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URBAN GROWTH AND ETHNIC CHANGE IN THE UKRAINIAN SSR,
1923–1933

BY GEORGE LIBER

IN the third decade of the twentieth century the Soviet Ukrainian writer and literary critic Borys Antonenko-Davydovych (1899–1974) succinctly expressed the Ukrainian dilemma:

One could live one's entire life in a Ukrainian city and not know Ukrainian. You could ask the conductor in a Kiev tram a question in Ukrainian and he would not understand or would pretend that he did not understand you. A Ukrainian writer, appearing before a provincial audience, might discover that 90% of the audience had never read any of his works or heard anything about him at all. But it should be axiomatic that it is best and most 'natural' to learn Ukrainian in a Ukrainian city, for the most part to hear Ukrainian on Kiev's streets, and for 80% of the readers to borrow Ukrainian books from urban libraries. $2 \times 2 = 4$, right? But this equation has yet to be demonstrated under our conditions in the Ukraine. For us, this is still a theorem.¹

Insofar as the ethnic composition of the cities of Eastern Europe did not necessarily reflect the ethnic composition of the surrounding countryside, Antonenko-Davydovych's frustrations echoed the frustrations of all nationally-conscious East Europeans in the 19th and early 20th centuries. For them, the city was more than just an economic, cultural, military, political and communications centre. Cities—especially such historic capitals as Prague, Budapest, Vilnius, and Riga—were the flagships of their emergent national movements. And because the overwhelming majority of nationally-conscious East Europeans defined their identity in large measure by primary language usage, they believed that the language of their cities would have to reflect the language of the surrounding countryside if their national movements were to triumph.

Apart from the question of language usage, cities were the most visible tip of the iceberg in the social structure of East European societies. Cities were divided along ethnic lines across an urban-rural axis, with Russians, Germans and Jews occupying the more prestigious positions, while the indigenous populations occupied the less prestigious urban and rural positions. In this cultural division of labour, individuals were 'assigned to specific occupations and other social roles on the basis of observable social traits or markers'. This division of labour existed 'regardless of the level of structural differentiation in society'.² This uneven diffusion of industrialisation and urbanisation generated and intensified nationalist aspirations in the Austro-Hungarian, German, Russian and Ottoman empires in Eastern Europe prior to the First World War. The ethnic struggle for more equal distribution of economic resources merged with the political struggle, which was fought primarily in the cities.³

As a result of peasant migration into the cities, as well as the successful political struggle of the East European national movements after 1848, the ethnic composition of the cities gradually came to mirror the ethnic composition of the surrounding countryside. The dissolution of the four empires and the establishment of independent states at the end of the First World War legitimised the political and social control wielded by the one dominant national group (or two in the case of Czechoslovakia) over its multi-ethnic cities. Over the course of time, the countryside—in effect—triumphed over the cities.⁴

By 1920 only Vilnius and the urban centres in Belorussia and the Ukraine defied this modern-day phenomenon. Because the Belorussian and Ukrainian national movements were weak and because of White, Bolshevik, German, Austro-Hungarian, Polish and other interventions, they could not gain control of the cities and lost their struggles to establish independent and indivisible homelands during the Russian Revolution. The victory of the Bolsheviks (who were predominantly urban, proletarian and Russian) over the non-Russians (most of whom were peasants) was most consequential in the Ukraine, a strategically important agricultural and industrial centre and the most populous non-Russian republic of the Soviet Union.

The Ukrainians constituted 80.0% of the population of the Ukrainian provinces and dominated the countryside, while the Russians and Russified Ukrainians and Jews dominated the urban areas. Few Ukrainians migrated to and found employment in the cities. Those who did gradually absorbed the Russian urban ethos and soon came to identify themselves as Russians.

But as the cities and towns grew in the late 1920s as a consequence of the Soviet industrialisation effort, the large number of migrating Ukrainians reversed this process. By 1933, perhaps even by 1931 (not 1939, as Soviet statistics suggest) the majority of the urban population identified themselves as Ukrainians.⁵

The question of *when* the cities stopped being cauldrons of russification is very significant because these changes had serious implications for the political integrity of the Russian-dominated, multi-national Soviet state. The major political institutions (such as the working class, the trade unions, and even the Communist Party of the Ukraine itself) were centred in the cities and they were influenced by the ethnic transformation of the cities. These urban ethnic changes strengthened the implementation of the liberal Soviet nationalities policy (known as *korenizatsiia*) and secured a potential base of support for Ukrainian national communism, which sought to establish its legitimacy in the Ukrainian republic. At the same time, these changes challenged the All-Union Communist Party's goals and called into question the party's search for legitimacy among the non-Russians. We cannot completely understand Robert Conquest's and James Mace's arguments concerning Ukrainian national communism, the purges in the Ukraine, and the famine of 1932–33 without investigating the ethnic changes in the Ukrainian cities in the 1920s and early 1930s.⁶

Urban growth, 1920–1934

The Soviet Union began its transformation from a predominantly rural to a predominantly urban society after the social and economic disruptions caused by

the revolution and the Civil War subsided. By 1923, the urban centres in the USSR had recovered the majority of their 'lost' population and began to grow again. The Soviet urban population more than doubled between the first and second officially-approved censuses of 1926 and 1939. It increased from 26.3 million to 55.9 million, representing a jump from 17.9% to 32.8% of the total Soviet population. According to Eugene Kulischer, the overall increase during this 12-year period was 29.6 million. He attributed 5.3 million of this to natural increase and estimated the initial population of communities reclassified as urban at 1.3 million. The residual urban increase, caused by in-migration from the countryside, thus amounted to 23 million. In 1939 two-fifths of the urban population were peasants who had come to the cities within the preceding 12 years.⁷

In the Ukrainian SSR between 1920 and 1933 the urban population nearly doubled—from 3,916,300 to 7,158,700⁸ (see Table 1). Although the rate of natural increase of the rural population was much higher than that of the urban population, the rural share of the total population dropped. This meant that more peasants were leaving the countryside.

The various Ukrainian economic regions, all of which experienced urban growth at different rates. Thus, according to published statistical handbooks, from 1924 to 1 January 1929 the population of the Ukrainian urban centres grew by 29.2%. Yet, within this total, the three industrial regions had the highest percentage of urban increase: the Steppe (31.9%), the Dniepr Industrial Region (46.7%), and the Donbass (74.3%), while the three primarily agricultural regions had the lowest percentage of urban increases: Polissia (12.0%), the Right Bank (19.2%), and the Left Bank (14.6%).⁹ The highest degree of urbanisation occurred in regions with highly developed industrial centres—especially in Kharkov, Kiev, Odessa, Dnepropetrovsk, Nikolaev, Maryupol, and in the Donbass.

