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## THE ROLE OF THE UKRAINE IN MODERN HISTORY

BY IVAN L. RUDNYTSKY

### THE SETTING OF THE PROBLEM

A striking difference between the historical development of the countries of Western Europe and that of those of the eastern half of the continent has been often observed. The former, particularly France and England, have enjoyed, in spite of some periods of revolutionary upheaval, a millennium of continuous growth. Germany's fate has been much less favorable, and farther to the east it is impossible to find any country which has not experienced, at one time or another, a tragic breakdown and an epoch of a national *capitis deminutio*, sometimes extending for centuries. Here one will think of the subjugation of the Balkanic peoples and Hungary by the Turks, of the crushing of Bohemia by Habsburg absolutism, of the partitions of Poland.

The Ukraine is a typically East European nation in that its history is marked by a high degree of discontinuity. The country suffered two major eclipses in the course of its development. The medieval Rus' received a crippling blow from the hands of the Mongols, was subsequently absorbed by Lithuania, and finally annexed to Poland. In the middle of the seventeenth century the Ukraine rose against Polish domination, and a new body politic, the Cossack State, came into existence. By the second half of the eighteenth century, however, the autonomy of the Cossack Ukraine was destroyed by the Russian Empire. A new upward cycle started in the nineteenth century. The movement of national regeneration culminated in the 1917 Revolution, when a Ukrainian independent state emerged, to succumb soon to Communist Russian control. This third, last great division of Ukrainian history, which lasts from the 1780's to the Revolution, and in a sense even to the present, forms what may be defined as "modern Ukrainian history."

When nationalist movements got under way in nineteenth-century Eastern Europe, they were of two different types. In one, the leadership remained with the traditional upper class (nobility), into which newcomers of plebeian background were infused only gradually. Their

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programs were characterized by a historical legitimism: their aim was the restoration of the nation's old state within its ancient boundaries. In the movements of the second type, leadership had to be created anew, and the efforts were directed toward the raising of a "natural," ethnic community to a politically conscious nationhood. These latter movements had a slower start than the former, but they drew strength from their identification with the strivings of the masses, and they were able to profit from the inevitable democratization of the social structure. When the territorial claims of nations of the two types clashed, as happened frequently, those of the second category usually prevailed in the long run. The two categories are referred to as the "historical" and the "nonhistorical" nations respectively. If these concepts are to serve as useful tools of historical understanding, the following things are to be kept in mind. "Nonhistoricity," in this meaning, does not necessarily imply that a given country is lacking a historical past, even a rich and distinguished past; it simply indicates a rupture in historical continuity through the loss of the traditional representative class. Second, the radical opposition that appears between these two types when they are conceived as sociological models by no means precludes the existence in historical reality of borderline cases, as for instance the Czechs.

*Prima facie* evidence assigns the Ukraine to the category of the "non-historical" nations. The modern Ukrainian nation is not simply a continuation or restoration of the Cossack Ukraine of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, or, of course, even less of the Kievan and Galician Rus'.<sup>1</sup> On the other hand, one must not overlook the links that connected the nineteenth-century national *risorgimento* with the Cossack epoch. The modern nationalist movement started in those areas of the Ukraine where the Cossack traditions were the strongest, and originally most of the leaders came from the descendants of the former Cossack officers (*starshyny*) class. Symbols and ideas derived from the Cossack tradition played an important role even as late as the 1917 Revolution.<sup>2</sup>

Ukrainian history of the nineteenth century may mean two different things: a history of the nationalist movement on the one hand, and a

<sup>1</sup> It is significant that the Third Universal (Manifesto) of the revolutionary Ukrainian parliament, the Central Rada, which proclaimed the formation of the Ukrainian People's Republic (November 20, 1917), and the Fourth Universal, which declared the Ukraine a sovereign state completely separate from Russia (January 22, 1918), avoided any reference to historical rights and were completely based on the principle of democratic self-determination. Since the president of the Rada and the originator of these two acts was the dean of Ukrainian historians, Mykhailo Hrushevsky, this omission was not fortuitous. It reflected an essential trait of the ideology of the Ukrainian movement.

<sup>2</sup> A parallel situation may be found at the transition from the first to the second epoch of Ukrainian history. The Cossack State was not a direct continuation of the Kievan State, but neither was it without connections with this predecessor. The Ukrainian ("Ruthenian," in the nomenclature of the time) gentry, burghers, and clergy, among whom the traditions

history of the country and the people on the other hand. The two are closely interrelated, but they do not coincide.

Beginning with the 1840's and until the 1917 Revolution, there was an uninterrupted chain of groups and organizations, formal and informal, that were committed to the idea of the Ukraine's cultural and political regeneration as a separate nation. Combated and persecuted by tsarist authorities, the movement was irrepressible. At times it demonstrated a great vitality (as in the 1870's); at other times it seemed to have gone into hibernation (as in the 1880's). It would be a fruitful task, which has not yet been fully accomplished by historical scholarship, to trace the course of the Ukrainian nationalist movement, somewhat as the course of the Russian revolutionary movements has been traced by Jan Kucharzewski and Franco Venturi.

It is clear, however, that until the eve of the 1917 Revolution, Ukrainian nationalism retained the character of a minority movement. (This refers to the Russian Ukraine only; the situation was different in Austrian Galicia.) The peasant masses were, until 1905, little touched by the nationalist movement. Thoroughly Ukrainian in all their objective, ethnic traits, they had not yet adopted a modern national consciousness, and generally remained politically amorphous. The members of the upper classes were mostly Russified and, except for those engaged in the Ukrainian movement, regarded themselves as belonging to the Russian nation. The question arises whether under such circumstances the student is entitled to include in "Ukrainian history" everything that happened on Ukrainian soil.

