

THE REAL FACE OF RUSSIA

ESSAYS AND ARTICLES

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ON THE PROBLEM OF
BOLSHEVISM

by

EVHEN MALANIUK

FOREWORD

In the first half of the 20th century many Ukrainians left their native land and most of them made their second home in the United States of America. It was the élite of the people that gathered there: poets, political writers, scientists and members of the learned professions generally. Their work, though dealing with the most topical questions, has remained practically unknown in the West because it was written in the Ukrainian language. Many of these publications point to interesting facts, which have been ignored in the West, such as the falsification of history, for instance. Then there is creative writing, which captures naked reality in poetic form. One of these expatriates is the well known Ukrainian poet and publicist, Evhen Malaniuk, whose treatise "On the Problem of Bolshevism" is here offered to the Western reader. Only negligible cuts have been made in order to compress the work.

E. Malaniuk was born in 1897 and has had personal experience of Bolshevism. In the year 1917 we see him in the trenches of the gradually disintegrating Russian army, and later in the Ukrainian National Army. In 1925 appeared his first volume of poetry, "Stiletto and Style", which was followed at intervals of several years by other collections, published in West Ukraine, France and Germany, as well as journalistic work.

Malaniuk's lyrics have a tremendous dynamic force and an exciting rhythm. As a distinguished poet and critic said of him: "He sees the scarlet banners of stormy times fall in the smoke-filled sky. In the vast spaces he hears the yells of Mongols of earlier times. In divine anger he speaks of his home-land and, like Ezekiel, calls it a harlot who gave herself to every comer. He calls down upon her a cleansing rain and prays that she may rise again in the white robes of her snowy fields. — It is every Ukrainian's vision of the future, for they all know that only a national state of their own can provide the conditions in which the spiritual forces of the people can unfold." So much of Malaniuk as a poet.

In 1956 he published in the USA his treatise "On the Problem of Bolshevism", with which he turned from poetry to historical philosophy. In this article he draws not only on his personal experience, but also on the study he made — versed in several languages — of Russian and Western writers on the subject. More than twenty renowned authors serve him as witnesses in his case.

Malaniuk challenges old and deep-rooted misconceptions about the origin of kolkhozes and the whole complex of "Russia" generally. With irrefutable logic he demonstrates that the sovkhoses (state farms) and kolkhozes (collective farms) of the present day have their roots in Tsarist institutions, such as the 'obshchina' (village community) and that Bolshevism is not an idea which Lenin imported from Germany, but a system which grew organically among the Slavonic and Mongolian tribes of Muscovite Russia. He shows how the outwardly monolithic 'Russia' is in fact composed of diverse peoples, who have been harnessed to a system that is alien to them. Particularly interesting are his pointers to the falsifications in Russian history. It has been common knowledge for several decades now that the old history had been grossly distorted. The name 'Rus', for instance, by which the southern, Dnieper Slavs were known, was appropriated by Muscovy, which caused the former to call themselves 'Ukrainians' in order to dissociate themselves from the Muscovites.

Malaniuk's truthful account of events, his profound knowledge about the old Muscovite empire, the Russian empire and, finally, the Soviet empire, and his penetrating analysis of the soil in which Bolshevism was able to develop, deserve to be acknowledged and heeded by historians everywhere. The evidence Malaniuk produces is so convincing that one is amazed how the facts of the case could ever have been overlooked.

His treatise is divided into the following chapters:

- Introduction
- I. The Ideology
- II. The Fertile Soil
- III. Tsarism
- IV. Church and Tsarism
- V. The Tsardom

There is also an extensive list of sources.

B.

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INTRODUCTION

The term 'Bolshevism', much in use at the beginning of the Russian Revolution, became unfashionable after World War II and is about to disappear altogether. This is probably not so much the doing of the Soviet rulers as that of those camouflaged international circles, who try their utmost to present the official Moscow ideology, i.e. Marxist Communism, as the predominant ideology of the present time, as a vision of the future, as a religion, and who see in it above all the one ideology that can be set against the nationalism they so abhor. These same circles have from the very start given the name of 'Russia' to the empire the Bolsheviks had restored, despite the new constitution and contrary to the official designation of U.S.S.R. (Union of Socialist Soviet Republics). The term 'Russia' corresponds no doubt more closely to their sentimental notions and at the same time lends respectability to the imperialist ambitions of the Bolsheviks, who have now become the "aristocracy" of the Soviet Empire.

There is little doubt that Moscow Communism, and the empire it rules, would long ago have ceased to exist but for the help it receives from these circles abroad. It would have collapsed, not only through the active resistance of organic forces within the U.S.S.R., but as a consequence of the absurd internal structure of the Soviet empire, which can only be maintained by millions of police and by the systematic suppression of individuality and the strangling of the spiritual life of the overpowered and enslaved peoples.

Communism is made the peculiar justification for the permanent system of Soviet terror and the periodic bursts of genocide and other kinds of mass murder, on the grounds that great aims demand great sacrifices. Thus criminal actions are presented as necessary measures of defence. In consequence there appeared after the last war similar distortions when the world Press used such cynical expressions as "Communist Koreans", "Communist Czechs", "Communist Germans" etc., as if in the territories concerned there had been an ideological alliance rather than the usual enforced occupation by Moscow of actual fact. The support which the U.S.S.R. enjoys from outside is, of course, not confined to helpful propaganda, but provides material aid, loans, diplomatic cooperation and, above all, political assistance in the final destruction of the peoples subjugated by Moscow. This

is done with an eye to the colonial opportunities in the present U.S.S.R. and, especially, to the colonial potential, which forms an irresistible attraction for the greed of anonymous exploiting capitalism, whose myth Karl Marx has created.

The Communist legend, with its emphasis on internationalism and the "building of socialism" (clearly of the Marxist stamp), is no doubt an important tool in the hands of Moscow, but it is by no means the whole story. It rather serves as a screen, like every fabricated ideology, behind which the true nature of what is termed 'Bolshevism' is hidden. Bolshevism is a far more comprehensive concept than Communism, but the latter provides perhaps the most convenient pseudonym for the former. Neither "Socialism", nor "Marxism", nor "Dictatorship of the Proletariat", nor any other abstract term can adequately render the essence or the meaning of the historical phenomenon which introduced the new era in the history of 'Russia', which has so far lasted for several decades. This historical process cannot be reduced to just another of the many "...isms." It is an historical event which is organically connected with a distinct geographical territory, with a distinct population of a distinct human type, and with the history of a distinct people, and it is conditioned by a distinct cultural climate.

It would be naïve and quite unwarranted to attribute the rise of Bolshevism merely to the fact that in 1917 the emigrant V. Ulyanov (Lenin) returned in a sealed carriage to Russia, or to the "strategic genius" of the journalist L. Bronstein (Trotsky), or to the influence of the writings of the "prophet" Karl Marx. Let us leave this to the discussions among those circles we have already mentioned, whose "specialists on Communism" and "experts on Russia", consciously or unconsciously, either depict Bolshevism as a purely economic system or restrict their view to the aspect of the proletarian revolution or to the so-called economic interpretation of history (Marxism, Socialist Talmudism, etc.). We ourselves have neither the space, nor the time, nor any inclination for such theorising.

I. THE IDEOLOGY

Foreigners do not
understand what
goes on in Russia.

M. Litvinov (Wallach).

We will not begin with a definition. The phenomenon of Bolshevism is too intricate and has too many facets to be defined in more or less scientific terms or even to be comprehended at all by the rationalistic minds of the West. Only a handful of scholars are the exception.

Let us begin with the usual personal reminiscences. It is the autumn of 1917. The Russian trenches of the first World War have become almost deserted. The empire is *de facto* dismembered. It is the period of the Provisional Government under Kerensky. In Petrograd, Lenin's voice resounds from the balcony of the ballerina Krzhzhesinskaya's palace and keeps repeating the word 'Soviet' in various combinations. In the disintegrated Army any discipline that remains is purely from habit.

My rifle company (in which many Ukrainians served) receives from regimental command a telephonist, a typical Russian from the Ryazan area, red-haired, lively and cunning. At his telephone he avidly follows the course of events at home and treats every soldier to the political news. The speeches by Lenin and his associates particularly appeal to him.

A young cadet officer from an 'Intelligentsia' background, a budding opera singer and graduate of the Academy of Music, who holds liberal-democratic views and is enthusiastic about Kerensky, attempts to re-orient this telephonist. Incessantly one hears such phrases as "liberated Russia", "democratic government", "loyalty to the Allies", "war until victory." The red-haired, snub-nosed telephonist listens and tries to remain courteous (there is still a shadow of authority left), but in the end he burst out: "Do stop about your Kerensky and

Democracy! It makes one sick. We don't need Kerensky. What we need is a firm authority, don't you see? The Bolsheviks, Lenin, that's an authority, but not that law-twister of yours. Lenin is the boss! The comrades tell me over the telephone what he says to the people. One can hear at once that this is the stuff. This is what we, the workers and the peasants, need — you don't, of course, you the masters and intellectuals!"

This red-headed, not very young Russian, who had never heard of Marx, was not a Socialist and belonged to no party, was already Bolshevik. It was amazing to hear with what reverence he pronounced the mere word. Perhaps it reminded him of the word 'bolshoy', or of 'bolshak' (the eldest of a Russian family) hallowed by tradition. Be that as it may, the fact is that in my regiment, in which a great number of non-Russians served (Ukrainians and Cossacks among them), all those who were born Russians were already Bolsheviks in the autumn of 1917, quite independent of what social class they belonged to. They were Bolsheviks, not in the party-ideological sense of the word, but in the almost metaphysical sense of the whole concept, which can only with difficulty be comprehended by merely sociological methods of analysis.

In the first breath of Bolshevism, in the very first of Lenin's speeches, the Russian people sensed behind the Marxist terminology the traditional autocratic spirit, the spirit of historical tsarism, with which the true Russian feels so much at home.

Identifying the Revolution with a revival of religious and national consciousness, it was not only Klyuev and Yesenin, the gifted poets of peasant stock, who welcomed Bolshevism, but also the refined poet and scholar Andrey Belyy (son of Professor Bugayev) and the last of the great poets of imperial times, Alexander Blok, (cf. his poem "The Twelve"), as well as many other eminent Russians who can with justice be called the head and heart of their nation. The most outstanding officers of the old Army became Bolsheviks, as I myself could observe, and they provided for the Bolshevik army a professionally trained General Staff with Brusilov at the head.

In the White Army of Denikin, fighting against the Bolsheviks, the majority were non-Russians, mostly Ukrainians. The nucleus of that army formed the regiments of the Don and Kuban Cossacks. The leader of the Kornilov army, in spite of his name, was equally a non-Russian. It is after all well enough known that it was only the peripheral peoples who resisted the Bolsheviks and not national Russia herself.

By the same token, it can hardly be supposed that the aristocratic Chicherin, the Tsar's former Chargé d'Affaires in London, was a convinced Marxist, and it is certainly not by accident that he became the first Bolshevik Minister of the Exterior.

Enough has been said about these matters in the documentary literature on the subject, and we need not go into them any further.

What can be established without any superfluous documentation is the fact that the so-called "Russian Revolution", which by its nature was to dissolve the empire, has found in the Bolsheviks a relief crew for the running of the imperial machine. The degenerate descendants of the Russian aristocracy were incapable of working that machine, particularly had they failed at that critical moment when with one blow the empire lost its colonies and only a denuded ethnographical Muscovite state remained.

There is an anecdote of those often dramatic days when the Bolsheviks fought for power. When one of the pretenders to high government position, known under the pseudonym of Zinovyev, expressed doubts whether their not very numerous group would be able to take over and maintain the government, Lenin promptly replied: "If tsarist Russia could be ruled by 140,000 noblemen, then that same Russia can be ruled by our Party, which already has tens of thousands of members."

Although Lenin cannot be called a genius, one must admit that he possessed a very wide knowledge, specifically about the psyche of the Russian people, the course of Russian history, the roots of Russian civilisation, and about the nature of power. In this last respect Lenin was certainly superior to our Ukrainian historians and poets (Hrushevsky and Vynnychenko), for he had doubtless studied the work "Of War" by Karl von Clausewitz more closely than the work of the other Karl, the "Capital" by Marx. It is an open secret that immediately after the overthrow the Bolsheviks took over intact the organisation and staff of the notorious tsarist 'Okhranka' (department of the secret police).

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One need not be a mystic to feel that we are living in an era in which evil has become an almost tangible thing.

We — especially we exiled Ukrainians — feel not only the existence, but the very essence of evil, and with such clarity as only medieval man felt it. The demoniac element in the complex of Bolshevism is undeniable, however much the false 'experts' may attempt, under the pretence of professional argument, to put forward their rational definitions, such as political economy, socialism, sociology and, of course, Marxism, i.e. "scientific Marxism."