TABLE 1
GROWTH OF THE URBAN POPULATION, 1920–1933

Date*	Urban	Percentage		Total
		Urban	Rural	
1920	3,916,300	15.4	84.6	25,386,000
1923	4,206,100	15.9	84.1	26,450,600
1924	4,608,181	16.9	83.1	27,353,230
1925	4,904,133	17.5	82.5	28,018,328
1926	5,191,076	18.1	81.9	28,692,566
1927	5,487,334	18.7	81.3	29,368,055
1928	5,817,479	19.4	80.6	30,017,862
1929	5,953,467	19.6	80.4	30,363,547
1931	6,098,900	—	—	—
1933	7,158,700	22.4	77.6	31,901,400

* Usually Soviet demographers calculated the population on 1 January of each year. The exceptions are: 1923 (1 March), 1931 (15 March), 1920, 1933 (dates are not provided).

Sources: *Estestvennoe dvizhenie naseleniya Ukrainy v 1926 g.* (Kharkov, 1929), p. 2; *Estestvennoe dvizhenie naseleniya Ukrainy v 1927 g.* (Kharkov, 1929), p. 2; *Estestvennoe dvizhenie naseleniya Ukrainy v 1928 g.* (Kharkov, 1930), p. 2; *Suchasna statystyka naseleण्या Ukrainy* (Kharkov, 1929), p. 2; O. M. Asatkin, ed., *USSR v tsyfrakh: Statystychnyi dovidnyk* (Kiev, 1936), p. 388 (Table 1).

From 1920 to 1934 the number of cities with more than 100,000 inhabitants grew. They also became more important, as their share of the entire urban population increased. In 1926 there were six such cities: Kiev, Odessa, Kharkov, Dnepropetrovsk, Stalino and Nikolaev. They constituted 33.5% of the entire urban population of the Ukraine. By January 1934 there were 11 key cities with a population of over 100,000, comprising approximately 40.8% of the total urban population (see Table 2).

Following the pattern set in the late 19th century, the urban centres of the Donbass, the Dniepr Industrial Region, and the Steppe, regions outside the historic Ukrainian ethnic core area, grew at a faster pace than did cities in Polissia, the Right Bank, and the Left Bank, the regions which comprised the ethnic core. But with the increasingly rapid pace of industrialisation, collectivisation, and the migration of peasants, the cities—breaking with the previous pattern—contained more residents who identified themselves as Ukrainians.

Ethnic changes, 1920–1926

Owing to its geographical location and to historical circumstances, the Ukraine, a borderland, traditionally attracted a large number of people of non-Ukrainian origin who settled for the most part in larger towns and trading centres. Gradually they dominated the cities, the economy, and the political order, leaving the countryside to the Ukrainians.

Soil exhaustion and ever-decreasing plot size,¹⁰ the alien nature of the cities, the educational backwardness of the peasants, and the lack of employment opportunities forced the Ukrainian peasant to leave his village. But instead of seeking non-

TABLE 2
GROWTH OF THE LARGEST CITIES, 1920–1934

City	<i>Temporary and Permanent Residents</i>			<i>Permanent Residents</i>		
	1920	1923	1926	1926	1931	1934
Kiev	366,396	423,000	513,637	482,781	539,482	560,000
Kharkov	285,213	307,800	417,342	398,683	535,822	635,395
Odessa	427,831	314,800	420,862	405,795	475,446	487,753
Dnepropetrovsk	189,900	150,300	232,925	224,538	322,785	359,747
Stalino	38,100	32,100	105,857	104,260	194,273	288,407
Nikolaev	108,820	82,300	104,909	99,734	122,729	140,067
Zaporozhe	25,000	43,766	55,744	54,451	162,958	199,940
Kamianske	n/a	16,908	34,150	33,658	89,107	124,466
Makeevka	n/a	11,700	51,471	51,319	81,024	104,583
Voroshilovgrad	57,000	44,220	71,765	69,429	96,821	123,475
Maryupol	55,200	44,718	63,920	62,294	105,921	164,987

Source: O. M. Asatkin, ed., *USSR v tsyfrakh. Statystychnyi dovidnyk* (Kiev, 1936), pp. 389–90; *Mis'ki selyshcha URSR. Zbirnyk stat.-ekonomichnykh vidomosti* (Kharkov, 1929), pp. 4–8; *Sotsialistychna Ukraina: Statystychnyi dovidnyk* (Kiev, 1937), p. 104.

agricultural employment in nearby urban centres, he was most likely to migrate to Siberia or to the Far East in search of land. This migration to Asiatic Russia began in the late 1880s, and between 1896 and 1916 at least 1,600,000 individuals—12.8% of the Ukrainian population—had migrated to those distant areas.¹¹

This pre-war pattern changed in the early 1920s, when both the number and percentage of Ukrainians in the republic's cities grew—from 32.2% in 1920 to 47.2% in 1926.¹² The percentage of urbanised Ukrainians in 1926 varied inversely with the size of the town or city, reaching 69.4% of the population of towns under 20,000 but only 33.0% in cities over 100,000. Given the social factors at work, this pattern should not be unexpected.

This ethnic pyramid subsequently became more elastic. It began to expand in the 1920s and early 1930s as the number of Ukrainian migrants came to outnumber other migrants. The most dramatic increase in the percentage of Ukrainians took place in the Donbass, the Steppe, and in the Dniepr Industrial Region, where the percentage of Ukrainian growth far surpassed that of the overall population.¹³ Such dramatic increases in the numbers of Ukrainians among urban dwellers unquestionably contributed to the Ukrainianisation of the cities.

Generally, as the towns grew, so did the percentage of those who identified themselves as Ukrainians. When the towns suffered depopulation in the wake of the downturn in the economy after 1917, Ukrainians left in far greater numbers than did other ethnic groups, thus causing a decrease in the percentage of the Ukrainian population—especially in the Donbass.

Figures regarding Russian inhabitants of Ukrainian cities, as a rule, show the exact opposite; during the downturn in the economy Russians left in lesser numbers than did other ethnic groups. This difference suggests that the Ukrainians, who probably came from neighbouring areas, had a stronger tie to the land than did the Russians, who were most likely to come from distant areas. With the economic downturn, the Ukrainians returned to their families and friends in the countryside, their point of origin, which was closer for them than for the Russian workers.

TABLE 3

URBAN AND RURAL POPULATION OF THE UKRAINIAN SSR BY NATIONALITY, 17 DECEMBER 1926

Nationality	Total	Percent- age of		Percent- age of		
		Total	Urban	Urban	Rural	
Ukrainians	23,218,860	80.0	2,536,499	47.2	20,682,361	87.5
Russians	2,677,166	9.2	1,343,689	25.0	1,333,477	5.6
Jews	1,574,391	5.4	1,218,615	22.7	355,766	1.5
Poles	476,435	1.6	98,747	1.8	377,688	1.5
Germans	393,924	1.4	34,253	0.6	359,671	1.5
Others	678,971	2.4	141,730	2.7	537,231	2.4
All Groups	29,019,747	100.0	5,373,533	100.0	23,646,194	100.0

Source: *Ukraina: Statystychnyi shchorichnyk 1929* (Kharkov, 1929), p. 22.