A memoirist has noted the following observation. If the train from Kiev to Poltava which carried delegates for the unveiling of the monument to the poet Kotliarevsky in 1903 had crashed, this would have meant, it was said jokingly, the end of the Ukrainian movement for a long time; nearly all the leading personalities of the movement traveled in two cars of that train.<sup>3</sup> But how is one to explain a movement that at the turn of the century had only a few thousands of self-professed adherents, by 1905 began to assume a mass character, and after another twelve years erupted, in 1917, as a nascent nation of over thirty million? The answer can be only this: there were at work among the population of the Ukraine other forces which, without being identical with the nationalist movement, were pointed in the same direction, and finally, as if drawn by an irresistible attraction, merged with it. The nationalist movement played the role of the catalyst, and in this sense it was extremely important. But we cannot historically explain the origins of

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of the Kievan Rus' remained alive even under Polish domination, provided the Cossack military organization with a religious-political program, and partly also with a leading personnel, which lifted the anti-Polish revolt of 1648 to the level of a war of national liberation. This is the point in which the Ukrainian Cossacks radically differed from similar Russian communities of frontiersmen, the Don and Iaik (Ural) Cossacks.

<sup>3</sup> Євген Чикаленко, *Спогади (1861-1907)* (New York, 1955), p. 337.

the modern Ukrainian nation if we concentrate on the nationalist movement alone. We must take into account also various other forces: for instance, the activities of the Ukrainian zemstvo or those of the Ukrainian branches of "All-Russian" revolutionary organizations, from the Decembrists, through the Populists, to the Marxist and labor groups at the turn of the century.<sup>4</sup> All of them made their contributions to the formation of the modern Ukraine. Moreover, a closer scrutiny shows that these movements, though not endowed with a fully crystallized Ukrainian national awareness, usually possessed it in an embryonic stage in the form of a "South Russian" sectionalism, or "territorial patriotism."

Thus it may be stated that the central problem of modern Ukrainian history is that of the emergence of a nation: the transformation of an ethnic-linguistic community into a self-conscious political and cultural community. A comprehensive study of this subject would have to include an investigation into the factors that shaped the nation-making process, either by furthering or by impeding it. The interrelation with all the other forces, active on the wider East European scene, would have to be taken into account.

The character of modern Ukrainian history changes definitely after 1917. The making of the nation was basically completed during the revolutionary years 1917-20.<sup>5</sup> For the last four decades the central issue of Ukrainian history was the nation's struggle for survival under foreign rule and for the restoration of its liberty and independence. The struggle was—and is to the present day—primarily directed against Soviet Russia. But in the interwar period it was, in the western portion of the Ukraine's territory, directed also against Poland, and during the years of World War II against Nazi Germany as well.

#### METHODOLOGICAL APPROACHES

In studying Ukrainian prerevolutionary history, stress ought to be placed primarily on social-economic developments and on the evolution of social thought; a politically oriented historical investigation would be relatively unproductive.

Not having an independent state nor even such a semi-independent autonomous body politic as, for instance, the Poles possessed in the

<sup>4</sup> Limitations of space do not permit bolstering these statements with proper references. Two short examples must suffice: the memoirs of V. Debagorij-Mokrievich and the first part of those of I. Petrunkevich, the former for a presentation of revolutionary Populism, and the latter for one of zemstvo liberalism, in the Ukraine of the 1870's. Both men were of Ukrainian descent, but regarded themselves as members of the Russian nation, and wrote in Russian. Nevertheless, they were quite aware that the people among whom they were working differed in many essential respects from the Great Russians and had to be approached in a different way. An unmistakable Ukrainian aura pervades these reminiscences.

<sup>5</sup> Only in some backward areas, such as the Carpatho-Ukraine (Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia), was the crystallization of a modern national consciousness delayed until the 1930's.

“Congress” Kingdom, the Ukrainians were unable to participate in politics on a governmental level: they were not directly connected with the great world of diplomacy and military affairs. The international order established in Ukrainian lands in the last third of the eighteenth century by the Russian annexation of the Black Sea coastal areas as well as of the “Right Bank” (i.e., of the territories west of the Dnieper), and by the annexation of Galicia by the Austrian Empire, remained basically unchanged until 1914. This long period of stability made any idea of international change seem remote and unrealistic to contemporaries.<sup>6</sup>

Conditions in the Russian Empire were such that an overt political life on a nongovernmental level was also impossible, at least until 1905. In this respect, the Ukrainians in Austria had a great advantage over the majority of their compatriots, who lived under Russian rule. After the 1848 Revolution, Galician Ukrainians took part in elections, possessed a parliamentary representation, a political press, parties, and civic organizations. In the Russian Ukraine political strivings could be expressed only through illegal channels, namely, through underground groups, whose activities were necessarily of limited scope. In the long run it was, however, inevitable that changes of social structure and intellectual trends were to have political effects.

The two great stages in the prerevolutionary Ukraine's social development were the abolition of serfdom in 1861 and the rise of modern industrialism toward the end of the century. Neither movement was limited to the Ukraine but rather was common to the Russian Empire as a whole. Still, the Ukrainian lands possessed certain social-economic peculiarities of their own, and the idea, generally held by Western scholars, of the Ukraine's complete integration in the economic fabric of the empire, “like Pennsylvania's in the United States,” is incorrect. The Ukrainian peasantry had never known the system of the “repartitional commune,” and they were undoubtedly more individualistically minded than the Great Russian muzhiks. Ukrainian agriculture was connected through the Black Sea ports with the world market; most of Russia's agricultural exports came from the Ukraine. The rapid development of Ukrainian mining and heavy industries was due to a massive influx of foreign investments. The economic connections of the Ukraine were in many respects closer to the outside world than to Central Russia.<sup>7</sup>

<sup>6</sup> It is, however, to be noted that each of the major international conflicts in which the Russian Empire was involved—the Napoleonic, Crimean, Balkanic, and Japanese wars—had definite repercussions in the Ukraine. In each case movements arose which attempted to take advantage of Russia's predicament for the betterment of the Ukraine's position.