Such 'experts', 'scholars', new-fangled 'historiographers', — among them a considerable number of somehow or other remunerated Soviet propagandists — assert, for instance, that the terror, the concentration camps, the mass resettlements, the constriction of the natural growth of people, are all inventions of the German Nazis, while every normal person knows that the latter were only inept disciples, two decades late, of the Bolsheviks. About such methodical mass tortures as the two great famines in our homeland, which the Bolsheviks organised

in 1922 and 1933 and in which 30% of our people perished, the 'experts' remain silent; or, if they cannot avoid the topic, they insolently maintain, without any proof whatever, that there was starvation everywhere in the Union, "in the whole of Russia", and that it had been caused by the necessity of "building socialism", or at least by the necessity of "industrialising" the country; or, simply, that the threat from "capitalist" enemies made rearmament inevitable. This cynical lie is then taken up, after long discussions, by other 'experts', is printed in hundreds of tomes and thousands of copies, broadcast over the radio and studied at universities. And so the infernal machine goes on working; for the father of the lie is, as you know, Satan.

For various reasons we shall have to leave the undoubted satanic element of Bolshevism out of consideration, since an analysis of this irrational part of the ideology would require another kind of treatment and a different terminology. In actual life, however, irrational and rational manifestations are so closely intertwined, the real and the mystical so often become merged, that the conscientious researcher frequently arrives at the conclusion that our so-called exact science is very limited and, indeed, it has in the course of the technological 19th century itself acquired the attributes of a strange and purely pagan mysticism (the taboo of the "unscientific").

In the examination of our subject we cannot avoid touching upon the theory, or the "science", propounded by Marx. It is after all the basis of the Communist philosophy and thereby of Bolshevism, which was to be a specifically Russian form of Marxism.

Karl Marx was born in 1818, the son of a christened lawyer from the Rhineland, the descendant, probably, of an old rabbinic family who emigrated from Ukraine in the 17th century. He studied at the universities of Bonn and Berlin and wrote his thesis on Democritus, the materialist philosopher of antiquity. He started to work as a journalist, emigrated to Paris where, together with Heinrich Heine, he published the magazine 'Vorwärts' (Forward). After the revolution of 1848 Marx returned to Germany, but only a year later, in 1849, he moved to London. There he lived, always in financial trouble and dependent on the help from relatives, until his death in 1883.

In view of the general familiarity with Marxism (in the schools of the USSR it is an obligatory subject and has replaced religious instruction), there is no need to give here an account of the bases of Marx's theory, which are expounded in the three volumes of his 'Capital' (first published in Hamburg between the years 1867 and 1894). That theory is so impregnated with economic determinism that every scientific character is lost, a fact which contemporaries and even Marxists themselves have pointed out. This, however, did not and does not prevent interested circles proclaiming Karl Marx a great scholar, who for the first time had provided the economy, and thereby history, with a scientific basis; whose theory represented a

feat of logical thinking; who had turned the whole world of old ideas upside down, had opened up a new era in the history of mankind; and who had become, as a Soviet writer expressed it, "the Sabaoth of a new world." A few of his champions among his kindred, with typical lack of moderation and unconscious blasphemy, do not shrink from placing him as a reformer beside... Christ.

The scientific value of Marxism is, of course, far more modest than one might suppose from the noise made about it by Soviet and pro-Soviet propaganda. Marx's theory has long ago been assigned its proper place in time and space. Even true Marxists no longer dwell on it; they neither discuss nor defend it. In genuine science, Marx's theory has for some time now been the equivalent to "the Emperor's new clothes" of Andersen's fairy-tale.

But, as we have said before, there is a close link between the irrational and the rational, the supernatural and the natural. Marx's turbid, confusedly talmudistic and in the end surely rather primitive theory about "classes" and "values" contained nevertheless something that acted like a spark on the minds of men and was ultimately to connect the author's name with the sea of blood and tears which engulfed above all our native country, which was also the home of the ancestors of the fateful man. There was something in that theory that eludes rational analysis. Between the lines there was perhaps something demoniac, something — I venture to say it — satanic.

The astonishing thing about Marx's theory, even if one considers only its formal character, is the complete absence of the spiritual element, the ethical. While the author is ostensibly concerned with the well-being of man (the proletarian, the worker), he puts in the place of man some transient species of a simplified Darwinian order.

The creative mind is eliminated; manifestations of the human spirit are denied existence; life is reduced to minimal, semi-animal functions. To call it anti-humanism would be an under-statement; it is de-humanisation, an abstraction contrary to all nature, with which that theory confronts us. The doctrine not only does away with God, which would be in keeping with trends in the scientific 19th century; it does away with man himself. For man is above all, whatever science may say, God's image and not a robot or a number in a concentration camp. All this is not a question of mere materialism. Materialism as a system of philosophy had been known long before Marx. The same Democritus (5th century B.C.) on whom Marx wrote his thesis, the originator of the theory of atoms and author of no less than 72 works on subjects of cosmology, ethics and the theory of cognition, was a learned physicist and the first of the materialist philosophers known to us. None of this prevented him, however, from devoting special treatises to spiritual matters.

The naïve, brutal and, in true German fashion, straightforward materialist Ludwig Feuerbach flourished shortly before Marx. He

went as far as to maintain that "man is what he eats" (a pun in German: *Der Mensch ist, was er isst*), which did not save him, however, from being charged with "idealism" by both Marx and Lenin. Compared with what we in our time have seen of the effects of materialism, his maxim appears to us now as no more than the babble of a drunkard.

All this is to say that at the core of Marxism there is not only materialism as a specific philosophic system, but also something abysmal and terrifying. For if man, as depicted in that theory, is no longer linked to family, nature, the universe, the spiritual, God — then man, as we know him, ceases to exist altogether. Marxism is not only atheistic; it is, from an historical point of view, antichristian in the full sense of the word. There is no doubt whatever that under the cloak of quasi-scientific definitions Satanism lurks in the Marxist doctrine.

The first to point this out is said to have been the great Ukrainian poet, Ivan Franko, who in 1898 wrote about Marxism: "...it is to be expected that we shall soon have (in fact we have it already) a formal religion based on the dogmas of hate and the class struggle." Then it was the famous philosopher Nikolay Berdyayev, who in one of his early essays (1906) stressed "the falsehood" in Marxism and called the doctrine a "prison of the mind" and an "evil of the future." Berdyayev was well aware of the demoniac nature of Marxism, with its cult of de-personalisation and "non-being", and foresaw in it the unquestionable antichristianism.

I can still recall the strong impression made on me by the fragment of an article or letter by Karl Marx which I happened to read. It was not the content, but the style that struck me (it was in German). It was decidedly biblical, the style of the Old Testament prophets. The proletariat was compared to the "chosen" people and Marx saw himself as Moses, their leader. Since style tells us much about the author himself, this brief excerpt was illuminating and provided a key to the understanding of the essence of the doctrine which lies behind its "scientific" and "economic" disguises. It also gave the answer as to why, from among other socialist theories, it should have been Marx's theory that so much kindled enthusiasm and possessed such marvellous energy, such an electric charge, that what is after all a grandiose movement could spring from it.

In my opinion, it is above all due to the personality of Karl Marx, to his innate character, which was stronger than the influences of education, environment or official nationality. The man who was supposed to be rationalism personified, emerges from contemporary memoirs and from surviving letters and other documents as a man "possessed", who indeed looked like an Old Testament prophet and who was a born leader — not just some kind of party leader, but a visionary, absorbed in an ideal, a myth, a distant goal...

In ordinary life he was a difficult man, highly intolerant, despotic, not open to argument. Dominated by his ideas, he was able to influence his contemporaries and environment and at times to extort blind obedience from them. He was a man of indomitable mental energy (not "materialistic", i.e. physical) and it was this force, of rather dark origin, which revealed itself in his "scientific" work, his journalism, his exuberant organising activity (*Communist Manifesto*, 1847), and produced such disastrous results.

The fact that Marx's theory was put into practice on the territory of the Russian empire and not, as one might logically have assumed, in already industrialised Germany, must not be regarded as an accident or as an historical misunderstanding. The communist Moses had for some time had his fanatical eye on that mysterious country to the east of Europe, as his notes and articles prove.

His comrade, Heinrich Heine, poet and acute observer, showed particular sympathy for Russia and associated it with definite hopes. All that was needed was a mental bridge, a metaphysical contact with one specific point in the complex of "Russia" and the psyche of her intellectual élite. And that point was to be the Russian Messianism, for Marxism itself was and is only a quasi-scientific form of Messianism.

Nor was it accidental that Russia's great poet Alexander Blok greeted the Bolshevik overthrow with his blasphemous-messianic poem "The Twelve", in which he placed at the head of the twelve Red guardsmen the figure of Jesus Christ, in reality, of course, Antichrist.

II. THE FERTILE SOIL

Four years after the appearance of the first volume of "Capital", Dostoyevsky published his novel "The Devils" (or "The Possessed") (1871), which one would associate rather with Marx's "Communist Manifesto" of 24 years earlier — "Europe is haunted by the spectre of communism" (1847). It is exceedingly strange, but characteristic, that scholars should take so little notice of this novel, which is a first rate source of enlightenment on Bolshevism and indeed constitutes one of the most important documents in the vast literature on the subject. Unfortunately, the "experts on Russia" preponderate among scholars, and they carefully dissect the problem, with an energy that could be employed to greater advantage, without getting at the heart of the matter. Three quarters, if not 90% of these "experts" tear the historical event of Bolshevism out of the context of history, of time and space, as if it were something that had developed in the stratosphere and not on this iniquitous earth of ours. The anti-historical approach is the worst sin of these "scientists." They split *a priori* the problem seen in abstraction and arrange it into groups of aspects (sociological, social, economic, material, etc.).

"The Devils", it is true, is fiction, a work of literature rather than science. But it can be proved by a number of examples that novels of this kind make a far greater contribution towards the illumination of a problem than documentary material or scientific treatises, especially when such treatises are written by scholars without imagination or on a purely rational basis.

The mere fact that the novel was originally proscribed by the Bolshevik government and appeared only later, when the Soviet empire had consolidated itself, in the "academic" complete (i.e. not popular) edition of the works of Dostoyevsky, is highly significant. One may be sure that the novel is not to be found on the shelves of the public libraries of the U.S.S.R. It is in the nature of things that the book should play no part either in the so-called anti-Communist campaign outside the U.S.S.R. conducted by Russian emigrants, or in the propaganda of the fifth column.

These circles have good reasons for ignoring or keeping silent about "The Devils." In the whole of world literature there is no other work that provides deeper insight into Bolshevism and hence is more anti-Bolshevist than "The Devils", with the exception perhaps of Saltykov-Shchedrin's "History of the Town of Glupov" which is, however, almost incomprehensible to anyone not acquainted with the complex of "Russia" because of its style, and, possibly, the books of the English writer Joseph Conrad (a Pole from Ukraine), "The Secret Agent" and "Under Western Eyes", which do not seem to be particularly popular either.

Dostoyevsky's "The Devils" is probably the greatest work this very prolific author has written. The novel somehow bursts the frame of conventional writing, perhaps even of literature altogether, as is the case with the "Undivine Comedy" by the Polish writer Krasinski: in its visions this crosses the boundaries of ordinary literature and provides another valuable clue to the ideas behind Bolshevism, being at the same time a strange prophecy.

It is well known that Dostoyevsky was a psychological wreck, suffered from epilepsy and was a compulsive gambler. Apart from the difficulties arising from his national origins and his family environment (he was the grandson of a Greek Orthodox priest and the son of an unbalanced father, whom he hated), he had been drawn into a revolutionary circle, was condemned to death and then, under the very gallows, "reprieved" by Tsar Nicholas I and banished to Siberia. This severe mental shock and years of forced labour wrought havoc on Dostoyevsky's sensitive mind. The man, who had already lost his roots, was morally broken for ever. The pathological element in his writing is consequently strong. Far more than anything by a healthy writer, his novels are a rich mine for psychopathologists and criminologists. The actual stories of his novels are interwoven with the treatment of important psychological, philosophical and religious problems, particularly Christianity and Orthodoxy.

Always in financial trouble, he tended to draw out his books and make them more complicated, often to the detriment of composition. This is why, apart from their moral indigestibility, they are so difficult to read.

"The Devils" stands out among Dostoyevsky's other work by the extraordinary clarity of the prophetic vision of Russian Bolshevism and the way in which it uncovers the Bolshevik "subsoil" of Russia. Its clairvoyant description of several historical events in the future (the 9th/22nd of January incident; the Rasputin episode; the figure of Lenin, even of Trotsky; and much else) cannot fail to make a deep impression on the modern reader. It was this epileptic, with his diseased mind and depraved tendencies (Stavrogin's confession in "The Devils" is autobiographical, according to the testimony of contemporaries), who was to foresee the future disasters, and he paid for his prophetic vision with suffering throughout his life. While

referring the reader to the novel itself, I may be permitted to quote here one of the passages which gives the gist of the views held by one of the characters, the "ideologist" Shigalyov. It is the conversation between Verkhovensky and Stavrogin.

