

RELIGION AND IDENTITY IN THE CARPATHIANS

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"The worst thing that has happened in the world during the past few years is the appointment of the Pole, Wojtilla, as Pope. His aggressive brand of Catholicism has had a particularly negative impact on our people." So spoke an Orthodox priest from a Carpathian mountain village in far northeastern Czechoslovakia during the course of a conversation in 1986.

This uncompromising statement, spoken as it was by a young priest in his late twenties who is exceedingly popular among his parishioners for his religiosity and liturgical practices, captures in essence the centuries-old religious animosities that continue to persist in the Carpathian region, despite many changes wrought in the social and political fabric of the local society in the course of the twentieth century. The message of the Carpathian village priest is undeniable and reflects a reality known to many—that the dichotomy between the Orthodox and Catholic cultural and religious spheres remains great, and that any successes garnered by one side are inevitably viewed by the other as a direct threat to the national as well as religious concerns of what is described by self-appointed group spokesmen as "our people." Just who is this group referred to so euphemistically as "our people"; where is the region that they inhabit; and how do their religious preferences interact with their concept of national self-identity?

To begin with the second of these questions, the Carpathian region refers to the mountains and valleys of the north-central Carpathian ranges inhabited by East Slavs who historically have been known as Rusnaks or Rusyns and who in modern parlance are referred to as Ukrainians.¹ According to political boundaries established at the close of World War II, this East Slavic inhabited Carpathian region includes territories in far southeastern Poland, northeastern Czechoslovakia, and the far western Soviet Union, in particular the Transcarpathian oblast of the Ukrainian S.S.R. In the context of our conference theme, emphasis here will be placed on developments in the Carpathian region found within Poland and Czechoslovakia, that is in a non-Soviet geopolitical sphere referred to generally as Central or East-Central Europe.

With regard to the inhabitants of the Carpathian region, there are a few characteristics about which we can speak with relative certainty. In terms of language and culture, they belong to the sphere of the East Slavs. Some of their earliest ancestors (supplemented by later waves of migration from the east) have inhabited the Carpathians since the time of the dispersal and resettlement of the Slavs during the sixth and seventh centuries. Then with the initial entry of the Slavs into the Christian world during the ninth and tenth centuries, the Carpathian region became firmly part of the sphere of Eastern Christianity.

It is this association with the Christian East that led to the self-description of these people as being of the Rus' faith (*rus'ka vira*), a formulation which subsequently became the ethnonyms Rusnak or Rusyn as terms of self-designation. Despite their being ruled since the early Middle Ages by western Catholic Poland (north of the Carpathians) and Hungary (south of the Carpathians), these East Slavs persisted in using the terms Rusnak/Rusyn to describe themselves and thereby to emphasize their religious and cultural affinity with the East.

The strong sense of religious and ethnic conceptual bonding as expressed through the terms Rusnak/Rusyn remained undisturbed until the last decades of the nineteenth and the outset of the twentieth century, when local leaders influenced by the idea of nationalism and by the statistical and other demands of modern state bureaucracies began to argue that the traditional religious mode of self-identity was too vague and that the populace must think instead in terms of ethnolinguistic or national categories.

Thus there began attempts at terminological precision together with the formulation of a national instead of religious identity. The practical result, however, has not been clarity, but on the contrary, profound confusion that to a large degree still exists. This confusion is reflected by the fact that the East Slavs in the Carpathians have been described by others and by themselves as either Rusyns, Rusnaks, Lemkos, Ruthenians, Russians, or Ukrainians, terms which are at certain times and for some members of the group mutually exclusive national identities and at other times complementary identities that form and reflect a kind of hierarchy of multiple loyalties. Looked at in another way, the terminological question can be seen as a struggle between the religious-based universalism of the faithful Eastern Christian masses as expressed in their association with the concept Rus', and the attempts of an often secular intelligentsia which prefers to emphasize the ethnonational particularities of the group. Nonetheless, the people themselves have seemed historically to prefer Christian universalism to ethnic particularism. For the purposes of our discussion, it might be preferable to use the historic terms Rus' or Carpatho-Rusyn to describe the population of the Carpathian region.

When we turn to the current state of religion in the Carpathian region, we see that for the East Slavic Rusyns there are today basically two

Eastern Christian churches, the Orthodox and Greek Catholic. Although both derive from the same theological base, they are divided along jurisdictional lines that bring to the fore the whole question of the western Catholic and eastern Orthodox spheres of religious and cultural influence in Europe. Indeed, the presence of Christianity in the Carpathians, whether the result of the ninth-century mission of Cyril and Methodius and their disciples or the post-tenth century arrival of Christian migrants from Kievan Rus', predates the division between the eastern Orthodox and western Catholic worlds that began in 1054.² While the Carpathian region remained Eastern Christian, it was politically part of Roman Catholic Poland and Hungary, located along the Orthodox borderlands of those states in an area that witnessed periodic attempts at church union between the thirteenth and fifteenth centuries (Galicia, 1247; Constance, 1414-17; Florence 1439).³

Finally, a qualified success in these unionistic efforts took place in 1596, when at Brest in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, several Orthodox bishops agreed to enter into union with Rome. The resultant Uniate Church, as it was known, switched its jurisdictional allegiance from the Orthodox ecumenical patriarch in Constantinople to the Catholic Pope in Rome, but it was allowed to retain its Eastern Christian practices, including the liturgy of St. John Chrysostom said in Church Slavonic not Latin, a married priesthood, and the Julian calendar. The 1596 Union of Brest that affected lands in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth was followed half a century later by the Union of Užhorod in 1646, which affected the lands in the Hungarian Kingdom.⁴

It should be stressed that the introduction of the union between 1596 and 1646 took on from the outset the negative characteristics of an all-or-nothing situation. Backed by the Polish and later Hungarian Roman Catholic hierarchies and secular governments, the Uniates were initially recognized as the only legal form of Eastern Christianity in the region. Therefore, the adherents of the "old faith" (*stara vira*) Orthodoxy were forced to accept the union or emigrate eastward to Slavic lands under the control of Muscovy. It was in the Carpathian region, in particular, that Orthodox adherents with their own hierarchs held out the longest. They survived until the late eighteenth century when finally all Carpatho-Rusyn villages became Uniate or Greek Catholic, as the church came to be officially called in the Austrian Empire which by 1772 had come to control the whole area.⁵

It should also be remembered that from the very beginning, local Orthodox prelates considered the Union of Brest and Union of Užhorod to be uncanonical and therefore illegal. And when there were no longer any local Orthodox hierarchs left in the region, the anathematic views toward the Uniates/Greek Catholics were maintained by the hierarchy of the Russian Orthodox Church in Muscovy and later the Russian Empire.

It is not surprising, therefore, that after the partitions of Poland (1772-1795), when the Russian Empire gained large territories inhabited by Greek Catholics, the tsarist government systematically banned their Church, and with the assistance of the Russian Orthodox hierarchy forced Greek Catholics to become Orthodox until the last Greek Catholic diocese on Russian territory (Chełm/Kholm) was abolished in 1875.⁶

Despite persecution in the Russian Empire, the nineteenth century proved to be the best era in the history of Greek Catholicism. This was connected with the policy of the Austrian government, in particular the Josephine reforms and enlightened ideas that dominated state policy at the precise moment when in 1772 the Habsburgs acquired Galicia and the vast majority of Greek Catholics. Already one year before, the Habsburg rulers had raised Mukačevo to the status of an independent Greek Catholic diocese (previously it had been subordinated to the Roman Catholic archbishopric of Eger), while in Galicia, the Greek rite was made equal to the Roman rite and by 1808 the metropolitan status of L'viv-Halych was restored in Galicia.⁷

