

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Pogroms, mob violence and genocide in western Ukraine, summer 1941: varied histories, explanations and comparisons

WENDY LOWER

In this essay, the author presents new research, as well as surveys existing interpretations, of the history of pogroms in Ukraine during the Holocaust. Focusing on western Ukraine during summer 1941, the author determines that across the region Jews were the primary targets of attacks, but the politics and dynamic of the mob violence and among the occupation forces varied from place to place. Besides the powerful, antisemitic charge of Judeo-Bolshevism, the author explores other political, social, psychological and ideological causes of the violence. She stresses the cross section of society represented among the pogromists, and the role of nationalist insurgents and German occupation officials. The author traces the relationship between the German-led mass shootings and the pogroms, and argues that distinctions made between mob violence and genocide usually fail to account for the changing interaction of the two phenomena. The overlapping, escalating history of the two is especially evident in western Volhynia where, unlike in neighbouring Galicia, the number of Jews killed in mass shootings exceeded those killed in pogroms. Thus by the end of September 1941, in the eastern capital of Kiev, there was no large pogrom comparable to the 'Petliura Days', in L'viv, instead there was Babi Yar.

Introduction

For the past 15 years, research on the Holocaust has focused in large part on the Nazi-occupied territories of the former Soviet Union—facilitated by the collapse of the Union and access to the regional archives in the newly independent states, and driven by new questions about the forms of mass violence outside of the killing centres such as Auschwitz. Besides changing our understanding of the centre and periphery of the Nazi empire in Europe, this research shift has also deepened our understanding of the dynamics of state organized and mob violence. The entire discussion of collaboration has been broadened by social historical research at the regional and micro levels, epitomized by Jan Gross's work, *Neighbors*, which reignited the debate on Jewish–Polish relations.[1] Whereas earlier work almost exclusively characterized the perpetrators as Nazis or

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Germans, now one asks, in reference to Jedwabne, did the Germans need to be present, and are they entirely to blame for the Holocaust?[2]

Of course the 'Final Solution' was a Nazi-imposed and sinisterly managed policy of genocide.[3] But its most violent aspects occurred in Eastern Europe, in the open, and involved the indigenous populations. Thus events that comprise 'the Holocaust' represent an intersection of German history and the varied local and regional histories of Europe. Such a statement is not meant to trigger accusations of collaboration or minimize the role of Nazi Germany; it is intended, rather, to shed light on the fact that the collective, sustained killing of an entire group by another is very much a social phenomenon. This article's question is whether acts of collective violence like the Jedwabne massacre occurred in a similar manner in western Ukraine and elsewhere, and, if so, how and why.[4]

Beyond the small town of Jedwabne, in a swathe of territory that comprised the borderlands of the Nazi and Soviet empires, anti-Jewish violence formed a distinct pattern. In the interwar Polish, Romanian and Baltic territories under Soviet control and subjected to NKVD deportations and massacres in 1940 and 1941, pogroms became a common feature of the first days and months of the Nazi 'liberation' in the summer of 1941. The role of the Germans and other Axis forces (Hungarians, Slovakians, Romanians) in inciting the violence varied from place to place. Western Ukraine saw some of the worst cases, not only in the region's capital of L'viv, but also across the villages and towns extending eastward and southward. What details of, and explanations for, this violence have emerged in recent research? Did certain situational factors or an interethnic dynamic cause or aggravate tensions that led to massacres? Once the Red Army left, did local populations attack Jews before the Germans had arrived? Did the recent history of Sovietization and the longer history of pogroms in Ukraine influence events in the summer of 1941? What do the pogroms in western Ukraine reveal about the history of mob violence and genocide elsewhere? These questions are explored here in two parts. First, drawing from recent research, diverse examples of pogroms in western Ukraine are presented.[5] This empirical survey is followed by a comparative analysis that considers the various, cross-disciplinary explanations for mob violence during the Holocaust in Eastern Europe.

The pogroms in western Ukraine represented a continuity and break in the region's history of warfare, occupation, interethnic conflicts and antisemitic violence. Rather than argue that the occurrence of pogroms in 1941 illustrates an ethnic or national case of genocidal complicity, this essay stresses the regional distinctiveness of anti-Jewish actions that were perpetrated by men and women of various class, ethnic and religious backgrounds in western Ukraine. Ukrainians, the majority population in the region, comprised the largest number of civilian participants in the pogroms, but were often encouraged by Germans, and in some cases were joined by Hungarians and Poles. Furthermore, interpretations of the pogroms of 1941 are often skewed by what followed—the larger, systematic operations such as mass shootings or the deportations to killing centres such as Belzec. Pogromists and *genocidaires*, private persons and state officials, worked hand in hand and independently, and with different short-term and long-term

motives and goals. Recent interpretations that stress the importance of an imperial centre-periphery dynamic *within* the German administration of the 'Final Solution', must also integrate the significant influence of non-Germans in shaping Nazi decisions and the regional variations of Holocaust history in Ukraine, especially during the critical months of 1941.

Galicia

The Germans arrived in the small eastern Galician town of Peremyshliany, forty kilometres southeast of L'viv, on 1 July 1941. During the Soviet occupation (late September 1939 to late June 1941), the Jewish population had doubled, reaching 6,000, causing a strain on local resources and housing that was mostly borne by the local Jews. There was a Jewish school in Peremyshliany, but the Soviets shut it down in 1940. Most Jews in the area were educated and lived in the town; they were prime recruits for the Soviet administration. The communist ideology was also intellectually appealing, more than the radical nationalist movements with their antisemitic platforms.[6] During the interwar period, there was a high rate of assimilation among Jews who for instance attended the Polish gymnasium and intermarried. But during the Soviet occupation, Jews were more visible than before in town, because the Soviet government gave them unprecedented opportunities to work in government positions that they could not occupy during the Second Polish Republic. Meanwhile Poles as an ethnic group, the intelligentsia deemed anti-communist, and wealthier individuals were targeted in arrests, many were deported and some killed. Except for those associated with the Ukrainian nationalist and *émigré* organizations, the status of Ukrainians in general increased.[7]

Three days after the Germans arrived in Peremyshliany, according to postwar Jewish survivor testimony, a 'Ukrainian mob' lashed out at the leadership of the Jewish community. The Belzer Rebbe (the head of a historic Hasidic dynasty), who had sought refuge in Peremyshliany from Nazi-occupied Poland, barely escaped. His son was not so lucky, and was thrown into the burning synagogue. Across the street from the burning synagogue the revered Ukrainian Greek Catholic priest, Omeljan Kovch, observed these events with disgust. Months later he rescued Jews, which led to his arrest and execution.[8] The pogromists destroyed and plundered many Jewish homes. German military authorities summoned the male Jewish heads of each household, and when the Jewish men did not come forward to be registered, local thugs (those not in uniform with sticks and other makeshift weapons) seized the women and brought them to the local prison where they were brutalized by Ukrainian militia. Survivor accounts concur that acts of local anti-Jewish violence began just after the Germans arrived. Lucy Gross Raubvogel wrote her account of the experience just after the war:

> Our large synagogue and all of its annexes were burnt. The flames were rising up high, parched window frames and benches on which our grandfathers, fathers, and brothers used to sit now crackled. Fire turned into an awesome element. A throng of peasants gathered around the fire with their sacks ready to plunder, a mass of devoted Christians with their

> children, along with the Germans who recorded this overwhelming sight on the film. The wind carried sparks from one building to another, the fire crackled and soared into the sky mercilessly, and the bones of the first victims crunched. An enthused mob of shrieking peasants, just like locusts, pounced on everything that belonged to the Jews. They plundered, stole, and in some incredible ecstasy they destroyed within minutes what had sometimes survived the generations.[9]

Jacob Litman, a refugee from Nazi-occupied Poland residing in Peremyshliany, recalled:

> . . . as soon as the Germans came in they burned the synagogue and threw Jews into the fire of the synagogue, especially the religious Jews, who had been picked up off the streets by virtue of their looks and beards. There was a big Hasidic population in Przemyslany before the war . . . The Russians had not bothered them much during the previous two years, they kept to themselves. Germans lashed out at them first.[10]

Litman described the atrocities committed by Germans and Ukrainians including his own suffering at the hands of two Ukrainian militia men who pulled him out of a bread line, threw him in the basement of the prison and beat him twice daily for about four weeks. He was wrongly accused with the murder of the Trofimayak brothers who were 'Ukrainian nationalists whom the Soviet security police killed in cold blood just before the German invasion.'[11]

A diarist named Samuel Golfard, who witnessed events in Peremyshliany, wrote during the war:

> The participation of Ukrainians in the murder of hundreds of thousands of Jews is beyond any dispute . . . At the German invasion, they themselves initiated terrible massacres in comparison to which even the cruelty of the Germans seemed pallid. It is a fact that the Germans took pictures of Jews being hurled into the flames of burning houses. In Przemyslany the perpetrators of this were the Ukrainians. Had they been allowed, they would even today cut down the entire ghetto in their passion for plunder.[12]

These Jewish sources are essential eyewitness accounts that establish the occurrence of the crimes perpetrated by neighbours. But each testimony contains its own bias. The victims were thrust into horrible circumstances that hardly allowed them to establish the diverse motives of their tormentors. Lucy Raubvogel stressed the greed and rage of peasants bent on plundering and destroying Jewish property. Litman explained that he had been accused of causing the deaths of Ukrainian nationalists, thereby attributing the cause of the violence to political vengeance. Golfard stressed that Ukrainians were often the initiators and more excessive in their cruelties and plundering than the Germans. In his diary, Golfard is critical of all who participated in the Holocaust, especially the Jewish police, while presenting a favourable portrait of the Poles who helped him. Golfard was an intellectual from Radom, a Polish patriot who was not especially sympathetic toward the plight of the Ukrainian peasant, and after what he saw and experienced in Peremyshliany, he had little reason to change his attitude. In this source and others cited above, the interaction between the German occupiers and Ukrainian pogromists is unclear.

A few months after this synagogue burning, a German security detachment and *gendarmerie* unit organized a mass shooting of 500 Jewish men at the edge of town in the Brzezina (birch tree) forest on 5 November 1941. Ukrainian militia assisted in the identification and arrest of Jewish men. The militia guarded the perimeter of the mass shooting site.[13] Ghettoization, forced labour and waves of mass shootings followed in 1942 until the last Jews of Peremyshliany and the surrounding villages were killed in the summer of 1943. Some Jews who had managed to escape to the forests were killed in the Ukrainian–Polish civil war and Soviet–German partisan warfare that engulfed the area in spring 1944. Ukrainians supporting the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) and wishing to 'ethnically cleanse' western Ukraine suspected that Jews in the forest had allied with enemy Poles or the Soviets; Poles in the Home Army distrusted Jews as pro-Soviet, while many Soviet partisans viewed the Jewish survivors as potential traitors to the homeland who had been tainted by the German occupation.[14]

Peremyshliany was one of at least fifty-eight Jewish communities struck by pogroms in summer 1941. Historian Dieter Pohl estimates that in other parts of eastern Galicia more than 12,000 Jews died in pogroms, the largest occurring in the city of L'viv, where approximately 3,000 to 4,000 Jews were brutally murdered between 30 June and 25 July 1941.[15] As was the case in nearby Stanyslaviv (Ivano-Frankivsk), Zolochiv, Drohobych, Buchach and Ternopil', in L'viv the Jews were blamed for the Soviets' mass murder of Ukrainian prisoners and others whose mutilated remains were found in NKVD jails.[16] Some of these towns had a recent history of pogroms that occurred in connection with the retreating Russian army (under the tsar) in 1915 and 1916, suggesting that this territory's history of warfare, occupation and its geopolitical location as a multiethnic borderland might have contributed to the more extreme violence in 1941.[17] However such violence was not a constant in these borderlands, but was rather ignited by a specific crisis. In fact most of the pogroms after the First World War (1918–21) occurred outside this region in the area of the former Pale of Settlement, the city of L'viv being a prominent exception.[18] The pattern of pogroms that occurred in western Ukraine during summer 1941 is clearer than the First World War. More documentation has emerged and the direct causes are ascertainable. The Soviets pursued a policy of mass murder of Ukrainian political prisoners during the retreat. The new German occupiers and their Ukrainian allies in the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists were both determined to clear Ukraine of Jews who were branded Bolsheviks, and to this end organized antisemitic 'retaliation' campaigns.[19] The fact that Jews, Russians and Poles were also victims of NKVD atrocities in Galicia and Volhynia was conveniently suppressed. Instead all the evils associated with Bolshevism were projected on the Jews as an inferior race and threatening other.[20] Typically, Jewish men were forced to exhume bodies of prisoners killed by the Soviets; in some cases, they had to wash the corpses and dig the graves to prepare for a religious burial. While the Jews carried out these gruesome tasks, the local population was allowed to vent their rage about the despised Soviet system, beating Jews with clubs, rods and other blunt instruments.[21]

In Boryslav, a survivor, Anna Dichter, explained that the Germans arrived on 1 July 1941, and the pogrom started on 3 July: 'My father and I were forced to wash the bodies of prisoners slain by the NKVD. My father had to stay overnight in the prison; Ukrainians burned his body with sulphuric acid and ended up killing 400 Jews in those days. Killing them with sticks and stones, not with guns'.[22] Another survivor, Jozef Lipman, also from Boryslav, stated that, 'the Germans gave the Ukrainians a free hand to take revenge on the Jews … The Rusyns descended from the mountains [the Carpathians] and started brutal massacres … using metal rods and sticks with nails … our family was in hiding, neighbors saved us'.[23] Forcing the Jews to remove bodies from the prisons was not a practice limited to L'viv, but occurred elsewhere, demonstrating a coordinated German–Ukrainian response. The popular assaults with makeshift weapons manifest local initiative, the sort of intimacy of violence, the neighbours attacking neighbours, which stands out in survivors' retelling.