"He (Shigalyov) has invented 'equality'... Spying. Every member of the society spies on the others, and he is obliged to inform against them. Everyone belongs to all the others, and all belong to everyone. All are slaves and equals in slavery. In extreme cases slander and murder, but, above all, equality. To begin with, the level of education, science and accomplishment is lowered. A high level of scientific thought and accomplishment is open only to men of the highest abilities! Men of the highest ability have always seized the power and become autocrats. Such men cannot help being autocrats, and they've always done more harm than good; they are either banished or executed. A Cicero will have his tongue cut out, Copernicus will have his eyes gouged out, a Shakespeare will be stoned — there you have Shigalyov's doctrine! Slaves must be equal: without despotism there has never been any freedom or equality [an inconsistency, typical of Dostoyevsky's heroes; see above, about the despotism of higher ability], but in a herd there is bound to be equality — there's the Shigalyov doctrine for you! Ha, ha, ha! You think it strange? I am for the Shigalyov doctrine!

...The moment a man falls in love or has a family, he gets a desire for private property. We will destroy that desire; we'll resort to drunkenness, slander, denunciations; we'll resort to unheard-of depravity; we shall smother every genius in infancy.

...Slaves must have rulers. Complete obedience, complete loss of individuality; but once in thirty years Shigalyov resorts to a shock, and everyone at once starts devouring each other, up to a certain point, just as a measure against boredom. Boredom is an aristocratic sensation; in the Shigalyov system there will be no desires. Desire and suffering are for us; for the slaves — the Shigalyov system.

...We'll have a few fires — we'll spread a few legends... an upheaval will start. There's going to be such a to-do as the world has never seen."

("The Devils", Part Two.)

As a youth I tried to read this novel, but without success. It appeared to me as the fabrication of a psychopath, and I dropped the book. It was only in the early thirties, when a complete picture of Bolshevism had emerged, that I was irresistibly drawn back to "The Devils"; I then read it with great attention and returned to it again and again. It became quite clear to me why the police-controlled education authorities had to hide the book from the general public: It was a prophecy come true, a magic mirror of reality; it unmasked the "Revolution" and provided a relentless analysis of Bolshevism and its roots. Dostoyevsky had also given subtle hints about the threads that connected the "native" Bolshevism with international and communist Socialism.

An important complement to "The Devils" is the work of the satirist Saltykov-Shchedrin, entitled "A History of the Town of Glupov" (from "glúpyy" — stupid). A former Governor himself, the author was the best judge on Russia's administration. In the form of satire, very involved and grotesque for the benefit of the censor, his book gives in essence the history of "Russia." The author was a positivist and rationalist, an educated and shrewd man, who had nothing to do with mysticism (nor, perhaps, with religion). Content and style of his book are, of course, entirely different from those of "The Devils", but it maps out, with near-mathematical conciseness, a kind of ground-plan of the terrible empire. The "Russian system" is brought out in full relief and the potentially Bolshevik foundations are clearly visible (Shchedrin prophetically uses even the word "communism" several times). His stylised "Description of the Governors" (heads of state, chiefs of police etc., i.e. rulers, in whom we recognise the tsars, dignitaries and politicians of the empire), with the brilliantly and prophetically depicted Ugryum-Burcheyev at the top, is an extraordinary literary achievement. The figure of Ugryum-Burcheyev shows so many similar traits of character that it might be a portrait of Stalin.

The author deliberately wrote in the civil service jargon of government offices, a style only comprehensible to those familiar with "Russia", and the book has therefore hardly been translated. It is, of course, in this specific language that the essence of the book is to be found.

The same subject is treated by a foreign eye-witness in the best book ever written on "classical" Russia. It is the well known but little studied book (Paris 1843) by the Marquis de Custine, who was a clear-sighted observer with a very fine ear. His work has nothing in common with the demoniac metaphysics of "The Devils" or the grotesque satire of Shchedrin, but it is a sober and penetrating account, full of that brilliant "esprit" for which his nation is famous.

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A familiarity with the literature on the subject and with historical sources, the knowledge of facts, personal observation and at least a rudimentary feeling for the metaphysical side of things, inevitably lead the impartial investigator to the conviction that the territory of the historical Russia provided a particularly favourable ground for the realisation of Marx's theory and that Bolshevism could only rise in the Muscovite domain.

It is by no means easy to discuss the subject of "Russia", let alone to make assertions about it. One knows from personal experience how this topic has for long been deliberately complicated and obscured and literally surrounded with a smoke-screen of lies, and how it has in certain spheres (scholarship not excluded) become a peculiar taboo. A Ukrainian investigator faces particular difficulties, since his findings, however objective and scholarly they may be, are liable to be dismissed as "zoological chauvinism."

This is precisely what happened to the objective and painstaking Ukrainian historian M. Hrushevsky, whose vast body of work the "revolutionary" Soviet government declared as "zoological chauvinism" and "fascist bogus history" and caused it to disappear, thus depriving generations of Ukrainians of the possibility of studying it. Such measures are after all quite natural for that government and hallowed by tradition. It applies similar methods even to representatives of the "progressive" and ruling nation of "Russia." Is it not a fact that the Russian historian N. Polevoy was eliminated by the government because his conception of history contradicted that of Karamzin, of which the men at the top happened to approve? Has there not for years been a ban on the work of the historian Pokrovsky who, although a Marxist, was a genuine scholar? And did not Tsar Nicholas I declare the eminent thinker Peter Chaadayev, a former Guards officer of the Moscow nobility and friend of Pushkin's, to be insane (with all the legal consequences that it entailed) only because he had published an excellent historical-philosophical article? There are innumerable examples of this police supervision of intellectuals from the times of the Muscovite State to those of the later Petersburg and Soviet empires.

Abroad the situation is no better when it comes to knowledge about Russia. Moscow's untiring and cunning external propaganda over the centuries has seen to that. Western Europe has never sufficiently evaluated that propaganda, whose intensity, method and scale have only during the Soviet period become evident. Back in the Moscow period, Ivan IV, the Terrible, this first overt imperialist (whom the Soviet writers were instructed to extol as a genius and the prototype of Stalin), had the legend spread abroad that he was a descendant of Alexander of Macedonia and, possibly, of Cleopatra of Egypt, and that his predatory wars were undertaken for the sole purpose of propagating Orthodox Christianity — which did, however, not prevent him from butchering 40,000 Orthodox citizens of Novgorod.

Then there was the considerably perfected foreign propaganda, conducted in masterly fashion by Catherine II, that German adventuress on the Russian throne, the goddess of the (well paid) French Encyclopaedists, the "Semiramis of the North." For the attainment of her own ends she succeeded in winning over three quarters of the Polish élite of the 18th century, who sold the future of their country to its most terrible historical enemy in return for a permanent fixed allowance from the Tsarina.

From extant documents we know that the secret service of Nicholas I endeavoured to bribe such an eminent French writer as Balzac into writing a book on Russia that would counteract the views expressed by the Marquis de Custine. This was by no means an unrealistic approach (Balzac was fond of money and needed it) and it was probably mere coincidence that it came to nothing (thanks

to a rich match Balzac made in Ukraine). But for two centuries there were many small and big Balzacs and Voltaires in the pay of the Petersburg secret service. There are strong grounds for the belief that the famous diplomat of revolutionary France, Talleyrand, the excommunicated bishop who became a minister under Napoleon and Louis Philippe, was an agent of the Tsarist secret service. Moscow's agents abroad in our day have indeed a great tradition and work according to well tried methods. (The mysterious figure of Bormann in the Hitler era may here be remembered.)

But to cut short this aside, although it is a highly important topic, let us simply face the fact that the world has been given a certain picture of Russia, now threatening, now pacifist; now primitive, now mystical; now barbaric, now civilised (ballets, etc.); but at all times the image has been created of an "undivided" national entity, and it is that image which survives to this day.

For the historians of Europe (and of the world in general) this "Russian" conception has remained intact, and other views, e.g. Hrushevsky's, are regarded as being tendentious. Thus, the country which up to the 17th century was officially named "Ducatus Moscoviensis" and during the 17th century "the Moscow State", became in the course of one single century, the 18th, the "Russia" existing since eternity, despite the fact that both the empire itself and its (old Ukrainian) name date only from 1709, the year of the catastrophe of Poltava, so fateful to the whole of Europe.

From the 18th century onwards the Tsars look outwardly like the kings of Western Europe. The Romanov dynasty became in a short time 90% German, and so did a considerable majority of the dignitaries and aristocrats. (The Prussian element took the place of the Tartar element of the former Moscow Principality, as it were, and the numerous Urussovs were replaced by the no less numerous Benckendorffs.)

In short, from outside the Petersburg empire appeared perfectly normal. To the mind of the average European of the second half of the 19th century "Russia" was, perhaps, somewhat exotic and backward, but on the whole a large state like every other state, and it did not display anything out of the ordinary, no trace of "another world." The Marquis de Custine was one of the very few who, in the first half of the 19th century, detected something entirely different...

Among scholars, in literature, in politics, and in the imagination of the West generally, a notion of Russia was formed which, due to the law of inertia, survives and exerts its influence to this day. It is extremely difficult to combat this erroneous idea by literary, rational means, and only an intimate acquaintance with "Russia" can enable anyone to attack it at its roots. Such direct acquaintance is today only too painfully forced upon the Germans, the Czechs and the Slovaks; and the people of Poland, as well as of Bulgaria, Roumania

and Hungary, have in our day renewed experience of that system, for which they have to pay dearly.

We know from personal experience that a Western intellectual would look in astonishment at anyone who told him, for instance, that the Russian peasants had for centuries no legal right to property of any kind. He would politely point out to his informant that this was a statement which was no doubt prompted, quite understandably, by his own nationalist bias and his aversion to (Moscow) Russia. That same European remains in ignorance about the many different, strongly contrasting cultures, which are to be found on the territory of the Soviet empire. The past history of the Caucasus, the ruins of the splendid civilisation of Turkestan, the monuments of antiquity in the Black Sea area — what are these to him? All he knows of Ukrainian history is, perhaps, the romanticised Mazepa (from the interpretations by Byron, Liszt, and the painter Horace Vernet). Even such highly sensitive men of the West as the poet R. M. Rilke are unable to perceive the essential difference between the Cathedral of St. Sophia at Kiev and any other church, e.g. that of Basil the Blessed in the Red Square at Moscow. The outdated, almost fossilised idea of an “undivided”, “great”, “limitless” “Russia” exerts a hypnotic influence on the observer and distorts his view of even the most obvious reality. (Rilke, for one, had seen with his own eyes both Kyïv (Kiev) and Moscow.)

Intellectuals of this kind see in Bolshevism a “great Russian Revolution”, not realising that both “evolution” and “revolution” are in the context with the, for them, wholly inscrutable system of “Russia” nothing but empty words that mock their meaning. (See Joseph Conrad’s brilliant article on the eve of the revolution of 1905, “Revolution and Autocracy.”)

To such intellectuals the incident of “the sealed carriage”, in which Ludendorff is said to have transported Lenin to Russia with the malicious intent to harm the Allies, is more important than the removal of the seat of government from the quasi-European Petersburg to the national Moscow, an event whose significance from the historical-philosophical point of view has not been understood. Such intellectuals would also be surprised to learn (and would explain it as coincidence) that the Cheka (later NKVD) has its headquarters at the Lubyanka, the very spot which housed the notorious torture cells and prisons of the secret service of the old Moscow State.

This type of over-rationalising super-intellectual has lost the art of historical thinking. In the age of technocracy his intellect has become mechanised and his intuition has evaporated. Even the terrible suicidal destruction of Europe, which we have witnessed in the apocalyptic years of the Second World War (brought on by Hitler), is judged from the determinist point of view — that historical philosophy so well reasoned by, e.g., Oswald Spengler, but so catastrophic in its consequences to Europe. And this type of

intellectual is still dominant today (a glaring example is A. Toynbee, as well as men like Sartre and the legion of “repentant communists” and ex-Trotskyites in the literature of our time). Young, promising forces, who chose a new direction, are carefully held in check by those circles who have monopolised the means of mass communication. As Dostoyevsky put it in “The Devils”, they “smother every genius in infancy.”

It is these factors in our age which contribute to the continued existence of Bolshevism. Even if it decays from within, those interested circles will rush to its aid and preserve it at all costs until the “propitious moment” when its ideology “will shine forth all over the world” from the modern Mecca of “the new faith.”

III. TSARISM

With political ends in view, a "history of Russia" was concocted under government auspices, appropriating the unrelated history of the Kiev Rus', and this approved version was taught for centuries in the schools and universities of the former Russia. After a short Marxist interval, this conception of history was taken up again by the present Moscow rulers and is being expounded in the schools of every country of the Soviet empire, as well as by propaganda. The "history" was subject to many modifications until it lost every shred of scientific value and only served to propagate the myth of the political unity of "Russia" and now of the U.S.S.R.

Russian history is based on the famous "History of the Russian Empire" by N. Karamzin (12 volumes, published 1816-1826). The author, a writer of Tartar descent without any specialist knowledge, was nominated as official historiographer by an ukase of the Tsar. He was, in Karamzin's own words, to "select" historical material about "Russia", "to enliven it, give it colour." The work was to be "attractive, impressive, remarkable, not only to Russians but also to foreigners..."

