

TREATY OF PEREYASLAV AND THE POLITICAL ORIENTATION OF BOHDAN KHMELNYTSKY

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The Treaty of Pereyaslav of 1654 appears to us as the turning point of demarcation of two periods of Ukrainian history. Was this agreement inevitable and well calculated by Ukrainian policy or not?

Bohdan Khmelnytsky in general laid the foundation for the policy of Ukraine toward Europe. His foreign policy was based on a conception that had not previously been held in Ukraine. Up to the time of Khmelnytsky the Ukrainian question had been more or less of a local character. The whole of Ukraine belonged to Poland, i.e. it was part of an alien state organism. There is no doubt that the Kozaks had again and again acted independently, had interfered in the questions of neighboring states, had relations with foreign sovereigns, received subsidies from them, supported their own candidates in Moldavia, Wallachia and sometimes the Crimea, received foreign envoys (Komulovych from the Vatican, Lasota from the Holy Roman Emperor) and entered as a military factor into the plans of the European coalitions against the Turks. Yet they still acknowledged the authority of the Polish state. King Wladyslaw even acquired quite some popularity among the Kozaks. This tradition was powerful and the Polish nobles owed to it the fact that by weakening the power of the King, they also weakened the connections of Poland with the border nations as Ukraine.

In time this process of alienation went very far. In the middle of the seventeenth century, Poland was no longer a real monarchy but was only an aristocratic republic, with an elected president at its head, who was of course chosen for life and had the title of King. Under such conditions, the ties between the Ukrainian Kozaks and the Polish royal power continued to grow weaker, while the hostility of the Kozaks as the representatives of the Ukrainian people to the nobles, their methods of enslavement, their boundless egotism and their greed for power, etc. kept growing stronger and stronger.

Up to the time of Khmelnytsky, the whole Kozak foreign policy had been of a sporadic character. But the separation from Poland and the establishment of Ukraine as a state first laid the basis for more or less definite orientations. As a result of the separation from Poland

there arose a mass of new problems — the organization of the army, finances and other problems connected with the ethnographical frontiers of Ukraine, with the social questions (the liberation of the peasants from



**HETMAN
BOHDAN KHMELNYTSKY**
Contemporary portrait from the
Pecherska Lavra Monastery
in Kiev

Polish serfdom). At the same time Ukrainian policy acquired a clearer and more definite character, especially when in the later stages of the Polish-Ukrainian war Khmelnytsky introduced, in modern terminology, the idea of the independence and unity of all territories inhabited by the Ukrainian people.

It was an extraordinarily hard task of anything else. The main dominating structure of the new Ukrainian state was radically different from Poland. The broad masses of the people had taken the trend with the elemental desire for "freedoms" without thinking of anything else and the dominating circles (the new officers and the Ukrainian nobility who had taken the side of Khmelnytsky) had to organize life anew without having any other pattern than the old Kozak organization and the Polish form of government. The course was unknown and it required great efforts to abandon the past. As a result, the treaties both with the Poles (Zboriv and Bila Tserkva) and with Moscow (Pereyaslav) have an unclear and fundamentally improvised character. The old is mixed with the new, secondary questions with primary and basic ones.

We can look with admiration upon Hetman Bohdan for the way in which amid the storms of war and a general uprising of the popular masses, and the pressing needs of the new state, he was able to arrive at a systematic foreign policy. In this there were two lines of orientation: the southern and the northern; Moscow at the moment did not come into the calculation. One looked toward the Black Sea, the other to the Baltic;

one to the southeast, the other to the northwest. On one side the Ukrainian statesman thought of a Balkan-Danubian union, on the other of a Ukrainian-Byelorussian state. Both trends were necessary for the development of Ukraine, especially in economics and trade. One plan has been preserved to us in the Collection of State Writings and Treaties (Moscow, 1822, III) as an outline of a Ukrainian-Turkish convention which scholars assign to 1649 (some to 1648 and others to 1650-1), i.e. the period of the closest relations of Turkey and Khmelnytsky. It shows to us that Khmelnytsky fostered broad political plans for navigation and trade on the Black and Mediterranean Seas. He also attached importance to the acquisition of the neighboring Byelorussian territories. After the capture by the Kozaks of Stary Bykhiv on the Dnieper in 1657, he proclaimed it a "free port" for Dnieper trade.

THE SOUTHERN PLAN OF UKRAINIAN FOREIGN POLICY

Let us look at the first, the Southern Plan of Ukrainian foreign policy. By the autumn of 1648, in Kiev after the formal greeting by the population who saw in him the liberator of Ukraine "from the Polish Egyptian bondage," Khmelnytsky had a decision to make. He was greeted by representatives of Moldavia (in the person of Paisios, Patriarch of Jerusalem), Transylvania, Wallachia and Turkish envoys. They wished the Hetman to use his power in behalf of the entire eastern Orthodox world. (Patriarch Paisios planned a union of Orthodox nations which was to include Muscovy, Ukraine, Moldavia and Wallachia). Prince George Rakoczy of Transylvania sought an alliance with Ukraine so that the Hetman would support his candidacy for the Polish throne.

