Bukovyna: A Border Region with a Fluctuating Identity

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Debates about issues of national and regional identity have recently occupied a central place in the work of historians, political scientists, and sociologists. On the one hand, the growing interest in these issues and their pre-eminent position in contemporary academic discourse testify to their topical nature; on the other, this trend signifies a certain methodological lethargy in the theoretical and categorical apparatus used to research past and present ethno-national and ethno-political processes. Such investigations have gained prominence in the context of the social and political transformations underway in Central and Eastern Europe. Indeed, they are a necessary component of the sustainable development of the nascent national states and democratic regimes that have risen on the new terrain. Ethno-political stability may be the final determinant of these societies' transformation into well-balanced and efficient democracies. However, the path of democratization has proven to be longer and more difficult than the advocates and masterminds of totalitarianism's collapse initially expected.

Relations among Ukraine's leading ethnic communities have drawn justified attention from scholars in that country and from their foreign colleagues, as well as from policy-makers and ordinary citizens.[1] The stability of the ethno-political situation within the country and decision-makers' well-elaborated measures aimed at promoting inter-ethnic harmony guarantee the advancement of democracy and serve as an important stimulus and prerequisite for the formation of a civil society in this post-Communist country. At the same time, the situation in this sphere of political relations is a litmus test for the alignment of the nation's political direction with the strategic goal of integration with European structures, as proclaimed by Ukrainian policy-makers and supported by a significant number of Ukrainian citizens. The European democratic standard of tolerance as the basic model for developing the Ukrainian political nation requires respect for the inter-ethnic dialogue that occurred over the last few centuries, as well as the scrupulous study of modern tendencies in this area. It is imperative to implement timely countermeasures against potential sources of inter-ethnic tension and, in the worst case, conflict between the country's

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[1] See, for instance, V[iktor]. O. Kotyhorenko, *Etnichni protyrichchia i konflikty v suchasnii Ukraini: Politolohichnyi kontsept* (Kyiv: Svitohliad, 2004); Raul Chilachava, ed., *Mizhnatsionalni vidnosyny i natsionalni menshyny v Ukraini: Stan i perspektyvy* (Kyiv: Holovna spetsializovana redaktsiia literatury movamy natsionalnykh menshyn, 2004); Vladimir Kulik [Volodymyr Kulyk], "Natsionalizm v Ukraine: 1986 – 1996 gody," in *Natsionalizm v pozne- i postkommunisticheskoi Evrope*, 101–26, ed. Egbert Yan [Jahn] (Moscow: ROSSPEN, 2010); and Ihor Burkut, *Rusynstvo: istoriia i suchasnist* (Chernivtsi: Prut, 2009).

leading ethnic communities. At the same time, Ukraine faces not only internal but also growing external challenges to its ethno-political stability as well as threats to its territorial integrity and statehood.

These challenges demand serious attention, particularly in the multi-ethnic regions of Ukraine, that is, where ethnic Ukrainians have traditionally lived side by side with other ethnic groups. Chernivtsi Oblast is a case in point. Ukraine's smallest oblast, it is comprised of parts of two historical regions—Bukovyna and Bessarabia. These territories have never been ethnically homogeneous, though Ukrainians have long inhabited them, and they have "enjoyed" a historical destiny typical of East European lands—multiple changes in their territorial-administrative status. In the twentieth century alone Bukovyna and Bessarabia have been part of the Austro-Hungarian and Russian empires, the Kingdom of Romania, and the Soviet Union. Their colonial status was reflected in the mentality of the local population. Bukovynians were repeatedly urged, if not forced, to change their political identity, civic allegiance, and attitude to the dominant cultures.

Consequently Bukovyna has always been a very interesting example of an ever-changing value system whose identity has gradually developed into a mutable but relatively stable hierarchy. Its hierarchical structure has been comprised of the following components: ethno-cultural, social, religious, and others characterizing the region's inhabitants. As a result, over the last few centuries local self-perceptions and self-representations have engendered a regional identity and even the phenomenon of so-called Bukovynism.

In this article I offer a general picture of the multi-ethnic environment in Chernivtsi Oblast, summarize the historical experience of its formation, and focus on outstanding problems regarding the region's past that have been raised by contemporary scholars, first and foremost by historians and political scientists. The results of sociological surveys that academic staff of the Department of Political Science and Public Administration at Chernivtsi National University carried out in 2002–2003 and 2009 form the basis of my assessment of the oblast's current ethno-political situation, the identities of its inhabitants, and the region's identity.