According to Philip Friedman, who was a survivor of the Holocaust in Galicia as well as a pioneering historian, the involvement of Ukrainians cut across class, educational, generational and political lines. Individuals acted with different motives and varying aims, which converged spontaneously or was cleverly harnessed by German and Ukrainian leaders. News that actions against Jews would occur in the towns prompted peasants to arrive in town with carts to load up the plunder. Memory of rumours about pogroms in the First World War and before provided onlookers and participants in 1941 with a precedent, a pattern of response.[24] But the stereotype of the rapacious Ukrainian peasant distorts the reality and obscures culpability. In Delatyn, the pogrom was organized by the local music teacher, Slawko Waszczuk, and in Stanyslaviv by Professor Lysiak from the local teachers' seminary. In Dubno, a Jewish survivor identified his former Ukrainian colleagues who took over the municipal administrator and organized a pogrom. In Ternopil' the leaders of the violence were a Ukrainian pharmacist, a teacher and other local elites. Ukrainian priests, judges and school inspectors petitioned to German authorities to start anti-Jewish measures. Antisemitic propaganda entered into the school curricula. In Zbarazh, 'Ukrainian secondary-school students marched singing through the streets, and on to the Jewish cemetery, where they destroyed the tombstones'.[25] Nor was the organization and implementation of the violence strictly 'men's business'. Women were among the assailants and organizers, like the daughter of a prominent attorney in Zolochiv. All sections of society participated in the pogroms: the educated and uneducated, the urban and rural, lower and middle class, religious and secular, young and old.[26]

References to Ukrainian pogromists as a 'mob' are obviously imprecise. While it is difficult to identify the individuals acting within a group, it is possible to trace the participation of organized units such as members of the Ukrainian nationalist movements. Recent research has documented the antisemitic platform of the Ukrainian nationalist movement, and its history of anti-Jewish actions in western Ukraine. Ukrainian nationalists (in both factions, loyal to Stepan Bandera, OUN-B, and to Andriy Melnyk, OUN-M) were useful, expedient local collaborators for securing the territory in the first chaotic months of the invasion. German military intelligence and field offices relied on Ukrainian nationalist

activists (*pokhidni hrupy*) who had joined them in the invasion, as well as local Ukrainians who were sympathetic to the OUN and joined the local administration as militia forces, leaders in self-help and other local governing committees.

Indeed, for many Ukrainian nationalists the pogroms in summer 1941 had some historical legitimacy in the First World War and the interwar fate of the Ukrainian independence leader Simon Petliura. In the agitational literature of the OUN, in publications such as *Surma* (which the Polish government had banned), Ukrainian writers asserted that the pogroms that occurred during the Ukrainian struggle against Bolshevism (1918–21) were caused by the Jews themselves:

> Jewish behaviour toward the Ukrainian population, their Russifying and Polonizing mission, engendered the hatred of the Ukrainian population for the Jews and created the grounds for the pogroms, against which the small Ukrainian army was helpless. Instead of engaging in theatrical poses and shedding tears, the Jews and the defenders and supporters of Schwartzbard [Petliura's 1926 assassin] should have beaten themselves on the chest and accepted part of the responsibility for the pogroms...[27]

This is a classic defence logic in which agency and blame are projected onto the actual victims, and the perpetrators appear as 'helpless'. The mainstream Ukrainian press was not much milder in promoting Petliura as a national martyr, and his assassin Schwartzbard as a Jewish Bolshevik agent.[28] The L'viv pogroms at the end of July 1941, which were designated the 'Petliura Days', perpetuated this cycle of revenge. Thus a Ukrainian perception that the nationalist struggle was threatened by Bolshevik–Jewish agents was rooted in the failed bid for independence in the First World War, and this political frustration and hostility grew with the extension of Soviet communist rule westward in 1939–41. When German and Ukrainian occupiers arrived in Galicia, they sought to restore order (or as the Nazis saw it, impose a higher civilization), but they also unleashed anti-Jewish fears and resentments that surfaced in several insidious forms.

In addition to demands for the purging Ukraine of 'Jewish–Muscovite elements', one finds in the local antisemitic propaganda the traditional canards: Jews were portrayed as Christ killers, foreign or Soviet agents, the source of epidemics and swindlers. All of these accusations were meant to elicit responses and spur action, usually that of revenge, expiation or expected martyrdom. When the Germans first arrived, some pious Ukrainians perceived the Germans as a 'godsend' because they allowed the restoration of the churches and religious rituals. Religious antisemitism, which had been suppressed by the Soviet regime, was allowed to resurface.[29] In Jablonica, the village priest incited his parishioners with a sermon in which he praised local Ukrainians for drowning the Jews, and assured them that their deed would be 'rewarded with paradise'.[30] In Korets' (Volhynia), the Ukrainian nationalist Mitka Zavirukha led a pogrom in August 1941 that was immediately followed by a German mass shooting of 350 Jewish men. He was seen running wildly through town announcing that he was sent by God to punish the Jews and eliminate them from Ukraine.[31] The 'Bolshevik-Jew' appeared as a threat to the nation-state and Christianity, as an evil that combined images of a conspiratorial minority (the Elders of Zion) with Satan.

To resolve this apocalyptic crisis, Jews were supposed to suffer, to be sacrificed for the 'greater', 'legitimate' good of the Christian majority. Though historian Saul Friedländer's notion of redemptive antisemitism focused on central and western Europe, some key aspects of his theory are evident in eastern Europe as well, in particular the unusual combination of apocalyptic, conspiratorial worldviews voiced by religious and secular antisemites. The redemptive took on various forms that were operative in Ukraine as well as elsewhere in Eastern Europe, like Lithuania, where a non-Jew arrested as a Soviet criminal in summer 1941 could be freed if he could present evidence that he had killed a Jew, which was deemed an acceptable demonstration of one's loyalty to the Lithuanian nation.[32] Historian Leonid Rein found a similar pattern in Belorussia, where some collaborators explained that they killed Jews 'to prove their loyalty to the German authorities'.[33] Peer pressure was a factor here, but no less important was the criminal rite of passage and fanatical notion of sacrifice and suffering for the nation. Proving one's anti-Bolshevik, anti-Soviet convictions (i.e. national loyalty) was equated with taking the life of a Jew. Political redemption or deliverance from the sin of Bolshevism meant the human sacrifice of a Jew who embodied the secular evil of Bolshevism.[34]

Thus, one finds among the pogrom participants in western Ukraine—those who organized, plundered, humiliated and in many extreme cases killed Jews—fanatical nationalists, devout Christians, secular professionals, youth, elderly, civic leaders and rural farmers. This cross-section of society contained 'fringe' criminal elements or ruffians, thugs and rabble-rousers, but they were not the dominant force in summer 1941, which is one of the more troubling and puzzling aspects that has not been fully explored by scholars of Ukrainian studies.

Volhynia-Podolia and Polissia

A similar pattern of local anti-Jewish violence occurred in the neighbouring region of Volhynia, which also had been occupied by the Red Army in September 1939 and had experienced the upheaval of rapid Sovietization until the Germans arrived in summer 1941. Shmuel Spector's foundational research on this region identified twenty townlets where Ukrainian peasants murdered Jews and pillaged Jewish property. The methods were reminiscent of practices during the 1918–21 riots, in which locals wielded iron bars and boards spiked with nails. In a few cases in 1941, entire towns were wiped out, in Jedwabne fashion, but more typical were the 'traditional' beatings, raping and ransacking of Jewish homes, accompanied by the killing of one or two persons.[35] The exceptional case occurred in Kremenets, where Ukrainian nationalists and their local helpers killed 300–500 Jews before a German Army commander intervened in response to a Jewish appeal. According to Yehuda Bauer, the Ukrainians in Kremenets organized a militia as soon as the Soviets left and began to persecute the Jews, denying them a bread ration when there was a shortage. After the corpses of sixty Ukrainians who were killed by the Soviets were discovered in the local jail, retaliation against the Jews ensued in the form of rapes and murder, which was overseen by a unit of Einsatzgruppe C. The massacre lasted three days. [36]

In July and August 1941, the Germans' 'Final Solution' policy of mass murder expanded to include Jewish women, and then children. Thus most of the 12,000 Jews killed in Volhynia in July were shot by German military and SS-police forces, often in combination with pogroms.[37] Shortly after the Wehrmacht arrived in Lutsk they discovered the 2,800 dismembered corpses of former inmates of the NKVD prison. According to the report of a local Einsatzgruppe C commander, Ukrainians who survived the prison massacres reported to the German occupiers that 'the Jews had played a decisive part in the arrests and shooting'. In the brief period after the Soviets left and before the Germans arrived, massive looting of the shops and acts of arson occurred. The local German military commander turned to the entire staff of the Einsatzkommando unit for assistance in safeguarding supplies and restoring order. On 30 June 1941, a search for those responsible for the plundering and fires resulted in the arrest and shooting of 300 Jews and twenty looters. A few days later, on 2 July, the corpses of ten German soldiers were discovered. To retaliate for the 'murder of the German soldiers and Ukrainians, 1160 Jews were shot by a platoon of order policemen and a platoon of soldiers'.[38] The Germans reported that many Ukrainians were helpful in denouncing the Jews, and most were uncontrollable looters, especially the Ukrainian militia who 'mistreated' the local population of Jews and Poles. In Rivne (and Ternopil' Galicia), the Ukrainian militia murdered Polish families and behaved 'in such a way that even the Ukrainian peasants call them Bolshevik hordes'.[39]

From the German point of view, the local vigilantes, plunderers and political activists had to be controlled and exploited. Yet coordinated interaction of local German commanders and Ukrainian leaders was more the pattern than the exception in summer 1941. In the Volhynian town of Klevan', German forces organized a pogrom on the second day of the occupation. Ukrainian militia assisted by dragging Jews from their homes, which were then ransacked by locals. The Jews were brought to the main square, lined up in five rows and shot. Jewish corpses were brought to mass graves, as well to the synagogue where they were burned. Some 500–700 Jews were killed in these massacres.[40] Historian Timothy Snyder wrote about Klevan' that 'Ukrainians told the SS which homes were Jewish, and that all of the Jews were communists. About 700 of the 2,500 Jews of that shtetl were killed during the first days of the occupation, their bodies left on the street to be eaten by dogs and swine for three days'.[41]

Documentation on Ukrainian nationalist involvement in the pogroms in Volhynia-Polessia is scarce, in large part because the movement itself became fractured and was forced underground in August and September 1941. The OUN was not the only nationalist group that took over local administrations and participated in pogroms. Supporters of Ukrainian rebel Taras Bulba-Borovets, the Polissian *Sich*, carried out anti-Jewish actions along the Ukrainian–Belorussian border in the Pripjet marshlands. According to Karel Berkhoff's research, one 15-year-old-member of the Sich recalled: 'we did everything they asked. I went everywhere, rode everywhere, fought and shot Jews who had treated me badly'. The *Sich* had its own newspaper, in which it announced at the end of 1941, 'now

the parasitical Jewish nation had been destroyed'.[42] Researcher Jared McBride also documented *Sich* pogroms north of Zhytomyr at Olevs'k. In that case, the robbing, torture and killing of Jews was done with no German involvement.[43]