Initially, however, such positive government intervention only helped to continue one trend in Greek Catholic circles that had existed since the church had come into being in 1595; namely, the tendency for the hierarchy and priesthood to assimilate culturally and linguistically to the dominant culture. In the case of Galicia, this meant Polish culture south of the mountains—Hungarian. Part of the assimilatory trend included changes in Eastern Christian liturgical practices, such as the adoption of the western Gregorian calendar, replacement of Church Slavonic with Polish, Hungarian, or Slovak, and by the twentieth century the imposition of celibacy for the priesthood. These trends occurred with various speed and in some cases were reversed or never even implemented. For instance, the trend toward Polonization of the Greek Catholic hierarchy ended with the onset of Austrian rule in Galicia in 1772, then began again at the outset of the nineteenth century until it was definitively reversed after 1848, so that under the leadership of certain metropolitans (Hryhorii Iakhymovych, Andrei Sheptyts'kyi) the church became a catalyst of national consciousness and stood in the forefront of the Rus'-Ukrainian national movement in Galicia.⁸

On the other hand, south of the mountains in Hungary, this same period saw the Greek Catholic Church become an instrument of national assimilation, with some of the hierarchs and many priests of the Diocese of Mukačevo becoming leading magyarones who helped promote state efforts to magyarize the local Rusyn population. Part of this trend witnessed the creation of a new Greek Catholic vicariate (1873) and then diocese (1912) at Hajdúdorog in which Hungarian gradually replaced Church Slavonic as the liturgical language and the local Rusyn population became completely magyarized.⁹

The point is that in the eyes of many Rusyn patriots, whether among the intelligentsia or masses, the Greek Catholic Church had become or was becoming the symbol of compromise and subservience to the Roman Catholic world of Poland and Hungary, and that changes in religious practices seemed sure to be followed by linguistic and national assimilation and the eventual disappearance of the Rusyns as an East Slavic people. It was attitudes such as these that led to a search for some kind of eastern spiritual renewal, which in part took the form—depending on one's views—of a “descent into the schisma of Orthodoxy” or a “return to the Orthodox faith of our fathers.”

Throughout all the Greek Catholic territories in the Austro-Hungarian Empire, it was precisely in the Carpathian region where the Orthodox revival had its greatest following. This was in part due to the return of immigrants from America (who had converted to Orthodoxy in the New World), to the interest of Pan-Slavic circles in the Russian Empire, and to the innate conservatism of the Carpathian mountain inhabitants who instinctively felt themselves different—and therefore suspicious—of non-mountain dwellers, whether or not they happened to be of the same faith or nationality.¹⁰ Moreover, from the very outset, the “return to Orthodoxy” was often a conscious religious and national act, since Orthodoxy was depicted by its apologists and came to be viewed by its new adherents as the “true faith” of the East Slavic Rus' *qua* Russian people. Such views not only coincided with the late nineteenth-century brand of Russian Pan-Slavism and Neo-Slavism, they also responded to the Christian universalist preferences of the Rusyn masses, since the Russian Orthodox Church integrated within its fold many ethnic elements, the dominant Slavic component of which was considered part of a so-called common Russian people (*obščerusskij narod*).¹¹

Therefore, by the twentieth century the following symbolic dichotomies prevailed throughout Carpathian society. For Greek Catholics, their church represented the perfect compromise for Eastern Christianity, since it allowed for the survival of the Eastern rite and of the East Slavs, whether as Rusyns or Ukrainians, in a western Christian political and cultural environment. Based on such premises, Orthodoxy was considered not only the misguided faith of schismatics from the fold of “universal” Catholicism, but also a potential if not actual threat to Austria-Hungary because it preached the ethnonational unity of Rusyns and Russians and looked forward to the day when tsarist Russia would expand its despotic grasp up to and beyond the Carpathians.

As for the Orthodox, they felt their church represented a return to the “original” faith of Rusyns and all East Slavs, so that its existence served as a guarantee against foreign or western (read: Polish or Hungarian) national assimilation. In that context, argued the Orthodox, the Greek Catholics not only were preparing the ground for assimilation to Polish or Hungarian

culture (Ukrainian was, by the way, viewed as an artificial bastardized form of the Polish language and its acceptance a sure step on the road to eventual complete Polonization), they also slowly but surely were dropping all the tenets and practices of Eastern Christianity until it would not be long before Greek Catholics would be no different from Roman Catholics.

As long as the Austro-Hungarian Empire existed, the Orthodox revival in the Carpathians was kept to a minimum, even if it required trials from time to time against its adherents who were accused not only of religious diversion but of state treason.¹² However, with the collapse of Austro-Hungary in 1918 and the creation of relatively religiously tolerant new political authorities in the Carpathian region—Poland north of the mountains and Czechoslovakia to the south—the Greek Catholic-Orthodox rivalry took on a new dynamism. The Rusyn masses began to express their national as well as religious preferences by large-scale “conversions” to Orthodoxy. Thus, among Rusyns south of the mountains in Czechoslovakia, nearly one-quarter (112,000) of the 460,000 Greek Catholics became Orthodox during the 1920s, while during the same period north of the mountains in Poland, about the same percentage, one-quarter (50,000) of the Rusyns, known locally as Lemkos, did the same.¹³

Moreover, the religious change was often marked by violence, as parishioners locked Greek Catholic priests out of their churches, drove them from their parish houses, and installed Orthodox priests (*poppy*), often newly-arrived refugees from lands farther east that had come under Soviet control.¹⁴ South of the mountains in Czechoslovakia, the pro-Orthodox movement was in large part a reaction against the pro-Hungarian tendencies of the Greek Catholic hierarchy and village priesthood—a reaction, moreover, that for its own political reasons was welcomed and at times directly supported by the Czechoslovak authorities. North of the mountains in Poland, the pro-Orthodox movement was motivated by a reaction against the westernizing liturgical orientation and Ukrainian national preferences of certain circles in the Greek Catholic Church, in particular within the Diocese of Przemyśl-Sambir-Sanok which had jurisdiction over the Lemko Rusyns.¹⁵ Because they considered Ukrainianism as a separatist and anti-Russian (therefore in peasant eyes anti-Rusyn as well) phenomenon, the local Lemko Rusyns saw in Orthodoxy their national as well as spiritual salvation.

Not surprisingly, the Vatican was alarmed by the seemingly wholesale flight to Orthodoxy. In an attempt to stem the tide, in Czechoslovakia it replaced the former Hungarian bishops of the two Greek Catholic dioceses (Mukačevo and Prešov) with nationally pro-Rusyn and politically pro-Czechoslovak candidates.¹⁶ In Poland, on the other hand, Rome felt obliged to take a more radical jurisdictional step by detaching the Lemko-inhabited Carpathian region from the Ukrainian dominated Greek Catholic

Diocese of Przemyśl. The result was the creation in 1934 of a Lemko Apostolic Administration, directly under the Vatican, and headed by a pro-Lemko Rusyn (that is, not a sympathizer of the Ukrainian national orientation), whose presence was intended to suggest to the remaining Greek Catholics that their church and their children would not be turned into instruments of Ukrainianization.¹⁷

Considering its own traditional anti-Ukrainian position, the Polish government welcomed the Lemko Apostolic Administration as a limited but positive step in controlling Ukrainian influence in the southeastern part of the country, while Ukrainian spokesmen branded the move as a Polish-inspired Vatican plot to tribalize, divide, and eventually assimilate the Ukrainian nationality, of whom Lemko Rusyns were considered a part.¹⁸ As for the Lemko Rusyn population, it generally welcomed the creation of what was now considered its "own" Greek Catholic church,¹⁹ and the Vatican move, based on precedent among immigrants from the Carpathian region in the United States, did in fact contribute to stabilizing membership and in cutting further losses to Orthodoxy.²⁰

By the 1930s, a tenuous balance was reached between the two variants of Eastern Christianity in the Carpathian region. Some villages became all Orthodox or all Greek Catholic, others were split between the two orientations, each of which had its own church. However, this balance and relative stability was brutally upset after World War II with the arrival of a new political force in the area—the Soviet Union.