The Bukovynian Phenomenon:
The Origin of "Golden Age" Myths

Despite Bukovyna's unexpected historical turns, its inhabitants' experiences have led to rather stable traditions of ad hoc multiculturalism marked by a prevalent attitude of respect for the languages and customs of their compatriots with other ethnic roots, as well by an ability to sustain more than tolerant inter-ethnic relations in present-day Chernivtsi Oblast. It is noteworthy that such relations have been dis-tinguished by a high degree of stability. Although the tensions and conflicts that occurred in the past between Bukovyna's largest ethnic communities should not be ignored, it is important to underline that these conflicts were, as a rule, more often than not artificially instigated by policy-makers and not by the local population. The period of Austrian rule in Bukovyna (1774–1918) should be acknowledged as the one that contributed most to the culture of ethnic and religious tolerance among the region's residents. Discussion of inter-ethnic relations there in the past is necessarily speculative, because historians have mostly ignored the ethnic dimension or, at best,

given only superficial accounts of it.[2] Archeological findings have produced similarly scanty results.[3] Therefore our imagined journey into the tradition of Bukovynian multiculturalism and tolerance should begin at the time when this former periphery of the Ottoman Empire became part of the Habsburg Empire.

There is no need for a consensus of opinion regarding the Austrian period of the region's history. It suffices to say that during this period Bukovyna experienced significant progress in its economic, social, and cultural life.[4] From the mid-nineteenth century, the city of Chernivtsi (German: Czernowitz) underwent a rapid development in its urban culture and communications network, which increasingly connected the region with central and western Europe[5]. On the whole, however, Chernivtsi, and Bukovyna in general, modernized and industrialized gradually, if not slowly. The establishment of Chernivtsi University in 1875 and later of a large theatre building heralded the city's further development, and this autonomous crownland capital gradually became a regional academic and cultural centre.[6] The opening of various ethnic—Romanian, Polish, Jewish, German, and Ukrainian (the *narodnii dim*)—community halls in Chernivtsi emphasized the growing role and prestigious status of the city's ethnic communities.

These local achievements of the Habsburg era, which still impress, were offset by negative developments. Bukovyna was one of the Austro-Hungarian Empire's most impoverished and economically underdeveloped provinces and a cultural backwater, and this influenced relations between the local ethnic communities. The two largest ethnic groups in the Duchy of Bukovyna—the Ukrainians and the Romanians—constituted a pre-industrial, agrarian, patriarchal society whose social structure was truncated. However, the local Romanians were more advanced because they had a landed aristocracy consisting primarily of the descendants of medieval Moldavian boyars. This social stratum controlled Bukovyna's rich and influential Orthodox eparchy with its see in Chernivtsi. The status and activities of the Romanian community there were greatly supported by the neighbouring Romanian kingdom, which cherished the dream of incorporating Bukovyna.

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[2] See, for instance, Pavlo V. Mykhailyna, "Vysvitlennia istorii Pivnichnoi Bukovyny na storinkakh sloviano-moldavskykh litopysiv," *Arkhivy Ukrainy*, 1969, no. 4: 81–84; idem, "Vidomosti z istorii Pivnichnoi Bukovyny XV–pershoi polovyny XVII st. v moldavskykh litopysakh," in *Mynule i suchasne Pivnichnoi Bukovyny*, vyp. 1: 13–18, ed. I. I. Kompaniiets (Kyiv: Naukova dumka, 1972); V. M. Kurylo, *Pivnichna Bukovyna, ii mynule i suchasne* (Uzhhorod: Karpaty, 1969); and B. O. Tymoshchuk, *Pivnichna Bukovyna – zemlia slovianska* (Uzhhorod: Karpaty, 1969).

[3] See Kurylo, *Pivnichna Bukovyna*; and Tymoshchuk*, Pivnichna Bukovyna*.

[4] See M[ykhailo]. V. Nykyforak, *Derzhavnyi lad i pravo na Bukovyni v 1774–1918 rr.* (Chernivtsi: Ruta, 2000).

[5] For a detailed discussion, see my article "Chernivtsi: (Ne)porozuminnia mizh spadshchynoiu ta spadkoiemtsiamy," in *Chernivtsi v konteksti urbanistychnykh protsesiv Tsentralnoi ta Skhidnoi Evropy,* 5–34, ed. Michael Dippelreiter and Serhii Osachuk (Chernivtsi: Zelena Bukovyna, 2008).

[6] See V. Bilyk et al, *Vitannia z Chernivtsiv* (Chernivtsi: Prut, 1994); S. S. Kostyshyn et al, eds., *Chernivetskyi universytet, 1875–1995: Storinky istorii* (Chernivtsi: Ruta, 1995), 5–72; and Tamara Marusyk, "Teatralne i muzychne zhyttia Pivnichnoi Bukovyny (druha polovyna XIX–poch. XX st.)," in *Z istorychnoho mynuloho Bukovyny,* 137–47 (Chernivtsi: Chernivetskyi derzhavnyi universytet, 1996).

