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**THE UKRAINIAN-POLISH
PROBLEM
IN THE DISSOLUTION
OF THE RUSSIAN EMPIRE
1914-1917**

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INTRODUCTION

In this discussion of the Ukraino-Polish border problem, we have to take into consideration two distinct aspects of the problem. On the one hand, we have to analyse the problem as a problem of development and growth of the constitution; on the other hand, the problem is seen as an aspect of diplomacy.

The border problem cannot be separated from the general constitutional questions. The border, in fact, becomes delineated in the process of formation of a state. The border is the limit of claim of sovereignty, and of its effective exercise by a state. Hence, in our discussion of the Ukraino-Polish border problem we will have to trace the development of the corresponding states, and see how their borders, or claims for borders clashed. Our problem is the more complicated, as the two sides based themselves usually upon irreconcilable principles in the definition of their respective states, and their borders. The Polish political thought usually looked back to a "historical Poland", and that at the period of the highest territorial expansion, or at least to the territory of the "historical Poland" previous to the partition of 1772. The position was complicated by a certain element of an ethnographic principle. The Ukrainian political thought expressed itself almost completely in the principle of ethnography, and, when limited, the claim would be reduced to the claim of statehood and border on the basis of the "principle of self-determination". Thus, the contemporary ethnic distribution of the population in Eastern Europe was looked to, and a new state of 35 million people arising in Europe was envisaged. Again,

the situation might be complicated by the occasional reference to the "historical Ukraine", in allusions to the Hetmanate disestablished in late eighteenth century.

On the other hand, the problem is also that of international diplomacy. Neither Poland, nor Ukraine, existed as proper agents in international relations on the eve of the World War One. In international relations, the territory of Poland and Ukraine was no more than the south-western part of Russia, and parts of Germany and Austria-Hungary. The other part of our investigation is the study in how far the emergence of the Ukraino-Polish border was an international problem, how this problem was treated by the Powers, and in what way this problem was becoming solved or aggravated by the actions of these Powers. This is indivisibly connected, again, with the attitude of the Powers to the question of the very existence of the Polish and Ukrainian states.

Looking back into the earlier history of the Ukrainian-Polish border problem, generally discussed as the problem of "eastern borders of Poland," as, for instance, in a recent study by Rhode, we see the problem as one of the most persisting problems in Eastern Europe. The Polish nation, placed between the Germanic groups with their traditional DRANG NACH OSTEN and their Slavic neighbours to the East, was pushed back and forth ever since the historical times in the Dnipro-Wisla-Oder region. The "Red Rus", the future duchy of Halych, was attached to the main body of the Grand Duchy of Kiev and its dependencies in the tenth century. Through the following centuries, even into the days when Kiev was destroyed by the Tartars, Halych had kept its character, and was eventually taken over by the Poles. With the expansion of the power of the Lithuanian princes in later centuries, Kiev entered the Grand Duchy of Lithuania.

The eastern border of Poland was eliminated, however, through the union of Poland and the Grand Duchy in

the "Commonwealth" (Rzecz Pospolita, Rich Pospolyta), in which the rights of the population of all regions, in regard to religion, language and so on, were guaranteed. With time, the preponderance of the Polish party became manifest, with the eventual result of the revolution in that Commonwealth led by Khmelnycky, which tore the state asunder, and enabled the formation of the Ukrainian Cossack state, with the consequent emergence of the modern Ukraino-Polish border problem. With the progressive weakening of the remainder of the Commonwealth, and the incorporation of the Ukrainian Cossack state after the destruction of the Ukrainian state of Mazepa by Peter I, the Commonwealth came more and more completely into the sphere of influence of neighbouring powers. The Commonwealth containing Polish, Ukrainian, Belorussian and Lithuanian population, was progressively partitioned in the late eighteenth century, between Russia (Muscovy), Prussia, and Austria (Empire).

The problem of the "eastern border of Poland" was thus radically eliminated. The French revolution, and, in particular, Napoleon, through his "Duchy of Warsaw" contributed greatly to the revival of the "Polish problem", with the result that the Congress of Vienna authorized the maintenance of Poland as a state, which came to be referred to as Congress Poland. However, this state was shortlived; there were two attempts at a re-establishment of the Polish state in the nineteenth century, by means of revolution, with lamentable results. The vestiges of the Ukrainian state, preserved in the form of the "Hetmanate" by Russia had been also finally eliminated in the late eighteenth century; the autonomist feeling, however, seems to have survived, and gained power in the democratic, socialist and romanticist currents of the nineteenth century.

Still, in the early twentieth century neither Poland nor Ukraine existed as an international "problem". It

was not at all clear whether there was going to be a Poland at all, just as it was not too clear whether there was going to be a Ukrainian state. We shall be careful not to allow in this study a "hindsight" and assume that everything was moving to the formation of the Polish and Ukrainian states, and thus to the internationalization consequent upon the emergence of the Ukrainian-Polish border problem.

However, after the turn of the century, the spread of democratic ideas was strengthening the demands for self-government, and, eventually, for independence by the Ukrainian and Polish populations. On the other hand, the international situation was becoming auspicious. The ancient Prussian-Muscovite-Imperial understanding which allowed the partition of the Commonwealth was being allowed to lapse. To the intense dislike of the "conservatives" in the Russian Empire, who foresaw the future in terms of a Russian-German understanding, with the East reserved for Russia, and the West for Germany, as did, for instance, Baron Rosen, the Russian Ambassador to Washington in a famous expose of 1912, the Russian-French-English Entente was being furthered. This came to draw Russia into a stance hostile to Germany, and, secondarily, to Austria-Hungary. The whole basis of the partition of the Commonwealth was being undermined, as was well foreseen by the "conservatives".

This forced the Polish and the Ukrainian problems (the latter as a part of "historical Poland" and on its own account) into the international arena. With the collapse of the diplomatic understanding in regard to the "south-western Russia", the parts of Germany and of Austria-Hungary, and strengthening of the ideal of the "principle of self-determination", the stage for the constitutional and diplomatic development of the "Ukrainian-Polish border problem" was set.

CHAPTER ONE

THE EMERGENCE OF THE POLISH-UKRAINIAN BORDER PROBLEM

1. THE OUTBREAK OF WAR

The Ukrainian National Republic and the Polish Republic were the creations of the first World War; the re-emergence of the two peoples upon the international scene in turn created the problem of the border between them, a problem which involved many diverse factors.

The story of the dispute over the Ukrainian-Polish border takes its beginning therefore from the declaration of war by Austria against the Russian Empire on August 1, 1914. At that date there existed neither a Ukrainian State nor a Polish State, but simply the three great empires of Russia, Germany and Austria-Hungary. The question of the future position of the Poles and Ukrainians then subjects of these states concerned the ruling powers most immediately in connection with their own primary national objective — victory in the war.

Of the two peoples, the Poles were the first to be courted by all 3 powers concerned, and, since the policy pursued by the government of each differed from that of the others, the Polish people soon found themselves presented with three different sets of proposals.

Poles (appealed the German High Command), the hour of liberation from the Muscovite yoke is approaching... We bring you the freedom and independence for which your forefathers have suffered so much. Join the Allied forces, and... we shall throw the Asiatic hordes beyond the borders of Poland.¹

While the Germans in promising "independence" and mentioning borders thus brought out the question of the future separate existence of Poland, the declaration of the Austrian command was much more cautious.

Salute our standards with confidence, (it read), they bring you justice... To break the barriers preventing you from profiting from the conquests of civilization — this is one of the important tasks which this campaign has imposed upon us.²

German policy towards Poland, insofar as the declaration was concerned, was determined, on the one hand, by the imperial and military attitude, on the other hand, by the traditional Prussian anti-Polish position. The imperial attitude supporting the extension of the German Empire, led by the Emperor, coincided with the military attitude which desired extended German influence to the East on strategic grounds, and hoped to achieve this end by having Poland as an associated state, or at least a buffer state. The Prussian interest, however, was to attach parts of Poland to Prussia; since it was out of the question for Prussia to swallow Poland whole, while the association of Poland with Germany as an imperial constitutional unit would have endangered the hold of Prussia over the parts of Poland already incorporated, Prussia too came to see the value of an independent Poland, unless another partition be arranged.

On closer investigation, it is evident that the Emperor and the military foresaw the creation of a Poland whose eastern borders would be pushed as far as possible, the whole then being attached to the German Empire. The Kanzler Bethmann-Hollweg, together with the majority in the Berlin Reichstag, approved of this idea which would have made the new state a bastion against Russia, and (as they saw it) would prevent any serious Franco-Russian understanding. As Blociszewski pointed out, the Prussian pan-Germans were afraid of any independent

Poland. They were strongly supported by the Hakatists, a Prussian group, which supported the promotion of anti-Polish colonization. These last two groups possessed a majority in the most powerful state in the German Empire, Prussia. Their policy was to advocate either a return of Poland to Russia, thus reinstating the centuries-old tradition of the Russo-German co-operation, or a new partition with Russia amounting to the same thing or again, a partition of Poland with Austria. In such a way, the Imperial policy found itself deadlocked head — on with the Prussian policy, a state of affairs full of danger to the very survival of the monarchy.³

The result of the contradictory impulse was still the tendency to support some sort of a Polish state.

Austrian policy, however, was defined on a completely different basis. While the Poles within Prussia had been subjected to extreme Germanization, limitation of property rights and so forth, the Poles in the Austro-Hungarian monarchy enjoyed a favoured position. The entire Monarchy was based upon the co-operation between the German-speaking Austrians and the Hungarians. In the Kingdom of Hungary, the Hungarians, albeit a minority of the population had kept almost exclusive power over the Ukrainians, Slovaks and others by means of an oligarchical constitution, and the support of the administrative machinery. Austria, however, was a constitutional monarchy with universal, equal, and secret ballot. German-speaking Austrians were also in a minority, but nevertheless, retained the predominant power through the co-operation with the Poles against the Ukrainians, Czechs, Italians, and other national groups. The Poles, again, held dominion over Galicia, which included Western Ukraine (that is, over the ancient Ukrainian duchies of Halych and Volodymyr), through the exploitation of the oligarchical constitution of Galicia, which favored the Poles, and especially the Polish aristocracy. Thus taking the situation as a whole, it is obvious

that the Austro-Hungarian Empire was based upon the intimate understanding and co-operation of the three races: the German-Austrians, the Poles and the Hungarians.

Poles had their own Minister in the Austrian cabinet: the minister for Galicia was traditionally a Pole. They controlled both the Imperial and Provincial civil services within Galicia and were well represented in the military class and the judicial system. Polish writers generally grant the favoured position of the Poles but neglect to mention the constitutional basis upon which it was founded. Dmowski, the leader of the Polish National Democrats, wrote in his Memorandum to Wilson in 1918, "If, under the Austrian domination, the government of Galicia is found in Polish hands, this does not mean at all that they are favoured by Austria, but only that in that Province there exists no other element which would be capable of taking over its administration." What Dmowski fails to mention is that elections to the Galician Sejm were through 'curiae' in which the almost exclusively Polish Szlachta (aristocracy) possessed 31.7% of the mandates, and the cities and commercial-industrial chambers 25.2%, whereas only 42.8% of the mandates was reserved for the farmers, who were solidly Ukrainian. If one adds to this the fact that the Galician elections had been largely characterized by administrative pressure and often bloodshed, it becomes clear by what means the Poles had succeeded in keeping their privileged position, while the Imperial government was quietly ignoring the problem in return for the support of its German-dominated policy in the Reichstag (Parliament) by the group of Polish deputies known as the Polish Circle.

It is thus clear that Austrian policy towards the Poles within the Russian Empire could envisage the day when Poland would enter the Empire either wholly or in part, provided that the Hungarians could be persuaded

that they would still remain the second most important element in the Empire. The Austrian Headquarters therefore took care to avoid the word "independence" in its Declaration.

The Generalissimus of the Russian Armies, Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaievich, issued a declaration to the Poles as well.

Poles!.. The hour has come when the sacred dream of your fathers and ancestors can become reality. One and a half centuries ago, the living body of Poland was torn to pieces, but her soul did not die. She has lived on in the hope that the time of resurrection for the Polish nation should come through brotherly peacemaking with Great Russia. The Russian armies are bringing to you the glad news of such an appeasement. Let the borders cutting the Polish nation to pieces vanish, let her re-unite into one under the sceptre of the Russian Tsar! Under that sceptre Poland shall be reborn, free in her faith, language and self-government.⁵

Despite their apparent generosity, the promises of the Generalissimus were most uncertain. They were vitiated by the silence of the civil authorities; self-government was being promised without guarantee as to the authenticity of the promise and without specification as to the form self-government would take. In the past, the policy of the Russian empire to the Poles had been ruthless Russification, although it allowed the Polish aristocracy corresponding rights with their Russian equivalent. It moreover seemed doubtful that Russia would share in the Prussian fear of not being able to digest the whole of Poland should the latter be reunified under the Tsarist rule as prosed. Actually the reaction to the Russian proposals was complicated by a divergence of opinion on this very question, for those "Russian" Poles who were organized in political parties differed from their compatriots in Germany and Austria-

Hungary in being sharply divided amongst themselves. The Socialists, who were organized generally around the PPS, the Polish Socialist Party led by Pilsudski, saw any further extension of Russia into the remainder of Polish territory, particularly in Austria, as utterly dangerous to the very survival of the Polish idea. The National Democrats, led by Dmowski, were of the opinion that if all of Poland were united within Russia, the combined Poland would become too large to be swallowed up by Russia, and could, being united, demand and obtain greater and ever greater rights of self-government, although independence was not envisaged. Even the separation of the ancient Ukrainian province of Kholm from the kingdom of Poland within the Russian empire in 1912 and the establishment of that territory as a separate government did not shake Dmowski's persuasions.

Shortly after the appeal to the Poles, the Generalissimus issued an appeal to Ukrainians in Galicia. The appeal was addressed to "Russians", a subtle indication of the traditionally assimilative policy of the Russian Empire in regard to the Ukrainians.

Brothers! (it ran), Just as a stormy stream forces its way through the hard rock to find its union with the sea, so is there no power enduring enough to stop the Russian people's insistent striving toward unity. Let there be no longer a Russia under yoke! Let the heirdom of the sainted Vladimir, the land of Yaroslav the Osmomysl, the princes Danilo and Roman, throw off the yoke of slavery and raise the standard of the one and great indivisible Russia. Let the providence of God, who first blessed the task of the gatherers of the Russian lands, be realized.⁹

The proclamation did not contain any reference to the institutions — the Ukrainian public schools, a few Ukrainian high schools, and a Ukrainian section in the University of Lviv — which the Western Ukrainians,

not without blood, sweat and toil, had obtained the right to establish and operate. Nor did it mention the political power held through the Ukrainian club in the Austrian Reichstag and the Galician Sejm. On the other hand, so far as the Poles were concerned, the proclamation in effect gave them notice that, whatever form Polish "self-government" would take, at any rate its blessings would stop, in the east, at the western borders of the Kholm government and the western borders of the ancient duchy of Halych — an area corresponding largely to Eastern Galicia. In such a manner was a possible eastern border for the Poland of the future first suggested.

At any rate, the Tsarist government took care to assure that only the narrowest interpretation of "self-government" be made in the West. The Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sazonov, wrote to the Russian ambassador in Paris on August 19, 1914, that the translation of the word "self-government" by "autonomie" in the French press overemphasized the degree of independence intended (what his government actually expected from the Poles, he wrote was "patient readiness.")⁷ The allies of the Russian Empire, France and the British Empire, kept strict silence. The Ukrainian-Polish border, as well as the very question of the self-government of Poland and the Ukraine, were considered internal affairs of the ally, and as such, not subject to scrutiny to say nothing of interference.

The Poles and Ukrainians began organizing their national institutions. In the middle of August 1914, the Polish deputies in the Austrian Reichstag decided to convoke an assembly of the deputies of the Galician Sejm, the Polish members of the Reichstag and those of the Chamber of Lords of Vienna. These having met at Krakow, in conjunction with all the political parties and their diverse organizations, decided to unite to constitute the Supreme National Committee which was to sit in Krakow.⁸ Its essential aim (taking into consideration the

fact that Austria, if victorious, could look for enlargement primarily in the direction of Poland), was the union of Poland and Austria and that the legions to be formed were to fight for such union.⁹

The Supreme National Committee, and the Polish Circle of the Reichstag, attempted to obtain from the Austro-Hungarian government the publication of a manifesto announcing the creation of a Polish State. They envisaged a Polish state consisting of the Kingdom of Poland and of Galicia with the territory of Kholm reincorporated into the Kingdom. The Ukrainian-Polish border would then run along the River Bug and the River Zbruch. Tisza, the Hungarian Prime Minister, and Count Berchtold, the joint Austrian-Hungarian Minister of Foreign Affairs were against the project as it would have done away with the duality of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, that is with the co-control of the entire Empire by the Hungarians with the Austrians. He had a strong ally in Germany which was not willing to see Austria so greatly strengthened.¹⁰ This project came to nothing.

The Poles within the Kingdom of Poland dominated by the Russian Empire did not find it so easy to establish central institutions of their own. Nevertheless, they did express their loyalty. V. Jaronski, speaking on behalf of the Polish Circle of the Duma expressed the view of the National Democracy, an August 8th. "Being divided, territorially, we the Poles," he said, "must be as one in sympathy for the Slavs. Let the blood spilt by us and the trials of war, sending brother against brother, bring for us union... of the Polish people."¹¹

It was not until November that the Russian government allowed the formation of a Polish political body. In contradistinction to the purely economic and humanitarian Civic Committee which had been previously allowed to the Poles, the new body possessed a policy. It now, under the name of the Polish National Committee,

published a declaration which showed its agreement with the policy of Dmowski's National Democrats:

The great, epochmaking war is doing away with the borders in Poland... Let us (then) prove by our unity... that the Poles, in all the regions of their large Fatherland have one thought, one goal: the union of Poland, and the laying of foundations for the free development of the nation.¹²

The declaration went on to protest against "the intrigues of the Austrian government."¹³ The Polish National Committee itself, after leading a quiet existence in Warsaw, eventually departed with the Russian armies eastwards until it found itself in St. Petersburg where it continued its existence in virtual silence for some time.

If now from the case of the Poles we turn to consider that of the Ukrainians, we see emerge from the mass of historical fact a distinctly different picture. It has already been mentioned that the Poles in Austria did not only possess civil liberties, but enjoyed a privileged position in relation to the Ukrainians and Jews. Curiously enough, the Poles within the Russian Empire were likewise privileged, though to a lesser degree, for, while the majority of Poles within the Congress Poland were in no way better off than the Ukrainians, continued Russian acceptance of the Polish land-owning class guaranteed that a segment of the Polish population at least would have considerable rights and liberties. Much of this Polish land-holding class, moreover, was concentrated in Right-Bank Ukraine, (that is, that portion of the Ukraine west of the Dnieper.) It naturally follows that few Ukrainians were large landholders. The explanation for this rather curious state of affairs, while too much intertwined with the history of the area for us to tell the whole, lies in that train of events which brought to the Ukraine first the Poles then the Muscovites and the centuries-long attempt at Polonization and Russification of its population, and partly in the continued Muscovite

support of the Polish aristocracy at the expense of the native Ukrainian land-owning and educated classes. In such a fashion had the Ukrainians, throughout the course of their history been deprived of power and prestige; now, while the Polish National Democrats were able to acquire recognition in Russia owing to their economic power and the support lent by them to the autocracy, the Ukrainians, traditionally ignored, found their task more difficult.

The war seemed to have been received loyally by Ukrainians in the Russian Empire. UKRAINSKE ZHYTTYA (Ukrainian Life), edited by Simon Petlura and published in Moscow nevertheless ventured to give expression to a certain amount of separate national opinion on the occasion of the Austrian declaration of war:

The enemies of Russia will try to drag the Ukrainian population over to their side and strive to spread confusion among them by all sorts of promises, political and national. The Ukrainians shall not be tempted by such provocative incitations and shall fulfil their duty as citizens of Russia in this time of crisis to the last.¹⁴

In a like manner, Hrushewsky wrote in RECH (Speech):

I did not foresee the solution of the Ukrainian problem in Russia in the tearing away of the Ukrainian lands from her, but rather through the common effort of the Russian and Ukrainian citizenry within the borders of the Russian Empire within the scope of the law and along the lines of constitutional development and of the autonomy of lands and national consciousness.¹⁵

However, despite the protestations of loyalty, the government closed most of the Ukrainian press.¹⁶ Cultural associations were dissolved. The Ukrainian public opinion and policy came to be expressed by the Society of Ukrainian Progressists (Tovarystvo Ukrain'skikh Postupovtsiv). The Society meeting in Kiev, in Septem-

ber, decided to take a neutral position in the war.¹⁷ Repressions continued. Shortly after addressing the Society, the Ukrainian historian Hrushewski, was exiled to Siberia. Silence settled over the Ukraine, to be broken only very occasionally.