<sup>7</sup> An early Ukrainian Marxist, Iulian Bachynsky, developed in his essay *Ukraina irredenta* (1895) the thesis that while the industries of Congress Poland were working for and dependent on the Russian market, Ukrainian industry was rather competitive with that of Central Russia. From this he drew the prognosis that the Ukraine was more likely than Poland to secede from Russia. This reveals the shortcomings of a purely economic interpretation of historical events, and for this Bachynsky was criticized by such outstanding



Agrarian overpopulation and the harsh lot of industrial workers led to a sharpening of social tensions in the Ukraine. A characteristic of the Ukrainian scene, a phenomenon to be found also in other “non-historical” countries, was the overlapping of social and national conflicts. The great landowners, capitalists, and industrial entrepreneurs were predominantly members of the local Russian, Polish, and Jewish minorities, or foreigners. Thus the coming revolution was to be simultaneously a social and a national one. The Ukrainian national movement was not limited to any single social class. It had individual supporters among the members of the upper classes, and it reached into the class of industrial workers. Still, it found the strongest response among the middle strata: the prosperous peasantry, the rural intelligentsia and semi-intelligentsia, the emerging native petty bourgeoisie of the towns. Close links existed between Ukrainian nationalism and the cooperative movement, which was growing at great speed in the years preceding World War I. The larger cities retained a predominantly Russian character, and this was to be a great handicap to the Ukraine during the Revolution. But, judging by the example of other countries with a similar social structure, the “Ukrainization” of the urban centers would have been a question of time.<sup>8</sup>

The impact of the economic policies of the Russian government on the Ukraine must also be considered. Some economic historians active during the early Soviet period (M. Slabchenko, M. Iavorsky, O. Ohloblyn, M. Volobuev) used the term “colonialism” to define the Ukraine’s position in relation to the former empire. This concept, borrowed from the Marxist arsenal, was not altogether well chosen. Tsarist Russia possessed genuine colonies, such as Transcaucasia and Turkestan, but the Ukraine could not be counted among them. The administration looked rather on the Ukraine as belonging to the core of the “home provinces” of European Russia. The economic progress of the Ukraine (“South Russia”) was in many respects faster than that of the Great Russian center. Nevertheless, the economic policies of the government were mostly adverse to Ukrainian interests. The Ukraine, for instance, carried an excessive load of taxation, since the revenues collected in the Ukraine did not return to the country but were spent in other parts of the empire. The construction of railroad lines, which was dominated by strategic considerations, as well as the existing system of freight rates and customs duties, failed to take Ukrainian needs into account. Contemporaries were well aware of the issue. It is noteworthy that the industrial groups of the “South”—who were of non-Ukrainian background and had no connections with the nationalist movement—

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contemporaries as M. Drahomanov and I. Franko. Still, the facts pointed out by Bachynsky were certainly significant.

<sup>8</sup> One may recall that Prague and Riga preserved well into the nineteenth century a predominantly German outlook.

tended to form regional syndicates and associations for the defense of the area's economic interests, neglected by the government of St. Petersburg.<sup>9</sup>

The other major field of prerevolutionary Ukrainian history was social thought. It is a well-attested historical rule that in countries that lack political liberty there exists a tendency toward an "ideologization" of politics and, simultaneously, toward a politicization of cultural and intellectual life. Where civic strivings cannot be expressed through overt, practical activities, they are diverted toward the realm of theoretical programs and ideologies. Under such circumstances, creators and carriers of cultural values tend to develop a strong feeling of civic vocation. This applies to both the Russian and Ukrainian nineteenth-century societies, but there was an important difference between the two. The Russians, as members of an independent and powerful nation, even if subordinated to a despotic regime, had few grievances of a specifically national nature. Thus the mental energies of Russian intellectuals were mostly concentrated on the construction of social or theocratic utopias. Ukrainian intellectuals, on the other hand, were bound to vindicate the claims of their country as a separate national entity.

The magnitude of the task facing Ukrainian intellectuals can hardly be exaggerated. The consistent policy of the tsarist government—which, in this respect, found full support from Russian public opinion, including its left wing—was to deny the very existence of a Ukrainian nationality. Those elements of the Ukrainian heritage which could be assimilated were declared to belong to the "All-Russian" nation, of which the "Little Russians" were a tribal branch; the other elements of the Ukrainian heritage, which were unfit for such an expropriation, were systematically suppressed and obliterated. For instance, determined to relegate the Ukrainian language to the level of a peasant dialect, the Russian government imposed in 1876 a general prohibition of all publications in Ukrainian. Against these tremendous pressures, Ukrainian linguists and ethnographers defended the idea of a Ukrainian ethnic individuality on an equal footing with the other national groups of the Slavic family; Ukrainian historians, from Kostomarov to Hrushevsky, demonstrated the continuity of their country's past development from prehistoric times to the present.

