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Sakarya University, Adapazari, Turkey

RELATIONS BETWEEN THE TURKISH EMPIRE, ZAPOROZHIAN COSSACKS AND CRIMEAN KHANATE IN THE FIRST HALF OF THE 17TH CENTURY

A cooperation between the Crimean Khanate and the Zaporozhian Cossacks in the first half of the 17th century rose to its peak between 1620 and 1630. There were important reasons for this alliance between the Crimean Khanate and Zaporozhian Cossacks. The joint aspect in terms of the Zaporozhian Cossacks and the Crimean Khanate was, that both of the sides, as the border forces, were under control of strong powers. The Crimean Khanate formed the main base of the Ottoman State's northern policy, and the Ottomans had been carrying out their policy against Poland and Moscow through the agency of the Crimean Khanate since the time of Mehmet the Conqueror. There were relations of the same kind between the Zaporozhian Cossacks and the Polish Kingdom. The developments arising between the Crimean Khanate and the Ottoman Empire resembled those ones between Poland and the Cossacks. The subject of our presentation is to throw light on the above said cooperation and to deal with its background. The character of relations between the Ottoman Empire and the Crimean Khanate, as well as those between the Polish Kingdom and the Zaporozhian Cossacks have been analysed for the said aim, and subsequently the historical grounds and specific features of the Cossacks–Crimean cooperation have been dealt with. Finally, the preparation period of the Revolution under the head of Bohdan Khmelnytsky was accentuated.

Key words: Crimean Khanate, Zaporozhian Cossacks, Ottoman Empire, Polish Kingdom, Moscow, Khmelnytsky, szlachta.

History has presented the Cossacks and Crimeans as the adverse powers to each other; but, when those powers are considered beyond the formal histories, a similarity will be deduced. There were a lot of similar attributes appearing under the same historical conditions between the Cossacks and the Crimeans. That both of them were vassals of greater powers was an important resemblance. There were also some similarities in the way both protecting powers ruled those border communities. While the Ottomans benefitted from the political antagonism between the Girays Dynasty and Karachi Princes (Karaçi beyleri), Poland made use of the rivalry between the Zaporozhian Cossacks and the Registered Cossacks serving to the Polish and Lithuanian Commonwealth. The need of the states to have irregular forces besides standing armies was another parallelism that is remaining permanent. It was more advantageous to rent skilled military forces at an affordable cost in the times of the need, contrary to very high costs used on the salaries, provision and transportation of the regular and professional military forces. Thus, while the Ottomans became dependent on the Crimean cavalry towards the end of the 16th century, Poland was in the same situation with the Cossacks. The thought of benefitting from the military power of the Cossacks existed in Habsburg Empire, too. For that reason an Habsburg envoy Henry Lassota was sent to the Porgos of the 16th century [19].

Despite the vassalage of both forces, they could become crucial elements in the respective state. They could even insist on their own political targets according to the conjuncture. This was a case viewed between the vassals and their protectors. The Crimean Khanate effectuated the permanent element of the Ottoman Empire at the end of the 16th century. The Ottoman Empire became unable to move against Persia, Austria and the Northern powers without the support of the Crimean cavalry [26, pp. 480-513]. The Crimean cavalries were self-sufficient powers. On the other hand, the dangers they made by long-term plunders over Poland, Austria and Persia, were very deterrent. Contrary to the regular forces, the plunder attacks damaging behind the front had more influence. The rival powers were compelled to end the war to avoid those attacks. The key factor that forced Poland make a treaty with the Ottomans in Khotyn Battle was the devastating assaults of the Crimean and Nogaya raiders.

Benefits the Cossacks provided to Poland can be considered in the same direction, too. Poland assigned defending its southern borders almost to them. Oppressive attacks of the Cossacks rendering the Black Sea into a frightening sea, provided Poland great ease and

advantage. Since the attacks of the Cossacks, the Khotyn Campaign, the greatest expedition of Ottomans in the north, has met great difficulties just in the first stage. The Ottomans took into account Poland's demands keeping under severe control the Crimean Khanate after this event, because they also complained and charged Poland with the Cossacks. Poland implicitly reminded the Ottoman Empire the attacks of the Crimean Khanate, and drew the problem into a frame of reciprocity.

The Cossacks were among the major forces Poland relied on against Sweden and Moscow in the north. Thus, Poland was bound to the Cossacks like the Ottomans were bound to the Crimeans. The Cossacks had the pivotal role as the mobile forces of the Polish army, since the Polish gentry (Szlachta) in the Parliament did not allow any campaign which would probably bring additional expenditures upon them. Let us take a closer look at the two forces in their interrelations, and at the states they depended on.

The Ottoman Empire and the Crimean Khanate

The Crimean Khanate became a vassal of the Ottoman Empire at the time of Mehmet the Conqueror. The Ottoman Sultan did not put an end to the Girays dynasty from the line of Cengiz and maintained it under the status of vassalage. Since 1475 the Crimean Khanate had constituted the northern branch of the Ottoman's policy, and the Ottomans carried their policies by this Khanate against Poland and Moscow [25, p. 34]. The social structure of the Crimean Khanate consisted of four main tribes. Those tribes, called the Shirins, the Barins, the Argins and Kipchaks, actually became essential social bodies of the Kipchak Steppe before the formation of the Crimean Khanate [15, pp. 51–73; 21, pp. 282–309; 37, pp. 33–80]. In the concept of the age, those constituted the equivalent function of the province system in the sedentary states [11, p. 171]. The leaders of those tribes were called in general the Karachis (Karaçi). These Karachi Princes were also partners of the political power, and they supervised its execution. Usage of the politic power of the Khanate was divided among the Karachi Princes. The Karachi Princes were almost consultative bodies concerning the internal and foreign policies of the Khanate, and the Khans could not act without their approval. At this point, the real powers using the politic power of the Khanate were the Karachi Princes, and in many ways they resembled the Polish Szlachta. The difference of the Karachi Princes was that they did not have as much larger economic functions as the Szlachta had. The Crimean Khanate, being bound to the military organisation and devoting the sustainance sources of its army among

the biggest military forces of that time, was dependent on plundering the lands in the south of Ukraine or Poland. In addition, the Khanate constantly needed the Ottoman financial assistance. That the Girays Dynasty was the top body in the representation of the political power of the Khanate, induced a transition of the balance of the power in favour of the Khans, but against Karachi Princes, and this caused a long term of political and military crises in the Khanate.