Only under Austria did the Ukrainians possess relative freedom. On the first day of the war, August 1, a meeting representative of the Ukrainians in the Austrian-Hungarian Empire took place, at Lviv. All the Ukrainian members of the Reichstag and the Galician Sejm of the three parties — whether National Democrats, Radical Democrats or Social Democrats — as well as delegates of the three parties, and the representatives of the Ukrainian military societies, Sich and Sokil, took part in the meeting. It was decided to form a national council; its members were to be proportionately representative of the Ukrainian parties. The council (Rada) was formed and on August 2nd, when the meeting took the name of the HOLOWNA UKRAINSKA RADA (Main Ukrainian Rada), K. Lewycky, the head of what was then the main Ukrainian party, the National Democrats, was elected head of the Rada.

The Main Ukrainian Rada published its manifesto defining the attitude of the Ukrainian people in Austria-Hungary to the war and to the Ukrainian-Polish dispute. It stated that the Ukrainians of Austria would take the side of Austria insofar as in Austria the Ukrainians had the legal right to develop freely their cultural, political, and economic forces. As for the ultimate of the Ukrainian struggle, the Rada proclaimed this to be an independent Ukraine. As regards the Ukrainians in Austria, the Main Ukrainian Rada asked that all the Ukrainian territories of Austria-Hungary (Eastern Galicia, Transcarpathian Ukraine, northern Bukovina) be united in one separate Kronland (province), with its own parliament and freedom to govern itself.¹⁸ All such Ukrainian strivings in Austria-Hungary were met with

extreme hostility. The population was subjected to repressions. In the subsequent repressions of the Ukrainian population suspected of Russophilism by the administration the number of victims ran into thousands.¹⁹

While the crystallization of the political institutions of Poles and Ukrainians was proceeding, the Austrian armies, after some initial successes, fell back under the Russian attack, and on September 3, the City of Lviv, the main city of the Western Ukraine, and the administrative centre of Galicia, was occupied by the Imperial Russian troops.

2. STALEMATE IN THE WAR

Whatever pan-Slavism there was in Galicia, it was rudely shaken and possibly destroyed through the behaviour of the Russian government. Most Ukrainian institutions of Galicia were destroyed. The Ukrainian press was prohibited. The Russian functionaries took over all administration and introduced the Russian language, unintelligible as it was to the mass of Ukrainians. The Archbishop of the Russian Orthodox Church, Eulogius, took steps to bring about the "conversion" of the Ukrainian Uniate Catholics in more than sixty communes: the Ukrainian Catholic metropolite of Lviv, Sheptycky, had been deported to Central Russia.²⁰ The brutality of the Russian administration was so manifest that there were protests against it in the Duma, while a Bishop, Nikon, though Orthodox, protested against the civil and religious oppression.²¹ Of somewhat greater importance was the view of the French ambassador in Petrograd, Paléologue. "Throughout the entirety of Galicia", he states in his diary, "Russian nationalism went wild... witness the arrest of the metropolite Sheptycky, the expulsion of the Basilian monks..., the suppression of the Ruthenian (Ukrainian) newspapers... I spoke to Mr. Sazonov officially about this situation."²² The Russifica-

tion of the Ukrainians and Poles in Galicia nonetheless continued unabated.

Shortly after Lviv was taken, the Generalissimus of the Russian Army again spoke to the Poles:

His Majesty promises that if he finished the war victorious, all the parts of ancient Poland, both those that are under German domination as well as those under the Austrian and Russian domination, will be united into an autonomous whole, and that Poland shall revive under the sceptre of the Emperor of Russia.²³

The Russian Government appointed Lieutenant-General Count Bobrinski the Military Governor-General of Galicia. Paléologue, the French Ambassador to the Russian Emperor, described the man and his policy: "I know him well; this is an intelligent, honest, likeable person, but possibly the most reactionary of all the nationalists."²⁴ Bobrinski's policy was forthright, and he wasted no time in letting the population know where he — and they — stood. Speaking in reply to the municipal authorities of Lviv, he said:

Eastern Galicia and the region of the Lemkis have constituted from times immemorial an integral part of the one and indivisible Russia. In their territories the autochthonous population has ever been thoroughly Russian; in consequence, its organization must be Russian in basis. I shall introduce here the Russian language, the Russian law and Russian administration. These elements shall be, of course, introduced gradually, as I consider that one must not, in the interest of the population, violate the normal course of life in the country.²⁵

This policy of destruction of the cultural and political life of the country and the subjection of it to the all-Russian despotism, was re-stated by Tsar Nikolai II, in person, when he stayed for a short while at Lviv. He proclaimed publicly that Eastern Galicia was a "thoroughly

Russian" country.²⁶ Poles were further disenchanted when the Province of Kholm was separated definitely from the Kingdom of Poland.²⁷

After the temporary military losses, the Germans and Austrians had recovered; by the end of November 1914, the Germans had taken the entire Western part of the Kingdom, while the Austrians advanced to Dunajec. The comparative weakness of the Austrians, as compared with the German Army, became more and more manifest, with the result that the Germans were able to exact certain concessions from Austria. The administration of the Lublin government, Austrian to begin with, passed into German hands.²⁸ Finally, talks between Austria-Hungary and Germany were agreed upon, and out of them arose the Convention of the Provisional Partition of the Occupied Zone of the Kingdom of Poland. It was agreed at Poznan that the partition should not be regarded as final nor prejudice the eventual peace treaty. The eastern and the southern portion was to be administered by Austria, while the western and northern portion was to be administered by the German Empire.²⁹ This agreement was settled in further detail in the talk of April 20 - 22 at Kattowitz. Except for a small part of the Congress Poland, the Ukrainian regions came under Austrian control. Austria used her advantages to enlarge the sphere of action of the Supreme Polish Committee at Krakow. In late December, it was allowed by the Austrian army to extend its activity into Russian Poland under Austrian occupation. Throughout, the actions of the Krakow Committee were co-ordinated with Vienna, so that there was a general agreement on its activity within the jurisdiction of the Austrian-Hungarian army. The policy of the Krakow Committee was the rebuilding of the Polish state as part of Austria-Hungary. Early in 1915, Pilsudski, the leader of the Polish Socialist Party, wrote to the president of the Supreme Polish Committee, Jaworski, "I must state that

the political goal of the war which had put to ourselves from the beginning, was and is still the union of Galicia and the Kingdom within the Austro-Hungarian monarchy.’³⁰

If we turn to the Ukrainian side of the story we find silence still reigning in all the Russias, with the Ukrainian territories of Austria being now under the Russian occupation. In Austria, the Main Ukrainian Rada changed its seat from Lviv to Vienna and reorganized itself as the General Ukrainian Rada. In May 1915, it attempted to publish a Manifesto on behalf of the entire Ukraine. “We recognize,” stated the manifesto, “that the future liberty and independence of the Ukraine depend absolutely upon the complete defeat of the Tsarist Empire. Our desideratum for the Ukrainian territories which are dying under the Russian yoke is a Ukrainian state, free and independent. Our program for all our nation is complete national liberty.” Having thus stated the general principle, the manifesto moved on to the particular. “The Ukrainian people,” it reads, “demand, in order to protect their liberty, its territorial national autonomy within the confines of Austria-Hungary, that is the union of all Ukrainian territories in one whole under a (separate) organization.”³¹ The Manifesto, was suppressed by the Austrian-Hungarian government. Repressions against Ukrainians continued.

With the first indication of impending Russian defeat, the chances of Poland’s realizing her dream of reunification improved somewhat. On June 11, 1915, the Council of Ministers of Russia decided that a Polish-Russian Commission should be established towards the realization of the proclamation of the Grand Duke. At the opening of the debate in the Commission, Goremykin, the President of the Council of Ministers, declared that “the reunion of Poland lies in the hands of God.” “If Poland were to be reunited, there would be self-government, and if her reunion were not to come, there would

be no self-government.’”³² Finally, in mid-September, the Commission turned in two incompatible reports — one drafted by the Russian members, one by the Poles. No action was taken.

While in Russia, the question of Poland's future status was only brought into the open when and to what degree the Russian armies were being defeated, the problem of the Ukraine ignored altogether. Austrians seemed hardly more friendly.

On September 1, 1915, the Austrian-Hungarian government established the General Government of Kielce in the Austrian zone of occupation. On October 1, the seat of the General Government was transferred to Lublin. On September 4, Germany established the Government-General of Warsaw including under its rule most of the Kingdom of Poland, and, in the east, the districts of Biala, Konstantynow, Radzyn and Wlodawa. As we saw, Krakow Committee operated in the Lublin zone.

The area administered by the Austrian Government-General was largely Ukrainian — it included Polissia, Volhynia, and the Kholm province (the Hrubieshov and Tomashow districts of the last being added in June 1916) — with a piece of the Kingdom thrown in for good measure. The new Governor-General of Lublin, however, introduced into the Ukrainian territory in his charge a Polish administration, following the example set by Galicia. The largely Ukrainian population was allowed but few rights, and it was soon becoming obvious that an attempt was being made at their cost to obtain Polish sympathies within the kingdom, now, as has been said, largely under German rule.³³

Describing the period in his memoirs, Count Burian shows a completely Polish bias. “Galician politicians,” he wrote, “not unnaturally showed the keenest interest in their liberated fellow countrymen with whose fate

they already had begun to indentify themselves.”³⁴ Ukrainians could hardly have been ignored more.

While the ultimate fate of Poland as far as Germany was concerned was not at all clear, in the meantime the Germans showed themselves somewhat conscious of Polish interests. The Kanzler, Bethmann-Hollweg, speaking to the opening session of the Reichstag in August 1915, expressed “the hope” that the beginning of “development that would dissolve the old rivalries between Germans and Poles has been reached.” He said he hoped that “the land freed from the Russian yoke shall be led to a prosperous future, wherein they should be able to cultivate and to develop their national life.” He went on to say, “We shall administer the occupied country with justice, attempting to make an appeal, in the measure of the possible, to the co-operation of the local population.”³⁵

Despite the urgency of the situation and the desirability of reaching a solution, the Polish policy itself remained somewhat confused. In July 1915, the Supreme National Council asked for extension of its authority. Count Burian counselled patience. “The Austrian Poles,” he observed, “had always shown confidence in the government... and they had no reason to regret it.”³⁶ While asking for extension of authority, the Poles were not completely clear where the borders were to be.

Jodko, one of the leading lights in the PPS, wrote in 1916, that on the whole the eastern borders of Poland ought to run along the River Dnipro (Dnepr) — and so include the main city of the Ukraine, Kiev — and then along the River Pripiat.³⁷ People nearer reality, however, such as the anonymous writer Polonus, felt that the real danger to the Polish state in early 1916 was not the loss of the Ukraine itself, but rather of the Kholm province and Eastern Galicia in favour “of the new Ukrainian formation.”³⁸ The Poles on the whole, however, continued to put their trust in the traditions and promises of the

German-Austrian elite of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy.

The Polish outlook within the Russian Empire became even bleaker towards the end of 1915. Dmowski and Count Plater left St. Peterburg, and, on behalf of the Polish National Committee, went on a tour of neutral and Allied countries, Switzerland, London, Paris, Rome. The reason for their departure was of course that there was nothing to be done at Petrograd. Thus, the centre of the Polish National Democratic activity passed from the Russian Empire and into the hands of the Allies. Thus was avowed also the failure of a policy — the Dmowski policy of a unified great Poland within Russia.

In February 1916, Dmowski gave a report at the meeting of the National Democratic representatives from all parts of Poland in Lausanne. An executive was formed there, on whose behalf Dmowski went to London, Count Plater to Paris; Paderewski acted on its behalf in the United States, while Piltz was active in Lausanne.³⁹ In March 1916, Dmowski presented to the Russian government through its ambassador in Paris a memorandum requesting the recognition of Poland's independence.⁴⁰ This action, which must have appeared to Izwolski as "intolerable presumption", marks Dmowski's and the National-Democrats' full break with the Russian orientation. The Polish question was brought up once in the way Dmowski envisaged the solution. However, the attempts of Sazonov, the Minister for Foreign Affairs in July 1916 to have the autonomy of Poland proclaimed only resulted in his dismissal.⁴¹ The solution was to be sought on other lines, as will be discussed further on.

3. PROCLAMATION OF THE KINGDOM OF POLAND

While the Polish situation in Russia was becoming finally clear, the period of indecision for the Central Powers in regard to the problem was also coming to an

end. The Polish problem was indeed demanding a solution. The military situation in the West had approached a stalemate, and a radical change in the East seemed the only chance the Central Powers had to carry off a victory, and so to preserve their monarchies and their ascendance.

By early 1916, it was increasingly a political imperative that a solution to the Polish problem be found. On the 5th of April, Bethmann-Holweg made an announcement to that effect in the Reichstag. He said that although it had not been the intention of opening the Polish problem, it was there to be solved now. "Germany and Austria-Hungary," he said, "must solve it, and they will solve it."⁴ While his proposed solution, stated after the applause following these purposeful words had died down, amounted to little more than the usual promise that Poland should not again be placed under the Russian domination, it came about that this time steps were taken to implement the promise.

What actually now determined the form given to the solution of the Polish problem was the will o'wisp of a Polish army. The German military command estimated that up to one million men could be mobilized in Poland, and, under the existing circumstances, thought it wise to respect the pressure such a force could be expected to exert in behalf of some sort of independent Poland.

When in the Summer of 1916, Austrians again suggested a Poland under Austrian suzerainty, Berlin suggested in return the formation of an 'independent' Polish state. Although General Konrad von Hoetzendorf had been frankly sceptical, Von Bessler was so certain of success that Wilhelm II was finally moved to risk the experiment. Thus, the imperial scheme triumphed over the colonial one; there would be a separate Poland, tied to the German Empire by political, economic, and military ties, and entering into the German customs union. The Prussian element was placated by the incorporation of a strip of Polish territory directly into Germany.

The Austrian counter-proposal in its turn suggested certain modifications in the German plan. In it the Austrians asked that Germany consent to see a truly independent Poland constituted exclusively of the Russian territories; Germany was not to carve off any strip of these territories for her own, nor were there to be ties of any nature binding Poland either to Germany or to Austria-Hungary.⁴³

The surprising thing about the negotiations over the Kingdom of Poland was that Germany approached the matter in the spirit of compromise, and, as it seems to us, in something like good faith. The Prussian interest was being sacrificed. All the Prussian fears came true eventually; the existence of the Kingdom of Poland did call forth a vast Polish national revolt in Poznan and Prussia with all the consequences for Germany. The negotiators could not but have been conscious of the dangers in bringing a Polish state into existence, yet they gave in, in most essentials. Thus, by German and Austrian agreement, it was finally decided to create a new Poland from the territories which had belonged to Russia, a constitutional and hereditary monarchy, possessing, a separate army placed provisionally under the German command. The independence of the new state was to be proclaimed as soon as possible by the two Emperors; its actual organization was to be undertaken later. Poland would enter into the alliance of the Central States, thus joining Germany, Austria, Turkey and Bulgaria. Her policies would have to conform to the policies of the allies. Finally, as a crumb to the Prussians, the two Empires would mutually guarantee the possession of their own Polish territories. In regard to the eastern border, which is of particular interest to us, Poland was to receive Wilno, and the border was going to be pushed "as far as possible to the east."⁴⁴ The combination of the Polish client with the German patron promised nothing good to the Ukraine.

There still remained, however, the matter of the Ukrainians and Poles within the Austro-Hungarian Empire. The Austrian government seemed to have decided to maintain and even to strengthen the old Polish-German coalition against the oppressed Ukrainians, Czechs and others. As long as the Ukrainians in Galicia remained in an essentially federal state, the Ukrainians in co-operation with the Jews, could always look to the central parliament (in which the observance of the principle of direct and proportional representation gave them some part) against the wanton exercise of power held by the Polish ruling class under the Galician Constitution. The Austro-Hungarian government now, in its eagerness to curry favour with the Poles, gave them a binding promise that Galicia would become "self-governing". "It is my will," wrote the Emperor to the President of the Council, de Koerber, "that from the moment when the new (Polish) state is formed, and parallel with its formation, Galicia receive the right to regulate herself her own affairs in the full measure of that being compatible with the prestige and welfare of the monarchy. In thus letting you know of my intentions, I charge you with the elaboration and submission to me of drafts proper to their realization in conformity to law."⁴⁵

This measure brought about the end of the Ukrainian orientation in Austria towards the Austrian monarchy. Leaders of the General Ukrainian Rada, led by its head, K. Lewycky, resigned; the former opposition leader, Petrushewych, took over the leadership.⁴⁶ Henceforth, the Ukrainians in Austria began to entertain the view that the Ukrainian nation must go it alone in her attempts for self-government. On the other hand, the Entente powers, as the allies of Russia, did not seem to provide a basis for co-operation.

The Western Ukrainians, found sympathy, if nothing more, in the Eastern Ukraine. The Society of Ukrainian

Progressists protested the Galician autonomy in a declaration of December 1916:

We completely support the demands of the Galician Ukrainians, the demand for partition of Galicia into autonomous national parts, Ukrainian and Polish, and we protest against that form of national oppression over the Ukrainian nation that was imposed by the Austrian act of Autonomy of Galicia.⁴⁷

The rescript of the Emperor in regard to Galicia was published on November 5, 1916. At the same time, the Proclamation of the Two Emperors setting up the Kingdom of Poland was published.

The Governors-General of Warsaw and Lublin proclaimed in similar manifestos to their subjects that the Emperors, "secure in their expectation of the final victory of their arms and anxious to lead to a happy future the Polish territories torn from the Russian domination, have agreed to form out of these regions an independent state with a hereditary, constitutional monarchy..."⁴⁸ The monarchs further committed themselves to the profound trust that the aspirations towards self-government and the national development of the Kingdom of Poland would be realized now, "taking necessarily into account the general political circumstances of Europe, as well as the welfare and security of their own States and peoples..." The monarchs reserved to themselves "the more exact definition of the borders of the Kingdom of Poland."⁴⁹ For the time being the eastern borders of the Kingdom included Kholm, so that on the whole, the border situation resembled that before the partition of 1793, and would include very considerable Ukrainian territories, the province of Kholm and much of Polissya and Volhynia.

Sikorski, one of the Polish leaders, described the general attitude of the Poles at the time. "The propositions (contained in the manifesto) were too inde-

finite and too incomplete to create any real confidence in the future independence and vitality of the proposed kingdom. Nevertheless, this proclamation underlined the international importance of the Polish question. The Manifesto... was the first international act truly of importance in regard to the Polish problem. It put new life into the efforts expended by Poles in favour of their independence, and it drew the attention of the entire world."⁵⁰

Blociszewski considered the Manifesto as "the first step on the road to liberation from the standpoint of international law."⁵¹ Poninski considered that the two elements provided by the Manifesto, the nucleus of an army and the nucleus of an administration, "contributed to save Poland from anarchy at the moment of the defeat of the Central Empires, and allowed the liberation of the country from the Austrian-Hungarian occupation at the very time of the Armistice."⁵²

Stanislas Kutrzeba, the secretary of the Academy of Sciences, and perhaps the greatest Polish constitutional historian, thought the Manifesto of high importance. "What value then, had these acts?" he wrote. "Such that, for the first time, in a formal manner, one side had made a declaration definitely indicating basis for an independent Polish State. This declaration had to be taken into account from then on. True enough, Russia, and later also the other Entente powers, protested against the acts of November on the ground that, since they were promulgated in time of war before the conclusion of treaties which would have decided the problem of the possession of these territories, they were issued contrary to the practice of international law. But such statements could no longer settle the matter."⁵³

Polish opinion within the land now divided into two camps: those who tended to co-operate with the Germans and Austrians in building the Kingdom were labelled "activists", those who kept neutral, "passivists". No one

took up the cause of active, not to speak of armed, resistance. Among the Activists, the most co-operative were the two extreme wings. There were conservatives from among szlachta and big business, led by Prince Janusz Radziwill.⁵⁴ The leading role belonged to the Polish Socialist Party; it was joined, however, on the left, by the Popular Party, the National Workers' Union, the National Party, the Progressive Union. To the centre and the right, there was the Group of the National Labour and Reformed, the League of the Polish State, and the National Peasants' Union. In November 1916, all the Activist groups joined in the National Council.