However, Bukovyna's two most numerous ethnic communities did not dominate the region's political and administrative structures, and even less so its financial and commercial life. The local imperial bureaucracy consisted mostly of ethnic Germans,[7] but members of the rather small but active and well-educated local Polish community also occupied many administrative positions and served as mayors and members of the crownland's diet.[8]

During the second half of the nineteenth century the gradual advancements in local (particularly municipal) self-government and the liberal constitutional reforms in the Habsburg Empire introduced Bukovyna's inhabitants to the traditions of European liberal political culture, while competing for parliamentary representation and access to other elected and appointed positions necessitated reaching consensual decisions among candidates representing various ethnic groups and social strata. These circumstances contributed to forging the regional elite's typically "Bukovynian" political qualities and a regional identity. The elite highly valued and even cultivated the art of political compromise through constant dialogue and co-operation instead of confrontation. Potential ethnic conflicts and divergent political or social interests were moderated by overlapping religious identities. For instance, most of the Romanians and Ukrainians who contested the official status of indigenous ethnic group and the collective rights associated with it were members of the Orthodox Church, while most of the region's ethnic Germans and Jews belonged to the German-speaking cultural community.[9] The list of overlapping identities of the region's ethnic groups could be extended. Consequently Bukovynians were distinguished by their conspicuous regional identity while remaining loyal to the ruling imperial dynasty and cultivating a feeling of personal allegiance to the ruling monarch. These stabilizing factors dampened the escalation of ethnic confrontations, as did the influence of German "high" culture, which played an integrative role and not merely dominated in the region.

At the turn of the twentieth century all of central Europe witnessed the rapid nationalization (nation building) within its various local ethnic communities, a rise in national awareness, and the development of discrete and, at times, bellicose national identities. But these tendencies did not essentially transform the patterns of co-operation among Bukovyna's ethnic groups. The region's residents often saw themselves as Bukovynians first, and only then as Ukrainians, Romanians, Jews, and so on. While they might be treated as archaic, these phenomena were unique at that time for the Danubian empire, which constantly sought a balance between the requests and demands of its ethnic groups and regional elites. The absence of a dominant ethnos ensured ethno-political stability in Bukovyna, while the two numerically dominant groups—the Ukrainians and the Romanians—remained mostly outside the main site of

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[7] See Serhii Osachuk, *Nimtsi Bukovyny: Istoriia tovaryskoho rukhu (druha polovyna XIX–pochatok XX st.)* (Chernivtsi: Zoloti litavry, 2002), 12–17.

[8] See V. Strutynsky and Andrii Horuk, "Kulturno-prosvitnytska diialnist Bukovynskoi polonii v druhii polovyni XIX–na pochatku XX st.," *Naukovyi visnyk Chernivetskoho universytetu: Istoriia, politychni nauky, mizhnarodni vidnosyny*, 2002, 341–50; and Andrii Horuk, *Natsionalno-kulturnyi rukh poliakiv na Bukovyni (druha polovyna XIX st .– 1914)* (Chernivtsi: Zelena Bukovyna, 2005), 49–53.

[9] See Alfred Ablaitinher [Ableitinger], *Natsionalni superechky na Bukovyni do 1914 roku: Yikh spetsyfyka u konfliktakh natsionalnostei Tsislaitanii. Mini-kosmos Bukovyny. Kulturni zdobutky rehionu* (Chernivtsi: Zelena Bukovyna, 2006), 112.

inter-ethnic tensions in eastern Europe—the urban environment—or were marginalized there. Therefore ethno-political mobilization and conflictual situations were rather improbable; and owing to their unanimous Austrian state patriotism and personal loyalty to the emperor the political elites of the various ethnic communities did not play the role of "mobilizers". The region's ethnic-community leaders perceived the empire's central authorities as a desirable and most powerful ally as well as a welcomed mediator in conflict situations. They appealed to their co-nationals mostly to confirm the importance of their position of loyal servants of the monarch and the empire.

The social roles that the leading ethnic communities played rarely resulted in clashes of interest or direct confrontation between the Ukrainians and the Romanians, the Germans and the Jews, and so on. However, this did not mean that fully peaceful coexistence characterized the region. "Clouds" of conflict were sometimes visible, but they did not gather over this territory overtly and did not lead to popular unrest and ethnic calamities. It is also noteworthy that the central authorities in Vienna and the local authorities in Chernivtsi highly valued the internal stability of this border region, which could at any time become a battlefield between competing imperial rulers (this indeed happened during the First World War).[10] These tendencies provided Austrian policy-makers with ample opportunities for learning lessons about political manoeuvring and ethno-political diplomacy via conducting negotiations with representatives of the region's diverse ethnic groups and religious communities. Such negotiations touched upon a wide spectrum of problems, unanimous solutions to which were hardly ever achieved. A commonly known fact is testimony to the socio-linguistic tendencies of those days: both average Bukovynians and local policy-makers could freely communicate in four or five major regional languages—German, Ukrainian, Romanian, Polish, and Yiddish. Such historical "invariables" of relative peace and the slow development of an "East Tirol" helped to create a Bukovynian myth of a friendly, peaceful, hospitable, multicultural, somewhat patriarchal and peripheral land that was relatively problem-free from the standpoint of the imperial authorities.