<sup>9</sup> The greatest wrong which tsarist Russia committed against the Ukrainian people in the field of social-economic policies was the introduction of serfdom in 1783. As long as the Cossack officers showed an inclination toward political separatism, the tsarist policy was to pretend the role of "defender" of the common people against the local upper class. Later, when the danger of separatism had diminished, the interests of the peasantry were sacrificed, in order to reconcile the Ukrainian gentry with the loss of their country's political autonomy. Russian-style serfdom was introduced in the Ukraine at a time when it was already on the way toward extinction in other parts of Eastern Europe, and when even in Galicia it was being restricted by the policies of Austrian "enlightened despots," Maria Theresa and Joseph II.



A national consciousness implies not only a system of ideas of a more or less rational, cognitive nature but also an emotional commitment, which is more likely to be stimulated by poets and writers than by scholars. It is not fortuitous that the representative hero of the nineteenth-century Ukraine was not a statesman or a soldier, but a poet—Taras Shevchenko. His historical significance is not to be measured by purely literary standards. The Ukrainian community saw and continues to see in him a prophetic figure, whose inspired word touches and transforms the very hearts of his people.

As far as the Ukrainian political program is concerned, its foundations were laid in 1846-47 by a circle of young intellectuals in Kiev, known under the name of the "Cyril and Methodius Society." Gradually revised and elaborated, it remained the platform of the Ukrainian movement until the Revolution. Its classical exposition is to be found in the writings of the outstanding Ukrainian thinker of the second half of the nineteenth century, Mykhailo Drahomanov. Divergencies of views between individuals and groups were inevitable, but there was in the Ukrainian movement a far-reaching consent on essentials. These included: a strong insistence on radical social reform but without the spirit of fierceness and exclusiveness of many Russian revolutionaries; emphasis on political liberty and Western-style constitutionalism; a program of federalistic reconstruction of the empire as a means of satisfying Ukrainian national aspirations without necessitating a complete break with Russia. However, from the 1890's on, there existed an alternative program of separatism and state sovereignty of the Ukraine. It gained the acceptance of the Galician Ukrainian community, but in the Russian Ukraine the majority of the spokesmen remained faithful to the traditional federalistic program. They depended on the hope that a future democratic Russia would be able to divest itself of the tsarist traditions of imperialism, centralism, and national oppression. The final conversion to the idea of the Ukraine's independent statehood was effected in 1917, under the impact of experiences with Russian "revolutionary democracy." The evolution of Ukrainian political thought from federalism to separatism resembles the development of the Czech national program from Palacký to Masaryk.

It is important to take notice of the ideological terms in which Ukrainian thinkers defined their nation's opposition to the Russian Empire. The first to formulate the issue was the former leader of the Cyril and Methodius Society, M. Kostomarov: he contrasted the Kievan tradition of liberty and individualism with the Moscow tradition of authoritarianism and of the subordination of the individual under the collective.<sup>10</sup> Stripped of Kostomarov's romantic terminology, the problem was repeatedly restated by later Ukrainian publicists and

<sup>10</sup> Cf. Kostomarov's essay «Два русскія народности.» originally published in the journal *Основа* (St. Petersburg), No. 3, 1861.

political theorists. They saw the Ukraine, because of its deeply ingrained libertarian attitude, as an organic part of the European community of nations, of which despotic Muscovy-Russia had never been a true and legitimate member. "Most of the national differences between the Ukraine and Muscovy can be explained by the fact that until the eighteenth century [i.e., until the establishment of Russian rule] the Ukraine was linked to Western Europe. In spite of the handicaps caused by the Tatar invasions the Ukraine participated in Europe's social and cultural progress."<sup>11</sup> These words of Drahomanov, a left-wing liberal and socialist, are paralleled by those of a conservative thinker, V. Lypynsky: "The basic difference between the Ukraine and Moscow does not consist in the language, race or religion, . . . but in a different, age-old political structure, a different method of the organization of the *élite*, in a different relationship between the upper and the lower social classes, between the state and society."<sup>12</sup> Ukrainian thinkers believed that the emancipation of their country, whether through federalism or separatism, would accelerate the liberalization of Eastern Europe as a whole. According to their conviction, the centralistic structure of the empire was the base on which tsarist despotism rested. The break-up of this monolithic unity, whose maintenance required a system of universal oppression, would release the creative, libertarian forces of all peoples, not excepting the Russians.

An investigation of Ukrainian prerevolutionary intellectual history should not omit those scholars of Ukrainian origin who worked at Russian universities, published their works in Russian, and who are therefore usually regarded as Russian. Let us name but a few of these men: the philosophers P. Iurkevich and V. Lesevich; the economists N. Ziber, N. Iasnopolsky, and M. Tugan-Baranovsky; the sociologist M. Kovalevsky; the jurist B. Kistiakovsky; the linguist A. Potebnia; the literary scholar D. Ovsianiko-Kulikovsky; the military theorist M. Dragomirov. The list could easily be expanded. The question arises: with what right can these "luminaries of Russian science" be claimed for the Ukrainian intellectual tradition? In studying the lives of these men we find that while skirting an overt identification with the Ukrainian cause, which would have been catastrophic for their careers, they remained in touch with the nationalist movement, as its "secret disciples." If that were all, their Ukrainian connection would be of only a biographical relevance. More important is the fact that the structure of thought of these scholars betrays their Ukrainian bias, although it is often expressed in a subtle way, not immediately perceptible to an outsider. One example, which illustrates the point, must here suffice. It refers to F. Mishchenko (1848-1906), the brilliant student of ancient

<sup>11</sup> М. Драгоманов, *Вибрані твори*, I (Prague, 1937), p. 70. The passage quoted is from the Autobiography, originally published posthumously in 1896.