Over the course of time absolutism was inevitable in monarchical constructions, and the tribal forces that opposed this tendency were in need of a permanent external support. This deficiency in the administrative structure of the Khanate gave rise to outer intervenes from time to time, and those intervenes could turn to coercion after Haji Giray's death. The Genoese were not contented with intervening to the interregnum of the Khanate; probably following the demands from inside, they seized the power actually, and did not give it up any more. In this case, both the dynasty and the tribal forces were eliminated [25, pp. 24–25]. The conquest of the Crimea by the Ottomans was the consequence of these developments. Prince Eminek, the leader of the Shirins, that was the most distinguished tribe in the Crimea, asked his letter for helping him against the Genoese oppressions. Mehmet the Conqueror, appreciating this request conquered the Crimea [15, p. 56]. The Ottoman administration in the Crimea was in close relation with this conquest from its very starting point. After the Ottomans had invented this medium inviting them to a conquest, they never relinquished the opportunities it would supply. The balance between the Girays Dynasty and Karachi Princes would be controlled by the Ottomans after this stage [25, p. 38]. The tribal forces considered the Ottoman element as a guarantee for their existence and maintained their relations with it by evaluating them in the course of history. As for the Girays Dynasty, from the beginning, it saw the Ottomans as an invader, except for the moment of the conquest, and aimed at escaping from that vassalage. Contrary to the alliance between the Ottomans and the tribal forces that took place naturally in the historical process, there was a contradiction between the Girays and the Ottoman government at the socio-political basis.

As the Crimean tribal forces supposed the Ottomans to be guarantee of their independence, they controlled the Girays dynasty in the line with the Ottoman world policy. The Ottoman State set up reliably such a northern multifaceted policy. The Ottoman State was afraid of the political tradition available behind the Northern Black Sea. It found more convenient for its political interests maintenance of a divided political area having arisen after the breaking of the Golden Horde Empire, that would be a branch of Genghis Holy Dynasty sovereigning over the Volga, Dniepr, Ten basins and the Caucasus, including the Polish-Lithuanian region. Thus, it did not want the Crimean government to be strong enough to rule over the region of Astarkhan, and the Nogays Khanates in the Ten Basin, Kazan Khanate and Moscow states in the Volga Basin [16, p. 37; 24, p. 59; 30, p. 217]. Karachi Princes did not seem to have the same idea. Their political vision was limited by maintenance of their tribal power in the Khanate only. The Ottoman government felt annoyed by the Crimean Khanate's undertaking attempts to force its status of vassalage, and could easily make attempts needed in a cooperation with Karachi Princes. The removal of Sahib Giray Khan from the throne in a tragic way was the clearest and most successful example of this cooperation [25, pp. 41–46].

The Crimean Khanate, being kept under control in this way, was an important political entity ensuring both

the defence of the northern borders of the Ottoman Empire, and implementation of its northern policy. The Moscow envoys sent to the Ottoman Empire until the second half of the 17th century met at first the Khans, and then they were received subsequently in Istanbul in case of necessity. The contrast between the Girays Dynasty and the Ottomans revealed itself almost in every campaign, and the Khans did not avoid throwing heavy blows at the Ottomans in the occasions, when the Khanate's support was of a crucial importance. The first and most important of those ones was Astarkhan expedition planned in 1569. In this expedition the Ottoman army returned back without conquering Astarkhan since the deliberate action of the Crimean Khan, and it perished in the wrong guidance by the Khan while returning home [14, pp. 349–402]. The person who gave a chance to John Sobiesky watching a proper moment to hit a deadly blow to the Turks during Vienna Siege in 1683 was the Crimean Khan too.

The Cossacks and Poland

The emergence of the Cossacks on the stage of history began, when Ukraine entered Poland's domination. Late Mr. Pritsak mentioned at length, that the culture and civilisation of the Kievan Rus kept its progress under the authority of the Golden Horde [32, pp. 1–28]. The recent histories, too are in the same direction on the Ukrainians' entering into the course of assimilation under the domination of Poland. This course of assimilation was carried by the Shlachta in the social, economic and cultural fields [20].

Towards 1520, the Crimean Khanate had reached the peak of its strength, had ascendancy over Moscow, and intensified its pressure over the Kievan Area under the domination of Poland. At this period, the Shlachta put into action some military units it had picked up among the Ukrainian population. This stage is important in view of its constituting the beginning of the course, when the Cossacks were employed as the border guards against the Ottomans and Crimeans. Those border forces under the authority of the Shlachta were protecting the Ukrainian border population on one hand, and it also could carry on some offensive actions on the other hand. These forces gave a political and military function to the population of the middle and lower Dniepro region by integrating them with the Cossacks. Thus, a new era began, during which the Cossacks also represented opposition to the Polish Shlachta, apart from their main task of protecting the Polish population against the Crimeans [28, pp. 243–258].

The most interesting and important personality in that period was undoubtedly Dimitry Vishnevetsky. The population living in the field stretching from the north of the Middle Dniepro Area to the Lower Dniepro Area resisted the domination of the Shlachta. This resistance was an inactive displeasure in the first stages. Dimitry Vishnevetsky belonging to the Shlachta himself, discerned this social resistance consisting mostly of the Ukrainian population and attempted to use it in favour of reaching his own political aim. In fact, Vishnevetsky was a Polish nobleman having fallen in conflict with the Polish rulers, because of some land problems. This person that was one of the highest Polish nobles, and he tried to create a new principality in the area spreading from Kiev to the Lower Dniepro Area under the vassalage of any great power except for Poland. The most proper alternative as a suzerain was the Ottoman Empire. Vishnevetsky attempted to actualize his aim through a visit to Istanbul.