The cultivation of traditions of inter-ethnic balancing, the relative parity of interests in their regional hierarchy, and the local culture of communication and compromise embodied in the regional Bukovynian identity of the Habsburg era were jettisoned soon after this region and Bessarabia (which had developed under the a quite different political, administrative, and socio-cultural conditions of tsarist rule since 1812) were annexed by Romania in 1918.[11] This "great reunion," which remains not only a Romanian national holiday but also a national ideal for a sizeable part of Romanian society, became first a drama and then a tragedy for the national minorities of the region. Since then, for the first time in the history of the region as a separate territory, there emerged a dominant nation that considered itself hegemonic and behaved accordingly. The leaders of this nation perceived this territory exclusively as part of Romanian history, culture, and national traditions.[12] During the interwar period official

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[10] See V[olodymyr]. Fisanov, "Bukovynske i halytske pytannia u mizhnarodnykh vidnosynakh periodu Pershoi svitovoi viiny," *Visnyk Tsentru Bukovynoznavstva: Seriia istorychna* (Chernivtsi), vyp. 1 (1993): 143–52.

[11] See *Khotynu – 1000 rokiv: Materialy Mizhnarodnoi naukovoi konferentsii, prysviachenoi 1000-littiu Khotyna*, ed. V. M. Botushansky (Chernivtsi, 2000).

[12] Igor [Ihor] Burkut, "Istoricheskie etapy formirovaniia bukovinskoi polietnichnosti," in his *Politychni protsesy: Istoriia, mify, realnist (pohliad z rehionu),* 74–81 (Chernivtsi: Prut, 2005).

Bucharest perceived and treated regional ethnic communities at the very least as a suspicious and potentially dangerous factor of instability in poor and politically unstable Romania.

The Romanian authorities' elimination of the institutions and traditions of the Habsburg era was not limited to the liquidation of Bukovynian autonomy. From the early 1920s on efforts directed at the Romanianization of non-Romanians increased, which in turn increased dissatisfaction in almost all regional communities. Ion Nistor, the leading Romanian historian of the time and a later statesman, succinctly formulated the position of the new rulers: he claimed that the "reunion" of Bukovyna with Romania left no space for *homo bucovinensis*, but only for *civis Romaniae.*[13] Inter-ethnic tensions increased considerably during and after the 1930s. Ethno-cultural contradictions were complemented—and aggravated—by discord over agricultural issues, control over local finance, and competition in the scarce labour market. Ethnic Romanians constantly demanded and received the more prestigious positions in the public service with the support of the national government. Campaigns directed at imposing Romanian traditions upon the local Ukrainian population were conducted with the consent of the central authorities, and Ukrainians reluctant to refuse their origin were discriminated against in a number of ways. Discriminatory measures also targeted the Jewish minority, which Romanian financiers and entrepreneurs viewed as a powerful and dangerous competitor.

Similarly, other regional communities could hardly boast of evident achievements in the interwar period. And yet, the main source of ethno-national instability in the region was the tensions between the Romanians and the Ukrainians, which constantly increased owing to the activities of both pro-Soviet and anti-Soviet Ukrainian nationalist guerrilla movements. In any case, these groupings represented a threat to Romania, and therefore local Ukrainians suffered from numerous constraints and repressive measures. It is worth noting that in their Romanianization efforts in Bukovyna both the central and local authorities successfully divided and conquered by neutralizing the usual anti-discriminatory solidarity of other ethnic groups. As a result, the region's local Romanians and Ukrainians supported official Romanian anti-Semitism to a certain degree, as did the indigenous Germans, who were increasingly influenced by Nazi ideology. Meanwhile anti-Ukrainian sentiments spread not only among Romanian chauvinists.

This has led me to conclude the regional pattern of the elite and mass culture of ethnic relations in the Habsburg era as neither absolutely solid nor self-sufficient. This culture—sometimes defined in the literature as the phenomenon of "Bukovynism" and a vivid example of a specific regional identity—was not capable of resisting the radical nationalism and chauvinism that spread throughout Europe in the interwar years.[14] The competition for resources, better developmental prospects, land, capital, education, and spiritual influences all affected society in the previous period as well. The difference was that now politicians, bureaucrats, official Bucharest, and its local representatives fanned and cultivated these contradictions.

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[13] Cited in Irina Livezeanu, *Cultural Politics in Greater Romania: Regionalism, Nation Building, and Ethnic Struggle, 1918–1930* (Ithaca:Cornell University Press, 1995), 49.

[14] See Ihor Burkut, "Bukovyna u planakh Velykoi Rumunii," in *Bukovyna 1918–1940 rr.: Zovnishni vplyvy ta vnutrishnii rozvytok*, 49–51, ed. Serhii Osachuk (Chernivtsi: Zelena Bukovyna, 2005).

After the Soviet invasion of northern Bukovyna and Bessarabia on 28 June 28 1940, those regions radically changed politically, economically, socially, and culturally. However, with the exception of official propaganda and punitive measures (it is important yet very difficult to trace any kind of ethnic priority regarding the latter), the Soviet authorities did not manage to elaborate specific policy instruments with regard to regional ethnic communities. The very entry of the Red Army as stipulated by the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact is still a bone of contention among statesmen and historians in independent Ukraine and post-Ceausescu Romania who have tried to assess the events of 1940.[15] (Their views are beyond the scope of this article.) It is noteworthy that the establishment of Soviet rule radically changed the ethnic and social situation in Bukovyna for the first time. The mass emigration of ethnic Germans ensued,[16] as did the exodus of a sizeable number of members of the Bukovynian intelligentsia and representatives of the business elite, who were not pro-Soviet and were aware of realities in Stalin's Soviet Union. A previously unified region ceased to exist, and Chernivtsi Oblast of the Ukrainian SSR was formed in 1940.The remainder of this article will focus on this oblast.