<sup>12</sup> Вячеслав Липинский, *Листи до братів-алборобів* (Vienna, 1926), p. xxv.

history who was particularly concerned with the questions of Greek communal self-government and federalism. According to a recent Soviet study, "in this stubborn insistence on the federalist principle we can detect the influence of the ideas of Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism."<sup>13</sup>

The emergence of the modern Ukrainian nation may be understood as the outcome of an interaction of social forces and ideas. The social transformation taking place in Ukrainian lands in the course of the nineteenth century prepared the people for the acceptance of the nationalist ideology elaborated by several generations of intellectuals. The policy of tsarist Russia consisted in containing the activities of the intellectual circles while upholding a system of paternalistic supervision over the masses, which was to protect them from "contamination" and to keep them in a state of perpetual civic infancy. This policy was relatively successful in that the formation of the modern Ukrainian nation was delayed for decades. But it could not be prevented, as the emergence of an independent republic in 1917 was to prove.

#### REGIONAL VARIATIONS

The prerevolutionary Ukraine did not possess territorial unity. In each of the two great empires, Russia and Austria-Hungary, several Ukrainian lands with strongly developed sectional traits may be distinguished. An historical investigation into the origins of the modern Ukrainian nation must take these regional variations into account.

We may differentiate between those principal Ukrainian lands in which the nationalist movement had taken root in the prerevolutionary era, and those which were passive in the process of nation-making. We shall call the latter category marginal Ukrainian lands. The difference between the two was not determined by the size, as some of the principal territories (e.g., Bukovina) were smaller than some of the marginal group.

Limitations of space do not permit a discussion of the marginal lands, which included the Kuban territory of Northern Caucasia, the Kholm (Polish: Chełm) area in the Congress Kingdom of Poland, and Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia (the Carpatho-Ukraine) in Hungary. There are the following principal Ukrainian territories; in Russia, the Left Bank, the *Slobids'ka*, the Southern, and the Right Bank Ukraine; in Austria, Galicia and Bukovina. Since Ukrainian history is so often approached from a centralistic Moscow-St. Petersburg perspective, an attempt will be made to give special attention to those Ukrainian lands which do not fit into the framework of Russian history and which for this reason are often overlooked by Western scholars.

The Left Bank Ukraine (i.e., the Ukrainian territory east of the

<sup>13</sup> М. В. Нечкина, ed., *Очерки истории исторической науки в СССР*, II (Moscow, 1960), 307.

Dnieper) corresponded with the area of the former autonomous Cossack State, the so-called hetmanate. Vestiges of the old institutions survived here until the reign of Nicholas I: the governor-generalship of Little Russia was dissolved in 1835, and the traditional Ukrainian civil law abolished in 1842; the self-government of the towns, based on the Magdeburg Law, had been suppressed in 1831. The Left Bank nobility, descendants of the Cossack officer class, repeatedly attempted to revive the autonomous order. The Napoleonic invasion of 1812 and the Polish insurrection of 1830 offered opportunities, and these autonomist strivings survived until the 1840's. However, in contrast with Poland and Hungary, historical legitimism was not to remain the platform of Ukrainian nationalism. The Left Bank nobility did not possess enough strength and solidarity to determine the course of the nation's renaissance. As a corporate entity the class loses importance after the middle of the century. Ukrainian nationalism took shape, ideologically and organizationally, under the auspices not of historical legitimism but of Populism. Nevertheless, the Left Bank provinces of Poltava and Chernyiv (Chernigov) continued to be the geographical core of the Ukrainian movement. No other section of the Ukraine provided such a large proportion of nationalist leaders, and here the movement had succeeded in making considerable headway among the masses some years before the outbreak of World War I.

The Ukrainian cultural revival found its first important center further to the east, in the *Slobids'ka* Ukraine (*Slobozhanshchyna*). In the seventeenth century this territory belonged to Muscovy, but was largely uninhabited. It was settled by refugees from the Dnieper Ukraine, who brought with them the Cossack system. The Cossack regiments of the *Slobozhanshchyna* remained under the direct control of the central government, and did not share in the turbulent political history of the hetmanate. But Kharkov, the capital of the *Slobozhanshchyna*, was to become in 1805 the seat of the first modern university in Ukrainian lands. This was achieved with contributions from the local gentry and burghers.<sup>14</sup> In the 1820's and 1830's, a group of writers and scholars connected with the Kharkov University laid the foundations of Ukrainian vernacular literature and of Ukrainian ethnographic and folkloristic studies. The motive was nonpolitical, but the enthusiasm for the "folk," inspired by the Romantic School of Kharkov, was to become a constituent element of modern Ukrainian nationalism, one of an importance hardly inferior to the traditions of political autonomy which originated in the Left Bank.

The Southern Ukraine (the steppes) consisted of the former territory of the Zaporozhian Sich and the possessions of the Crimean Tatars and Turkey. In the eighteenth century this was still largely an uninhabited

<sup>14</sup> The founders of the Kharkov University came from a circle influenced by the ideas and the example of the philosopher and spiritual reformer Hryhoriy Skovoroda (1722-94).