By late 1944, all the Greek Catholic territory that formerly had been part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire came firmly under the control of the Red Army. And within one year, most of that territory was incorporated into the Ukrainian S.S.R., leaving at most about 300,000 Rusyns beyond direct Soviet control within the new boundaries of Poland (circa 180,000 in the Lemko Region) and Czechoslovakia (circa 120,000 in northeastern Slovakia).

While the officially atheistic Soviet Union at best tolerated Russian Orthodoxy, especially since the *modus vivendi* reached between Stalin and the church during World War II, it was certainly not going to allow on its territory what was now hailed as the historic instrument of Polish and Hungarian feudal domination over the Rus' people and at present the agent of Vatican and western imperialism—namely, the Greek Catholic Church. Thus, the Soviet government was simply following the precedent of tsarist Russia, and aided by the Russian Orthodox Church hierarchy—which in any case never recognized the legality of the Union of Brest and Greek Catholicism—organized in 1946 a church sobor in L'viv, which abrogated the 1596 union.²¹

As a result of the 1946 L'viv Sobor, the Greek Catholic priests in former eastern Galicia (L'viv, Przemyśl, Stanyslaviv dioceses) were given the choice to become Orthodox, and 1,111 (37.6 percent) of the 2,950

accepted the offer. As for the remainder who refused, a few hundred went underground, while an estimated 1,600 were imprisoned, where they lingered with few exceptions until their deaths in Soviet camps.²² Three years later, in Soviet-controlled Transcarpathia (formerly Subcarpathian Rus' in Czechoslovakia), the Greek Catholic Diocese of Mukačevo was liquidated and the church and its faithful officially transformed into Orthodox. Unlike in Galicia, there was no sobor held in Transcarpathia as had been the case in L'viv. Instead, the "act of reunion" was simply declared to be in effect following the reading of a proclamation during a service on August 28, 1949 in the cathedral church in Užhorod.²³

With Greek Catholicism officially eliminated on Soviet territory, it for the moment only survived in the Carpathian region of southeastern Poland and northeastern Czechoslovakia. In each of those countries the situation in the postwar years has been particularly complicated.

After the new Soviet-Polish and Soviet-Czechoslovak borders were formed in 1945, efforts were made on both sides to follow the trend at the time in international relations, which favored the transfer of populations in an effort to make political and ethnic boundaries coincide, that is, to eliminate the problem of national minorities which—so it was felt—had contributed to if not caused World War II. In this regard, Rusyns from the Carpathian region (in return for Poles and Czechs from Soviet territory) were given the option to emigrate eastward to the Soviet Ukraine. In Poland's Lemko region, about 120,000 opted or were administratively encouraged to go east; in northeastern Czechoslovakia, only 12,000 Rusyns accepted the invitation. This eastward trek to the Soviet Union from Poland took place in 1945-1946 and from Czechoslovakia in 1947. Nonetheless, about 40,000 Lemko Rusyns still remained in southeast Poland and another 110,000 in northeastern Czechoslovakia.²⁴

As for Poland, the new pro-Soviet government resolved the problem in a simple way. Claiming that the local Lemko Rusyns were aiding anti-Soviet Ukrainian partisans who were held up in the Carpathian Mountains, during the spring and summer of 1947 the Lemkos were forcibly removed from their homes and resettled in the so-called "Recovered Lands" (*Ziemia Odzyskana*), the formerly-German territories of Silesia (especially near Wrocław) and along the Baltic Sea that had become part of Poland in 1945. This forcible deportation—whose fortieth anniversary is being celebrated this year—is perhaps a unique example of one Slavic group carrying out such a program in peacetime against fellow Slavs.²⁵ Therefore, with regard to the historic Eastern Christian churches in Poland's Carpathian region, the problem was resolved. There simply ceased to be any problem because there were no more Eastern Christians.

In legal terms, Poland's Communist authorities accepted the Soviet view that after the L'viv sobor of 1946 the Greek Catholic Church ceased to exist in historic Galicia, which included lands in post-1945 Poland that

had been under the jurisdiction of the Diocese of Przemyśl and the Lemko Apostolic Administration. Based on such a premise, Polish government decrees were issued in 1947 and 1949 which respectively nationalized Greek Catholic church property and then legalized the seizure on the grounds that it belonged to "juridical persons" whose "existence and activities lost their purpose as a result of resettlement of their members to the Soviet Union."²⁶ As a result of these decrees, the Greek Catholic Church in Poland was "delegalized," allowing for the official "non-recognition" of the Greek Catholic rite in Poland from that time until the present.

In practice, after 1947, the Lemko Greek Catholic Apostolic Administration (with its 129 parishes and 127,580 faithful as of 1943) ceased to exist. Church property in the depopulated Lemko Rusyn villages was left to decay and eventually disappear. In those villages resettled by Poles, former Greek Catholic churches were often appropriated by the Roman Catholic Church, in a few instances given to the Orthodox Church, or in the case of wooden ones, left to decay or be torn down, using what remained of the structures for firewood.²⁷

South of the border in Czechoslovakia, the vast majority of the population remained in place. There were two reasons for this. In contrast to the historic tradition of antagonism between Poles and East Slavic Rusyns and Ukrainians north of the Carpathians, on the southern slopes of the mountains the past was basically marked by friendly relations between Slovaks and Rusyns. Moreover, the isolated extremist views directed at Rusyns living on "Slovak land" were neutralized in the new postwar political situation in Czechoslovakia in which the powerful Communist party had a relatively high number of functionaries of Rusyn background.²⁸ Therefore, aside from the truly voluntary nature of the eastward emigration of 12,000 Rusyns in 1947, there was to be no attempt at forced deportation to the Soviet Union or westward to other parts of the Czechoslovak republic.

However, after Czechoslovakia came to be ruled exclusively by a Communist regime in February 1948, the Soviet model in religious affairs was soon adopted. This sealed the fate of the Greek Catholic Church. In April 1950, Czechoslovak Communist officials, aided by a few local Orthodox priests, called a church sobor in Prešov. The Soviet model was followed and the union with Rome was abolished, making all former Greek Catholics become Orthodox. Like the rest of the Orthodox Church in Czechoslovakia, the new Orthodox parishes initially became part of the Russian Orthodox Moscow Patriarchate.²⁹ Of the 301 Greek Catholic priests at the time, an estimated 76 became Orthodox. The remainder who refused to convert were either arrested (including Bishop Gojdič of Prešov and his suffragan Vasyľ Hopko) or left the priesthood for other professions.³⁰

Thus, by 1950, it seemed that the Greek Catholic problem had been resolved in East-Central Europe. The homeland where the church had flourished was now firmly in Orthodox or, in part, Roman Catholic hands.

Ironically, within the Soviet bloc, it was only in ostensibly anti-Slavic Hungary—where the Diocese of Hajdúdorog had long ago taken on a purely Hungarian character—that Greek Catholicism survived as a legal church.³¹

However, despite their Communist governments and even strongly pro-Stalinist orientation, neither Poland nor Czechoslovakia was the Soviet Union. As a result, the relatively less rigid approach of Warsaw and Prague to religious matters allowed for new movement on the Eastern Christian front. In Poland, following the political changes in October 1957, a church-state *modus vivendi* provided a “tolerated but not recognized” status to the Greek Catholic rite within the Roman Catholic Church. This meant that Lemko Rusyns and fellow Greek Catholic Ukrainians scattered throughout the western and northern parts of the country were permitted to have services conducted at some fifty “pastoral points” by the approximately fifty surviving Greek Catholic priests who were now designated bi-ritual assistants in Roman Catholic parishes. In practice, Greek Catholic services were held in Roman Catholic chapels provided the resident priest agreed.³² In effect, the hierarchy of the Polish Roman Catholic Church was mildly tolerant of these activities, while the response among the lower echelons of the Polish priesthood ranged from Christian solidarity with to fierce opposition against their Greek Catholic brethren.