Among the Passivists were to be found the National Democratic Party, the Realist Party, the Progressive Polish Party, the National Union of the Christian-Social Party, and the League of Economic Independence. These parties in their turn organized the Political Club of Parties.⁵⁵

The Activists published a declaration to the Polish nation on November 5. "Poles", it read, "a great hour has rung in the history of our people." The declaration, signed, incidentally, on behalf of the PPS by Jodko, showed great ambitions in regard to the eastern Polish-Ukrainian border. "We believe that our armed lines shall carry the victorious banner to the Eastern borders of the old Rzecz Pospolita... We believe that in the war with Russia there will be won for us a Fatherland, great, powerful, and based upon the unused forces of our nation."⁵⁶ Thus, in its very birth, the new Polish state, or at least the Activist Polish parties, envisaged an unlimited Drang nach Osten the Polish way, to Vilnius, and Kiev.

While the Passivists of the Kingdom remained silent, their party brethren, the National Democrats organized in Polish National Committee in Lausanne, rather gingerly protested the formation of the Kingdom, while implicitly granting its value insofar as the granting of a constitution was concerned. "The proposed confirma-

tion of the Polish state, as created exclusively of the territories occupied by a single part of the Polish people, does not correspond to the wishes of the Poles, but, on the contrary, confirms the partition of their homeland. In confirming the tendency towards the division of the national forces of Poland, Germany and Austria-Hungary condemn the new State to powerlessness and make it an instrument of their policy.”⁵⁷

In the Ukraine, the Society of Ukrainian Progressists, the one important body of public opinion, stated in a declaration of December 1916, that they sympathised with the “fully justified and just demands of the Polish nation to national independence within ethnographic borders.” However they warned “the Poles, in a fraternal fashion, not to begin the cause of their liberation by a new error, bringing back to life the spectre of a ‘historical Poland,’ and new violence to the neighbouring nations, Ukrainian, Belorussian and Lithuanian.”⁵⁸

In Russia, the Minister of Internal Affairs, Protopopov, announced that the Government “stood fast upon the basis of the Declaration of the Supreme Commander.”⁵⁹ Otherwise the Government protested to the Allies and the neutrals. France and England followed with their own protest in a note to the Russian President of the Council, Stürmer, against the manifesto: they raised their voices “against the pretensions of Germany and Austria-Hungary to create a new state upon the territory momentarily occupied by them and to raise an army among the population of these regions.”⁶⁰

The Commission of Foreign Affairs of the Chamber of Deputies in Paris passed a resolution stating that “the Polish Nation can come back to life as a living and strong body, free in its language, and its autonomy, only if the borders cutting it disappear, and its ethnographic and political integrity be restored.”⁶¹ The fact of the matter was that after all the noble noise was over, the Allies had nothing to offer Poland, due to the Russian

alliance. Still, as General Hoffmann, that brutal and forthright German observed, in regard to the proclamation of the Kingdom, "The French are cursing unbelievably; so the matter is unpleasant to them."⁶²

The American government kept a neutral silence. This may explain the fact that the protest of the Central Polish Aid Committee in America, headed by Paderewski, was not published until the end of the month. The protest described the manifesto as "an important document" and protested against "this new partition of Poland."⁶³ The Poles of Austria and Prussia welcomed the Manifesto. Speaking on behalf of the Polish Circle of the Vienna Reichstag, Bilinski stated: "The Reichstag Circle greets the creation of the Kingdom with a patriotic enthusiasm and gives the highest praise, the warmest thanks to the great-hearted Monarch."⁶⁴

4. AFTER THE PROCLAMATION OF THE KINGDOM

Now the Central Powers, considering the manifesto as payment in advance, came around to collect. On November 9th, the two Governors-General issued an appeal for volunteers.

In reply, the National Council passed a Resolution stating that only a Polish government could have the power to raise a Polish army. Furthermore they pointed out that "General Pilsudski is all ready to take the supreme command of it."⁶⁵

Two days later, von Bessler published a decree concerning the creation in the Kingdom of Poland of a Council of State and of a Sejm to sit in Warsaw. Literate male inhabitants 30 years of age or more could vote. The competence of the Sejm was to be rather limited; it was to aid the poor districts, to take care of the "improvement" of the land and to look after war reconstruction. It could collect taxes and float loans. Every decision, however, had to be sanctioned by the Governor-General.

In return the National Council demanded that a Council of State be formed immediately.⁸⁷ The occupying powers agreed. Shortly, the two Governors-General issued a decree establishing the Provisional Council of State as had been demanded by the National Council. The new Council was to consist of twenty-five members who were to be called to office by the Highest Command of the two Emperors. The Council would then choose from within itself a president and a vice-president.⁸⁸

This news called forth the publication of a declaration of the Tsarist government concerning the future make-up of Poland. Russia was willing now to extend the autonomy to the entirety of Poland, whereas before only the conquered parts were to receive autonomy. Poland, of course, was to be kept within the Empire.⁸⁹

Developments were somewhat affected by the offers and counter-offers of peace in December 1916. On the twelfth, the Central Powers offered to enter into peace talks; a few days later Wilson called on all belligerents to state their terms of peace. On the 30th, the Allied Powers declared that there was no peace possible "as long as reparation of the violated rights and liberties be not assured, and the principle of nationality and of the free existence of small States remain unrecognized."⁹⁰ Compliance with such demands would imply the evacuation of Poland.

The new year, 1917, began with great expectation of peace. France saw it impossible to ignore the fact that Poland was being demanded by Russia. Briand's programme of peace, published on January 10, devoted a separate article to Poland in which it was noted that "the intentions of H. I. M. the Emperor of Russia in regard to Poland have been clearly indicated by the proclamation he had just addressed to his Armies."⁹¹ In the proclamation referred to, the Russian Emperor declared that the formation of a "free Poland" inclusive of all the three parts of Poland was "a Russian war-aim."

The Activists had decided, in the meantime, that they would recognize and give their support to the Provisional Council of State as the Government of Poland. Furthermore, they expressed the wish that the Council enlarge its competence to embrace all the field of public administration, and that it put itself energetically to the task of organizing a regular armed force.⁷³ Shortly, a list of Council members, consisting of Activists alone, was approved by the two Emperors. In the middle of January, the Provisional Council of State was opened and Waclaw Niemojowski was chosen MARSZALEK — the chief officer. Next day, the Bureau of the Council was elected and Niemojowski took the oath "to serve the homeland and the Polish nation."⁷⁴ Thus was the first Polish executive created; there was no mention of the Emperors in Marszalek's oath.

The Council of State of the Kingdom of Poland in a manifesto of mid-January defined the "historical tasks" of the Council as follows: "To bring back to life the Polish State, to reconstruct it in reality, to extend effectively the independent power of the State over all the lands which gravitate towards Poland and which had been taken by Russia."⁷⁵ This again was a statement of a Polish DRANG NACH OSTEN, all the more frightening for the Ukraine, as such a Drang coincided with German policies, as we have seen earlier. The Council attempted to widen further its base. In February the Council approached the Passivists for co-operation without success. It was quite plain that the Council was not able to get a grip on the situation. Its demands for greater authority from the occupying powers went largely unheeded. It was in this state that the Revolution of 1917 found it.

German policy became ever more self-confident. The power of Russia was being dismissed. The declaration of Bethmann-Hollweg of November 9, 1916, sealed the Russian-German break. In the session of the Budgetary

Commission of the Berlin Reichstag several speakers raised objections against the November Manifesto to the effect that it stood in the way of the eventual conclusion of a separate peace with Russia and might cause disturbances among the Polish population of Prussia. Bethmann-Hollweg answered, "We have present with us this alternative: either to take a chance on attempting to bring Poland into the Western sphere, or not to do so. If we do not dare, I am persuaded that imprisonment in Russia is Poland's inevitable fate. Should we give Poland... back to the West... then we would have created a defence line against the East, and brought back into existence a state whose military, political and economic advantages would stand comparison with the old."⁷⁶ Germans considered themselves strong enough to carry out their plans alone, and to establish a new *modus vivendi* with the Russian Empire. This was all the more possible now, that whereas in the past the co-existence of the three parties of Prussia, Russia and Austria had enabled each to play the other two against each other, now Austria-Hungary was no match for the other two, and, as Germany gained power in the process, she may well have decided that the new arrangement to be created was practicable.

German policies towards Austria-Hungary, at the turn of the year were somewhat similar to those towards Russia. In January 1917, the Germans asked the Austrians to evacuate Lublin. The Austrians refused. In the debate which followed the German demand, it was decided that the Austrian-Polish solution was not to be entirely scrapped. At that time that solution saw the establishment of an Austrian prince upon the Polish throne; or at least the prevention of the establishment of a German prince upon the throne. Thus Germany, though generally successful, was somewhat checked.

As we have seen, Russian public policy had been largely an attempt to keep the Polish national problem

locked up and isolated. Its actual statements were frequently a series of responses to outside happenings, which could not be ignored. Still another of these outside happenings was the incidental mention by Wilson of the Polish problem in the message to the Senate dated January 22, 1917. Wilson defined the existence of a "united, independent, and autonomous Poland" as a condition of peace.⁷⁷ It is extremely difficult to trace such a policy to its origin. First and foremost, it lay in the general constitution of the United States of America which had been built as if to illustrate the principle that men may govern themselves. Secondly, the policy appears as an implementation of the Wilsonian ideal of peace based upon the self-determination of nations. The comparatively great knowledge the Americans possessed of Poland was probably also influential. Her history and her literature evoked American sympathies. Furthermore, great numbers of Poles were settled in the United States. Paderewski and the Polish Aid Committee helped elect Wilson in the November elections in 1916.⁷⁸ Nor should we neglect the importance of the personal contact. The friendship of Paderewski, with Colonel House, Wilson's chief confidant, may have contributed in a large measure to the attention paid by responsible American statesmen to the Polish case.

This, however occasioned no change of policy in Russia. Still, two days after Wilson's appeal, the Tsar ordered a Special Commission to elaborate the fundamental principles of the future constitution of the Polish State. The first meeting of the Commission took place a month later — enabling us to see that the government was in no hurry — and the Commission disappeared with the Government that created it, without arriving at any concrete result.⁷⁹

The Russian policy towards the borders in the West was being formed and executed by secret diplomacy. As early as March 1916, Sazonov, the Foreign Minister,

wrote to the Russian Ambassador in Paris as follows: "We are ready to leave France and England full liberty in the definition of the Western borders of Germany, counting that in their turn, the Allies will leave us equal liberty of action in the determination of our border as against Austria and Germany. It is imperative, especially, to insist on the exclusion of the Polish problem from the number of subjects of international discussion and on the prevention of all attempts to put the future of Poland under the guarantee and investigation (kontrol) of powers."⁸⁰

This was a serious expression of the policy adopted by the Russian Empire toward Poland, and it was maintained right into the Russian Revolution. The attempt was made to leave the solution of the Polish problem to the unilateral decision of the Russian Empire, and the eastern border of Poland, if any was to be defined at all, would probably have been in the best of cases a purely formal matter. Thus, when Viviani and Thomas, the French Socialist ministers, arrived in Petrograd on behalf of the French government, and attempted to discuss also the case of Poland, Sazonov, as the French Ambassador, Paléologue, put it, "insisted in the most pressing of terms on the danger which the Alliance was running in risking an intervention, even a discrete one, of the French government in the Polish question."⁸¹ These were very strong words to use, especially in view of the chance of a separate German-Russian peace which darkened the international scene at the time.

The Russian secret policy moved towards the total removal of the Polish problem from the international scene, in the Spring of 1917, with co-operation of France. On February 18, Pokrowski, the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, announced to Izwolski that, on the French initiative, the Tsar having consented to the principle of the return of Alsace-Lorraine to France and the accomplishment of a strategic separation between France

and Germany on the left bank of the Rhine, a parallel freedom should be left to the Russian Empire in regard to its Western border, in accordance with an earlier note of February 1916.⁸² Izwolski was able to telegraph on the 11th of March, while the Revolution was in full progress, the total disinterestedness of the French Republic of Briand in Polish affairs: "The government of the French Republic, wishing to... assure to her Ally, as much from the military point of view, as well as from the point of view of industrial life, all the guarantees desirable for the security and the economic development of the Empire, accord to Russia full liberty to determine at her will its Western borders."⁸³

NOTES

¹) Blociszewski, J., **La restauration de la Pologne et la diplomatie européenne**, Paris, 1927, p. 6.

²) *Ibid*, p. 5.

³) *Ibid*, p. 18.

⁴) Roth, P., **Die Entstehung des polnischen Staates**, eine voelkerrechtlich-politische Untersuchung, Berlin, 1926, (Oeffentlich-rechtliche Abhandlungen, Vol. 7), p. 143.

⁵) Filasiewicz, S., (ed.), **La Question Polonaise pendant la Guerre Mondiale**, published by the Polish National Committee, Paris, 1920, (Recueil des Actes diplomatiques, Traités et Documente concernant la Pologne, Vol. 2), p. 6.

⁶) Stakhiv, M., **Zakhidnya Ukraina ta polityka Pol'shchi, Rosii i Zakhodu (1772 - 1918)**, 6 Vols., Scranton, 1958-1961; Volumes III to VI (first part), bear title Stakhiv, M., **Zakhidnaya Ukraina, Narys istorii derzhavnoho budivnytstva ta zbroynoi ta dyplomatychnoi oborony v 1918-1923**, Scranton, 1959-1961, Vol. II, p. 25.

⁷) Roth, *op. cit.*, p. 11.

⁸) Blociszewski, *op. cit.*, p. 7.

⁹) *Ibid*, p. 15.

¹⁰) *Ibid*, p. 8.

¹¹) Dmowski, R., **Polityka polska i odbudowanie Państwa**, Warsaw, 1926, p. 429.

- ¹²⁾ **Ibid**, p. 432.
- ¹³⁾ Roth, **op. cit.**, p. 36.
- ¹⁴⁾ Krypyakevich, I., **Velyka istoriya Ukrainy**, Winnipeg, 1948, 1948, p. 760.
- ¹⁵⁾ **Ibid**, p. 761.
- ¹⁶⁾ Doroshenko, D., **Istoriya Ukrainy 1917-1923**, 2nd ed., 2 Vols., New York, 1954, Vol. I, p. 5.
- ¹⁷⁾ **Ibid**, p. 11.
- ¹⁸⁾ Stakhiv, **op. cit.**, Vol. I, pp. 161-163.
- ¹⁹⁾ Doroshenko, **op. cit.**, Vol. I, p. 25; also Stakhiv, **op. cit.**, Vol. I, p. 168.
- ²⁰⁾ Blociszewski, **op. cit.**, p. 16.
- ²¹⁾ Doroshenko, **op. cit.**, Vol. I, p. 13.
- ²²⁾ Paléologue, M., **La Russie des Tsars pendant la Grande Guerre**, 3 Vols., Paris, 1921-1922, Vol. I, pp. 221-222.
- ²³⁾ Blociszewski, **op. cit.**, p. 11.
- ²⁴⁾ Paléologue, **op. cit.**, Vol. I, p. 222.
- ²⁵⁾ Doroshenko, **op. cit.**, Vol. I, p. 6; also Filasiewicz, **op. cit.**, p. 13.
- ²⁶⁾ Blociszewski, **op. cit.**, p. 16.
- ²⁷⁾ Filasiewicz, **op. cit.**, p. 20.
- ²⁸⁾ Blociszewski, **op. cit.**, p. 17.
- ²⁹⁾ Filasiewicz, **op. cit.**, pp. 15-17.
- ³⁰⁾ Fiedler, F., **W sprawie granic wschodnich**, Łódź, 1945, p. 9.
- ³¹⁾ Sawchenko, F., **L'Ukraine et la Question Ukrainienne**, Paris, 1918, pp. 44-45.
- ³²⁾ Filasiewicz, **op. cit.**, p. 23.
- ³³⁾ Stakhiv, **op. cit.**, Vol. I, pp. 174-175.
- ³⁴⁾ Burian, Count Stephan, **Austria in Dissolution**, London, 1925, p. 93.
- ³⁵⁾ Filasiewicz, **op. cit.**, p. 29.
- ³⁶⁾ Blociszewski, **op. cit.**, p. 17.
- ³⁷⁾ Fiedler, **op. cit.**, p. 8.
- ³⁸⁾ Polonus, (pseud.), **New Partitions of Poland**, London, 1916, p. 7.
- ³⁹⁾ Roth, **op. cit.**, p. 36.
- ⁴⁰⁾ Dmowski, **op. cit.**, p. 433.

- 41) Paléologue, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 304.
- 42) Filasiewicz, *op. cit.*, p. 43.
- 43) Burian, *op. cit.*, pp. 95-100; also Ludendorff, E., (ed.), **Documents du C.O.G. allemand sur le rôle qu'il a joué de 1916 à 1918**, 2 Vols., Paris, 1922, Vol. II, pp. 18-20; also Blociszewski, *op. cit.*, pp. 26-27.
- 44) Blociszewski, *op. cit.*, p. 27.
- 45) *Ibid*, p. 28.
- 46) Stakhiv, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 181.
- 47) Doroshenko, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 16.
- 48) Filasiewicz, *op. cit.*, p. 57.
- 49) *Ibid*, p. 58.
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CHAPTER TWO

THE REVOLUTION OF 1917 AND THE BORDER

1. MARCH 1917 — THE HONEYMOON OF THE REVOLUTION

When on March 12th, the Duma formed an Executive Committee with Rodzianko at its head, and the Executive Committee in its turn appointed a government with Prince Lvov at its head, all over the country there arose parallel units of the Committee of United Civic Organizations and of the Council of Workers' and Soldiers' deputies. In the Ukraine, the members of the Society of Ukrainian Progressists took the initiative to organize in Kiev on March 15, an all-Ukrainian political body, the Rada (Council). Of it Hrushewski, the great Ukrainian historian, was elected President in absentia. The Rada was organized on the same principle as the Committees of United Civic Organizations which were the mainstay of the Provincial government and were recognized by the government, with the difference that Rada was not to be either a city or a provincial centre, but rather an all-Ukrainian centre. This latter fact immediately led to an overwhelming growth of the Rada at the expense Committees and Councils. There entered into the Rada delegates of the Ukrainian cultural-educational, political, and civic organizations of the City of Kiev. These included the political parties, the co-operative movements and organizations of the clergy, teachers, students and soldiers. The Rada had no determinate plan of action for the future, nor was its membership determined. This was to the advantage of the institution. In the words of

Khrystiuk, "the power of the Rada, its tasks and its methods of work evolved with no great internal obstacles together with the development of the Ukrainian revolution".² Its growth was, incidentally, accompanied and furthered by the sudden recrudescence of the Ukrainian press now that the prohibition of the Ukrainian language was allowed to lapse.

The formation of the Rada, in its earliest form, preceded by one day the renunciation of the crown for himself and his son, by Nikolai II. On the day following the latter event, the day on which Nikolai's brother Mikhail also renounced the crown and asked all "Russian citizens" to obey the Provisional Government, a Ukrainian delegation sent by the Rada was received by Prince Lvov, the newly named Prime Minister. It was asked that the right to full worship be returned to the Ukrainian Uniate Catholic Church, and rights given to the Western Ukrainian ("Galicians") and others. Prince Lvov declared that the Government agreed with the demands in principle.³ Thus we see, the Ukrainians within the Russian Empire from the very first displaying an interest in the future position and rights of the Western Ukrainians, an interest that is in just these territories which were going to become the "minimum" claims of the Polish Kingdom, and the Polish Republic. We also see the beginning of support of the Ukrainian border claims by Russians, though only as Russian borders, lesser though than the German support of the Polish claims, however, precisely because Russia was losing the war, and the Germans were gaining it at that time.

The Committee of the Kiev gubernia (province) was formed on March 17. The Committee consisted of 12 members, with 5 of those being Ukrainian. It was this Committee which was the actual power in the Ukraine in the early weeks of the Revolution until it was supplanted by the Rada. It was essentially through the Committee of Civic Organizations, and the parallel local Committees

that the Gubernia Commissar, M. Sukovkin, governed the province, as the bearer of the official power of the Provisional Government. The Commissar otherwise lacked administrative and police apparatus.⁴ The Ukrainian Rada was allowed, however, to continue to develop.

Public opinion finally found an opportunity to express itself. Immediately upon the return of Hrushewski from Moscow (where he had been allowed to go from Siberia in the middle of the war), the Ukrainian Central Rada called a public meeting in Kiev on April 1. A total of 100,000 people attended. Hrushewski was the speaker on behalf of the Rada. The meeting approved resolutions in which confidence was expressed in the Central Government. The Central Government was to call the Constituent Assembly as soon as possible and the general Constituent Assembly was to approve the autonomous regime being introduced in the Ukraine. Most importantly for the Rada, the meeting delegated the Ukrainian Central Rada to come to an understanding with the Provisional Government in the matter of these resolutions.⁵ Rada was thus becoming the focal point for the Ukrainian public opinion. After this meeting, the Ukrainian Rada felt that it had the support of its people, and began to act accordingly.