The 1926 census (see Table 3) showed that 80% of the people in the Ukrainian republic identified themselves as Ukrainians, 9% as Russians, and 5% as Jews.¹⁴ Only 11.0% of the total Ukrainian population lived in the cities. With the exception of the Germans, the Ukrainians displayed the lowest level of urbanisation of the five most populous nationalities of the Ukraine, ranking far behind the Jews (77.4% urbanised), the Russians (50.0%) and the Poles (20.7%).

According to the census of 1926, Ukrainians comprised a majority in each of the regions of the republic, ranging from 60.0% in the Donbass to 87.8% of the entire population in the Left Bank. The regions with the highest percentage of Ukrainians were—not surprisingly—the agricultural ones, the Left Bank and the Right Bank. The regions with the lowest Ukrainian percentage were the newly industrialised ones: the Steppe and the Donbass. Ukrainians still constituted the overwhelming majority in the countryside, but even here their majority fluctuated—from 73.8% of the rural population of the Steppe to 93.2% of the rural population of the Right Bank. While Ukrainians constituted a plurality of the overall urban population, they held the undisputed majority of the population in the countryside. Ukrainians constituted a majority of the urban populations in the agricultural regions, Polissia and the Left Bank, and a plurality in the Right Bank and the Dniepr Industrial Region. They remained only a minority, however, in the Steppe and in the Donbass.

After 1920 the cities of over 100,000 began to grow again, recouping their population losses following the post-revolutionary economic downturn. By 1926 Ukrainians constituted a plurality of the population in Kiev (42.1%), Kharkov (38.4%) and Dnepropetrovsk (36.0%), while Russians constituted a majority in Stalino (56.2%) and a plurality in Odessa (38.7%) and Nikolaev (44.5%). As these figures indicate, the Ukrainian stronghold was Kiev, the centre of the Right Bank and the Ukrainian ethnic core.¹⁵

Urban ethnic change after 1926

As the cities and towns grew in the years following 1926, so did the number of Ukrainians in them. Because the Soviet and the Soviet Ukrainian governments did not publish any substantial statistical data on these changes after 1926, we cannot point to any direct evidence concerning the Ukrainian majority in the cities. Instead, we can only assume that the large-scale migration into the towns and cities and the severe labour shortages throughout the USSR in late 1930 (which drastically reduced the inflow of migrants from the RSFSR and other republics into the Ukraine) produced more urban Ukrainians.

The Ukrainian peasantry began to steam into the cities as a result of the increasing attractiveness of city life. The cities were attractive thanks to better pay as well as the Soviet government's increased investment in urban industrial centres. The government attacked their traditional way of life by dekulakisation and forced collectivisation, which was punctuated by the subsequent famine of 1932–33. One migrant described the differences between a worker's and a peasant's life in the late 1920s and why the latter would choose the urban life:

The worker received wages, i.e. something permanent and steady, even if they were low. But the collective farmers worked the same (amount of hours) or even longer hours and did not receive any steady income. During the first years of industrialisation the workers were better off. They received potatoes and bread and other food in larger quantities. This was done especially so as to draw more people into industry.¹⁶

The most likely candidates for migration were those who were poor, possessing no land or at best small plots (with no draft animals), those between the ages of 20 and 59, and those accused of being 'kulaks'. They were persuaded that their socio-economic future did not lie in the countryside, but in the expanding urban industrial centres.

On the eve of the industrialisation period, approximately half the population of the Ukraine was of working age, and of these a significant number were moved by their poverty to opt for city life.¹⁷ Thus, land hunger, the lack of draft animals, the abundant labour-supply in the countryside, and finally, forced collectivisation shifted the previous migration patterns. These factors contributed to the increase in the number of people in the urban labour force, especially in the period between 1928 and 1932. Now, as a result of the pull of the cities and the push of the countryside, more Ukrainian peasants entered the Ukrainian, but previously Russified, cities.

Migrants moved into the industrial centres, but not all of them permanently. In fact, only where a high level of industrial development already existed in the countryside did the migrants tend to move into the industrial centres. For example, only 3.3% of the migrants from the industrially-underdeveloped Volyn guberniya found work in industry in the mid-1920s, while 39% of the migrants from the kharkov guberniya and 95.6% of the Donbass migrants found employment in industry.¹⁸ As these figures suggest, not all of the rural migrants lacked experience of industrial work. At first, a significant number of those coming to the cities were actually returning: they were workers who had left the cities in the early 1920s owing to unemployment and shortages in the urban centres. However, as the number of migrants grew, those who had no urban industrial experience began to dominate the rural-to-urban migration.¹⁹

While it cannot be definitely proved that Ukrainians comprised the majority of the migrants and therefore dominated the migratory process, Ukrainian migrants must have played a significant role. This is because the vast majority of the inhabitants of the republic lived in the countryside (see Table 3), where the Ukrainians constituted 87.5% of the rural population.²⁰ By 1933, perhaps even by 1931, Ukrainians constituted over half of the urban population of the Ukrainian republic, especially in some of the major cities (as shown in Table 4).

These figures suggest that the immigration from the RSFSR and other Soviet republics slowed. Therefore, the dramatic rate of urbanisation which occurred in the Ukraine after 1926 must have occurred at the expense of the latter republic's countryside, which was overwhelmingly Ukrainian.

Before 1926 non-Ukrainians were more prone to migrate to the larger towns and cities than were Ukrainians. This pattern, however, was overturned when the immense mass of Ukrainian peasants was forced, by circumstance, out of their native rural areas. As early as 1931, based on calculations in Appendix 1, we may

TABLE 4

CHANGES IN THE NUMBER AND PERCENTAGE OF UKRAINIANS IN FIVE IMPORTANT INDUSTRIAL CENTRES, 1923–1933

City	1923		1926		1933	
	Number	Percentage	Number	Percentage	Number	Percentage
Kharkov	122,000	37.9	160,000	38.9	330,000	50.0
Stalino	2,200	7.0	27,500	26.0	86,000	31.0
Lugansk	9,500	21.0	31,200	43.0	71,000	60.0
Zaporozhe	12,000	28.0	26,500	47.0	60,000	56.0
Dnepropetrovsk	24,500	16.0	83,000	36.0	185,000	48.0

Source: S. V. Kossior, 'Itogi i blizhaishie zadachi provedeniya natsional'noi politiki na Ukraine', *Pravda*, 2 December 1933, pp. 3–4, and 'Radyans'ka Ukraina—mohutnii forpost bazy svitovoi proletars'koi revolyutsii—SRSR', *Bil'shovyk Ukrainy*, 1933 No. 13–14, p. 4.

assume with good reason that Ukrainians constituted a majority in all urban centres taken together, although not necessarily in each separately. Why?