Also, beginning in 1957, some Lemkos were allowed to return to their ancestral villages—provided they could arrange to convince Polish families to sell them back their confiscated homesteads. By the mid-1960s, about 3,000 had returned, and this process of resettlement in the Carpathian homeland has continued so that today there are about 10,000 Lemko Rusyns living once again on the northern slopes of the Carpathians.³³ This has meant that the Eastern Christian presence, which had been physically removed by 1947, has now returned in the form of both a semi-legal Greek Catholic and fully legal Orthodox community.

The numbers are albeit small, with the estimated 10,000 Lemko Rusyns living in the Carpathians being divided more or less evenly between Orthodox, Greek Catholics, and non-believers. In response to this mini-revival, the Polish Autocephalous Orthodox Church established (or reestablished) in 1983 a new Eparchy of Przemysl and Nowy Sącz, specifically for the Lemko Carpathian region. It is based in Sanok, has 33 parishes served by 14 priests, and is headed by a bishop of Lemko Rusyn background, Adam Dubec.³⁴ In 1985, a symbolically major event took place in the small Lemko Rusyn village of Zyndranowa, where the first Orthodox church newly constructed in the region since before World War II was opened. Two other Orthodox churches are under construction in Krynica and in the town of Gorlice.

This activity among the Orthodox has caused concern within Polish Roman Catholic circles and has forced a slight change in their traditionally intolerant attitude toward Greek Catholics. When the first Greek Catholics

began returning to the Carpathian region, it was not uncommon to find Roman Catholic Polish priests—often under the influence of their own parishioners—refusing access to chapels in their churches for Greek Catholic services. With the recent increase in Orthodox activity, however, the Roman Catholics feel such “schismatic” activity needs to be stopped and that allowing Greek Catholics to function easily might be the best way to achieve that goal. Moreover, the favorable pronouncements of Pope John Paul II toward Ukrainian (Greek) Catholics in the West, and the four recent visitations by the secretary of the Vatican’s Congregation for the Oriental Churches (Archbishop Myroslav Marusyn) to Poland’s Greek Catholics has raised the latter’s status if ever so slightly.³⁵

Nonetheless, the Greek Catholics do not have their own church structure in Poland, but remain under the jurisdiction of the Polish Roman Catholic Church. In the Carpathian region, there are today 13 parishes served by 3 priests. Of those parishes, 2 (Komańcza and Krempna) managed somehow to survive throughout the postwar events, 5 (Kulaszne, Łosie, Nowica, Pętna, Uście Gorlickie) were established in the 1960s following the initial return of Lemkos, and (Gładyszów, Gorlice, Krynica, Olchowiec, Rozdziele, Rzepedź) have come into being since 1979.³⁶ All but one of the Greek Catholic parishes carry on their services in Roman Catholic churches, that is, at the discretion of the local Roman Catholic priest. It was therefore of great symbolic importance when a large new Greek Catholic church, the first of its kind to be constructed since World War II, was opened just this year in the village of Komańcza.

On the southern slopes of the Carpathian Mountains in Czechoslovakia, the fate of Eastern Christianity in the past four decades has been significantly different. The efforts at political liberalization in the 1960s that culminated in the Prague Spring of 1968 also prompted Czechoslovakia’s former Greek Catholics to demand the restoration of their church. In June 1968, their efforts were met with success as the Dubček government legalized the existence of the Greek Catholic Church.³⁷

One immediate question that arose concerned church property. Who now had a legal right to it—the Orthodox who held it since 1950 or the Greek Catholics who wanted it back? This thorny issue was to be resolved by the mechanism of a plebiscite. Among the first symbolic steps of the plebiscite was the return of the Prešov diocesan cathedral church to the Greek Catholics in July 1968. In the course of the next year, plebiscites were held in about 210 parishes, only five of which opted to remain Orthodox. In the end, the government recognized the existence of 205 Greek Catholic and 87 Orthodox parishes.³⁸

In many ways, the political and cultural turmoil that marked Czechoslovakia’s Prague Spring played itself out in Rusyn villages through the mode of religion and a return to the Orthodox-Greek Catholic conflicts that had characterized the interwar years. Immediately after the legalization

decree was issued, a delegation of 100 Orthodox priests delivered a protest to the president of Czechoslovakia against the reestablishment of the Greek Catholic Church.³⁹

At the village level, while there were peaceful transfers of property from the Orthodox to Greek Catholics, there were also several cases marked by assaults and the physical removal of Orthodox priests, breaking down of church doors, stoning of services, and in at least one instance the death of a Greek Catholic curate at the hands of an Orthodox priest. The situation was made even more ominous in that most of the plebiscites were carried out after August 21, that is in the presence of Soviet armed forces throughout the country. While it is known that some Orthodox priests garbed in sacred vestments greeted the Soviet troops as "liberators and defenders of Orthodoxy," vicious rumors soon began to circulate according to which the Orthodox supposedly had invited the Soviets and that it was they who were now identifying to the interventionist forces the Greek Catholics as "counterrevolutionaries."⁴⁰

Nonetheless, despite the return beginning in early 1970 to a Soviet-style regime in Czechoslovakia which repealed many of the achievements of 1968, the restoration of the Greek Catholic Church has not been rescinded. It continues to function openly and with its own ecclesiastical structures—although like many Czech and Slovak Roman Catholic dioceses without its own bishop. Moreover, the existence of a legal Greek Catholic Church in eastern Slovakia has proven to be a source of embarrassment to Soviet authorities in neighboring Transcarpathia, where an underground Greek Catholic Church has increased its activity especially in the 1970s, a movement that apparently has been encouraged by the improved status of co-religionists and co-nationals on the other side of the border in Czechoslovakia.⁴¹

But why have the Czechoslovak authorities or—more precisely in the new post-1968 federalist situation—the Slovak authorities allowed for the survival of the Greek Catholic Church in their country? The answer, in part, is to be found in the nationality problem and this, in turn, leads to the further question. How has the restoration of Greek Catholicism and therefore the renewal of the Orthodox-Greek Catholic dichotomy in the Eastern Christian world of the Carpathians affected the way in which the local population views itself and is viewed by others with regard to the question of national identity? Whereas there are some aspects of the conflict over national ideology that are evident in Poland's Lemko Region, the number of Rusyns living there is too small to make any conclusive judgements.⁴² South of the mountains in Czechoslovakia, however, the critical mass is large enough to see some trends.

First of all, it should be remembered that as part of the post-World War II Soviet influence in Poland and Czechoslovakia, the nationality question, like the religious question, was ostensibly resolved as a result of

the so-called "iron laws" of Marxist historical evolution, albeit helped along by administrative decree and legal enforcement. This meant that the nearly century-old question of who the East Slavic Rus' population of the Carpathians was in national terms—Russian, Ukrainian, or a distinct Rusyn nationality—was decided. They were Ukrainian. But like the religious question, the nationality question turned out to be not so easily resolved.⁴³

When in 1952, the Rusyn population of northeastern Czechoslovakia was administratively declared to be Ukrainian, which meant among other things having Ukrainian instead of Russian taught in the nearly 322 elementary and secondary schools, large numbers of people reacted by voluntarily declaring themselves to be Slovak and demanding—and receiving—Slovak schools in their villages. By 1966, there were only 72 elementary and secondary schools left in Rusyn communities that were not Slovak, i.e., that provided instruction in Ukrainian. Then, with the heady days of the Prague Spring when demands of all kinds were being made to correct the injustices of the neo-Stalinist past, alongside the demand for a return of the Greek Catholic faith there was a call for the return of Rusyn schools and for recognition of Rusyns as a distinct nationality. Indeed, planning was begun to restore instruction in the local Rusyn dialect in the schools—which would have meant a rejection of Ukrainian instruction and the return of Slovak schools—but then the Warsaw Pact intervention put an end to those and all other "counterrevolutionary" ideas. As we have seen, Czechoslovakia's Rusyns did get back their Greek Catholic Church, but at what cost?

