V. Lypyns'kyj's Political Ideas from the Perspective of Our Times

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Vjačeslav Lypyns'kyj's treatise *Lysty do brativ-xliborobiv* (Letters to fellow farmers; Vienna, 1926) contains an exposition of both his political philosophy and his practical political program. This paper addresses the latter, that is, Lypyns'kyj's ideas about specific issues in Ukrainian politics. The more than half-century that separates us from Lypyns'kyj allows for a critical evaluation of his legacy, or, to paraphrase the title of Benedetto Croce's study on Hegel, to inquire into "what is living and what is dead" in Lypyns'kyj from the perspective of our own times.

Lypyns'kyj wrote the *Lysty* in the years 1919 to 1926. Obviously the Ukraine and the world at large have undergone tremendous changes since then. In approaching the *Lysty* today, the reader encounters topics that appear hopelessly dated. To give just one example, Lypyns'kyj wished to base Ukrainian statehood on the *xliboroby*, a class of stalwart yeomen farmers. But, as we know only too well, an independent landowning peasantry was destroyed in the Soviet Union, including the Ukraine, long ago. Moreover, owing to massive industrialization, the majority of the Ukraine's population is no longer rural, but urban. Given these facts, one could readily conclude that Lypyns'kyj's precepts, whatever historical interest they may possess as a relic of a generation gone by, have become quite irrelevant in the present-day world.

On closer examination, however, Lypyns'kyj's ideas retain their relevance and validity to a high degree. True, they must be translated into the idiom of our time, that is, critically reinterpreted in the light of present conditions. Also, points of disagreement with Lypyns'kyj must be registered. In the powerful "Foreword to Readers from Hostile Camps" of his *Lysty*, Lypyns'kyj challenged his political adversaries to an honest combat of ideas: without being his adversaries, we can still respond to that challenge.

Lypyns'kyj is, after all, not as distant from us in time as it might seem. He formulated his program from the perspective of the experience of the Ukrainian Revolution of 1917–21. But the historical epoch which started for the Ukraine in 1917 is still in progress. Lypyns'kyj's central problem was Ukrainian statehood: an analysis of the reasons why the modern bid for independence failed, and a search for ways to regain the independence that was lost and to make it secure. The solution to this fateful problem still lies in an uncertain future.

Social Pluralism

What is Lypyns'kyj's most enduring contribution to the problem of Ukrainian statehood? From among his many insights, I single out the perception that the structure of the future Ukrainian state, if there is ever going to be one, will necessarily have to be *pluralistic*. In other countries, those of the Western political culture, pluralism is usually taken for granted. In Ukrainian thought, however, Lypyns'kyj's stress on pluralism represented a radical innovation. The nineteenth-century populists' vision of Ukrainian society was monistic, in the manner of Rousseau. They viewed "the people" (*narod*), identified with the peasantry, as a homogeneous mass; anything or anyone that rose above the *narod* they condemned as parasitic, morally tainted, and essentially non-Ukrainian. Populist historians, from Mykola Kostomarov to Myxajlo Hruševs'kyj, glorified elemental peasant revolts, but they were suspicious of statebuilding efforts by Ukrainian elites. During the interwar period, among Ukrainians outside the USSR the ideology of populism was largely superseded by that of integral nationalism. Nationalism was in many ways a reaction to and an antithesis of populism. But the political philosophy of integral nationalism, too, was monistic, and in this respect it at least carried on the populist tradition. Integral nationalism simply replaced the concept of an undifferentiated "people" with that of a monolithic "nation." Both populism and integral nationalism adhered to the conception of a homogeneous society, with no allowance for a variety of social strata and political trends.

Lypyns'kyj sharply criticized monistic, reductionist ideologies which, by excluding large segments of the Ukraine's population as either so-called class enemies or alleged ethnic aliens, in fact perpetuated the nation's incompleteness and hence its perennial statelessness. He defended the notion that the Ukraine must evolve a differentiated class structure, encompassing all strata that are essential for the existence of a mature nation and an independent state. This was to be achieved partly by the rise of new elites from the popular masses, and partly by the reintegration of the alienated old elites. Lypyns'kyj pointed out that the strata which populists and integral nationalists rejected as non-Ukrainian contained some of the economically most productive, best educated, and politically most experienced elements of the country's population.