The first attempt to write Russian history as a history of the people, rather than a record of the state, met with the indignation of the entire élite of the empire with Pushkin and Prince Vyazemskiy at the head. Under attack were the six volumes of "A History of the Russian People" by the Moscow historian Polevoy (1796-1846). Tsar Nicholas I wanted to send the author to Siberia, but contented himself in the end with depriving him of all means of livelihood. Polevoy died destitute and forgotten. A hundred years of historical writing in the service of politics does not remain without consequences, for human memory does not go very far and even fifty years may prove to be a barrier. Even in Western European archives and libraries many documents, testimonies and memoirs are buried under the dust of oblivion. The officially promoted view has thus become the history of "Russia" and has been accepted ever since by the scholars of the world as dogma and guiding principle.

When the so-called Bolshevik Revolution came (which was merely the starting point for an armed restoration of the empire by a series of imperialist wars), not only the world outside but also the former "Russian" peoples were astounded at the barbarous methods of the Bolsheviks, the peculiar structure of the Bolshevik state (Cheka, terror as a system, contempt for the human being), the shockingly bloodthirsty government, the cynicism and inhuman cruelty of the Russian people.

It was generally assumed that these were transitional phenomena of "the Revolution" (like the Jacobins and Marat), unavoidable paroxysms of class hatred, a temporary madness of the very people who in the minds of the educated circles of "Russia" were "the bearers of divine thought." No one heeded the warning which the representative of that people, the poet Alexander Blok, gave to the world when he said at the very beginning of the holocaust: "We shall let you see our Asiatic face..."

The world was so hypnotised by the official version and the conception of history held by Russian intellectuals that it did not (or would not) see the reality nor grasp the significance of what lay behind the strange-sounding name of "Bolshevism."

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In the last few decades some European intellectuals have been looking more closely at the phenomenon of Bolshevism and began to study the history of the Mongolian empire of the 13th and 14th centuries. In the course of this analysis they realised that Moscow State had from 1237 to 1480 been a part of the political structure of the Mongolian empire of the Jenghiz Khan dynasty and for some time afterwards had remained, politically and culturally, within the Mongolian sphere of influence. (We refer the reader to the "Eurasian" writers P. Savitskiy, P. Suvchinskiy, G. Vernadskiy, among others). In this connection an interesting publication appeared in Harbin in 1926 under the title "My" (We) by V. Ivanov, which attempted to advance a purely Asian theory for Russia ("In Asia we are at home...").

We see that the Mongolian period in Moscow's history lasted almost half a century longer than the "Europeanized" Petersburg period of the later "Russia" (1709-1917). No matter how falsely that period is being represented in official textbooks, no conscientious historian of the state and people of Muscovy can minimize its true nature and its significance.

It is common knowledge that in the year 1222 there appeared on our steppes the armed hordes of Temuchin (Jenghiz Khan). They were Turko-Mongolian nomads, who were named "Tartars", although the Tartars proper formed only a part of these hordes. After Jenghiz

Khan had passed through China, Turkestan, Persia and the Caucasus, he aimed at the conquest of Europe. The first attempt in that direction met with the resistance of the Kiev State (the battle on the bank of the river Kalka in the spring of 1223). However, its allies, the Polovtsi, fled in panic and the battle was lost. For the Mongols this encounter was of great advantage: It was a thorough scouting operation and must have provided them with valuable information for the strategic planning of their future incursions. Fourteen years later the Mongol forces, aided by Chinese generals and specialists from the conquered nations, had developed into an army which was militarily and politically invincible, given the political state of affairs in Europe at the time (the conflict between Church and secular power; the decline in the art of war: outmoded weapons and tactics of the knights, improvised supplies and, above all, a deterioration in organisation and strategic thinking).

The army, which pushed towards Europe under Batu Khan's command, disposed of all sorts of weapons, including artillery and engineering devices. It was organised in multiples of ten (Tens, Hundreds, Regiment = 1000, Corps = 10,000, Army = 100,000) and had an able General Staff and an efficient Medical Service (Chinese personnel, highly qualified in those days). As it was an army of horse-soldiers it was perfectly capable of covering about forty miles a day. One might compare it to a huge and well trained motorised army of our day, with the most up-to-date equipment (the use of gunpowder for blasting) and provisioning (including meat and milk preserves). Most important, it was an army with a wild, cruel and self-confident spirit, born of the mysterious depths of Asia, a mentality which was strange and utterly incomprehensible to European Christians and Moslems alike. This mental power made itself felt even from afar; by spreading fear and terror, it paralysed and demoralised the threatened peoples. The campaign of Batu Khan was a triumphant march. After destroying the kingdom of the Bulgars on the Volga in the course of a few months, the Mongols overwhelmed and laid waste at the end of 1237 and the beginning of 1238 the territories of Suzdal, Ryazan, Rostov and Tver, securing thereby the right flank of their main drive.

Having set up their administration in the conquered lands, the Mongols moved south and destroyed Pereyaslav and Chernihiv. The Dnieper formed a natural barrier to their advance on Kiev. The Mongols waited until it was frozen and then, on the 6th of December 1240, overcoming the desperate defence of the inhabitants, they captured that capital of Eastern Europe.

1241 was the year of a *Blitzkrieg*. Batu's army passed further westward, devastating Volhynia and Galicia, taking Cracow and Breslau [Wroclaw]. At Liegnitz [Legnica] (9th April 1241) the Czech and Polish knights put up a stout defence. They were defeated and

it was a tragedy like that on the river Kalka (nine sacks full of ears cut off the fallen knights). This resistance, however, gave a certain degree of protection to the North-West of Europe. The march continued to Olomouc in Moravia and on to Magyar Hungary, where Budapest was taken on the 3rd July 1241. The left wing of the Mongol army reached the Adriatic, the Austrian town of Neustadt was occupied, and the fate of Vienna appeared to be sealed.

We have dwelt somewhat on the Mongolian campaign in order to stress the character of that historic event. It is not our task here to examine the reasons why Batu Khan eventually decided to turn back, thereby sparing Western Europe the later invasion by a different species of Huns. (Note: The mounted Bolshevik hordes of the years 1918-1920, as for instance Budenny's cavalry squadrons, were a faint but unmistakable historical reminiscence of those Mongol days. In the early Soviet literature of the 1920s two interesting books dealt with this subject: "Tuatamur" by Leonid Leonov and "Konarmiya" (English translation: "Red Cavalry") by Isaak Babel, the most valuable contributions, perhaps, to Soviet writing.)

As a consequence of the Mongol invasion the whole of Eastern Europe, with the exception of the coastal part of the Balkans, the entire territory of the Kiev empire with its former northern colonies, fell under Mongol domination, the "Tartar yoke", as the chronicles called it. In the western part of the Mongol Empire was the Golden Horde (Altun Orda), a strictly centralised unit, with its capital at Saray on the Lower Volga. Its economy was well organised and one of the main functions of the Golden Horde officials (the so-called *baskaks*) was the gathering of tribute from the conquered peoples.

One might expect that the effects of Mongol domination had been the same in all the principalities of the Ruś, that had even earlier become rather disorganised. But the course of history is far more influenced by cultural frontiers than by political ones.

The Kiev empire never had, and never could have had, a homogeneous civilisation. Its parts were not alike, neither ethnographically nor racially. European civilisation extended to the north-western frontier regions of Pereyaslav and Chernihiv and there, too, lay the ethnic borders.

The rapid conquest of the regions of the future Muscovy was no historical accident. Apart from Kozelsk, where there was terrible slaughter, the resistance of the northern principalities was not very strong. In the territory of Ukraine, with its fortified towns, the Mongols had to use all their tactical abilities and proceed in stages, while the poor towns of the North presented no particular difficulties to the ruthless invaders. Besides the material aspects, there was the important difference of the cultural backwardness of the northern population with its primitive Finnish admixture. The people there had no deep-rooted traditions and certainly no spiritual values with

which to oppose the conquerors. Unburdened by any historical tradition, any feeling of solidarity or national integrity, the northern Princes simply accepted the bondage imposed on them and thus surrendered morally.

The Muscovite realm acknowledged the Mongols' authority as a matter of fact. The Khan of the Golden Horde was their "Tsar" and his name was mentioned in church services. The Princes were nominated as governors by the "Khan-Tsar" and served him faithfully. They went as far as to arrest and deliver up for execution disobedient princes (as, for instance, the Moscow prince Ivan Kalita, who took Alexander, Prince of Tver, to the Golden Horde, where he was executed). These Governor-Princes acted as the chief tax-gatherers for the "Tsar of the Horde" and exercised their office conscientiously and with as much cruelty to their subjects as the Mongols themselves would.

It would, however, be one-sided not to mention the positive side of that political regime. The Tsar of the Horde was the acknowledged Tsar of the Muscovite realm; the Muscovite princes obeyed him blindly; the formally Christian Muscovite Church prayed for him; and the "Grand Prince" of Moscow was confirmed by him (even men like Alexander Nevsky).

In the meantime Moscow had become the centre of Muscovy. The autonomous Grand Prince of Moscow extended his power further and further; he stood above all other local princes, was their sovereign in relation to the Khan and, indeed, assumed absolute power over them. The main idea of Moscow imperialism, the "gathering of lands", took shape and began to be bloodily accomplished in the days of the "Tartar yoke." One of the most interesting experts comments on the subject: "...Under the iron heel of oppression our people and our country had come to comprehend the essence of power. It is this understanding which holds our country together and which transformed a mercenary protector of caravans into the autocratic Prince of Moscow... Thus it is to be explained that the Western White Tsar succeeded in uniting under his rule the heritage of the Grand Khan, of the "Sons of Heaven", of Jenghiz Khan and Kubilai Khan, and later to weld Russia into a military empire." (V. Ivanov in "We", chapter IV.)

The political unity of Muscovy and the later Moscow State, achieved by the Princes of Moscow under the supremacy of the Mongols, the characteristic totalitarianism of their political system, their autocratic and indivisible government and the technique of terror to maintain that government — all this was the result of the influence the Golden Horde had exercised for centuries, in short, the Mongolian training.

The totalitarianism of the Soviet regime of our time, the "collectivism" which, on principle, denies every individuality to men or classes, the abolition of private property (as the material basis for

the individual), terrorism as an administrative instrument, and much else (such as the deification of the Government; the army of police inside the country), these are not features of the "Revolution", of Socialism or of Marxism as such, but are the product of an historical process.

The fact that as soon as the Bolsheviks came to power Lenin removed the seat of government from the Europeanised Petrograd to Moscow is in itself of deep historical significance. The decision had nothing to do with Socialist or Marxist thought, but sprang from Lenin's thorough knowledge of the history and psychology of his people. V. Ivanov has this to say on the subject of Moscow: "After 300 years of battles, suffering, toil and heroism, our ancestors had at last found the magic word... That word was "Moscow", which was to create the Moscow State within the borders of the Mongolian empire and beyond them."

History repeated itself when in the year 1917 Moscow once more became the starting point, this time for the "Marxist" restoration of the Tsarist Empire, and the "European" Petersburg period of the empire was crossed out, as a hindrance to this process.

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There appears to be nothing more hopeless and fatal and, as it were, closed in on itself than the history of the Moscow State. And there is, probably, no other people so de-personalised, so severely and permanently violated by their Tsarist system, as the Muscovite-Russian people who are allegedly the masters of their empire. For all their cruelty, they are an unhappy people, even if they themselves are not aware of it.

"They are strong, usually of the same complexion as Europeans...", the German diplomat Adam Olearius wrote in 1633. "It makes one shudder to hear how children talk to their parents and parents to their children..." "They are devoid of shame... During a religious procession a harlot, in a fit of drunkenness, tore off her clothes. A drunken pilgrim tried to take advantage of the situation, but to the great amusement of the crowd he was not able to." "They call spirits the Tsar's wine... Their caviare and sturgeon taste good and are exported to England, Holland and Italy... They beat their wives to death... They are born slaves... In front of the Tsar they debase themselves, calling themselves by the most contemptuous names..." — "They have a despotic government. The nation is ruled by an hereditary autocracy which enslaves everyone. Aristotle would call this form of government a tyranny... The Muscovites say: 'Everything belongs to the Tsar and to God'... The Muscovites do not know what freedom is."

One could quote endlessly in the same vein. Similar descriptions can be found in other books, including contemporary ones, but it will

be enough to quote a writer of the twenties, who said: "The work of Adam Olearius reminds one of reports of the present time."

Has anything changed in the last four decades? "What has changed?" asked the Russian poet M. Voloshin (really Kiriyenko-Voloshin, of Ukrainian extraction), referring to the years 1917-1918, and answered: "On all roads the same high wind/ With the commissars: the spirit of despotism/ With the Tsars: outbreaks of revolution."

All that had changed was outward appearance and names; the nation itself, which had been shaped in peculiar circumstances and whose education was continued in an essentially identical environment as before, remained unchanged. On the throne of Moscow men of different character, different nationality, even of different race, followed each other. But from the Tsar-Revolutionary Peter I to the Revolutionary-Tsar Dzhugashvili (Stalin) the nature of things was the same. A modern chronicler need only copy what Adam Olearius wrote in the first half of the 17th century. It is possible that Peter I, who spent years of apprenticeship in Holland, really intended to transform the Moscow realm into a modern European empire when he gave it the name of the mediaeval Kiev state. It is possible that the Russian intellectual of Tartar descent, Ulyanov (Lenin), really wanted to destroy the tsarist system of Moscow and build a modern socialist empire. We know only too well what became of the "transformation." Behind the stocky figure of Lenin rose the tall spectre of Peter I, and the communist tsar Stalin was to emulate more and more the particularly typical Moscow Tsar Ivan the Terrible. As we know, Soviet historians were even ordered to rehabilitate that Tsar's image and Soviet writers were recommended to treat topics that would make analogies between that Tsar and Stalin possible.