Turning to the Poles now, we see the establishment of Polish political centres in the Ukraine. In mid-March, at the initiative of certain influential Polish organizations, there was elected at Kiev a Provisional Polish Committee, purely National-Democrat in sympathy. The Committee called a meeting of all the Polish organizations of the Ukraine for March 19. A Polish Executive Committee was elected at that meeting. The Committee again had a definite National-Democratic tendency. The president was Joachim Bartoszewicz, the leader of the National Democrats in the Ukraine.⁶ This Committee represented primarily the large landed interest. As for the Socialists, they were of lesser importance among the Polish population of the Ukraine, although it was the Pilsudski men who

came in time to co-operate rather closely with the Ukraine, and who eventually entered the Rada as representatives of the Polish minority. Their base was formed in early July through the formation of the Democratic Centre at Kiev.⁷

The first declaration of the new democratic Russia came on March 27th from Russia's revolutionary organization, the Petrograd Council of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies. The Petrograd Council of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies was willing to see Poland become quite independent.

Bringing to the attention of the Polish people the victory of freedom over the Policeman of all Europe, the (Council) declares that the democracy of Russia stands upon the basis of the recognition of the national-political self-determination of nations and declares that Poland has the right to be completely independent in respect to the constitution and international relations. We send to the Polish people our fraternal greeting and wish it success in the coming struggle for the re-establishment of the democratic republican constitution in the independent Poland.⁸

This particular appeal, the first quasi-governmental appeal of the revolutionary Russia, although not quite free from the hypocrisy thrown upon it by the true relationships of power and the German-Austrian occupation of Poland, is of considerable interest. A few days earlier, Kerenski, a Minister of the Provisional Government, speaking for himself alone, told the Daily Chronicle that he was in favour of Polish independence.⁹

It was the Provisional Government itself rather than the Council of Deputies, or individual Ministers, who spoke for the entirety of the Russian Empire. The Provisional Government defined its policy towards the problem in co-operation with some Polish groups. The Government had a choice. The Dmowski group was by now doubly compromised: on the one hand, it had the teme-

rity to seek support in Europe: the new people in the government were democrats but they drew the line at that. Secondly, the Dmowski National Democratic group was compromised on account of their very near association with the autocratic elements which had just been swept from power. Again, the Pilsudski group was deeply compromised through their co-operation, such as it was, with the Germans and Austrians. The new Polish group in ascendance were the Polish liberals, associated with the Polish Democratic Committee presided over by Lednicki. The Polish Democratic Committee was hardly helped in their task by the declaration of the new government that, in the words of Miliukov, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, it would respect "the international engagements assumed by the past regime". To this, the Minister added that the cabinet had decided "to guide itself by the democratic principles of respect due to the small and large nations of the liberty of their development and of good understanding between nations".¹⁰ The second part of the declaration was a pious hope for virtue on the part of the Poles. The first part referred to the very definite engagements regarding the Rhine and the borders of Russia with Germany and Austria, and the acquiescence of Allies in the incorporation of the Ukrainian-populated territories of Eastern Galicia and the Trans-Carpathian Ukraine. At any rate, Lednicki and his group found a very favourable reception from the Provisional Government and the Council of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies in Petrograd. The Provisional Government deputised Lednicki¹¹ himself to compose an appropriate appeal on the problem. The final draft was prepared by Miliukov, who valued especially highly the proviso by which the final decision was to be taken by the Russian Constituent Assembly and the Polish-Russian military alliance which were provided.¹² The Proclamation was published on March 29th.

Poles! (it read), The old political regime of Russia... has been overthrown forever. The free Russia, in the person of its Provisional Government, invested with all powers, hurries to address you with a fraternal greeting and calls you to new life, to freedom. The old government had given you hypocritical promises which it could, but would not fulfil. The Central Powers used her errors to occupy and rob the land. Exclusively to fight Russia, and her Allies, they gave you illusory state rights, and that not for the entire Polish people, but only for the part of Poland temporarily occupied by the enemy... Brothers, Poles... the time of great decisions shall come for you too. The free Russia calls you into the ranks of the fighters for the freedom of nations. The Russian people, having thrown off their yoke, recognizes also for the fraternal Polish nation the full right to determine its fate by its own will. Faithful to the agreements with the allies, faithful to the common plan of struggle with Germanic militarism, the Provisional Government considers the establishment of an independent Polish state formed from all the lands in which the Polish people are in a majority, as an assured pledge of an enduring peace in the future renewed Europe. The Polish state, attached to Russia by a free military union, the Polish state shall become a solid rampart against the pressure of the Central states against Slavdom. The freed and united Polish nation will determine for itself its state form, expressing its will through the Constitutional Assembly called in the capital of Poland and elected through universal vote. It will be up to the Russian Constitutional Assembly to consolidate finally the new fraternal union and to give its consent to those changes of the state territory of Russia which would be necessary for the formation of the free Poland from all its three, now separated parts..."³

The proclamation, by referring to the agreements with the Allies, meaning primarily France, restated once again that Poland was going to be a unilateral concern of Russia. Provisional Government absolved itself of re-

sponsibility in regard to the Polish rights by reference to the Russian Constituent Assembly which would have to sanction the necessary changes. In a word, the Provisional Government began from the proposition that the revolution changed little in Polish-Russian relations and that any negotiations would have to start virtually from the status quo ante. The Proclamation assumed that Poland was interested primarily in Slavdom, and instead of co-operation with France, it assumed that the Kingdom would be content to remain primarily a Russian buffer state against Germany. By giving no recognition to any Polish organization, in the way which was eventually forthcoming from France and England, the Russian government proclaimed itself the only arbiter of Polish interests for now. Not content with the limitation of the Russian Constituent Assembly, the Government proclaimed the necessity of a military union. There is indeed the basic supposition that the Russian assembly and her laws are of greater consequence than the Polish assembly and their views. We may conclude this analysis of the Declaration by stating that it gave the Poles little beside fair words; however, the recognition of Poland as a constitutional unit enabled the Allies to finally begin a Polish policy of their own. This, in itself, was a sacrifice on the part of Russia. In regard to the Eastern borders, the Proclamation, following the principle of Polish government for Polish inhabited territory, have a rather strict definition. The border was thus to run to the west of Kholm, Volhynia, and Eastern Galicia. This favoured Ukraine, but the Provisional Government thought in terms of a Russia one and indivisible, rather than the Ukrainian interest in the border.

For the National Democrats, the Proclamation meant another turn in their public policies. Up till now, they had spoken largely in terms of an autonomous Poland. As the memorandum to Izwolski testified, they had come

over to the idea of independence in their private actions somewhat earlier. Now, they publicly espoused the doctrine of an independent Poland.¹⁴ However, the Proclamation could not satisfy Dmowski. A few days before it was issued he had met Balfour, the Foreign Secretary of Great Britain. On that occasion he left a memorandum in which the claims of the Polish National Committee were expressed. In the first place he wanted the proclamation of the recognition of independence of Poland by Russia and the Allies. In regard to the Eastern borders, the memorandum stated that the borders of 1772 were not possible. The whole of Galicia and the province of Kholm and Volhynia were to be incorporated into Poland on the East, he said.¹⁵ Dmowski's principle of incorporation was to take in territories "in which the masses spoke Polish, had the consciousness of belonging to the Polish nationality, and were attached to the Polish cause."

In the Kingdom of Poland, the Proclamation was interpreted as a recognition of itself. "We wish to maintain the relations of good neighbours with the Russian State", observed the Council, "but we must oppose categorically any attempt to drive us to a war against the Central Powers." The State Council raised the territorial problem. "The age-long Polish-Russian dispute in regard to the vast lands situated between ethnographic Poland and Russia, lands which for centuries have shared the fate of Poland, has not been settled by the proclamation of the Russian government... The fate of these lands ought to be determined in favour of the political power of an independent Poland, and respecting the wishes of the nations inhabiting these areas."¹⁶ In such a manner, the Council of State restated its expansionist policy. As a postscript to the Proclamation we must mention that the Provisional Government had instituted on March 28, a Commission of Liquidation of Affairs of the Kingdom of Poland, under the chairmanship of Lednicki. The first

working meeting took place more than a month later. The Commission produced no concrete results.

The Allies of Russia, singly, and all in common, had welcomed the Proclamation. France, again, went furthest in the interpretation of the document, and proclaimed that "the French Republic would be happy to lend its collaboration to Russia in the question (of Polish resurrection)."¹⁷ And so, the Polish problem, and consequently the problem of its eastern border, despite all the agreements to the contrary became internationalized. On the other hand, the Ukrainian problem was coming to a head. While the transition was difficult for the Poles and their side of the border, the Ukrainians were to have even a more difficult time.

2. THE IMPASSE IN THE UKRAINE AND POLAND

The Rada was moved to a fast accumulation of power. The all-Ukrainian principle of its organization coincided on the whole with the wishes of the Ukrainian peasantry and intellectuals. The Ukrainian working class was quite small, and what there was of it, was usually Russian or Jewish; the Ukrainian democratic doctrines began moreover to attract to the Rada the Jewish nationality in the Ukraine.

In mid-April, the Rada called an All-Ukrainian Congress at which all Ukrainian provinces, with the exception of the Western Ukraine, which was under enemy occupation, were represented.

The All-Ukrainian Congress consisted of some 900 delegates from the Ukrainian army and from economic organizations and political parties of the peasants, workers and intellectuals.¹⁸

The Congress elected as Head, Hrushewski, Head of the Ukrainian Central Rada. In its resolutions, the Congress demanded national territorial autonomy for the Ukraine. A federal republic was recognized as the only possible constitution for Russia. Agreeing that the all-

Russian Constituent Assembly had the right of "sanction" in the matter, the Congress declared that there was an immediate necessity to organize a Land Rada consisting of representatives of Ukrainian districts and cities, of nations living in the Ukraine, and of civic groups. The initiative in this matter was to be taken by the Ukrainian Rada.¹⁹

The Congress asked for national self-determination in regard to the border definitions between states. This demand was made in order to guarantee the possession of Galicia by the Ukraine. To that end, the Congress also demanded that representatives of the Ukraine be allowed to sit in the peace conference. By a separate clause, the Congress protested, "in connection with the declaration of the Provisional Polish Council of State... against all pretensions for the non-Polish lands" and again "the Ukrainian people would not suffer any such attempts to take over her rights over the territory of the Ukraine, covered by her sweat and blood."²⁰

The Rada, through its Military Commission, was also gathering support in the front-lines. Frontal Radas and Committees were elected by soldiers. The first Congress of the delegates of the Army, consisting of 700 representatives of over 900,000 Ukrainian soldiers, met at Kiev in mid-May. The Congress was opened by the President of the Rada, Hrushewski, who thereupon was elected the Honorary Head of the Congress. In the resolutions, it proclaimed that it considered "the Ukrainian Central Rada the only competent body called to decide all matters which have to do with the entire Ukraine and her relationship to the Provisional Government."²¹

With the army thus supporting it, the Ukrainian Central Rada sent a delegation to Petrograd in order to further its constitutional position. There, towards the end of May, the Delegation presented a declaration which stated that the only correct way out in the present situation was the full satisfaction of its demands, as

follows: "Taking into account the unanimous demands for the autonomy of the Ukraine put forward by the Ukrainian democracy, we hope that the Provisional Government will express by an act its agreement in principle with this demand."

The second basic demand was narrowly connected with the problem of the Ukrainian-Polish border. "The inevitability of the solution of the Ukrainian problem in the international conference in connection with the fate of Galicia and the part of the Ukrainian land occupied by the Germans makes it necessary to decide now that the presence in that conference of representatives of the Ukrainian nation is a matter of principle."²² This also was a demand on the part of the Ukrainian Rada for the Ukrainian-Polish border running west of Eastern Galicia and the province of Kholm.

The Provisional Government rejected the Ukrainian demands. It would not recognize the Rada as the true representative of the will of the entire Ukrainian nation, as the Rada "was not elected by the popular vote."²³

In Kiev, the First All-Ukrainian Peasants' Congress was called for early in June. In the Congress there were present one representative from each district (volost'), from Peasants' Union (Spilka), two representatives from each county (povit), and from the county Committee of Peasants' Unions, and two representatives of each provincial (gubernia) organization of the Peasants' Union. Altogether there were 2,200 delegates, with 1,500 having a vote. The Congress decided on a tug of war: the Congress declared that the Rada was the only institution which could "save the land from chaos." In conclusion, it was demanded that "representatives of the Ukrainian nation take part in the international peace Congress."²⁴ The Congress formed a Rada of Peasants' Deputies which immediately entered the Central Rada. So strengthened, the Rada was to continue to struggle.

In the middle of June, the Rada passed the decision that the Provisional Government went consciously against the interests of the "toiling people of the Ukraine" and against the principle of self-determination of nations. The Rada addressed the Ukrainian nation with the call "to become organized to come to an immediate laying of foundations for an autonomous constitution in the Ukraine." The General Meeting of the Rada considered that "the Central Rada has exhausted all means to come to an agreement with the Provisional Russian Government."²⁵

The Second Ukrainian Army Congress was called for mid-June. Anxious to undercut the power of the Rada, the Provisional Government, through Kerenski, the Minister of War, attempted to prohibit the holding of the Congress; the prohibition was ignored, however. The Congress took place as planned. Altogether there were 2,308 delegates from the front, the rear and the fleet. These had been elected by some 1,600,000 Ukrainian soldiery.²⁶ The Congress stated, after deliberation, that the "Provisional Russian Government did not comprehend national relations in the Ukraine, and did not take into account, as it ought to have, the great organized and elemental power of the Ukrainian democracy, awakened by the Revolution." Taking those things into consideration, the Second Army Congress resolved that the Provisional Russian Government, "if the maintenance of the gains of the Revolution in Russia as a whole was dear to them," satisfy the demands of the Ukrainian Rada. The Congress defined its position to the Rada. It decided "to invite its higher representative body, the Central Ukrainian Rada", to make no further approaches in the matter to the Government, and to begin immediately a solid organization of the land in agreement with national minorities.²⁷ In conclusion, the Congress elected from its midst a Ukrainian Rada of Soldiers' Deputies, and resolved that it should enter the Ukrainian

Central Rada. The Rada accepted this increase in representation.

Supported thus by the Congress, the Ukrainian Central Rada decided to bring matters to a head. On June 23, 1917, on the last day of the meetings of the Army Congress, the Central Rada issued the First Universal of the Ukrainian Central Rada to the Ukrainian Nation:

Ukrainian Nation! Nation of farmers, workers, and of the toiling people... Your best sons, the elected people from the villages, factories, from the soldiers' quarters, from all the Ukrainian societies and organizations, have elected us, members of the Ukrainian Central Rada, and ordered us to stand and fight for... rights and liberties. Your elected people, Nation! had expressed their will as follows: Let the Ukraine be free. Without separating from the entire Russia, without breaking with the Russian state, let the Ukrainian nation have the right to order its life on its soil by itself. Let law and order (lad i poriadok) in the Ukraine be administered by the All-National Ukrainian Assembly (Sejm) elected by universal, equal, direct and secret vote.

The Central Rada appealed for support to the minorities: "The Central Rada trusts that non-Ukrainian nations living in our land will also care for law and order in our land, and in this heavy time of universal lawlessness, (they shall) in union with us begin the work of organization of the autonomy of the Ukraine."²⁸

The publication of the Universal found immediate acceptance on the part of the population of the Ukraine. This acceptance manifested itself in a series of meetings and declarations.

Within a week the Ukrainian Central Rada formed the Ukrainian Government under the name of the General Secretariat of the Ukrainian Central Rada. The Government was a coalition, with the Ukrainian Social Democrats leading. Vynnychenko was the Head of the General Secretariat; Yefremov, the Secretary for Nation-

alities Affairs; Baranowski, Finance Secretary; Martos, the Secretary for Agrarian Affairs; Petlura, the Secretary for Military Affairs. The General Secretariat submitted a report as "the executive body of the Central Rada" and government, on July 9. The Ukrainian Central Rada approved the report, including the plan of activity of the government. And thus the Ukraine acquired its first Government since the eighteenth century. In its rapid consolidation, it began to present a serious danger to the government of Poland and its threat to expand eastwards under the wing of the German and Austrian power. The general territorial claims of the Ukrainian government were based on self-determination, and it was this principle of free decision by territorial units to which the Ukrainian government clung throughout.

While the Rada was gathering power in the Ukraine and was becoming powerful enough to challenge the Central Russian Government, the situation in Poland was developing in a similar way. The difference here was, however, the fact that Germany was in a rather good military position, and was not in the midst of a revolution. In Poland, an impasse had also been reached in early May. The Polish army, still to be organized, was put under the jurisdiction of the Governor-General and not the jurisdiction of the Council of State, and Pilsudski, its chosen commander, and Head of the Military Commission of the Council. Furthermore, there was a threat of a purge of Polish officers in such armed groups as did exist. The Council still did not possess much real power. On May 1, the Council of State approved an ultimatum to the occupying powers. Under the threat of immediate resignation, the Council demanded that the Powers consent that the Council name a Regent; secondly, the Council demanded an immediate formation of a Provisional Government to consist of Polish ministers designated by the Council; the ministers would be the Cabinet which would exercise the executive power until

the Regent could take over his functions.²⁹ The Powers promised an official reply a few days later. In mid-May, Baron Konopka asked the Council on behalf of the Powers to wait. On May 17th, the Council suspended its work, and adjourned until such time as it received a definite answer.

In the meantime, Germany was conducting talks with Austria-Hungary. Austria could not hold its own against Germany. On May 18th, Bethmann-Hollweg and Czernin signed an agreement at Kreuznach which by the third clause provided that "Austria-Hungary... give up condominium in Poland and disinterest themselves in the Kingdom of Poland from the political and military point of view."³⁰ From that time on, Poland was on her own as against her neighbour.

Finally, in early June the Central Powers came to reply to the ultimatum. Count Lerchenfeld-Koefering and Baron Konopka for Germany accepted the idea of the nomination of a Regent. Leaving the Governor-General out of consideration, the Powers agreed to consider the Provisional Council of State as representative of the developing Polish State. "Without endangering the situation which assured (to the Powers) their internal right," the Powers would see different branches of administration transformed into ministries. Furthermore, the nomination of a person to whom the highest direction of the different branches of administration was to be given was requested from the Council.³¹ The Council of State agreed to accept the declaration as the basis for relations. A commission was charged with drafting a statute on "provisional organization of the supreme authorities of the Polish State."³²

Having thus prepared the ground, the Central Powers prepared to build a Polish army. The Commission for Military Affairs was ignored. Bessler himself gave a call-to-arms. The results were so meagre as to be embarrassing: 2,000 Poles straggled to the colours. This

formed the turning point in German policy towards Poland. One of the important reasons why the military wished to see "something" created was in order to have an army: one million men seemed easy to raise. When that "something" did not raise anything, the Germans cooled off. Furthermore, Russia was unexpectedly exhausted. Now Poland could come in the way of a favourable separate peace of the Russian Empire with the Central Powers.

On the other side, the Left among the Activists was becoming rapidly cool. On July 2nd, Pilsudski resigned as a member of the Provisional Council of State. Together with him there resigned Jankowski, Siwinski, Stolarski. The reason for the resignation, given by Pilsudski, was that he saw no way for the formation of a Polish army, the task for which he had specifically entered the Council.³³

In the troubled days that followed, Germans arrested several members of the Polish Military Organization, an undercover Pilsudski military group, of the Central National Committee, and generally of the Left parties. On the night of July 21-22, General Pilsudski and Colonel Sosnkowski, also of the Military Commission of the Council of State, were arrested. They were deported to Germany and imprisoned in Magdeburg.

This then was the second failure in Polish political thought and activity — the policy of Pilsudski and PPS which had supported the idea of an independent Poland supported by Germany and Austria, with the eventual change of front for Poland, had come to nothing.

3. THE JEWISH PEOPLE AND THE UKRAINE

The All-Ukrainian Congress of April had resolved that "one of the main principles of Ukrainian autonomy was the full guarantee of the rights of national minorities living in the Ukraine."³⁴ This intention, proclaimed over and over again was succeeding in bringing the

Jewish minority over to the support of the Rada, and eventually to the support of the Ukrainian interests in the matter of the Ukrainian-Polish border. The demands of the Jewish minority had been outlined in a series of conferences of the Jewish parties.