The entry of the Romanian army into the territory of northern Bukovyna in 1941 negatively influenced the ethno-political situation there. The period of wartime Romanian occupation is, undoubtedly, the most dramatic page in the history of local ethnic relations: it was characterized by flagrantly chauvinist, terrorist policies, the instigation of civilian anti-Semitism with pogroms as its culmination, and later by acts of genocide against the Jewish population. The Ukrainian population of the region also suffered from repressive Romanian policies. The dictator Ion Antonescu and his entourage even envisioned measures for "cleansing" Bukovyna of ethnic Ukrainians.

It would be an overstatement to claim that the return of Soviet rule in 1944 brought desired peace and stability to the region's still multi-ethnic community. Local inhabitants who did not manage or did not want to leave their homeland with the retreating Romanian forces experienced the "peculiarities" of Stalin's regime—mass repressions, forced collectivization, violent campaigns against "bourgeois nationalism," and so on—to the utmost.[17] It is noteworthy that the comprehensive and radical changes that occurred in the ethnic composition of Bukovyna during the first half of the twentieth century continued into the second half of the century. They resulted in irreparable deformations in regional identity and in the local population's perceptions of the "Other." As a consequence of the constant changes in the region's political status, the voluntary *and* forced migration of the population (as a side effect

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[15] For reflections about this event, see *28 chervnia 1940 roku: Pohliad cherez 60 rokiv. Materialy naukovo-praktychnoi konferentsii, m. Chernivtsi, 29 chervnia 2000 roku*, ed. V. M. Botushansky (Chernivtsi: Prut, 2000).

[16] V. Kholodnytsky, "Z istorii vzaiemovidnosyn mizh radianskymy i nimetskymy predstavnykamy v radiansko-nimetskii zmishanii komisii po evakuatsii bukovynskykh nimtsiv u Chernivtsiakh," *Naukovyi visnyk Chernivetskoho universytetu: Istoriia, politychni nauky, mizhnarodni vidnosyny,* vyp. 123–24 (2002): 193–206.

[17] Tamara Marusyk, *Zakhidnoukrainska humanitarna intelihentsiia: Realii zhyttia ta diialnosti* (Chernivtsi: Ruta, 2002), 134, 141, 144–49; V. Kholodnytsky, "Z istorii pereselen i deportatsii na Bukovyni v 40-kh rokakh XX st.," in *Istoryko-politychni problemy suchasnoho svitu*, vol. 8, 51–62, ed. Yurii Makar (Chernivtsi: Ruta, 2001).

of those transformations) on the eve of the Second World War, and the evacuation of the overwhelming majority of Bukovynian Germans to the Third Reich in 1940.[18]

All ethnic communities inhabiting the region suffered tremendous social, demographic, and ethno-cultural losses as a result of the Holocaust (in the case of the Jews and Roma), exodus, mass repressions, and mass violence. Changes in the ethnic and sociocultural composition of the urban population were especially marked. It would not be an overstatement to claim that in the postwar period Bukovynian urban culture on the either side of the Soviet-Romanian border differed dramatically from the regional pattern of the pre-1918 era. In the post-Stalin period, local policies in the sphere of ethnic relations became more reserved and balanced. Soviet policy-makers were keen to show the advantages of "Lenin's national policy," "proletarian interna-tionalism," and the "eternal friendship of nations" that had "blossomed" in the USSR. On the one hand, phony attention was paid to the Ukrainian population through the formal Ukrainianization of educational and cultural institutions. On the other hand, the activities of educational institutions and the mass media took into account, to some extent, the linguistic and cultural needs of local communities, including the Romanian-Moldovan community, mostly in the countryside. The aforementioned policies were aimed at demonstrating harmonious ethnic relations. However, there were actually many unresolved ethnic problems.[19] For instance, policy measures were directed at the Russification of local cultures and education, especially in the region's capital, Chernivtsi. Unfortunately these measures and their consequences have not yet been the focus of much attention by contemporary Ukrainian researchers. This lack of interest is rather surprising. It testifies indirectly to the insufficient critical *and* scholarly assessment of this very important component of the Soviet legacy, and it confirms the endurance of the Soviet theoretical heritage: both average citizens and decision-makers still revere this legacy, which is often perceived as an exemplary solution to ethnic challenges. However, this tendency is hardly deserving of admiration.