The price, in fact, has been to see that church become an instrument of Slovakization. Indeed, the general trend toward assimilation was already well underway. For instance, if in the 1930 census, 91,079 persons in northeastern Czechoslovakia claimed Rusyn as their nationality, in 1959-60, when Ukrainian was the only possible choice, a mere 35,435 opted to do so.⁴⁴ It is uncertain whether the several proposals for changes away from the Ukrainian cultural and educational policy made in 1968-1969 would have made any difference in an individual's decision to emphasize a sense of Rusyn identity. The brutal destruction of the Czechoslovak experiment from the East only convinced many traditionally pro-Czechoslovak Rusyns that they had better throw in their lot fully with their West Slavic brethren by identifying with them nationally as well as linguistically and politically.

In this context, the Greek Catholic Church has been an unwitting partner in the assimilation process. At the moment of its restoration in June 1968, the question of who was to serve as bishop in the restored diocese of Prešov became acute. The last bishop, Pavel Gojdič had died in prison in 1960, but his auxiliary and successor Vasyľ Hopko survived, was released in 1964 for confinement in an old-age home, and finally in 1968 was rehabilitated and allowed to return to Prešov to lead the restoration process of the Greek Catholic Church. However, from the very onset,

pro-Slovak forces within the church vowed that no Rusyn should ever again head the diocese.

To justify their views, the Slovak Greek Catholic faction pointed to official Czechoslovak nationality statistics, which allowed since Communist rule only for a Ukrainian identity, not a Rusyn one. Accordingly, there were only 35,000 (1960) Ukrainians in northeastern Czechoslovakia, which represented a mere 11 percent of the total Greek Catholic population estimated at 315,000.⁴⁵ Slovak Greek Catholic activists, who were generally suspicious of most data and statements issued in the past by the Czechoslovak Communist authorities, accepted at face value the official statistics. As for the "Rusyn revival" of 1968, whose spokesmen challenged Slovak views on statistics and other matters, it was dismissed as the machinations of anti-Slovak extremists or perhaps even pro-Soviet agitators.

Such attitudes were held not only by Slovak Greek Catholics in eastern Slovakia, they were also promoted by powerful Slovak financial circles in the West, which put pressure on the Vatican to appoint a Slovak to head the restored Greek Catholic Diocese of Prešov.⁴⁶ In the end, the recently-released and rehabilitated Bishop Hopko, who was allowed to return to Prešov in 1968 to lead the movement to restore the Greek Catholic Church and who was to be recognized as bishop by the Dubček government, was finally allowed to travel to Rome in December 1968 for an audience with the Pope. However, when the bishop returned home a few weeks later, he discovered that (according to a letter of the Sacred Congregation for Oriental Churches, dated December 22, 1968) he was removed as head of the Presov Diocese and made subordinate to a Slovak administrator (Reverend Jan Hirka).⁴⁷ Thus, the chance to have the appointment of a Greek Catholic bishop to the Diocese of Prešov recognized by the Czechoslovak government was missed in 1968-1969 because of internal nationality controversies. Effectively removed from any real influence since early 1969, Bishop Hopko died in 1976, and in the political circumstances of Czechoslovakia since then, the authorities are strongly disinclined to accept any new episcopal appointments in their country, whether of the Roman or Greek Catholic variety.

In the absence of a bishop, there is an administrator of Slovak background, who is doing his best to Slovakize church practices. For instance, the largest printings of church publications are today in Slovak instead of Ukrainian or in Rusyn dialect as had been the case in the early years of the church's restoration.⁴⁸ Whereas the language of the liturgy remains Church Slavonic, the homilies and other non-liturgical parts of the service are in Slovak. A case in point is the Greek Catholic Cathedral in Prešov. Of the four masses, each Sunday morning all but one are in Slovak. But even the one exception that is *po-rusky* includes a homily in literary Slovak, whose otherwise soft and aesthetically pleasing West Slavic melodious

sound is particularly jarring in an East Slavic and Eastern Christian religious and social setting.

In response, the Orthodox Church, with its approximately 20,000 faithful, its own cathedral churches in Prešov and Michalovce, and its 74 parishes spread throughout the countryside, prides itself once again as the defender of the East Slavic Rus' world in the face of Vatican and Slovak nationalist assimilationist encroachments as carried out through the medium of the Greek Catholic Church.⁴⁹ After all, for the Orthodox world, Greek Catholicism remains the bastard child of Roman Catholic Jesuit machinations in Eastern Europe, and for many Orthodox it seems particularly ironic that Greek Catholicism has been allowed to survive and do its "destructive work" among Eastern Slavs in Poland and Czechoslovakia right on the doorstep of the Soviet Union. Furthermore, the traditional Rus'-Russian orientation of many Rusyns in Czechoslovakia makes such views quite palatable, so that those villages which were most reluctant to accept Slovak schools and a Slovak identity are precisely those which have remained Orthodox.

Thus, when all is said and done, the nationality question and problems of national identity that were ostensibly resolved in the Carpathian region just after World War II continue to be expressed consciously or unconsciously through the medium of religion. As in the past, so too in the present, Christianity and its temporal structures remain a shield for nationalist passions and, alas, national hatreds.

NOTES

1. On the question of nomenclature, see Paul R. Magocsi, *The Shaping of a National Identity: Subcarpathian Rus', 1848-1948* (Cambridge, Mass., 1978), pp. 277-281.

2. The question of the beginnings of Christianity in the Carpathians is a controversial one. Local church historians have accepted as a given the introduction of Christianity by Cyril and Methodius or by their disciples in the late ninth century, with both the eparchies of Mukačevo south of the mountains and Przemysl to the north supposedly having come into existence already in the ninth century. The earliest historical records derive from a much later period—eleventh century for Przemysl and 1491 for Mukačevo.

For a discussion of the extensive literature arguing for the Cyril and Methodian origin of both eparchies, see Magocsi, *Shaping of a National Identity*, pp. 106-108; Borys Ivan Balyk, "Do pytanja pro počatky chrystyjanstva ta jepyskopstva v Peremyšli v IX-X st.," *Analecta Ordinis S. Basilii Magni*, Sectio II, Vol. XVI, 1-4 (Rome, 1979), pp. 50-97; and Marian Bendza, *Pravoslávna Dioceza Przemyska w latach 1596-1681* (Warsaw, 1982), pp. 23-36. For a recent superpatriotic view arguing that "historic Transcarpathia" received Christianity directly from the Cyril and Methodian mission in 862, that is *before* the arrival of the Byzantine missionaries in Moravia, and that it was *from* the Carpathian region that Christianity reached Kievan Rus' over a century later (c. 988), see the provocative monograph by Stepan Pap, *Počatky chrystyjanstva na Zakarpattí* (Philadelphia, 1983).

3. From among the many surveys of the various unionistic attempts, see Oscar Halecki, *From Florence to Brest* (1439-1596) (New York, 1958); and Mykola Čubatyj, *Istoriya chrystyjanstva na Rusy-Ukrajini*, 2 vols. (Rome and New York, 1965-76).

4. For details on these unions, see Halecki, *From Florence to Brest*, and Michael Lacko, *The Union of Užhorod* (Cleveland and Rome, 1968); and a discussion of the basic problems and literature in Paul Robert Magocsi, *Galicia: A Historical Survey and Bibliographic Guide* (Toronto, 1983), pp. 81-86.

5. An Orthodox eparchy with its own bishop survived in the eastern part of Subcarpathian Rus' (Transcarpathia) under the protection of Protestant Transylvania until 1711, while north of the mountains the Orthodox Eparchy of Przemyśl had throughout the seventeenth century an Orthodox as well as Greek Catholic bishop until 1691, when it became definitively Greek Catholic.