Joseph Conrad proved to be prophetic and to the point when he remarked about 1905 that the words "evolution" and "revolution" sounded like a cruel mockery in the face of Russian reality. Taking a closer look at the latest "transformation" one realises that it affected — in a destructive form — only the non-Muscovite territories, which the Bolsheviks reconquered and re-occupied in the years 1918-1923 and later. There, Moscow agents introduced an alien form of government, and to there the elements of the Moscow culture were transplanted in a ruthless manner (abolition of private property, collectivisation of agriculture, deprivation of personal and national freedom, disregard for human dignity, extermination of Christianity) and every smallest sign of organic and historic national life was crushed under police and military pressure. Any conscientious and impartial historian must eventually arrive at the conclusion that the so-called Revolution is only one of the many paradoxes of Bolshevism: the national territory of Muscovite Russia knew no revolution. Behind the new trappings, new names, new banners and hymns, the

historically established government of Russia remained unchanged. The Bolshevik "Revolution" was powerless against it, as so many earlier revolutions had been. The historical government has devoured the revolution and historical tsarism has swallowed up "commissarism."

Deep down in its national consciousness the Russian people must have been aware for a long time of its ill-starred and hopeless history; and over the centuries this feeling was bound to produce a complex of inferiority. In the Russian folksongs, these sincerest confessions of the nation's soul, the same theme recurs again and again — not of sorrow, not of suffering, but of a fatalistic hopelessness, against which it is futile to strive. "It created a song, like a deep groan, and its spirit died for ever" — this is how Nekrasov felt, a poet whom even the Bolsheviks esteem as a competent judge of the Russian soul. It is well known that there is little to divide the complex of inferiority from its opposite, megalomania, and how easily it may change into it. The myth of "Moscow, the third Rome", from which a direct line leads to the other myth of "Moscow, the third International", is said to have arisen among the Byzantine emigrants in the 15th century. The relevant documents, however, name the monk Filofey as the first to coin the phrase for the benefit of Moscow. It was he, who from his monastery at Pskov twice appealed to the Grand Princes of Moscow (Basil III and Ivan IV): "The Empire (Byzantine Rome) dissolves into the Third Rome: the new great Russia. The Christian empires of the past converge in you; the first and the second Rome have fallen, but the third Rome, Moscow, stands and a fourth there will not be. You are the Tsar of all Christians in the world."

There, in the old Muscovy, we have the origin of that typical messianism, which the Russian intellectual elite of the mid-19th century — particularly the Slavophiles — did so much to strengthen. The Slavophile and Orthodox poet-philosopher A. Khomyakov (1801-1860) expressed his belief in the words: "Oh, you, who are unworthy, you have been chosen..." Khomyakov and the Slavophiles, of course, never tried in any way to motivate their faith. It was a later generation of Russian messianists who endeavoured to rationalise and, looking into the future, maintained, for instance, that the "direct transition to property-less socialism" was a prerogative, granted by Providence to Russia alone, while in the capitalist West the historically rooted right of possession would constitute a considerable obstacle to the development of socialism... So much for the "socialist" or communist ingredient of Russian messianism. The messianic idea permeates almost every sphere of Russian thought — not excepting that of the Westernisers — and above all Russian literature, to which we refer the reader interested in the subject. The scope of this article permits only a few general observations on the theme. Not-

withstanding the view expressed by V. Lypynsky that the sense of a messianic mission is inherent in every great nation, we are inclined to doubt this and to distrust all these forms of messianism, especially when they inspire our immediate neighbours.

Psychologically, every messianic idea grows on the borderline between inferiority and superiority complexes. Sometimes it can even be the peculiar manifestation of a despair that has its roots in history: hopelessness finding a pseudo-outlet in a more or less fantastic idea. Every genuine messianism is almost a kind of psychosis. And here we must distinguish "genuine" messianism from other forms, such as the British "Rule the Waves" or the German Wilhelmine "Berlin-Baghdad" notions, which are no more than national and political doctrines of a more or less rational order. Even an attempt, as that of Mykola Khvylovyi's "Asiatic Renaissance", to propound a Ukrainian messianism, nowadays strikes us as quite realistic and not at all messianic: it *could*, in certain circumstances, be a political doctrine of Ukraine. What is far worse is the case of a nation cast by its intellectuals in the role of "Christ" and the Queen of Heaven being proclaimed "Queen" of a mundane state.

But the concept acquires a really apocalyptic character in the messianism of Moscow, which, consciously or unconsciously, takes upon itself the mission of absolute Evil on a world-wide scale.

The only means to combat this psychopathic state is, of course, Christianity, true Christianity, the antithesis to the Antichrist.

IV. CHURCH AND TSARISM

In Adam Olearius's book there is a description of a street scene in early 17th century Moscow. Two soldiers meet a drunken pope (priest). They hasten to ask him for his blessing, but the pope loses his balance and falls in the mud of the road. The soldiers set him on his feet again and then receive the blessing from the intoxicated and dirty pope. Olearius mentions this apparently quite typical incident in his usual matter-of-fact style, and this brings out all the more the loathsome and sinister aspects of the situation. The author does not dwell on these impressions and incidents and does not attempt to explain them. This particular episode, however, deserves a somewhat closer look. It does not come as a surprise that a pope should be wandering dead drunk through the streets of Moscow, since we are well enough acquainted with that kind of thing from books (e.g. "The Russian pope of the 15th century" by O. Amfiteatrov). The servant of the Muscovite church at that time was usually illiterate and filthy, used bad language in church no less than his parishioners and was in no respect different from them. In a Christian from abroad the episode described must have left a lasting feeling of disgust. Separated by many centuries, we are today able to see the incident in perspective.

There can be no doubt that religion, whatever it may be, plays a very important part in the life of every human society. It is the most profound, innermost and most essential in human life and through it immediate contact with the soul of a people is established. Man is born with an ineradicable religious instinct. Attempting to oust Christianity, Bolshevism itself turns, consciously or unconsciously, into a satanic modification of historical Orthodoxy. The eminent orthodox thinker George Fedotov (1886-1951), the courageous and most competent judge of Russian political philosophy, has this to say: "In its structure, revolutionary Marxism is a Judeo-Christian apocalyptic sect... in its social class-consciousness and in its dogmatism, it displays the features of Orthodoxy." ("Novyy Grad"; N.Y., 1952, pp. 49-50).

The Russian, too, it seems, had and has an instinctive religious feeling, though in an extremely peculiar, "polarised" form which tends to deviate far from the nominally Christian content of his religion. Notwithstanding its obvious universality, Christianity invariably adapts to the geographic, cultural and political, that is national, environment in which it finds itself. Thus there is a great difference between eastern and western Christianity; and a still wider gap exists between the Orthodoxy of the Greeks and Bulgarians and that of, say, the Ethiopians. There are differences even in the Roman Catholicism of not only Brazil and Italy, but also of France and Germany.

For the Christianity of the ancient Kiev to reach the north-eastern regions of Suzdal, Vladimir and later, Moscow, severe obstacles had to be overcome in the course of several centuries. Since the cultural and moral climate of those regions was unfavourable, the Church had to resort to the difficult and dangerous device of the gradual "Christianisation" of pagan rites and customs. What made these areas particularly inaccessible to the standards of Christian ethics and to the very spirit of Christianity was their ethnic constitution.

The renowned Russian thinker D. Merezhkovsky once expressed his shock at the fact that at the (geographically near) Upsala University the subject of a dissertation was the question: "Are the Muscovites Christians?" — and that in the 18th century! As recently as the beginning of our own 20th century an ethnographical commission discovered authentic heathens in the neighbourhood of Petersburg.

Nevertheless, the religious sentiment of the Russian people cannot be doubted, although it finds its expression in imperfect, sometimes even repellent, quasi-Christian ritual forms, and the report by Olearius goes to confirm this. Very few people, however, know anything about the tragic, distorted and obscure history of Russia's religious development and what has provocatively been dubbed the "Raskol", i.e. heresy or schism.

What is significant in the episode Olearius described is, after all, not the fact that the priest was drunk, but that in spite of it the soldiers helped him up and asked his blessing. The men were obviously prepared to overlook the undignified circumstances in their respect for what the priest stood for in their eyes. To them the dirty, drunk and, no doubt, illiterate pope was still an agent who linked them, if not to heaven then at least to something of a superior order. As the word implies, religion is after all a bond uniting man and God, earth and heaven, soul and mind.

Behind the police and censor's term of "heresy" or the milder conception of the "Old Belief" lies Christianity in its national Russian interpretation; it is the Christian religion with that content and form which corresponded to the sensibility of the Muscovite-Russian people

and which they made their own and cultivated in the course of their historical development. That content and those forms may appear strange, primitive custom alien to us, yet such was the Christianity that flourished in the Muscovite State and came into conflict with the established Church.

The history of the Church in Europe is not without examples of antagonism between Church and State. We need only remember Canossa. The barefooted Emperor Henry IV in the snow before the gates of the castle of Pope Gregory VII is more than just an episode; the event marks an important stage in the history of the European attitude to spiritual power, without which the later historical development of the European continent, or even what we call European civilisation, would have taken rather a different turn. In the old Ukraine, spiritual authority stood inviolate and throughout the country's stormy history was never questioned. Political power bowed in deference before the church, emphasizing in this way that what is God's ranks higher than what is Caesar's.

The relationship between Church and State was of an entirely different character in the Moscow State and the later Russia. Already in pre-Muscovite Suzdal, there was the notorious Prince Andrew Bogolyubsky who, from political considerations, drove out Bishop Nestor, calling him an "unsuitable official." That was in the year 1157. From the 13th century onward, the Church of Moscow became more and more a tool of political power. It was on the orders of Ivan Kalita (that first champion of Moscow's rapacious imperialism) that the Moscow Church excommunicated Prince Alexander of Tver, who had fled to Pskov, cursed him as a criminal and as a "traitor to the legitimate Tsar of the Horde" (a heathen, that is), and at the same time excommunicated the whole of Pskov (1337). About four centuries later similar operation was carried out by the then synodal Petersburg Church against "the builder of churches", the Ukrainian Hetman Ivan Mazepa...

A sad chapter in history is the conquest of the principality of Tver by Moscow. In 1327 Tver rebelled against the Golden Horde. The insurrection was suppressed by Moscow, which was distrustful of the powerful Tver and saw in the troubles its opportunity to annex the territory in pursuance of its "gathering of Russian lands." Ivan Kalita, as official representative of the Golden Horde, not only crushed the rebellion, but ruthlessly robbed and devastated the once prosperous principality — "towns and villages were laid waste and the people slaughtered", as the chronicler puts it (who, incidentally, was himself a Muscovite). For ten years the exiled Alexander of Tver fought from Pskov and Novgorod for his rights and for the freedom of Tver. Ivan Kalita had in the meantime secured the Khan's permission for his annexation of the territory and now he planned

the destruction of the emigrant Prince himself. With that end in view he started a war against Pskov. When this proved unsuccessful, he persuaded the Khan to "invite" Prince Alexander to a "conference" at the Horde. There, Alexander and his son Theodore were murdered (1339). Thus Tver was "united" with Moscow.

Characteristic and instructive is the campaign against Church and Christianity conducted by the "militant Orthodox" Moscow Tsar Ivan the Terrible. The Metropolitan of the Moscow-Russian Church at the time, Philip Kolychev, of an old Boyar family, was a devout Christian, an educated and courageous man. In front of the altar of the Uspensky Cathedral in Moscow he publicly protested against the terroristic regime of the Tsar and his "bodyguard", the Oprichniki. Ivan IV repented for a while; but on the 8th September 1568 he had the Metropolitan dragged from amid his congregation in the cathedral by one of his chief Oprichniki, the Boyar Basmanov. All the Metropolitan's relatives were killed and the head of one of them was sent as a present from the Tsar to the Old-Nikolsky Monastery, to which the Metropolitan had been banished. But more was to come. On the 23rd of December 1569, the Tsar's "henchman", the Boyar Malyuta Skuratov, appeared at the monastery and on the Tsar's orders strangled the Metropolitan with his own hands.

All this took place before the eyes of the people, before the eyes of the faithful who had been deprived of their beloved spiritual leader. "The people remained silent" — as Pushkin expressed it in his tragedy "Boris Godunov." The people, who had for so long been politically violated, who were like a formless mass without any social structure, that people was incapable of reacting with a deed. But the better part of this silent people could not but pass judgment and draw conclusions in the depth of their hearts.