As a deliberate strategy, the OUN-B infiltrated the local Ukrainian militia in western Ukraine, and in many towns and villages the militia became a paramilitary force of the OUN-B. The force sought to destroy all threats to Ukrainian national sovereignty, including the murder of old elites, communists and Jews in pogrom-style massacres.[44] For example, in the Podolian towns of Bar and Shpykiv, the Ukrainian militiamen attached to OUN-B, who wore the nationalist symbol of the trident on their sleeves, initiated the first anti-Jewish measures by ordering that 'all Jews over seven years of age must wear the white star'.[45]

The pattern of anti-Jewish measures and violence that is discernable in western Ukraine was largely the result of the movement and distribution of German as well as Ukrainian occupation agents. Ukrainian nationalists in the OUN-B, many of whom had witnessed or heard about the largest pogrom in L'viv, continued to move eastwards with the German Army, and repeated the actions on a smaller scale in the villages. A local activist with the OUN-B Gindalo Kovalchyk in Rohachiv (south of Novhorod Volynsk) explained that in late July or early August 1941, two Ukrainians who were members of Bandera's movement arrived from eastern Poland, and immediately called a meeting in his village. They were there to organize the militia and register supporters. At the meeting, one local man declared that the German Army had liberated Ukraine from Bolshevism, and it was time to seek revenge upon the Jews for Soviet crimes. There were a few hundred Jews living in Rohachiv on the eve of the Nazi invasion. They did not survive the occupation. It is unknown if a pogrom occurred before the Germans arrived or in the wake of this OUN-B meeting.[46] A diarist who was an OUN-B member in the Nachtigall Battalion travelled from L'viv to Vinnytsia, and noted: 'During our march, we saw with our own eyes the victims of the Jewish–Bolshevik terror, which strengthened our hatred of the Jews, and so, after that, we shot all the Jews we encountered in 2 villages'.[47]

Documentation of Ukrainian militia and nationalist forces who shot Jews independently of the Germans reveals the antisemitic logic prevalent in western Ukraine during summer 1941. This was traditional scapegoating taken to a new level. The horrors of the Soviet regime were not exaggerated, but the role of the Jews in the regime was. The fury of the local population melded with the fascist programme of the occupiers. The fact that Jews were among those massacred in NKVD prisons was not mentioned in German or Ukrainian reports. Ukrainian nationalists in the OUN-B and OUN-M espoused an anti-Jewish political programme, a Ukraine for Ukrainians, and saw their independence struggle as a battle to remove Bolshevik, Muscovite (Russian), Jewish and Polish threats from Ukraine. The extremely antisemitic agendas of the Germans and Ukrainians, coming on the heels of the brutal Soviet occupation distinguished this period of warfare and occupation from the First World War when pogroms occurred but on a smaller scale, and in the lands of the former Russian Pale of Settlement, less so in Austro-Hungarian Galicia.

The coincidence of pogroms and mass shootings that reached genocidal proportions suggests several developments. The pogroms were part of a Nazi strategy, a deliberate attempt to expand the killing of Jews with the help of local antisemites and Ukrainian nationalists. The pogroms were also both a cause and outcome of radicalization that occurred within German circles as well as between German and indigenous agents on the ground. The expansion of the killing as systematic mass shootings also meant that the sites of murder were moved from the centre of towns to the outskirts where the landscape of rivers, forests and ravines served other more practical needs (secure gathering points, embankments to absorb bullets and depressed terrain to serve as mass graves). The first weeks of antisemitic mob violence as public spectacles of revenge, triumph and consolidation of power was supplanted by genocide. This escalating overlapping history of mass violence is especially evident in western Volhynia where unlike in neighboring Galicia, the number of Jews killed by mass shootings exceeded those killed in pogroms.[48] Thus by the end of September 1941, in the eastern capital of Kiev, there were no pogroms comparable to the 'Petliura Days', instead there was Babi Yar.

The increase in mass shootings and decrease in pogroms was mainly due to Nazi decisions to destroy Soviet Jewry and, to that end, expand the presence and power of the SS-police forces in occupied Ukraine. At the end of July, Reich Leader of the SS and Chief of the German Police Heinrich Himmler's right-hand man in Ukraine, Higher SS and Police Leader Friedrich Jeckeln, expanded the mass shooting actions from Jewish male adults to Jewish men and women, ordering the First SS Brigade to kill all Soviet agents in Novohrad Volynsk, specifying as well that the available Ukrainian militia should be on hand to help. They massacred 1,658, among them 800 Jewish men and women who were shot under Jeckeln's direct supervision by the banks of the Zluch River.[49] In Berdychiv, no German evidence has emerged that describes pogroms occurring prior to the Germans' arrival. The German military commander and units of Einsatzgruppe C initiated the first attacks against the Jewish elders. When Jeckeln's forces arrived in August, more systematic measures began, including ghettoization followed by mass shootings, with the worst massacres on 15–16 September. It seems that no ruse or pretext was used in the destruction of Berdychiv's Jews.

In Zhytomyr as in Kiev, the Jews were blamed in the German-controlled Ukrainian language newspapers for destruction in the town. In both cases, the military commander demanded retaliation, and Jews were marched through town before being shot. One of the common antisemitic claims in these parts was that the 'Jewish' NKVD carried out the forced collectivization and imposed the famine of 1932–33. Also, if any Jewish persons could be found with a record in the Soviet government, they were publicly accused and tried for Stalin's crimes: that is, blamed for Soviet atrocities. Even without a paper trail to associate Jews with the Soviet government, denunciations flooded German offices; a secret police official in Kiev commented that his wastebasket was overflowing with denunciations that implicated Jews with the crimes of the Soviet government or that identified locals as ethnically Jewish.[50]

Nazi German forces sought out *Volksdeutschen* (ethnic Germans, hereafter *Volksdeutsche*) to install as the new privileged elite. With their sudden power, the *Volksdeutsche* also played a leading local role in the perpetration of anti-Jewish violence. German officials, who were supposed to be 'rescuing' their ethnic brethren and placing them in key administrative positions, found that the Jews offered a convenient scapegoat for the sad state of the *Volksdeutsche* who had suffered under Stalinism.[51] Again, the fact that Jewish members of the Communist Party and NKVD were themselves targets of the purges or that Zionists and other Jews were found among the tortured victims in the NKVD prisons was suppressed or escaped their prejudiced thinking.[52]

The clearest case of local collaboration in the Holocaust in this region, and elsewhere in Soviet Ukraine, is documented in the Nazi recruitment of Ukrainians and *Volksdeutsche* to the SS and police units that initiated or were ordered to carry out anti-Jewish measures and massacres. German leaders found a sufficient number of Ukrainian volunteers to implement the various measures and tasks associated with the 'Final Solution', but they observed that pogroms were not widespread in the Zhytomyr region, to the disappointment of SS officials. An Einsatzgruppe C report from August and early September 1941 revealed, 'Almost nowhere could the population be induced to take active steps against the Jews'. These regions had experienced a longer history of Soviet rule. In the Soviet Union, interethnic tensions including antisemitism were officially suppressed, with the claim that all nationalities lived in friendship under communism. The public use of the derogatory word, 'zhid', or 'zhyd', was met with penalties and months in prison. The racist ideology (not term) of Judeo-Bolshevism was introduced by the Germans, and found fertile ground across Ukraine, but in summer 1941 it was not strong enough in central Ukraine to incite pogroms. Furthermore, as local Ukrainians witnessed the mass shootings and came to realize the full genocidal force of Nazi rulers, most became fearful and expressed ambivalence, fewer displayed their satisfaction.[53]

To involve the local population in the anti-Jewish campaigns, the Germans forced the Jews to march through town. This was a common practice across Europe whereby the expulsion of the Jews was turned into a public parade. Unlike the deportations in the Reich, however, the Jews in Ukraine were led to the edge of town, often so close to peasant huts, collective farms, orchards and grazing fields that the massacres were seen and heard by local residents.[54]

Although, according to German reports, the number of pogroms decreased as the Wehrmacht advanced eastward, survivor testimony reveals that some did occur, particularly in the smaller localities where the Germans were not present or did not bother to report the event. This is unclear because the pogrom cannot be corroborated by a German report, and there were no Jewish survivors. In a village near Chudniv, the Jewish survivor Galina Pekerman recalled the outbreak of a pogrom after the Germans arrived at the end of July. The action was clearly organized by the German occupiers and local Ukrainians and targeted one segment of the population. The Germans recruited local Ukrainian militia to massacre the Jewish children in the village; this massacre was followed by mass

shootings carried out by the Germans and Ukrainians at the local park (where 800 were killed). A division of labour in the killing was evident here.

A similar event occurred in Radomyshl, just north of Zhytomyr, where Ukrainian militiamen were employed to kill the children. In the case of Miropol', the postwar testimony of survivor Liudmila Blekhman and the wartime report of an OUN-B unit concur that the Ukrainian militia carried out the mass shootings. More shocking to Blekhman than the behaviour of the drunken militia was the reaction of her neighbours. As she recalled, when the Jews had been gathered, the Jewish men 'decided to break through the police cordon and let people escape from the main square'. The stunned militia was thrown into disarray, and many Jews, including Blekhman, were able to escape, though few found refuge in Ukrainian homes. Blekhman heard a Ukrainian peasant woman yelling from her window, 'Mr Policeman, a Jewish kid ran into my house. I saw him!' One could also hear comments about the plunder, exclamations about finding a nice coat or a good Singer sewing machine. As the Jews were reassembled at the square, they were forced to walk through a cordon of locals, who tried to grab their bags and threw rocks at them. According to an observer from the OUN-B, all the Jews of Miropol' were shot on 9 September 1941. Descriptions of the excessive alcohol consumption within the militia also appeared in these OUN-B reports.[55]

Nazi leaders (among them Reich Security Main Office Chief Reinhard Heydrich and Nazi ideologue and Minister of the Occupied Eastern Territories Alfred Rosenberg) advised their subordinates in the police and civilian agencies to allow and even incite pogroms, but Nazi leaders also were concerned about creating an uncontrollable, chaotic situation.[56] Such a situation might even play into the hands of Ukrainian nationalists who, according to the OUN-B's prewar guidelines, deliberately took advantage of the unrest by advising their local agents, 'at a time of chaos and confusion, liquidation of undesirable Polish, Muscovite, and Jewish activists is permitted, especially supporters of Bolshevik–Muscovite imperialism'.[57]

Southern Ukraine: the Black Sea Region

Though Jews as victims of violence was a constant across the borderlands, the politics and interethnic dynamic of the mob violence and among the occupying forces varied from region to region. Around the Black Sea of Ukraine in particular, Romanian–German imperial projects to 'cleanse' the territory of unwanted minorities and 'solve' the Jewish Question overlapped. Romanians, Germans, *Volksdeutsche* and Ukrainians engaged in acts of collective violence against 'their' Jewish neighbours. Here, where the Roma minority resided in larger numbers, the Germans also targeted and killed this population along with the Jews. For example, between the Bug and Dniester Rivers, Einsatzgruppe D commanders actively recruited ethnic Germans into the Sipo-SD to assist in the mass murder of the Jews and other so-called undesirables and security threats. In the historic ethnic German settlement at Landau, about fifty kilometres northwest of Nikolaev, Himmler's agents in charge of race and resettlement matters coordinated

cleansing actions with the Romanian occupation government. The settlements contained ethnic German policemen (*Selbstschutz*) who, with little prodding, began targeting the Jews and Roma for exploitation as forced labourers and for killing. At the colony of Schoenfeld, the inhabitants formed vigilante bands, chased down the Roma, and burned them in the barns on their farms.[58]

In terms of the societal aspects of anti-Jewish violence in 1941, events in Odessa were perhaps more significant than those in Kiev. In October 1941, an estimated 25,000–30,000 were shot, hanged and burned in Odessa, a city with one of the largest urban populations of Jews in Eastern Europe after Warsaw and Budapest.[59] Such a high death toll clearly was the result of a highly organized series of massacres. The killings were ordered by General Ion Antonescu himself, who demanded (in Order no. 302.826) 'immediate retaliatory action, including the liquidation of 18,000 Jews in the ghettos and the hanging in the town squares of at least 100 Jews for every regimental sector'.[60] This order was issued after an explosion in Romanian military headquarters, which had killed dozens of occupation officials, including the commanding officer. Romanian killing methods included a mix of grenading and shooting of Jews who had been crammed by the thousands into wooden buildings. In an act reminiscent of the burning of Strasbourg's Jews in the fifteenth century, Romanians forced Jews into the harbour square and set them on fire. In this twentieth-century version, however, the Romanians did not allow Jews to save themselves through conversion (baptism).

