnicity (race, language, culture, religion, or all these elements together), as especially dangerous in the case of the Ukraine. In view of the presence on its territory of sizeable minorities, occupying positions of political, cultural, or economic authority, the unleashing of ethnic-based nationalism would oblige these minorities to oppose the idea of statehood for the Ukraine and would compel them to turn to the Russian or Polish metropolis for support. In such a political configuration the realistic chances for the Ukraine to gain independence would be nil, and the Ukraine would be condemned to colonial status.

Lypyns'kyj's opposition to ethnically defined nationalism remained as constant as did his loyalty to the territorially bound notion of a nation. The two conditioned each other, so that Lypyns'kyj wished to reconcile the concept of land (country) with the idea of nation. He felt that this would replace nationalism with patriotism, which he equated with what may conditionally be called *Heimatliebe*. Lypyns'kyj distinguished between ethnically defined nationalism and patriotism; the latter, he maintained, germinated just from the love of the country itself, from love of the national territory, of *zemlja* and *bat'kivščyna*, without xenophobic enmity. Sensing that the spread of ethnic-based nationalism was growing along with the advancement of democracy, he recognized that a reorientation in the concept of nation alone would not prevent nationalistic hatreds. Hence, after the Revolution and his rejection of democracy, Lypyns'kyj tied his idea of nation not only to territory, but to a particular political system, namely, monarchy in the form of classocracy.

The theory of territorialism as a means of redefining the idea of nation prompts some critical comments. One question is, when Lypyns'kyj advanced his theory of territorialism before World War I, by what criterion was he defining the national territory of the Ukraine? Was it a geographical one? The answer to that is, of course, negative. In geographical terms the territory of the Ukraine is far from a well-defined geographical unit; on the contrary, the Ukraine is basically an extension of the East European plain, so purely geographical criteria cannot determine Ukrainian national territory. Yet Lypyns'kyj advocated the idea of a Ukrainian territory. By what criterion, then, did he define the national territory of the Ukraine? The

answer is: by the ethnic one. He considered that geographical area of Eastern Europe on which the Ukrainian peasant population lived *en masse* as the Ukraine. To the national minorities living within this Ukrainian ethnic mass—namely, Russians, Poles, Jews, and others—his theory of territorialism promised preservation of their cultural and national identity as well as preservation of their social status, in return for their loyalty to the Ukraine. Did Lypyns'kyj anticipate that in the case of the prolonged existence of an independent Ukrainian state, these minorities would retain their individual national identity? The answer is—probably not. In the long run he foresaw their ethnic assimilation with the mass of the Ukrainian people. That conclusion follows logically from his theory of the formation of a nation.

Lypyns'kyj's theory of the formation of nation is elaborate and complex, and refers to the racial symbols "the yellow" and "the black." However, in most cases his references to race are to be understood in psychological rather than biological terms. He emphatically denies the racial purity of any of the existing nations, and he considers the blending of various races one important source for the growth of civilization.

An adequate presentation of Lypyns'kyj's theory of the formation of the nation would demand much explanation, the more so since it is on some points circular in reasoning. It may be presented most succinctly, perhaps, against the background of his controversy with Volodymyr Starosol's'kyj, whose fine study of nation, entitled *Teorija naciji* (Theory of nation), appeared in 1922. Starosol's'kyj used Ferdinand Tönnies's sociological theory of *Gesellschaft* and *Gemeinschaft* to explain the essence of nation. Starosol's'kyj saw nation as a basic *Gemeinschaft*, that is, a spontaneous, organic community which protects an individual against alienation and social atomization by providing him with framework and material for his spiritual fulfillment. On the other hand, Starosol's'kyj defined state as a basic *Gesellschaft*. In applying Tönnies's sociological theory Starosol's'kyj followed Otto Bauer, although Bauer himself made limited use of Tönnies's theory. Lypyns'kyj, without having recourse to that theory, sees the essence of nation in a way similar to Starosol's'kyj's. He, too, viewed nation as a basic, organic community fulfilling the same functions pointed out by Starosol's'kyj,[13] and he, too, ascribed to it the highest social value.