“no man’s land,” and until well into the nineteenth century the territory preserved the character of a frontier country. Besides Ukrainians, the territory attracted numerous other settlers: Russians, Germans, Greeks, Bulgarians. No other section of the Ukraine had so many ethnic minorities as the South. The Ukrainians of the steppes and of the Black Sea coast, most of whom had never known serfdom, displayed a spirit of self-reliance and enterprise. It was no accident that during the Civil War peasant anarchism, represented by Nestor Makhno, found many supporters in the South. The South’s participation in the nationalist movement was relatively small; its contribution to the making of the modern Ukraine was predominantly economic. Under the Old Regime the Right Bank was economically, as well as politically, connected with Poland, while the Left Bank and the *Slobids’ka* Ukraine were turned toward Muscovy. The frontier on the Dnieper separated the western and the eastern half of the Ukrainian ethnic area. This changed with the opening of the Black Sea ports. Now the trade of both the Right and the Left Banks became oriented toward the South. This was a decisive step toward an economic integration of Ukrainian lands and toward the formation of a unified Ukrainian national economy. The South also became, from the 1880’s on, the scene of a mighty development of mining and heavy industry in the Donets and Krivoi Rog basins, which induced some writers to call that territory—with some exaggeration—a “Ukrainian America.” The South became the economic center of gravity of the modern Ukraine.

The historic individuality of the Right Bank (territory west of the Dnieper) was determined by the fact that even after the Russian annexation of 1793 the Polish nobility remained the socially dominant element in the land, and to a large extent preserved this position until 1917. Indeed, the landowners as a class rather profited by the change of the regime, since their domination over the peasantry was more effectively backed by the police and army of an absolute monarchy than by the inefficient administration of the late Commonwealth. The magnates, masters of huge latifundia, adopted an attitude of loyalty toward the empire. The middle and petty gentry, on the other hand, did not abandon hopes for the restoration of the Polish State, stretching to its historical frontier on the Dnieper. The two insurrections of 1830 and 1863, which originated in Congress Poland, spilled over to the Right Bank Ukraine. The local Polish conspirators made attempts to win the Ukrainian peasants to this cause, using the Ukrainian language in their proclamations and promising that in the future reborn Poland the Ukraine-Rus’ would form an autonomous body. This agitation met no favorable response. The memories of old Poland were hateful to the Ukrainian masses, who had not forgotten the Cossack wars and to whom the very word “Poland” was a symbol of oppression. The spokesmen of the young Ukrainian nationalist movement consistently rejected

Polish claims to the Right Bank, as this implied a partition of the Ukraine between Russia and Poland. This may be regarded as a striking example of the incompatibility of "historical" and "ethnic" nationalism. The inability of the Poles and the Ukrainians to compose their differences and to evolve a common policy toward Russia fatefully determined the further development of both nations.<sup>15</sup> In spite of this failure the Polish-Ukrainian entanglement in the Right Bank had some positive aspects from the point of view of the progress of the Ukraine toward nationhood. Polish influence in nearly half of the Ukrainian ethnic territory served as a counterbalance to Russian domination. Through the nineteenth century the western part of the Ukraine remained a zone of tension, where Russian and Polish forces competed for supremacy. In the long run, this strengthened Ukrainian self-awareness as a nation distinct from either Poland or Russia. The Polish nobility of the Right Bank consisted in a large measure of the Polonized descendants of the old Ukrainian aristocracy; and even the originally Polish families had, in the course of generations, become acclimatized to the Ukrainian environment and felt strong "territorial patriotism." For instance, Polish writers from that area used local motives and formed a "Ukrainian school" in Polish literature; some of them were bilingual and belonged as much to Ukrainian as to Polish literature. Polish-Ukrainian scholars made valuable contributions to the study of the country's history and ethnography. The Ukrainian community definitely rejected the program of a "Jagiellonian federation," dear to the hearts of the Polish-Ukrainian minority; still, certain concepts formulated by the publicists of the Right Bank had an impact on the growth of Ukrainian political ideologies.<sup>16</sup> Some members of the Polish minority in the Ukraine, "not wishing to be alien colonists in their native land" (to use an expression of one of them), crossed the borderline separating the two nationalities and identified themselves fully with the Ukrainian cause. They were few, but from their number came some of the outstanding leaders of modern Ukrainian nationalism. Being thoroughly Western in their cultural background, they led the Ukrainian movement away from the Russian connection.<sup>17</sup>

<sup>15</sup> The case of Finland might be used here as an illuminating contrast. The upper classes of Finland were Swedish. But they did not try to bring the country back, in the name of "historical rights," under the rule of Sweden. Rather they united their forces with those of the native Finnish majority for the common defense of the liberty of the homeland. This cooperation was to be eminently beneficial to both Finland and Sweden, and to the Swedish-Finnish minority as well.

<sup>16</sup> An example of this is the idea of a Polish-Ukrainian political writer, F. Duchiński, according to whom the Russians were not really a Slavic people, since they were of Ugro-Finnic stock, which had become linguistically Slavicized; this implied a deeper ethnic difference between the Russians and the Ukrainians than the close affinity of the two East Slavic languages would suggest. This conception, whatever its scholarly merits, enjoyed a considerable popularity in Ukrainian circles.

<sup>17</sup> Three men merit mention in this context: Volodymyr Antonovych (1834-1908), historian and archaeologist, the founder of the "Kievan historical school," the leader of the



In turning to the Ukrainian territories of the Habsburg Empire, we shall first mention Bukovina. This small land, acquired from Moldavia by Austria in 1774, had a diversified population. The Ukrainians predominated in the north, the Rumanians in the south; there were also numerous Germans and Jews and a sprinkling of Armenians and Gypsies. German served as a *lingua franca* among Bukovina's motley inhabitants. The easternmost university with German as a language of instruction was at Chernovtsy, the capital of Bukovina; the city itself seemed a cultural outpost of Vienna. Some local Ukrainian writers started their literary careers in German. On the eve of World War I the Ukrainians of Bukovina enjoyed more favorable conditions of national development than those of any other territory: they had achieved a share in the province's government proportionate to their numbers.