In other parts of the newly occupied Romanian territories, in Bukovina and northern Bessarabia, the crude association of the Soviets with Jewry was operative. The mayor of Onişcani (Bessarabia), Vasile Crăciun, portrayed in historian Vladimir Solonari's account as 'a former cuzist and well-to-do peasant (kulak)', lashed out at the Jews in his community. Crăciun explained that 'Soviet power deported all the good people from our village … Now that the Romanians are here, we have to arrest and kill all Jews'.[61]

The Romanian government accumulated its own record of anti-Jewish atrocities independent of the Germans, to such an extent that even Hitler observed in August 1941 that 'Antonescu is pursuing much more radical policies in this area than we have so far'.[62] Both regimes shared projects of ethnic purification and dedicated the machinery of the state to organize mass deportations and mass murder against Jews and other minorities. In summer 1941, the dynamic of the two state programmes contributed to an escalation on the ground as Jews attempted to flee both regimes and the Romanian–German borders (the Dniestr and Bug Rivers) became the sites of a refugee crisis and overlapping atrocities.[63]

The Romanian case demonstrates that the joining of state-sponsored and popular violence is not continuous, but comes together in certain regions, at certain times, and does not necessarily lead to escalation, or mark an irreversible step to genocide. Romanian leaders modified their policies in 1942, and the deportations of Romanian Jews to killing centres in Poland did not occur, to Hitler's disappointment.[64]

Historical and theoretical explanations for the violence

This sketch of anti-Jewish violence in Ukraine (west of the Dnepr) barely scratches the surface. There were many more documented incidents, and one can only venture a guess as to how many undocumented ones occurred. Such a gruesome catalogue of atrocities must be explained or at least some analysis attempted. Jan Gross concluded: 'When reflecting on this epoch, we must not assign collective responsibility. We must remain clearheaded enough to remember that for each killing only a specific murderer or group of murderers is responsible. But we nevertheless might be compelled to investigate what makes a nation (as in 'the Germans') capable of carrying out such deeds'.[65] Gross did not explain the root causes of such 'national' capabilities, though his in-depth work on Jedwabne obviously supports his argument for specificity.

Several scholars of Ukrainian, Jewish, Romanian, German, Polish and Holocaust history, as well as theorists from other disciplines, have offered various explanations. For example, Bogdan Musial, a historian of Nazi-occupied Poland, has argued in light of the Jedwabne discovery that more blame should be directed at the Soviet regime, suggesting that Jewish overrepresentation in the criminal communist regime caused Poles, Ukrainians and Germans to vent their anti-Soviet rage against the Jews.[66] Norman Naimark debunked Musial's argument by referring to his 'bloated claims about extensive Jewish participation in Soviet crimes and justifiable Polish resentment against Jewish perpetrators'. Yet, as Naimark conceded, such perceptions and prejudices mattered above and beyond the fact that Jews were not overrepresented in the Soviet government, but seemed more visible because the minority, previously barred from most state positions, found positions in the Soviet administration. While many Jews were in the leadership of the interwar communist parties, certainly not *all* Jews were communists. Prior to the Great Terror (1937–38), about forty percent of the high-ranking NKVD officers in the Soviet identification system were of Jewish nationality. During the Terror, Jewish officers in the NKVD carried out Stalin's orders as well as fell victim to the purges. By the fall of 1939 the percentage of Jews in the NKVD leadership had dropped from forty to less than four per cent. The Jews rather than the Russians were blamed for the Terror as well as for the atrocities committed by the Soviets between 1939 and 1941. The conflation of Jews with the crimes of the Soviet regime was an irrational sentiment rooted in emotions of resentment, fear and anger toward a minority that could most easily be blamed.[67]

More recently, historian Timothy Snyder's explanation for the pogroms placed greater weight on the double occupation that these borderlands experienced. Across the *Bloodlands* of eastern Europe, pogroms took place 'where the Soviets had recently arrived and where Soviet power was recently installed, where for the previous months Soviet organs of coercion had organized arrests, executions and deportations. They were a joint production, a Nazi edition of a Soviet text'.[68] Clearly the overlapping history of the Soviet and Nazi regimes was a key factor in causing the pogroms, but in what ways exactly? As soon as

the Soviets evacuated, local populations were quick to act on claims of an alleged Jewish Bolshevik threat, and welcomed this antisemitic Nazi propaganda.[69] This pattern of response has been substantiated by Andrzej Zbikowski's meticulous research on Jedwabne and dozens of communities in eastern Poland where violence erupted in summer 1941.[70] The presence of NKVD prisons triggered pogroms but this cause specific to towns such as L'viv does not explain how and why similar acts of anti-Jewish violence occurred on a smaller scale in localities where no prisons with corpses of NKVD victims were discovered.

In his work on Berezhany in eastern Galicia, survivor and historian Shimon Redlich concluded that 'the initiation and conduct of the pogroms weren't identical in the various localities'. In larger cities, they were organized by German security units and various Ukrainian organizations; in smaller towns and in the countryside, killing was more spontaneous. The position of the Germans was 'ambivalent'. However, there was one common element; as Redlich explained, 'In most cases the murder of Jews by Ukrainians was linked to the NKVD executions. Both German and Ukrainian nationalist propaganda widely used the theme of Judeo-Bolshevism and alleged Jewish participation in the Soviet terror machine'.[71] Dieter Pohl, who introduced some of the first systematic evidence of pogroms in eastern Galicia, also stressed the importance of the OUN network of expeditionary forces, which were operative in sparking and coordinating the pogroms with the German authorities as well as in spreading anti-Jewish propaganda and advocating 'German methods' in 'the struggle against Jewry in Ukraine'.[72] Their campaign was most effective in western Ukraine, where the anti-Soviet enmity was channelled against the Jews as a whole and exacerbated by the recent experience of NKVD deportations and atrocities. The Jewish–Soviet nexus in the eyes of the local population, nationalist agitators and the German occupier was the most powerful, widespread source of hatred and vengeance against Jews in Ukraine. Yet there were other causes that should not be overlooked.

Holocaust historian Yehuda Bauer, who compared the towns of Buchach and Kremenets, argued for a more differentiated picture of motives based on the urban and rural setting. The stereotype of the hostile Ukrainian or Ukrainian peasantry minimizes the malice of Ukrainian townsfolk who attacked their Jewish neighbors.[73] Though the pogrom in Kremenets was among the worst in Podolia, the behaviour of the peasantry was not particularly or excessively violent. Plundering was common but did not necessarily precipitate unbridled physical aggression. The higher density of Jews in the towns and cities accounts for the more acute tensions and resulting violence, according to Bauer.

Survivor and historian Philip Friedman explained in his early work on Ukrainian–Jewish relations that 'anti-Jewish activities were the work of an inflamed populace' steered by a lethal mixture of Ukrainian organizations and German officials in the military and SS police. In Ternopil' the Germans summoned the Ukrainian Committee to help prepare a pogrom, while in Glyniany (neighboring Peremyshliany) the Ukrainian Committee appealed to the Germans to start an anti-Jewish campaign, including suggesting the formation of a ghetto. Friedman

elucidated the particular dynamics behind the organization of pogroms in each locality and, like Gross, was careful to stress the specificity of each setting, the persons involved, and the events.

Micro studies of the pogroms have also inspired macro explanations. Historian Omer Bartov has researched centuries of interethnic history in Buchach, and found the roots of the genocide in the uneven socio-economic development among the town's different ethnic groups,[74] whereas Frank Golczewski offered a nuanced explanation based on his in-depth research on Ukrainian–German and Ukrainian–Jewish relations. In Galicia, Ukrainians developed a longer history of cooperation with Germans that was part of the Habsburg (Vienna) legacy. Furthermore, '*Ukrainian* anti-Jewish violence was rare *in Galicia* throughout the 19th century and immediately after the First World War'.[75] Though there were pogroms in Galicia that were instigated by Russian army forces and also carried out by local Ukrainians and Poles during the collapse of the short-lived Ukrainian Republic, Golczewski's downplaying of them in his thesis suggests that these First World War-era incidents were not significant enough to mark this territory as a hotbed of anti-Jewish violence. 'By the start of the Second World War', he argued, 'this had changed—for the worse'.[76] During the Depression in the 1930s, the agricultural economy in Galicia experienced a collapse in prices, which aggravated Ukrainian–Jewish relations in the marketplace, where Ukrainian peasants sold to Jewish wholesalers and Ukrainian consumers bought from Jewish retailers. Furthermore, official Polish antisemitism in the form of quotas and restrictions in civic and social organizations stigmatized and isolated the Jewish minority in eastern Galicia.[77]

Where the Germans and Ukrainians (and Poles) saw eye to eye was in the desire to rid Ukraine of Bolshevism. In the Soviet administration of eastern Poland, Jews were mostly employed at the communal level, thereby making them more visible to Ukrainians and Poles 'on an everyday basis'.[78] The perception that Jews gained the most from the 'detested' Soviet rule, combined with prewar antisemitic prejudices—religious beliefs, economic envy and differences in education levels—put additional strain on the already tense relations between Jews and non-Jews; Soviet rule, which persecuted both Polish and Ukrainian nationalists as well as Zionists, was generalized as 'Jewish rule' by both anti-Soviet Poles and Ukrainians.[79] The generalization could not accommodate other realities, such as the fact that Jews who tried to protect their private property and businesses joined Ukrainians in an anticommunist front, and were also deported during collectivization. For Ukrainians, Sovietization was seen as an attack on the peasantry and Ukrainian political sovereignty, but it also destroyed the Jewish and Polish intelligentsia and middle class.[80]

Conflicting explanations for the pogroms are reflective of various methodological approaches, mixed source materials, as well as biases. For many years, the dominant interpretation placed full blame on the German occupiers, shifting attention away from the controversial subject of collaboration.[81] As evidence of the German intent to spark pogroms, the orders and reports of the Einsatzgruppen

were most influential, such as this order from Reinhard Heydrich, Chief of the Reich Security Main Office:

> No obstacles are to be put in the way of self-cleansing efforts on the part of anti-communist and anti-Jewish circles in the territories to be occupied. To the contrary, they are to be triggered leaving no traces whatsoever, to be intensified when necessary, and to be guided in the right direction, without these local 'self-defence circles' being able later to refer to orders or political promises made.[82]

Yet all the pogroms that exploded simultaneously across the borderlands in large cities and small villages were not the nefarious handiwork of German SS-police officials who deliberately left no trace of their presence. Indeed, this Einsatzgruppen order could be interpreted differently—as Heydrich's desire for locals to do the Germans' 'dirty work', not to be construed as doing a favour for the Germans but because they shared in the same goal to rid Ukraine of Jews. To a large degree, the Germans had to rely on the local population because German manpower was lacking for the tasks needed to fully exploit the Jewish population and commit the genocide. Germans did not occupy all the towns where pogroms occurred. One of the challenges for historians is to determine where German orders ended on the ground and local violence started, with or without direct Nazi oversight. Yet Golczewski finds that 'even non-Ukrainian scholars have sometimes gone too far in minimizing the depth of anti-Jewish, anti-communist, and anti-Russian sentiment in these regions'. Raul Hilberg, for example, asserted that 'truly spontaneous pogroms, free from Einsatzgruppen influence, did not take place', and that 'all pogroms were implemented within a short time after the arrival of the [German] killing units'.[83] The attempt to place full blame on the Germans however does not explain the pogroms that broke out in areas occupied by Hungarian forces, in towns such as Stanyslaviv, Kolomyia, Horodenka and Obertyn.[84]

In fact, while the Germans expressed disappointment about the decrease in pogroms in central and eastern Ukraine, they also found that mob violence was a problem because it spiralled out of control, prompting Einsatzkommando 5 (Einsatzgruppe C) to report at the end of July 1941 from Uman (Ukraine) that the pogroms were hindering more systematic efforts to achieve a 'Final Solution'.[85] This comparison between pogroms and the 'Final Solution', as articulated here, is especially revealing of the German outlook and intent. Here one sees a distinction made between popular and state violence, and the historical break from the pogrom to genocide. In fact the two forms of violence and the two histories became inseparable in Ukraine as of July 1941.