Lypyns'kyj disagrees totally, however, with Starosol's'kyj's theory of the formation of a nation. Starosol's'kyj maintained that the authentic nation appeared rather late on the political scene, more or less simultaneously with the emergence of democracy, and thus one cannot talk about the

[13] Lypyns'kyj, *Lysty do brativ-xliborobiv*, p. 245.

existence of nation in a true sense before the French Revolution. That view ascribes—at least implicitly—to democracy the capability of germinating a nation. Lypyns'kyj rejects this view, asserting that in historical experience "no one nation was initiated or could have been initiated by democracy."[14] According to Lypyns'kyj, democracy possesses disintegrative rather than integrative tendencies. Every nation that is authentic—that is, non-fictional, or exists other than in the minds of *literati*—is an ethnic, racial, and linguistic amalgamation. By its very nature, democracy is unable to accomplish the formation of a new nation. In the opinion of Lypyns'kyj, this nation-forming capability belongs exclusively to monarchy, whether classocratic or ochlocratic. Only monarchies have a sufficiently strong center of power and authority to integrate racially, linguistically, and confessionally diverse groups into one nation. Even the United States is not an exception, since the American colonial tradition was monarchical, not democratic. Hence Lypyns'kyj believes that any people, in order to transform themselves into a nation, must undergo a period of rule by monarchy in either the classocratic or ochlocratic forms. Only after national integration has been accomplished by monarchy can democracy appear on the political scene, having a state apparatus and an efficient army officer corps, both built by the monarchy, at its disposal. Monarchy, then, and not democracy, is the real creator of nations. Democracy is actually the destroyer of nations.

Lypyns'kyj's theory of the formation of a nation is simultaneously an admittance that individual nations are not something granted by nature or Providence, but are the product of a complex historical process. About this he constantly reminds his readers, for instance in this excerpt from his *Lysty*:

> All nations were created by leading, active minorities according to the receptivity (*pry vospryjimčyvosti*) of their leadership by the passive majorities and [all nations] were dying spiritually and physically due to the weakness of these leading minorities and to the non-receptivity of the passive majorities to their leadership. If it were permissable to use such a comparison, a nation is as much a product of human creativity as is a cultivated breed of cattle. The latter, when not submitted to the process of cultivation, degenerates, either dying out or regressing to a primitive stage. The difference lies in the fact that cattle is cultivated by an outside force, namely, human creation, while nations must cultivate themselves. Nature gives for the creation of a nation only rough material in the form of this or another, and better or poorer, mixture of races, better or worse geographical space; similar to her giving of better or poorer material and places for buildings. A nation, however, like a building, is a product of human beings—a product which actually is constantly

[14] Lypyns'kyj, *Lysty do brativ-xliborobiv*, p. 245.

exposed to destruction by nature. To preserve and develop it [the nation] there is need for perennial effort, there is need for a struggle against nature.[15]

Lypyns'kyj's theory of the formation of a nation is intimately connected with his other major thesis advancing the identification of state with nation. He reached the identification of state with nation only after the Revolution, when his rejection and condemnation of democracy became total. In some statements his identification of nation and state is so close that logically Lypyns'kyj had no choice but to deny the status of nation to large ethnic communities like the Ukrainians. He denies the status of nation to the Ukrainian people not because they do not have their own state at a given time, but because they lack a strong state tradition. Holding fast to that principle, Lypyns'kyj divides the existing ethnic communities into *deržavni i nederžavni*, that is, those with a state tradition and those without it. Thus, the Poles, even before regaining independence, Lypyns'kyj classified as a nation because for centuries they had their own independent state, capable of integrating an ethnically mixed population by giving it identity as a nation; also, even in times of subjugation, the Polish people had retained a political elite capable of leadership. The Ukrainians, Lypyns'kyj maintained, are in an entirely different situation. They are a "stateless people," and hence not yet a nation because they lack both a long-standing state tradition and a political elite capable of imposing its will on the Ukrainian peasant masses. The Ukrainian people are as yet only a "nationality" in the process of becoming a nation. Their political status is a colonial one. Indeed, the Ukraine is a somewhat peculiar colony, due to the large number of extremely diverse foreign political and cultural influences to which it has continually been exposed.

The Ukrainian people can become a nation only when they succeed in transforming the Ukraine into an independent state. Yet the building of a new state Lypyns'kyj always considered the most difficult of all political tasks—incomparably more difficult if the given country exists as a colony. Before World War I, in a review of Leon Wasilewski's book *Ukraina i sprawa ukraińska* (The Ukraine and the Ukrainian problem), he wrote, "a state does not emerge at once. The process of the creation of a state is the most difficult and the most painful process of all known in the history of social life."[16]

15 Lypyns'kyj, *Lysty do brativ-xliborobiv*, p. 359.

16 V. Lypyns'kyj, "Kil'ka uvah z pryvodu knyžky d. Vasilevs'koho," *Literaturno-naukovyj vistnyk*, 1912, no. 9, p. 343.

The classification of the Ukraine as a colony and of the Ukrainian people as a "nationality" (and not a nation) results from Lypyns'kyj's theory of the formation of a nation and from his far-reaching identification of state and nation. In the essay entitled "Xam i Jafet" (Ham and Japheth), which has the character of a political parable, Lypyns'kyj states:

> State is, first of all: authority, territory, and society. Without these three components there is no state. This means that for the building of a state, the presence of an organized power sustaining authority in the name of a common good of the entire country-territory and the entire society is necessary.
>
> Nation is, first of all, a spiritual, cultural, and historical unity. This means that for the birth of a nation, the long existence of the given society on a given territory in the shell of its own state is necessary. Nation, a spiritual unity, is always born out of the state, out of a territorial-political unity, and not vice-versa.[17]

In *Lysty*, his fundamental political treatise, Lypyns'kyj elaborates on the same thesis, primarily from the perspective of his concept of a political elite capable of imposing its creative will on the passive masses. Lypyns'kyj, we know, denied the role and status of a political elite to the Ukrainian intelligentsia. An authentic elite, in his interpretation, must control the means of production and the means of self-defense: in his words, it must have at its disposal "production and the sword" (*produkcija i meč*). Otherwise stated, the status of an elite derives from its material base, from its capacity to produce material goods, and from its capability to defend itself and the country. It must, then, also control the army. A leading stratum not possessing this material base is powerless, and therefore not a real political elite. Starting from this concept of the political elite, Lypyns'kyj argued that without its own political elite a nation cannot exist. An elite, if it is not fictional, must be in control of its own political power, and a national elite can do this only in its own state. Only then can it impose its idea of nation on the passive masses, and only then can we speak about the existence of a distinct nation, knowing its own political identity, germinating its own patriotism, and using the means of defense in its own national interests. Nevertheless, the shaping of the idea of nation is the task of the intelligentsia. The intelligentsia is, however, incapable of realizing that task when it is separated from the national material base. Therefore he concluded:

> Without its own sovereign state organization there cannot be a nation. "Its own state" is a synonym for "the authority of its own aristocracy [elite]." Since the existence of a nation without its own national aristocracy [elite] is an impossibility,

[17] V. Lypyns'kyj, "Xam i Jafet," *Postup*, 1928, no. 3/4, pp. 76ff.

the existence of a national aristocracy [elite] as well as of a nation without its own state is also an impossibility.[18]

Fully aware that he was running against the entire tradition of Ukrainian political thought, Lypyns'kyj persisted in explaining his position from a variety of angles.

The cause of this difference of position . . . lies in the diametrically opposed understanding of the relationship between state and nation by those Ukrainians who put cultural-national issues and attributes in first place, and by us, state-oriented Ukrainians (*deržavnyky*) who put political and territorial issues and attributes in first place. This difference can briefly be formulated as follows: they wish to arrive at statehood with the help of the nation, and we wish to achieve the status of nation through the state.[19]

The idea that of the many complex forces shaping the nation, the foremost is the role of the state was presumably first stated by Lord Acton. In his essay "Nationality" Lord Acton said: "A state may in the course of time produce a nationality; but that a nationality should constitute a state is contrary to the nature of modern civilization. The nation derives its power from the memory of a former independence."[20] It seems highly improbable that Lypyns'kyj was familiar with Acton's view, or that he was influenced by him in developing his own theory of the formation of a nation and, by extension, his identification of a state with nation. Most likely Lypyns'kyj's development of the two theories was influenced by the sociological thought of Ludwig Gumplowicz as set forth in his study *Der Rassenkampf*, and by the views of Roman Dmowski. Dmowski, during a sojourn to Japan at the time of the Russian Revolution of 1905 (his purpose was to paralyze the political activity of Józef Piłsudski), was so impressed by the coherence of the Japanese nation that he added a chapter entitled "Nation and State" to the fourth edition of his *Myśli nowoczesnego Polaka*: there he concluded that "state and nation are in reality inseparable concepts."[21] This, of course, does not mean that Lypyns'kyj is to be accused of intellectual plagiarism. While these sources must have provided him with some ideas, he reshaped and elaborated them beyond recognition. Hence his theories are essentially his own intellectual products. After Lypyns'kyj's death, the idea that the state gives birth to the nation was also independently advanced by the Swiss historian Werner Kaegi in his *Historische Meditationen* (published in 1942)

[18] Lypyns'kyj, *Lysty do brativ-xliborobiv*, p. 211.

[19] V. Lypyns'kyj, "Z pryvodu statti generala Zales'koho," *Xliborobs'ka Ukrajina*, no. 5, p. 280.

[20] Lord Acton, *Essays on Freedom and Power* (New York, 1955), p. 162.

[21] R. Dmowski, *Myśli nowoczesnego Polaka* (reprint of the 4th ed., London, 1953), p. 103.

and by Rudolf Rocker in his *Nationalism and Culture* (published in 1937).