First of all, the Ukrainians constituted an overwhelming majority in the population of the countryside. It seems reasonable to assume that this trend toward increased Ukrainian migration to urban areas must have intensified after 1926, as the cities became more heavily industrialised and therefore required a larger labour force. Second, in the autumn of 1930, with the end of unemployment in the USSR and the emergence of severe labour shortages all over the country, the number of migrants to the Ukraine from the other Soviet republics must have decreased. Thus, it is not only very plausible, but almost inevitable that Ukrainians constituted a majority of the overall urban population by 1931 (even though each individual city varied).

Sifting further through the available evidence, one finds circumstantial evidence suggesting that by the beginning of the 1930s Ukrainians had become a majority in the cities of the Ukraine: — (1) After the publication of detailed analyses of the 1926 census figures for the Ukraine, no later statistical data on ethnic breakdowns in the Ukrainian SSR were made available.²¹ The excellent periodical series, *Statystyka Ukrainy*, which produced over 200 volumes in eight years, was not published (nor was it replaced by any other publication) after 1930. The Central Statistical Administration of the Ukraine undertook an urban census in 1931, but when the results were published two years later, they contained no information on the national composition of the republic. There were similar omissions on nationality by *Suchasna statystyka naseleennya Ukrainy*, which attempted to survey the population changes in the Ukraine between 1924 and 1 January 1929. In *Natsional'nyi sklad U.S.R.R.* Khomenko thoroughly analysed the ethnic situation in the Ukraine up to 17 December 1926, but he did not publish any later figures relating to nationality.

Why is there such a lacuna in the statistics on ethnicity available for the period after 1926? Possibly because publication of such data would not have served the purposes of the party. The party leadership, both in Kharkov and Moscow, must have noticed the changes in the ethnic composition of Ukrainian urban areas

resulting from the rapid growth of the cities. This transformation was destabilising to the traditional Russian dominance of the cities. Publication of these statistics would therefore have confirmed and legitimised these ethnic changes.

Armed with such an officially-sponsored legitimacy, the supporters of the liberal Soviet nationalities policy (*korenizatsiya*, also known as Ukrainianisation in the Ukraine) would have been in a position to ask embarrassing questions regarding the actual implementation of the Ukrainianisation policy. Thus, the lack of extensive data after 1926 seems most likely to have been the result of the party's calculated suppression of such information. They attempted to keep the pro-*korenizatsiya* faction from pressing for even greater Ukrainianisation of the party, the bureaucracy, and the trade unions and from threatening Russian political hegemony in the cities. — (2) An indirect method of determining ethnic change in the Ukraine in the late 1920s and early 1930s is to analyse the increase in the number and circulation of Ukrainian-language newspapers. It is a simple barometer of change, because it provides an approximate measurement of all those who could read Ukrainian, who nearly unanimously identified themselves as Ukrainians. Since the number of non-Ukrainians literate in Ukrainian was small, an analysis of Ukrainian language newspapers, especially in the cities, provides us with a hazy outline of the radical increase of Ukrainians in the cities in the 1920s. But in evaluating these data we must bear in mind that an analysis of the increase in Ukrainian-language newspaper circulation measures, for the most part, literate Ukrainians, not illiterate ones.²² The latter, however, must have constituted the overwhelming majority of the migrants to the cities from the Ukrainian countryside.

At the beginning of the twentieth century the potential market for these newspapers was small. More than half of the population of the Ukraine was illiterate. There were several reasons for this problem: the low level of education in the Russian empire, the absence of compulsory general education, the small urban Ukrainian population, the tsarist restrictions against the use of the Ukrainian language until 1905, the First World War and the revolutionary upheaval. On 17 December 1926 approximately 39.6% of the population of the USSR²³ and 40.7% of the population of the RSFSR were literate.²⁴ In the Ukraine, 44.9% of the population was literate.²⁵ The literacy rate of those who identified themselves as Ukrainians was lower than that of the other major ethnic groups residing in the Ukrainian SSR (See Table 5).

Of the 9,628,040 literate Ukrainians, 8,109,057 lived in the countryside and 1,518,983 in the urban centres. Of the rural group, 5,605,658 (69.1%) were literate in Ukrainian. Of the urban dwellers, 863,141 (56.8%) were literate in Ukrainian.²⁶ Thus, a significant number of Ukrainians were literate in a language or languages other than Ukrainian, usually Russian.

Taking into account the problem of analysing bilingualism (or trilingualism) and the linguistic assimilation of millions of individuals, what was the maximum potential market for newspaper readership in the Russian and Ukrainian languages? Of the three largest nationalities of the Ukrainian SSR (constituting 94.6% of the population), 6,468,799 Ukrainians were literate in Ukrainian and 4,719,898 in Russian, 1,419,444 Russians were literate in Russian and 213,215 in Ukrainian, while 935,784 Jews were literate in Russian and 241,151 in Ukrainian.

TABLE 5
LITERACY AND NATIVE LANGUAGE LITERACY IN THE UKRAINIAN SSR, 1926

	Total Population	Literate Population	Native Language* Literates	Percentage of Native Language Literates among All Literates
Ukrainians	23,218,860	9,628,040	6,468,799	67.2
Russians	2,677,166	1,486,452	1,419,444	95.5
Jews (Yiddish)	1,574,391	1,102,227	668,985	60.7
Poles	476,435	228,798	141,954	62.0
Germans	393,924	260,901	245,885	94.2

*Note: Native language is defined as the language 'which the respondent has the best command of or which he usually speaks'. N. Ya. Vorob'ev, *Vsesoyuznaya perepis' naseleniya 1926 g.* (2nd ed., Moscow, 1957), p. 90.

Source: *Vsesoyuznaya perepis' naseleniya 1926 goda, Vol. 11: Ukrainskaya Sotsialisticheskaya Sovetskaya Respublika*, table 6 (Moscow, 1929), pp. 8–9.

Thus, over 7,075,126 individuals of all nationalities were literate in Russian and over 6,923,165 in Ukrainian.²⁷ More could read Russian than Ukrainian, even though there were more Ukrainians than Russians. Most importantly, however, only about one-third of the total literate urban population was literate in Ukrainian, while 78.0% was literate in Russian.