As geographical points of comparison, Latvia, Lithuania and Bessarabia/Northern Bukovina also saw a surge in anti-Jewish popular violence during Operation Barbarossa. In Latvia, Einsatzgruppe A reported on 7 July 1941 that units of a local auxiliary police teamed up with two other independent groups to form a coalition against the Jews. They destroyed several synagogues and 'liquidated' 400 Jews in Riga.[86] In Lithuania, where the pogroms in Kovno resembled those in L'viv, historian Saulius Sužiedélis stresses the political and ideological role

of the fascist nationalist groups, the Lithuanian Activist Front (LAF), and the organized auxiliaries in the Rollkommando Hamann; among the killing units in the area the 'Lithuanian contingent under Lt Bronius Norkus, accounted for at least half of the total number of persons' listed as murdered in the famous Jaeger report. Antisemitic violence formed blood-bonds between the Nazi occupiers and their fascist allies. Lithuanian communists or other politically 'suspect' persons could prove their new found loyalties to the fascists by denouncing the Jews and participating in the pogroms, thereby diverting attention from their own affiliations with the Soviet regime.[87] Even if data prove that Jews were not dominant among the leadership of the NKVD and that a significant number of Lithuanian Jews were anti-Soviet, it would not change the fact that most Lithuanians *perceived* Jews as collectively pro-Bolshevik or pro-Polish, and Nazi propaganda reinforced that view. As in Ukraine, latent antisemitism persisted and appeared in a number of overt forms, most of them accusations of collusion with some 'outside' enemy, be it Bolshevik occupiers, Polish nationalist aggressors or international capitalists. Such accusations shared the underlying assertion that the Jewish minority was not 'one of us' and, therefore, a natural target of discrimination, exclusion and, in times of crisis, even violence. Those who acted on such perceptions saw themselves as loyal patriots, not as immoral criminals. Lithuanian pogromists condemned the Jews as national traitors. In western Ukraine, a similar perception was common of Jews as 'traitors' allied with the Poles, the Russians and, more aggressively, portrayed as members of the Cheka, and the NKVD. Two contrasting images circulating in the lands of double occupation reinforced this perceived conflict: the Jews welcoming the Red Army in 1939, and the local Ukrainian, Lithuanian and Latvian nationalists welcoming Hitler the liberator in 1941.[88]

Besides the important role of nationalistic and antisemitic ideologies, another significant theme that requires more disentangling is the actual form of the violence. The term *pogrom*, even in its original Russian meaning, is metaphorical and vague. Did pogromists in summer 1941 understand their acts within a tradition of plundering and humiliating Jews during times of crisis and warfare, or did they intend to remove all Jews from their communities including to commit mass murder? Violence on the scale that occurred in summer 1941 required the combined forces of ruffians, armed militia and educated organizers and ideologues. Furthermore the violence often coincided with the implementation of systematic discriminatory measures, such as the marking of Jews and their households, confiscation of their property and mass arrests.

To what extent were the pogroms in 1941 modern, or anti-modern? Several scholars have explained the Holocaust as the by-product of 'a modern vision' of the nation-state, and parts of this essay have stressed the combined influences of the overlapping Nazi, Soviet and Romanian imperial projects, and Ukrainian nationalism. Others have added another element to this modernization theory: the dynamics of imperial expansion or imperial collapse. In *The Massacre in History*, Mark Levene and Penny Roberts pointed out that the violence condoned and triggered by imperialists can be a sign of that state's lack of power and

legitimacy.[89] Levene argued, similarly to political theorist Hannah Arendt's thesis in her study *On Violence*,[90] that strong states do not have to resort to violent terror tactics to gain the support and maintain control over the populace; massacres themselves are not a 'finely tuned instrument of control'; they demonstrate a diffusion and fragmentation of power.

Applying this theory to the Ukrainian case in 1941, one could conclude that the involvement of the local population in the killing of Jews and other perceived threats manifested, on the one hand, the instability of the periphery of the Nazi empire, and, on the other hand, the precarious situation and immature form of the Ukrainian national movement. Following Levene's thinking, both perpetrators were in weak positions and used antisemitism to claim a historical legitimacy and hold over the newly occupied territories. Nazi 'ethnic cleansing' was an imperialist's 'civilizing process' meant to fortify the conqueror's position on claimed territory. Ukrainian nationalists or grassroots self-proclaimed patriots who co-perpetrated the Holocaust did so in the name of ousting an enemy from 'their' own territory, as part of the process of nation-state building and as a popular expression of self-determination.[91]

Theorists outside of the discipline of history have published numerous studies on interethnic and mob violence. Political scientist Roger Peterson stressed the role of emotions in inflaming group violence, especially individual feelings of fear and resentment that are shared by others during a crisis, such as the collapse of a state or during war when regular societal constraints are loosened or fall apart.

A weakness of Peterson's study is that he was unable to explain how individual emotions become a group sentiment. Ethnic violence is, in his view, characterized by the following pattern: first the political elites, jingoists, seek to consolidate their ethnic identity, and these 'calls for ethnic group solidarity trigger norms of exclusion in the mass population'.[92] Such calls for solidarity are often done in the name of warding off a threat; they are motivated by fear. Peterson posited that a crucial element of ethnic violence is the pairing of elites with local thugs and fanatics, which was indeed demonstrated during the Nazi invasion when Ukrainian militias and nationalists joined forces with governing committees and German commanders.[93]

Why the lure of ethnicity as a source of group identity and potentially a violent expression of it? Peterson explained that 'cognitive categories based on race and ethnicity serve to simplify a highly complex world'.[94] Two main features of interethnic violence are collapsing empires and nationalizing states, developments that occurred in extreme form in the interwar period. A nation-state defined by the majority left the detested minorities, the Jews most particularly, open to assault.

Anthropologist Jack David Eller defined violence as a biological, psychological and social phenomenon. Humans are violent, and groups 'with ideologies and interests are the most violent of all'.[95] This assertion is odd since most groups by definition have shared or collective interests, but that does not make them extremely violent. What is it about mob violence that seems leaderless? Groups provide individuals with some affirmation of their own resentments, and that legitimation is all the more powerful if the target of that resentment is another group,

thereby creating a threat and the moral rationale that one who 'suppresses' the threat is acting in self-defence. Eller agreed with Roy Baumeister's conclusion that 'the idealism of groups, as opposed to the idealism of individuals, usually ends up conferring a right, a license, to hate'.[96] The license to hate Jews in Ukraine in the summer of 1941 was granted by regional German commanders, Ukrainian nationalist leaders and even the peer pressure of the 'mob'.

Considering all of these historical and social–scientific explanations, the pogroms and escalating popular violence against Jews in Ukraine might be best understood as a convergence of several contingencies, phenomena and events with long- and short-term causes. Such a rare explosion of collective and state-sponsored mass violence cannot be explained by a single factor, such as the modernizing state, the banality of evil, barbaric tribal hatreds or the long fuse of Christian antisemitism. Intercommunal conflicts and tensions at this time were driven by overlapping socio-political developments and behavioural responses, including clashing ideologies, a scarcity of resources, a culture of violence, the Nazi–Soviet vise, and indeed a long history of anti-Jewish sentiment and actions. In the wake of the First World War, the various ethno-racial versions of nationhood or ethnocratic states placed Europe's minorities, especially the Jews, in an extremely vulnerable position. The communistic, internationalist alternative appealed to minorities and other marginalized groups but threatened the more established, but exclusive, capitalistic construct of the nation-state. Yet built into both the Nazi and Soviet alternatives were utopian notions of modernity, total revolution and social engineering that contrasted with a threatening *Feindbild*. Political struggles for power and legitimacy were played out on the streets and by a desperate 'mob' of the dislocated. It can hardly be overstated just how significant the First World War was in fostering the rise of fascism, inuring an entire generation of Europeans to violence and cheapening the value of individual life. The triumph of this tragic marriage of violence and mass politics was further demonstrated by the fact that pacifists like Remarque, peace-aspiring organizations such as the League of Nations and strategies such as appeasement ultimately failed. This was the general ideological, political context that the economic crises only made worse.[97] By 1939 the economic divide between Eastern and Western Europe remained significant; the Nazis exaggerated and distorted this gap in their own stark depictions of a modernizing Germany *vis-à-vis* a backward Poland or degenerate Judeo-Bolshevized Russia, a contrast that was also depicted as the 'superior Aryan' and 'Eastern Jew'. In the post-Versailles mapping of the European nation-states, border restrictions made these economic and political differences more pronounced.[98]

The mounting showdown between the fascist, nationalist approach, epitomized by the Nazi movement, and its totalitarian counterpart, the Stalinist version of Marxism, placed the inhabitants of 'the' Ukraine in a precarious position. In the western regions of Galicia and Volhynia, Ukrainians were numerically the majority, but they became a persecuted political minority when placed within borders of the fledgling Polish state. As might be expected, most Ukrainians resisted Polonization. They did not envision flight to another homeland as an

option, and assimilation was slowed by gaping socioeconomic differences. In the Soviet east, the Ukrainian majority fragmented into political and economic pieces as a result of the Stalinist revolution. There was much disillusionment about and even hatred of the Soviet experiment and its methods, but by 1941 the system had involved and implicated two generations of participants that cut across ethnic lines. Jewish activists could be 'blamed' for the early period, but not the latter one. Intermarriage and urbanization of Ukrainians, Jews and Russians began to blur ethnic differences. Yet both the Polish and Soviet attempts at consolidating their power and hold over Ukraine did not foster strong intercommunal ties; on the contrary, they seeded more intense animosities, resentments and uncertainties. A culture of denunciation flourished in Stalinist Ukraine as each tried to exploit a system that made big promises but offered little rewards. Within the different regions of Polish- and Soviet-controlled Ukraine, Jews and ethnic Ukrainians were divided socially and politically by the secularism, factionalism and terrorism of modern politics.

The outbreak of the war, the early successes of the German military and the aggressive antisemitic policies of the Nazis added fuel to this fire. Ukrainians, Poles and Jews suddenly found themselves in another major war that was more ideologically divisive than the previous one. Generations now shared a collective memory of what was possible in a setting of total war. Jews understood their vulnerability, although not its genocidal potential. Pogroms were by no means an automatic response to such political social crises in the upheaval of war, but the very fact that this history of anti-Jewish violence existed in the collective memory made it possible, if not likely, that pogroms would recur with the arrival of antisemitic Nazis. The German presence was decisive because during the upheaval of September 1939, with a few exceptions (such as the border area of Grodno, where the actual events have not been fully clarified yet), pogroms did *not* break out across Soviet-held territory. Then later, after years of antisemitic Nazi propaganda, when the Red Army returned to Ukraine, pogroms occurred again in 1944–45, in eastern and western Ukraine, with the most publicized one in Kiev.[99]

In comparing the violence in summer 1941 in Galicia and Volhynia-Podolia, there was a decrease in the scale of Ukrainian-led pogroms though looting was just as widespread, according to German observers.[100] Survivor testimony reveals that Ukrainians betrayed Jewish neighbours, denounced them, stole their property and brutalized them. But one cannot state with certainty that 'no Jedwabnes' occurred in central and eastern Ukraine; this is because we have no sources for many smaller Jewish communities that were destroyed, and because after the war Soviet investigations and war-crimes trials played up the role of Ukrainian nationalists as collaborators but minimized the popular antisemitism of ordinary 'peaceful Soviet citizens'.[101]

In *Neighbors*, Gross argued that we must see the Holocaust 'as a mosaic composed of discrete episodes, improvised by local decision-makers, and hinging on unforced behaviour, rooted in God-knows-what motivations, of all those who were near the murder scene at the time'.[102] The case of Ukraine shows that its significant regional variations necessitate a piece-by-piece approach. But can these micro, episodic

histories be properly placed into a bigger 'mosaic'? Moreover, Gross' work forces us to question the notion of 'neighbourly' relations. In Ukraine and elsewhere in Nazi-occupied Europe, the Germans cleverly exploited and exacerbated tenuous interethnic ties by unleashing greed and antisemitism, but these vices and prejudices were not German inventions, and the Nazi occupation was one chapter in a much longer history of antisemitic thinking and behaviour in Ukraine.

The pogroms of 1941 cannot be seen in isolation and especially not limited to the borderlands. More than a singular episode, the anti-Jewish violence of the summer of 1941 marked both a culminating moment as well as a historic break. The German-led mass shootings and gassings were state-sponsored acts of genocide, distinctly different from but coinciding with popular violence. At the time the pogroms might have seemed to be episodic and historically familiar but in retrospect they contributed to the much larger, unprecedented genocidal campaign of the 'Final Solution'. Distinctions made between mob violence and genocide fail to account for the interaction of the two phenomena, and such distinctions may reveal a bias. In a 'peripheral' region such as Ukraine, the historical pattern of pogroms had a normalizing effect that inured inhabitants there and foreign observers to the violence. The massacres were brutally repulsive but not disorganized. During the Holocaust, local pogroms continued after summer 1941(and even into the immediate postwar period). Nazi-led ghetto liquidations in Galicia in 1943 were accompanied by the ransacking of Jewish dwellings, rapes, plunder, beatings and other tortures that preceded the deportations and mass shootings. The pogroms, which the German occupiers integrated into their program of genocide, were perpetrated by a coalition of forces: popular mob violence, independent nationalist insurgency groups and the Nazi state. The co-occurrence of these violent phenomena is an important, arguably defining feature of the genocide that should be better disentangled, contextualized and explained.