Perhaps the most striking feature in the rebirth of the Galician Ukraine was the unique role played by the Greek Catholic (Uniat) Church. "This is the only national church which is not a state church, the only one which, while a branch of the Church Universal, is, at the same time, entirely national. . . . Even unbelievers love the national church which they regard as a vehicle of incomparable efficacy in the political struggle."<sup>18</sup> The Eastern Rite drew a clear-cut demarcation line that separated its adherents from the Poles, and the allegiance to Rome was a bulwark against Russian influence.<sup>19</sup> At the beginning of the nationalistic movement, the clergy provided a ready-made leadership for the Ukrainian community. This was clearly displayed during the 1848 Revolution, when the Galician Ukrainians ("Ruthenians," in the terminology of that time), guided by their bishops and priests, made their political debut. Of utmost sociological importance was the fact that the Greek Catholic clergymen were married, and formed a quasi-hereditary class; in their style of living they resembled a lesser gentry.<sup>20</sup> In later times, toward the end of the century, this ecclesiastical hegemony was felt to be inadequate to the needs of a modern society, and was

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secret organization *Hromada* and of the Ukrainian movement in Russia during the most difficult period of reaction in the 1880's and 1890's; Viacheslav Lypynsky (1882-1931), eminent historian, political philosopher, and conservative leader; and the Metropolitan Andrii Sheptytsky (1865-1944), for forty-four years the head of the Greek Catholic Church in Galicia and the outstanding Ukrainian ecclesiastical figure of the century.

<sup>18</sup> Stanislas Smolka, *Les Ruthènes et les problèmes religieux du monde russe* (Berne, 1917), pp. 225 and 228.

<sup>19</sup> The Uniat (Greek Catholic) Church had been suppressed in the Right Bank Ukraine by the Russian government in 1839. Tsarist Russia at all times showed an implacable hostility to Ukrainian Catholicism of the Eastern Rite, and this attitude has been inherited by Soviet Russia.

<sup>20</sup> In works of fiction dealing with the Anglican clerical milieu, for instance, in Oliver Goldsmith's *The Vicar of Wakefield*, one encounters an atmosphere strikingly similar to that which used to prevail in the patriarchal homes of the Galician priests. There was, however, one major difference: the clergymen of the Church of England were the social allies of the English aristocracy, while those of the Greek Catholic Church stood in a radical opposition to Galicia's Polish aristocracy.

increasingly resented; this led to a strong anticlerical, secularist trend. But the lay intelligentsia, who gradually assumed the leadership of the nationalist cause, were largely sons of clerical families. A handicap of the Ukrainian movement in Galicia was the poverty and economic backwardness of the land, and even more crippling was the circumstance that political power had rested, since the 1860's, in Polish hands. In a settlement comparable to the Austro-Hungarian Compromise, the Viennese government turned over the administration of Galicia to the Polish ruling class, sacrificing the interests of the Ukrainian nationality.<sup>21</sup> The Poles used their dominant position to block, by all possible means, the progress of the Ukrainian community. For instance, Polish resistance prevented the creation of a separate Ukrainian university, although at the University of Lviv (Lemberg) there were several Ukrainian chairs. Still, Austria was a constitutional state, and this enabled the Galician Ukrainians to apply civic self-help. In this they achieved signal successes. The country was covered with a dense and ever-expanding network of economic, educational, and gymnastic associations, branching out to every village. The peasant masses, who owed to this work not only an improvement of their living conditions, but also a new feeling of human dignity and civic pride, became deeply imbued with the nationalist spirit. The discipline and the militancy of the movement were hardened through a stubborn, protracted political warfare against the dominant Polish administration. Gradually, the balance of forces between the two communities began to shift. A turning point was the introduction of universal manhood suffrage by the Austrian electoral reform of 1907; a large Ukrainian representation appeared for the first time in the Vienna Parliament, and the central government was forced to adopt a new policy toward the Polish-Ukrainian dispute. Polish control over the Ukrainian majority in eastern Galicia could no longer be maintained, short of physical violence, and the reform of the province's constitution appeared to be only a question of time.<sup>22</sup> In contrast with the Russian Ukraine, where the nationalist movement, although advancing quickly, had not yet succeeded in encompassing the whole people, the Galician Ukrainians were already, before 1914, a fully crystallized national community.

<sup>21</sup> The crownland "Kingdom of Galicia and Lodomeria" also included, besides the territory of the Old Rus' principality of Halych (from which its name was derived), an ethnically Polish area, west of the river San. In the Ukrainian, eastern part of Galicia there existed, as in the Right Bank Ukraine, a socially privileged Polish minority of landowners and town dwellers. In the province as a whole the numerical strength of the Polish and the Ukrainian groups was approximately equal, but the aristocratic character of the Austrian constitution and Vienna's policy favored the Polish element. From 1848, and to the last days of the monarchy, the Ukrainians strove for a partition of the province on ethnic lines, but in vain.

<sup>22</sup> A new electoral law for the Galician Diet was adopted early in 1914, but the outbreak of the war prevented its implementation. The Ukrainians were to receive some 30 per cent of the seats in the Diet, and a share in the autonomous provincial administration. This

The fact that the nineteenth-century Ukraine lacked territorial integration was a sure sign that a Ukrainian nation, in the full meaning of the word, did not exist at that time. But there were many symptoms indicating that the historical trends of the various sections were converging.