The Hetman wished to profit by these diverse interests in the struggle with Poland and the increased security of his young state. So from the beginning he glanced at Moscow and sent there along with the Patriarch Paisios Captain S. Muzhylovsky, but he sought no more than an "alliance" with it and no "union", not even a protectorate. At the same time he maintained very friendly relations with the Porte and he even came to an alliance with it in 1650-1. This was so close that M. Hrushevsky considered it the acceptance of the position of a vassal state. Turkey was a very important factor, for without its neutrality, it was impossible to create that Black Sea-Danubian policy which in reality the Hetman wished to put into operation. Similarly he entered into relations with the Lithuanian Hetman Radziwill, leader of Lithuanian Protestants, so as to secure Ukraine in the northwest.

There was also another state, that of the Crimea, with which he cooperated very closely in the early years, but this caused him the greatest difficulties by its fickleness (Zboriv, Zhvanets, etc.).

This brings us to the question whether the first steps of Khmelnytsky in Moldavia had an accidental character. When the Khan of the Crimea categorically insisted that Khmelnytsky join him in a war on Moscow and threatened otherwise a break in their friendship, Khmelnytsky made the counter-proposition of a joint campaign against the Moldavian Hospodar Vasyl Lupul, to turn the Khan's attention from Moscow. Khmelnytsky was angry at Lupul for his unfriendly attitude toward the Kozaks in the campaign of 1649. Thus there came the joint Tatar-Kozak campaign in Moldavia in September, 1650.



TYMOSH KHMELNYTSKY,
Hetman's elder son, married to Roksanda Lupul,
daughter of Moldavian Hospodar (ruler).
Miniature in Historical Museum in Lviv.

As a result of this defeat Lupul was compelled to make an alliance with the Ukrainian Hetman and as a guarantee he promised to give his daughter in marriage to Khmelnytsky's oldest son Tymosh. The events of 1652 are a clear proof to us that Khmelnytsky was really seriously interested in the Danubian combination. The sending of his son to the south with an army, the defeat at Batih of Kalinovsky, the Polish suitor for the hand of Roksanda, the entrance into Moldavia and the marriage with Roksanda were all actions that cost blood and money.

In this period it became more and more clear that the Hetman had wide political plans with the object of securing a firm foothold on the Danube uniting the Moldavian and Wallachian states with Ukraine. We may admit that the Hetman thought it possible to place his son Tymosh on the Moldavian throne and to give his father-in-law Lupul the principality of Wallachia and perhaps of Transylvania. Ukraine was to be-

come the centre of the Black Sea-Danubian states, closely connected by friendly relations with Turkey.

But this political combination was needed for the next task, the defeat of Poland. Khmelnytsky's strategy was to surround Poland with a ring of hostile states, especially on the south. These were to be the Crimea, Moldavia, Wallachia and Transylvania with Ukraine in the dominant role. The kinship with the family of Lupul (the second daughter of Lupul was married to the Lithuanian Hetman Radziwill) offered a chance for the separation of Lithuania from Poland or at least of Lithuanian neutrality in the Polish-Ukrainian conflict. On the more distant horizon stood Moscow, from which the Hetman hoped for at least a diplomatic intervention in Poland, and Sweden in the person of Queen Christina, with whom he began conversations.

Events, however, went otherwise than Khmelnytsky had hoped. Wallachia and Transylvania reacted very hostilely to the plans of the Ukrainian Hetman. They merely threw Vasyl Lupul off the Moldavian throne and Khmelnytsky had to fight to defend Lupul's rights in Moldavia. The two campaigns of Tymosh into Moldavia, his wounding and death in Suchava were the finale of Khmelnytsky's diplomatic attempts in the southern policy which ended in a failure.

We think that the death of Tymosh was a terrible blow for the Hetman. On the one hand, the failure of his Moldavian plans as a result of the hard war, the exhaustion of Ukraine as a result of it, and on the other, the death of his capable elder son Tymosh hurt him. This was a devastating blow at the idea of a southern coalition and the Black Sea-Danubian plans of the Hetman, for these were based upon the life of his son Tymosh and the already secured kinship with the Hospodar Lupul.

THE ERROR OF PEREYASLAV TREATY

The faulty Moscow plan of Khmelnytsky in his depressed condition must be ascribed to his haste and the lack of care with which the Ukrainians carried on the diplomatic negotiations with Moscow in January, 1654 in Pereyaslav. The Muscovite Tsar knew how to profit by them. The Ukrainians went to the meeting essentially unprepared, while Moscow knew what it wanted and started with the solid tradition of the Muscovite clever statehood with its developed conceptions of the autocracy and its diplomatic routine.

