

The 1996 J.B. Rudnyckyj Distinguished Lecture

University of Manitoba

Presented by

Serhii Plokyh

**Associate Director Peter Jacyk Centre for Ukrainian Historical Research
Deputy Editor Hrushevsky Translation Project**

Dr. Serhii Plokyh is an Associate Director of the Peter Jacyk Centre for Ukrainian Historical Research at the Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, University of Alberta. He serves as Deputy Editor of the Hrushevsky Translation Project, and has co-edited, Mykhailo Hrushevsky, *History of Ukraine-Rus'*. Vol. 7: *The Cossack Age to 1625*. (Edmonton and Toronto, 1999). His latest book, *A Rebel Faith: The Cossacks and Religion in Early Modern Ukraine* has been accepted for publication by the Oxford University Press, and will appear in print next year. He also authored a number of articles on the role of history and religion in the shaping of the Russian and Ukrainian identities.

THE CRIMEAN DISPUTE: HISTORY IN RUSSIAN- UKRAINIAN TERRITORIAL CLAIMS

Introduction

The dissolution of the USSR -- the last world empire - brought to the fore the whole range of problems that usually accompany the dissolution of empires. The disintegration of the Ottoman, Habsburg, and, to some extent, French empires took place in the midst of war. Despite the fact that Britain and later Portugal withdrew from their colonial territories almost peacefully, the national, tribal and religious conflicts that commenced after the departure of colonial administrations eventually resulted in bloody conflicts and wars.

Among the many problems that have followed from the dissolution of the USSR is the border question. Although the border disputes in the former USSR have not been as sharp as they are in the former Yugoslavia, they do constitute a serious threat to peaceful relations between the former Soviet republics. It was hardly accidental that the first major manifestation of the national unrest in the USSR came with the events in Nagorno-Karabakh, a region claimed by two former Soviet republics: those of Armenia and Azerbaidzhan. The transformation of administrative borders into state ones is proving to be a very complicated and uneasy process.[1]

With the disintegration of the USSR, the border question has raised to the level of special importance the relations between two other republics of the former Soviet Union-Russia and Ukraine. The problem came to light in late August of 1991, after the proclamation of Ukrainian independence. On August 29 the spokesman for the Russian President, Pavel Voshchanov, announced that if Ukraine seceded from the USSR, Russia would reserve the right to revise its borders with Ukraine.[2] In fact, the new Russian authorities claimed Russia's right to the eastern and southern oblasts of Ukraine, areas, which underwent a high degree of Russification during the Communist regime, and to the Crimean peninsula, a region transferred from Russia to Ukraine in 1954.

Since the results of the Ukrainian referendum (held in December of 1991) demonstrated an overwhelming support for the idea of Ukrainian independence (more than 90% of the voters that took part in the referendum voted for independence) the nationalistic factions in the Russian leadership were forced to abandon previous Russian claims to the eastern Ukrainian oblasts and concentrate specifically on the issue of Crimea, the only region in Ukraine where ethnic Russians constitute the majority of the population and where the vote for independence was the lowest one in Ukraine.

The results of the referendum in Crimea also showed that the support for independence in Sevastopol was slightly higher than in other areas of Crimea (in Crimea it was 54%, in Sevastopol - 57% in favour). There was also other indication that voters in Sevastopol were more "pro-independent" than in the other areas of Crimea. In the vote for the president of Ukraine that was conducted simultaneously with the referendum, Viacheslav Chornovil, the head of the Lviv regional administration in Galicia - the stronghold of Ukrainian nationalism, received in Sevastopol more votes (10,93%) than the representative of the highly Russified city of Kharkiv, ethnic Russian Vladimir Grinev (8.38%). The vote in Sevastopol signalled serious threat to the Russian interests in the area and from the first days of 1992 Sevastopol and Black Sea Fleet appeared in the centre of the massive propagandistic campaign, launched by the Russian parliament.