All parts of the Ukraine (excepting the "marginal" lands) passed through the same stages of growth, which might be labeled the "Age of Nobility," the "Populist Age," and the "Modernist Age." No full presentation of this periodization scheme will be attempted here.<sup>23</sup> But one or two points might be stressed. During the first epoch, which lasted approximately to the middle of the century, the leadership of the society rested with the nobility of Cossack descent in the Left Bank and the *Slobids'ka* Ukraine; with the Polish-Ukrainian nobility in the Right Bank; and with the Greek Catholic clergy, who also formed a sort of a hereditary gentry, in Galicia. Populism was strongest in the Ukrainian lands east of the Dnieper, where it partly overlapped with Russian revolutionary Populism; but analogous currents existed also among the Polish-Ukrainian society of the Right Bank, in the shape of the "Peasant Lovers" (*khlopomany*) movement, and in Galicia, where its first wave was represented by the *narodovtsi* ("People's Nationalists") of the 1860's and 1870's, and the second by the Radicals of the 1880's and 1890's.

As time went on, cooperation among various Ukrainian lands increased steadily. The foundation of the first modern nationalist organization, the Cyril and Methodius Society, in 1846 was the result of an interpenetration of the autonomist tradition of the Left Bank with the *Slobids'ka* Ukraine's cultural revival. The integrating economic function of the South has been mentioned. By the turn of the century, the old sectional differences among the Ukrainian lands in the Russian Empire had either disappeared or lost most of their importance.

Differences remained between Galicia and the Dnieper (Russian) Ukraine as a whole, and they were deep enough to create considerable political friction during the Revolution. Nevertheless, the relations between the Dnieper Ukraine and Galicia offer eminent examples of interregional cooperation. Galicia was intellectually rather arid. The ideas which inspired the Ukrainian rebirth in Galicia came almost without exception from the Dnieper Ukraine. The work of outstanding leaders of East Ukrainian origin, such as M. Drahomanov and M. Hrushevsky, was closely associated with Galicia and had profound, durable impact there. On the other hand, after the ukase of 1876,

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still fell short of what the Ukrainians demanded on the basis of their numerical strength, but the Polish monopoly of power was at last broken.

<sup>23</sup> The writer has tried to do this in the article "The Intellectual Origins of Modern Ukraine," *Annals of the Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences in the U.S.*, Vol. VI (1958), No. 3-4.

which suppressed all overt Ukrainian activities in the Russian Empire, Galicia became the sanctuary of the entire Ukrainian nationalist movement. Works of East Ukrainian writers were published in Galicia and smuggled into the Russian Ukraine. Tangible nationalist achievements in Galicia served as an encouragement and model to Ukrainian patriots under Russian rule. Galician Ukrainians, while fighting for an equality of rights with the Poles, were thinking not only of themselves: they believed that their homeland was destined to become the "Piedmont" of a future independent Ukraine.

One final comment. No issue facing the Ukrainian people in the nineteenth century was more portentous than the dilemma of choosing between assimilation in an All-Russian nation or assertion of separate national individuality. The far-reaching Russification of the Ukraine was an obvious fact, and it could not be explained entirely by the repressive measures of the tsarist government. Russia radiated the tremendous prestige of a great power and of a brilliant imperial civilization. Many Ukrainians, dazzled by this glory, were eager to participate in it. How humble and pitiful appeared what the Ukrainian patriots dared offer in opposition to the splendid Juggernaut! How preposterous was the disproportion of forces between those which stood at the disposal of a huge and despotic state and those of a handful of dreamers, armed with nothing but faith! Little wonder that the spokesmen of the Ukrainian movement instinctively adopted a protective coloring and tried to appear as harmless as possible. They often presented their cause as a nonpolitical, cultural regionalism, comparable with the Provençal *Félibrige*. When formulating a political program, they did not go beyond the demand of a federalistic reorganization of the Russian Empire, which, after all, might have been acceptable to some Russians. Ukrainian patriots were, certainly, sincere in these protestations of political innocence. But the tsarist administration saw the situation in a different light: firmly convinced that the rebirth of the Ukraine presented a deadly threat to the future of Russia as a great power in Europe, they waged a war of annihilation against even the most innocuous expressions of Ukrainian nationalism, while at the same time offering to "loyal Little Russians" tempting opportunities of career, recognition, and material rewards. The spell of Russia reached those Ukrainians living outside the frontiers of the empire. In Galicia there existed, in the second half of the nineteenth century, a pro-Russian current. The Galician Russophiles (called "Muscophiles" by contemporaries) favored the adoption of Russian as the language of literature.<sup>24</sup> At one time the majority of the land's intelligentsia seemed to lean to

<sup>24</sup> The Russophile movement emerged, in the 1860's, as a reaction to the hegemony which the Poles had achieved in the province. It was also fed by conservative sentiments which saw a special value in the traits of the cultural heritage, common to all Eastern Slavs: the Slavonic liturgy, Cyrillic script, Julian calendar, and the traditional name of Rus', which could be easily identified with Russia.

the Russophile side. The contest between the Russophiles and the nationalists dealt with apparently trivial questions of language, grammar, and orthography, but in truth the entire future of the Ukrainian cause hinged on the outcome. Galicia was the proving ground, where the partisans of the national abdication and of the national self-assertion measured their strength. The issue was of course relevant to the whole Ukrainian people, but only outside Russia could the contest be waged overtly, and by means of persuasion, without the tsarist police officer appearing on the scene. To both Galician currents came aid from beyond the frontier: the Russophiles received subsidies from St. Petersburg, while the nationalists had the moral support of the Dnieper Ukraine. In a slow, tenacious effort the Russophile group was pushed back, gradually reduced to an impotent faction, and at last completely absorbed by the growing nationalist movement. This was a turning point in the history of Russo-Ukrainian relations, and the effects were soon felt also in the Dnieper Ukraine. The trend toward Russification was reversed. By 1917 the entire Ukraine was swept by the torrent of a national revolution.