We don't know what he did, by who he spoke to, in what sort of negotiations he engaged, which proposals he offered, what sort of answers he got; but from the evolution of the events we understand that he couldn't get a positive

reaction from the Ottoman administration. The conjuncture in 1550s was not favorable for the attempt of Vishnevetsky. The Ottoman Empire concentrating its force in the west upon Austria, and in the east upon Iran, was in peace with Poland. The classical Ottoman – Polish amity starting at the time of Suleyman the Magnificent will last for until the end of the XVIth century. Vishnevetsky turned to Moscow when he couldn't take a desired answer from İstanbul. A rival in extreme cost to Poland and Ottoman without any risk was irrefusable for Moscow. Vishnevetsky continued his actions with the assistance provided to him by Ivan IV. The Ottomans witnessed to the pressure from Vishnevetsky in the decade of 1550-60. Ivan IV did not have enough power to protect Vishnevetsky against Poland and the Ottomans. In that period, the Ottoman-Moscow classic friendship was valid too. Vishnevetsky having failed to get his aims, took part in the rebellion of Moldavia launched and headed by Albert Lasky in the 1660s. His aim in that attempt, too was probably to replace Moldavia's Hospodar and to build a new vassal state according to the conditions of the period. He was caught, brought to İstanbul and executed. Though the action of Vishnevetsky started with the Cossacks along the Danube and Dniepro water basins did not bring him success but it evoked the long-standing echoes. Vishnevetsky accomplished his successful fights by organising the Cossacks' communities in the Danube and Dniepro water basins against the Ottomans that was the superpower of the age. The Hortytsia Base which was the centre of the free Cossacks was claimed to be have been founded by him [27, pp. 95-140; 29, pp. 55–95; 34, pp. 258–279; 35, pp. 261–275].

The Cossacks rising to the level of strong border forces owing to Vishnevetsky grew stronger and stronger due to supporting by some strata of the population in the resistance of the latter one to Poland, the Crimea and Moscow. While the Porogs were turning into the land of the Free Cossacks, the Ukrainian enslaved population was integrated with the Registered Cossacks under the control of Poland. Poland became depended on the Cossacks in the said time. The Cossacks became the most important professional forces of the 16th century. Poland made use of the Cossacks against Moscow in the north, and against the Crimea in the south. As for the free Cossacks are concerned, they turned the Black Sea into a frightening battlefield by dashing onto the Ottoman-Crimean bases according to their strategic purposes.

Cooperation between the Cossacks and the Crimeans for a Joint Purpose

The Cossacks got the power enough to permit them to move free after 1580s. During this period, the Ottomans showed serious weaknesses against Austria; the fact that Wallachia and Bogdan played an important role in this weaknesses was to some extent related to the Cossacks. The Ottoman Empire increased taxation in parallel with an increase of the expeditionary expenses, and imposed additional dues they couldn't overcome on those principalities, who were obliged to meet the requirements for provision and transportation of the army on these expeditions. The other factors that increased the mentioned problems were weakening of the Ottoman Empire and loss of influence on the environment. Since the factors like these the population of Wallachia and Moldavia was coming to the edge of the crisis [8, p. 615].

In this case, the Cossacks, who were international powers, attacked Azak and caused great damage. After the attacks that caused great panic and echo in İstanbul, the Ottomans started to watch regularly the Cossacks and took necessary precautions in line with the information they

obtained (For the Cossack attacks to Azov, see: Decree to Caffa Governor, dated 23 Cemaziyelahir 990 / July the 15th, 1582, BOA, MD, XLVII, 214/503 [2]; Decree to Captain Pasha, dated 26 Cemaziyelahir 990 / July the 18th, 1582, BOA, MD, XLVII, 219/516 [3]; Decree to Mehmed Bey who was the former Caffa Governor, dated 26 Safer 991 / March 21st, 1583, BOA, MD, XLIV, 171/352 [4]). The development of the Cossacks in this way continued. We shall not elaborate all of the corresponding events, but we do not want to bypass one of them. The Cossacks wanted to be recognized as a legitimate force by the ambassador of the Crimean Khanate. Yevornitsky mentions that the Crimean Khan Islam Giray responded in the affirmative to this demand [40, p. 62]. The death of Stephan Batory (1586) became the turning point. The plan to put the Cossacks under the control of Rada grew weaker after this date. The Szlachta did not yet have any national purpose, and moved upon its own economic interests. As long as the institutional identity of the Cossacks were developing, the tendency of the Ukrainian peasantry to them increased. Thus, the Ukrainian peasants turned to the Cossacks as a hope to get independence against the oppressions of Szlachta [9, p. 97]. Poland comprehending that the Cossacks entered into the course of independence made some regulations in 1590 restricting significantly their rights and undertaking some measures intended for putting the Cossacks under severe control [13, p. 181].

The more Poland was increasing its pressure upon the peasants, the more the relations between the peasants and Cossacks were developing. The Ukrainian society reached to the state of rebelling against the Szlachta in the 1590s. The rebellion headed by Kozinsky was the first one. Kozinsky taking refuge to the Cossacks by escaping from the economic conflicts among the Szlachta was appointed as Ko Ataman (1590), and headed for rebellion to take back what he had lost by the defeat in 1592. The Cossacks under the command of Kozinsky were beaten in the first battle in 1593, but won the second. Kozinsky, who soon won great success and became the leader of Ukraine, acted to seize Kiev in the final stage. Although Kozinsky was killed in this siege the Cossacks continued to the invasion. Poland could get out of this invasion with the support of the Crimean Khanate. As the Crimean troops attacked to the Sich, Zaporozhian Cossacks returned home by ending the siege. This siege of Crimean probably had taken place in cooperation with Poland [9, p. 105; 28, pp. 326].

By this time the Cossack Community had become a social and politic power. The social component of this power in the state constituted an attractive ambiance for the losers in the warfares among the Szlachta. The ones offended by Poland, tried to experience their chances by taking a refuge among the population consisting mostly of the Ukrainian peasants. Thus, Naliveko, emerging after Kozinsky pursued the same way. Naliveko, a member of the Szlachta, headed the Cossackdom by moving his own forces, and entered into a cooperation with the Zaporozhian Cossacks. Naliveko rebellion breaking out in 1594 continued successfully in 1595. He demanded to be handed over the line between the Dniepro and Bratislava to the Cossacks in return for an agreement with Poland. The Polish government appointed a high-level General Zolkievsky over Naliveko. In the end of strong struggles continuing until 1597 the Rebellion was suppressed [28, pp. 327-334]. Poland managed to suppress the said uprisings with great loses. After crushing the Zaporozhian Cossacks using an unproportional force, the charge to control them was assigned to the Registered Cossacks. Poland empowered the Registered Cossacks for this mission and settled them near the Zaporozhian base

Hortytsia. The Zaporozhian Cossacks being immovable fell into a great crisis [9, p. 148].