In Ukrainian statebuilding processes Lypyns'kyj assigned a preeminent, though by no means exclusive, role to the *xliboroby*—a somewhat archaic and poetic term for farmers. His *xliboroby* correspond fairly closely to the stratum communist propagandists have called *kulaki* in Russian or *kurkuli* in Ukrainian. Within the context of the revolutionary era, this conception made political sense. The Ukraine's population was still overwhelmingly rural, and prosperous farmers—those who had benefited from the recent Stolypin reforms—undoubtedly represented the economically most progressive force within the agrarian sector of society.

It might appear that Lypyns'kyj's argument has been made pointless by the Soviet collectivization of agriculture. However, Lypyns'kyj himself envisaged a future situation in which the urban and industrial sector would become dominant in Ukrainian society. He thought that under such circumstances the industrial working class and its "labor aristocracy" would be called to assume political leadership. He referred approvingly to the contemporary example of England, where the Labor party had formed a government for the first time in 1924.

The main point of Lypyns'kyj's reasoning, and the one which retains enduring validity, was the thesis that the Ukrainian struggle for independence ought to be socially based on those classes—agrarian, industrial, or both—which control material production, possess economic clout, and have, so to say, "a stake in the country." In this emphasis on production and economic power Lypyns'kyj approached Marxism—with which he was actually charged by his integral-nationalist critics. (However, contrary to the Marxists, he ascribed an independent function also to the military, "the power of the sword," which in his theory was not merely a reflection of economic forces.) The populist conception of the Ukrainian struggle for social and national liberation was that of a movement of the dispossessed masses, that is, primarily of the impoverished, semi-proletarianized segment

of the peasants, led by the intelligentsia. In response, Lypyns'kyj asked ironically: what would the prospects for the American Revolution have been if it had been a revolt of Redskins and Negro slaves, led by religious missionaries? The American Revolution could succeed only because it was based on substantial elements of colonial society and involved the former colonial elites.

Because intellectuals lack direct access to and control of levers of economic and military power, Lypyns'kyj considered them ill-suited for political leadership and the exercise of governance. This critique of the intelligentsia should not, however, be misinterpreted as a fundamental anti-intellectualism. Lypyns'kyj believed that intellectuals have a vitally important function to fulfill, namely, that of creators and guardians of cultural values and formulators of sociopolitical ideologies. But when intellectuals grasp after power, they only become untrue to their proper vocation, while aspiring to a role for which they lack the needed prerequisites.

The Problem of the Nobility

Lypyns'kyj was convinced that the Ukraine's struggle for independence could not succeed without the support of a part of the historical nobility. The large place which this topic occupies in his thinking was, undoubtedly, existentially conditioned. He was a scion of the Right-Bank *szlachta*, and his early, pre-World War I activity was devoted to reintegrating that Polonized stratum into the Ukrainian national community. The underlying motive was a strong sense of *noblesse oblige*. It was Lypyns'kyj's belief that noblemen had a moral duty to serve their native country, and not the interests of a colonial power. At the same time, he hoped that by fulfilling their duties as citizens of the Ukraine, noblemen would vindicate the right of continued existence for their class. Lypyns'kyj was primarily concerned with the Right-Bank Polonized *szlachta*, but his concept applied equally to the Left-Bank Russified *dvorjanstvo*, which descended from the Cossack officer stratum (*staršyna*) of the seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Hetmanate.

The whole issue has become water under the bridge, because the nobility in the Ukraine was completely swept away by the course of events. Still, we can ask: what significance did Lypyns'kyj's conception possess in the setting of his time?; and, can that conception, with some adjustments, still in some way be relevant today?