6. For details, see W. Lencyk, *The Eastern Catholic Church and Czar Nicholas I* (Rome and New York, 1966).

7. The metropolitanate of L'viv-Halych, established in 1303, ceased to exist in 1401. On the positive impact of Austrian rule, see Julian Pelesz, *Geschichte der Union der ruthenischen Kirche mit Rom von den ältesten Zeiten bis auf die Gegenwart*, esp. Vol. II (Vienna 1880); Edward Winter, *Byzanz und Rom im Kampf um die Ukraine 955-1939* (Leipzig, 1942), pp. 120-137 and his "Die Kämpfe der Ukrainer Oberungarn um eine nationale Hierarchie im Theresianischen Zeitalter," *Kryios*, XI (Konigsberg, 1939-40), pp. 129-141. For further literature on this problem, see Magocsi, *Galicia*, pp. 104-105.

8. See Winter, *Byzanz und Rom*, pp. 160-183; and John-Paul Himka, "The Greek Catholic Church and Nation-Building, 1772-1918," *Harvard Ukrainian Studies*, VIII, 3-4 (Cambridge, Mass., 1984), pp. 426-452.

9. Magocsi, *Shaping of a National Identity*, pp. 55-58; Atanasij V. Pekar, *Narisy istoriji cerkvy Zakarpattja*, Vol. I (Rome, 1967), pp. 95-112; Imre Timko, ed., *A Hajdudorogi Bizánci Katholikus Egyházmegye jubileumi emlékkönyve 1912-1987* (Nyirégyháza, 1987), esp. pp. 17-29 and 158-181.

10. The impact of returning Carpatho-Rusyn immigrants on the Orthodox revival in the homeland deserves scholarly attention which it has heretofore not received. For the New World background, see Paul Robert Magocsi, *Our People: Carpatho-Rusyns and Their Descendants in North America* (Toronto, 1984), pp. 22-29; and Constance J. Tarasar and John H. Erickson, eds., *Orthodox America 1794-1976* (Syosset, N.Y., 1975), pp. 43-70. The role of Orthodox sympathizers in the Russian Empire (in particular Count Vladimir Bobrinskoy) also should be analyzed. For some interesting insights, see the statement of a contemporary Russian Orthodox activist: Michail Šaryč, *Bratskij privjet bratjam i sestram-karpatorussam, živuščim v predjelach karpatskich gor i v Amerikje* (St. Petersburg, 1893); and the annual reports: *Otčet o djeatel'nosti Galicko-russkago Blagotvoritel'nago Obščestva v S.-Peterburgje*, 2 vols.: za 1912/1913-1914 god (St. Petersburg, 1913-14).

11. For the best explanation of the Orthodox East Slavic ideology as it pertains to the Carpathian region, see O. Mončalovskij, *Svjataja Rus'* (L'viv, 1903).

12. The first of these trials occurred in 1882 in L'viv (against Olga Grabar and others) followed by Marmaroš Sighet in 1913-1914 (against Archimandrite Aleksej Kabaljuk and others) and L'viv in 1914 (against Simeon Bendasjuk and others). Cf. René Martel, "La politique slave de la Russie d'avant-guerre: Le procès ukrainien de Marmarosz-Sziget," *Affaires étrangères*, VI, 10 (Paris, 1936), pp. 623-634 and VIII, 1 (1937), pp. 58-64; Bohdan Svitlynskij, "Avstro-Uhorščyna i Talerhof," in *Voennye prestuplenija habsburgskoj monarchii, 1914-1917 gg.* (Trumbull, Conn., 1964), annex, pp. 1-40; Konstantin M. Beskid, *Marmarošský proces* (Chust, 1926).

13. For the situation in the Carpathian region in Czechoslovakia, see Magocsi, *Shaping of a National Identity*, pp. 178-185; and Ivan Vanat, *Narysy novit'oji istoriji ukrajinciv Schidnoji Slovaččyny, 1918-1938*, Vol. I (Bratislava and Prešov, 1979), pp. 175-189. For the situation in Poland, see Ivan Teodorč, "Lemkovskaja Rus'," *Naučno-literaturnyj sbornik Galicko-russkoj maticy*, VIII [LXIX] (L'viv, 1934), pp. 16-23.

14. The center of the Orthodox movement south of the Carpathians was in the village of Lodomirová, just outside of Svidník in northeastern Czechoslovakia, where in the early 1920s Archimandrite Vitalij Maksimenko established the Holy Trinity Monastery and printshop to propagate the faith. Two decades later, after the arrival of the Red Army in the region, the monks with their new converts fled a second time, to reestablish their Holy Trinity Monastery as part of the Russian Orthodox Church Outside Russia—The Synod, in Jordanville, New York. Cf. Paul R. Magocsi, *The Rusyn-Ukrainians of Czechoslovakia* (Vienna, 1983), pp. 40-41; and Vanat, *Narysy*, Vol. I, pp. 178-179.

15. The bishop of the Greek Catholic Diocese of Przemyśl-Sambir-Sanok was actually a Lemko, Josyf Kocylovs'kyj (1876-1947, consecrated 1917), who was one of the leading "westernizers" in Greek Catholic Metropolia of L'viv-Halych, favoring celibacy and other Latin-rite influences in opposition to the "easternizing" predilections of Metropolitan Šeptyc'kyj. As for the diocesan priesthood, it was for the most part deeply imbued with a Ukrainian national sentiment. Tadeusz Duda, "Stosunki wyznaniowe wśród Łemków grekokatolickich zamieszkałych na terenie obecnej diecezji tarnowskiej w XIX i XX wieku," *Tarnowskie Studia Teologiczne*, X, 1 (Tarnow, 1986), pp. 240-243.

16. The pro-Hungarian Greek Catholic bishops of Prešov, István Novak (1879-1932, consecrated 1913) and of Mukačevo, Antal Papp (1867-1945, consecrated 1912), each of whom refused to swear an oath of allegiance to the new Czechoslovak state, were replaced eventually by Petro Gebei (1864-1931, consecrated 1924) in Mukačevo and by Pavel Gojdič (1888-1960, consecrated 1927) in Prešov.

17. The first apostolic administrator was the Lemko-born Reverend Vasylij Mascjuk (1899-1936) who was followed in 1936 by another Lemko, the Reverend Jakiv Medvec'kyj (1880-1941). The new Greek Catholic administration included 111 parishes and 127,305 faithful. See the statistics and historical survey (stressing the distinctiveness of Lemkos and their Christian descent from the SS Cyril and Methodij mission) in *Šematyzm Greko-Katolyckoho duchovenstva Apostol'skoji administraciji Lemkovščyny 1936* (L'viv, 1936).

18. For a summary of the Ukrainian understanding, see the introduction by Vasyľ Lenčyk to the reprinted edition of the 1936 *Šematyzm* (Stamford, Conn., 1970); and the earlier Mykola Andrusjak, "Der westukrainische Stamm der Lemken," *Südost-Forschungen*, VI, 3-4 (Leipzig, 1941), pp. 536-575.

19. For the contemporary Lemko view strongly critical of "Ukrainian infiltration," see "Što musyme o sobi znaty y pamiataty!," *Kalendar 'Lemka' na zvyčajnyj rok 1935* (Przemyśl, 1934), pp. 133-134; and the discussion by one of the clerical supporters of the Apostolic Administration, I. F. Lemkyn [Ioann Poljans'kyj], *Ystoryja Lemkovyny* (Yonkers, N.Y., 1960), pp. 168-170. For a non-partisan review of those events, see Duda, "Stosunki," pp. 243-246.

20. It was in part the realization that Rusyn Greek Catholic immigrants from south of the Carpathians who were living in the United States could not get along with their increasingly Ukrainian-oriented religious brethren from Galicia that prompted the Vatican to establish separate administrations (1916) and then dioceses (1924) for immigrants from Austrian Galicia and the Hungarian Kingdom—the present-day distinct Ukrainian Catholic Church and Byzantine Ruthenian Catholic Church. Accepting

pre-World War I political boundaries, Lemko immigrants were separated from their Rusyn brethren and placed within Galician Ukrainian dioceses. Cf. Magocsi, *Our People*, pp. 29-34.