As the "all-Union resort" and home of the Black Sea fleet, Crimea has been viewed by many Russian politicians as an "ancient Russian territory." Leaders of the parliamentary nationalistic factions have been using every single opportunity to claim that the transition of Crimea to Ukraine in 1954 was conducted allegedly in violation of the Russian constitution and that there are more than enough legal arguments in place to demand the transfer of Crimea back to Russia.[3]

In April of 1992, when the confrontation over Crimea had reached its peak, Russian Vice-President Aleksandr Rutskoi on his visit to Crimea made a direct claim to that territory, justifying this claim on the basis of historical arguments. Rutskoi rejected one part of Crimean history - the transfer of the peninsula to Ukraine in 1954, and emphasized another - the annexation of Crimea by the Russian Empire and its military presence there:

"If one turns to history, then again history is not on the side of those who are trying to appropriate this land. If in 1954, perhaps under the influence of a hangover or maybe of sunstroke, the appropriate documents were signed according to which the Crimea was transferred to the jurisdiction of Ukraine, I am sorry, such a document does not cancel out the history of Crimea."[4]

Since 1992 the issue of Crimea, Sevastopol and the Black Sea Fleet has constantly remained in the center of Russian-Ukrainian relations. The Black Sea issue has been raised again and again each time the political struggle in Kremlin has intensified. From Aleksandr Rutskoi to Aleksandr Lebed, every consecutive "strong man" in Kremlin would raise the issue, and appeal in that way to the nationalistically orientated Russian electorate.

As the power struggle in the Kremlin intensified with Yeltsin's heart attack in June, 1996, the issue of Sevastopol and the Black Sea Fleet were again resurrected by the presidential hopefuls Moscow mayor Iurii Luzhkov, and then Security Council secretary Aleksandr Lebed. Much further than Luzhkov or Lebed went in their claims to Sevastopol members of the Russian parliament, Georgii Tikhonov, the Chairman of the Duma Committee on CIS Affairs, publicly stated that Sevastopol "was, is and will be Russian." Tikhonov and his Committee submitted to the Duma resolution that stopped the partition of the Fleet, and declared Sevastopol to be an exclusive base of the Russian Black Sea Fleet.[5]

Though the current crisis over the Black Sea Fleet and status of Sevastopol has a number of elements that distinguish it from the previous "Sevastopol crises," there is a lot in common between the new and old Russian-Ukrainian debates on the issue of Crimea. What is in common in all of them is the type of historical argumentation that is used by the Russian side to make its claim to Se

vastopol. The cornerstone of all Russian claims to the Crimea and Sevastopol is a myth of Sevastopol as an exclusively Russian city, the "city of Russian glory," the symbol of Russian fleet and Russian glorious past in general.

This paper takes as point of the departure John A. Armstrong's definition of the myth as the integrating phenomenon through which symbols of national identity acquire a coherent meaning.[6] Thus, the main goal of this paper is not to define whether the Sevastopol myth is "true" or "false," but to determine how the myth was created and how it has been transformed in order to meet the challenges of the changing political circumstances.

For the nationalistically orientated Russian politicians, the history of the Russian presence in the Crimea is closely connected to the history of the fleet, and henceforth, to the history of its main base in the Crimea - Sevastopol. The former commander of the fleet, Admiral Igor Kasatonov (was recalled from Sevastopol to Moscow in December 1992) stressed in an interview with the Russian newspaper Literaturnaia Rossiia, that Russia in any form cannot be imagined without its glorious Black Sea fleet. According to Kasatonov, the Ukrainian takeover of the Black Sea fleet and its naval bases in Crimea and Black Sea region would throw Russia back three centuries, to the times before the rule of Peter I. Kasatonov was really proud to say in his interview that during his tenure as a commander of the fleet, the tombs of Admirals Lazarev, Nakhimov, Kornilov, and Istomin were restored in St. Volodymyr (Vladimir) Cathedral in Sevastopol.[7]

In the autumn of 1996 when the status of Sevastopol once again was under discussion in the Russian parliament, the Russian newspapers published the appeal of A. P. Nakhimov, G. V. Kornilova, and A. P. Istomin, allegedly offsprings of the Sevastopol heroes, to the President, government and parliament of Russia. The appeal called on the authorities to put effectively Sevastopol under the Russian control.[8] The names of Nakhimov, Kornilov, and Istomin, the commanders of the fleet and defenders of Sevastopol during the Crimean war of 1853-56 may symbolize better than anything else, the sense of Sevastopol myth, as it exists in contemporary Russia.

Sevastopol Mythology: Imperial Period

The Sevastopol myth as many other myths, based on the war events, aroused from the humiliation of defeat. War victories give pride to nations, glory to generals, but very rarely serve as a basis for the myths that can mobilize and bring a nation together. From the times of Ancient Greece and the veneration of 300 Spartans, stories about the heroism of those, being defeated, serve as an important component of nation's heroic mythology. From that perspective it is hardly accidental that the graves of unknown soldiers, defenders of Motherland are usually much more venerated, than the triumphal arches devoted to the famous generals and their victories abroad.