In respect to the first question, Tocqueville's remarks about the fate of the old French nobility bear noting:

It is indeed deplorable that instead of being forced to bow to the rule of law, the French nobility was uprooted and laid low, since thereby the nation was deprived of a vital part of its substance, and a wound that time will never heal was inflicted on our national freedom. When a class has taken the lead in public affairs for centuries, it develops as a result of this long, unchallenged habit of preeminence a certain proper pride and confidence in its strength, leading it to be the point of maximum resistance in the social organism. And it not only has itself the manly virtues; by dint of its example it quickens them in other classes. When such an element of the body politic is forcibly excised, even those most hostile to it suffer a diminution of strength.[1]

Lypyns'kyj assumed that Ukrainian society was bound, in any event, to retain a "plebeian" character, that is, to be basically peasant, proletarian, and petty bourgeois. The access of a limited number of persons of noble background would not have changed this state of affairs. But it might have transmitted a dose of traditional political culture to the raw and inexperienced leaders of the Ukrainian liberation movement—a quality which they conspicuously lacked. The Anglo-Irish gentry gave to Ireland Parnell (an example cited by Lypyns'kyj); the Swedish-Finnish aristocracy gave to Finland Mannerheim (who, like Pavlo Skoropads'kyj, was a tsarist general before the Revolution); the Polish-Ukrainian aristocracy gave to the Ukraine Count Roman Szeptycki—Metropolitan Andrej Šeptyc'kyj. If one considers the incalculable services to the Ukrainian cause of the last single individual, one is entitled to wonder whether the participation of more men of Šeptyc'kyj's type could not have made the difference between victory and defeat in the Ukrainian struggle for independence. It is therefore difficult to disagree with Lypyns'kyj's assertion that the Ukrainian populist intelligentsia committed a grave error in repulsing rather than trying to attract Ukrainophile members of the historical nobility. Such Ukrainophile tendencies undoubtedly existed among both the Russified and Polonized wings of that class, but they met with little encouragement.

Contrary to what his opponents have sometimes said, Lypyns'kyj did not dream of preserving the old, prerevolutionary social order and obsolete class privileges. He fully accepted the need and inevitability of far-reaching social change. But he thought that the nobility could serve as a link between the "old" and "new" Ukraine, and thus supply an element of continuity in the life of a nation whose development was characterized by a high degree of discontinuity.

Our objective is not the conservation of the noble class, and even less a return to the *status quo ante*. . . Nobody knows better than we that the mass of our Russified and

[1] Alexis de Tocqueville, *The Old Regime and the French Revolution*, trans. Stuart Gilbert (New York, 1955), pp. 110–11.

Polonized nobility has already to a large extent become degenerate, and that the last Mohicans of the Cossack-nobiliary era of our statehood must at last disappear, in the same way as have disappeared their predecessors, the last Mohicans of the Varangian-princely era. Such is the stern law of nature. But it is also a law of nature that sound seeds can grow only on a mature tree. Before an old tree dies, it must deposit into the soil sound seeds from which a fresh, reborn life will sprout.[2]

Lypyns'kyj contended that only those revolutions can succeed whose leadership includes a dissident segment of the old elite. He derived this conception from his studies of the Xmel'nyc'kyj period in the seventeenth-century Ukraine: it was the participation of Ruthenian nobles which lifted the Cossack revolution above the level of a mere jacquerie and which made possible the establishment of the Ukrainian Cossack state.

The experience of universal history seems to bear out Lypyns'kyj's contention. It would be easy to adduce supporting examples from the experiences of the English, American, French, and Chinese revolutions, and from a number of national-liberation revolutions of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Lypyns'kyj himself referred to the Russian Revolution:

Uljanov would probably not have become Lenin, if in his veins, and in the veins of his fellow-believers and helpers—the Čičerins, Buxarins, Kalinins, Kamenevs (the chief of the general staff, not Naxamkes)—did not run the blood of the old Muscovite nobility of service, who by the *opričnina* and terror saved and rebuilt the Muscovite state under [Ivan] Groznyj, during the Time of Troubles, under Peter the Great, and who are now saving and restoring it the fourth time under the banner of Bolshevism.[3]

It is a matter of record that more former tsarist officers served during the Civil War with the Red Army than with the White Armies of Kolčak, Denikin, and Judenič, and that the Soviet state apparatus incorporated from the very beginning many members of the old regime's administrative personnel. We can, therefore, agree with Lypyns'kyj's thesis that the Bolshevik leadership derived its sure power instinct and its political know-how from the elite of imperial Russia.