Lypyns'kyj's identification of nation with state requires some additional qualifications. A starting point is his uncompromising statement in a letter to General Petro I. Zales'kyj, his former military commander. Zales'kyj, disregarding the role of individual political systems, advocated the view that the ethical integrity of those who rule is in itself sufficient to resolve for the better all the problems besetting the political life of a country. Lypyns'kyj, who always totally disagreed with that view, never allowed the personal ethics of those in government to substitute for the role of political form. He respectfully yet angrily reminded General Zales'kyj that "each tsardom of this world is tied to one or another political form."[22]

To reiterate, Lypyns'kyj maintained that the entire span of human history proved that only three basic political systems are possible: classocracy, ochlocracy, and democracy. He explains at some length why, despite outward appearances, differences in the government structure, in written and unwritten constitutions, all political systems—theocracy, oligarchy, despotism, dictatorship—can be subsumed under the three basic systems. He explains why a formally monarchical system can at one time present itself as a classocracy and at another as an ochlocracy or even democracy.[23] Lypyns'kyj ascribes such paramount importance to political systems because he believes that each exerts a decisive influence on the nature of a nation. Let us look at this problem as concisely as possible. According to Lypyns'kyj, in the case of classocracy, the state is an expression and political instrument of the nation. He considers such a situation the proper one—the best of all possibilities for a nation. In the case of ochlocracy, the state totally dominates the nation, sometimes to the point of absorbing it. In the case of democracy, a faceless society dominates the state, and this faceless society's sectional, vested interests, by undermining state authority, work to destroy the very texture of the nation. Democracy leads to the slow death of a nation, whereas ochlocracy leads to the subjugation of a nation by the state. However, under some exceptional conditions, ochlocracy can transform itself into a classocracy: if this event takes place, the state will be restored to its proper place as an exponent of nation. Classocracy safeguards the growth and might of a nation. But this circumstance may result in an unhealthy imperialism, which, in turn, weakens the fabric of classocracy, resulting in the exhaustion and decline of a given nation

[22] V. Lypyns'kyj, "Lyst do generala Zales'koho," *Sučasnist'*, 1969, no. 9, p. 119.
[23] Lypyns'kyj, *Lysty do brativ xliborobiv*, p. 191.

Whether Lypyns'kyj's theses can be confirmed by historical experience is a separate question, demanding extensive analysis.

This exposition of Lypyns'kyj's idea of nation must deal with problems pertaining to the situation of the Ukrainian nation: (a) What is the source of the national identity of the Ukrainian people? (b) Under what conditions can the Ukraine—by Lypyns'kyj's definition now a colony—gain statehood? (c) Can the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic be considered a potential source of statehood for the Ukraine?

On the first problem—namely, Ukrainian national identity—Lypyns'kyj's view, as in many other cases, is opposite to those generally dominating Ukrainian political thought. While Lypyns'kyj does not deny the existence of cultural differences between the Russian and the Ukrainian peoples, he considers these ethnic-cultural features insufficient to define Ukrainian national identity. In his treatise entitled *Poklykannja "Varjahiv" čy orhanizacija xliborobiv?* (Invitation of the "Varangians" or organization of farmers?) he asserts that a basic error committed by the Ukrainian intelligentsia is the belief that the Ukrainian people are in the same national relationship to the Russian people as, for instance, the Czechs are to the Germans, the Poles are to the Russians, or the Bulgarians are to the Turks.[24] According to Lypyns'kyj, the relationship between Ukrainians and Russians is incomparably closer to the relationship existing between Belgian Walloons and Frenchmen, Bavarians and Prussians, or Germans and Austrians. Asserting that the Russian and the Ukrainian people share the same cultural base, namely, Byzantine culture and Eastern Orthodoxy, he regarded all other cultural differences as notable but not irreconcilable.

His qualifications prompt us to ask Lypyns'kyj: What, then, is the source of the germinating national identity of the Ukrainian people? He has a clear and, as usual, peculiar answer, arising from his political doctrine as a whole. He sees the source of the national identity of the Ukrainian people in factors neither ethnic nor cultural, but political. An excerpt from the preface to his *Lysty* can be taken to adequately summarize his position:

> The basic difference between the Ukraine and Muscovy is not language, tribal race, creed, or the appetite of the peasant for the landlord's land; in one word—not the cultural-national attributes and social issues but the differences in political systems which were evolving over the span of centuries, in the different (classocratic and not ochlocratic—as is explained in this book later on) method of the organization of the ruling stratum (*pravljača verstva*) [elite], in the different reciprocal relationship of those on top and the masses, of state and society, of those who rule and those who

[24] V. Lypyns'kyj, *Poklykannja "Varjahiv" čy organizacija xliborobiv?* (Vienna, 1926; New York, 1954), p. 69.

are ruled. It is possible to separate Kiev from Moscow and to transform the "Little Russian" tribe into a Ukrainian nation in a separate Ukrainian state only when relying on those political differences, on political and not on cultural-national or social issues.