The Conference of the Jewish Socialist Workers' Party held at the end of March resolved that "the Jewish workers put for themselves the task of obtaining the national-political autonomy." A Jewish Sejm (parliament) was demanded; the Sejm would have within its competence "the serving of the cultural needs," social welfare, a national budget and representation of the community. The Tenth conference of the Bund, held about the same time, had a more modest programme. It resolved that "the immediate realization of the national-cultural autonomy" was "a timely political slogan of the day."³⁵ The Zionist Congress followed the conferences. It demanded the Jewish tongue as the language of instruction in schools, (Yiddish was meant). Furthermore, the demand was made for "a representative of the Jewish nation... at... the Peace Conference."³⁶

Jewish demands in Poland were largely similar. A characteristic declaration was made, for instance, by Holenderski, the representative of the Poale-Zion party in the Lodz City Council: "The Jewish worker is striving for self-government forms such as would assure to the Jewish Nation the opportunity to satisfy their national demands, that is national autonomy."³⁷ However, they could not expect much satisfaction from the Polish groups, in particular from the National Democrats.

Other minorities largely fashioned their demands after the Jewish demands. The Rada negotiators with the minorities were of course conscious of the wishes of the minorities. The main objective of the negotiations with the minorities, undertaken seriously by the Rada after the proclamation of the First Universal, was the attempt of the Rada to become representative of the

Ukrainian part of the population of the Ukraine, as before, and at the same time, through the admission of the representatives of other nationalities in the Ukraine, into the Rada on general principles, to become a representative body in the fullest sense. Rada also wished to gather the support of the minorities for her foreign and territorial policy.

NOTES

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²⁾ **Ibid**, Vol. I, p. 15.

³⁾ **Ibid**, Vol. I, p. 123.

⁴⁾ Doroshenko, **op. cit.**, Vol. I, pp. 40-41.

⁵⁾ Dimanshtein, S.M., (ed.), **Revolutsiya i natsional'nyi vopros, Dokumenty i materialy po istorii natsional'nogo voprosa v Rossii i SSSR v XX veke**, Vol. II, Fevral' — oktyabr' 1917, Moscow, 1930, pp. 133-134.

⁶⁾ Jabłoński, H., **Polska autonomia narodowa na Ukrainie, 1917-18**, Warsaw, 1948, (Warsaw. University, Historical Institute, **Prace**, Vol. 3), p. 152.

⁷⁾ **Ibid**, p. 152.

⁸⁾ Roth, **op. cit.**, p. 127.

⁹⁾ Dmowski, **op. cit.**, p. 449.

¹⁰⁾ Filasiewicz, **op. cit.**, p. 143.

¹¹⁾ Stakhiv, **op. cit.**, Vol. II, p. 35.

¹²⁾ Roth, **op. cit.**, p. 15.

¹³⁾ Filasiewicz, **op. cit.**, pp. 151-153.

¹⁴⁾ Roth, **op. cit.**, p. 39.

¹⁵⁾ Komarnicki, T., **Rebirth of the Polish Republic**, London, 1957, pp. 161-162.

¹⁶⁾ Filasiewicz, **op. cit.**, p. 154.

¹⁷⁾ **Ibid**, p. 157.

¹⁸⁾ Khrystiuk, **op. cit.**, Vol. I, p. 38.

¹⁹⁾ Doroshenko, **op. cit.**, Vol. I, pp. 58-59.

²⁰⁾ **Ibid**, Vol. I, p. 36.

²¹⁾ Khrystiuk, **op. cit.**, Vol. I, p. 50.

- ²⁰⁾ **Ibid**, Vol. I, p. 55.
- ²¹⁾ **Ibid**, Vol. I, p. 63.
- ²²⁾ **Ibid**, Vol. I, pp. 66-67.
- ²³⁾ **Ibid**, Vol. I, p. 69.
- ²⁴⁾ **Ibid**, Vol. I, p. 69.
- ²⁵⁾ **Ibid**, Vol. I, p. 70.
- ²⁶⁾ Doroshenko, **op. cit.**, Vol. I, pp. 89-92; also Khrystiuk, **op. cit.**, Vol. I, pp. 72-73.
- ²⁷⁾ Blociszewski, **op. cit.**, pp. 67-68.
- ²⁸⁾ Seyda, **op. cit.**, Vol. I, p. 63.
- ²⁹⁾ Blociszewski, **op. cit.**, p. 69.
- ³⁰⁾ **Ibid**, p. 70.
- ³¹⁾ Filasiewicz, **op. cit.**, p. 206.
- ³²⁾ Tcherikover, I., **Antisemitizm i pogromy na Ukraine 1917-1918-1919**, Berlin, 1923, p. 65.
- ³³⁾ Dimanshtein, **op. cit.**, pp. 280 ff.
- ³⁴⁾ **Ibid**, p. 279.
- ³⁵⁾ Rosenfeld, M., **Nationales Selbstbestimmungsrecht der Juden in Polen**, Wien, 1918, p. 56.

CHAPTER THREE

FORMATION OF THE UKRAINIAN NATIONAL REPUBLIC AND THE UKRAINIAN-POLISH QUESTION

1. CONSOLIDATION OF THE RADA AND THE BORDER

Having taken matters into their own hands, through the proclamation of autonomy and consequently, of their own autonomous government, the Ukrainians faced alone the entire Russian political community whose actions could by no means be foreseen. Miliukov, who in the meantime had lost his position as the Minister of Foreign Affairs, declared that the Rada had committed "a grave crime," while the newspaper of his Constitutional Democratic party, RECH, saw in the proclamation of self-government "a German intrigue." BIRZHOVYE VE-DOMOSTI (the newspaper of financial interests), declared that "a decisive answer must be given to this Universal, of which there can be no other description, than treason against the state... We need not hesitate to use extreme measures in order to destroy the power of the declaration of the Ukrainian Rada."¹

The Russian peasantry also took a negative attitude to the Universal. The Executive Committee of the All-Russian Council of Peasants' Deputies decided to consider as "completely just, the refusal of the Provisional Government to immediately proclaim the autonomy of the Ukraine, "in that it had no right so to do..."² For the same reason, the Committee considered the issue of the Universal by the Ukrainian Central Rada unlawful and

dangerous describing it as the Universal “which proclaims the immediate realization of the full autonomy of the Ukraine, the convocation of the Ukrainian Constituent Assembly — for the issuing of the fundamental laws of the Ukraine; and which puts the Central Rada, as it were, in the position of the Highest Government of the Ukraine.” In conclusion, the Executive Committee demanded the cancellation of the Universal published by the Ukrainian Central Rada. The First All-Russian Congress of Workers’ and Soldiers’ Deputies took a somewhat conciliatory attitude. The Congress resolved that only the All-Russian Constituent Assembly had the final decision in the matter of autonomy. It stated, however, a provisional body representing “the democracy of all nations inhabiting the Ukraine... ought to be formed”. This body would be entrusted with the preparation of the fundamental principles of the autonomous constitution of the land, and with the preparatory work towards the convocation of the representatives of the entire population of the Ukraine. The Provisional Government was invited therefore to come to an agreement with the bodies of “Ukrainian revolutionary democracy” towards the satisfaction of the national demands of the Ukrainian nation.³ Thus the Council was in fact demanding that the First Universal be ignored, that some indefinite “bodies of Ukrainian revolutionary democracy” and not the Rada be made the basis for further development, and that the Constituent Assembly, on the All-Russian principle, should have the final word. Finally the Council pointed out what it saw as the necessity of the “revolutionary unity of the toiling masses of all the nations of Russia”. The Council completely ignored the non-Russian point of view, in that it took no account of the fact that the Provisional Government was the constitutional reflection of the Tsarist regime — there was there represented the Russian oppressor and overlord and not the non-Russian “hewers of wood and carriers of water”.

If it were to have presented any real "common front", the Central Russian institution would have had to give up the claim of being an "all-Russian" government but rather come to treat with the constitutional creations of the oppressed nations as an equal with equals. For the time being, the Provisional Government was doing nothing.

The First Universal finally succeeded in awaking Europe somewhat. French policy in regard to the Ukraine was, in the words of Borschak, simple, for, "of its own free will, it ignored the Ukrainian question".⁴ In France, the official policy in regard to the Universal was expressed by LE TEMPS: it amounted to stating that whether Ukrainians wanted to be so or not, their very existence was dangerous to the Allied effort. "Because the Ukrainian question is there, we cannot allow ourselves to go around it. Europe is in flames... Germany is within our doors. It is not the legitimacy of the Ukrainian claims that we can discuss at this moment. What interests us above all is the use which the enemy could make of these claims however legitimate they may be... It is plain that they fill us with distrust, not in regard to the Kiev assembly itself, but rather in regard to the exaggerations to which it could be pushed and whatever profit might be drawn from this by Germany."⁵ A policy more "real" could hardly have been drawn up by Germany. In line with this policy, the French Ambassador in Petrograd, Noulens, refused on any account to enter into relation with the representatives of the Ukrainians, Estonians and others. His impartiality was pushed to such extremes that he consistently refused even to allow the French Consul at Petrograd, Pélissier, to go to Kiev when he wished to go.⁶

However, even in that early period, there were some segments of French public opinion which were more friendly to the idea of a Ukrainian State. Pélissier and his circle had been one of these. Pélissier was the editor

of the periodical ANNALES DES NATIONALITES which had published some articles favorable to the Ukraine. In the early summer he had an interview with Ribot, the French President of the Council, on the matter. To Ribot's objections that the French could not dismember Russia, their ally, Pélissier, remarked that, on the contrary, their question was not at all that of the dismemberment of Russia, in that "the interests of Russia herself demand a realization of the rights of the nationalities."

As the power of the Rada grew, Pélissier came to urge a more forwardlooking French policy. He published two articles in L'INFORMATION in which he drew the conclusion that Russia ought to be transformed into a federal State in that such a move would solve the East European problem. In that federation, the first place would go to the Ukraine. He also pointed out that the greatest part of the front-line was passing through the Ukraine. It was necessary for France, he insisted, to enter into relations with the Ukrainian Central Rada of Kiev.⁷ In this opinion he was supported by Painlevé and Jean Brunhes, prominent French statesmen. Pélissier seems to have been influential in Masonic circles. It was a sign that the French policy was beginning to shift to a more sympathetic position in regard to the Ukraine when Pélissier was appointed on July 4th to the staff of the French Embassy of Noulens, with the mission to study the nationalities' movements.

The German policy seemed to have been for the time being an attempt to compromise the Rada in Russian and Allied eyes, and so to leave the Rada isolated and amenable to some possible future German pressure. For the time being, Germany was too deeply involved with Poland and the support of the Polish Eastern claims to consider those of the Rada seriously. It must have been perfectly plain at the time that while Germany could consider keeping Poland, and yet have Russia neutral

in the future, any attempt at changing the status of the Ukraine meant the undermining of Russia as a world power of the future, and Germany, at this stage, could not have felt ready for this. There is no evidence of any importance to suggest any German relations with the Rada or the Ukrainian national movement at this time. Miliukov's allegations may be dismissed as being based on too scanty evidence.⁸ Czernin's report of the statement of von Stumm, then Under-Secretary of Foreign Affairs, that the German Foreign Office had relations with the "separatist movement in the Ukraine," if correct, amounted probably to an attempt on the part of Germany to browbeat their "august Ally", for obviously the Austrians had no Ukrainian contacts. Certain segments in German public opinion, though, in particular the industrial segment, supported a German understanding with the Ukraine. Referring to the First Universal, a certain Hennig in the RHEINISCHE-WEST-FÄLSCHHE ZEITUNG wrote:

The separatist wishes of the Ukraine, skillfully supported, could result in a political revolution, rich in consequences. An independent Ukraine would be a precious ally for the Central Empires. The Black Sea would become the Mediterranean of the Quadruple alliance... (The Universal) is the grandest and happiest event for Germany in the entire course of the World War... Through the separation of the Ukraine, the excessive power of Russia must be broken.⁹

This view, however, was as yet, far from becoming German state policy.

The Russian government continued its policy of non-recognition of the Rada. Towards the end of June, it attempted to downgrade the Rada. The Minister-President Prince Lvov issued a declaration to the "Ukrainian People" by-passing the Rada.

Citizens! Ukrainians: To lead the land through all dangers, to call the All-National Constituent Assembly in which all nations of Russia in a universal and equal vote should express their will directly and solidly — this is the goal put forward by the Government, the provisional carrier of the revolutionary power. This is your duty too, citizens-Ukrainians. Are you not part of the free Russia? Is not the fate of the Ukraine tied closely to that of the liberated Russia? Who can have any doubts that Russia, which stands under the banner of full government by the people, would not guarantee the rights of all nations which enter into its composition? The nations will be able, through their representatives in the Constituent Assembly, to hammer out those forms of state and economic constitution which would completely correspond to their constitutional wishes.

Prince Lvov went on to say that in regard to all the nations of Russia, the Provisional Government has begun already to make the right of cultural self-determination active.

The Provisional Government had considered it and is considering it as its duty to come to an agreement with civic democratic organizations of the Ukraine in the matter of all provisional measures which may be and ought to be followed in the future to assure the rights of the Ukrainian people in local government and in self-government, in school and in court, — measures which would be preliminary to the transfer to that final free governmental organization which the Ukraine should receive from the hands of the All-National Constituent Assembly. However, the full rebuilding of the state body of Russia and of the constitution of the all-Russian Army is impossible while Russia is under fire of outside enemies and internal troubles endanger the cause of freedom. Brothers and Ukrainians!.. In the minute of threatening danger do not bring into the nation, just when a concentration of all forces is necessary, a quarrel where brother might kill brother... Let the final decision of all

fundamental questions be left for the Constituent Assembly which is about to be formed.¹⁰

The declaration offered little to the population of the Ukraine. The stubborn refusal of the Provisional Government to admit the validity of the Ukrainian constitutional creation, the Rada, indeed forced Ukrainians to wonder whether any meaning at all was to be attached to Russian guarantees of the "right of all nations".

The Ukrainian Central Rada ignored the appeal and continued its organizational work. The All-Ukrainian Rada of Peasants' Deputies, elected by the Peasants' Congress, did consider the appeal and decided that it did not contain the demands passed on to the Government by the Ukrainian Central Rada which had also been supported by the First All-Ukrainian Peasants' Congress. Furthermore, it decided that the peasantry of the Ukraine were to continue organizational work, and, uniting around the Ukrainian Central Rada, create, under her leadership, "a free autonomous life in the Ukraine together with the entire toiling people of the national minorities of the Ukrainian land."

The Peasants' Rada would consider attempts on the part of the Provisional Government as sincere only after the Provisional Government recognized the Ukrainian Central Rada as the lawful agent (*zastupnytsya*) for the interests, and as the expression of the will of the Ukrainian toiling nation, and would enter into co-operation with her.¹¹

Thus we see the strange attempt of the Provisional Government end in well-deserved failure, in regard to the Ukrainian peasantry. The Ukrainian Central Rada was at this time engaged in conversations with the representatives of minorities, or nations, living in the Ukraine at that time. Practically, such conversations concerned coming to an agreement with the Jewish nation, and also with Russians and Poles, in so far as other minorities were not numerous nor well-organized.

Again, the Polish minority, although amounting to perhaps as much as 8% of the population, had most of its population scattered in the west of the country, and was utterly divided in opinion. The Jewish nation, or the Jewish minority, was moving to the Ukrainian side, in so far as the Ukrainians were ready to grant Jewish desires on general democratic principles. In fact, the Ukrainian claim and the Jewish claim rested on essentially the same philosophical basis. The one fear of the Jews at the time, however, was to be divided from their compatriots in Russia. The Russian minority, as may be seen in the resolutions of Russian parties in the Ukraine, saw great dangers in "bourgeois republics." Under the circumstances then, the policy of the Jews to the Ukrainian Central Rada was of paramount importance, in so far as the Russian minority needed the support of other minorities if their resistance to the Rada was to be sufficient.

Rada was having discussions with minorities.

The main objective of the negotiations with the minorities was the attempt of the Rada to become the representative of the Ukrainian nation, as before, and at the same time, through the admission of the representatives of other nations into the Rada on general principles, to become a representative body in the fullest sense.

It is remarkable indeed that the Ukrainian democracy moved in this direction. Rather than proclaiming the assimilatory doctrine in the way of Russia and Poland, with some catchy slogan of the type "majority rules", the Ukrainian democracy was ready to concede, and in fact, was encouraging the development of national thought of non-Ukrainian groups. It was through the evolving co-operation of Ukrainians and Jews that the agreement was closed. On July 12, the South-Western Committee of the Jewish Social-Democratic Party passed a resolution which was quite favourable to the

Ukrainian position, though it did not quite overlap with the Ukrainian views.¹² Finally, the territorial principle of the Ukrainian Central Rada was agreed on, the only division of opinion being the demand of the nationalities for 50% of the seats, while the Rada was willing to grant 30%.

In the meantime, the Provisional Government, on having its bluff called, sent a Delegation to Kiev to come to an agreement with "the Ukrainian democracy". Kerenski, Tsereteli, and Tereschenko were sent. The Delegation had a common meeting with the Secretariat and the Presidium of the Rada on July 12. Later, there took place a meeting of the Delegation with the Executive Committee of Civic Organizations and Councils of Workers' and of Soldiers' Deputies. Next day, July 13th, agreement was finally reached in a common meeting of the Delegation, the Secretariat and the Presidium. The agreement included the publication of two parallel documents, the Second Universal on behalf of the Rada, and the Proclamation (Postanovlenie) on behalf of the Provisional Government. It was facilitated by the already existing general understanding with the national minorities. On July 15th, the Government of Prince Lvov fell over the agreement with the Rada. A new government was formed by Kerenski on the basis of the agreement; the Constitutional Democrats were not included. The Rada published the Second Universal.

Citizens of the Ukrainian Land!.. The Provisional Government... extends its hand to the representatives of the Ukrainian democracy — the Central Rada — and appeals in the agreement with it to the creation of a new life of the Ukraine for the good of the entire revolutionary Russia. We, the Central Rada, which has ever stood for non-separation of the Ukraine from Russia, so that, we may proceed together with all her nations towards the development and welfare of the entirety of Russia and to the union of her

democratic forces, receive the appeal of the Government to unite and inform all the citizens of the Ukraine: The Ukrainian Central Rada, elected by the Ukrainian people through their revolutionary organizations, will shortly be completed upon an equitable basis by the representatives of other nations living in the Ukraine elected from their revolutionary democracy of the Ukraine which would represent the interests of the entire population of our land.

The Rada further declared that the enlarged Central Rada would produce from its membership a separate body, responsible to her — the General Secretariat, which would be presented for recognition (*zatverdzhennya*) by the Provisional Government, as the bearer of the highest land authority (*vlada*) of the Provisional Government in the Ukraine.

Moving towards the autonomous constitution in the Ukraine, the Central Rada, in agreement with the national minorities of the Ukraine, will prepare drafts of the laws of the autonomous constitution of the Ukraine in order to submit them for approval to the Constituent Assembly... In regard to the formation of the Ukrainian armed groups, the Central Rada will have her representatives at the Cabinet of the War Minister, at the General Headquarters, and Highest Commander-in-Chief who shall take part in the matter of the formation of separate groups exclusively of Ukrainians, in so far as such formation, in the opinion of the War Minister, would be possible from the technical side without endangering (*narushuvaty*) the preparedness of the army...¹³

The phraseology of the Universal had been purposely kept limited. Thus the Universal, proclaimed on July 18, contained the assurance that the Rada was “decidedly against the attempts of the wilful realization of autonomy.” In return for it, though, the Rada persisted in the basic claim to be the governing body of the Ukraine.

The Ukrainian Government was proclaimed as being part of the Ukrainian Rada. The Universal was published in the Ukrainian, Jewish, Russian, and Polish languages.