What is the relevance of these historical insights to the Ukrainian quest for independence under present conditions? Assuming the correctness of Lypyns'kyj's reasoning, one conclusion logically follows: an independent Ukrainian state can be reborn only with the active support of a significant segment of the Soviet Ukrainian "nobility of service," that is, of those Ukrainian nationals who occupy positions of responsibility in the Communist party, the administration and the economic management of the Ukrainian SSR, and the Soviet army. Their situation resembles that of the

[2] Lypyns'kyj, *Lysty do brativ-xliborobiv*, p. 75.
[3] Lypyns'kyj, *Lysty do brativ-xliborobiv*, p. 39.

nineteenth-century "Little Russian" nobles: they serve the imperial system and they are to a considerable extent Russified. Yet they form the actual elite of contemporary Ukrainian society. There are reasons to assume that, despite outward conformity, many among them do not lack a sense of Ukrainian identity, and that they harbor grievances against the Moscow overlord. Extrapolating from Lypyns'kyj's argument, it would seem that a wise, statesmanlike policy on the part of Ukrainian émigrés would be to foster dissident tendencies in the ranks of the Soviet Ukrainian elite. If, on the other hand, Ukrainian émigrés damn indiscriminately all members of that establishment as renegades and traitors, they would only be repeating the mistakes of the populists in their dealings with the historical nobility.

Political and Religious Pluralism

Lypyns'kyj's social pluralism was complemented by political pluralism. His point of departure was a firm conviction that there is not and can never be a paradise on earth, a perfect social and political order. The future Ukrainian state, too, will be no utopia: it will inevitably contain a full measure of mistakes, abuses, and injustices. The task of the opposition will be to strive for their correction. Therefore, "in our hetmanite Ukraine there will always be room for His Majesty's opposition alongside with His Majesty's government."[4] Furthermore, by placing pressure on the establishment, the opposition prevents it from becoming complacent and stagnant. A legally recognized opposition is the mechanism which assures a continual rejuvenation of the national elite by an influx of fresh blood.

Most illuminating about Lypyns'kyj's understanding of political pluralism is his discussion with Osyp Nazaruk concerning the strategy to be adopted toward representative Ukrainian leftists. Nazaruk, a recent convert to the hetmanite ideology, urged Lypyns'kyj to "kill" (figuratively) such false prophets as Drahomanov, Franko, Hruševs'kyj, Vynnyčenko, and "even Ševcenko, as a propagator of ideas about society and the state." Lypyns'kyj replied:

> Ševčenko, Franko, and Drahomanov are revolutionaries. I think that it is pointless to combat some of their harmful ideas by debunking their revolutionary authority. There shall always be Ukrainian revolutionaries who will draw, and quite rightly so, inspiration from them. The trouble is not at all in that we have revolutionaries. The trouble is that we have only revolutionaries. In order to heal this lethal one-sidedness of the nation, we need conservatives with a positive program, and not merely with a negation of the revolutionaries. The formation of such a positive

[4] Lypyns'kyj, *Lysty do brativ-xliborobiv*, p. xl.

conservative political thought is, in my judgment, much more important than a struggle against Ševčenko, Franko, and Drahomanov. Moreover, this struggle is hopeless without the existence of a strong Ukrainian conservative organization. People must get their ideas from somewhere. As long as they have only the above-mentioned writers, they will draw from them, no matter how much one would criticize them. There is only one remedy: to provide writers with a different mode of thinking, a different tactic, a different style, and, above all, with a preponderance of reason and will over romanticism and mindless emotions.[5]

In sum, Lypyns'kyj's conservatism did not by any means imply the suppression of other, non-conservative Ukrainian ideological trends and political parties. He was quite willing to find something positive even in Ukrainian communists, provided that for them communism is for the Ukraine, and not the Ukraine for communism. What he actually desired was, first, to overcome "the lethal one-sidedness of the nation" by strengthening the hitherto underdeveloped, conservative wing, and, second, to coordinate the several contending forces within a unified political system, under a rule of law common to all.