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Notes and references

1 Jan Gross, *Neighbors* (New York: Penguin, 2002). Andrzej Zbikowski has carefully identified thirty-eight localities around Jedwabne in western Belarus where similar atrocities occurred: 'Pogroms in Northeastern Poland: spontaneous reactions and German instigations', in Elazar Barkan, Elizabeth Cole, and Kai Struve

(eds), *Shared History—Divided Memory: Jews and Others in Soviet Occupied Poland, 1939–1941* (Leipzig: Leipziger Universitätsverlag, 2007), pp. 316–354. On the 'Jedwabne Debate', see Joanna Michlic, 'The Soviet occupation of Poland, 1939–1941, and the stereotype of the Anti-Polish and Pro-Soviet Jew', *Jewish Social Studies*, Vol. 13, 2007, pp. 135–176; Andrzej Zbikowski, 'Jewish reaction to the Soviet arrival in the Kresy in September 1939', *Polin*, Vol. 13, 2000, pp. 62–72.

2 See John Klier and Shlomo Lambroza (eds), *Pogroms: Anti-Jewish Violence in Modern Russian History* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992). Recently Kai Struve has explored (using the concepts of collective memory introduced by Reinhart Koselleck) the pogrom as a social ritual. See Kai Struve, 'Ritual und Gewalt: Die Pogrome des Sommers 1941', in Dan Diner (ed.), *Synchrone Welten: Zeitenräume jüdischer Geschichte* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2005), p. 228. William Hagen has also applied theories of social ritual to his study of the pogrom; see his 'The moral economy of ethnic violence: the pogrom in Lwow, November 1918', in Robert Blobaum (ed.), *Antisemitism and Its Opponents in Modern Poland* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2005), pp. 124–147.

3 For a nuanced treatment of the centre-periphery model that accentuates the role of regional German leaders in the summer of 1941, see Jürgen Matthäus, 'Controlled escalation: Himmler's men in the Summer of 1941 and the Holocaust in the occupied Soviet territories', *Holocaust and Genocide Studies*, Vol 21, No 2, 2007, pp 218–242.

4 A recent article explores these questions as a study of collaboration. See Vladimir Melamed, 'Organized and unsolicited collaboration in the Holocaust: the multifaceted Ukrainian context', *East European Jewish Affairs*, Vol 37, 2007, pp 217–248.

5 Pogroms in western Ukraine, Galicia and Volhynia-Podolia have been documented in the following places: Berezhany, Bibrka, Bolekhiv, Borschiv, Boryslav, Buchach, Chortkiv, Chudniv, Delatyn, Dobromil, Drohobych, Dubno, Glyniany, Grimaïliv, Horodenka, Horodok, Iavoriv, Jablonica, Kamianka-Strumyliwka, Khorostkiv, Klevan', Kolomyia, Korets', Kosiv, Kremenets, L'viv, Mgline, Miropol', Nemyriv, Obertyn, Olevs'k, Peremyshliany, Sambir, Sarny, Sasiv, Shubkov, Skalat, Skhidnytsia, Sokal, Stanyslaviv, Stryj, Terebovlia, Ternopil', Tovste, Velyki-Mezhyrichi, Zbarazh, Zboriv, Zhovka, Zolochiv. Many of these pogroms in Western Volhynia are mapped by Ray Brandon, in Ray Brandon and Wendy Lower (eds), *The Shoah in Ukraine: History, Testimony, Memorialization* (Bloomington: University of Indiana Press, 2009), p 93. Pogroms are documented in German military and SS police records, mostly Einsatzgruppen reports, describing the event explicitly as a pogrom or as local antisemitic acts, as 'murders', 'maltreatment', 'excesses', 'a bloodbath', 'plundering' and burning of synagogues. See the full Ereignismeldung UdSSR Nr. 24, 16 July 1941, among many others from 1941 reprinted and annotated, in Michael Mallmann, Andrej Angrick and Jürgen Matthäus (eds), *Die 'Ereignismeldung UdSSR' 1941: Dokumente der Einsatzgruppen in der Sowjetunion* (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 2011). The other main source for documenting pogroms has been Jewish testimony, especially the early accounts recorded by the Jewish Historical Institute in Warsaw, for example, Uri Lichter's testimony, Archiwum ZIH, sygn. 302/61, Zygmunt Tune sygn 301/2242, brought to my attention by Ray Brandon. Pogroms are described in the Soviet Extraordinary Commission reports, and there was at least one investigation and trial in Soviet Ukraine explicitly against pogromists in Czernovitz, United States Holocaust Memorial Museum Archives (USHMM), Record Group (RG) 31.018m, reel 12, Ukrainian Security Service (SBU, formerly Soviet KGB). Ukrainian sources on pogroms are rare (OUN-B field units and reports compiled in Slyvka, Iu. Iu., and Ia. S. Lial'ka (eds), *Litopys neskorenoï Ukraïny: Dokumenty, materialy, spohady* (L'viv: Prosvita, 1993) and postwar testimonies, such as videotaped interviews in the Yahad in Unum Archives, Paris. The imbalance of sources on pogroms, and the different Polish, Ukrainian and Jewish experiences and views of the violence (not German) are analyzed in Christoph Mick's 'Incompatible experiences: Poles, Ukrainians, and Jews in Lviv under Soviet and German occupation, 1939–1944,' *Journal of Contemporary History* Vol 46, No 2, 2011, pp 336–363.

6 Jan Gross, *Revolution from Abroad: The Soviet Conquest of Poland's Western Ukraine and Western Belorussia* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002). Litman was a refugee from Warsaw who arrived in Peremyshliany and was appointed a teacher by the Soviet administration. Litman's description of Jewish–Polish relations during the Soviet occupation is in his interview transcript, tape #4a.mp3 CD4, 10.58/25.10, 27 June 1982. Also see Jacob Litman's 1997 autobiography, manuscript in USHMM Archives, Litman Family Collection, copy provided by the Litman family, p 35 and p 50 (1997). In the initial months of Soviet occupation (October and November 1939) Ukrainians and Jews persecuted the Poles in L'viv as acts of revenge, or to affirm the removal of this centuries-old 'ruler'. At first the Soviets encouraged this, but later had to control spontaneous anti-Polish activities. See Michlic, 'The Soviet Occupation of Poland, 1939–1941', p 144. On the actual diversity of the Jews in interwar Poland including Galicia, and the complex dilemmas they faced, see Ben Cion Pinchuk, *Shtetl Jews Under Soviet Rule: Eastern Poland on the Eve of the Holocaust* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990) and Dov Levin, *The Lesser of Two Evils: Eastern European Jewry under Soviet Rule, 1939–1941* (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society, 1995).

7 Christoph Mick, '"Only the Jews do not waver": L'viv under Soviet occupation', in Elazar Barkan, Elisabeth Cole and Kai Struve (eds), *Shared History – Divided Memory: Jews and Others in Soviet-Occupied Poland, 1939–1941* (Leipzig: Leipziger Universitätsverlag, 2007), pp 247–249.

8 The son's name was Moishe. The Belzer Rebbe was hidden with a Polish family, then given a disguise and taken out of town by Hungarian counterintelligence officers. Yosef Israel, *Rescuing the Rebbe of Belz. Belzer Chassidus: History, Rescue and Rebirth* (Brooklyn, NY: Mesorah Publications, 2005). See Shoah Foundation Visual History Archive (Los Angeles): Basia K., video testimony, 7 December 1997, Brooklyn, NY, tape 1, segment 4; Israel L., video testimony, 6 November 1995, Brooklyn, NY, tape 2, segment 33; Ida K., video testimony, 24 September 1996, West Orange, NJ, tape 1, segments 18–20. Thanks to Vladimir Melamed for assisting with this interview research. The burning of the synagogue and reaction of Kovch were recounted by Ivan Fuglevych, a Ukrainian eyewitness, interviewed by the author on 24 July 2005, and 8 October 2010.

9 Lucy Gross (b. 18 April 1926), typed manuscript with corrections and notations, written by Lucy Gross just after liberation in Germany and then in Israel (c. 1946–1950). Polish original translated into English by Magdalena Norton. The author is grateful to Gisela Gross Gelin (Lucy's sister) for allowing me to copy the manuscript.

10 See the transcript of audio interview, 1982, tapes 2–3, pp 1–20. Also see Litman's 1997 autobiography, private papers of the Litman Family, recently donated to the USHMM archives.

11 See Jacob Litman's introduction to 'Samek's Testimony', p 3.

12 'Samek's Testimony, 1943', entry of 6 March 1943. Samuel Golfard was shot in late June or early July 1943. See Wendy Lower, *Samuel Golfard's Diary and the Holocaust in Eastern Galicia* (Lanham, MD: Altamira Press, 2011).

13 This first action is described by Holocaust survivors and a Polish rescuer from the town, some of whom lost husbands, fathers, sons and uncles in this massacre. There are slight discrepancies about the ages of the victims, varying from 14 to 65 years, and one testimony dates the massacre in October, and describes the gathering point as a Yiddish school, not the Polish gymnasium. See interviews of survivors, Shoah Foundation Visual History Archive: Basia K., video recording, 7 December 1997, Brooklyn, NY, tape 1, segment 4; Israel L., video recording, 6 November 1995, Brooklyn, NY, tape 2, segments 30–32; Esther L., video recording, 6 November 1995, Brooklyn, NY, tape 2, segment 35; Ida K., video recording, 24 September 1996, West Orange, NJ, tape 1, segments 28–30; Lynn W., video recording 11 October 2001, Del Ray Beach, FL, tape 1, segment 12; Michael S., video recording, 14 November 1997, Warsaw, Poland, tape 2, segment 46; Regina P., video recording, 28 November 1995, Miami Beach, FL, tape 1, segments 28–29; Jacob L., video recording, 13 June 1995, Union, NJ, tape 3, segment 87. The few published sources on the town, including additional Hebrew and Polish testimony, confirm that the massacre occurred but offer slight variations on its size and dating. See Danuta Dabrowska, Avraham Wein, and Aharon Weiss (eds), *Pinkas Hakehilot: Encyclopedia of Jewish Communities, Poland, Eastern Galicia* (Jerusalem: Yad Vashem, 1980), Vol 2, p 442; 'Przemslany', in Shmuel Spector (ed.), *The Encyclopedia of Jewish Life Before and during the Holocaust* (Jerusalem: Yad Vashem, 2001), Vol 2, pp 1035–1036; 'Peremyshliany', in *Encyclopedia Judaica* (Jerusalem: Keter Publishing, 1971) Vol 13, p 277. The November shootings were also described by a German gendarme, Bruno Sämisch, who was tried and convicted by the East German justice system in the early 1950s. See Sämisch testimony, 3 February 1951, Ministry for State Security BV Halle, Ast 5544, BStU# 00133-138, Urteilsurschrift, Strafsache gegen den Arbeiter Bruno Sämisch aus Muehlanger Landesgericht Dessau, and 'Gründe', pp 1–5. BStU #00133-138, Archiv Staatsanwalt des Bezirkes Halle, Fach No. 2052.

14 On the 'taint' of the Soviet regime, see Timothy Snyder, *Bloodlands: Europe between Hitler and Stalin* (New York: Basic Books, 2010), p 196. The Holocaust occurred in a context of extreme violence in Galicia between Poles and Ukrainians, and between Ukrainians and Soviets, with the Jews often caught in the middle, killed for association with one of the 'enemy' factions. The Red Army's return and introduction of its own destruction battalions aggravated the situation in 1944. An estimated 500,000 Ukrainians were deported from western Ukraine between 1944 and 1949; 90,000 Ukrainians were killed, while the number of Poles runs from estimates of 10,000 to 100,000. See Shimon Redlich, *Together and Apart in Brzezany: Poles, Jews and Ukrainians, 1919–1945* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2002), pp 144–147; Jeffrey Burds, 'AGENTURA: Soviet informants' networks and the Ukrainian underground in Galicia, 1944–1948', *East European Politics and Societies*, Vol 11, No. 1, 1997, pp 89–130; Timothy Snyder, '"To resolve the Ukrainian question once and for all": the ethnic cleansing of Ukrainians in Poland, 1943–1947', *Journal of Cold War Studies* Vol 1, No. 2, 1999, pp 86–120; Snyder, 'The causes of Ukrainian–Polish ethnic cleansing 1943', *Past and Present* Vol 179, 2003, pp 197–234. According to historian Per Rudling, there is a resemblance between Jewish survivors' accounts of the rural pogroms in western Ukraine in 1941 and of the UPA's campaigns in Volhynia in 1943. In both cases, the murder weapons

were mostly farm tools such as knives, hay forks and axes. Per A. Rudling, 'OUN, UPA and the Holocaust: a study in the manufacturing of historical myths', p 5, paper presented at the annual conference of the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies, 12 November 2009, to be published in the Carl Beck Papers, summer 2011.