21. The proceedings of the L'viv Sobor were published first in *Dijanyja Soboru hreko-katolyc'koji cerkvy u L'vovi, 8-10 bereznja 1946* (L'viv, 1946) and more recently in a revised version. *L'vivs'kyj cerkovnyj sobor: dokumenty i materialy, 1946-1981* (L'viv, 1984), with a slightly abridged English version: *The Lvov Church Council: Documents and Materials, 1946-1981* (Moscow, 1983).

22. *Martyrolohija ukrajins'kych cerkov*, Vol. II: *Ukrajins'ka katolyc'ka cerkva: dokumenty, materialy, chrystyjans'kyj sanvydav Ukraïny*, ed. Osyp Zinkevyč and Taras R. Lončyna (Toronto and Baltimore, 1985), p. 74. For greater details, see *First Victims of Communism: White Book on the Religious Persecution in Ukraine* (Rome, 1953).

23. For the Greek Catholic view, see Pekar, *Narysy*, pp. 159-170; Vasył' Markus, "Nyščennja hreko-katolyc'koji cerkvy v Mukačiv'skii Jeparchiji v 1945-50 rr.," *Zapysky Naukovoho tovarystva im. Ševčenko*, CLXIX (Paris and New York, 1962), pp. 386-405; and Michael Lacko, "The Forced Liquidation of the Union of Užhorod," *Slovak Studies*, I: *Historica*, No. 1 (Rome, 1961), pp. 145-157. For the Russian Orthodox view in praise of the historically justified return to the true faith, see Bishop Savva (of Mukačevo and Užhorod), "30th Anniversary of the Reunion of the Zakarpatskaya Region Greek Catholics (Uniates) with the Russian Orthodox Church," *Journal of the Moscow Patriarchate*, No. 1 (Moscow, 1980), pp. 21-24.

24. For a discussion of the Lemko Rusyn eastward migration in the context of other European population movements at the time, see Joseph B. Schechtman, *Postwar Population Transfers in Europe, 1945-1955* (Philadelphia, 1962), pp. 151-179. On the lesser known emigration from northeastern Czechoslovakia, see Magocsi, *Rusyn-Ukrainians of Czechoslovakia*, p. 48; and Vanat, *Narysy*, Vol. II: *1938-1948* (1985), pp. 264-266.

25. Although it seems that plans for the deportation of Lemkos (and Ukrainians from neighboring lands in postwar southeast Poland) were already prepared, it was the death of General Karol Świerczewski in a battle with the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (the Banderites) in March 1947 that provided the official justification for removal. The forced deportation was carried out between April and July 1947 (often with only a few hours notice), despite the fact that the remaining Lemkos in Poland were primarily in the western Lemko region (west of the Dukla Pass) where the Ukrainian Banderites carried on only limited activity and where the local population was traditionally anti-Ukrainian.

On the deportation and the new life of Lemkos in the "Recovered Lands," see Andrzej Kwilecki "Fragmenty najnowszej historii Łemków," *Rocznik Sadecki*, VIII (Nowy Sącz, 1967), esp. pp. 274-287 and his *Łemkowie: zagadnienie migracji i asymilacji* (Warsaw, 1974).

26. Cited with further details in Bohdan R. Bociurkiw, "The Suppression of the Greek Catholic Church in Postwar Soviet Union and Poland," in Dennis J. Dunn, ed., *Religion and Nationalism in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union* (Boulder, Colo. and London, 1987), p. 106.

27. In the palatinate of Rzeszów, which included most of the Carpathian Lemko region as well as former Ukrainian-inhabited villages beyond the San, the vast majority of the 220 churches that disappeared between 1939 and 1972 were not destroyed as a result of World War II, but because of neglect during the post-1947 decades of peace. Ryszard Brykowski, "Zabykowe cerkwie," *Architektura*, XXXVII, 5 (Warsaw, 1983), pp. 53-58.

For a useful introduction to what occurred in Lemko villages after the deportations and resettlement by Poles, see C. M. Hann, *A Village Without Solidarity* (New Haven, Conn., 1985), pp. 17-39.

28. Ostensibly, the leader of the Slovak nationalists during the interwar years, the Reverend Andrej Hlinka, had once quipped that it might be preferable to ship the Rusyns eastward. This attitude was to resurface at times of political instability as during the deportation of Lemkos and the Banderite problem in neighboring Poland (1945-1947) and the Prague Spring (1968-1969). On Slovak attitudes and the high number of Rusyn Communist activists after World War II, see Pavel Maču, "National Assimilation. The Case of the Rusyn-Ukrainians of Czechoslovakia," *East-Central Europe*, II, 2 (Pittsburgh, Pa., 1975), pp. 126-127.

29. The Orthodox jurisdictional question south of the Carpathians was complicated. With the expansion of Orthodoxy during the interwar years in both eastern Slovakia and Subcarpathian Rus', the new church with its Eparchy of Mukačevo-Prešov was placed in 1931 under the Serbian patriarch in Belgrade. In 1945-1946, the Orthodox in Soviet Transcarpathia (Subcarpathian Rus') and in Eastern Slovakia were released from the jurisdiction of the Serbian Orthodox Church to become respectively the Eparchy of Mukačevo and the Czechoslovak Exarchate of the Russian Orthodox Moscow Patriarchate. Finally, in 1951, the Orthodox in Eastern Slovakia, organized into the Eparchies of Prešov and of Michalovce, became part of a distinct Czechoslovakia Autocephalous Orthodox Church, retaining since then close ties with the mother church in Moscow. Pavel Aleš, "Cesty k autokefalitě," in *Pravoslávny cirkevný kalendár 1981* (Bratislava, 1980), pp. 79-86.

30. For the Greek Catholic view of these events, see Pekar, *Narysy*, pp. 170-176; Lacko, "The Forced Liquidation," pt. 2: "Liquidation of the Diocese of Prešov," pp. 158-185; and Julius Kubinyi, *The History of the Prjašiv Eparchy* (Rome, 1970), pp. 169-178. For the local Orthodox view, see Aleš, "Cesty," p. 84 and Iliya Kacur, *Strucny prehl'ad histórie pravoslávnej cirkvi v bývalom Uhorsku a v Československu* (Prešov, no date), pp. 166-171. For the Czechoslovak Marxist view, see Ivan Bajcura, *Ukrajinska otázka v ČSSR* (Košice, 1967), pp. 128-132.

31. In neighboring Romania, the union was abolished and the Greek Catholic faithful absorbed into the Romanian Orthodox Church in October 1948, while in Yugoslavia, which had broken with the Soviet bloc in 1948, the Greek Catholic Diocese of Križevci (which included Rusyn communities originally from south of the Carpathians as well as local Croats and Ukrainian immigrants and their descendants from Galicia) continued to function.

32. By 1977, large concentrations of Greek Catholics were identified in 156 Roman Catholic parishes, including 16 located in the Tarnów and Przemyśl Roman Catholic dioceses, which cover the Lemko Region. Bociurkiw, "The Suppression," pp. 107 and 118, n. 57.

33. Kwilecki, "Fragment najnowszej historii," pp. 287-288; and Kwilecki, *Lemkowie*, pp. 198-200.

34. The Orthodox understanding is that the eparchy in 1983 is a restoration of what ceased to exist in 1691. Mykola Syvic'kyj "Vidrodžennja peremys'koji jeparchiji," *Cerkovnyj kalendar na 1985 rik* (Sanok, 1984), pp. 165-169.

35. Archbishop Marusyn's visitations took place in 1984, 1985, 1986, 1987. Some included the Lemko Region. An important statement of support for Poland's Greek Catholics occurred during the last visit of Pope John Paul II to Poland (June 1987), when he attended mass at the Basilian Greek Catholic Church in Warsaw.

36. See the statistics in the first Greek Catholic church almanac published in Poland since before World War II: *Hreko-Katolyc'kyj cerkovnyj kalendar 1987* (Warsaw, 1987), pp. 74-78.