Modern Russian national mythology started its formation at the beginning of the nineteenth century with the growth of national awareness and formulation by Count Uvarov of the "theory of official nationality," the three-component formula of Autocracy, Orthodoxy and Nationality.[9] The veneration of Ivan Susanin, the central figure of the first Russian national opera by Mikhail Glinka, *A Life for the Tsar* (1836) presents probably one of the first examples of the new kind of national myth making.[10] The Borodino myth could serve as another example of the same kind of mythology. The myth aroused from the account of the decisive battle in the history of 1812 Napoleon's campaign in Russia. The trick with Borodino myth is that the battle, though costing the French massive casualties, could be hardly claimed as a Russian victory. After Borodino, Russians continued their retreat and surrendered Moscow to Napoleon without any further resistance.[11]

The Sevastopol myth, as it exists today, can be divided into two parts. One part is based on the events of the Crimean war (1853-56), another on the events of World War II. The Crimean war started as a result of international conflict over the partition of the Ottoman Empire. In 1853, St. Petersburg began a successful campaign against the Turkish protectorates, Moldavia and Wallachia. Very soon the Ottomans received crucial support from the two powerful Western European states, Britain and France. Neither of these powers wanted Russia to strengthen her positions in the Balkans, or to take control over the Black Sea straits.

With the entry of Britain and France into the war, the center of the conflict had been moved to the territory of the Russian Empire. In 1854, the allies invaded Crimea and besieged Sevastopol, the main base of the Imperial Black Sea fleet. This turn of the events came as a major surprise to the Russian government. Forty years after its victories over Napoleon, it still believed that Russian army and fleet were the most powerful ones in Europe. As it was shown by the events of the war, this was not the case at all. The only enemy against whom the Imperial army and fleet could launch successful campaigns was the armed forces of the declining Ottoman Empire.

The Russian fleet could not withstand the allied fleet and was forced to retreat to the Sevastopol harbour. The only factor that helped the Russian Empire in the war and rescued it from the immediate defeat was the heroism of the defenders of Sevastopol. The siege cost the allies thousands of killed and wounded soldiers and officers, and humiliated the elite forces of the two colonial powers. Nevertheless, in 1855, after the long and exhaustive siege, the Imperial army had no choice but to leave Sevastopol. The war was over. Russia was forced to sign the humiliating Paris peace treaty with the allies that would not allow her to maintain the Black Sea Fleet, or to have fortresses on the shores of the Black Sea.[12] This military defeat was the first one of that scale, since the Muscovite-Polish wars in the seventeenth century. It created an atmosphere, in which the Sevastopol myth came to existence.

The formation and development of the myth in the nineteenth century was influenced by one of the main trends of Russian political thought, Pan-Slavism. The Pan-Slavists, such as Mikhail Pogodin, supported the government policy toward the Ottoman Empire to the extent that it reflected their own agenda of taking control over Constantinople, and the liberation of the Orthodox Slavs, that suffered under the Ottoman Muslim yoke.[13] The Russian public at large viewed the siege of Sevastopol as a symbol of Russian heroism, which saved Russia from the foreign invasion despite the inefficiency and corruption of the Tsarist administration.[14]

Despite the many similarities, which exist between the Ivan Susanin and Borodino myths on one hand, and the Sevastopol myth on the other, there are also important differences between them. Although all of them can be called the "defence of the motherland" myths, the Sevastopol myth was the first one to be based on the events of the war, conducted on the originally non-Russian territory, being annexed to the Empire only seventy years before the outbreak of the Crimea war. From that perspective, the Sevastopol myth presents a new type of Russian mythology, the one that justified and glorified the defence of the new imperial possessions, gained by Tsars in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.

The veneration of Sevastopol heroes got a new impulse before and after the victories of the Russian Empire Russo-Turkish war (1877-1878), a war launched by the government under the Pan-Slavic slogans.[15] In 1869, the Museum of the Defence of Sevastopol was opened in the city. In the 1890s, the monuments to Admirals Kornilov and Nakhimov were erected and the new Sevastopol military museum building was opened. In 1904-1905, to commemorate the 50th anniversary of the defence, numerous monuments to the defenders of Sevastopol were erected in the city and the unique museum (panorama) "The defence of Sevastopol, 1854-1855" was opened.[16] Probably it was not accidental that the idea for the veneration of Sevastopol heroes came at the time when Russia became involved in the new, Russo-Japanese war of 1904-1905.