One more illustration will serve to show up the policies of Moscow tsarism with regard to the Church and religion, and thus to Christianity and God as such. In the year 1577, Ivan IV visited the Pskov Pechersky Monastery, which the Abbot Korniliy had had strongly fortified. This aroused the Tsar's suspicions (not without reason, perhaps) and in his rage the "Orthodox" Moscow Tsar struck the abbot dead with a pointed stick he always carried with him. And, most interesting of all, he had the tombstone inscribed with the words: "The Tsar on Earth has delivered him up to the Tsar in Heaven." This inscription — no less eloquent a symbol than "Canossa" was for the West — is an expression of the general attitude of Moscow towards Church and religion, of the spiritual autocracy of Moscow tsarism and of its ideology, as formulated by one of its greatest exponents.

There is a striking similarity between this inscription and the motto on Jenghiz Khan's official seal: "God in Heaven, Jenghiz Khan on Earth."

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The "Raskol", or Great Schism, a phenomenon of great complexity, had its roots deep down in the Russian soul. To begin with, it was an expression of protest against the derision and violation under which religion suffered at the hands of autocratic tsarism. In time, the Raskol of the Church took on a political character, which was a logical and quite natural development. When serfdom — which had originated under the tsar of Tartar descent, Boris Godunov, and had been confirmed as a basis of the Moscow State by Tsar Alexis Romanov in 1650 — became firmly established in law, the Raskol constituted, by virtue of its influence and a decidedly national character, an explosive element in the political life of the Moscow State.

We cannot examine here all the issues that were involved in the Raskol. All we can say is that its history is the history of the national and religious martyrdom of Moscow Russia. It is the record of the systematic moral and physical violation of the Russian people's soul, of their religious consciousness and ethical foundations, of everything most sacred to them, since tsarism denied the people even that minimum of freedom which the worst despotism normally concedes to its slaves. Not much has been written on the Raskol, and what there is usually is too one-sided, treating merely the ritual questions of the controversy. This is not surprising when one remembers the strict police censorship, which has been so typical a feature of every political system in Russia. Although the Raskolniki had sought support outside Russia (e.g. in 1857-58 in France under Napoleon III), the Raskol has unfortunately hardly been studied by scholars abroad.

The immaterial and superficial questions raised by the Raskol concerning church ritual — e.g. the "two-finger blessing" or the "double hallelujah" of the Old Believers, which were so ridiculed by the official Church, although they were after all national and traditional forms of ritual — must not detract from what was essential in the Raskol: 1) The rejection of the blasphemous Caesaro-Papism of Moscow; 2) the rejection of Moscow's political system of Antichrist (as the Raskolniki aptly called it), i.e. tsarist totalitarianism; and 3) active resistance against the violation of the people's soul.

The Raskol brought forth such personalities as the preacher Avvakum, whom the official, adulterated history books of Russia and the U.S.S.R. either ignore or ridicule. Avvakum was a born leader of the most upright character, a brilliant orator and an eminent ecclesiastical scholar. He was cruelly persecuted, twice banished and, when he remained "obstinately unrepentant", burnt at the stake at the head of his faithful followers (1st April 1681). Anyone who associated with him had his tongue cut out by the police of the

"most gentle" of tsars, Alexis Romanov, and whoever did not renounce him was hanged (as, for instance, Avvakum's pupil Avramiy in 1670 at Moscow).

The Raskol often had the armed support of the Moscow "Streltsy" (soldiers). We need only recall the various Streltsy risings in and before Peter I's reign. Peter's own son and heir, Alexis, was an adherent of the Raskol, and this is why he was murdered by his father. The Tsarevich had fled from his father to Vienna in 1716 and sought the protection of the Emperor Charles VI, to whom he was related by marriage. Peter forced his son by threats to return to Russia. After having been tortured and knouted, the Tsarevich was eventually choked to death "silently" between two pillows by his father's henchmen, the "aristocratic" Tolstoy, Buturlin, Ushakov and Rummyantsev.

The citadel of the Raskol, the Solovetskiy Monastery with its ninety cannon, which was later to acquire such a sad fame, was taken by assault after a desperate struggle on the 22nd of January 1676. No less than 20,000 Raskolniki were burned at the stake during the years 1666 to 1690 alone. In the 18th century there was incessant persecution and the Raskolniki committed mass-suicide by burning, often thousands at a time. As late as 1897, that is practically on the eve of the 1905 revolution, there were cases of mass-suicide by immurement.

In our day, we are amazed at the cruelty of the Russian people; and so was the writer Gorky, himself a son of that very people and a Bolshevik sympathiser. But no one cared to see the paths by which this people was led to such cruelty and — more important still — how its terrible spiritual emptiness was brought about.

It was tsarism, which for two centuries had re-moulded the "ruling nation" and trained it for its predatory, imperialist "historical mission", and which had methodically and remorselessly created a gaping spiritual void in the Russian soul (exemplified by nihilism among the intellectuals on the one hand, and the Raskolniki — "Nietovtsy", the negative peasant sects, on the other). The void was filled with messianic ideas of various kinds. Everything was done to breed hatred against all forms of organic culture, and malice and hidden envy mingled in the professed contempt for the "rotten West." Hatred was bred against the "Latin heresy" (Catholicism), against the "Khokhly" and "Cherkassishki" (contemptuous names for Ukrainians), the "Frantsuzishki" and the whole non-Russian world, which sooner or later was to be conquered. Bolshevism recognised and made use of that gaping void in the Russian soul. It drew on all the experience and employed all the means which past history supplied, and on that basis built a system, unprecedented in its reach and the intensity of its impact.

Let us look for a moment at the history of the Raskol in its relation to our own national culture. It is common knowledge that the Raskol and the movement which sprang from it were caused by the correction of the church books, undertaken on the initiative and by orders of the Patriarch of Moscow, Nikon. The grave errors which in the course of centuries had crept into the sacred books had long been obvious. The work of revision was at first assigned to a few Moscow churchmen but, owing to the ignorance and obscurantism prevailing in Moscow, their enterprise failed hopelessly. Nikon, who had previously been Archbishop of the newly annexed Novgorod and thus was used to a different climate in church life and culture, turned for help to the centre of that culture, to our Kiev. In 1649, the Kiev Academy sent a group of learned theologians (Epifaniy Slavynetsky, Arsen Satanovsky, Theodosiy Safanovych) to Moscow, who were to assist the "sister church" in its task. These were later joined by thirty scholars, translators and professors of the Greek language. They were shocked by what they found in the Moscow church books. Their criticism, although expressed in diplomatic terms, aroused a veritable storm of indignation and anger among the Moscow clergy, headed by the Bishop, who accused the revisers of "Latin heresy." It may be mentioned here that at an earlier stage the Greek scholar Arsen, who was the first to apply himself to the correction of the Moscow church books, had for that same "heresy" been banished to Solovetsky monastery and had only in 1656 been brought back by Nikon.

The rather belated attempt to adapt Moscow church life to the Ukrainian pattern did not achieve any positive results. After some time, it rather led to a terrible tragedy within the Moscow Church and finally to the complete subjection of the Church to the State. The official Church lost all influence and was reduced for ever to the role of just another government department in the civil administration of the Moscow State and, afterwards, of the Russian Empire. The attempt made during the Revolution of March 1917 to restore the Moscow Patriarchate, i.e. the autonomy of the Church, was quickly and radically suppressed by the Bolshevik regime and its traditionally Muscovite methods.

These facts show up once more the strong contrast and most essential difference between the Churches of Kiev and Moscow, both supposedly adhering to the same "Orthodox" faith.

In spite of all historical evidence, Bolsheviks as well as anti-Bolshevik Russians continue to cling to the phantom of the "unity of faith" between the Russian and Ukrainian Orthodox Churches. The so-called Moscow Patriarchate, reconstituted under Bolshevik auspices after World War II, has made "the unity of the Orthodox

faith" and its "militant mission" the basis of its church policy (designed, of course, to prop Soviet imperialism). Thus — to give only one example — it drove, with the help of Soviet security police, Ukrainian Catholicism in Galicia under ground.

But to return to Patriarch Nikon who was Patriarch of Moscow from 1652 to 1658. Like his predecessor of tragic fame, the Metropolitan Philip Kolychev, he was a remarkable man. In contrast to Philip who was a nobleman by birth, Nikon was of humble birth (like Pope Gregory VII). Hardened in his stormy youth, he showed an iron will and great, sometimes overwhelming ambition. It may well be that he tried to model himself on Gregory VII, for there were elements of papal caesarism in his church-reforming activity. It was he who declared that "the priest is above the tsar." He consented to becoming Patriarch only after the Tsar had long and humbly beseeched him and had gone on his knees before him (a humiliation for which Tsar Alexis apparently never forgave him). Before being enthroned, Nikon was able to persuade the Tsar to have the remains of the Metropolitan Philip murdered by Ivan the Terrible transported in state from Solovetskiy monastery to Moscow (1651). In short, the year 1652 was a Russian version of Canossa in the history of the Moscow Church. At a number of Councils, Nikon achieved the *de facto* autonomy of the Moscow Church and eventually even had his own archers, a military force not subordinate to the Tsar's authority. Nikon might very well have solved great historical and church problems if he had not stepped outside the ecclesiastical sphere and reached for political power, and if he had shown some understanding for the Raskol and its leaders.

It is an illustration of the chaotic conditions in Moscow at the time that the Patriarch and the Raskol movement should have become deadly enemies. The conflict was paradoxical, since both sides really pursued the same aim — i.e. spiritual emancipation and independence of Church from State — and had become divided only on purely superficial and unessential issues (the two-finger crossing, the double Hallelujah, etc.). In the course of centuries, these ceremonial customs had become a fossilized, sacrosanct church ritual, which took on the character of dogma and was defended with religious-nationalist fanaticism.

Nikon's radical measures in the matters of Church rite and his unrestrained lust for power eventually led to his ruin. In the meantime, the cunning Tsar Alexis bestowed on him the dubious gift of the title "Gosudar", or sovereign, which in name put him on a level with the Tsar. This caused a violent reaction not only from the nationally oriented Church (the later Raskolniki), but also from national political circles, the Boyars, who saw in it an attempt to weaken the absolute power of the secular government. Tsar Alexis,

who had for some time been aware of Nikon's real intentions, cleverly exploited these antagonisms. In the end, Patriarch Nikon was the loser in the unequal struggle, the Raskol crystallized into its final form, and the tsarist regime acquired its last polish in dealing with church affairs. From now on the tsarist system was able to formulate the principles of its church policy for centuries to come. In this connection Peter I, the son of Tsar Alexis, was to play a decisive role.

Peter's "reform" of the Moscow Church was, in the words of an expert on the subject, "outright blasphemy and mockery." "Peter succeeded in weakening the national forces of Orthodoxy and to deprive them of their sight" (G. P. Fedotov, "Novy Grad"). He "reconstructed" the official Church and added to it a new institution, the Holy Synod (Protestant in origin, but old-Muscovite in content). For the suppression of the Raskol Peter enlisted police and army forces; he imposed special taxes and even decreed special dress for the Raskolniki. During his reign, the watchwords of the Raskol were coined: "The Tsar is the servant of Antichrist" (Peter himself was simply called "Antichrist", or "Usurper", or "the Jew from the tribe of Dan", etc.); "the two-headed eagle is of demoniac ancestry, since only the devil has two heads"; the Synod was called "Jewish Sanhedrin", and the Senate — "Antichrist's Council."

The Pugachev rebellion of a later period (1773-1775) can in all probability be regarded as the armed rising of the Raskol against the "Antichrist's state", just as the earlier revolutionary activity of Razin was no mere coincidence. But it was already the swan-song of a movement, which had had its great chance at the time of its birth and growth around the middle of the 17th century, when Tsar and Patriarch were engaged in the struggle for supreme power. By virtue of its peculiarly Russian nationalist character, however, the Raskol itself was under the spell of "the nationalist conception of power." It is significant that both Razin and Pugachev were Don Cossacks by origin and officers of Cossack forces by profession.*

*) Note: The only study of the movements led by these men is by the Ukrainian historian M. Kostomarov (see his monograph on "The Revolt of Stenka Razin" and other writings). Western scholars have shown hardly any interest in the subject and seem to have accepted the official version of Russian historiographers, according to whom Razin and Pugachev were nothing more than agitators, unbridled and ignorant representatives of the mob. But, first of all, both Razin and Pugachev were officers, not "mob", and they commanded forces numbering tens of thousands. Their enthusiastic followers were the non-Russian Tartars, Mordvins, Kalmucks etc., as well as the population of the Cossack regions. Both men had their own political ideas and principles. These armed rebellions were only with great difficulty put down by the Moscow and Petersburg governments, who used every means from bribery, treason and "fifth columns" to terrorism, including the wholesale slaughter of populations and the burning down of towns and villages.

The Raskol proved unable to found its own anti-tsarist church, with its own teaching and its own hierarchy. It succumbed to the idea that the Tsar was the sole embodiment of national power. The Raskol as such ceased to exist; but the forces which produced it have kept alive.