To round out the picture, it should be mentioned that Lypyns'kyj was a pluralist also in matters of church politics. Personally a faithful Roman Catholic in his ancestral Latin Rite, he considered religious pluralism a permanent feature of Ukrainian life. He advocated parity for all denominations, although he thought that on historical grounds the Orthodox church had a rightful claim to be the *prima inter pares* among Ukrainian churches. Lypyns'kyj was convinced that civilized politics presupposes Christian ethical principles, but he rejected with indignation all attempts to equate nationality with any specific denomination ("only an Orthodox can be a good Ukrainian," "only the Greek Catholic church is the true Ukrainian national church," etc.). Lypyns'kyj strongly opposed clericalism, the formation of political and civic organizations along denominational lines, and, generally, the mixing of political and ecclesiastical concerns, which, in his opinion, ought to be kept separate.

There can be little doubt that Lypyns'kyj's ideas about the need for political pluralism and the importance of a legally recognized opposition retain their validity for the present and the future. A post-communist Ukraine, lest it become another dictatorship, would have to possess a pluralistic political structure. Pluralism is considered a hallmark of liberal democracy. Yet, paradoxically, among all Ukrainian political thinkers it was the anti-democrat Lypyns'kyj who was the most consistent pluralist.

[5] Letter of Lypyns'kyj to Nazaruk of 18 February 1925, cited in *Lysty Osypa Nazaruka do Vjačeslava Lypyns'koho*, ed. Ivan L. Rudnytsky (Philadelphia, 1976), p. xlvi.

Monarchy and Legitimacy

Lypyns'kyj's monarchism is the most questionable part of his program from our contemporary point of view. We are bound to wonder why this exceptionally intelligent man so passionately defended the concept of a monarchical structure, in the form of a hereditary hetmanate, for the future Ukrainian state.

There exists an intimate connection between Lypyns'kyj's pluralism and monarchism. Precisely because the Ukraine that he envisaged was to be socially and politically differentiated, this plurality called for a counterbalancing principle of unity. Without a unifying center, without a universally recognized authority, there was the acute danger that conflicting social forces and rival political movements might split the Ukrainian body politic into chaotic fragments. Ukrainian history shows, unfortunately, only too many instances of such self-destructive feuds.

Lypyns'kyj's historical research convinced him that one of the principal reasons why the seventeenth-century Ukrainian Cossack state did not establish itself permanently was the failure of Bohdan Xmel'nyc'kyj's plans to make the office of hetman hereditary. The electivity of the supreme office detracted from its authority, facilitated the spread of anarchic factionalism, and provided foreign powers with easy opportunities to intervene in internal Ukrainian affairs. Lypyns'kyj applied this "lesson of history" to the contemporary Ukrainian situation.

Lypyns'kyj believed that a state cannot be created without the use of physical, military force. States are born out of wars and revolutions, yet force alone is insufficient. Equally needed is that the government which uses force be legitimate, that its authority be based on a principle which is accepted by all—not only by the ruling minority, but by the popular masses as well. Historically, it was the monarchical institution which provided the principle of legitimacy in the building of states and nations: "All great European nations were united by monarchies. Without a monarchy, would the unification of Germany, France, Italy, or the rebirth of smaller nations, such as Bulgaria, Romania, Norway, be thinkable? Why should we be an exception?"[6]

The problem of legitimacy of power has been discussed by two twentieth-century Western theorists, the Spaniard José Ortega y Gasset and the Italian Gugliemo Ferrero. It is worthwhile to compare their ideas on that subject with those of Lypyns'kyj. Ortega wrote:

[6] Lypyns'kyj, *Lysty do brativ-xliborobiv*, p. 47.