The new imperialistic war and the new defeat created the new national myth, the myth of the heroic defence of Port Arthur, which in many ways resembled the old Sevastopol myth. Port Arthur served as the base of the Imperial fleet in the Far East and was besieged by the Japanese army. After a long siege, it was surrendered by the Russian Imperial Army. The popular Port Arthur myth, like the Sevastopol one, condemned the inefficiency and corruption of Tsar's generals and praised the heroism of Russian soldiers. Like Sevastopol myth, the myth of the heroic defence of Port Arthur came to existence in the atmosphere of defeat and national humiliation.[17]

Both myths praised Russian heroism, the people that according to the official point of view, was formed out of three branches: Great Russians, Littlerussians and Belorussians, who formed the core of the Russian imperial army. This concept of the tri-partite Russian people did not survive the events of 1917 Revolution. The new Bolshevik authorities in Russia were forced to recognize the existence of three separate peoples, Russians, Ukrainians and Belorussians. What remained almost intact after the Revolution was Sevastopol mythology. It remained to be centered on the heroism of the Russian people that now was understood not as heroism of the tri-partite nation, but as the heroism exclusively of the Great Russians.

Sevastopol Mythology: Soviet Period

The first years after the Bolshevik takeover brought predominantly negative attitudes toward the Russian imperial history. Lenin's view of Tsarist Russia as a prison of peoples was developed in the writings of the leading Soviet historian of that time Mikhail Pokrovsky, and his school. The consolidation of power by Stalin in early 1930s resulted in the dramatic change of the official attitudes toward the Russian past. Not only the old negative approaches to the Russian imperial history were abandoned, but the followers of Pokrovsky were persecuted and often sent to Siberia. The national revival, which made its first steps in the non-Russian Union republics was crushed by the authorities and Russian nationalism was employed by Stalin to extend the power base of his oppressive regime. Russian nationalism was also viewed as a mean to provide mobilization of the Soviet society on the eve of the World War II.[18]

The atmosphere of war preparation set the stage for recalling the images of the imperial past and the revival of the Sevastopol myth. Soviet aggression against Finland, whose allies were Britain and France (Russian adversaries in the Crimean war), also helped to create the right atmosphere for the reemergence of Sevastopol myth. Probably the first major Soviet historical work on the Sevastopol siege was published in 1939. Its publication coincided with the outbreak of the World War II and Soviet invasion in Poland and Finland.[19]

The German aggression against the USSR and the outbreak of the Soviet-German war accelerated the process of reorienting the Soviet propaganda machine toward the heroic images of Russian imperial past. The war was officially called the Great Patriotic war, the name based on the official name of the Russian war against Napoleon in 1812. New myths, based on war events came into existence, while the old ones made their comeback in a big way. One of them was the myth of Sevastopol. Its reemergence was of special significance for the war effort due to the fact that in 1941-42, Sevastopol was besieged again. This time it was by the Germans, and the city's defenders had shown again the samples of true heroism.[20]

Admiral Nakhimov, the participant of the first siege of Sevastopol, was elevated to the status of national hero by Soviet propagandists. In 1944, the order and the medal, both named after Nakhimov were introduced to decorate Soviet Navy officers and rank-and-file sailors. The same year the special cadet schools for the training of Navy officers were created and were also named after Nakhimov.[21] Thus Admiral Nakhimov was transformed into an icon in the newly created Russian Soviet iconostasis. He took his place next to Aleksandr Nevsky, Aleksandr Suvorov, and Mikhail Kutuzov.

The new wave of Sevastopol veneration came in 1955 with the commemoration of the one hundredth anniversary of the Crimean war and Sevastopol defence. The commemorations were held in the atmosphere of the Cold War, in which the old Sevastopol enemies, Great Britain, France, and Turkey were the NATO members, and most likely adversaries of the USSR. Dozens of books and hundreds of articles, dealing with the history of the Sevastopol siege in 1854-1855 were published between 1945 and 1960. At the same time the standard Soviet work on the Sevastopol siege was written by the noted Soviet historian of the Stalin era, Evgenii Tarle. It was entitled *The City of Russian Glory: Sevastopol in 1854-1855*, and was published in 1954 by the publishing house of the USSR Defence Ministry.[22] The book was based on the two-volume study about the Crimean war, written by Tarle earlier[23] and was addressed to the general public.