15 Recent research by other scholars has proposed a larger figure, ranging from 13,000 to 35,000, with fifty-eight pogroms in western Ukraine and thirty-five in eastern Galicia. See Dieter Pohl, 'Anti-Jewish pogroms in Western Ukraine: a research agenda,' in Barkan *et al.* (eds), *Shared History—Divided Memory*, p 306. Alexander Prusin's estimate of 30,000 Jews killed in pogroms in summer 1941 covers the territory from Latvia to Bessarabia; see *The Lands Between: Conflict in the East European Borderlands, 1870–1992* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), p 151.

16 For the most detailed account of the Zolochiv pogrom, see Marco Carynnyk, 'All monstrous and hellish: the Zolochiv pogrom, July 1941', paper presented at the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies Conference, 12 November 2009. Recent estimates for the number of prisoners massacred during the Soviet retreat in summer 1941 in East Galicia and the Kresy are 20–30,000 persons. See Prusin, *The Lands Between*, p 151.

17 Alexander Prusin, *Nationalizing a Borderland* (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 2005), pp 59–62.

18 Hagen, 'The moral economy of popular violence'.

19 The antisemitic agenda of the OUN has been more clearly established in recent research by Franziska Bruder, *'Den ukrainischen Staat erkämpfen oder sterben!' Die Organisation Ukrainischer Nationalisten (OUN) 1928–1948* (Berlin: Metropol Verlag, 2007), pp 32, 99–101; and Karel C. Berkhoff and Marco Carynnyk, 'The Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and its attitude towards Germans and Jews: Iaroslav Stets'ko's 1941 *Zhyttiepys*,' *Harvard Ukrainian Studies*, Vol 23, Nos 3–4, 1999, pp 149–184. Marco Carynnyk, 'Foes of our rebirth: Ukrainian nationalist discussions about Jews, 1929–1947,' *Nationalities Papers*, Vol 39, No 3, 2011, pp 315–352.

20 Joanna Michlic, *Poland's Threatening Other: The Image of the Jew from 1880 to the Present* (Omaha: University of Nebraska Press, 2006).

21 Redlich, *Together and Apart in Brzezany*, pp 101–102. See also Omer Bartov, 'White spaces and black holes: Eastern Galicia's past and present', in Brandon and Lower (eds), *The Shoah in Ukraine*, pp 318–353.

22 Anna D., February 1996, Brooklyn NY, tapes 1–2, segments 19–21, 23, 25–26, 28, 30, 41–43, the Shoah Foundation Visual History Archive. Cited in Vladimir Melamed, 'Reflections on collaboration: the first days of pogroms in L'viv and Boryslav', unpublished manuscript.

23 Vladimir Melamed, 'Organized and unsolicited collaboration in the Holocaust: the multifaceted Ukrainian context', *East European Jewish Affairs*, Vol 37, 2007, p 230.

24 Struve, 'Ritual und Gewalt'.

25 Philip Friedman, 'Ukrainian-Jewish relations during the Nazi occupation', in *Roads to Extinction* (New York: Jewish Publication Society, 1980), p 200, n 31.

26 Friedman, 'Ukrainian-Jewish Relations', 199, n 30.

27 *Surma* quote excerpted from Carynnyk's presentation in 'Foes of our rebirth', p 317.

28 Carynnyk determined that early July pogroms in Lviv, Ternopil' and Zolochiv were directly incited by the OUN. His extensively documented survey of the antisemitsm of the OUN is in 'Foes of our rebirth', pp 315–352.

29 Friedrich Heyer, *Die Orthodoxe Kirche in der Ukraine von 1917 bis 1945* (Cologne: Rudolf Müller, 1953), pp 170–172. Karel Berkhoff, 'Was there a religious revival in Soviet Ukraine under the Nazi regime?', *Slavonic and East European Review*, Vol 78, 2000, pp 536–567.

30 J. Gerthner and D. Gerthner, *Home is No More: The Destruction of the Jews of Kosow and Zabie* (Jerusalem: Yad Vashem, 2000), p 72, excerpted from the online document published by the Shoah Resource Center, www.yadvashem.org. The incitement of the priest is also in Friedman, 'Ukrainian–Jewish relations', p 200, n 30.

31 See Archiwum ZIH syg. 301/260, 301/2756. On Zavirukha, see Dov Bergl, 'Thus was the city destroyed', in Eli'ezer Le'oni (ed.), *Korits (Vohlin): sefer zikaron li-kehilatenu she-'alah 'aleha ha-koret* (Tel Aviv: Irgun Yotse-Korits be-Yisra'el, 1959), pp 338–347. Entry, 'Korzec' (Korets' Rivne)', in Geoffrey Megargee and Martin Dean (eds), *Encyclopedia of Camps and Ghettos, 1933–1945: Ghettos in German-Occupied Eastern Europe*, Vol 2, Part A (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2011). Thanks to Martin Dean for sharing these sources with me.

32 Struve, 'Ritual und Gewalt'.

33 Leonid Rein, 'Local collaboration in the execution of the "Final Solution" in Nazi-occupied Belorussia', *Holocaust and Genocide Studies*, Vol 20, No 3, 2006, p 394.

34 Saul Friedländer, *Nazi Germany and the Jews: The Years of Persecution, 1933–1939* (New York: HarperCollins, 1997), pp 82–83, 86–87, 90, 95. Friedländer's text focuses on specific ideological developments in

Germany and mostly among the upper and middle class, while acknowledging the powerful, broader influence of the *Protocols of the Elders of Zion*, a tsarist Russian fabrication. He describes redemption in racial–religious terms 'as liberation from the Jews—as their expulsion, possibly their annihilation'. One could stretch his analysis to the political–religious worldviews among some Eastern Europeans in 1941 who believed that the struggle or survival of their nation and church hinged on the expulsion or death of 'the Bolshevik-Jew'. These antisemitic fantasies were not imported by the Germans, but are evident in the literature of the Ukrainian nationalist movement and found in documentation of Ukrainian views, albeit some recorded by German observers, or German-censored newspapers. Religious ceremonies also became a political tool of antisemites and nationalist activists. On the German revival of religion and local anti-Judaism, see Army Group South, Occupied Rear Area, War Diary, leaflet dated 19 July 1941, US National Archives and Record Administration (NARA), RG 242, T-501/R 5/000518, observation report referring to Ukrainian view of Jews as Satan, NARA, RG 242, T501/R6/001143-4; and leaflets distributed by the 17th Army in Ukrainian, NARA, RG 242, T 501/R 674/8308414. Additional German reports (RmfdbO) about anti-Jewish sentiment of Ukrainians, Central State Archive, Kiev, 3206-255-6. Friedrich Heyer, *Die Orthodox Kirche*, pp 170–172. On Bishop Polikarp, see Berkhoff, 'Was there a religious revival', pp 549–550; and Karel Berkhoff, *Harvest of Despair: Life and Death in Ukraine under Nazi Rule* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1994), pp 83–84.

35 Shmuel Spector, *The Holocaust of Volhynian Jewry, 1941–1944* (Jerusalem: Yad Vashem, 1990), pp 64–65; also see chart, pp 66–67.

36 Yehuda Bauer, 'Buczacz and Krzemieniec: the story of two towns during the Holocaust', *Yad Vashem Studies*, Vol 33, 2004, p 263. Timothy Snyder concurs that 'In Volhynia, the most deadly pogrom was apparently in Kremenets (Polish, Krzemieniec), where the NKVD had murdered some 100–150 prisoners before departing in haste, and where the disinterred bodies revealed signs of torture. Here the local population killed about 130 Jews'. See Snyder, 'The life and death of West Volhyinian Jewry, 1921–1945', in Brandon and Lower (eds), *The Shoah in Ukraine*, p 91.

37 Estimate based upon A.I. Kruglov, *Entsiklopediia Kholokosta* (Kiev: Evreiskii sovet Ukrainy, 2000), p 30, p 146. Snyder, 'The life and death', p 92.

38 Hans Safrian, 'Komplizen des Genozids: Zum Anteil der Heeresgruppe Süd an der Verfolgung und Ermordung der Juden in der Ukraine 1941', in Walter Manoschek (ed.), *Die Wehrmacht im Rassenkrieg: Die Vernichtung hinter der Front* (Vienna: Picus Verlag, 1996), p 102.

39 Ereignismeldung UdSSR Nr. 24, July 16, 1941. Nr. 43, August 5, 1941, in Mallmann, Angrick and Matthäus (eds), *Die 'Ereignismeldung UdSSR' 1941*.

40 The occurrence of pogroms in 1918 and their locations have not been compared systematically with the pogroms in 1941. However several significant connections have been explored in Mark Levene, 'Frontiers of genocide: Jews in the eastern war zones, 1914 to 1920 and 1941', in Panikos Panayi (ed.), *Minorities in Wartime* (Oxford: Berg, 1993), pp 83–117. On the 1918 pogrom in L'viv, see Hagen, 'The moral economy of ethnic violence'. Also see Sarunas Liekis, Lidia Miliakova and Antony Polonsky, 'Three documents on anti-Jewish violence in the Eastern Kresy during the Polish–Soviet conflict', *Polin: Studies in Polish Jewry*, Vol 14, 2001, pp 116–149.

41 Snyder, 'The life and death', p 92.

42 Berkhoff, *Harvest of Despair*, p 64.

43 The Bulba-Borovest faction looked to the legacy of the nationalist movement in eastern Ukraine, specifically the Ukrainian People's Republic formed in November 1917 and defeated by the Bolsheviks. See the paper by Jared McBride, 'Eyewitness to an occupation: the Holocaust in Olevs'k, Zhytomyr Ukraine', presented at the conference 'The Holocaust in Ukraine: New Resources and Perspectives', Paris, 1–2 October 2007.

44 Bruder, *'Den ukrainischen Staat erkämpfen oder sterben!'*, pp 146–148. Bruder cites file 3833, the OUN administration in western Ukraine, found in the Central State Archive in Lviv (CDAVOU). The antisemitic leaflets and summary reports in these files correspond with the OUN-B district level reports in the Zhytomyr State Archive, p 1151c-1-2.

45 Wendy Lower, *Nazi Empire-Building and the Holocaust in Ukraine* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2005), p 91.

46 G. Kovalchuk Interrogation, Sipo-SD files, April 1942, Zhytomyr State Archives, Ukraine P1151-16. The local leader, Anton Achtanin called for the revenge acts against the Jews because he claimed that the Jews had killed his father in the 1930s. Achtanin was arrested by the German Sipo-SD in December 1941. His fate, and that of Kovalchuk, are not recorded in the German file.

47 Author's translation from German; original Ukrainian translated by Bruder, '*Den ukrainischen Staat erkämpfen oder sterben!*', p 150.

48 Pohl, 'Anti-Jewish pogroms in Western Ukraine', p 309.

49 Lower, *Nazi Empire-Building*, p 76.

50 Bundesarchiv Ludwigsburg, War Crimes Investigation and Trial of Kiev Sipo-SD Office, statement of Erich Ehrlinger. See Alexander Prusin, 'A community of violence: the Sipo/SD and its role in the Nazi terror system in Generalbezirk Kiew,' *Holocaust and Genocide Studies*, Vol 21, No 1, 2007, pp 1–30.

51 In the Kieper and Kogan hanging of 9 August 1941, in Zhytomyr, the placards stated that the two 'Jewish Cheka' men were responsible for the murders of *Volksdeutsche* and Ukrainians. A retaliatory mass shooting of 400 Jewish men, including boys and elderly people, followed the public hanging. See Lower, *Nazi Empire-Building*, pp 79–80; Doris Bergen, 'The Nazi concept of "Volksdeutsche" and the exacerbation of anti-Semitism in Eastern Europe, 1939–1945', *Journal of Contemporary History*, Vol 29, No 4, 1994, pp 569–582.

52 See Snyder on the erroneous conflation of Jews with communists, and German exploitation of the prison murders in *Bloodlands*, pp 193–197.