Concord, the kind of concord which forms the foundation of stable society, presupposes that the community holds a firm and common, unquestionable and practically unquestioned, belief as to the exercise of supreme power. And this is tremendous. Because a society without such a belief has little chance of obtaining stability... Each of the European nations lived for centuries in a state of unity because they all believed blindly—all belief is blind—that kings ruled "by the grace of God."... When the peoples of Europe lost the belief, the kings lost the grace, and they were swept away by the gusts of revolution.[7]

Ferrero's argument runs along similar lines. According to him, European civilization has produced two great principles of legitimacy, the monarchic-hereditary and the democratic-elective. Either of them has proved capable of serving as the foundation of stable political systems. Since the French Revolution the monarchical principle has gone into decline, leading to the downfall of monarchy in most countries by the end of the First World War. However, the disappearance of monarchy was not followed, in most cases, by the establishment of a stable and legitimate democracy, for which the respective peoples were not ready. The vacuum of authority left behind by the collapse of monarchies was filled by regimes Ferrero terms "revolutionary" or "totalitarian," and whose first examples he sees in the Jacobin and Napoleonic dictatorships. Such regimes claim to represent the popular will. But their pretended democratic character is a sham, because they cannot face the test of free elections and the existence of an overt opposition. Revolutionary regimes try to compensate for the lack of authentic democratic legitimacy by appeals to an exclusive and militant ideology and to the personal charisma of infallible leaders, by engaging in foreign military adventures, and finally by a systematic repression of all dissident elements. Revolutionary/totalitarian regimes are necessarily terroristic, because the rulers, sensing the illegitimacy and instability of their authority, live in a constant fear of society, and society lives in fear of the rulers.[8]

Lypyns'kyj's views fully coincide with those of Ortega and Ferrero in respect to the legitimizing function the monarchical institution once fulfilled. A basic divergence is to be found, however, in their evaluations of the present and of future prospects. Both Ortega and Ferrero thought the only workable solution to the problem of legitimacy of power in our times to be democratic. Lypyns'kyj denied this. His pessimistic assessment of democracy undoubtedly reflected the failure of Ukrainian and Russian

[7] José Ortega y Gasset, *Concord and Liberty*, trans. Helene Weyl (New York, 1963), pp. 19–20.

[8] Gugliemo Ferrero, *The Principles of Power: The Great Political Crises of History*, trans. Theodore R. Jaeckel (New York, 1942).

democracy in 1917, and the sorry performance of Western liberal democracies which won the war against conservative-monarchical imperial Germany, only to fail conspicuously in the creation of a viable and stable postwar order. Lypyns'kyj was strongly dedicated to the idea of a rule of law. Therefore, he could not but reject a "revolutionary"—that is, dictatorial and totalitarian, solution to the problem of the structure of power, represented in Ukrainian politics by the communist and integral-nationalist movements. The only remaining option, and the one he passionately embraced, was to uphold the time-proven principle of monarchical legitimacy.

To avoid misunderstanding, it must be emphasized that Lypyns'kyj was no partisan of absolute monarchy. He most definitely rejected absolutist monarchical regimes, such as tsarist Russia's, calling them "hereditary dictatorships." "Of course, we do not want the old tsarist autocracy, this semi-Asiatic, democratic [i.e., populist] despotism, which in moments of danger saved itself with the help of the mob, by pogroms."[9] The type of monarchy he advocated was "restricting by law and restricted by law"—in other words, constitutional monarchy. He repeatedly referred to the example of England as the model that Ukrainians should try to emulate. He believed that the seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Hetmanate was evolving toward this type of political system.

Lypyns'kyj was not blind to the fact that the spirit of the age was altogether inhospitable to the idea of hereditary authority, the principle of monarchical legitimacy:

> A new monarchy, a new dynasty, cannot be created in a time when press and literature dominate life. Founders of monarchies and dynasties, "God-given" leaders of nations, cannot appear in an age in which the epic sense of life has vanished. Epic heroes (*bohatyri*) are not being born with the friendly assistance of the cinema and newspaper reporters.[10]

Lypyns'kyj hoped that this difficulty could be overcome by an appeal to tradition: not the creation of a new dynasty, but the restoration of a dynasty whose claims are hallowed by historical precedent. Under the given conditions, this meant support for the Skoropads'kyj cause: a member of that family had once occupied the hetman's office in the eighteenth century, and a descendent of the same family had validated these historical rights by assuming the hetmancy in 1918.