The general approach to the history of the Crimean war employed by Tarle presents the mixture of criticism of the imperialistic character of the war (in a tribute paid to the works of Marx and Engels), and of glorification of the Russian people. The book starts with a statement that the Crimean war had introduced a glorious page into the history of the Russian people. That statement is followed by the attack on the "British imperialism." [24] In another passage, Tarle compared the siege of 1854-1855 to Sevastopol defence of 1941-1942 and attacked the "heirs" of Hitler and Hitlerism in Washington and Western Germany.[25] Following the writings of Marx and Engels, Tarle often blamed Imperial Russia, but not for its imperialistic ambitions, as for its weakness and backwardness, that did not allow the Empire to win the war. The Crimean war was presented by Tarle to the Soviet reader as a war, launched by the Western states "against our Motherland." [26] According to Tarle, in 1854-55, the defenders of Sevastopol, fought not only for the city, but also defended "the annexations, made by the Russian state and the Russian people at the times of Peter I and during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries." [27]

The title of Tarle's book, *The City of Russian Glory* reflected one of the main characteristics of the book. Tarle wrote about Russian glory and Russian heroism, where "Russian" was viewed exclusively as Great Russian. There was no any attempt to interpret "Russian" in any broader manner. The campaign against "cosmopolitans" in the late 1940s and early 1950s brought to the fore the practice of glorification of ethnic Russians and denial of any attention to the historical figures of non-Russian origin. One of the most venerated historical figures in Stalin's USSR was the participant of the Crimea war, brilliant Russian surgeon Nikolai Pirogov. A special future film was produced at that time to glorify Pirogov. The surgeon's achievements were supposed to prove the superiority of the Russian science and scholarship over the western ones. There is little surprise that Pirogov was among the most venerated heroes of the Crimean war and Tarle's book was not an exception.[28] At the same time the names of those generals and officers, who played an important role in the Sevastopol defence, but who were of non-Russian background, were barely mentioned in the book.

One of the examples of the approach employed by Tarle is the case of the military engineer E. Totleben, who was in charge of the fortifications at the time of the siege and whose talent and activity contributed immensely to the success of the imperial army. Totleben was barely mentioned by Tarle. (The author himself did not have "politically correct" last name.) Instead Tarle devoted many pages of his book to the glorification of Admiral Nakhimov. Nakhimov in fact was a hero of Sinope (a successful navy battle against the Turks in the autumn of 1853) but played a

secondary role in the Sevastopol defence. He was clearly demoralized by the allies' control of the Black Sea, and according to numerous accounts, sought death on the fortifications of Sevastopol.[29] He was never in command of the Sevastopol defence and only in 1855, was appointed to serve as a commandant of the port. The rules of the myth making nevertheless demanded to transform Nakhimov from the hero of the successful attack on the Sinope into the hero of the defence of the motherland. The official version of the Sevastopol siege, presented by Tarle, claimed that after the death of Admiral Kornilov, who was killed during the very first attack of the city, Admiral Nakhimov became "the soul" of the defence.[30]

Tarle's book became probably the most popular Soviet publication about the Sevastopol siege and contributed immensely to the creation of the image of Sevastopol as a city of Russian glory. It popularized the symbiosis of Marxist phraseology and ideas of Russian nationalism, which formed the ideological base of Stalin's policy in the 1930s-1950s. In the 1960s, due to the change of the Soviet ideological approaches under Nikita Khrushchev and the transfer of Crimea to Ukraine, the glorification of the Russian heroism during the Sevastopol siege of 1854-1855 was overshadowed by the glorification of Soviet heroism in the Sevastopol siege of 1941-1942. Sevastopol's heroic defence against the German invasion served as one of the sources a new mythology, the mythology of the "Great Patriotic War." In the 1960s, Sevastopol along with Moscow, Leningrad, Odessa and some other cities was awarded with the Golden Star of the Hero of the Soviet Union. Subsequently, the main attention in the historical literature, devoted to the Crimea and Sevastopol shifted to the history of the Soviet period.[31]

Around the same time, the exclusively Russian character of Sevastopol myth was effectively challenged by the glorification of the Sevastopol heroes of non-Russian origin. The heroism of the ethnic Ukrainian, Petro Kishka (in Russian transcription - Petr Koshka), was highly praised in all the books about Sevastopol siege, published in Ukraine.[32] In the 1980s, the book by A. Blizniuk, devoted to Belorussian heroism during the Sevastopol siege was published in two editions in Belarus. (The most prominent of the ethnic Belorussians who fought in Sevastopol during the Crimea war was Aleksandr Kozarsky.)[33] The process of reclaiming of the parts of the Sevastopol myth by Ukrainians and Belorussians continued until the dissolution of the USSR, but it was never able to change the exclusively Great Russian character of the myth that it acquired in the Soviet Union in 1930s-1950s.