Beginning in 1925, both the number and the circulation (*tirazh*) of Ukrainian-language newspapers radically increased (see Table 6) until they reached their peak circulation in 1932. Of course, the creation of new newspapers and the increase in newspapers' circulation was government-controlled and did not necessarily reflect the reality of market needs. It is also most likely that many people read each newspaper issue, signifying that the readership of the new Ukrainian-language newspapers was far greater than the circulation statistics given above. The readership of these newspapers also must have included Russians who wanted to know about local news and sports, information provided by the Ukrainian-language press.²⁸ Although the increase in the number of Ukrainian-language newspapers was not necessarily due to the migration of Ukrainians to the cities, why else would the party and the Soviet government spend scarce funds to increase circulation of these newspaper in the Russified cities of the Ukraine?

Because the communist party planned to mobilise the new urbanites in their native language, we are safe in assuming that a significant increase in these publications reflects rather accurately a rise in the literate Ukrainian population. And it was indeed striking. For example, *Kommunist*, the official party newspaper, began to publish in Ukrainian in June 1926 and increased its circulation from 35,000 to 330,000 by June 1931.²⁹

It is certainly no coincidence that after the influx of large numbers of Ukrainian peasants in the 1920s, Ukrainian newspapers spread to cities which had previously had an under-developed or non-existent press. In 1929 and 1930 the major

TABLE 6
NEWSPAPERS BY LANGUAGE AND ANNUAL CIRCULATION, 1918–1933

Year	Ukrainian Language		(in 000) Russian Language		Other Languages	
	Number	Circulation	Number	Circulation	Number	Circulation
1918	60	n/a	227	n/a	24	n/a
1919	127	n/a	228	n/a	33	n/a
1920	87	2,832	266	34,169	7	889
1921	45	11,223	95	28,866	6	n/a
1922	30	9,741	102	55,367	7	n/a
1923	28	14,373	86	100,440	1	14
1924	36	21,195	95	96,938	26	342
1926	81	53,387	84	121,392	22	3,530
1927	94	72,745	90	119,953	21	5,501
1928	117	111,098	105	123,096	23	5,836
1929	298	208,080	124	113,935	15	10,918
1930	552	349,290	75	85,080	27	21,036
1931	980	464,642	80	37,448	37	20,829
1932	1,278	950,295	169	48,948	82	37,921
1933	1,721	661,495	293	46,091	108	27,867

Source: *Presa Ukrains'koi RSR 1918–1973: Naukovo-statystychnyi dovidnyk* (Kharkov, 1974), pp. 176–7; *Presa Ukrains'koi RSR 1918–1975: Naukovo-statystychnyi dovidnyk* (Kharkov, 1976), pp. 174–5; and *Presa Ukrains'koi RSR, 1917–1966: Statystychnyi dovidnyk* (Kharkov, 1967), p. 113.

newspapers in Kharkov, Odessa, Dnepropetrovsk, Nikolaev, Zaporozhe, and in the Russified factory towns of the Donets Basin, shifted their language of publication from Russian to Ukrainian.³⁰ The major exception to this trend was Stalino, although a Ukrainian-language Komsomol newspaper appeared there.³¹ This was significant in that this newspaper was the Soviet government's first attempt to reach the young Ukrainians who had recently migrated to this area, which was located outside the Ukrainian ethnic core.

While almost all the newspapers in some cities appeared exclusively in the Ukrainian language, central Russian-language newspapers, such as *Pravda* and *Izvestiya*, were always available. In 1925, for example, '150,000 [daily] copies of the former and 200,000 copies of the latter were circulating in the Ukraine'.³² It was not until 1929 that the combined circulation of all Ukrainian-language newspapers outnumbered the combined circulation of both Russian-language newspapers published in the Ukraine and those imported from the RSFSR.

Thus, the calculations in Appendix 1, the disappearance of detailed statistics on the ethnic breakdown of population movements in the Ukraine after 1926, and the increase in the number and circulation of Ukrainian-language newspapers, especially in the cities, demonstrate that something was happening *in* the cities. At first glance these trends seem contradictory. But after we probe beneath the surface they provide fragmentary evidence that the Ukrainians became the majority of the urban population in their own republic by the early 1930s.

Assimilation

A Ukrainian plurality or majority of the urban population did not necessarily mean that Antonenko-Davydovych's equation '2 x 2 = 4' was a proven theorem in the Ukraine. The language and culture of the cities did not always mirror the self-identification of their inhabitants.

Although ethnic Ukrainians constituted 47.2% of the total urban population in 1926, the dominant culture of the cities was Russian. While the Russians constituted only 25.0% of the overall urban population of the republic, they dominated the governmental apparatus, the party, and the non-agricultural occupations, most notably the urban labour force. In addition, significant numbers of Ukrainians and Jews assimilated to the Russian culture.

How many non-Russians were assimilated? We may determine the perimeters of linguistic assimilation by comparing two categories in the 1926 census, nationality (*narodnost'*) and native language (*rodnoi yazyk*). The first category was defined 'in terms of both ethnic descent and subjective allegiance; apparently, it was left to the census taker and the respondent to settle between themselves which connotation should take precedence over the other'.³³ The second category was 'determined by the census taker'.³⁴ *Rodnoi yazyk* designated the language the interviewee knew best.³⁵ The difference between the first category and the second may be assumed to be the linguistically assimilated population, which does not necessarily coincide with ethnic re-identification.

Changes in ethnic identity occur when individuals from ethnic groups with a lower socio-economic status identify themselves with the dominant or the more advanced ethnic groups.³⁶ Changes of language and ethnic identity do not take place at an abstract collective level, but as the result of individuals making more or less conscious decisions dictated by their perceptions of their own self-interest.

Seldom do people learn a language as a consequence of a deliberate decision to assimilate. Assimilation is merely the long-range outcome of a long series of minute day-to-day decisions to do certain things and shun others. There is no overall mechanistic tendency to assimilate or not to assimilate.³⁷

In addition to ethnic change, ethnic compromise—the development of stable bilingualism or biculturalism—may also occur. And although ethnic compromise requires 'some effort and entails some strains, it can be a viable option too'.³⁸ Most people, however, 'literally "commute" between ethnies, presenting an assimilated front in one situation, but being "traditional" in another'.³⁹

Because ethnic identity is based upon an individual's psychological bonds with a group and because it is difficult, if not impossible, to measure and evaluate these parameters, we should not identify only those whose native language is Ukrainian as Ukrainians. While native language is an important component of national identification, it is not the *only* component. In evaluating ethnic changes, ethnic self-identification is the most objective criterion.

Although ethnic self-identification is the most important criterion, especially when such an ethnic choice was politically dangerous in the past, one's native language is also an important factor in determining the prestige of a given

nationality. The overwhelming majority of the inhabitants of the Ukrainian SSR who responded to the native language question in the census had retained the native language of their nationality. Thus, only 7.4% of the total population of the Ukrainian SSR had abandoned their native language in 1926: 4.3% of the rural population, but 20.9% of the urban population.