To put the question in another way, the situation of Ukraine was not so hopeless that it could not have gotten along without Pereyaslav. When we consider the entire development, we see that the northern line of Khmelnytsky was not remote for realization in the next years. The im-

portant decisions as to Pereyaslav and Moscow were on the very eve of new events and new possibilities. The chief factor was the change in the Swedish relations.

In 1654 the Swedish Queen Christina, the daughter of Gustavus Adolphus, abdicated and left the throne to her relative Charles X Gustav (Pfalz Zweibrücken). This militant king (1654-1669) entirely reversed the eastern policy of Sweden and thus gave Ukraine a firm basis for a new northern orientation. The old Swedish Queen Christina had been peaceably inclined and had not wished to get into war but she had kept up for some years active relations with Khmelnytsky in view of the traditionally strained relations with Poland and Moscow. Under the Swedish plans Ukraine was to be the southern anchor of the Swedish East European line of Charles X Gustav.

In his depression Khmelnytsky oriented himself on the centre of the Eastern European area, on Moscow, and this was dangerous for Ukraine. It was a fatal move and that it would be was evident from the first moment of the Pereyaslav negotiations. The Pereyaslav, or rather the Moscow agreement, was an example of the indefinite and chaotic condition under which Ukraine fell after the liquidation of the southern orientation. It galvanized into action that factor which had been long in preparation before its inception and which decided in one blow to utilize the situation in Poland and Ukraine after a long and hard war to realize the ancient Muscovite plans of securing Kiev. By entering the Pereyaslav negotiations, Moscow undoubtedly had in its mind to take over the whole of Ukraine and Byelorussia and through their domination to become the decisive factor in Eastern Europe.

In the beginning of January, 1654, the negotiations began in Pereyaslav. Yet the first act before the carrying on of the real, although preliminary, talks was the administration of the oath of loyalty to the Tsar by the Hetman and the Zaporozhian Army; this produced a strange impression. The entire ceremonial was well staged by Moscow as were the later stages of the negotiations. The chief object was to force the Ukrainians by all means into the position of "subjects" by the administration of an oath of loyalty to the Tsar by Khmelnytsky and his officers.

The Muscovite envoys brought with them another thing that was not expected. According to his instruction, Buturlin was to administer the oath to the entire population of Ukraine. By this, after the oath in Pereyaslav, Khmelnytsky, could not turn back and in time this emphasis on "subjection" brought bitter fruits and there were not a few people both among the clergy and colonels but also in the wider circles who refused to swear.

Thus even before the very negotiations, Khmelnytsky and his collaborators showed neither a firm position nor adequate preparation. Previous practice did not offer proper parallels. The long dependence upon Poland, perhaps unconsciously, still continued. The conditions, which the Ukrainians asked from Moscow, were taken on the one hand from the previous treaties with the Polish state and concerned the Kozak army as a separate class in the state, its rights and liberties. On the other hand there were points, made in a detached and unsystematic way, which declared for the rights and liberties of the Zaporozhian Army as a separate state with a separate regime and organizational features.

It is undeniable that the agreement of Pereyaslav which was finally concluded in Moscow and written down in March, 1654, was something alien to Ukraine which did not know the measures that Moscow intended to introduce into it. The crux of the question did not lie in the treaty which established a special sort of vassal dependence of the Ukrainian state upon Moscow, and on which Khmelnytsky had almost certainly not counted. There was a long series of more or less important details in the treaty, which all too definitely showed the true intentions of Moscow. There were the very negotiations; the ceremonial of the oath gave adequate basis for a suspicion of the partner.

Probably Khmelnytsky, accustomed to alliances with foreign states, did not bother his head about the results which this agreement at Pereyaslav might have for the future of Ukraine. He allowed a Muscovite *voyevoda* with a garrison in Kiev, and from this there developed the whole system of the occupation of the most important cities of Ukraine by Russian *voyevodas* and their armies. Even in Khmelnytsky's lifetime Moscow wanted to have its *voyevodas* in Chernyhiv, Pereyaslav and Nizhen, for which the treaty did not provide and which Khmelnytsky did not permit. He governed Ukraine as a sovereign state even after the treaty of 1654.

Events after the treaty of Pereyaslav brought to the Ukrainians only disillusionments. The Hetman had hoped to receive from Moscow speedy and strong assistance, so that after the crushing of Poland he could occupy all Western Ukrainian lands, including Galicia, and establish an independent state. At the same time Moscow was thinking only of its own interests and directed its main blow against Smolensk and the Lithuanian-Byelorussian lands. This was the more dangerous because in 1654 a new Crimean khan Maghmet Girey came into power and presented Khmelnytsky with the ultimatum of breaking with Moscow or counting on the hostility of the Crimea. After Pereyaslav the international position of Ukraine became worse, and Khmelnytsky could not break

with Moscow. Thus the first result of the accord of 1654 was the turning of the Khan of the Crimea to the side of Poland.