Conclusion

The legitimacy of Ukrainian borders has been challenged often by the Russian politicians on the grounds of historical legitimacy. In the case of Ukraine, as in other cases of territorial claims against other former Soviet republics, Russian politicians take as a point of departure the borders of the Russian Empire of the late eighteenth and early twentieth centuries, the period when the Empire had reached its maximum territorial expansion. There is nothing new in this approach. For instance, Rumanians usually claim the territory once united under the leadership of Michael the Brave at the beginning of the seventeenth century, while Poles - the territory that belonged to their state in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.[34] One of the students of Russian foreign policy, N. Narochnitskaia, has posed in this respect a rhetorical question: "Why in the case of Crimea, do we follow the borders of 1954, in the case of the Baltic region those of 1939, and in the case of the Kurile Islands, those of 1855?"[35]

Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn in his latest pamphlet 'The Russian Question at the End of the Twentieth Century' presented his own view on the history of the Empire and its aggrandizements in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. For Solzhenitsyn, Russian appropriation of the Crimea was the act with which Russia reached her 'natural southern boundary.' [36] Solzhenitsyn paid some attention to the Crimean war and Sevastopol siege. It is quite interesting that from all the defenders of Sevastopol, Solzhenitsyn mentioned only Totleben and omitted the name of Nakhimov. Solzhenitsyn also departed from the Soviet tradition of blaming the defeat in the war on Russian backwardness. He returns to the pre-Soviet tradition, blaming the defeat on the authorities and sided with Sergei Solovev, who in 1856 advocated the continuation of the war. [37]

Overall, the Sevastopol myth, although being restructured and reshaped after the fall of the USSR, constitutes part of Solzhenitsyn's outlook. At the end of his pamphlet, Solzhenitsyn (very much in accordance with the tradition, established by Evgenii Tarle) attacked the United States for their alleged interference into the Russian-Ukrainian debate over Sevastopol. He wrote in that regard: "The American ambassador in Kiev, Popadiuk, had the gall to declare that Sevastopol rightly belongs to Ukraine. Based on what historical erudition or relying on what legal foundations did he pronounced this learned judgement?" [38]

It is difficult if not impossible to overestimate the significance of the idea of national territory to the system of beliefs of every modern nation. Of no less importance for this system is the complex of historical myths that provides a nation with its own view of its past and tries to explain and justify a nation's territorial possessions or territorial claims against its neighbours. With the collapse and disintegration of world empires, the problem of the division of the territories between "old" imperial and "young," stateless, nations have arisen. The historical arguments and historical myths are of special importance for the justification of conflicting territorial claims of different nations. The current dispute between Russia and Ukraine over the status of Sevastopol serves as a perfect example of the use and misuse of historical mythology in contemporary international relations.

NOTES

[1]. On the problem of imperial disintegration, national self-determination and border conflicts see: Alfred Cobban, *The Nation State and National Self-Determination*, London: Collins/Fontana, 1969, pp. 295-299; J.R.V.Prescott, *The Geography of Frontiers and Boundaries*, Chicago: Aldine Publishing Company, 1965, pp. 109-178; John Coakley, "National Territories and Cultural Frontiers: Conflicts of Principle in the Formation of States in Europe," *Frontier Regions in Western Europe*, Ed. by Malcolm Anderson, London, 1983, pp.34-49.

[2]. See the statement made by P.Voshchanov: *Izvestiia*, August 29, 1991.

[3]. See quotations from the internal memorandum on Crimea, prepared by V. Lukin, then chairman of the Committee on International Affairs of the Russian parliament and currently Russian ambassador to the USA (*Komsomolskaia pravda*, 22 January, 1991); interview with S. Baburin and N.Pavlov, members of Russian parliamentary group that visited Crimea in December of 1991 (*Literaturnaia Rossiia*, 31 January, 1992) and Ukrainian protests on the creation and activities of the Russian Supreme Soviet ad hoc committee on Sevastopol's status, called into existence on the Seventh

Congress of People's Deputies of Russia in December 1992 (Uriadovyi kurier, 11 December 1992, Pravda Ukrainy, 23 January, 1993, UKRAINFO Reports, 20 February, 1993).