Among those who had changed their native language, the Russian language was clearly felt to be more prestigious than the Ukrainian language. By far the greatest number of people chose to assimilate linguistically to Russian instead of to Ukrainian (see Table 7), both in the cities and in the countryside. Those who assimilated to the Russian language constitute 84.2% of all who changed their language. The Ukrainian language assimilated only 14.6%, mostly in the countryside.

Of those in the countryside who did abandon their native languages nearly three-quarters chose to assimilate to Russian rather than to Ukrainian. Of the five largest nationalities in the Ukraine, only the Poles assimilated to Ukrainian in any significant numbers. In the cities, however, the Poles still preferred to speak Russian.

Perhaps even more telling is the fact that a significant percentage of Jews (22.6%) and Ukrainians (5.6%) abandoned the use of their own native language in favour of Russian. The linguistic assimilation of these groups was much higher in the cities, where 28.3% of the Jews and 24.7% of the Ukrainians listed Russian as their *rodnoi yazyk*. Although the corresponding figures were much lower for the countryside, even there the Russian language was making inroads. But it was nonetheless in the cities, where 44.5% of the urban residents gave Russian as their native language, that russification was most prominent.⁴⁰

It is not surprising that the cities were the primary cauldron for russification. Cities possess a high population density and interaction among their inhabitants is both frequent and impersonal, contributing to an *anomie* of the recent migrants. As a result of such psychological stress,

mere convenience favours the use of the dominant language as the *lingua franca*, thus heightening the incentives to assimilate. This explains why cities are ideal melting pots. Stable multi-lingualism seldom survives long in a city. Generally, one language achieves ascendancy—at least as a *lingua franca* in the public domain.⁴¹

Because it was the language of political administration and because it was closely

TABLE 7

LINGUISTICALLY ASSIMILATED POPULATION OF THE UKRAINIAN SSR, 17 DECEMBER 1926

Percentage Assimilated to:

	<i>Total Assimilated Population</i>	<i>Ukrainian Language</i>	<i>Russian Language</i>	<i>Other Languages</i>
Urban	1,113,140	3.7	95.6	0.7
Rural	1,018,150	26.6	71.7	1.7
Total Ukrainian SSR	2,131,990	14.6	84.2	1.2

Source: Derived from *Vsesoyuznaya perepis' naseleniya 1926 goda, Vol. 11: Ukrainskaya Sotsialisticheskaya Sovetskaya Respublika* (Moscow, 1929), Table 6, pp. 8–17.

related to the Ukrainian language, Russian became the native language of a significant proportion of the urban residents in the Ukraine.

Linguistic assimilation, however, should not be confused with total national assimilation, which we might define as a complete or near complete loss of national self-identity in combination with a full or almost total adoption of another identity. Linguistic assimilation, however, is an integral part of this process. According to one Soviet sociologist,

Linguistic assimilation leads not only to a change of native language but to important changes in national self-identification. The national language and national self-identification are closely related ethnic determinants. While changing one's native language does not in itself signify a reorientation of ethnic self-awareness, it does already testify to profound ethnic changes and the development of an assimilative process.⁴²

Assuming, then, that linguistic assimilation signals the existence of certain psychological attitudes which shape the relationship of an individual toward his ethnic past and which cannot be measured in statistics, we may be safe in suggesting that the linguistically unassimilated in the Ukraine, especially the Ukrainians, would be more likely to support Ukrainianisation than those whose national self-identification and *rodnoi yazyk* varied. How much more likely is difficult to determine, inasmuch as this period was quite volatile.

There are indications that more linguistically assimilated people were drawn back to the Ukrainian language and culture after 1926, especially after the great migration of Ukrainian peasants into the cities. By identifying themselves as Ukrainians, they committed not only a political act (which would have been unwise during the tsarist period), but also opened up opportunities for themselves. The opportunities which were unleashed as a result of Ukrainianisation promoted Ukrainians into positions of political authority. Ukrainianisation as a cultural and political programme raised the prestige of the Ukrainian language and culture, and a number of assimilate Ukrainians undoubtedly returned to the Ukrainian fold. They had a vested interest in reaffirming their ethnic origins in the light of the rapid urban growth, the increasing numbers of fellow compatriots migrating to the cities, the psychological alienation produced by migration, and the party's emphasis on Ukrainianisation.

Conclusion

In 1921 Stalin predicted that the cities in the non-Russian republics would eventually reflect the national composition of their surrounding countryside:

... It is clear that the Ukrainian nationality exists and that the development of its culture is a communist obligation. One should not go against history. It is clear that if the Russians dominated the cities of the Ukraine until now, then in time these cities will inevitably be Ukrainianised. Forty years ago Riga was a German city, but inasmuch as cities grew at the expense of the countryside and the countryside is the custodian of the [indigenous] nationality, now Riga is a completely Latvian city. Fifty years ago all Hungarian cities had a German character. Now they are all Magyarised. The same will happen in Belorussia, where non-Belorussians predominate.⁴³

Less than a decade later, in the late 1920s, the large-scale movement into the cities of the Ukraine changed not only their size, but their ethnic composition as well. As a result of the rapid pace of both industrialisation and collectivisation, a large mass of Ukrainian peasantry began to migrate to the cities and, by 1931, Ukrainians constituted a majority of the urban population. During the first five-year plan the movement of Ukrainian peasants to the cities occurred in numbers so large that, in practical terms, they could not be assimilated to the dominant Russian urban culture. Concomitantly, the prestige of the Ukrainian nationality rose, as the number of those city dwellers who claimed Ukrainian as their nationality far outstripped the total number of new urban residents. This meant that many of those who in the 1920 or 1923 censuses had identified themselves as 'Russians' identified themselves as 'Ukrainians' in the 1926 census.

As the cities acquired more Ukrainian inhabitants, Russian political control over the urban areas was threatened, for Ukrainisation and the increased urbanisation of Ukrainians signalled the imminent political de-russification of the cities and of the major industrial areas. While the Soviet authorities anticipated that more Ukrainians would migrate into the cities—although not the speed with which they did so—they did not count on the unintended political consequences which rapid urban growth engendered. Now the institutions of political power—the trade unions, the party and the bureaucracy—which drew their recruits primarily from the cities, were being supplied by a different ethnic pool—Ukrainian, not Russian. This ethnic transformation had political implications. These institutions now represented Ukrainian, not necessarily Soviet, prerogatives. Fearing the manifestation of these trends, Stalin had to choose between order and legitimacy. Not surprisingly, he embraced the first.

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APPENDIX

Calculating the number of urbanised Ukrainians in March 1931

Between 17 December 1926 and 15 March 1931 the urban population in the Ukrainian SSR grew from 5,191,076 to 6,098,900, an increase of 907,824 (see Table 1). In order to prove that Ukrainians came to dominate the cities, we must closely analyse this increment, dividing it into natural increase (births) and mechanical increase (migration).