Some problematic aspects of the postwar years in Chernivtsi Oblast merit further attention. During that period numerous anti-Semitic campaigns were launched concurrently with the first mass exodus of the Jewish population, which was actively facilitated by Soviet authorities and the KGB. Persons of Jewish origin were banned from certain occupations and professions and were discriminated against during enrolment procedures at some departments of Chernivtsi State University. Regional authorities also persecuted, at times quite harshly, members of the Ukrainian and Romanian intelligentsia suspected of harbouring the slightest measure of "nationalist sentiment." From time to time acts of closed-door or public chastisement of those suspected of anti-Soviet "deviations" were initiated. Illustrative of the period was also the notorious practice of "ratio equalization," which in the minds of the Soviet *nomenklatura* was supposed to ensure equitable representation in government and elected Party and Soviet bodies and meet all of the social, ethnic, and even gender needs of the population.

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[18] See Serhii Osachuk, "Sotsialna dynamika i politychni oriientatsii nimtsiv Bukovyny 1918–1940 rr.," in *Bukovyna 1918–1940 rr.: Zovnishni vplyvy ta vnutrishnii rozvytok*, 116–18, ed. Serhii Osachuk (Chernivtsi: Zelena Bukovyna, 2006).

[19] See Ihor Burkut, "Istorychni ta etnichni osoblyvosti rehionu," in *Kurs Ukrainy na intehratsiiu do Evropeiskoho Soiuzu: Rehionalni vymiry hromadskoi pidtrymky,* 16–17, ed. Anatoliy Krugla-shov (Chernivtsi: Prut, 2002).

To claim that ethnic relations in the USSR were harmonized in this way would be misleading. The postwar Soviet period was far from being devoid of manifestations of ethnic intolerance, and the traditional ethnic structure that existed in Bukovyna during the first half of the twentieth century was considerably deformed as a result of demographic changes and in- and out-migration artificially stimulated by the Soviet regime. Also, the urbanization of agricultural areas did not occur without ethno-cultural tensions. Suffice it to mention the wide circulation, if not cultivation, of many far from innocent ethnic "jokes" about Jews and Moldovans that still remain current in the region.

Nonetheless, despite these negative tendencies the Soviet period was marked by certain stability in ethnic relations, even if this goal was achieved through forceful means. The gradual but continually increase in intermarriage rates during that period a vital indicator of ethnic tolerance.

The various problems that were overlooked and even concealed became evident with the advent of Perestroika. That period of reform was marked by new ethno-political changes in Chernivtsi Oblast particularly a powerful cultural revival within the oblast's various ethnic communities. This revival not only brought about elation but also presented new, as well as forgotten, challenges requiring the development of skills in public politics, dialogue, and democratic forms of co-operation between policy-makers and the ethnic communities, as well as between the associations and organizations representing the latter. However, the rapid and at times not at all positive changes in Ukrainian society exacerbated the sensitive nature of inter-ethnic relations. Not only have feelings of pride for one's nation and its past been manifested, but also previously suppressed ethnic phobias and even chauvinist attitudes when the desire to reclaim one's own rights is intermingled with the temptation to overlook similar claims on the part of other citizens.

Since 1991 ethnic relations in Chernivtsi Oblast have gained particular political significance. During the first years of post-Soviet independence, not only some decision-makers but also governing bodies in neighbouring Romania demanded that the current state borders with Ukraine be redrawn and laid claim to territories that were part of interwar Romania. As a result, relations between ethnic Ukrainians and ethnic Romanians in Chernivtsi Oblast deteriorated. Fortunately, however, despite attempts to establish a Romanian irredentist movement there, ethnic tensions in the oblast have not culminated in open confrontation. In addition, under the pressure of NATO and the European Union, Romanian decision-makers have tried to improve relations with Ukraine. Even though this process is still under way, this Romanian-Ukrainian détente has had a positive influence on ethnic relations in Chernivtsi Oblast. During this difficult time, oblast authorities have tried to foster the revival of all of the oblast's ethnic communities and to respond favourably and respectfully to their needs, albeit haphazardly and irregularly.[20]

Much is still left to be done in this regard, but Ukraine's legislative efforts and its aspirations to meet the Council of Europe's high standards have resulted in attempts to

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[20] See V. Kotik [Kotyk], "Natsionalnye menshinstva v ramkakh mezhdugosudarstvennykh otnoshenii Ukrainy, Respubliki Moldova i Rumynii," in Ramochnaia konventsiia o zashchite natsionalnykh menshinstv:Mekhanizmy realizatsii. *Po materialam mezhdunarodnogo seminara, Kishineu, Komrat, Belts, 9–11 noiabria 1999 g.*, 116–27 (Chişinău, 2000).

solve the burning problems of ethnic politics through the application of fair legal procedures. Meanwhile both Romania and Moldova—and, more particularly, openly irredentist political forces in those countries calling for the revision of the current state borders—have been especially attentive to the ethno-political situation in Chernivtsi Oblast. Their influence has grown as a result of the ethno-demographic changes in the oblast. According to the published results of Ukraine's 2001 census, the oblast's Jewish population has almost entirely emigrated; there has been a downward trend in the number of residents who identified themselves as Russians before 1989; the ratio of ethnic Poles and ethnic Belarusians in the oblast has similarly diminished; while a sizeable percentage of those who previously declared themselves Moldovans have switched to identifying themselves as ethnic Romanians.[21] Because of these considerable changes, the traditions of regional multiculturalism, which had been nurtured for centuries, and the peculiar informal system of checks and balances within the ethnic communities have been abandoned. This presents a certain challenge, if not a threat, to regional stability.