37. The texts of the resolution of the Greek Catholic clergy requesting the legal reconstitution of their church, dated April 10, 1968, and of the Czechoslovak governmental decree, signed by then vice-prime minister (and today president) Gustáv Husák, approving the restoration and dated June 13, 1968, appeared in *Kalendár Greckokatolíkov 1969* (Trnava, 1968), pp. 46-50. An English translation of the governmental decree is found in Michael Lacko, "The Re-establishment of the Greek Catholic Church in Czechoslovakia," *Slovak Studies*, XI: *Historica*, No. 8 (Cleveland and Rome, 1971), pp. 164-165.

38. *Ibid.*, pp. 166-171.

39. For the Orthodox view of the Prague Spring, including opposition to restoration of the Greek Catholic Church, aided by the arrival in Czechoslovakia during early 1968 of "107 church figures—Vatican agents who were wolves in sheep's clothing," see the articles by the Orthodox Rusyn lay activist in Prague, Ivan S. Šlepec'kyj, sent by him in 1968 to the Prešov Ukrainian newspaper, *Nove žyttja*, but only published in the West: "Komy potrebna unyja s Rymom na Prjaševščyni?," *Karpatorusskij kalendar Lemko-Sojuza na hod 1970* (Yonkers, N.Y., 1970), pp. 77-80 and "V spravach demokratyzacyi Prjaševščyny," *Karpatorusskij kalendar' Lemko-Sojuza na hod 1969* (Yonkers, N.Y., 1969), pp. 35-59.

40. For details, see Lacko, "The Re-establishment," pp. 164-165; and Athanasius B. Pekar, "Restoration of the Greek Catholic Church in Czechoslovakia," *Ukrainian Quarterly*, XXIX, 3 (New York, 1973), pp. 284-288; and the protests of the Orthodox in their official organ, *Zapovit sv. Kyryla i Mefodija*, XI, 5, 6, 7 (Prešov, 1968).

41. By the second half of the 1970s, Greek Catholic laymen in western regions of the Ukrainian S.S.R. were at great personal risk (often resulting in imprisonment and exile) openly sending official requests to the Soviet government, the United Nations, and the governments of western countries, requesting the restitution of the Greek Catholic Church in the Soviet Union. Their activity culminated in 1982 with the establishment of the Initiative Group for the Defense of the Rights of Believers and the Church headed by Josyf Terelja, who has lived (when not imprisoned and until his most recent emigration to Canada in September 1987) in his native Transcarpathian village of Dovhe, near Mukačevo. See *Martyrolohija*, pp. 531-589 and 651-665; Ivan Hvat, "The Ukrainian Catholic Church, the Vatican, and the Soviet Union during the Pontificate of Pope John Paul II," *Religion in Communist Lands*, XI, 3 (Keston, England, 1983), pp. 264-294; and the monthly newsletter *Church of the Catacombs/Ukrainian Press Service* (St. Catharine's Ont., 1986-present).

42. In an atmosphere of political discussion that has prevailed since 1980 in Poland during and even after the rise and fall of the Solidarity movement, the question of the Lemkos has been revived once again. The issue concerns whether they should be considered Ukrainians (as they have been officially considered by the Polish government since 1945) or a distinct Lemko Rusyn nationality with the right to their own organizations. So far, it seems that this debate (carried on among Lemkos and among interested Poles and Ukrainians) has been the concern of the secular intelligentsia, without any particular role being played by either the Greek Catholic or Orthodox churches.

For details, see the series of articles in the *Carpatho-Rusyn American*, X, 1, 2, 3, 4 and XI, 1 (Fairview, N.J., 1987-88).

43. The following discussion is based largely on Maču, "National Assimilation." See also Magocsi, *Rusyn-Ukrainians*, pp. 49-55; Bajcura, *Ukrajinská otázka*, pp. 132-134 and 149-160; and Pavol Uram, "K niektorým otázkam vývoja ukrajinského školstva v ČSR v rokoch 1945-1960," *Zborník prac učitel'ov UML UPJŠ*, No. 5 (Košice, 1978), pp. 243-252.

44. Maču, "National Assimilation," pp. 104 and 129-130.

45. Based on the relatively reliable statistics of 1930, and taking into consideration natural increases and post-World War II emigration, there should have been approximately 130,000 Rusyns in Slovakia in 1968. Magocsi, *Rusyn-Ukrainians*, p. 64, n. 91.

46. The leading figure was and still is the Canadian industrialist Stephan B. Roman, a native "Rusnak" of self-declared Slovak nationality. Typical of the exaggerated statements of the time were those made in an interview with Roman and the then auxiliary Greek Catholic bishop in Toronto, Michael Rusnak, conducted by the Polish-Canadian journalist Benedykt Heydenkorn. While the interviewer rightly stated that the "view that all Greek Catholics are Ukrainians . . . is false," he then proceeded to agree with Roman that there are 500,000 Slovak Greek Catholics in the United States. This is remarkable, since at the time the *Official Catholic Directory, Anno Domini 1970* (New York, 1970) reported only 265,119 members in the Byzantine Ruthenian Catholic Church in the United States (and this includes as many, if not more, self-declared Carpatho-Rusyns than Slovaks, not to mention smaller numbers of Croats and Hungarians). The 500,000 figure could only be considered realistic if it was to include as well Ukrainian Greek Catholics in the United States (from historic Austrian Galicia), who in their own two dioceses numbered 254,333 in 1970. The total figure would be 519,453 which, following the Roman/Rusnak line, would imply that all these American Greek Catholics (Carpatho-Rusyns, Croats, Hungarians, Slovaks, Ukrainians) should be considered Slovaks.

As for the Carpathian homeland, Bishop Rusnak stated emphatically: "I can assure you that in all of Slovakia there are at most 20,000 Ukrainians"; which, therefore, justified the need for a Greek Catholic bishop of Slovak background for the Prešov Diocese. Benedykt Heydenkorn, "Rozmowy z bpem Rusnakiem i St. Romanem," *Kultura*, No. 1/2 [256/257] (Paris, 1969), pp. 148-153.

It is interesting to note that although Slovak elements in the West failed to gain a Slovak episcopal appointment for the Prešov Diocese in 1968-1969, Roman was instrumental in convincing the Vatican in 1981 that it should create a distinct Slovak Byzantine Ruthenian Catholic Church in Canada (headed by Bishop Michael Rusnak) for all of eight parishes! Though small in size, this church is seen as a model for a hoped-for future transformation of the originally Carpatho-Rusyn (and only partially Slovak/Croat/Hungarian) but now generally Americanized Byzantine Ruthenian Catholic Church in the United States into a Slovak body.

47. For opposite interpretations of Hopko's fate in 1968-1969, see the Slovak view by Lacko, "Re-establishment," p. 174; and the Rusyn/Ukrainian views by: A. Pekar, *Bishop Basil Hopko, S.T.D., Confessor of the Faith* (Pittsburgh, Pa., 1979), pp. 15-30, his "Restoration," pp. 288-296; and the anonymous *Tragedy of the Greek Catholic Church in Czechoslovakia* (New York, 1971), pp. 25-66.

48. For instance, beginning in 1968, the Greek Catholic Diocese published the monthly *Slovo* in Slovak and *Blahovistnyk* in Ukrainian and Rusyn as well as annual almanacs (*kalendary*) in Slovak and Ukrainian editions. In the past decade, the tirage of *Blahovistnyk* has been reduced substantially, and the almanac appears only in one edition with articles primarily in Slovak.

49. The statistical data is drawn from the *Pravoslávny cirkevný kalendár 1981* (Bratislava, 1980), pp. 57-61. While it is true that most Orthodox parishes use only Church Slavonic in the liturgy and Rusyn dialect (often heavily mixed with Church Slavonicisms) for homilies, Orthodox publications (including the monthly *Zapovit Kyril i Mefodija* and annual almanacs) are now primarily in Slovak.