Unfortunately, we do not have the complete statistics on births in the cities during this critical period. We do have, however, the records of births in the urban areas between 1924 and 1928, as shown in Table 8.

Comparison of birth and death rates gives one a clear picture of overall natural increase during this time. These figures show that the urban birth rate declined and the urban death rate increased in the mid-1920s, and that the number and percentage rate of natural increase in the cities declined. Factors such as industrialisation, collectivisation, the housing shortage, and the increasing em-

TABLE 8
BIRTHS AND DEATHS IN THE URBAN AREAS, 1924–1928

Year	Average Annual Population	Births	Deaths	Natural Increase	Percentage Natural increase Per Year
1924	4,608,181	160,028	67,637	92,391	2.0
1925	4,904,133	165,379	70,828	94,551	1.9
1926	5,191,076	164,816	72,216	92,600	1.8
1927	5,487,934	162,251	73,434	88,817	1.6
1928	5,802,571	153,208	75,901	77,307	1.3

Source: *Stan suchasnoho naselessnyia U.S.R.R. na 1. I. 1929 r.* (Kharkov, 1929), p. 32.

ployment of women naturally lowered the birth rate so that the overall natural increase compared to the total urban increase in the 1926–31 period declined.

Let us assume that the urban natural increase was 89,133 per year or 7,428 per month (the average urban natural increase in the 1924–28 period). This figure is undoubtedly higher than the real one because births were declining steadily in the towns and cities and deaths in the USSR usually were underreported.⁴⁴ A working estimate of the urban natural increase during the 1926–31 period, therefore, might realistically be 378,828 (7,428 per month times 51 months). However, the increase in the number of urban inhabitants during this period was 907,824, suggesting that migration must have accounted for 528,996 persons (907,824 minus 378,828).

Let us assume that 47.2% (the percentage of the urban population that was Ukrainian in 1926) of the urban natural increase represented ethnic Ukrainians. Using this formula, we find that the number of Ukrainians born in the cities would have grown by approximately 178,807 in the 1926–31 period (378,828 times 0.472). Adding this figure to the Ukrainian urban population of 1926 (2,536,499), we come to a hypothetical figure of 2,715,306 urbanised Ukrainians in March 1931. In order to comprise over half of the 1931 urban population of 6,098,996, or 3,049,498, at least 334,192 migrants, or 63.2% of the total migrants to the Ukrainian cities in the 1926–31 period (528,996), need to have been Ukrainian. In the light of intensive industrialisation, dekulakisation, and collectivisation this scenerio was not impossible.

¹ Borys Antonenko-Davydovych, *Zemlieyu ukrains'koyu*, (Kharkov, 1930; reprint: Philadelphia, 1955), pp. 59–60.

² Michael Hechter, *Internal Colonialism: The Celtic Fringe in British National Development, 1536–1966*, (Berkeley, CA, 1977), pp. 314–15.

³ Ernest Gellner, 'Nationalism', in his *Thought and Change*, (London, 1965), p. 166.

⁴ Charles Tilly, 'Town and Country in Revolution', in John Wilson Lewis, ed. *Peasant Rebellion and Communist Revolution in Asia*, (Stanford, CA, 1974), p. 289.

⁵ Between 1920 and 1933 in the Ukrainian SSR the Soviet government carried out two censuses, in 1920 and 1926, and two urban censuses, in 1923 and 1931. Since the provinces of Podolia and Volhynia were not included because of the many reservations concerning the 1920 census (carried out during the Civil War), the available 1920 data have been presented selectively. See V. P. Shibaev, *Etmicheskii sostav naseleniya evropeiskoi chasti SSSR*, (Leningrad, 1930), pp. v–vii, for a discussion of the limitations of these data. The most comprehensive statistics are contained in the censuses of 1923, 1926, and 1931: *Naseleniia v mistakh Ukrainy na 15 bereznyiia 1923 r.*, (Kharkov, 1925); *Vsesoyuznaya perepis' naseleniia 1926 goda*, (Moscow, 1929–31), Vols. 11–13 and 28–30; and *Pidsumky obliku*

mis'koi lyudnosti URSR 1931 roku, (Kharkov, 1933). Population statistics for other years are estimates, based on projected natural rates of increase, by Soviet Ukrainian demographers. The 1931 census, unfortunately, does not contain data on nationality.

⁶ Robert Conquest, *The Harvest of Sorrow: Soviet Collectivization and the Terror-Famine*, (New York, 1986); James E. Mace, *Communism and the Dilemmas of National Liberation: National Communism in Soviet Ukraine, 1918–1933*, (Cambridge, MA, 1983); and 'Famine and Nationalism in Soviet Ukraine', *Problems of Communism*, 1984 No. 3, pp. 37–50.

⁷ Eugene Kulischer, *Europe on the Move: War and Population Changes, 1917–1947*, (New York, 1948), p. 107.

⁸ In the 1923, 1926 and 1931 censuses the term 'urban centre' was defined as 'all official cities, small towns, and populated points—even though they did not possess an urban or rural soviet—which met the following conditions: (1) more than five hundred people lived there, and (2) more than half of those considered to be "economically independent" worked in non-agricultural occupations'. *Pidsumky obliku*. . . , p. v. Nevertheless, many 'urban centres' which did not meet these criteria were included in the Soviet censuses of the 1920s. Thus, we should view these censuses with caution. Nevertheless, while they are not as accurate and reliable in all instances as one would desire, the data do provide in varying degrees a reasonable approximation to reality upon which general trends can be analysed.

⁹ *Suchasna statystyka naselelnya Ukrainy*, (Kharkov, 1929), pp. 2–3 and 33–35.

¹⁰ See Ilyia Vydanovych, 'Agrarna polityka ukrains'kykh uryadiv roktiv revolyutsii i vyzvol'nykh zmahan' (1917–1920)', *Ukrains'kyi istoryk*, IV, Nos. 3–4 (1967), pp. 5–60; and Harold Weinstein, 'Land Hunger in the Ukraine, 1905–1917', *Journal of Economic History*, II, No. 1 (1942), pp. 24–35.

¹¹ A. Khomenko, 'Natsional'nyi sklad naselelnya Ukrainy po novyshykh danykh', *Chervonyi shlyakh*, 1923 Nos. 6–7, p. 90; Vydanovych, p. 12; and Donald W. Treadgold, *The Great Siberian Migration: Government and Peasant in Resettlement from Emancipation to the First World War*, (Princeton, NJ, 1957), p. 148.