[My] second conclusion: because the national creative elements arrived in the Ukraine from Europe, and not from Asia, and because all Ukrainiandom (*ukrajinstvo*) as a national movement aiming at statehood has been the child of European and not of Asiatic culture, the Ukraine for the sake of its own birth and self-realization must first of all cut its umbilical cord with its mother—the West and Poland. Without political separation from Poland there will not be a Ukraine; just as Poland could not have emerged without political separation, without cutting off its umbilical cord from its mother Germany in the second half of the twelfth century. As long as the Ukraine does not separate itself from Poland, all national Ukrainian creative (*ukrajinotvorči*) elements, arriving from or through Poland and feeling behind themselves the support of the Warsaw metropolis, will not be willing to undergo fully the process of Ukrainianization; this means—blending with the "Little-Russian" mass of people into one entity and transforming this tribal mass into a nation. The Ukraine, bound with Poland through its creative upper strata and being of one political body with her, will rot and die together with Poland as does a mother with a child which is unable to be born.

However, to achieve this separation from Poland without drowning itself in the Russian sea—this is a problem Ukrainiandom could not solve during a millennium of its existence.[25]

Lypyns'kyj arrived at this conviction early and expressed it programmatically in an essay entitled "Druhyj akt" (The second act) written about 1911. He declared that the liberation of the Ukraine had to proceed through two acts, or stages. The first had begun with the uprising of Xmel'nyc'kyj—namely, the struggle against Poland. Now this "cutting of the umbilical cord" was approaching its end, and the days of Polish rule in Galicia were numbered. The Ukrainian people now faced the "second act" in their liberation—that is, the struggle with Russia. This stage, he maintained, is rapidly approaching. He worried that it might catch the Ukrainians unprepared. After World War I he made a partial retreat from this position. For a time he doubted that Russia would ever commit willfully the political error of incorporating the Western Ukraine into its sphere of domination: the Russian raison d'état might see Polish domination in the Western Ukraine as preferable to its own. In principle, however, he remained faithful to former views, restating them in 1929, shortly before his death, in an open letter to the editor of the daily *Dilo*. Saying that "the spirit of the Ukraine lies in its Western and not Eastern lands," he

[25] Lypyns'kyj, *Lysty do brativ-xliborobiv*, p. xxv.

anticipated that only through the unification of the Western Ukraine with the Eastern Ukraine could the Ukrainian people become capable of challenging the domination of the Muscovite metropolis. A union of the Western and Eastern Ukraine could not be achieved, however, without the help of Russia; therefore, unification must be preceded by a political alliance of the Ukrainian people with the Russian, or, as he put it, "with the European East." As if reiterating the thesis of his essay "The Second Act," written about two decades earlier, he asserted that "the Ukrainian creative deed" (*ukrajins'ke tvorče dilo*), initiated by Bohdan Xmel'nyc'kyj, must be completed; otherwise the Ukraine will not exist. Thus, the unification of all the Ukrainian lands under the aegis of a stronger metropolis was, he believed, the precondition for the Ukraine's shedding of colonial status.

This was, however, only a precondition and by no means a guarantee of attaining independence, since the liberation of a colony and its transformation into a state is the most difficult of political tasks. He constantly warned his fellow Ukrainians that they cannot compare themselves with either Poles or Czechs, who were not "stateless people" (*nederžavni narody*) because they had preserved an uninterrupted political tradition of statehood and retained or restored their own political elites. The case of the Ukrainian people is essentially different. He diagnosed the political condition suffered by the Ukrainian people as "statelessness" (*nederžavnist'*) rather than "subjugation" (*ponevolennja*). The so-called subjugated people retain their sense of statehood. Unlike stateless people, subjugated people are not organically tied with the foreign authority; hence they may regain their independence by exploiting the opportunities offered by international situations and crises. They possess their own political elites, who are instantly ready to substitute for the authority and power which derives from the metropolis.

The situation of a stateless people, or colony, is entirely different. Deprived of their own political elite, they are organically unable to exploit even the most favorable external opportunities. Those who raise their voices for independence in a colony have "the will to power," but they do not have the knowledge and experience necessary to build and retain authority, to run the state apparatus, and to rule. Those among them who possess these qualifications are alien elements, organically connected with the metropolis and relying on its support for the retention of their sociopolitical status. They are usually void of what is to be called "territorial patriotism." Hence, if the new elite, emerging from the masses as fighters for the colony's freedom, turns against the former colonial ruling minority, and not exclusively against the metropolis, they will either alienate or

exterminate the elements capable of sustaining political order and power. Instead of a new authority, a political vacuum will develop, and the country will slip into anarchy, reconquest by the metropolis, and, eventually, into a similar or even worse colonial state.