The Cossacks crisis ended with Samuel Koska becoming the Ataman in 1599. This veteran revived the Cossacks again. Poland was obliged to support the Cossacks in their struggling in Wallachian and Moldavian problems, Livonia Wars and against Moscow. In spite of all its disadvantages, Polish General Zamoisky applied for being supported by the Cossacks. Samuel Koska turned this successfully into a politic advantage. He proceeded in bargain as a free side with Poland and negotiated his claims for his supporting. Koska imposed his conditions, and in this way a new Poland-Cossacks cooperation started. The Cossacks supported Poland in every field, and they moved unchecked along the southern borders, to the Crimea, Wallachia and Moldavia. During the period when the Turkish-Austrian Wars were continuing in the highest scale, and when Moscow was in troubles period, Poland, that eased its cooperation with the Cossacks, was taking advantage of the weak positions of its rivals. The Cossacks were unavoidable at this period for Poland. Ten thousands of Cossacks took part in Poland's wearing expedition launched against Moscow and returned home with lots of booty [6, p. 92].

After Poland had got through the troubles period, the Cossacks, as if being a half-free community, moved towards the Turkish-Crimean borders and made there terror. In the Black Sea there was no place that was not under the menace of Petro Konoshevich Sahaidachny, elected Kos Ataman in 1613. The Dniepro was exceeded, the Black Sea coasts, foremost Sinop, became the main targets of Cossacks' attacks. Those attacks reached the very harmful state, since "the converted slaves" had fled from the Ottoman Empire, the Cossacks informed. Na'yimâ mentions that the Sinop foray occurred in cooperation with those converts [23, p. 118]. Cossacks' raids after Sinop foray continued in a high level. They could dare to attack the outskirts of Istanbul after foraying Caffa and Trabizond in 1615 [40, p. 148]. At that time Poland, and especially the Szlachta, were in the mood of approaching adversely the classical status of the Ottoman Empire. Poland now intervened to Moldavia, and protected the politic sides opposite the Ottomans.

There was not avoided fighting with the Ottomans at the said point. It is interesting that this new mood was developed in parallel to the Cossacks' raids. The largest part of Poland's forces actually consisted of Cossacks. Pechevi designates those "Rus", and separates them from the Polish. According to the same source, in the war broke out the Moldavian problem since a half of the Poland's army consisted wholly of 40,000 soldiers who were Cossacks [31, p. 446]. The population Pechevi referred to "Rus" was not related with Moscow sphere. These represented the Ukrainian-Rus population. There were endeavors to spread into Transilvania the movement, which influenced Moldavia [18, p. 129]. Though the Cossacs were under control of the Szlachta, they moved further, when they found the new opportunity and performed their own plans. It can be said that this period was the golden age for the Cossacks. After the negotiations with Austria, the Ottoman administration took essential measures to solve the Moldavian problem, that reached the separation point. The Polish-Cossack army was put on a serious route-expedition performed by the great army in 1616. The corresponding victory of the Ottomans increased the forays of Cossacks instead of reducing [28, pp. 348–350]. Following this Ottoman expedition, the Dniepro, Caffa, Sinop and Trabizond came under great attacks of the Cossacks [22, p. 64]. At this phase the Cossack

movement turned into a great extent guerilla movement, and the Ottoman State became unable to defend its borders [18, p. 128]. When the Cossack forays extended towards Istanbul in 1617, the tension between the Ottomans and Polish almost turned into war. After the two sides took the position of war, peaceful negotiations were concluded, and peace was set up before a war outbreak. Although the main theme of the treaty was the Cossack attacks, the dimensions and effects of the attacks continued to increase after the agreement [1, pp. 7–8]. Finally, the famous Khotyn campaign (March – September 1621) commanded by the Turkish Sultan himself, was put in practice, it lasted for 4.5 months and failed. The main cause of the failure of this expedition was the Cossacks made the Turkish front back unsecured from continuous unexpected forays [22, p. 72].

There was another reason why the Turkish front back and the fighting power were weak. That was the Crimean inside crisis being in parallel to the Cossack phenomenon. The Ottomans used mostly not the Crimean cavalry, but the Nogays in this important expedition, because the Crimeans had degraded, while the Nogay Tatars had been ascended in importance beside the Porte at the period in question. The main reason for the said cardinal change was the Crimeans were trying to establish their vassalage towards Ottomans in another frame. But, the Ottoman central administration would not have been contented with an alteration of the ancient classic status; at this point the Ottoman-Crimean relations would have had a heavy blow, the Crimean tribal forces would have gone into new trends against the Ottomans, and this stage would have been ended in a blooded rebellion.

The problem that broke out between the Crimean Khanate and the Ottomans almost resembled the one between Poland and Cossacks. At the same time, a deep conflict emerged between the Ottomans and the Crimean tribal forces. The main reason for this conflict to descend to the 1580s was that the Ottoman central authorities dismissed Mehmet Giray II (1578–1584) and appointed Islam Giray II [10, p. 56; 26, p. 492; 33, p. 492; 38, p. 54]. Those dismissal and appointment caused tensions that set up beforehand in different ways between both the powers to the level of an uprising. Mehmet Giray's II sons Saadet Giray and Murat Giray resistance to the dismissal of their father proceeded to a cooperation with the Cossacks and withdrew to the steppes. Murad Giray took refuge to the Tsar, and Moscow-Crimean-Cossacks cooperation started immediately after this period. The above cooperation did not develop through the equality concept of both the powers, but it manifested in the context that Moscow holding the appraised princes used the advantages it gained. Moscow forced the Crimean Khanate to put pressure over Poland [12, pp. 12]. The tension created by the Crimean rebellious princes strengthened Moscow against the Ottoman Empire; taking over the leadership of the rebels by directing the Crimean military power over Poland, Moscow also gained an advantage over this important opponent. These events also show a development of the Cossack-Crimean cooperation through Moscovian protection.

During the reign of Khan Bora Gazi II Giray, who ascended the throne after Islam Giray's II death, the Crimean uprising ended, and the Ottoman-Crimean cooperation reached its peak again. The Crimean Khanate had penetration over Moscow and Poland [26, p. 493]. While Khan Bora Gazi II Giray was facing again the task of making the Khanate a regional power against Moscow and Poland, the Ottoman-Austria wars broke out. Under the circumstances, the Ottomans demanded that the Khanate would join it with all forces of the later one at the Austrian front. But the Khan's priority was the

Moscovian and Polish fronts. The conflict which arose as the consequence ended in dismissal of Gazi II Giray (1596). The dismissal of the Khan who had established his penetration into the Crimea and Caffa created a general discontent, and the dismissed Khan resisted to this fait accompli. Thus, Bora Gazi Giray obtained the throne again by removing Fetih Giray having been appointed as the Khan. During the second period of his khanship, he improved the Khanate's relations with the Ottomans, but he managed to do that only by renouncing the priorities of the Khanate's foreign policy [26, p. 494].