The Proclamation (Postanovlenie) of the Provisional Government was published on the same date. It was also published in four languages and stated that "having listened to the Ministers Kerenski, Tereschenko and Tsereteli on the Ukrainian matter," the Provisional Government had decided to appoint as the higher body for the direction of "land affairs" in the Ukraine, a separate body to be called the General Secretariat. Its membership would be determined by the Government in agreement with the Central Ukrainian Rada, and enlarged upon an equitable basis by representatives of other nations living in the Ukraine through the agency of their democratic organizations. All business connected with the life of the land and its government would be undertaken by this body. "Considering that the problem of the national-political constitution of the Ukraine... must be determined by the Constituent Assembly", the proclamation stated, the Provisional Government shall show a sympathetic attitude to the preparation by the Central Rada of a draft of the national-political state of the Ukraine along those lines which the Rada herself shall think most in the interests of the land... for presentation... to the Constituent Assembly." It was, then essentially through the Universal and the Proclamation that there was created in the land a body responsible primarily to the Rada, the members of which had virtually unlimited jurisdiction ("all business connected with life of the land and its government") qualified only by reference to the Constituent Assembly yet to be held. The relationship of this body, the government of the Ukraine, to the Ukraine, to the Provisional Government, had been defined by the Rada in the Universal approved also by the Provisional Government, as a matter of "recognition (zatverdzenyya)", or investment with powers,

by the Provisional Government. Furthermore, according to the Universal, the "recognition" was not absolutely necessary in so far as the existence of the secretariat was concerned, but was the means by which the Secretariat was to become also the agent of the Provisional Government: the Secretariat would in all events remain possessed of power as the executive body of the Rada. According to the Proclamation, the Secretariat as the agent of the Provisional Government, was to be the joint creation of the Rada and the Provisional Government. The procedure by which this was to be effected was not defined, and since the Secretariat which was already in existence and with which the Delegation had made the agreement was a body of the Central Rada, and since the whole point of the agreement was that a *modus vivendi* of the Provisional Government and the Rada be developed, it would appear that the Provisional Government intended to see the existing procedure maintained, and that the statement to that effect found in the Universal was acceptable to it.

This is also the interpretation of the documents by Baron Nolde, professor of constitutional (state) law in Petrograd University.

What then is the new Ukrainian state power?.. At the head of the land, there has been put, by agreement, the "Central Ukrainian Rada"... The Rada creates from within itself a "General Secretariat" responsible to it which would be recognized (approved) by the Provisional Government and which would be considered "the representative (the bearer) of the highest land power of the Provisional Government". The Declaration attempts to obscure the meaning of the organization... but however much the meaning of the agreement was to be masked... it is quite clear that the power had been transferred to the Rada and her body the Secretariat, while for the Russian Government, there was kept only "*nudum jus*" of recognition of that

Secretariat and the fiction that the Secretariat represents in the Ukraine the "power of the Provisional Government." In regard to the extent of the Secretariat's power..., the agreement... simply recognized that Rada and her Secretariat shall govern in the Ukraine as they see fit... What juridical argument would the Provisional Government put up against the Ukrainian government when the latter, on the basis of the agreement, should demand the transfer of the mail, telegraph or taxation?.. This is the meaning of the "agreement." The division of powers between Russia and the Ukraine was made on the completely unheard of principles of full liquidation of the powers (povnovlastiya) of Russia.¹⁵

The news of the crisis was received with great anxiety in France. Clemenceau's paper, L'HOMME ENCHAÎNE, stated; "The Ukrainians or Little Russians who, despite their name, talk a different language from the Russian one, demand their autonomy." VICTOIRE felt that the news from the Ukraine was very serious, LE RAPPEL saw that there was the danger that Russia might give place to Russia.¹⁶

The Ukrainian autonomy could no longer be ignored, and Noulens sent Pélissier to Kiev with the words, "Go see whether there's anything..." On his return, Pélissier gave a report to Noulens, in which he stated that the hour was near when the Central Rada would have all the power in the land. Noulens would not attach importance to the report, and was strengthened in his opinion by General Niessel, the head of the French military mission, whose belief it was that the Ukrainian national movement did not exist.¹⁷ The autonomous movement was also suspected, in the Russian tradition, of Germanophilism, although Pélissier in several articles protested against such interpretation. The Germans meanwhile continued in their ambivalent Polish-Ukrainian policy.

The Ukrainian Central Rada, on the basis of the agreement, offered 30% of the seats in the Rada to the Jews, Russians, and Poles in the Ukraine. The Jews had received 50 seats in the Central Rada and 5 seats in the Small Rada, the main Committee of the Rada which was continuously in session. These seats were divided among the Jewish parties. The Russians and Poles were allowed their representatives too. Among the Russians, the Social-Democrats, the Socialists-Revolutionaries, the Constitutional Democrats and even the Bolsheviks were represented in the Rada. The Constitutional Democrats remained in the Rada until October 12th only, while the Bolsheviks lasted on, without taking any active role, until the Bolshevik take-over in Petrograd.¹⁹

In connection with the transformation of the Ukrainian Central Rada into the governing territorial body, there took place a reformation of the Government. The Controller-General was Rafes, the Jewish Bund candidate. The Secretary-General of Mail and Telegraph was Zarubin, from the Russian Socialists-Revolutionaries. The candidates for the secretary of Labour and the Trade and Industry department were to be named by the national minorities.¹⁹

Three Vice-Secretaries were named to the Secretary-General of National Affairs, Shulhyn. The representative of the United Jewish Socialist Party, Dr. Silberfarb, was appointed Vice-Secretary in Jewish National Affairs;²⁰ in agreement with the Jewish socialist parties. M. Mickiewicz, the son of the great father, took the corresponding Polish position, while Odinets took the Russian one.²¹ Each of the Vice-Secretaries was supported by the National Council of the nation involved. Thus, Mickiewicz reported to the Polish Central Council, which consisted of four Pilsudcziki, seven PPS-left, and nine of the Democratic Centre, (again a Pilsudski formation). Neither the National Democrats, nor the Social Democratic Party of the Kingdom of Poland and Lithua-

nia (Communists) were represented.²² However, at crucial points, the power of the Polish Executive Committee, the National Democrat formation was heeded by the Rada.

The last move to consolidate the Rada was the First All-Ukrainian Workers' Congress called for the 24th of July. The late date at which the Congress was called suggests the small number of the industrial workers in the Ukraine when compared to the all-pervading peasant sea. The Congress was called by the Ukrainian fraction of the Kiev Council of Workers' Deputies. Representatives of all Ukrainian workers' organizations were invited, as well as representatives of the Ukrainian fractions of the general workingmans' institutions. There was a total of about 300 deputies evenly divided between the S. D. and the S. R. There do not seem to have been any Bolsheviks. In the matter of the constitution of the land the Congress demanded that "All Ukrainian workingmen (robotnytstvo) support with all their power, and all their energy the Ukrainian Central Rada as well as the General Secretariat as organs of the revolutionary powers in the Ukraine which base themselves upon the power of the entire revolutionary democracy — upon the workingmen, peasantry and the army... The Representatives of the Ukrainian proletariat in the Ukrainian Central Rada... represent in agreement with the entire revolutionary democracy — Ukrainian and non-Ukrainian — an independent class position".²³ At the conclusion of their sitting, the Congress elected the All-Ukrainian Rada of Workers' Deputies consisting of 70 Social-Democrats, 30 Socialists-Revolutionaries, and no Bolsheviks. The Rada would enter into the Central Rada.

In such fashion the constitution of the Ukrainian Central Rada reflected the national and social make-up of the population. The total number of representatives in the Ukrainian Central Rada was 822. About a quarter of them (212) were within the All-Ukrainian Rada of

the Peasants' Deputies. The all-Ukrainian Rada of Soldiers' Deputies accounted for the 100 seats. The Representatives of non-Ukrainian Councils of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies accounted for another 50. It is noteworthy that there was no non-Ukrainian body of peasants' deputies. Ukrainian Socialists parties held, on their own account (in addition to those held among other social groups) 20 seats. The Russian Socialists accounted for 40, the Jewish socialist parties for 35, and Polish Socialists for 15. The representatives of cities and provinces elected at peasant, labour and all-national congresses had 84 seats. The representatives of professional, educational, economic, and civic organizations, and the minor national parties, Moldavians, Germans, Tatars, Belorussians and others, held the remaining 105 seats.²⁴ Thus the stage was set for the discussion of the border.

The Ukrainian Central Rada was thus a representative body of the entire population of the Ukraine. It was formed through the consolidation of differing institutions and parties, the only way really possible under the circumstances of the revolution. This way still gave the Rada a much more solid and wide basis than any other institution in the former Russian Empire, whether the Provisional Government, the Petrograd Council of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, with the possible exception of the Finnish Sejm; the Polish regime too, had a much more narrow base.

In the middle of August, the Provisional Government issued a "Provisional Instruction" for the General Secretariat. It was attempted to limit the powers of the Secretariat to the Kiev, Volhynia, Podillia, Poltava and Chernyhiv provinces. The border was to run east of Kholm and River Zbruch. Only nine instead of fourteen Secretaries-General were provided. The Secretariat decided to virtually ignore the "instruction" but to offer only nine secretaries for the "recognition" of the

Provisional Government. Otherwise, the nation exerted herself in an organized struggle for the interests, and for union around the Ukrainian Central Rada. A new Secretariat was formed by the same Vynnychenko on September 3, approved by the Ukrainian Central Rada, and recognized by the Provisional Government on September 14, 1917. The uneasy truce lasted into October. In October, the Russian Senate refused to publish the Temporary Instruction. The impasse was deepened and just before the Bolshevik coup, the Provisional Government summoned some members of the Secretariat to Petrograd for "personal explanations," without any action taken.

2. POLISH POLITICS IN SUMMER 1917 AND THE BORDER

With the imprisonment of Pilsudski, it seemed that the Germans were ready to move in to destroy whatever autonomy the Kingdom of Poland had been able to obtain. However, that did not happen. It seems that the old division of opinion among the ruling Germans may have prevented that; it may be that the Germans feared that excessive repression might come to destroy the influence of the pro-German Poles. The conservative element among the Poles still remained with the Germans. The Russian Provisional Government "re-joined" the Province of Kholm²⁹ to the Kingdom of Poland, supporting the Polish border claim.

The Council of State was not able to withstand the pressure of the Polish public opinion and resigned on August 25. However, the council appointed a Provisional Commission to take care of departments. The Governor-General accepted the resignation.

The Central Powers moved now towards an acceptance of the ethnographic determination of Poland's borders. This was to be noticed, in particular, in the

northern part of the Eastern border. In the non-Polish territories, the Highest Military Command East introduced German administration, from which the Poles were kept out.

Nevertheless, on September 12th, 1917, the German and Austrian Emperors' Patent finally created a Polish state, with the grant of a constitution. The Patent stated in the first paragraph that the highest power in the Polish Kingdom, before its embracing by the King or the Regent, was being given to the Regency Council with the provision for guarantee of the status of the occupant powers according to international law, (unter Wahrung der voelkerrechtlichen Stellung der Okkupationsmaechte). In the fifth paragraph, the international representation of the Kingdom of Poland and the right to the conclusion of international conventions might be exercised by the Polish state power only after the conclusion of the occupation.⁷⁷ In view of Lloyd-George, this date marks the recognition by Central Powers of "Poland's independence of Russia."⁷⁸

The transfer of power into Polish hands continued at an accelerated speed. At the end of September, the University and the Poly-technical School of Warsaw were placed under the head of the department of public instruction and religion of the Kingdom of Poland. A few days later, the entire administration of the primary, secondary, and higher learning in both the Governments-General passed into the hands of the Temporary Commission of the Council of State.

The Council of State, before resignation, had suggested candidates for the Regency Council. These candidates were accepted and proclaimed by the Emperors on October 15. They were Kakowski, archbishop of Warsaw, Prince Lubomirski, the President of the Polish capital, and a landowner, Ostrowski. On October 27, the Council was invested with power by the Governors-General.

This development in Poland followed further exchange of opinion between the Austrians and Germans. Czernin had written to the German Government that Austria was ready to give up Galicia to Poland, and also to give Poland full independence of Austria, if the Germans would offer to give up Alsace-Lorraine in whole or in part. Michaelis, who had succeeded Bethmann-Hollweg as the Chancellor, would not hear of such possibility. Czernin's suggestion on Poland, he wrote, was unacceptable, in so far he would describe "the giving up of a strip of the Alsace-Lorraine territory to France is out of the question."²⁹ Poland's development to an independent state would have to continue on the basis of the Proclamation of November 5. It would remain to be seen whether Germany would gain any real advantage from the arrangement. Michaelis concluded by saying that, politically, it might be best to allow independence to Poland, with the take-over of the "border regions" "which would be necessary for military border security." The rest of Poland might be given full self-determination, also with the possibility of the union of Poland with Russia. This then was the policy of the new, more autocratic Germany.

The co-operation of the National Democrats with the French continued, and attempts at co-operation with Russians were tried. The future was seen in terms of a Polish-Russian co-operation. Dmowski in a memorandum of July 1917, an expansion of the earlier Dmowski memorandum to Balfour, printed as a pamphlet, foresaw the division of the non-Russian territories of the European part of the former Russian Empire between Moscow and Warsaw. The surprising thing about all this was the date for by July, the Ukrainian Central Rada had successfully rivalled the Provisional Government in the Ukraine. Nevertheless Dmowski saw that "there remained the problem of the border between Russia and Poland. The solution of the border problem, just and

satisfying to both nations, could not be reached either on the basis of history, or upon the pretensions of Russian nationalists. A significant part of the historical Poland would have to remain beyond the borders of the Polish state, which, however, must contain those provinces where the Western (Polish) civilization had left deep roots, and where the proportion of the Poles is rather important. The Polish state would embrace (on these principles) the land to the south of the eastern tip of Galicia, that is Volhynia.³⁰ It is clear that what was involved in Dmowski's memorandum was an attempt to solve the problem by partitioning the Ukrainian lands.

In mid-August there was formed at Lausanne a new Polish National Committee which elected Dmowski to its head and which took its seat in Paris. This new Polish National Committee consisted of Dmowski, Piltz, Count Zamoyski, Seyda, Rozwadowski and Paderewski; it undertook to organize and represent Polish politics in the lands of the Entente, as well as to take the leadership in the political affairs of the Polish Army in France.³¹ The French government gave a recognition of sorts to the Committee by addressing to it a letter in which the Committee was described as the one which must prepare the organization of future sovereign and independent Polish State.³² The Committee was recognized as the "legal Polish body" by the Government of France on December 20, a few days after the proclamation of the provisional constitution of the Kingdom of Poland. Great Britain followed suit on October 15, Italy two weeks later. The United States of America did not recognize the Committee until after the Bolshevik coup-d'état.

3. FALL OF RUSSIAN PRETENSIONS IN UKRAINE AND POLAND

In October 1917, the Ukrainian parties felt themselves to be strong enough to raise the question of the

calling of the sovereign Ukrainian Constituent Assembly. They had the support of all Jewish parties (except for the Bund), and active resistance on the part of the Russian Social Democrats and Russian Socialists-Revolutionaries.³³ Balabanov on behalf of the Socialists-Revolutionaries declared: "We shall fight against any separatist tendencies. Let the Ukrainians not overestimate their forces." Rafes on behalf of the Bund considered the break with the Russian Constituent Assembly a "counter-revolutionary action which must be fought." However, public opinion in the Ukraine was moving fast in the direction of independence. The Central Rada, on sending representatives to the Democratic Conference called by the Russian Government submitted an outline of its policy which included the demands that the right of all nations to self-determination without limitation be recognized, and that a consistent revolutionary government responsible "to the democracy of all nations of Russia" be formed. Most important of all, however, the Rada demanded "the transfer of all powers in the Ukraine into the hands of the Ukrainian Central Rada and its General Secretariats" in late September.³⁴

The Third All-Ukrainian Army Congress came together on November 2. It consisted of some 3,000 delegates from the front, rear and fleet units, representing over 3,000,000 of the Ukrainian soldiery. The Congress was divided according to political parties: two-thirds were Ukrainian-Revolutionaries. The rest were Ukrainian Social-Democrats, Ukrainian Independent-Socialists and non-party men. Hrushewski, the head of the Ukrainian Central Rada was elected the Honorary Head of Congress. Vynnychenko, the head of the Secretariat, announced at the Congress that the Secretariat would not engage in any conversations with the Russian government in regard to the calling of the Ukrainian Constituent Assembly.

It was during the debates of the Army Congress that the Central Committee of the left-wing of the Russian Social Democratic Workers' Party, the Bolsheviks, undertook a series of flying attacks within Petrograd, took government buildings, and proclaimed themselves the government. The Russian Empire was finally dissolving into anarchy. The Russian "democracy," had failed "in the honeymoon of the Revolution" to come to terms with other peoples of the Russian Empire — first and foremost, with the Ukrainians and Poles, the war was being lost and it was natural that, as the governmental structure dissolved, the more adventure-some elements should proclaim power.

The influence, however, of the "socialist" formation which was now making itself the head of the Russian Empire through terrorism was not of too great importance in the development of the arising states of Ukraine and Poland, for, as we have seen, these countries had been developing largely independently of Russian policy. The events in Petrograd served at the utmost as the background against which the independence movement in the Ukraine worked itself out to its natural conclusion in the Ukrainian National Republic, while the Polish development was even more independent.

On the evening of the day of the Bolshevik proclamation of assumption of power, November 7, the Rada held a meeting at which it decided to form the Land Committee for the Defence of the Revolution. Under the Committee there were associated with the Rada's representatives, representatives of other organizations.

The Committee included eight representatives of Ukrainian parties, four others from Ukrainian organizations, three representatives from Poale-Zion, the United Jewish Socialist Party and the Bund, one Russian S.R., and one Russian Bolshevik, who left very shortly. In its appeal on the next day, the Committee announced that its power extended over the entire Ukraine, that

is, over the Kiev, Podillia, Volhynia, Poltava, Kharkiv, Kherson, Katerinoslav and Tauria provinces.³⁵ This border thus excluded the Kholm province.

The Rada took a frankly negative position to the Bolshevik take-over, through a formal resolution in which the "uprising" was condemned.³⁶ Nor would Rada suffer any other authority. The Headquarters of the Kiev Military Section of the Russian army, in co-operation with the Commissar of the Provisional Government, Kirienko, attempted to exercise power by moving against the Bolshevik group in Kiev. The Revolutionary Committee resented the one-sided exercise of power, and pronounced the Headquarters dissolved. Bolsheviks, on the other hand, were too weak to present any serious danger. They were disarmed and dispersed by Rada, however.³⁷ The Rada was now faced with the Russian claimants to power through the Kiev Military Section and the Commissar of the Provisional Government. There were battles on November 11 and November 12 between the forces of the Rada and the forces of the Russian government. The Ukrainian Central Rada and the General Secretariat remained victors in the struggle. The Russian forces were allowed to withdraw from the City.

When order was restored in the City, with Russian forces beaten, and Bolsheviks dispersed, the Third All-Ukrainian Army Congress resumed meetings. Through a resolution it demanded: "For the struggle with anarchy which threatens the Ukraine, the Third All-Ukrainian Army Congress demands from the Central Rada and the General Secretariat that they, basing themselves upon the revolutionary Ukrainian army, take full authority in the entire territory of the Ukraine into their hands." In regard to the Petrograd coup, the Congress resolved that a struggle must be made against the demands of the Bolsheviks "to pass power in the Ukraine to the Soviets (Councils)." As the only true

representative of the "revolutionary democracy" in the Ukraine, there was recognized the Central Rada. The Congress furthermore demanded the immediate proclamation of the "Ukrainian democratic republic" in the ethnographic borders of the Ukraine.³⁸

The Ukrainian Central Rada shortly decided to extend its power to the Province of Kholm. In this she was basing herself, on the one hand on the principle of nationality, and on the other hand on the attitude of the Kholm Executive Rada. The Head of the Kholm Executive Rada appealed to the Third Army Congress for help against the Poles. "The delicate Polish hand can do more harm in the matter of weakening the Ukrainian movement than the Russian paw," he added.³⁹

On November 20, the Ukrainian Central Rada issued the Third Universal proclaiming the Ukrainian National Republic.

Ukrainian Nation and all Nations of the Ukraine! A dark and heavy hour has fallen upon the land of the Russian Republic... There is no central Government, and anarchy, lawlessness, ruin is spreading in the State... We, the Ukrainian Central Rada, by your will, in the name of the creation of law and order in our land, in the name of the salvation of the entire Russia, proclaim:

From now on the Ukraine becomes the Ukrainian National Republic. Without separating from the Russian Republic and keeping its unity, we shall stand firmly upon our land to aid by our forces the entire Russia, that the Russian Republic become a federation of equal and free nations. Under the Constituent Assembly of the Ukraine, all power to govern in our lands, to issue laws and to rule, belongs to us — the Ukrainian Central Rada and to our Government — the General Secretariat of the Ukraine... We shall take care that the rights of the Ukrainian people in Russia and outside Russia be not attainted in the peace-making at the peace congress. But until the peace should arrive, every citizen of the Republic of the Ukraine, together with citizens

of all nations of the Russian Republic must stand firmly on the front-line as well as in the rear...