[4]. See: Pravda Ukrainy, April 7, 1992. Quoted by Roman Solchanyk, "Ukraine and Russia: The Politics of Independence," RFE Daily Reports, May 14, 1992, p.3.

[5]. See: "Ukraine-Russia differences continue." Ukrainian News, October 9-27, 1996, p. 5; "Duma Passes Law Barring Division of Black Sea Fleet." OMRI Daily Digest, October 24, 1996; "Russian Duma Enacts Black Sea Fleet Bill." Monitor Report, October 24, 1996.

[6]. John A. Armstrong, "Myth and History in the Evolution of Ukrainian Consciousness," Ukraine and Russia in Their Historical Encounter, Edmonton, 1992, p. 133.

[7]. See Literaturnaia Rossiia, 8 January 1993.

[8]. See "Obrashchenie potomkov geroev Sevastopolia k Prezidentu, pravitelstvu i Federalnomu Sobraniu Rossii," Krymskoe vremia, 1996, no. 116. One of the many ironies of the appeal lies in the fact that Admiral Nakhimov did not have kids and was never married. See his biography by Iu. Davydov, Nakhimov. (Moscow, 1970).

[9]. On the theory of official nationality see S. V. Utechin, Russian Political Thought. A Concise History. (New York and London: Frederick A. Praeger, 1963), pp. 71-77; Nicholas Riasanovsky, Nicholas I and Official Nationality in Russia, 1825-1855. (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1969).

[10]. The historical foundations of the myth were challenged in the middle of the nineteenth century by Mykola Kostomarov. See Sergei Solovev's response to Kostomarov's critique of the myth: "O state g. Kostomarova ` Ivan Susanin,'" in S. M. Solovev, Istoriia Rossii s drevneishikh vremen, bk. 5 (vols. 9-10) (Moscow, 1961), pp. 355-62.

[11]. See an account of the Borodino battle in the standard Soviet history of the USSR: Istoriia SSSR s drevneishikh vremen do nashikh dnei, vol. 4 (Moscow: Nauka, 1967), pp. 125-32.

[12]. On the history of Crimean war there exists reach literature both in English and Russian. For an account of the events of the war see A. J. Barker, The Vainglorious War, 1854-56. (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1970). On the diplomatic consequences of the war for Russia see L. I. Narochitskaia, Rossiia i otmena neitralizatsii Chernogo moria, 1856-1871. (Moscow: Nauka, 1989).

[13]. See Nicholas Riasanovsky, Nicholas I and Official Nationality in Russia, pp. 165-67.

[14]. The heroism of the rank-and-file defenders of Sevastopol has been the major theme of The Sevastopol Sketches by Leo Tolstoy, which was approved by the Soviet authorities and included in the school curriculum on Russian literature. The same approach to the history of the Crimean war was inherited by the Soviet

historiography and can be found in almost all of the Soviet publications on the history of the war. See for example *Istoriia SSSR s drevneishikh vremen do nashikh dnei*, vol. 4 (Moscow: Nauka, 1967), pp. 517-68.

[15]. On the eve of the Russo-Turkish war of 1877-1878 there appeared a number of publications in Russia that were devoted to the history of the Crimean war and defence of Sevastopol. See *Opisanie oborony goroda Sevastopolia*, ed. E. Totleben, 2 vols. (St. Petersburg, 1871); *Sbornik rukopisei, predstavlenykh E. I. V. gosudariu nasledniku tsesarevichu o Sevastopolskoi oborone sevastopoltsami*, 3 vols. (St. Petersburg, 1872-1873); *Materialy dlia istorii Krymskoi voiny i oborony Sevastopolia*, ed. N. Dubrovin, 5 vyps. (St. Petersburg, 1871-1875). See also publications that came out at the time of the war: M. I. Bogdanovich, *Vostochnaia voina*, pts. 3-4, (St. Petersburg, 1877); N. Dubrovin, *Vostochnaia voina 1853-1856 godov. Obzor sobytii po povodu sochineniia M. I. Bogdanovicha*. (St. Petersburg, 1878).

[16]. See *Istoriia mist i sil Ukrainskoi RSR. Krymska oblast*. (Kiev, 1974), pp. 163-64.