¹² *Naselelnya Ukrainy po danykh perepisi 1920 goda*, (Kharkov, 1923); *Naselelnya v mistakh Ukrainy za danykh Vsesoyuznoho mis'koho perepysu 15 bereznya 1923 roku*, (Kharkov, 1925); and *Korotki pidsumky perepysu naselelnya Ukrainy 17 hrudnya roku 1926*, (Kharkov, 1928).

¹³ *Naselelnya Ukrainy po danykh perepisi 1920 goda*, (Kharkov, 1923), pp. 32–35; and *Mis'ki selyshcha USSR. Zbirnyk stat.-ekonomichnykh vidomosti*, (Kharkov, 1929), pp. 2–17.

¹⁴ The Soviet censuses of 1920, 1923, and 1926 present data in a form different from the Russian Imperial Census of 1897. Whereas the earlier census indicated the native language (*rodnoi yazyk*) of the respondents, the census takers of the 1920s asked the person to which nationality (*narodnost'*) he belonged, as well as his native language. The Soviet censuses of 1939, 1959, 1970, and 1979 also collected data for both native language and nationality (since 1939 called *natsional'nost'*) by self-identification. Because native language and national self-identification do not necessarily coincide, I will consider as Ukrainians those who identified themselves as 'Ukrainian' in the Soviet censuses of the 1920s. For a comparison of the questionnaires in the 1897, 1920, 1923, and 1926 censuses, see N. Ya. Vorob'ev, *Vsesoyuznaya perepis' naselelnya 1926 g.*, (2nd ed., Moscow, 1957), pp. 83–104.

¹⁵ *Korotki pidsumky*. . . , (Karkov, 1928), pp. 4–9.

¹⁶ Harvard University Refugee Interview Project, Box 5, No. 190 AD/AP, p. 17.

¹⁷ *Statystyka Ukrainy*, 1925 No. 86, pp. 1, 4.

¹⁸ TsGAOR Ukrainian SSR, f. 337, op. 1, d. 5038, l. 94–95; cited in F. G. Turchenko, 'osnovnye izmeneniya v sotsial'no-klassovoi strukture gorodskogo naselelnya sovetskoi Ukrainy v 1920-e gody', (Kandidat dissertation, Kharkov State University, 1986), p. 99.

¹⁹ TsGAOR Ukrainian SSR, f. 337, op. 1, d. 5038, l. 92; cited in Turchenko, p. 99.

²⁰ *Korotki pidsumky*. . . , p. 4; and *Natsional'nyi sklad sil'skoho naselelnya Ukrainy*, (Kharkov, 1927), pp. xvi–xix.

²¹ The best analyses of the national composition of the Ukrainian SSR in the 1926 census included: S.V. Minaev, *Naslidky vselyudnogo perepysu 1926 roku na Ukraini*, (Kharkov, 1928) and A. Khomenko, *Natsional'nyi sklad U.S.R.R.*, (Kharkov, 1931).

²² *Caveat emptor*: The requirements for categorising people as literate were very minimal during the 1926 census, which asked separate questions concerning reading and writing. The instructions stated that even someone who could 'dissect the printed word, syllable by syllable' or 'sign his name' would be considered literate. When the census materials were being prepared for publication, only those who could 'read' were included in the statistics on literacy. As a result, the literacy figures provided by the 1926 census grossly *over-estimated* the true literacy and potential newspaper readership. *Korotki pidsumky*. . . , pp. xviii–xix.

²³ Calculated by the author from *Vsesoyuznaya perepis' naselelnya, 17 dekabrya 1926 g. Kratki svodki, vyp. VII: Vozrast i gramotnost' naselelnya SSSR*, (Moscow, 1928), p. 12.

²⁴ Calculated by the author from *ibid.*, p. 18.

- ²⁵ Minaev, p. 77.
- ²⁶ Calculated by the author from Table 6, *Vsesoyuznaya perepis' naseleniya 1926 goda*, Vol. 11, pp. 8–17.
- ²⁷ *Ibid.* Vol. 11, Table 6-a.
- ²⁸ A. Kotliar, *Newspapers in the USSR: Recollections and Observations of a Soviet Journalist*, (New York, 1955), pp. 30–31.
- ²⁹ *Radyans'kyi knyhar*, 1931 No. 14, inside front cover.
- ³⁰ Steven L. Guthrie, 'Ukrainian Cities during the Revolution and the Interwar Era', in Ivan L. Rudnytsky, ed. *Rethinking Ukrainian History*, (Edmonton, Alberta, 1981), p. 171.
- ³¹ *Periodychni vydannya URSR, 1917–1960: Hazety. Bibliografichnyi dovidnyk*, (Kharkov, 1965), p. 6.
- ³² P. P. Bachyns'kyi, 'Zdiisnennya na Ukraini lenins'koi natsional'noi polityky v kul'turnomu budivnytstvi (1921–1925 rr.)', *Naukovi pratsi z istorii KPRS*, 1966 No. 10, p. 15.
- ³³ Yaroslav Bilinsky, *The Second Soviet Republic: The Ukraine After World War II*, (New Brunswick, NJ, 1964), p. 414.
- ³⁴ *Ibid.*
- ³⁵ V. I. Naulko, *Etnichnyi sklad naseleennya Ukrain'skoi RSR*, (Kiev, 1965), pp. 117–18.
- ³⁶ Robert A. Lewis, Richard H. Rowland and Ralph S. Clem, *Nationality and Population Change in Russia and the USSR: An Evaluation of the Census Data, 1897–1970*, (New York, 1976), p. 92.
- ³⁷ Pierre L. van den Berghe, *The Ethnic Phenomenon*, (New York and Oxford, 1981), pp. 254, 258.
- ³⁸ *Ibid.* p. 258.
- ³⁹ *Ibid.* p. 254.
- ⁴⁰ Table 6, *Vsesoyuznaya perepis' naseleniya 1926 godu*, Vol. 11, pp. 8–17.
- ⁴¹ van den Berghe, p. 259.
- ⁴² A. I. Khromogorov, *International Traits of Soviet Nations*, (Moscow, 1970), p. 5; cited in Walker Connor, *The National Question in Marxist-Leninist Theory and Strategy*, (Princeton, NJ, 1984), pp. 275–6.
- ⁴³ *Stenograficheskii otchet X s'ezda Rossiiskoi Kommunisticheskoi Partii 8–16 marta 1921*, (Petrograd, 1921), p. 93.
- ⁴⁴ According to Frank Lorimer, 'failure to correct for under-registration of deaths and for less favourable health conditions in areas for which vital statistics were not available led Soviet statisticians unwittingly to underestimate the force of mortality in the early Soviet period'. F. Lorimer, *The Population of the Soviet Union: History and Prospects*, (Geneva, 1946), p. 119. Lorimer, unfortunately, did not analyse how much Soviet demographers underestimated the mortality rate in the Ukrainian SSR between 1926 and 1931.