The problem of adopting Romanian identity by some part of the Moldovan population is not merely the result of successful propaganda regarding the twin notions of a united Romanian nation and *Romania Mare* among the local communities, although their influence cannot be denied. This trend may be explained by the improving social and economic conditions in Romania and as a side effect of that country becoming part of the EU in 2007 (it became a NATO member in 2004).[22] Considering the unfortunate social and economic conditions in independent Ukraine, and particularly in Moldova, additional opportunities, such as obtaining a Romanian passport (even if this is obviously illegal according to Ukrainian legislation), have appealed to many Romanian-speaking residents of Chernivtsi Oblast. These and other measures that the neighbouring country has implemented towards its co-nationals in the oblast have raised questions to which adequate answers are yet to be found. These factors have exerted a negative influence on ethnic relations in the oblast and provoked oblast and even Ukraine's central authorities to adopt active measures aimed at preventing and resolving undesirable conflicts. Nevertheless, sporadic confrontations and an escalation of ethnic tensions are still evident. It is equally important to acknowledge northern Bukovyna's geopolitical peculiarity: now it is not only the Ukrainian-Romanian-Moldovan borderland, but also a Ukrainian region bordering on such powerful political structures as NATO and the EU. In addition, Chernivtsi Oblast has encountered various problems regarding its role and prospects within the framework of the Upper Prut Euroregion are problematic.[23]

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[21] See V. Kaminska, ed., Natsionalnyi sklad naselennia Chernivetskoi oblasti ta yoho movni oznaky (za danymy Vseukrainskoho perepysu naselennia 2002 roku) (Chernivtsi: V. D. Livak, 2003), 4–8.

[22] See Anatoliy Kruglashov, "Vid 'Ievropy natsii' do 'Ievropy rehioniv,'" *Polityka i chas*, 2003, no. 10: 69–78; and S. Mitriaeva, "Terytorialni pytannia ta etnichni chynnyky v protsesi druhoi khvyli rozshyrennia NATO: Rehionalnyi vymir" <www.ji-magazine.lviv.ua/conf-march03 /mitriajeva.htm>.

[23] See S. Gakman, "Stan mizhetnichnykh vzaiemyn na terytorii ievrorehionu 'Verkhnii Prut': Dynamika, realii ta perspektyvy," in *Ievrorehiony: Potentsial mizhetnichnoi harmonizatsii. Zbirka naukovykh prats,* 180–90, ed. Anatoliy M. Kruglashov et al (Chernivtsi: Bukrek, 2004) .

It is for these and other reasons that not only the achievements of ethnic dialogue and co-operation in the oblast should be highlighted, but also those latent, not easily observable challenges to amicable social and political life there. The latter pose a potential threat to the oblast's security and stability. If these dangers are continuously ignored and not addressed in an adequate and timely fashion, they may very soon become a scourge for Ukrainian policy-makers, and not only for them.

Biased, if Not Corrupt, Judges: A Reflection of Ethnic Relations in National Historiographies

Academic approaches to the history and modern condition of Bukovynian multi-ethnicity are an important instrument of forming well-balanced and efficient ethno-national policies at the oblast and national level. However, thorough analysis of the existing academic literature reveals numerous lacunae regarding the historical conditions for the formation of multi-ethnic tolerance in the oblast as well as challenges to its further positive development. Historical arguments aimed at tracing the roots of contemporary ethnic relations in the oblast do not always facilitate a better understanding of the processes underway, or the elaboration of effective national and regional policies.

Serious research of the phenomenon of this "Europe in miniature" or "East European Switzerland" reveals isolated archipelagos of scholarship and political journalism amidst an ocean of diverse national historiographies. One rarely encounters any commonalities therein. Thus, intellectuals have reproduced not one but several nationally oriented or at least ethnically coloured images of "Bukovyna," each of which is produced and consumed by different segments of the population. Some important tendencies are discernible in the ethno-national reconstruction of the region. The Ukrainian and Romanian historiographies of Bukovyna and, along with them, the histories of the various ethnic groups that have inhabited this region have played a crucial role in defining the intellectual climate and the formation of mass stereotypes and ethno-national myths, and have influenced the ideological positions of national leaders and decision-makers. Representatives of the two national historical schools have engaged in open "confrontations" and in tactical debates that, in their extreme form, have manifested themselves in radical and nationalist ways. Regarding the latter, on the Romanian side the latter position has been most vividly represented by the famous historian, professor, government minister, and rector of Chernivtsi University in interwar Romania, Ion Nistor (1876–1962)—the leading representative of the historiographic position that Bukovyna is a historical Romanian land and that its indigenous Ukrainians are immigrants or Slavicized Romanians.[24] Various interpretations of this "classical" model of the past can be found in monographs by contemporary Romanian researchers, who, even if they skirt the thesis that Bukovyna is exclusively Romanian, insist that the Romanians must have an exclusive status and special rights as the indigenous ethnos of Chernivtsi Oblast.[25]

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[24] Ion Nistor gradually developed this idea for his book *Românii şj Rutenii in Bucovina: Studiu istoric şj statistic* (Bucharest: Socec şj B. Sfetea, 1915).