Bora Gazi Giray's death in 1608 undermined again the new founded fragile balance. In accordance with the consensus having emerged in that period, the tribal forces of the Khanate consisting of the Shirins, Barins, Sucuts and Mansurs, appointed Toktamys Giray to the throne without consulting the Ottomans. The Ottoman central government having found the enthroning contradiction in relation of the antecedent valid between both of the powers, refused approving. This appointment caused a new crisis for a short time period that was more serious, than the one in 1580. Two brothers from the Girays Dynasty, Mehmet and Shahin Girays, launched a rebellion using support from all the local tribal forces, and from all the Tatars and Cossacks over the steppes in general [10, p. 73; 26, p. 494; 28, p. 368; 36, p. 39; 38, p. 24].

In spite of the fact that formally Selamet Giray was the Khan, the sovereignty was actually passed to Mehmet and Shahin Girays. According to the Ottoman historian Rydvan Pashazade, who was better, than other historians, aware of the time when his father was the Caffa Governor, the sovereignty of the Kipchak Steppe has been passed into the hands of both of the brothers since 1608 [36, pp. 40-41]. There is information that the rebel princes made some preparations to attack and get the throne at the end of the last phase of Selamet Giray's reign [36, p. 21].

As it has been mentioned above, along this rebellion carried out in cooperation with the communities in the steppes, like mainly the Cossacks, Circassians and others, the Polish and Moscow's authorities replaced the Ottoman authority in the region. Penetrations of Moscow and Poland were actually temporary elements the Cossacks and Crimeans had brought into the region to break the Ottoman penetration. It is a very well known phenomenon how the Cossacks and Crimeans resisted Poland and Moscow according to the conjuncture. Those developments in the period, during which the Cossacks and Crimeans gained partially an autonomous status, also mark emerging of a new geopolitics in the Northern Black Sea. Roughly, the main character of the new conjuncture beginning in the first quarter of the 17th century was, that the border communities took control in the Northern Black Sea Area, and the big powers lost their authorities over the larger border areas.

After the death of Selamet Giray, whose reign could not go beyond the formal frame, Chanibek II was appointed to the throne by the Ottoman central authority (1610). He encountered with a decided resistance of Mehmet and Shakhin Girays. If Rydvan Pashazade's information is taken into consideration, the formal appointment of the new Khan did not have any importance, because the rebellious brothers took under their control the Crimean capital Bakhchisarai and seized the rule by attacking from the very beginning. Thus, Mehmet Giray had become the Khan, and he appointed Shakhin Giray the Kalgai. The formal Khan Chanibek Giray II had taken refuge to Rydvan Pasha, the Ottoman governor in Caffa. According to the information given by Rydvan Pasha, the rebels proclaimed with the letters they wrote to him that they had effectively taken over the dominance and demanded recognition by the Ottoman

government [36, p. 42]. Rydvan Pasha spoke to the pretenders that claiming for the throne in this way could not be legal, but they informed that they would make him approve by the sword, if he did not accept the situation [36, p. 43]. The Ottoman historians of the time mentioned that the fait accompli of the two brothers was accepted by the Ottoman government [23, p. 102]. But, according to Rydvan Pashazade, in the case of such a heavy rebellion against the legitimate authority, Rydvan Pasha submitted an offer to the Ottoman government suggesting the fait accompli to be approved, and the government being about to send the certificate of the renunciation. Thus, the khanship though to be given to the Mehmet Giray, was given to Chanibek Giray. Rydvan Pasha who was appointed as the commander-in-chief, was sent to enthrone Chanibek [36, pp. 47-48].

At this stage, the Ottoman ruling in the Crimea was ended, since both of the brothers respected the status of the Tatars [17, p. 351]. According to Rydvan Pashazade, the mainstay of Rydvan Pasha, who moved to appoint Chanibek Giray to the throne of the Crimea again and made the first battle in 1610, was heavy cannons. There were 4,000 janissaries and 5,000 cavalries at his disposal. As for Chanibek Giray's forces, they consisted only of a small unit of 100 soldiers. The main Crimean cavalries, Tatar mirzas, the heroes of Circassians, the Nogay combatants, soldiers of Jagataians were wholly in favour of Mehmet Giray.

Thus, Chanibek Giray and his protector the Ottoman Empire were in the situation of losing the Crimean population's support. Despite the fact that the rebellious Crimean forces were quite superior in number, Rydvan Pasha won the first battle. The Tatar cavalries approaching the shut of the scorching Ottoman cannonade were exterminated. Mehmet and Shakhin Girays fled. Our source Rydvan Pashazade tells that Mehmet Giray took refuge to Moscow, and Shakhin Giray did that to Iran. The rebellious brothers tried their chance once again by gathering forces from the steppes, but they were defeated in the second attempt, either [36, pp. 48-52].

The Crimean rebellion got a different extent at this stage, let alone decreasing. When Mehmed and Shahin Girays' later activities are taken into accounts, it is understood that they and their supporters actually went into a serious cooperation with the Zaporozhian Cossacks. The Ottoman sources report that Mehmet Giray was forgiven after the petition of pardoning, but he was exiled to Rhodes in the final phase. While Shahin Giray's flight continued, Mehmet Giray lived in exile in Rhodes between 1613 and 1623. The Khotyn Expedition's conjuncture made necessary dismissal of Chanibek Giray. Chanibek Khan, whose any serious function was not seen in the failed Khotyn expedition, having serious effects in the horrible end of Sultan Osman II, was dismissed, and Mehmet Giray was appointed as the Khan. Shahin Giray was appointed as the Kalgai, too [17, p. 35; 24, p. 35].