53 Berkhoff, *Harvest of Despair*, pp 60, 73–75.

54 Interview with Ukrainian eyewitness Mykola Stepanchik in Narodichi, conducted by Wendy Lower, Boris Kogan and Felix Starovoitov, 29 September 2009. Interviews with Ivan Fuglevych, conducted by Wendy Lower and Vladimir Melamad on 24 July 2005, and conducted by Wendy Lower and Vadim Altskan on 8 October 2010. Also see Ukrainian eyewitness testimonies (DVD) in the Mémorial de la Shoah exhibit catalog, *The Mass Shooting of Jews in Ukraine: The Holocaust by Bullets* (Paris: Groupe Morault, 2007), and Patrick Desbois and Edouard Husson, 'Neue Ergebnisse zur Geschichte des Holocausts in der Ukraine. Das 'Oral History'-Projekt von Yahad-In Unum und seine wissenschaftliche Bewertung', in Johannes Hürter and Jürgen Zarusky (eds), *Besatzung, Kollaboration, Holocaust: Neue Studien zur Verfolgung und Ermordung der europäischen Juden* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2008), pp 177–187.

55 Melamed, 'Organized and unsolicited collaboration in the Holocaust', p 222. The OUN-B reports were captured by the German Sipo-SD, and are available in the wartime German records held at the Zhytomyr State Archives, P1151c-1-2. The testimony of a Slovakian photographer (stationed near Miropol) and his photos prove that in the massacre of Jewish women and children of 13 October 1941, Ukrainian militia, along with German Order Police (probably Orpo Battalion 303), shot the victims at close range. The Security Service Archive in Prague, H-770-3.0020; thanks to Peter Rendek for sharing the testimony and photographs.

56 On the Heydrich order, see Ereignismeldung UdSSR Nr. 10, Der Chef der Sicherheitspolizei und des SD, Berlin, den 2. Juli 1941, NARA, RG 242, roll 233. Rosenberg advised in the 'Braune Mappe' that 'acts of the local civilian population against the Jews are not to be hindered as long as they are consistent with the imperative of maintaining peace and order in the rear military areas. Acts of street thugs and dark elements who plunder Jewish stores and steal Jewish property to enrich themselves are to be strictly opposed.' See 'Richtlinien für die Behandlung der Judenfrage', Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Rossiiskoi Federatsii (GARF), 7021-148-183, Braune Mappe: Die Zivilverwaltung in den besetzten Ostgebieten. Teil II: Reichskommissariat Ukraine, 1941, p 35.

57 Berkhoff and Carynnyk, 'The Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and its attitudes towards Germans and Jews,' pp 149–184, quotation cited in Lower, *Nazi Empire-Building*, p 95.

58 On the mass murder of Jews and Roma in Transnistria as part of overlapping Romanian and Nazi imperial projects, see Eric Steinhart, 'Creating killers: the Nazification of the Black Sea Germans and the Holocaust in Southern Ukraine, 1941–1944', PhD dissertation, University of North Carolina, 2010.

59 The figures for Jews who perished in Odessa and its environs vary, mainly owing to a mix of Soviet, Romanian and German sources. According to the 1939 Soviet census there were 200,961 Jews in the city of Odessa. Units of the 2nd and 10th Romanian Infantry Divisions occupied the city, authorized and carried out the systematic killing, starting with the public hangings of 'Jews and communists'. On 23 October, some 5,000 Jews were killed in pogrom and state-led violence in Odessa's streets and squares. Then 19,000 Jews were shot and their bodies covered in gasoline and set afire in the port's square. Another 5,000 were driven to barracks at the city's outskirts and killed. According to Kruglov, while 31,000 were killed in the city, another 25,000 Jews were massacred in the outlying region after gathering for registration in Dalnik. On these events and the Antonescu explusion order, see Alexandr Kruglov, *The Losses Suffered by Ukrainian Jews in 1941–1944* (Kharkov: Tarbut Laam, 2005), p 141, and the *Final Report of the International Historical Commission on the Holocaust in Romania: Romania Facing Its Past*, United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, available at: http://www.ushmm.org/research/center/presentations/features/details/2005-03-10/. The figure of 85,000 Jewish losses (25,000 in Odessa proper, with another 60,000 deported to killing sites in the environs) is presented in *The Yad Vashem Encyclopedia of the Ghettos during the Holocaust*, Vol II (Jerusalem: Yad Vashem, 2009), p 541.

60 Final Report of the International Historical Commission on the Holocaust in Romania, Chapter 5, p 54, available at: http://www.ushmm.org/research/center/presentations/features/details/2005-03-10/pdf/english/chapter_05.pdf.

61 Solonari finds that massacres of Jews were more common in Bessarabia than in Northern Bukovina, where the *gendarmes* organized their deportation. He does not explain whether the historical backdrops mattered in

pointing out this difference, for example, whether memory of the Kishinev pogrom of 1903 was influential in Bessarabia in 1941. For the Crăciun quote, see Solonari, 'Patterns of Violence: The Local Population and the Mass Murder of Jews in Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina, July–August 1941', *Kritika*, Vol 8, No 4, 2007, p 774, which cites the Archive of the Moldovan Service of Information and Security, file 615, p. 715, USHMM RG-54-003M.

62 Hitler stated this to Joseph Goebbels, who noted it in his diary. Joseph Goebbels, *Die Tagebücher von Joseph Goebbels*, ed. Elke Fröhlich (Munich: K.G. Saur, 1996), Part II: Diktate 1941–1945, Vol 1, p 269.
63 Donald Bloxham, *The Final Solution: A Genocide* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), pp 114–117.
64 Solonari, 'Patterns of Violence', pp 787, 752. Also see the interesting comparison by Mark Levene, 'The Experience of Genocide: Armenia 1915–16 and Romania 1941–42', in Hans-Lukas Kieser (ed.), *Der Völkermord an den Armeniern und die Shoah* (Zurich: Chronos, 2002), pp 423–462.
65 Gross, *Neighbors*, p 89.
66 Bogdan Musial, *'Konterrevolutionäre Elemente sind zu erschiessen.' Die Brutalisierung des deutsch-sowjetischen Krieges im Sommer 1941* (Berlin: Propyläen, 2000).
67 Berkhoff, *Harvest of Despair*, p 72, Snyder, *Bloodlands*, pp 93, 108, 194. Scholar Leonid Rein also established that Jews were not, as a group, beneficiaries of or dominant in the Soviet system; twenty-five per cent of the Jews in the annexed Polish territories were deported, a higher percentage than their proportion in the population of these territories. See Rein, 'Local collaboration in the execution of the "Final Solution" in Nazi-occupied Belorussia', p 386.
68 Snyder, *Bloodlands*, p 196.
69 Norman Naimark, 'The Nazis and the "East": Jedwabne's circle of hell', *Slavic Review*, Vol 3, 2002, p 479.
70 Zbikowski, 'Pogroms in Northeastern Poland'.
71 Redlich, *Together and Apart in Brzezany*, p 102. Dieter Pohl's critique of Musial's work (*Konterrevolutionnaere Element sind zu erschiessen*) is on the web, available at: http://www.fritz-bauer-institut.de/rezensionene/nl20/pohl.htm.
72 Dieter Pohl, *Nationalsozialistische Judenverfolgung in Ostgalizien 1941–1944* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1997), pp 54–59. The quote, from Yaroslav Stets'ko, is cited on p 49. See also Frank Golczewski, 'Shades of grey: reflections on Jewish–Ukrainian and German–Ukrainian relations in Galicia', in Brandon and Lower (eds), *The Shoah in Ukraine*, pp 114–155.
73 [3] Yehuda Bauer, 'Buczacz and Krzemieniec', p 305.
74 Omer Bartov, 'From the Holocaust in Galicia to contemporary genocide: common ground—historical differences', Meyerhoff Lecture, United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, Washington, DC, 17 December 2002.
75 Golczewski, 'Shades of grey', pp 116–117.
76 Golczewski, 'Shades of grey', p 117.
77 Golczewski, 'Shades of grey', p 123.
78 Golczewski, 'Shades of grey', p 128.
79 Golczewksi, 'Shades of grey', p 129.
80 Golczewski, 'Shades of grey', pp 82, 88.
81 Wolodymyr Kosyk, *The Third Reich and Ukraine* (New York: Peter Lang, 1993).
82 Quoted by Golczewski, 'Shades of grey', p 132.
83 For Golczewski's critique of Ukrainian historians and Raul Hilberg's statement from *The Destruction of the European Jews* (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1985), 312, see Golczewski, 'Shades of grey', p 132.
84 Golczewski, 'Shades of grey', p 132.
85 Snyder, *Bloodlands*, p 198, document cited from USHMM, SBU 4/1747/19-20.
86 Ereignismeldung UdSSR no. 15. Chef der Sicherheitspolzei und der SD, 7. Juli 1941, NARA, RG 242, T-175/roll 233.
87 Saulius Sužiedélis, 'Lithuanian collaboration during the Second World War: past realities, present perceptions', in David Gaunt, Paul E. Levine and Laura Palosuo (eds), *Collaboration and Resistance during the Holocaust: Belarus, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania*, (Bern: Peter Lang, 2004), p 158. Snyder makes similar observations in *Bloodlands*, p 196. This is also stressed by historian Alexander Prusin, who explains that: 'For "ordinary" men and women violence became a vehicle to access positions of temporary power and economic resources, a tool to ingratiate themselves with the occupiers, and a way to extinguish fear and rage pent up during the Soviet occupation'. See Prusin, *The Lands Between*, pp 175–176.
88 On the view that Jews welcomed the Red Army, see the review article by Marci Shore, 'Conversing with ghosts: Jedwabne, Zydokomuna, and totalitarianism', *Kritika*, Vol 6, No 2, 2005, pp 345–374, in particular, p 368, and her critique of Jan Gross' works, especially Gross' *Upiorna dekada: Trzy eseje na temat wzajemnych relacji między Żydami, Polakami, Niemcami i komunistami w latach 1939–1948* [The Ghastly Decade:

Three Essays on the Theme of Relations among Jews, Poles, Germans, and Communists in 1939–48]. On the Ukrainian response to German invaders, see Karel Berkhoff, *Harvest of Despair*.

89 Mark Levene and Penny Roberts (eds), 'Introduction', in Levene and Roberts (eds), *The Massacre in History* (New York: Berghahn Books, 1999), pp 10–12. Since this edited collection on massacres appeared, Levene has published two volumes of his own exhaustive study, *Genocide in the Age of the Nation State* (New York: I. B. Tauris, 2005).

90 Arendt wrote, 'Violence is by nature illegitimate, the tool that rulers use when they have lost or never had legitimate power'. As a political force, violence is the opposite of power, which is legitimate. Violence is distinguished by its instrumental character, like all other tools used for the purpose of multiplying natural strength. A movement can exert force without resorting to violence, Arendt argued. 'Violence does not promote causes, neither history nor revolution, neither progress nor reaction, but it can serve to dramatize grievances and bring them to public attention'. Hannah Arendt, *On Violence* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1970), p 79; quoted by Jack Eller, *Violence and Culture: A Cross-Cultural and Interdisciplinary Approach* (Belmont: Wadsworth Publishing, 2005), pp 7–10.

91 Levene, 'Introduction', in *The Massacre in History*, pp 10–12.

92 Roger Peterson, *Understanding Ethnic Violence: Fear, Hatred and Resentment in Twentieth-Century Eastern Europe* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002), p 73.

93 Peterson, *Understanding Ethnic Violence*, pp 74–75.

94 Peterson, *Understanding Ethnic Violence*, p 46.

95 Eller, *Violence and Culture*, p xiii.

96 Eller, *Violence and Culture*, p 16, in part quoting Roy Baumeister. Baumeister found that ordinary people do violent things, because of: (1) a desire for material gain; (2) fear of an imminent threat, acted out as a form of self-preservation; (3) a drive toward an ideal or a utopia, enacted by a lone crusader or by a movement, with the obstacle to the greater good becoming the target of violence; (4) sadism, or bloodlust, which is less common. See Roy Baumeister, *Evil: Inside Human Violence and Cruelty* (New York: W. H. Freeman, 1999), pp 375–378.

97 Robert Gerwath (ed.), *Twisted Paths: Europe 1914–1945* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008).

98 On the intertwined antisemitism, minorities and border policies that developed out of the First World War, see Bloxham, *The Final Solution: A Genocide*, pp 73–74, 84–85, 90–91, 94–100; and the economic impact, pp 100–102.

99 On Soviet-controlled Poland, 1939–1941, see Gross, *Revolution from Abroad*; and Barkan, Cole, and Struve (eds), *Shared History—Divided Memory*. On postwar pogroms, see Amir Weiner, *Making Sense of War: The Second World War and the Fate of the Bolshevik Revolution* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001).

100 Berkhoff, *Harvest of Despair*, 56.

101 Early survivor testimonies from these territories documented pogroms that were not evident in the German records and were inaccessible in Russian archives. See Joshua Rubenstein and Ilya Altman (eds), *The Unknown Black Book: The Holocaust in the German Occupied Soviet Territories* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2007).

102 Gross, *Neighbors*, p 81.

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