Peculiarly transformed, the essential features of the Raskol appeared again in such groups as the Slavophiles and the Narodovoltsy (The Will of the People), as well as in the attacks on the life of tsars, in the Rasputin episode, and in the S.R.s (Socialist Revolutionary Party). It was to a large extent the elemental force of the Raskol which gave the first impetus to the early groping attempts of Bolshevism. And it was due to the passive attitude of the nation, which the repression of the Raskol had induced, that the "foreign" seed of Marxism found fertile and historically prepared soil. With a people deprived of its faith and of elementary human rights, condemned to slavery and divested even of the right to personal property, with the structure of society destroyed and reduced to an inorganic "collective" mass, Moscow Russia was indeed "the chosen one", as Khomyakov expressed it.

But chosen by whom and to what purpose?

V. TSARDOM

As the reader will by now have appreciated, the subject under discussion is so vast that it cannot be exhaustively treated even in a number of volumes, far less in one small book. The Polish scholar Jan Kucharzewski collected in the twenties and thirties an enormous amount of material, which he published in the seven volumes of his "From White to Red Tsarism." The author tends, however, to get lost in too many abstractions and theories. He never saw and experienced Russia and thus he is not really familiar with its mentality. For the sheer wealth of material brought together, the work is nevertheless most valuable.

The interest and reasonably well informed reader may justifiably point to serious omission in these pages. Circumstances did not permit to treat or go into detail about certain side issues or subordinate themes, such as Moscow's "German Suburb" in the 16th and 17th century, for instance. This was the district assigned to the merchants and diverse experts from Western Europe who had taken service with Moscow. Not a few of these settlers were adventurers and even criminals, a fact in which one can see certain analogies with the Moscow Comintern of the 1920's and 30's. Historical writing has not shed much light on the part played by the German Suburb, but there cannot be any doubt that it was an important one. Through these foreigners in her midst Moscow became acquainted with the technical achievements of Western civilization and — what is even more important — through them Moscow was able to advance her foreign policies and spread her political myths.

Our account has had to omit such important events in the history of Moscow as the appearance of the pseudo-Tsar Dmitry I in 1605-1606. (There was to be a second false Dmitry as well). Although external forces were quite obviously at work (i.e. Poland, the Vatican, Ukrainian magnates headed by Prince Constantine Ostrozhsky, and the Cossacks of Ukraine), the persistent appearance of Pretenders at that period must primarily be seen as a natural reaction of the Moscow-Russian people to the preceding terrorist regime of Ivan the Terrible. Even the Ukrainian Hetman, Bohdan Khmelnytsky, had another Pretender "in reserve" (Timoshka Akundinov) in case he might be needed. Seen in historical perspective, the championing of Pretenders appears to us now as the first and, to that extent, perhaps

the only effort made by Russian society to free itself from its Mongolian past and to join the ranks of Western society and civilization.* For the lack of success the blame does not lie with the Pretender Dmitry I. To judge from the scant information available, he was a remarkable personality, an able statesman and ruler, who fully grasped the problems which confronted him in Moscow. The reasons for the collapse of this westernising attempt at the beginning of the 17th century are to be found in the carelessness of the outside instigators, in their inability to carry through an enterprise of historical importance at that vital time, in their ignorance about the psychology of the Russian people and its religious and national orthodoxy. A further factor responsible for the failure was the attitude of the Boyars at home. They even murdered Dmitry, who had become the idol of the Moscow populace.

On this, as on so many other occasions, the obstacle to change arose out of that obscure psycho-historical complex of Tsardom and Orthodoxy, which defies all attempts at rational analysis. It crystallized in Tartar times and has held the Russian soul in chains which can apparently never be shaken off.

The leaders of the revolutionary attempts that followed — the Don Cossacks Stenka Razin and Yemelyan Pugachev — were, as we have seen, by no means as primitive as official Russian history makes them out. (The most valuable contribution on the subject of these two men was made by M. Kostomarov, who also wrote about the "Samozvantsy", the Pretenders.) Both Razin and Pugachev were men of character and experience, the latter having travelled abroad. Both built their strategy on the strong moral basis of the Raskol. It was in their tactics that they made mistakes. Razin, who had a vast army and whose command extended from the Caspian to the White Sea, was ingenuous enough to declare: "I do not wish to be Tsar." And, yet more naïve, he acted accordingly when the revolutionary struggle was at its peak. Pugachev drew a lesson from Razin's experience and from the start claimed to be Tsar Peter III (who had recently been murdered by the lover of his wife, Catherine II). However, he could not keep up the pretence for long. One of the

*) Note: That "tsardom" in its political aspects was of Mongolian origin — a modification, in fact, of the Tartar khanate — is beyond question. The distinct culture, which the Tartars bequeathed to Moscow, has been clearly outlined by G. Fedotov in his "Novy Grad": "The Tartar element penetrated the body of Moscow and took hold of its soul. This spiritual conquest occurred at a time when the political power of the Horde was on the wane. In the 15th century, thousands of baptised and unbaptised Tartars entered the service of the Moscow Princes, filling up the ranks of the service-gentry, i.e. the future nobility... It was not so much under the 200 years of the Tartar yoke, but after it, that Moscow lost its freedom."

Many public figures of the later Petersburg empire were of Tartar descent, e.g. Derzhavin, Aksakov, the extreme Westerniser Chaadayev, and others. Even Turgenyev and L. Tolstoy had Tartar blood.

reasons for this was that the "Europeanised" administration of Catherine II functioned more efficiently than that under Tsar Alexis, when there were *de facto* two Orthodox Churches, when the preacher Avvakum made his passionate appeals and the tsarist regime was shaken in its foundations by the storms of the religious controversy.

Pugachev lost his moral influence when the people began to suspect that he was not Peter III, and the talents of General Suvorov helped to bring about his military defeat. By the use of terror and bribery (a reward of 10,000 roubles was on Pugachev's head), the rebellion was crushed. It was to be the last of the revolutionary attempts of this kind in the history of Russia. In the succeeding centuries the spiritually "for ever pacified" Russian nation could do no more than either "remain in silence", to use Pushkin's words, or to lend itself as a blind, soul-less tool to Petersburg and Soviet tsarism.

Another subject for which there is no room in these pages is the peculiar phenomenon of the Russian "Intelligentsia." As Russian-Bolshevist legend and influence spread in the West, this uniquely Russian concept has found its way into the vocabulary of European nations, although it is hard to see why Western social psychology should have burdened itself with an additional concept that never was an element of organic culture.

Let us here only briefly state that the Intelligentsia of the Petersburg empire must not be regarded as identical with what is commonly meant by the term "intellectuals", i.e. members of the learned professions. They did not belong to any distinct national or professional categories, but formed an enclave, an enlarged "German Suburb" as it were, within the society of the empire. They were people of diverse origin, background and education, who had gravitated from the various subject nations into the service of the government, which needed their cooperation as, for instance, primary school teachers, journalists, lawyers, doctors, writers and university professors. These people, who had been uprooted from their native soil, their society and their national culture, were entirely lacking in national consciousness; they were anational. Their official "Russian nationality" was a meaningless formality. This explains the renegade mentality, conscious or unconscious, which resulted in stunted minds and creative impotence. While the lower orders of the Intelligentsia served in the capacity of administrators as tools for the imperial policy of Russification, the upper strata — consisting predominantly of scientists and writers, but also artists — were responsible for creating various myths and, particularly, for perpetuating and elaborating, not without success, the lost legend of the empire. The very existence of the Intelligentsia was taken as "visible" proof of the correctness of the doctrine of the indivisibility of the empire. The same school of thought prevails today among the majority of Russian emigrants, who propagate these ideas outside the borders of the USSR.

The fate of the "All-Russian Intelligentsia" under Bolshevism was a tragic one. After it had found its political expression in the Kerensky government and had played the role of midwife at the birth of Bolshevism, it was destroyed, even physically, by the same Bolshevism it had helped to bring into the world. There were various more or less logical reasons for this turn of events. For one, it is obvious that, with few exceptions, the members of the Intelligentsia, accustomed to the Europeanised atmosphere of the Petersburg empire, were incapable of fulfilling any function in the mediaeval and national Muscovy that was reborn during 1917-1920.

Since the late 1920's, however, the Bolshevik regime can clearly be seen to aim at the creation of a new Intelligentsia, this time calling it "Sovietskaya", which is to play the traditional role of supporting the imperial idea.

There is a considerable amount of literature on the Russian Intelligentsia, yet we would refer our readers to the concise, but weighty, contribution made on the subject by G. Fedotov in his "Novy Grad."

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No historical event of any significance should ever be regarded as a *deus ex machina*. Every occurrence is explained by historical development. The phenomenon of Bolshevism has more than proved this axiom: It exposed to the eyes of the world the inner workings of the Moscow state machine and clearly demonstrated the spirit of traditional tsarism. Let us now look at a few details. The fact that most of those who went abroad never returned to Russia is nothing new. When Tsar Boris Godunov (a Tartar, successor to Ivan the Terrible) sent eighteen youths to study in Western Europe, not one of them came back. "Once one has breathed the air of spiritual freedom one is not likely to return to prison", comments G. Fedotov on the matter.

Neither the sovkhoz nor the kolkhoz is a result of Communism or Marxism, nor are they inventions of the Bolsheviks. Up to 1861, all landed properties in the Moscow and Petersburg empire were state farms, i.e. "sovkhozes"; and every village on ethnographically Russian territory always has been a "kolkhoz." When Ukraine was conquered by the force of arms, there, too, collective farms in the shape of "military colonies" were established by the dictatorial Arakcheyev, the minion of Alexander I. Bolshevism merely continued and intensified traditional policies in agriculture and followed in the steps of Peter I in its methods of "industrialisation."

Among the apostles of the Muscovite "obshchina" (communal ownership) were, besides the reactionary tsarist politicians, such radicals and progressives as Alexander Herzen, Chernyshevsky (the "dishevelled seminarist", as Shevchenko called him), N. Mikhaylovsky

— one of Lenin's mentors — and Karl Marx himself. Around the year 1880, the inventor of "scientific" socialism accepted and confirmed the Chernyshevsky-Mikhaylovsky theory, according to which the Russian communist obshchina provided the basis for direct transition to Marxist communist socialism, bypassing "the terribly long road" (Chernyshevsky) taken by "Roman-feudalistic, bourgeois-industrialised Europe" (Herzen).

All these men, together with the declared reactionaries like Leontyev, Pobedonostsev and others, and even Leo Tolstoy (as philosopher), were unanimous in their hatred of the humanist civilisation of Europe.

There is nothing in the history of modern "Russia" that does not have its roots in the past. Neither the open aggressiveness of Moscow nor the carefully hidden inner causes of that aggressiveness are anything new. The whole history of "Russia", of that "military empire", is the history of incessant, rapacious, cynical imperialism.

In the reign of Ivan IV, at a time which did not appear to be particularly favourable for expansionist activity, the biggest and for the history of Moscow most characteristic conquests were made, both in the West and in the East: the Western republics of Novgorod and Pskov, and the Tartar khanates of Kazan and Astrakhan. Moreover, in that same period Siberia was conquered by the Cossacks of the so-called "fringe nations", i.e. elements generally incompatible with Moscow. A paradox? No, rather a clever move of the interior imperial policy of Moscow. It achieved thereby the diversion of potentially revolutionary forces, which spent themselves in raids on foreign countries. How often, from Tsars to Soviet, the "political wisdom" of Moscow had recourse to this traditional device! Was not the war with Japan a desperate — and for the Petersburg regime tragic — attempt to evade the 1905 revolution?

In the hope that we have been able in the preceding pages to sketch the rough outline of our topic, let us now leave metaphysics aside and proceed to an examination of the more technical political aspects of the subject. Let us pass from bygone centuries to a period much closer to us, with which contemporaries are familiar either from personal experience or from first-hand description by the older generation.

The names of two eminent statesmen of the last phase of the Petersburg empire, Witte and Stolypin, will not be unknown to our readers. The careers of these two, by now historical figures — at which we shall be looking more closely in a moment — are strikingly symbolic of the perennial problem, which might be called the political doctrine of every kind of "Russia."

Summarizing what has been said before, this political doctrine can be variously formulated: beginning with the "God in Heaven, Tsar on Earth" dictum of Old Muscovy, through the "Orthodoxy and Autocracy" of Nicholas I, to the "Workers of the World, Unite"

slogan of the present. What is most essential and characteristic in this doctrine can be expressed in a few rational, though necessarily somewhat simplified, statements:

"Russia", no matter what her political form may be, can never tolerate within her dominion any kind of freedom, neither the freedom of the individual, nor that of the family, nor that of the race and, least of all, national freedom, not even that of the ruling nation (under Nicholas I the word "nation" was considered "revolutionary" and was prohibited). There can be no freedom for body or mind. Thus even the Church can be no more than a department of the Ministry of the Interior. "Russia" has at all times been based on the extinction of all individuality and hence, on the abolition among her people of private property, as this would provide a basis for personal freedom. "Russia" is therefore either the private domain of an autocrat or the "socialist" property of the formless, impersonal, soulless collective, i.e. ultimately it is part of a centralised state bureaucracy.