The fact that the Ottoman central government had to assign one of the two great rebels to the Crimean khanship and the second to the kalgaship, the second place after the khanate, reveals how lame the Ottomans were. The Ottomans paid the cost of being deprived of the support of the Crimean forces by losing the Khotyn Battle. The Crimeans ended their alliance with the Ottomans against Poland, Moscow and the Cossacks, but they came to the point of making alliance with any power against the Ottomans after 1608. The tribal forces amalgated around the rebellious princes. In the population, subject to the Crimea and the hinterland, those who obeyed the Ottomans were only Nogay Tatars. While the task of shooting back the rival forces were at the command of the Crimean Khans, who had been the leader of the Crimean tribal forces since the beginning, this

task was carried out by Kantemir Mirza, the leader of the Nogay tribes during the Khotyn campaign, and this led the Nogaytribe organisation replacing the Crimean tribal forces, especially the Shirins – the most prestigious tribe in the Ottoman's northern policy. That Kantemir Mirza had a privileged status belonging to the Shirins since the earlier times by seizing the opportunity the Crimean rebellion provided for him, made the rebellion rise to a different stage. As it was mentioned above, there was an indirect consensus among the Ottoman and Karachi Princes upon the Principal of the Shirins being higher than the other Princes.

During the Khotyn expedition, the Nogays removed the Shirins from their predominant position in the Ottoman political and military organisation, and replaced them by taking their place. When the Crimean tribal forces ended their traditional alliances with the Ottomans, the Ottomans replaced them by the Nogays. This can be considered as a natural development on the one hand, and as the Ottomans' carrying this natural course into policy, on the other hand. But, in fact, it was impossible that the balance could be assured by the Nogays, and the appointment of Mehmet and Shahin Girays was intended for the balance could be founded again. It is understood, that the Ottomans could not hold the Crimea, unless they founded once again the balance between the Nogays and the other tribal union. The Cossack raids in 1622-1623 climbed its peak, but it is seen, that they were only directed towards the coastal segments under the Ottoman control. There are serious indications about the Cossack raids reaching till Istanbul were planned in coordination with the Crimean rebellious princes [28, p. 377].

As all the sources have indicated in the alliance, Mehmet Giray set out to a great punishment of the rivals after enthroning in 1623. The main target in this punishment was the Nogays under the command of Kantemir. It was certainly contrary to the traditional status quo that the appointing of Kantemir by the Ottomans in the governorship status was targeted. Mehmet Giray from the very beginning moved contrary to the vassalage status of the Crimean Khanate, and orientated on gaining the complete independence. The great war between Mehmet Giray and Kantemir turned to a civil war. The Ottomans, having decided to protect Kantemir, appointed once again Chanibek Giray and dismissed the former Khan (1623) under the supervision of Rejep Pasha [36, pp. 60–61]. At that stage, Mehmet Giray was continuing to use full support from the tribal forces. Rydvan Pashazade thinks that, Rydvan Pasha, who was charged to enthrone Chanibek Giray, could not appreciate this fact, and trusted the authority only [36, p. 61]. Katip Chelebi confirms the claims, too [17, p. 56].

At this stage, the Crimean rebellious movement was not only against the Ottomans. There was a considerable amount of the Zaporozhian Cossacks in the company of the Crimean Rebellious forces. The war between the Ottomans under the command of Rejep Pasha and the Crimean-Cossacks alliance lasted for months. Caffa was destroyed to a great extent in the battles, where both sides incurred great losses. The Ottoman siege failed, and the khanship of Mehmet Giray was confirmed [39, p. 156].

In defeating the Ottoman forces the role of the Cossacks was greater, than the one of the Crimeans [22, p. 72]. The fire arms constituting the most important weakness of the Crimeans had been provided and used by the Cossacks. In these events, Iran, too, was apparently playing a role indirectly. It seems that there was an alliance between the Crimean-Cossacks allied forces and Iran against the Ottomans [24, p. 69]. A detailed study is needed to understand how large was the scale of the alliance with Iran. After the Ottoman fleet had

withdrew, the Cossack attacks reached Yeniköy, a town near Istanbul. It was felt that some precautions had been made by drawing chains to both ends of the Bosphorus or by setting the ships side by side. The Cossacks raids reached quickly Sinop and Trabizond. The role of Ataman Safran who had been a captive for a long time in Istanbul was great [28, p. 383].

Maybe, the greatest sea battle the Black Sea has ever seen in its history occurred in 1625 between the Cossacks fleet consisting of 300 chaikas and the Ottoman Empire. The Cossacks almost won the first phase of the battle, as there was no wind. The Cossacks chaikas did not need wind for moving, but the Turkish sailing ships could not move without wind. The battle carried out obviously by the Cossacks turned in favour of the Turks upon starting of the wind. This battle was lost by the Cossacks, the defeat was very serious, and it considerably affected both the situation of the Crimeans beside the Ottomans, and happened to be the fate for the Cossacks actions on the Black Sea [23, pp. 356–360].

After that defeat Poland and Cossacks lost the ascendancy, they had gained during their cooperation with the Crimean rebellious Princes against the Ottomans. On the other hand, after that defeat the Crimean-Cossacks alliance's dominance in the Crimea also entered a risky phase. Poland worried about the possibility for the Ottomans to launch counter attack. The Ottoman State took some measures to cut the Crimea's connection with the Cossacks in the north before besieging the Crimea. For this purpose, a castle was built on the Dogan Passage on the Dniepro. The building of the castle was erected over Yilky Water, a branch of the Dniepro, to the north from the Cossacks base Hortytza, and that shows how important the Cossack threat was [5, pp. 4/2, 5/4, 6/5, 19/25; 23, p. 398; 28, p. 387].

After the preparations were completed, the decision to dismiss Mehmet Giray was announced. This was at the same time the declaration of a war, though it was clear that Mehmet Giray would not approve that. The Ottoman army administration besieging the Crimean capital Bakhchisarai in May 1628, ascribed the Nogay leader Kantemir special functions in the battle. The Crimean-Cossacks forces were defeated in the first battle and fled towards Poland. The sources mention that Poland was an intervening party in the Crimean-Cossacks alliance. Doroshenko assigned by Poland for commanding the Cossacks rallied the allies again and attacked the Ottoman army in great masses. At first, the Crimean troops under the command of Mehmet Giray caught the ascendancy being supported by the Cossacks cannon shooting. Defensive forces under the command of Chanibek Giray and Kantemir tried to go into a close fighting by attacking in masses against the ascendancy of the Cossacks cannonade. This tactics was very reasonable, because in close fighting the advantages of the ascendancy of the Cossacks fire arms would be eliminated. For this purpose, Chanibek Giray and Kantemir's forces attacked the allies. The Crimean-Cossacks forces suffered defeat and fled. Mehmet Giray was injured and soon died. Cossacks Ataman Doroshenko was killed, too. Shakhin Giray fled together with the allies [23, pp. 427–428].