[9] Lypyns'kyj, *Lysty do brativ-xliborobiv*, p. 42.
[10] Lypyns'kyj, *Lysty do brativ-xliborobiv*, pp. 89–90.

Lypyns'kyj did not idealize Pavlo Skoropads'kyj's regime; he was aware of its weaknesses and criticized some of its policies. But he asserted that the Hetmanate of 1918, despite its shortcomings, was the closest approximation to a desirable form of government for the Ukraine, and, by the same token, the best chance to establish a viable Ukrainian state during the revolutionary era; he denied that the rival leftist regime of the Ukrainian People's Republic had such potential. Therefore, when the hour of Ukrainian independence shall strike again, Ukrainian patriots would, according to Lypyns'kyj, have to continue the work begun in 1918 by recreating a constitutional monarchy under the legitimate Skoropads'kyj dynasty. A critical assessment of Lypyns'kyj's monarchist conception should discuss it on two levels, from the perspective of the era of the Ukrainian Revolution (which, of course, was Lypyns'kyj's perspective), and from that of the present Ukrainian generation.

There is considerable evidence that throughout the nineteenth and into the early years of the twentieth century, monarchical loyalism of a spontaneous and naive kind was widespread among the Ukrainian people. It centered on the alien Romanov and (in Galicia) Habsburg dynasties. Lypyns'kyj was probably right that the Ukrainian masses had little understanding of statehood as an abstract concept; for them the state had to be personified in a living father-figure. It was sensible, therefore, to try to divert this feeling of allegiance, released by the abdication of the last tsar, toward the personified symbol of Ukrainian statehood. Also, memories of the Cossack age were still very much alive among the population of Central and Eastern Ukraine. It could seem reasonable, then, to anchor the reborn Ukrainian state in the tradition of the old Cossack body politic.

On the other side of the argument, the mainstream of the Ukrainian Revolution was undoubtedly populist and socialist. The regime of the Ukrainian People's Republic was more broadly based than Skoropads'kyj's Hetmanate. A native monarchical tradition did not exist in the Ukraine; the Hetmanate of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries was, after all, elective and semi-republican. Thus Hetman Pavlo Skoropads'kyj's quasi-dynastic claims did not suffice to endow his rule with an aura of legitimacy. Only massive popular support could have legitimized Skoropads'kyj's regime. To secure this would have required a leader of extraordinary genius and charisma, a second Bohdan Xmel'nyc'kyj. It is not to detract from the real merits of Pavlo Skoropads'kyj to say that he was not a statesman of such stature. The general political constellation of the time must also be taken into account. With the fall of imperial Germany, the victory of the liberal-democratic Entente in the West, and the Bolshevik Revolution engulfing Russia and spilling over into the Ukraine, it is difficult to see how

a conservative-monarchical regime could have possibly survived in the Ukraine. It is noteworthy that two other recently-reborn East European states, Poland and Finland, which originally were planned as constitutional kingdoms, switched to the republican form of government.

There was much justice in Lypyns'kyj's acerbic critique of Ukrainian "revolutionary democracy," that is, of the left-wing parties which formed the governments of the Ukrainian People's Republic during the Central Rada and Directory periods. But Lypyns'kyj erred in thinking that these faults were congenital to the democratic character of the Ukrainian People's Republic. They should rather be diagnosed as "infantile disorders," resulting from the immaturity and political inexperience of the Ukrainian national-liberation movement—a legacy of tsarist autocracy which denied to the peoples under its domination any training in self-government and responsible citizenship. This interpretation is corroborated by the experience of the West Ukrainian People's Republic, established on the territory of the former Austrian province of Galicia. The West Ukrainian state adhered basically to the same democratic-populist philosophy as the Ukrainian People's Republic in the central and eastern parts of the country. What made the difference was that the Galician Ukrainians had gone through the school of Austrian constitutionalism. The government of the West Ukrainian People's Republic enjoyed the unquestioned allegiance of the entire Ukrainian population, and it successfully maintained law and order throughout the territory under its control. The Western Ukraine was free of the scourges that afflicted the Dnieper Ukraine: agrarian riots, anti-Jewish pogroms, and *otamanščyna* (freelance military chieftains, or *otamany*, with their detachments). Lypyns'kyj explicitly recognized the legitimate nature of the government of the West Ukrainian People's Republic. This means that, even on Lypyns'kyj's terms, a stable and legitimate Ukrainian democratic regime was not, in principle, impossible.