The Ukrainian nation... will firmly defend the freedom of the national development of all nationalities in the Ukraine: we therefore proclaim to the nations, Russian, Jewish, Polish, and others in the Ukraine that we recognize the principle of national-personal autonomy and assure to them the right and freedom of self-government in the matters of national life, and we empower the General Secretariat of National Affairs to present to us in the nearest time a bill on national personal autonomy... The day of elections to the Ukrainian Constituent Assembly has been appointed...¹⁰

The Universal also determined the territorial limits of the Ukrainian National Republic. In the Ukraine west of the Dnipro, there was the Kiev province, Podillia and Volhynia. Further extension of the border westwards was provided for by stating that the matter of the addition to the Ukrainians of parts of the Kholm provinces and districts where the majority of the population was Ukrainian would be decided on "according to the organized will of the nationalities."

In the Third Universal, the Ukrainian National Republic also refused to recognise the "Soviet of People's Commissars", headed by Lenin. The Bolshevik establishment of power and the consequent civil strife, was rightly described as the spread of "anarchy, lawlessness, destruction (ruina) in the land." And, despite the words in regard to the desire to maintain the federal unity of the State, which were probably primarily directed at the Allies and the minorities, as well as at the more conservative element in the Ukraine, virtual independence was proclaimed. The supreme power was proclaimed to reside in the Constituent Assembly of the Ukraine, without any reference to the Russian Assembly.

In the proclamation of the national personal self-government, the Ukrainian National Republic began in fact a new experiment in constitutional history. The Third Universal primarily the expression of the will of the Ukrainian population of the Ukraine, was to find a favourable reception on the part of the minority nationalities. It was warmly welcomed by the Jewish nationality in the Ukraine. NAIE TSEIT the newspaper of the United Jewish Socialist Party, wrote: "The Ukrainian National Republic was proclaimed by, and for ALL the population of the Ukraine, Jewish, as well as the Ukrainian, Russian and Polish... Long live the free Ukraine, the first member of the federative All-Russian republic." The representative of the Bund, Zolotarev, stated in the Small Rada: "When we see that the freed Ukrainian nation gives freedom to our people too, we take part of the responsibility upon ourselves for this act and sign the Universal with all our heart."⁴ The Jewish parties expressed, however, some reservations in regard to the virtual proclamation of the independence of the Ukraine.

The Jewish political groups were attracted to the Rada by her conscious effect to give equal rights to all national groups in the Ukraine. Thus the Vice-Secretariat on Jewish Affairs was transformed into a full Secretariat, and thus the Secretary of Jewish Affairs, Dr. Silberfarb, took direct part in the governing of the country through the resulting membership in the Government, rather than through Shulhyn, the Secretary of Nationalities' Affairs, as earlier. On the other hand, the energetic way the government undertook the struggle against anti-semitism which threatened to harm national co-operation, could not but endear the government to the Jewish people.

In October, Shulhyn, the Secretary of Nationalities' Affairs, published an appeal. "There are to be noticed attempts at organization of anti-Jewish pogroms and

robbery of Jewish wealth. Criminal agitators... attempt to create the feelings of national enmity. All conscientious Ukrainians should with all their energy help the General Secretariat and the local administration in their struggle against this curse, which we have inherited from the Tsarist regime.”¹² About the same time, Vynnychenko, the Secretary for Internal Affairs, sent a circular to the Commissars of the U.N.R. “Dark elements are leading pogrom agitation,” he stated. The circular ordered the local government to undertake decisive measures against the pogrom agitation and lawlessness and to send an armed guard, if necessary.¹³ Finally, the Secretary for Military Affairs, Simon Petlura, published a declaration to the soldiers in regard to pogrom-mongering: “Do not allow pogroms and disorders, for if you should allow them, you would cover with shame the bright name of the Ukrainian army. No pogrom should take place on our soil.”¹⁴

As with other nations or national groups, the Ukrainian Jews had their political centre in the Secretariat of Jewish Affairs. The political centre of the Ukrainian Jews on the community, or, should we say, nationality level, was the NATSIONALRAT (National Council). The Natsionalrat was formed through association of Jewish parties. It had both legislative and executive function. The co-operation between the Central Government (Rada and the General Secretariat) and the Jewish national Government (Natsionalrat) was affected through the Secretary for the Jewish Affairs. The Secretary of the Jewish Affairs was to hold the confidence of the Natsionalrat at all times on parliamentary principles. The Natsionalrat expressed high confidence in the ability and the will of the Rada to keep the Jewish people safe from the excesses of war and revolution. The Natsionalrat published a Declaration to the Jews in regard to these matters in mid-October.

In the Ukraine the state is stable and firm. And it is this state which attempts here with all its forces to guarantee and assure order and peace for all the nationalities inhabiting the Ukraine. The General Secretariat had firmly decided not to allow any lawlessness... Do not lose courage, citizens Jews."⁴⁵

The trust the Jewish people bore to the Ukrainian Rada is seen to have been very great.

A different situation arose with the attitude of the Polish component of the population of the Ukraine to the Universal. The Third Universal drew the Ukrainian-Polish border (if there was to be a Poland), as the line probably cutting the Kholm province. On the other hand, the Third Universal authorized a wide-reaching agrarian reform. The Poles considered the reform to be very prejudicial to the interests of the Polish minority; due to historical circumstances much of the landed nobility of Ukraine was Polish.

The Polish people were organized in a manner analogous to that of the Jewish people, although the two main political groups, the National Democrats and the Polish Socialist Party had never come to form effective cooperation. The Polish Central Council, an institution parallel to the Natsionalrat, dominated by PPS, took a violently negative attitude. The Council was strongly supported by the Polish Executive Committee of the National Democrat orientation. The Vice-Secretary for Polish Affairs, who was to hold the confidence of the Council was directed to resign by the Council. After an impasse of several days, the Government ceded to the demands of the Council and of the Committee. The agrarian law was to be modified and its execution postponed. At the same time, the status of Mickiewicz as Vice-Secretary was raised to that of the Secretary for Polish Affairs. The Secretariat had in its jurisdiction now education and welfare. It controlled approximately

one thousand schools.⁴⁶ Thus we find that the Third Universal was at least passively accepted by the Polish minority, although it prejudged the question of the border and affected Polish property rights.

When the Universal proclaiming the Ukrainian National Republic was presented for approval to the Small Rada, not a single negative vote was cast. All Ukrainian and all Jewish representatives voted for the Universal. The Russian S.R. and S.D. representatives abstained.⁴⁷ There was much less unanimity in regard to the problem of the separate peace, that was brought up at the same time. In the Rada, only Ukrainian parties voted for it; all Jewish and both Russian parties voted against it.

The Entente powers, seeing the utter disintegration of any power in Russia, were reconciling themselves to the rise of the Ukraine, which was still maintaining its front, while the northern front which was dissolving. The French paper, *LE TEMPS*, wrote on the occasion of the Universal: "It is natural that the autonomy of the Ukraine be transformed into independence. Since the Great Russia has abdicated, the Little Russia becomes again the state. She could even become a powerful state."⁴⁸ The Entente generals of the military missions in Petrograd were invited to stay in Kiev, and, as a consequence, General Lavergne for France, Baxter for the British Empire, Romelli for Italy and Tagainaki for Japan came to stay there. Shortly afterwards, a French military mission under the leadership of General Tabouis began to function in Kiev. It was in contact with the French Ambassador at Jassy, Rumania. Pélissier too, came to Kiev.

D'Aux and Pélissier, members of the French Mission, have commented on the importance of the Ukrainian independence movement in the circumstances of the day.⁴⁹ Pélissier wrote: "Through breaking the unity of the Russian Revolution and so preventing the Bolsheviks

from occupying, in the month of November 1917 the rich wheat fields of South Russia, the Ukrainians, and in particular Petlura, may have saved European civilization."⁵⁰ The Ukrainian National Republic, the heir of the former Russian Empire, with Russia proper in chaos, and treating with the enemy, continued with Rumania the struggle against the Central Powers on the Eastern front in cooperation with her Allies. This augured well for the future.

The Polish situation, however, remained rather indefinite. The Polish National Committee refused, in mid-November, to recognize the Regency Council. Its letter to Sapieha, the representative of the Regency Council stated that the Regency Council lacked the character of supreme power and therefore could not be recognized as such.⁵¹ On the other hand, the Polish National Committee, recognized by the Allies, formulated as a war goal for the Peace Conference, the formation of a strong Poland,⁵² and the rebuilding of an independent Polish state embracing all Polish lands. That Polish state, it stated, must have a sufficient area and a considerable population so it could become an effective factor in the European balance of power. Thus the Polish lands were to include Galicia.

The Provisional Government had done very little about Poland. At the end of September, it confirmed its "unshakeable determination" to carry into effect its principles regarding a Polish state. The principle of the state to be formed out of all lands containing a Polish majority of the population was maintained. However, the Provisional Government suggested to the Allied Powers the publication of a special act sanctioning the fundamental principles laid down in respect to Poland by the Manifesto of March 29.⁵³ At this late date, such a suggestion constituted an attempt to turn the clock back. The Council of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies of Petrograd maintained its earlier policy. On October 20,

it issued instructions to the Executive Committee in regard to the Polish problem largely mirroring the earlier declaration of the Council: after the German evacuation of Poland, full self-determination was to be granted.⁵⁴ These declarations were issued in the face of ever-rising "anarchy, lawlessness, destruction in the land." Russian democracy was floundering. Having failed to come to workable arrangements with the formerly subject nations, first and foremost Ukrainians and Poles. Kiev, and more distantly, Warsaw, instead of becoming a source of strength became a source of weakness. And so, on November 7, 1917, the Russian State, the Provisional Government and the Executive Committee of the Council of Workers' and Peasants' Deputies were destroyed by the Bolshevik power and terrorism. The Polish-Ukrainian border, and the states of the Ukraine and of Poland, were no longer to be influenced in any decisive fashion by the Russian "revolutionary democracy."

NOTES

- 1) Khrystiuk, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 82
- 2) *Ibid*, p. 83.
- 3) *Ibid*, p. 84
- 4) Borschak, E., "La paix ukrainienne de Brest-Litovsk", in *Le Monde Slave*, Sixth Year, Paris, 1929, Vol. II, p. 43.
- 5) *Ibid*, p. 50.
- 6) *Ibid*, p. 50.
- 7) *Ibid*, p. 49.
- 8) Milyukov, Paul N., *Istoriya vtoroy russkoy revolyutsii*, 2 Vols., Sofia, 1921, Vol II, p. 89.
- 9) Borschak, *op. cit.*, pp. 40 - 1.
- 10) Khrystiuk, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 90.
- 11) *Ibid*, Vol. I, p. 91.
- 12) *Ibid*, Vol. I, pp. 86 - 7.
- 13) Doroshenko, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, pp. 115 - 6; also Khrystiuk, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, pp. 92 - 3.

- ¹⁴⁾ Doroshenko, **op. cit.**, Vol. I, p. 114; also Khrystiuk, **op. cit.**, Vol. I, pp. 93 - 4
- ¹⁵⁾ Khrystiuk, **op. cit.**, Vol. I, pp. 97 - 8.
- ¹⁶⁾ Borschak, **op. cit.**, p. 51.
- ¹⁷⁾ **Ibid**, p. 53.
- ¹⁸⁾ Khrystiuk, **op. cit.**, Vol. I, p. 95 - 6.
- ¹⁹⁾ Tcherikover, **op. cit.**, p. 66.
- ²⁰⁾ **Ibid**, p. 67.
- ²¹⁾ Khrystiuk, **op. cit.**, Vol. I, p. 136.
- ²²⁾ Jablonski, **op. cit.**, pp. 152 - 153.
- ²³⁾ Khrystiuk, **op. cit.**, Vol. I, p. 104.
- ²⁴⁾ **Ibid**, Vol. I, p. 104.
- ²⁵⁾ **Ibid**, Vol. I, pp. 114 - 5.
- ²⁶⁾ Filasiewicz, **op. cit.**, p. 205.
- ²⁷⁾ Kumaniecki, **op. cit.**, p. 87 - 88; also Roth, **op. cit.** p. 130.
- ²⁸⁾ Lloyd George, D., **War Memoirs**, 6 Vols., London, 1934 - 1936, Vol. VI, p. 3155.
- ²⁹⁾ Czernin, **op. cit.**, p. 217.
- ³⁰⁾ Komarnicki, **op. cit.**, p. 178.
- ³¹⁾ Dmowski, R., **Polityka polska i odbudowa Państwa**, Warsaw, 1926, p. 338.
- ³²⁾ Roth, **op. cit.**, p. 131.
- ³³⁾ Tcherikover, **op. cit.**, p. 68.
- ³⁴⁾ Khrystiuk, **op. cit.**, Vol. II, p. 29.
- ³⁵⁾ **Ibid**, p. 44.
- ³⁶⁾ **Ibid**, p. 44.
- ³⁷⁾ Doroshenko, **op. cit.**, Vol. I, pp. 169 - 172.
- ³⁸⁾ Khrystiuk, **op. cit.**, Vol. II, p. 48.
- ³⁹⁾ **Ibid**, p. 40.
- ⁴⁰⁾ Doroshenko, **op. cit.**, Vol. I, pp. 179 - 181; also Khrystiuk, **op. cit.**, Vol. II, pp. 51 - 2.
- ⁴¹⁾ Tcherikover, **op. cit.**, pp. 70 - 71.
- ⁴²⁾ **Ibid**, p. 81.
- ⁴³⁾ **Ibid**, pp. 81 - 82.
- ⁴⁴⁾ **Ibid**, p. 82.
- ⁴⁵⁾ **Ibid**, p. 83.
- ⁴⁶⁾ Jabłoński, **op. cit.**, p. 153.

⁴⁷⁾ Tcherikover, **op. cit.**, p. 69; also Doroshenko, **op. cit.**, Vol. I, pp. 181 - 2.

⁴⁸⁾ Borschak, **op. cit.** p. 56.

⁴⁹⁾ **Ibid**, p. 55.

⁵⁰⁾ Pélissier, J., **Ce qui s'est passé en Ukraine - Justice au Garibaldi Ukrainien, Petloura**, Lausanne, 1919, p. 4.

⁵¹⁾ Seyda, **op. cit.**, Vol. II, p. 608.

⁵²⁾ Dmowski, **op. cit.**, p. 54.

⁵³⁾ Filasiewicz, **op. cit.**, p. 245.

⁵⁴⁾ Golder, F. A., **Documents of Russian History 1914-1917**, New York, 1927, p. 646.

THE AFTERMATH

The Ukrainian National Republic, continuing the struggle against the Central Powers, found herself increasingly alone in the field; the Russian front, disorganized through the Bolshevik putsch, was fast disintegrating. Rumania was weakening.

The UNR, however, through the Minister of War, Petlura, proclaimed the front from Brest-Litovsk to the Rumanian line as the Ukrainian front. It was found, that the Ukrainian Armed Forces were rather successful. General Hoffmann comments in his memoirs on the fact that there was no armistice on the Southern front. It was not, he stated that the "Russian" troops did not want an armistice, but that "on the Southern front... they did not recognize the Petersburg Bolshevik delegation as qualified to make an armistice."¹

It is with this ability and will in mind to continue the struggle on the part of the UNR that the statements of Lenin and Trotski that the "army voted for peace with its legs" and that "since we could not engage in war, we had to conclude peace," have to be viewed. The confusion and chaos amidst which Trotski, Lenin and their party were struggling, with unquestionable opportunistic skill, was largely occasioned by the failure of the Russian people and the Provisional Government to reconcile themselves to the free development of nations. Peace, it was now felt, was imperative. On November 8th, the "Council of People's Commissars" offered to make peace "without annexation... and without... indemnities." On November 23rd, all army units were invited to enter "into armistice negotiations." Five

days later, the German Northern Army command agreed to take part in negotiations.

On December 5th, 1917, a truce was declared for the interval between December 7th and December 17th. The Armistice was finally signed on December 15th and was to come into effect December 17th. Article two of the Armistice read, "The armistice extends over all the land and air forces on the land front between the Black Sea and the Baltic Sea." But, as we have seen, the truce had not been affective on the Western Ukrainian front.

With the Russian front disorganized and in a state of anarchy since the Bolshevik take-over, and with the Bolshevik "peace" resolution of November 8th in effect, the position of the Ukrainian Armed Forces was becoming indeed tragic. The situation came to a head after the truce was made between the Germans and the Bolshevik government. On December 4th, the Small Rada took a resolution in the name of the Ukrainian National Republic to the effect that the Ukrainian General Rada recognized the necessity of approaching an armistice, meanwhile informing the state-allies of its intention so to do. It was furthermore decided that the Ukrainian Central Rada should send representatives from the General Secretariat to the Rumanian and the South-Western front in order to negotiate in the matter of an armistice. At the same time the Central Rada was to begin immediate preparation of a programme of peace in order to submit it on behalf of the UNR "to the nations of Russia", and also the Allied and enemy states, as the basis of negotiations.³

Relations with the Soviet of People's Commissars were meanwhile coming to an impasse. After the dispersal of the Bolsheviks in Kiev, the Bolsheviks of Petrograd attempted again to undercut the authority of the Rada, while at the same time organizing an invasion of the Ukraine. Thus the Bolsheviks called, on their own initiative, an all-Ukrainian Congress of Peasants', Sol-

diers' and Workers' Deputies, to be held at Kiev on December 17th. The Ukrainian government made no resistance, and in fact, lent its authority to the calling of the Congress. About 2,500 Workers', Peasants', and Soldiers' deputies of the Ukraine were present at the Congress, which met on December 17th in Kiev. Of these, only sixty were Bolsheviks.'

The constitutional matter with which the Congress dealt at the time was the relationship between the Soviet of People's Commissars and the Ukraine. On December 19th, the Soviets presented an ultimatum to the Ukrainian Central Rada in the form of a note:

"The Soviet of People's Commissars recognized the Ukrainian National Republic and her right to full separation from Russia, as well as to negotiations with the Russian Republic in regard to mutual federative, as well as other, relations. The demands of the Ukraine, in regard to her rights, and to the independence of the Ukrainian people, is recognized by the Soviet of People's Commissars... without limitations and conditions." One of the complaints in the ultimatum, however, was that the Ukrainian Rada allowed herself to disarm the "Soviet" army in Kiev and, on the whole, the demands of the ultimatum related to the control of armed forces in the Ukraine. It was furthermore declared that if no reply satisfactory to the Soviet were received within forty-eight hours, the "Soviet of Commissars of the People shall consider that the Ukrainian Central Rada is in a state of open war with the power of the Soviets in Russia and the Ukraine."⁵

The Congress of the Deputies met the ultimatum with extreme disfavour. Even Shakhrai, the leading Bolshevik member in the Ukraine, who later represented the puppet government of the "Ukrainian Soviet Republic" at Brest-Litovsk, explained to the Congress: "This ultimatum, in our opinion, is a misunderstanding which must be eradicated without loss of blood... We

shall fight the bourgeois policy of the Central Rada... But this ultimatum we regard as a misunderstanding. The Ukrainian branch of the Social Democratic Party (Bolshevik) in the Ukraine shall take all possible measures to end the misunderstanding peacefully.”⁶

The Bolsheviks at the Congress left it, 60 strong out of 2,500, and moved to Kharkiv where they proclaimed themselves the “All-Ukrainian Congress of Soviets of Workers’, Peasants’ and Soldiers’ Deputies’. There, on December 22nd, 1917, the “Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic” said to be “in federal union with the RSFSR” and essentially a puppet government, was proclaimed by the “Congress”.⁷

The Congress in Kiev resolved almost unanimously that it condemned the ultimatum of the Soviet of People’s Commissars. In a manifesto to the nations of the Russian empire, the Congress called them “to forestall the possibility of a disgraceful war.” In conclusion, the Congress of Councils of Peasants’, Workers’ and Soldiers’ deputies expressed their full confidence in the Central Rada.⁸

Beset thus on one side by the Bolsheviks and on the other side by the Central Powers, against which the Ukraine had for two months carried on an unaided struggle, the Ukrainian government began to favour the conclusion of an armistice. The peace policy was, on the whole, supported by the Socialist wing with Vynnychenko at the head, while the Nationalist wing, led by Shulhyn and Petlura, supported the continuance of the struggle against the Central Powers. Petlura was supported by the organization called The Young Ukraine, which had pro-Entente sympathies. He supported the plan of raising an army of half a million which would hold the front against the Germans with the aid of the Entente.⁹ However, the Vynnychenko “peace” faction won in the government, and Petlura resigned as Secretary of War. The failure of the Entente group enabled

Vynnychenko through Shulhyn to issue on December 24th, 1917, a note to the neutral and belligerent powers in which peace was proposed:

The General Secretariat (it read) holds it for imperative that its representatives take part in the conversations at Brest-Litovsk, and at the same time wishes that this matter be concluded at the international conference to which the Ukrainian government invites all belligerent states.¹⁰

Elections to the Constituent Assembly, which took place shortly and which demonstrated the power of the Ukrainian Central Rada resulted in 172 delegates being elected. (There were to be 301 delegates elected in the Ukraine, but the unsettled conditions prevented the election of the rest.) The vast majority of those elected were Socialists-Revolutionaries who were committed to the policy of support of the Rada (115 members). 34 Bolsheviks were elected, 9 Zionists, 5 Polish party representatives, 1 Bund representative, 1 Social Democrat, 1 Socialist-Revolutionary (Left), 1 Agricultural-Owner, and 4 others. It must be emphasized furthermore that these elections also took place in a part of the Left-Bank Ukraine under Bolshevik sway and thus do not give a correct estimate of the true strength of the Bolsheviks, as all other parties (except Left SR) were not tolerated there.¹¹ Elections to Zemstvos gave an even greater support to the Rada parties. Eighty percent of the vote went to Ukrainian parties, 18 percent to Jewish, Russian, and Polish parties, while the Bolsheviks gained 2 percent.¹²

Thus did the government of the Ukraine decide against continuing the struggle and call for peace. Conversations between the Germans and the Bolshevik Russians had already begun at Brest-Litovsk on December 22nd, 1917. On the Russian side, there was Joffe, Kamenev, Bitsenko, Pokrovski and others. The German delegation was led by the State Secretary for Foreign Affairs, von Kühlmann, seconded by General-Major

Hoffmann. Hoffmann was authorized to speak and even to protest in the name of the High Command. The Austrian-Hungarian delegation was led by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Czernin. There were also Turkish and Bulgarian delegates who had little to say.