THE BALTIC ORIENTATION OF UKRAINIAN FOREIGN POLICY

The Baltic-Swedish orientation rapidly became more favorable for Khmelnytsky after his mistaken alliance of Ukraine with Moscow. The chief reason was that Charles XII Gustav began a war with Poland in the spring of 1655. Friedrich Wilhelm, the Elector of Brandenburg, also took the field with his eye on his Prussian interests and so did George II Rakoczy, the Prince of Transylvania. A new coalition was formed against Poland, and Khmelnytsky joined it. In 1655 he signed a Ukrainian-Swedish military convention. This turned the attention of Ukraine to the northwest. The Swedes formed the basic element and were joined by Brandenburg, Transylvania and Ukraine. Likewise the Moldavians and Wallachians who had caused Khmelnytsky so much trouble and sufferings in 1652 and 1653, also joined. Even Turkey became quite friendly and opened serious conversations with the Ukrainian Hetman. This was intended to be a great coalition under the protection of the King of Sweden and the Lord Protector of England, Oliver Cromwell.

At this stage of the international situation the southern plans of Khmelnytsky became secondary, although they did not escape his attention. Sweden was now the prime factor and the negotiations with it (and Transylvania) opened the possibility for a firm occupation of the Western Ukrainian lands and an expansion to the northwest in connection with his Byelorussian plans.

In this situation Ukraine of Khmelnytsky became again an independent entity, despite Pereyaslav. The Black Sea combination ceased to be vital and the northern line was that on which Khmelnytsky acted.

Yet the recent alliance with Moscow on the basis of the Pereyaslav Treaty brought for Ukraine tension with Moscow and an unpleasant situation. From the very beginning there was no good understanding with the Tsar. Wherever the Muscovite military force aided in the struggle (as at Lviv), the Muscovites at once wanted to take over the conquered cities and fortresses for the Tsar. This of course Khmelnytsky could not permit, since he did not allow the steady intrusion of Moscow into his policy and strategy.

An especially sharp clash arose over Byelorussia. Khmelnytsky dreamed of uniting the Ukrainian and Byelorussian lands to form a great Ukrainian-Byelorussian state and was very sympathetic with every movement in Byelorussia that was favorable for the new Ukrainian state, without stressing the fact that Byelorussia lay across the traditional trade

route of Ukraine to Baltic and by seaway to Western Europe. It is then not surprising that he accepted the oath of loyalty of the Pinsk nobility, that he sent his representatives to Volyn, Prypyat and Polissya, that he took under his protection the principality of Slutsk, and that his "Byelorussian colonels", Zolotarenko and Nechay, organized in the Kozak manner the Byelorussian territory, which they held by occupation of such important points as Mohylev, Chausy, Homel, and were unwilling to give them to Moscow.

The relations with Moscow sorely deteriorated, because Moscow in 1655 opened negotiations with the Poles who put forward the plan of electing Tsar Aleksey Mikhaylovich to the Polish throne after the death of King Jan Kazimierz. As a result there began in 1656 a war between Moscow and Sweden, and a peace conference was held with Poland in Wilno that same year. The Ukrainian delegates were not admitted to this.

There were good grounds for breaking the treaty connection with Moscow, because the Treaty of Pereyaslav, concluded for protection against Poland, indeed ceased to operate. At the same time the Hetman did not formally denounce the alliance with Moscow, although he continued his own independent policy towards Sweden and thus the two sides of the Pereyaslav Treaty found themselves in hostile camps: Ukraine on the side of Sweden and Moscow on the side of Poland against Sweden.

Pereyaslav had not brought what had been expected to either the Muscovites or the Ukrainians. It was replaced by Wilno (1656). At the decisive moment Moscow abandoned her Ukrainian ally. Then for the first time Bohdan saw that Ukraine might become merely an object of booty between two rival neighbors, Poland and Muscovy.

From this time every understanding between Poland and Moscow was made at the expense of Ukraine. The new Kozak state was hard pressed from both sides. Both advanced their claims to it, the Poles with their old traditional demands, and Moscow with the new ones based upon the agreement of Pereyaslav and Moscow. The peace of Andrusovo of 1667, the Eternal Peace of 1686, divided the Right and Left Bank Ukraine into spheres of Polish and Muscovite influences. After this division and the elimination of Ukraine as an independent political factor in Eastern Europe, Moscow secured the dominant position and made itself the protector of the once independent and powerful Poland. It set up that balance of power in Eastern Europe which has continued now for three hundred years.