Owing to the numerous internal frontiers between nations, races and cultures, that have no spiritual connection of any kind with Russia, the government of the "Russian" empire — whether it is autocratic or "democratic" (and there even was once a democratic Russia) — has to maintain an extensive police apparatus with huge forces, dedicated to repressive action inside the country. (In the present USSR the police force is not much smaller than the standing army.) This state of affairs arises logically from the internal political situation, and no "Kerensky" could get away from the inner law of the "Russian" political structure. Outsiders may have failed to detect it in the reign of the Tsars, but the Bolsheviks have disclosed all the secrets of the basic political "law" to the whole world. The foundations on which the political structure of "Russia" rests can thus be seen as 1) total extinction of individuality, 2) prohibition of private property, and 3) systematic and all-pervading terror, modified and applied as circumstances require. And this, in essence, is "Russia's" political doctrine. Its logical consequences are obvious: military aggressiveness; the building up, by diplomacy, of "neutral zones" and moveable "iron curtains", behind which numerous agents in the shape of "communist parties", "fifth columns" and a host of "experts" are in action. (The latter, who know the defence secrets of their respective countries, often are ostensibly engaged in harmless theoretical "Sanskrit studies" or in practical homosexuality.)

We have seen then that Russia, in its imperialist role, must perforce disseminate the political and cultural ideas of mediaeval Muscovy throughout the countries, peoples and cultures it has conquered ("re-united"). Since this cannot be done without force, "Russia" must always be a militaristic empire and pursue a course of aggression and, to use non-diplomatic language, of robbery and destruction.

Two renowned statesmen of the Petersburg empire had gained a deep insight into the civilization of Western Europe and noted with concern how that civilization steadily pervaded the western parts of the empire. Both had the courage to pursue policies which might well be called revolutionary. But, alas, unknown to themselves they played the roles of tragic heroes. They engaged in a fight against the historical *moira* (to use a classical term) of Russia itself and the outcome could be no other than that of every tragedy.

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Sergei Witte (who on his dismissal was made a Count) was the son of Julius Witte, probably a German settler from the Baltic area or, more likely still, from the region of Odessa. His brilliant civil service career, which sounds almost like a fairy tale — from station-master at Fastov to Prime Minister of the Empire, began with a chance meeting with Tsar Alexander III. Shortly after the railway disaster near Birky in Ukraine, in which the imperial train was involved, Alexander happened to overhear from the window the conversation between the train commandant and some unknown official. The latter said in a raised voice: "The life of my Emperor is more important to me than your regulations. I cannot permit the train to travel at such a speed, because I know the profile of the track on my line." The Tsar had the official called to his carriage and asked him his name. It was Sergei Witte, master of a section on the South-Western Railway. Soon afterwards Witte was appointed Minister of Transport. His rise led in Witte to a peculiar Hamlet mentality: although a democrat of Western type and almost a republican by conviction, he was dazzled by the boundless opportunities with which the absolutist tsarist regime presented a man of his ability and energy and by the vast field of activity which seemed to stretch before him. Witte was also an excellent mathematician (Odessa University had held out to him an academic career) and his versatility and creative energy made him an outstanding personality. His monetary reform, which immensely strengthened the empire's economic position, and his brilliant negotiation of the Portsmouth peace treaty with Japan after what looked like a fatal defeat for Russia — these are examples of Witte's extraordinary talents. He was past master in handling the empire's administration, which he wanted, if not to reform, at least to perfect, and he clearly did so with some success. The later course of his career, however, demonstrated how tragically utopian his plans were.

Witte was fully aware of the peculiar political structure of the empire and saw all the shortcomings in its administration, which to him, a progressive of the 19th century, appeared historically outdated. He perceived clearly the frontiers of nationalities and cultures

which cut across the geographical "unity" of the empire, a unity which could only be maintained by the secret police and large forces of constabulary and gendarmes. As a man of Western background with a mathematician's mind, Witte knew only too well that this "unity" was a function of unknown qualities and could not be relied on. He intended, cautiously and without taking anyone into his confidence, to bring about by evolutionary processes the transformation of the inorganic and internally incoherent "Russian" empire into a centralised-monarchistic, but organic federal state after the German pattern. To achieve his aim, he proposed to enlist — and herein lies the tragic paradox — the help of autocratic and omnipotent tsarism itself. (When Witte was asked one day how he envisaged the future "Russia", he promptly replied: "Like the United States of America." This was presumably during the conference at Portsmouth, N.H., when he came into personal contact with the USA.)

One can hardly assume that Witte was ignorant of the history of Russia or the nature of the Muscovite nation, or that he did not see the significance of certain typically Russian phenomena (he perceptively described, for instance, the established religion as "orthodox paganism"). But there can be no doubt that he was prevented by his German antecedents and European education, as well as by his positivist and rationalist mode of thinking, from comprehending the spirit of historical Muscovite tsarism that lay behind the façade of "emperors" and the German Romanov-Holstein-Gottorp dynasty. His knowledge of the past must have been based on the distorted version of traditional teaching, otherwise he would not have failed to see how over the centuries Moscow had developed the tsarist principle, how it had created an ideology and built a whole system around it. In short, when Witte embarked on his venture he was not aware of the tremendous difficulties ahead of him, nor did he realise that the first and most formidable obstacle barring his way would be the very institution — historical tsarism, his arch-enemy — which he, from his rationalist and European point of view, had naïvely regarded as an ally or at least the Archimedean lever for his reforms.

Witte wanted to overcome tsarism with the help of tsarism — this was the tragic paradox in his undertaking. Never a favourite with the last of the Tsars, Nicholas II (a belated romanticist of orthodox tsardom, who was already under the influence of Rasputin), Witte was called upon to govern only in moments of obvious crisis. ("Jack of all trades" was his own ironic description of himself.) He saved the dynasty and the empire when he quenched the fires of the 1905 revolution by causing the Tsar to issue the Manifesto of 17th October 1905. It was a vague and anaemic document, promising a pseudo-constitution. (It is quite possible, and would be rather like him, that Witte himself genuinely believed in the sincerity of Nicholas II, whose disaster he had averted.)

After the introduction of the gold standard and the Treaty of Portsmouth, this was the third political battle Witte had won. Unfortunately he seemed to be one of those who win every battle but lose the war. The monetary reform and the Portsmouth treaty did not interfere with the essence of tsarism, they rather helped to strengthen it. But the October Manifesto, weak though it was, with which Witte had averted the immediate threat to the tsarist regime, was a different matter. When Witte in his simplicity tried to insist on the fulfilment of the promises made in the Manifesto, he, who was a statesman and devoted servant of the empire, was dismissed by the Tsar like a lackey whose services were no longer required.

Witte's idealistic plans, which he cherished and for which he was prepared to suffer — he often was snubbed by the flunkies at court, who looked at him as an upstart, — were thus wrecked overnight. They had come into collision with the basic concept of "Russia", with the principle of the inviolate and indivisible historical tsarism which, with the help of "Orthodoxy", had over the centuries been built up into a dogma and become a taboo.

Witte, Count of the "All-Russian" empire, the giant among the nonentities of a degenerate court, whom tsarism had overthrown, died forgotten and dishonoured on the eve of another outbreak of the Revolution whose tide he had stemmed in 1905. As on previous occasions in the history of the Moscow State and of Russia, this revolution was once more to be a "pitiless and senseless rebellion" (to use Pushkin's phrase) — the rebellion of a people whom tsarism had turned into slaves and who, as we now know, fought their battles on tsarist terms.

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The task which another protagonist in the last act of the Petersburg tragedy had set himself appeared far more modest and less revolutionary — at least at first sight.

Peter Stolypin came from a noble Russian family and was certainly one of the best representatives of the nation that ruled the empire. He owned an estate in Lithuania and was for some time Governor of that Western colony. He was thus in a good position to compare the conditions of the Lithuanian peasantry, who owned the land they worked, with those of the Moscow peasants, who had never even known the right to property. He came to the conclusion that if the peasantry of his mother country was to be a support for the monarchy and the tottering empire it had to be put on a sound basis, and that the only way to achieve this was to introduce legislation which made the peasant the owner of the land he cultivated.*

Shortly after Witte's dismissal, Stolypin was appointed Minister of the Interior and subsequently Prime Minister. With great

persistence and energy he worked on the land question and finally persuaded the Tsar, still alarmed by the 1905 revolution, to issue the edict which made it possible for a peasant to claim his holdings as personal property (9 Nov., 1906). This would have eventually transformed the peasant from his traditional status of "kolkhoz-member" of his village community into a free farmer on his own land.

It would seem that Stolypin's plan was perfectly logical and natural and no more than a necessary modicum of reform, but subsequent events were to show that even his moderate aims were revolutionary and, alas, utopian.

In the autumn of 1911, while attending a gala performance at Kiev with the Tsar and the Court, Stolypin was assassinated. The murderer, Bogrov, was able to get into the well-guarded opera house because he was himself an assistant of the Secret Police who were responsible for the security of the building. At the same time he was supposed to have been a member of a revolutionary terrorist group. (If so, one might have expected that he would have assassinated the Tsar himself, the main target of terrorist activity...)

In the history of the Russian revolutionary movement collaboration between revolutionaries (or rather the terrorists among them) and the imperial secret police was not without precedent (Azev, Father Gapon, and others). It is now difficult to analyse the exact circumstances of Stolypin's murder, particularly since the authorities at the time dealt with the matter very rapidly and without leaving any documents or accounts. The circumstances of the Prime Minister's death were certainly strange and will no doubt remain for ever a secret.

There was no secret whatever about the attitude to Stolypin's agrarian reform of the revolutionary movement on the one hand (which contained the seed of the future Bolshevik government) and of the highest nobility close to the throne, on the other. The revolutionaries saw in a strong land-owning peasantry ("kulaks") a danger for their plans, since a prosperous peasant class would not provide a motive force of revolution. But how is one to explain the opposition against the land reform, and the hatred for the man who launched it, on the part of those who were his equals in rank, wealth

*) What is generally known in the history of Russia as the Emancipation of the Serfs amounted to freeing the peasant from personal slavery and from unpaid labour on the estate of the landowner. The land, which had previously been the *de jure* property of the State and had been apportioned, together with the serfs, to various individuals in remuneration of their services, was now the property of the gentry. The peasant himself was not granted the right of ownership of his holding and was burdened with excessive redemption payments. The 1861 Act consequently created a huge agricultural proletariat. Foreseeing unfortunate effects, the more judicious had warned Alexander II of "these half-measures" of reform, as they called them. In the Russian colonies — Ukraine, Poland, the Baltic provinces, etc. — where Roman law of property prevailed for centuries, the agrarian situation developed on somewhat different lines.

and cultural background? What caused the pronounced displeasure of the Tsar with a man whose antecedents were unimpeachable, whose loyalty to the monarchy and whose personal qualities — benevolent intention, sincerity, courage — were beyond question (in contrast to Witte's case)? What was the reason for the fact, reported by contemporaries, that Stolypin's death — allegedly by the hand of a revolutionary — made the Tsar and the top members of the court and of the bureaucracy heave "a sigh of relief"?

There is only one possible answer to these questions: As Witte before him, Stolypin and his land reform had come into serious conflict with the dogmatic basis of the concept of "Russia." They violated the principle which made the State the owner of the depersonalized slave — the subject, who must be held captive in the traditional village commune, and who must not be allowed to have any property of his own, since that would provide a material basis for individuality and personal freedom. In the permanently tsarist Russian system there is no room for individuals. The efforts of both Witte and Stolypin were after all along lines which would inevitably lead to the natural disintegration of "Russia", i.e. the dissolution of the empire. All those anxious to preserve the traditional concept of "Russia" — the Tsar and the monarchists, the "Revolutionaries" and the Socialists, even the Liberals under Milyukov — could not but feel themselves threatened by a genuine revolution which Stolypin's measures had initiated. As a result, Peter Stolypin, faithful supporter of tsarist rule and monarchist by conviction, member of a noble Russian family, was murdered by an agent of both tsarism and "revolution", and with him died the national spirit of his own people.

It is noteworthy that in the Duma of 1906 the liberal democrats, with Milyukov at their head, who were supposed to be extremely "Western" in their outlook, came out against Stolypin's reform and in favour of maintaining the old collective ownership of land by the village community. Even to these "Europeanised" circles the "commune" was taboo. Their arguments were pretty confused; Stolypin's plan, it was said, was governed by the policy of the nobles, the landed gentry would be replaced by the kulaks, and it was tantamount to "destroying" the historical evolved "commune"...

The Leftists demanded that the allotments should remain the property of the village community as a whole and should not be allowed to be sold to individual peasants. They called for increased production by intensive farming, mechanisation and cooperative methods (P. Milyukov, *Memoirs*, Vol. 2). So we see that as early as 1906 the Left had kolkhozes, sovkhoses and MTS (i.e. machine and tractor stations) in mind.

It is significant that the death of Stolypin was sincerely deplored only in Ukraine. The villagers were grateful to him for making their economic emancipation from the empire easier, and the "Little

Russian" nobility saw in him a man who could have brought about a healthy reorganisation of the empire and thus rendered it viable (at least for a time). The only monument erected to the memory of Stolypin in the whole of the empire therefore stood — until 1917 — in Kiev, in front of the town hall of the Ukrainian metropolis.

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