The Bolshevik offer spoke generally of a "peace without annexations and contributions," the old (non-Bolshevik) peace programme of the Petrograd Council of Deputies, and included the following point: "National groups who did not have political independence before the war, are being assured the opportunity to be given them to freely decide the question of their adherence to that or another state or of their state independence, by way of referendum."¹³ It is of interest to see, that "Commissars" evidently thought of the possibility that Poland, and other lands affected, would be given as the FIRST choice "adherence to that or another state" and only then "independence." Kühlmann observed in the reply to this point, that the problem of adherence would be decided by the very state, in conjunction with its citizens in the way provided for by the constitution.

Joffe cemented the understanding between German militarists and Russian communists, by a statement harking back to the old tradition of the time-proven co-operation of the German and Russian Empires. "Territorial take-overs and conquests," he blithely declared, "are not Germany's way, nor are any strivings to destroy or limit the independence of any nation at all."¹⁴

We are faced now by a problem of a Secret Convention whose existence has been expressly denied by German sources, and by the Bolshevik sources, and which does not seem to have been openly referred to in later negotiations. It was signed by Krylenko, Volodarsky and others, on the Bolshevik side, and von Taubner, von Schünemann and Rausch on the German side. The convention is probably genuine. We are supported in this opinion by the fact that the terms of the Secret Con-

vention are such as were signed eventually, especially in regard to the Ukraine.

By this convention, the Soviet and German army commands agreed, at Brest-Litovsk, on December 22nd, 1917, that policy regarding Poland was, on the whole, to be conducted by the German Government. The Soviet Government agreed not to interfere in any way with a set of questions regarding Poland, in consequence of which, it would not have the right to protest or to demand explanation in the question of the separation and future government of the province of Kholm. Furthermore, the Soviet obligated itself to give every assistance to Germany and Austria in the war against Poland if the army of the latter were to cross the border of Lithuania or the Ukraine. If, going further, the German and the Austrian governments were to change their policy to Poland completely, the Soviet were to recognize the new course, and to defend it against any obstacles which might be put up by the former Allies of Russia.¹⁵ We are in the dark on the further history of the convention. The Soviet government did not indeed protest against the Kholm province separation, except for an editorial in PRAVDA. Otherwise, most of the eventualities provided for, did not happen, as the Germans and Austrians seem to have overestimated the strength of the Poles. The convention became quite unrealistic in a short while and this may explain its comparative neglect.

In accepting the Bolshevik phrase of 'peace without annexations', Kühlmann, in the opinion of Hoffmann, took the point of view that the problem of Poland, Lithuania and "Kurland" was not at all a question of annexations, but rather that the constitutional representatives of the same had decided a long time before to separate voluntarily from Russia, and to leave "the further regulating of their future constitutional (staatsrechtliche) position to Germany, or, as the case may be,

to the Central Powers.”¹⁶ This position was also expressed to Joffe by Hoffmann in a private talk at a dinner. He told Joffe that there could be no talk of “annexation” when parts of the former Russian Empire voluntarily expressed the wish to unite with the German Empire or some other state. He also pointed out that this applied in particular to Poland. “Joffe was stricken dumb,” he reported.¹⁶ So was Czernin, who at this point threatened, in writing, to conclude a separate peace, and had his bluff called by the Germans. A softly-worded note was finally sent to the Soviet on November 24th, and the Bolshevik offer was accepted officially next day.¹⁷

Two days later Germany and Austria-Hungary offered a joint counter-proposal. Article Two provided that the Russian state should take into consideration the declarations through which the peoples of Poland, Lithuania, Kurland, and parts of Estonia and Liflandia were expressing their desire for full state independence and separation from the Russian federation: “The Russian government should recognize that these declarations, under present circumstances, are to be considered as the expression of the will of the people, and it should be ready to make conclusions arising therefrom.”¹⁸ What was in fact demanded at this point was that the “Council of Commissars” express willingness to stand aside in matters relating to Poland. At this stage, the Bolsheviks were ready to go part way toward agreement by not making an issue of the question.

To the declaration, Joffe replied for the Delegation, “We agree that, in view of technical difficulties in regard to the realization of such a referendum and to the definition of the exact date of evacuation, the formation of special commissions is imperative.”¹⁹ The territorial matters were thus transferred to the Political Commission.

We must emphasize that any mention of the problem of the Ukraine was studiously avoided by either side,

and that the matter of referendums referred to Poland, but not to the Ukraine. It may have been obvious to the Germans that the Bolsheviks' power did not extend into the Ukraine, and that the Ukrainian National Republic was solidly based, unlike the Kingdom of Poland. The Bolsheviks' Government then had generally claimed sovereignty over the entire former Russian empire, but, in view of the fiction clashing so crassly with reality, they preferred not to bring up the matter at this stage.

The offer of the UNR to make peace was accepted by the Central Powers. On December 26th, the four Foreign Ministers addressed the acceptance note to the President of the General Secretariat, Vynnychenko, and the Secretary for International Affairs, Shulhyn, announcing their readiness to "greet the plenipotentiary representatives of the Ukrainian National Republic in the peace conversations at Brest-Litovsk."²⁰ The authenticity of the acceptance on the part of the Central Powers is shown by the genuine misunderstanding of internal relations on the part of Hoffmann. Thus, in the plenary meeting at Brest-Litovsk, Hoffmann asked Joffe to tell him by what way the delegation of the Ukrainian Central Rada would come, so that he could conclude the necessary technical preparations. Joffe promised to do so as soon as he was informed that "his delegation was being added to, by representatives of the Ukraine."²¹ As it happened, though, the Ukrainian Delegation found its own way to Brest-Litovsk.

The Polish situation was much less clear. With the dispersion of the Provisional Government, Russian policy, in so far as the Bolsheviks can be said to be expressing it, shifted very sharply to the right. There was no proclamation of any special policy for Poland. The return to autocracy was highlighted by the decree of November 28th, 1917, signed by Stalin, as Commissar for Nationalities' Affairs, announcing that the Soviet government had called into existence, within the Nationalities

Commissariat, the special Commissariat for Polish Affairs. Associated with the Commissariat for Polish Affairs, there was the so-called Soviet of Revolutionary-Democratic Organizations. The Soviet was composed of the representatives of the Social Democrats of the Kingdom of Poland and Lithuania, the PPS (Left), and, for a short while, of the PPS.²²

Thus was Poland implicitly claimed as part of the former Russian empire. That the claim was made in all seriousness is seen especially clearly in the Decree on Polish National Affairs signed by Lenin (Ulianov), the Chairman of the Council of Commissars, Stalin, as the People's Nationalities Commissar, and Bonch-Bruyevich. Article 67 of the decree dealt with the procedure for the issuing of orders or directives in Polish affairs. All departments of government were directed, while issuing "orders or directives on Polish affairs, especially in affairs dealing with Polish soldiers and refugees, to consult in advance with the Polish Commissariat at the People's Commissar for Nationalities Affairs."²³ Thus, the Polish Commissariat, under Stalin's control (and not, incidentally, the Polish Soviet) was being set up as the provincial government of Poland; that this was the fact is all the more clear in that the jurisdiction of the Commissariat in conjunction with the department was all-inclusive, and definitely wider than jurisdiction over "soldiers and refugees."

It is not too surprising, therefore, that shortly thereafter, the Commissariat on Polish Affairs issued a declaration "to the Polish People" in Russia which was quite outspoken. "Basing itself on the (Great Russian Revolution)", it read, "the Polish Commissariat will strive towards the liberation of the energies of the Polish people from ties of reaction and backwardness so as to awaken in the masses initiative and creative social action."²⁴

At the Commissariat for Nationalities' Affairs, the Polish Soviet was controlled by the Social Democrats of the Kingdom of Poland and Lithuania, SDKPIL, whose leading member was Dzerdzinski, the head of the Extraordinary Commission, the Cheka. SDKPIL, and consequently the Soviet, acted on the assumption of Poland's being part of Russia. In January, 1918, the SDKPIL resolved that it stood "in the ranks of the revolutionary proletariat of Russia, (and) considered the Soviets of the Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies and the Council of People's Commissars as representative of their own class interests."²⁵ Thus the Soviet of Revolutionary Democratic Organizations, recognized by the Soviet government as expressive, in some way, of the political interest of the Polish nation, was accepting the authority of the Soviet of People's Commissars. While class interests were being singled out, it must be remembered that the superiority of class interests over any other interest (such as national interest) was accepted.

While the "Soviet of People's Commissars," was laying claim to Poland as part of its Tsarist inheritance, the Regency Council showed some activity too. On December 21st, Kucharzewski, who had formed a government, demanded from the Central Powers that a representative of the Polish government be admitted to the negotiations at Brest-Litovsk.²⁶ Then, on January 7th, the three regents left on a pilgrimage to the two Emperors. Lubomirski, a Regent, assured William II that the Regency was firmly convinced that "after the establishment and the realization of the rights due to the Polish state, the Poles would follow, together with the German nation, the great goals which would guarantee to humanity its prosperity and general peace."²⁷

Despite such assurances, however, and despite the sympathy shown by the Austrians towards the Polish demand for enlarged powers, including representatives

at the conference, the Germans did not seem to have been too willing to give such powers to the Regency Council, especially in view of the fact that, in previous conversations, the Russian Communists had made it clear that they considered the Regency Council's claim to govern Poland less than perfect. In America, on the other hand, the President's Inquiry reported on December 22nd, suggesting a Poland consisting of the "Russian and perhaps Austrian Poland," a Poland, that is, with its eastern borders running along the River Bug and, further south, possibly the River Zbruch.²⁸

Thus, towards the end of 1917, both Poland and the Ukraine were asserting their rights to take part in the peace conference; both, it would appear wished to leave the war, and become neutral. Poland, possessed of some administrative power, was nevertheless not to be allowed to take part in the conference, and Pilsudski was in prison. As for the Ukraine, newly come to independence and the exercise of a widely representative self-government, she gained that permission to send representatives to the conference. On the other hand, the Allied policy seemed quite friendly to the Ukrainian National Republic. It was becoming generally recognized that the Ukraine might have to make peace; the diplomatic problem before the Allies was primarily how long the Ukraine could go on without negotiations, whether the Ukraine would stay in the war to help hold the Rumanian front either as a permanent ally or at least "till spring". In the event that the Ukraine were to sign a treaty of peace, the Entente interest would be whether this treaty would be favourable to them, and that the Ukraine be at least benevolently neutral to the Allies. The journey to Brest-Litovsk, and so towards the full internationalization of the Ukrainian-Polish question seemed necessary to the very existence of the Ukrainian National Republic, in the face of the German power in the East. The Journey

seemed also necessary in the face of the new Russian imperialism which was expressing itself in socialist phrases.

NOTES

- 1) Hoffmann, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 197.
- 2) Kreppel, J., (ed.), *Der Friede im Osten, Noten, Manifeste..*, Wien, 1918, p. 47; also Ludendorff, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 239.
- 3) Khrystiuk, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, pp. 94-95.
- 4) *Ibid*, Vol. II, p. 69.
- 5) Mayorov, S. M., *Bor'ba Sovetskoj Rosii za vykhod iz imperialisticheskoy voyny*, Moscow, 1959, p. 139; also Doroshenko, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 214; also Khrystiuk, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 69.
- 6) Khrystiuk, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 85.
- 7) *Ibid*, p. 71.
- 8) Andreus, B., *Polska a "kapitalistyczna interwencja" w stosunku do ZSRR, 1918-1920*, Rome, 1945, p. 24.
- 9) Borschak, *op. cit.*, p. 60.
- 10) Khrystiuk, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 96.
- 11) Doroshenko, D., *Istoriya Ukrayiny, 1917-1923*, 2 Vols., 2nd edition, New York, 1954, Vol. II, p. 6.
- 12) Kushnir, M., (Kouchnire, M.), *L'Ukraine, l'Europe orientale et la Conférence de la Paix*, Paris, 1919, p. 95.
- 13) Peace Conference. Brest Litovsk, *Mirnye peregovory v Brest-Litovske*, published by Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic, People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs, Vol. I, Moscow, 1920, p. 7, (quoted as Peace Conference. Brest-Litovsk.).
- 14) *Ibid*, p. 11.
- 15) *Texts of the Russian "Peace"*, published by the Department of State of the United States of America, Washington, 1918, pp. 11-12; also USSR, *Soviet Treaty Series*, Vol. I, 1917-1928, edited by Shapiro, L., Washington, 1950, p. 381.
- 16) Hoffmann, *op. cit.*, Vol II, p. 198.
- 17) Borschak, E., "La paix ukrainienne de Brest-Litovsk," in *Le Monde Slave*, Sixth Year, Paris 1920, Vol. III, p. 65
- 18) Peace Conference. Brest-Litovsk, *op. cit.*, p. 29.

- ¹⁹⁾ **Ibid**, p. 30.
- ²⁰⁾ Doroshenko, **op. cit.**, Vol. I, p. 295.
- ²¹⁾ Peace Conference. Brest-Litovsk, **op. cit.**, p. 32.
- ²²⁾ Kowalski, J., **Wielka Październikowa rewolucja socjalistyczna a wyzwolenie Polski**, Warsaw, 1952, pp. 97-98.
- ²³⁾ **Ibid**, p. 97.
- ²⁴⁾ **Ibid**, pp. 98-99.
- ²⁵⁾ **Ibid**, pp. 101-102.
- ²⁶⁾ Martel, R., **La France et la Pologne**, Paris, 1931, p. 67.
- ²⁷⁾ **Ibid**, p. 68.
- ²⁸⁾ Komarnicki, **op. cit.**, p. 205.

CONCLUSION

We have traced the evolution of the Ukraino-Polish problem and the territorial dispute through the decline of the Russian Empire. The Ukrainian National Republic is found to be developed with her border, or border claims, drawn. The Kingdom of Poland had no definite border, but the general claims of statehood and the border have been staked out.

Seeing it as a whole, the Ukrainian policy seems quite consistent. Both within the Russian Empire and the Austrian-Hungarian Empire, the Ukrainian policy took up the position of loyalty towards their respective states, and demands for some autonomy. Ukrainians were suspected of sympathies to the enemy, with the resulting repressions. With the emerging defeat of the Russian armies, and with the over-throw of the Tsar, the main centre of interest is found in the Eastern Ukraine, where the Ukrainian tendencies found expression in the policy of the Rada, the all-Ukrainian political, and eventually constitutional representation. With the development of the power of the Rada at the expense of the Provisional Government, the support of the extension of the border westwards, on ethnographic grounds, becomes the responsibility of the Rada. The progressive weakening and eventual disappearance of the Central Government, to which the Rada had contributed in some degree, brought anarchy in Russia proper, with several competing groups struggling for power. The Rada moved to establish the Ukrainian National Republic an independent constitutional unit, covering generally the ethnographic Ukrainian territory, in the borders of the former Russian Empire.

The Polish policy had been somewhat more contradictory. On the whole, it is polarized around two persons. On the one hand, there was Pilsudski, the leader of the Polish Socialist Party. His policy was the support of the Central Powers towards the re-establishment of a Polish state under the protection of the Central Powers. On the other hand, there was Dmowski, the leader of the National Democratic Party. He supported co-operation with Russia and her Allies; a large Poland under Russian protection was envisaged. The development of the war saw failure of Dmowski policy. With the rise of the more autocratic elements in the Russian regime in the progress of the war, the problem of the Polish autonomy was completely ignored. Even the more liberal faction, in the person of Sazonov, as Minister of Foreign Affairs, had insisted on keeping Poland as an exclusive concern of Russia. Again, the Pilsudski policy had also come to fail. Germany was not willing to countenance a Poland with an effective army or statehood of its own. Still, the Kingdom of Poland which arose in late 1916 and through 1917, did represent a form of the Polish state.

Turning now the Russian policy in regard to the problems, we see, on the whole, some understanding of the "Polish problem" and hardly any understanding of the "Ukrainian problem." Russian policy towards Poland was to attempt to bring in the conquered portions of Poland under German occupation, and to give it some sort of Polish identity. With the impending defeat of the autocracy, the policy foresaw the Polish ethnographic territory which had been under German and Austrian occupation united with the "Kingdom of Poland." The overthrow of Tsarism resulted in the emergence of the concept of a free Poland associated with Russia by a military union. The ethnographic principle for the eastern border of Poland was maintained. Russian government hardly thought in terms of a "Ukrainian problem" until

the publication of the First Universal of the Rada proclaiming the autonomy of the Ukraine. However, the Ukrainian claims in regard to the western border were supported as Russia's western borders. Thus, the Russian western border was thought to run so as to include the province of Kholm and Eastern Galicia, as well as the southern tip of Western Galicia, inhabited by the Lemki group. The Bolshevik policy to the Ukraino-Polish border was of little consequence.

German policy to the Ukraino-Polish border was to support the extension of the Polish eastern borders, as far as possible. This was in recognition of the fact that a policy of Eastern expansion of Germany demanded the complementary policy of support of a Polish DRANG NACH OSTEN. However, Prussia was changing it, as Prussia felt afraid of the power of Poland, as well as unwilling to take in more Poles within her borders, while Austria was directed by the fear of Germany, and the need to keep a modus vivendi with the Poles within Austria.

The Austro-Hungarian policy towards the Ukraino-Polish border was to support the extension of Polish claims to the East. In fact, Austria-Hungary, was Poland's most faithful supporter right until the federalization manifesto of October 1918. The Austrian policy, however, was very much complicated by her inferior position in the alliance with Germany, and by her own inenviable position in the matter of provisions in the war.

The French policy towards the problem of South-West Russia and the "eastern border of Poland" had followed strictly her "national interests," though somewhat influenced by the traditional French support for the subject nations of Russia; the latter aspect was largely due to romanticism, but should not be discounted. France, as the most important ally of Russia had kept a complete DISINTERESSMENT in the problem of Poland's eastern frontiers. French policy in regard to a

“Ukraine” was hardly in existence: However, as Russia saw herself forced by the ill-fortune in the war to give ever new promises to the Poles, France was always the first to support her. At the same time, France expressed her total disinterest in the Polish problem in return for the Russian promise of the same in regard to the French border with Germany. With the fall of Tsarism, the French policy became much more friendly to the Polish claims.

The British had been less directly involved in the Ukrainian-Polish problem and the Ukraino-Polish border, though we find a readier admission that one can “do business with Ukrainians.” The British began to develop a policy to the Ukraino-Polish border in conjunction with the policy of the French. Buchanan and Paléologue, the two Ambassadors in Russia, co-operated in attempting to exert polite pressure in regard to a Polish autonomous state.

The American policy was thoroughly confused. On the one hand there was the traditional friendship of the United States of America for Russia and the support of the territorial integrity of the same. On the other hand, there were the undoubted sympathies for the claims of Poland. The Ukrainian claims were much less known. The United States, again, was not a belligerent power for a long time, and in that period had not protested against the development of the Kingdom of Poland. After the Russian revolution, America came to support the Polish claim for independence, all the more readier, as Russia had gone a long way to satisfy Polish claims. The Fourteen Points of Wilson did support Poland, though the eastern border was projected on an ethnographic basis. With Russia dissolving in the turmoil, the American policy still was quite unclear, except for the fact that somehow the territorial integrity of the same was to be maintained.

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