Is there an exit from this vicious situation? According to Lypyns'kyj there exists but one, which is dependent upon an accidental situation, though conscious human effort can certainly attempt to exploit it. This chance for a colony to liberate itself comes when, for some reason—primarily for the sake of its own vested interests—the ruling metropolitan class finds itself alienated from the metropolis. If, in this instance, the new leaders of the stateless masses, while fighting for freedom, abandon their hatred for the existing ruling class, and convince them to join in the struggle for the independence of the country, the colony can become an independent state. The newly-created state may initiate the transformation of a heterogeneous society into an integrated nation. Why? Because the political experience of the former colonial elite can unite with the wish of the newly emerging elite to shed the domination of the metropolis. In other words, the will to power can unite with experience in authority. The revolutionary elite must not fail to recognize and seize this rare opportunity. It should not direct its forces against the former colonial rulers: on the contrary, it should make every possible effort to attract them to its cause.

Lypyns'kyj believed that such a chance had come for the Ukraine only during the period of the Hetmanate, and that the chance had been missed primarily due to the irreconcilable opposition of the revolutionary, democratic Ukrainian intelligentsia to the regime of Hetman Pavlo Skoropads'kyj. With the Bolsheviks' ascension to power in Russia and Skoropads'kyj's coup d'état in the Ukraine, the interests of the former, colonial ruling class stood in opposition to the interests of Moscow. If the Ukrainian intelligentsia had been willing to cooperate with the colonial elite, a new ruling elite might have emerged, possessing the will to independence as well as political experience. Such a ruling class in the Ukraine could have transformed it from a colony into an independent state. The newly-created state would—in time—have transformed the Ukrainian "nationality" into a nation.

Lypyns'kyj bitterly accused the Ukrainian intelligentsia of destroying this rare, almost unique chance in the annals of modern Ukrainian history. He pointed to two decisive causes for the failure of the Ukrainian intelligentsia. First, the intelligentsia was infected with the germ of ethnic nationalism and not territorial patriotism; this induced it to consider as Ukrainian only speakers of the Ukrainian language. Second, the highly egalitarian concept of democracy worshipped by the Ukrainian intelligentsia put it into

irreconcilable opposition to the old *pany* (lords). Eventually, the progress of the Ukrainian Revolution suffered from the absence of conservative forces. In the face of their almost total absence, the struggle for independence inevitably ended in anarchy, bringing in turn national catastrophe. Then the Ukraine reverted to its previous status, namely, to a colony.

What, according to Lypyns'kyj, are the prospects for the Ukraine in the future? On this point his views are somewhat ambivalent. The uncertainty stems mainly from his estimation of what the stability and duration of the Bolshevik regime might be. Like most of his contemporaries in the 1920s, he believed that the Bolshevik regime was unstable, and he anticipated its collapse in the not too distant future. He wrote: "Communism is not—as many may think—the beginning of a new era: it is the end and death of an old era. It is an inevitable completion and an inescapable reaction against this democracy which is connected with an anonymous capitalistic system of economy, born out of the French Revolution."[26]

Lypyns'kyj rejects the idea of the Soviet Ukraine as an embryo for the transmutation of the Ukrainian people into a nation. His most important supporting argument is that since the source of the Bolshevik party's domination is international communist ideology, what can at best be expected from Bolshevik rule is the propagation of international and anti-national ideas in the Ukrainian language. This circumstance cannot safeguard even the growth of Ukrainian native culture, because the idea of such a culture is organically alien to the communist ideology. The Bolshevik regime in the Ukraine cannot promote the emergence of a new communist, yet national, elite because Bolshevik power and authority in the Soviet Ukraine is not territorial-national. Its center and control point exists outside of the country; those Bolsheviks who rule in the Soviet Ukraine are in reality "political nomads," equally fit to govern the Ukraine one day and in Bukhara the next.[27] Therefore the Soviet Ukraine is now, and most probably will remain, only a variant version of a colony, dominated by the Russian metropolis.