After the Ottoman forces recaptured the Crimea, Shakhin Giray joined the Cossacks in the steppes, and the troops reinforced by Poland maintained their pressure upon the Crimean Peninsula. The Cossacks raids, too, continued in an increasing extension. There was no precise information about, whether Chanibek Giray, who was holding the Crimean throne, received full support from the tribal unity. But it was certain that the relations between the Ottomans

and the tribal forces did not gain its earlier reliable level. During and after the Khotyn expedition, the Nogays under the authority of the famous leader Kantemir were ascended by the Ottoman Central authority, and the Shirins at the top of the tribal hierarchy did not accept that new status quo. Kantemir, becoming the only base of the Ottomans in the Northern Area of the Black Sea and the Crimean Peninsula, now turned into an obstacle between the Crimeans and the Ottomans. A simple pretext was enough to reveal their hate and sedition. The Ottoman State completed its preparations for the Iranian front and called Chanibek Giray, too, to attend to the war. At that period the Polish-Cossacks pressure over the Black Sea was very strong. Another situation was, that the Nogays respected the status more, than the other tribal forces. Chanibek Giray did not leave the Crimea for the Ottoman expedition in this juncture, but left his Office. The new crisis between the Ottomans and Crimeans occurred in the following way. The tribal forces reacting on the Khan's resignation blamed Kantemir Mirza for that. While the Khans were losing their prestiges by being dismissed from the throne on insignificant pretexes, Kantemir maintained his function for a long time, and his charisma and honour aroused the other tribal forces jealousy.

The crowded Crimean army under the command of Chanibek's kalgai Husam Giray headed for the elimination of the Mansuroglu Ulus constituting the Kantemir Nogays. Kantemir's returning to Istanbul for the presentation of the problem before the Porte caused acceleration of the elimination. Although Inayet Giray, who was appointed as the Khan by the Porte, did not approve the elimination, his resistance to the tribal forces was in no way possible. He would have to resign by losing the trust of the tribal forces. The Crimean-Nogay antagonism turned into a blooded warfare. At a juncture in which the upper level kalgais and mirzas were killed, the Crimean Khan was dismissed. While he was looking for a chance to be forgiven in Istanbul, he was executed. The last event caused an internecine conflict rising to its peak point. The Crimeans were in no way possible to be checked against the Nogays. The Ottoman central authority had to sacrifice Kantemir. The famous Nogay leader was executed [23, pp. 301-306; 28, pp. 389-405].

There is some information that the Cossacks-Crimean alliance had been maintained by 1635. It can be thought that the elimination of Nogay tribes from the Azov hinterland empowered the Cossacks. It was not incidentally that Azov was invaded at that time. This was much connected with the Nogay-Crimean conflict. The great tension the Ottomans had both from the Crimeans, and from the Nogays, made the Ottoman-Cossacks relations gain a new level. Regardless of the consequences of the Ottoman-Cossacks warfare, the Cossacks-Crimean alliance sustained the weight of both of the regional forces by weakening the Ottoman domination all over the region. While the Cossacks were growing stronger against the Ottoman Empire, they become strong against Poland, too. Poland was pleased at the Ottomans' weakening owing to the Cossacks-Crimean alliance. But, from the point of the Cossacks, the alliance with Crimeans removed the danger in the south and made them much stronger position in relation to Poland.

The Cossacks appointed Taras Triasylo as their Ataman just in the Crimea after Doroshenko's death in the last battle in 1628. Meanwhile, another ataman – Hryhory Chorny emerged under the authority of Poland. After Taras removed Hryhory by integrating the Cossacks bound to him, he launched a revolt against Poland. It is claimed that that last revolt was different from the former ones considerably, because of the peasants constituting the majority of the attendants, rather than the Cossacks being

native insurgents [22, p. 68]. It is seen that the Cossacks became a social power, and they reached the level of representing the southern Ukrainian population at that stage. Hrushevsky is in the opinion of the said public movement, that began under the leadership of Taras, was a new and important stage in the Ukrainian history [13, p. 262].

Poland constantly needed the Cossacks badly, especially for the two following reasons: it was not possible for them to struggle against the Turks and Moskovites without a support from the Cossacks [9, p. 212]. Poland was violently suppressing the Cossacks rebellions, killing its leaders, due to the Ottoman pressure. Another reason for Poland having implemented a high level of violence against the rebels was, that the rebels threatened Poland itself. Sulima was one of the atamans who was killed in this way [40, p. 167]. This kind of contradictions were among the elements making necessary the Cossacks-Crimean alliance. There is an information in sources, that this kind of alliance continued at the time of Pavliuk's atamanship proclaimed after Sulima's [9, p. 224].

The revolts carried out under the leadership of atamans like Pavliuk (1637) and Ostriany (1638) were severely suppressed. The suppression of these revolts made Poland looking stronger, but it weakened that country socially. The events, carried out under the national identity of Ukraine, were impossible to be controlled with the help of the traditional policies of Poland. Consequently, Ukrainian independence movement emerged under the leadership of Bohdan Khemilnitsky.

Bohdan Khemilnitsky, too, started his negotiations with the Ottomans, but turned towards Moscow finally. In fact, the movement initiated by Khemilnitsky in 1648 and transformed by the Treaty of Pereyaslav (1654) to the vassality of Moscow was the same, as the one which was started in the time of Vishnevetsky. The political structure of Ukrainian population had been an undisputable necessity, since the end of the Kievan Period. The Ukrainian population did not have the geographical opportunities, which were available when the great empires came into existence. But the leaders, having estimated the conjuncture in the course of history, saw their permanent task in founding autonomous political bodies similar to Wallachia or Moldavia.

This aspect, from the point of view of the Crimean Khanate, had the same characteristics, the Cossacks problem had. The Crimean Khanate was in a perpetual struggle to change its status relatively the Ottomans in a more autonomous direction, than the one that Mehmet II designed according to the vassalage concept. The effort to represent the political heritage of the Golden Horde was always suppressed by decisive measures undertaken by the Ottoman central authorities. The period of the Cossacks-Crimean cooperation, which is the subject of our presentation, constitutes the time when the said social dynamics more clearly exposed itself.