Where does all this leave us today? Since the end of World War I monarchies have been disappearing in one country after another, to the point that kings have become an endangered species. This trend is not necessarily to be hailed as "progressive." In most cases, monarchies have been superseded not by stable democracies, but by dictatorships and tyrannies of the type Ferrero called "revolutionary" or "totalitarian" and Lypyns'kyj called "ochlocratic." (The Russians rid themselves of the tsar, and they received Lenin and Stalin; the Germans deposed the silly but rather harmless Kaiser Wilhelm II, and they got Hitler instead; the Iranians overthrew the shah, to fall under the rule of the Ayatollah Khomeini.) In those countries where monarchies still exist, there may be good reasons to preserve them: out of a sense of respect and affection for tradition, and as a

symbol of national continuity. It may also be advantageous to separate the office of the ceremonial head of state from that of the actual chief executive, and to keep the former non-political by removing it from partisan competition. It is not coincidental that those European countries where the institution of monarchy survives—Britain, the three Scandinavian kingdoms, the Netherlands, Belgium—are among those possessing the highest level of political culture and the best entrenched, most secure civil liberty. This applies also to Japan, in many respects the most advanced nation of Asia.

It is clear, however, that the institution of monarchy survives only on sufferance. By itself, it is no longer able to legitimize authority; rather, it is itself in need of being legitimized by popular will. And once a monarchy has fallen, it hardly ever can be restored, because whatever charisma it still may have possessed is gone forever. (Recent history has experienced only a single, isolated case of a monarchical restoration: Spain. It remains to be seen whether the restored Spanish Bourbon royalty will last.) Particularly in countries such as the Ukraine, where the entire traditional structure has been completely turned upside down by decades of communist rule, the prospects of a monarchical restoration must be assessed as nil. The problem of legitimacy remains, of course, but at this stage in world history it can be solved only along democratic lines. As Tocqueville correctly predicted one hundred and fifty years ago, the choice mankind faces is between liberal democracy and "democratic despotism."

There are indications that Lypyns'kyj, despite his dogmatic monarchism, had an inkling of this state of affairs. We know from his biography that shortly before his death he despaired of the Skoropads'kyj cause. Conflicts with Hetman Pavlo certainly played a role in this, but it seems that he was also assailed by doubts concerning the fundamental validity of his conception. This was his personal tragedy, which should be viewed with compassion. In any event, in his last writings, while continuing to advocate a hereditary hetmanate as most desirable, Lypyns'kyj proclaimed that the determination of the form of government of the future Ukrainian state should be a prerogative of the constituent assembly. This amounted to an admittance of the democratic principle of popular sovereignty—the principle he had rejected so vehemently.

It was Lypyns'kyj's great accomplishment to have been the first Ukrainian political thinker to have formulated the problem of legitimate authority. This problem was never raised by prerevolutionary democratic publicists, because they did not think in terms of independent statehood; they accepted the existing empires, Russia and Austria-Hungary, as a fact of life, and their vision of the Ukrainian national liberation movement was

that of a revolutionary ferment, a permanent opposition against these established powers. Populists and Marxists tended to be concerned primarily with socioeconomic issues, and to look on questions of political structure as secondary. Communists and integral nationalists, who dominated the Ukrainian political scene during the interwar era, were attuned to the problem of power, but wished to solve it in a revolutionary manner: by the dictatorship of a single party, standing at the helm of the masses and acting with unlimited authority in their name and on their behalf. Lypyns'kyj alone understood that, in order not to be arbitrary and tyrannical, the power of the state must be based on the principle of legitimacy and be circumscribed by it. This is what Ukrainian democrats should try to learn from Lypyns'kyj, while proposing a different solution.

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