[17]. The Soviet interpretation of the defence of Port Arthur included many elements of the Port Arthur mythology. See *Istoriia SSSR s drevneishikh vremen do nashikh dnei*, vol. 6, (Moscow: Nauka, 1968), pp. 100-110.

[18]. On national Bolshevism in Russia see S. V. Utechin, *Russian Political Thought*, pp. 253-56. On M. N. Pokrovsky, see Roman Szporluk's introduction in M. N. Pokrovsky, *Russia in World History. Selected essays*, ed. Roman Szporluk, (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1970). Interaction between politics and history writing in the USSR is discussed by Nancy Whitter Heer, in *Politics and History in the Soviet Union*, (Cambridge, Mass, 1971).

[19]. See: Berkov E.A., *Krymskaia kampaniia*, Moscow, 1939, Lagovskii A.N., *Oborona Sevastopolia. Krymskaia voina 1854-1855 gg.*, Moscow, 1939.

[20]. On the defence of Sevastopol in 1941-1942 see *Istoriia mist i sil Ukrainskoi RSR. Krymska oblast*, pp. 178-86. *Istoriia goroda-geroia Sevastopolia, 1917 - 1957*. (Kiev, 1958), pp. 199-257.

[21]. See *Radianska entsyklopediia istorii Ukrainy*, vol. 3 (Kiev, 1971), p. 214.

[22]. See E. V. Tarle, *Gorod russkoi slavy. Sevastopol v 1854-1855 gg.* (Moscow: Voennoe izdatelstvo Ministerstva oborony Soiuz SSR, 1954). In 1955 the same publishing house published the book by L. Gorev, *Voina 1853-1856 gg. i oborona Sevastopolia*. (Moscow: Voennoe izdatelstvo Ministerstva oborony Soiuz SSR, 1955).

[23]. See E. V. Tarle, *Krymskaia voina*, 2 vols. (Moscow and Leningrad, 1950). E. Tarle also authored a book about admiral Nakhimov (Nakhimov. Moscow, 1948).

[24]. E. Tarle, *Gorod russkoi slavy*, p. 3.

[25]. Ibid, p. 16.

[26]. Ibid, p. 15.

[27]. Ibid, p. 15.

[28]. See E. Tarle, *Gorod russkoi slavy*. On Pirogov's participation in the defence of Sevastopol see the publication of his letters and memoirs in N. I. Pirogov, *Sevastopolskie pisma i vospominaniia*. (Moscow and Leningrad, 1950).

[29]. See Iu. Davydov, *Nakhimov*, pp. 141, 162-66.

[30]. See E. Tarle, *Gorod russkoi slavy*, pp. 75-167. Tarle in this case barely introduced anything new, but rather followed the pattern, established by the pre-revolutionary Russian historiography. In the same way Nakhimov was presented in the numerous Soviet publications on his life and activities. Compare A. B. Aslanbegov, *Admiral P. S. Nakhimov*. (St. Petersburg, 1898); P. I. Belavenets, *Admiral Pavel Stepanovich Nakhimov*. (Sevastopol, 1902); N. V. Novikov, *Admiral Nakhimov*. (Moscow, 1944); E. V. Tarle, *Nakhimov*. (Moscow, 1948); *Admiral Nakhimov. Stati i ocherki*. (Moscow, 1954); P. S. Nakhimov. *Dokumenty i materialy*. (Moscow, 1954); V. D. Polikarpov, *Pavel Stepanovich Nakhimov*. (Moscow, 1950); Iu. Davydov, *Nakhimov*. (Moscow, 1970).

[31]. See for example the chapter on history of Sevastopol in *Istoriia mist i sil Ukrainskoi RSR. Krymska oblast*, pp. 142-205, and *Istoriia goroda-geroia Sevastopolia, 1917-1957*. The book is presented in the introduction to be the second volume of the two-volume history of Sevastopol. The first volume never appeared.

[32]. See *Istoriia mist i sil Ukrainskoi RSR, Krymska oblast*, p. 151, *Radianska entsyklopediia istorii Ukrainy*, vol. 2 (Kiev, 1970, p. 391.

[33]. See A. M. Blizniuk, *Na bastionakh Sevastopolia*. (Minsk: Polymia, 1989).

[34]. See John Coakley, "National Territories and Cultural Frontiers...", p.41.

[35]. *Literaturnaia Rossiia*, August 21, 1992.

[36]. Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, 'The Russian Question' at the End of the Twentieth Century. (Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1995) p. 30.

[37]. Ibid., pp. 48-50. [38]. Ibid., p.96.