Reckoning, however, that the Bolshevik regime would collapse in the foreseeable future, Lypyns'kyj was convinced that the building of a strong conservative movement outside of the Soviet Ukraine, as a counterpart to the Ukrainian democratic camp, would advance the struggle for an independent Ukrainian state. The existence of a suitable conservative ideology was the precondition for the emergence of a Ukrainian conservative force. Lypyns'kyj took this burden upon himself, although admitting that "it was not my vocation to take care of ideology. But I was compelled to

[26] Lypyns'kyj, *Poklykannja "Varjahiv,"* p. 38.
[27] Lypyns'kyj, *Poklykannja "Varjahiv,"* pp. 35ff.

accomplish it without having either habit or inherited talent. I wished to be a knight and to create a Ukrainian ideology of 'sword and production.' "[28] But no ideology, regardless of its political and intellectual values, is in itself a guarantor of political success. There must be real power behind it. This power can derive only from an organization having the character, coherence, and discipline of a secular order, whose members, believing unshakeably in the righteousness of their political goals, are ready to fight and to sacrifice everything, even life, for their realization. Such a conservative organization must accept as its axiomatic purpose the restoration of a hereditary monarchy in the Ukraine in the form of a legitimate Hetmanate. Practically, this meant that the claim to the Ukrainian throne belonged to the kin of Skoropads'kyj.

Lypyns'kyj took the initiative in creating such a conservative organization in the form of the *Ukrajins'kyj sojuz xliborobiv-deržavnykiv* (Ukrainian Union of Farmers–Statists). Only out of the Ukrainian agricultural class (former landlords and peasants) could there emerge, he believed, a conservative wing of the new Ukrainian elite. His conservative ideology unconditionally demanded the establishment of a hereditary monarchy in the Ukraine, in the form of a traditional Hetmanate, due to the structure of his theory of the formation of a nation. According to his theory only monarchy possessed the capabilities necessary to integrate ethnically and socially heterogeneous elements into one nation conscious of its identity. Moreover, a monarchy based on a conservative movement rooted in the agricultural class must assimilate the alien elements living in the towns and cities of the Ukraine; otherwise cultural and economic progress would be arrested.

> Urban culture, the condition of progress, can become national culture there, where there was or is a strong, conservative, politically militant village dedicated to the state; only there, where an urban speculator, always by his origin a foreigner, was compelled in a proper time to accept the language and the culture of the chivalrous and organized farmer-conqueror who organized the village and through the mediation of the monarchical court the entire nation.[29]

Toward the end of his life Lypyns'kyj's views would change dramatically. He fell into a bitter conflict with the leadership of the Ukrainian Union of Farmers–Statists and repudiated the right to the throne of the Skoropads'kyjs.

[28] "Notatky," 1:7.
[29] Lypyns'kyj, *Poklykannja "Varjahiv,"* p. 92.

Lypyns'kyj sometimes experienced doubt that the Bolshevik regime would collapse soon, as he hoped. What, in that case, did the future hold for the Ukraine? His response to that possibility was vague. Only reluctantly did he admit that the chance for the political emancipation of the Ukraine would increase with the expansion of the communist sphere of domination:

> . . . if communist ideology would win victory not only within the realm of Russia but at least in all of Europe, then it may be possible to expect that after some time a communist state ideology would increasingly accept local, territorial attributes and that out of it could grow some new, distinct, Ukrainian national version of international communism and that in this way the victory of communist ochlocracy could create on the corpse of the previous Ukrainian nation the foundations for a state of some new Ukrainian nation.[30]

Simultaneously, Lypyns'kyj experienced considerable doubt about the possibility of the world expansion of communism, because:

> on the territory of former Russia, [communism] absorbed such peculiarly Russian ingredients that its expansion beyond the frontiers of Russia seems to be impossible—not in the form of some exotic and highly narrow sect, but in the form of a new international creed *ex Oriente*.[31]

Hence in his personal notes (not dated precisely) he was inclined to judge the future of the Ukrainian nation pessimistically. He admitted that he was not excited about the outbreak of the Russian Revolution because it came too soon, and he rather sadly concluded that "we are facing the dawn of the mighty revival of the Muscovite nation. If we consent to giving to it the headship (*hlavenstvo*) of Rus', reducing ourselves to 'some Ukraine,' we face death as a nation."[32]

Despite this pessimistic prognosis, Lypyns'kyj, a newcomer to the Ukrainian nation, remained faithful to its cause to the last moment of his life. And while struggling to define the essence of nation, he eventually admitted that of all political notions, nation remains the least clear:[33]

> At the base of a nation there lies a mystical kernel. No matter how many attributes of a nation—such as language, culture, literature, territory, race, etc.—we would

[30] Lypyns'kyj, *Poklykannja "Varjahiv,"* p. 36.
[31] Lypyns'kyj, *Poklykannja "Varjahiv,"* p. 36.
[32] "Notatky," 1: 12.
[33] Lypyns'kyj, *Lysty do brativ-xliborobiv*, p. 374.

enumerate and analyze, eventually and finally we reach something unknown, something that is usually called "the spirit of a nation."[34]

Nation, specifically the Ukrainian nation, became the highest political value for Lypyns'kyj throughout his life. Yet, unlike Dmytro Dontsov, he denied to the nation the status of being a source of morality. That he saw in an extra-mundane religion, maintaining that there exists a universal human morality, defined by religion—in the Ukrainians' case, by Christianity.[35]

We know that Lypyns'kyj considered the Ukrainian nation-state to be the final goal for Ukrainian political strivings. He was firmly convinced that only under the protection of their own state could all the inhabitants of the Ukraine carry on "a good and dignified way of life."