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Ю. Озтюрк, д-р іст. наук, проф.
Університет Сакар'я, Адпазари, Туреччина

ВІДНОСИНИ МІЖ ТУРЕЦЬКОЮ ІМПЕРІЄЮ, КОЗАЦТВОМ І КРИМСЬКИМ ХАНСТВОМ

Спільна діяльність Кримського ханства із Запорозьким козацтвом у першій половині XVII ст. досягла свого найвищого рівня в період між 1620 і 1630 рр. Для такого роду зближення Кримського ханства і Запорозького козацтва були свої важливі причини. Зокрема, обидві сторони, як прикордонні сили, перебували під контролем сильних держав. Кримське ханство було інструментом зовнішньої політики Османської імперії, спрямованою на північ, основною складовою якої була протидія Польщі та Москві з посередництвом Кримського ханства від часів правління Мехмета Завойовника. Аналогічні стосунки були й між Польським королівством і Запорозьким козацтвом. З іншого боку, можна провести паралелі між статусами козацтва і кримських татар із домінуючими над ними силами. Мета статті – висвітлити зазначену вище спільну діяльність з оглядом на її передісторію. Проаналізовано характер відносин, які існували між Османською імперією та Кримським ханством, і, відповідно, відносини між Польщею та Запорозьким козацтвом, а також історичні засади для співпраці Кримського ханства з козаками. Велика увага звертається на період підготовки революції під проводом Богдана Хмельницького.

Ключові слова: Кримське ханство, Запорозькі козаки, Османська імперія, Польське королівство, Москва, Хмельницький, шляхта.

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Т. Пшеничний, канд. іст. наук
Київський національний університет імені Тараса Шевченка, Київ, Україна

УКРАЇНЬСКА ГРЕКО-КАТОЛИЦЬКА ЦЕРКВА У ДРУГІЙ ПОЛОВИНІ ХХ СТОЛІТТЯ: ІСТОРИОГРАФІЧНИЙ АНАЛІЗ

Українська церковна історія – це масштабне поле для наукового пізнання. ХХ ст. стало своєрідним тестом на виживання та самовизначення для українських церков. Через тотальний утиск у Радянському Союзі українського національного руху, механізм репресій було запущено і проти інституту церкви як невід'ємної складової суспільного життя українського народу. Характерною рисою антицерковної кампанії в УРСР стало насадження " нової" моделі суспільних відносин, побудованих на засадах атеїзму і безбожництва. Єдиною легальною національною церквою до березня 1946 р., яка всіляко чинила цьому опір, була Українська греко-католицька церква. Протягом усієї другої половини ХХ ст. її духовенство й чернецтво, перебуваючи в нелегальному становищі, залишалося центром, навколо якого консолидувався український рух опору.

Представлено сучасний погляд вітчизняних і зарубіжних учених на історію Української греко-католицької церкви у другій половині ХХ ст. На основі широкої історіографічної бази здійснено спробу показати місце УГКЦ в українському національному русі, її вплив на демократизацію суспільних процесів у другій половині 1980-х рр. тощо. Завдяки працям зарубіжних істориків вдалося показати актуальність церковної проблематики при вивченні суспільно-політичних процесів у СРСР. Її ігнорування, як відзначають окремі вчені, не дозволяє збагнути самого феномену національного руху, у тому числі в західних областях Української РСР.

Ключові слова: УГКЦ, ідеологія, атеїзм, УРСР, СРСР, історіографія.

Переусвідомлення минулого потребує, з одного боку, вдваги і копіткої праці, а з іншого – майстерності не стати його заручником. Часто-густо, коли історик поринає у світ пройдешніх подій, він потрапляє в інформаційне поле, яке відмінне від сучасного. Воно підсвідомо накладає на дослідника весь багаж інформації, яка формує в нього загальну картину подій, процесів і явищ. І професіоналізм вченого полягає в тому, щоб не стати жертвою минулого, не піддатися під його емоції. Сучасний історико-гуманітарний простір потребує особливого очищення від відчуття жертви. Іншими словами, на історика лягає велика відповідальність із написання героїчної історії України, інтерпретації минулого крізь призму подвигів його сучасників.

Однією з краєвих сторінок української історії ХХ ст. є її церковне життя, репрезентантом якого зокрема була Українська греко-католицька церква. Через політичні трансформації епохи, які супроводжувалися жорстокими методами політичного тиску на різні верстви населення, УГКЦ стала єдиною суспільною інституцією, що до останнього відстоювала право людини на свободу, волевиявлення і, зрештою, на життя.

Відродження систематичних і ґрунтовних досліджень з історії Української греко-католицької церкви розпочалися на початку 1990-х рр. Історики В. Коцур та А. Коцур пов'язували це з "новим підходом до аналізу документів керівних органів КПРС" [15, с. 463], запитом суспільства на розкриття злочинних дій радянської влади проти народу, а також формування національного вектору в українській історичній науці. Оцінка суспільством УГКЦ, викликана героїзмом її духовенства і чернецтва в радян-

ську добу, поступово почала набувати наукового розголосу. Церква перестала бути "шкідливим елементом" в житті населення, "розсадником буржуазного націоналізму" тощо. А це, у свою чергу, дало поштовх зміні "парадигми релігійного дискурсу" [32, с. 79], яка, на думку Т. Шевченко, розпочалася зі здобуттям Україною незалежності і триває донині.

Так, на початку 1990-х рр. лише на сторінках "Українського історичного журналу" з'явився ряд ґрунтовних наукових розвідок, присвячених церковно-релігійній тематиці в радянську добу. Їхні автори, серед яких Ю. Курносів, О. Субтельний, В. Ковалюк, Л. Шевченко, О. Уткін, О. Лисенко, В. Сергійчук та інші, на підставі розсекречених документів уперше почали вводити до наукового обігу маловідомі факти з історії церковного життя в СРСР. Спільною рисою всіх публікацій було, водночас, акцентування уваги на незадовільній історіографічній базі проблеми й актуалізація її перед науковцями. Зокрема, ішлося про вивчення церковних процесів у контексті розробки краєзнавчих досліджень і праць із регіональної історії. Так, у 1990 р. на цьому наголошував Ю. Курносів у своїй публікації, присвяченій радянській західноукраїнських земель. У 1992 р. про це писала Л. Шевченко у статті про культурно-ідеологічні процеси в УРСР. Ці вчені запропонували своєрідний перелік актуальних питань, які потребували першочергових відповідей. Серед них – масштаби гуманітарної кризи, викликані реформуванням культурного простору західних областей Української РСР; вивчення наслідків репресій проти духовенства регіону; наслідки антицерковної кампанії на рівні окремих населених пунктів тощо [16, с. 80–87; 33, с. 39–48].