The present world political situation points out clearly that despite a growth in the number of nation-states, the very institution of the nation-state is undergoing a crisis and is to some extent becoming a political anachronism. The leading American political scientist Hans Morgenthau, having observed that "the polyethnic state is, then, under modern conditions an unstable political unit which tends to disintegrate under the impact of nationalism or foreign intervention," stressed the obsolescence of the nation-state in our time:

> The justification of the nation-state, as of every political organization, is its ability to perform the functions for the sake of which political organization exists. The most elementary of these functions is the common defense of the life of the citizens and of the values of the civilization in which they live. A political organization which is no longer able to defend these values and even puts them in jeopardy must yield, either through peaceful transformation or violent destruction, to one capable of that defense .... The modern technologies of communication, transportation, industrial production, and arms have completely destroyed this protective function of the nation-state.[36]

Lypyns'kyj lived in a pre-atomic age. In his own time the nation-state was not yet experiencing any clear demise. Nonetheless, one can ask: Why did his brilliant political mind not sense the limitation of the nation-state, of which he was a passionate advocate with regard to the Ukraine? To a certain degree, Lypyns'kyj was indeed aware of the potential limitations of the individual nation-state. Hence he proposed for Eastern Europe a so-called *Sojuz tr'ox Rusej* (Alliance of the three Rus') as the final political

[34] Lypyns'kyj, *Lysty do brativ-xliborobiv*, p. 83.

[35] Letter of V. Lypyns'kyj to Stepan Hrynevec'kyj published under the title "Moral' ukrajincja-deržavnyka," in *Ukrajins'kyj holos*, 1927, no. 36.

[36] H. Morgenthau, *The Restoration of American Politics* (Chicago, 1970), pp. 344–46.

configuration. This idea, which Lypyns'kyj merely stated, without elaboration, has remained the least understood and the most misinterpreted of all his ideas. To Dontsov it became an object of ridicule and almost an admission of national betrayal by Lypyns'kyj. Yet, in reality, the idea of the alliance indicates Lypyns'kyj's awareness of the potential limitations of the nation-state. His idea proposed the complete, separate independence as states of three peoples—the Russians, Ukrainians, and Belorussians—and, simultaneously, a durable alliance among them, or a kind of political bloc. Lypyns'kyj either did not or could not define the nature of this alliance more clearly. His motives for proposing such an alliance are, however, stated clearly; they can be properly understood from the perspective of his agrarian, conservative aristocratism. He—like, later, Charles de Gaulle—regarded anonymous financial capital as an object of repulsive antipathy, for which democracy was only the docile servant. He proposed the Alliance of the Three Rus' because he believed that none of these states would be capable of individually withstanding the onslaughts of the potentially Asiatic, sociologically "nomadic" influx from the East, nor the penetration of ravenous, anonymous, financial capitalism from the West. He warned his fellow-Ukrainians against becoming either consciously or unconsciously a tool in the hands of the West against the European East, and vice-versa. It is in this context that he saw the real destiny and the ambitious mission of the Ukraine:[37]

> The Ukraine must find itself. From a colony in which the most diverse influences have intersected, it must become a nation-state having clearly defined and crystallized individuality . . . .[38]

The possibility for finding this individuality of the Ukraine lies in stopping the penetration of ruinous, internal nomads as well as of external nomads from the East, and in preventing the penetration of an even more dangerous enemy, namely, "rapacious, democratic, international financial capital and hostile foreign agricultural colonization from the West." Simultaneously, with resignation, Lypyns'kyj admitted:

> If there is to be a Ukrainian nation, my *Lysty* will be read by all those who will experience apprehension about the existence and future of this nation. If no Ukrainian nation comes into existence, my conscience will rest at peace because I paid as well as I could the self-imposed debt of serving the Ukrainian national legend.[39]

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[37] Lypyns'kyj, *Lysty do brativ-xliborobiv*, pp. 328ff.
[38] "Notatky," 1:3–4.
[39] "Notatky," 1:8.