[25] A review of some of them is in O[leksandr]. Dobrzhansky, "Etnichnyi sklad naselennia Bukovyny kintsia XVIII – pershoii polovyny XIX st. v suchasnii istoriohrafii," in *Materialy IV*

Teachers in the oblast's Romanian-language schools similarly prefer the exclusivist approach to teaching the history of Bukovyna, based on the idea of the autochthonous character of the Romanian population. The inexhaustible well of Nistor's wisdom continues to be the source of political inspiration for the ideologues of the modern-day nationalist right wing in Romania, and first and foremost for the members of the nationalist-royalist party. The latter still cherish dreams about *Romania Mare* of 1918, which they would like to become reality in a new, united Europe(!).

The aggressive and sometimes arrogant stance on the part of the authors of this historiography and political tradition has engendered similar academic retorts from the Ukrainian side. Exemplary among them is Arkadii Zhukovsky's classic history of Bukovyna, He wrote this work in response to Ion Nistor and inverts the Romanian formula for writing the history of the region. In Zhukovsky's view, Ukrainian Bukovyna has continuously restrained Romanian aggressive tendencies toward Ukraine.[26]

Zhukovsky's monograph is an important landmark of Ukrainian national historiography; it is highly polemical and critical of the prevailing views in mainstream Romanian historiography. In his book the reader may also find radical, partisan claims that reflect the intellectual and political climate of the 1930s and 1940s, during which the author's views and writing style were formed.

It is doubtful whether similar Romanian or Ukrainian monographs written at a time of aggressive ethnic confrontation and totalitarian and authoritarian experiments on European soil may serve as the starting point and theoretical basis for a tolerant and multicultural perception of Bukovyna's history. This can happen only if national leaders and often repugnant regimes view this history not only as a product but also—from a positive perspective—as the common achievement of many generations of the region's residents with various ethnic origins. The new generation of Ukrainian and Romanian historians are trying to find new forms and instruments of professional dialogue and compromise, and it has become ever more obvious that there is an urgent necessity for the elaboration of truly scholarly approaches to understanding the Ukrainian-Romanian past, with the focus on the "problem of Bessarabia and Bukovyna."[27]

On the Ukrainian side, valuable research has been being pursued by such Chernivtsi scholars as Oleksandr Dobrzhansky, Ihor Burkut, Hanna Skoreiko, Serhii Osachuk, Serhii Hakman, Ihor Piddubny, Volodymyr Fisanov, and this author. Among Romanian researchers, the Suceava historians Ştefan Purici (a graduate of Chernivtsi Uni-

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Bukovynskoi istoryko-kraieznavchoii konferentsii, 367–73, ed. S. S. Kostyshyn et al (Chernivtsi: Ruta, 2001).

[26] For Zhukovsky a burdensome and alienating factor in the history of Bukovyna was the influx of Romanian settlers, who displaced the indigenous Ukrainian population and persistently tried to denationalize and oppress them. The struggle between then two groups was the cornerstone of the region's history. See Arkadii Zhukovsky, *Istoriia Bukovyny* (Chernivtsi: Chas, 1994), 195.

[27] See, for example, V. Boiechko, "Pivnichna Bukovyna i Prydunavia – spokonvichnyi teren Ukrainy," *Polityka i chas*, 1992, no. 5: 47–51 and no. 6: 66–71; P. Symonenko, *Vichnozhyvi hilky Ukrainy: Pivnichna Bukovyna i pivdenna Besarabiia* (Kyiv, 1992); O[ksana]. M. Pavliuk, ed., *Bukovyna: Vyznachni postati 1774–1918 rr. Biohrafichnyi dovidnyk* (Chernivtsi: Zoloti litavry, 2000); Nicolae Ciachir, *Din istoria Bucovinei, 1775–1914* (Bucharest: Editura Academiei Române, 1993); and I. Luceac, *Familia Hurmuzaki: Itre ideal si realizare* (Chernivtsi: Editura Alexander Cel Bun, 2000).

versity) and his colleague Florin Pintescu deserve particular mention.[28] Since 2001 four triennial international academic conferences titled "Ukraine-Romania-Moldova: Historical, Political, and Cultural Relations"—the first such conferences in the entire history of Ukrainian-Romanian-Moldovan relations—have become an important step in fostering understanding between scholars of these neighbouring countries. The first of these conferences, held in Chernivtsi, in May 2001, brought out the long-standing communication difficulties between the scholars. At the same time, however, it facilitated the articulation of desired joint academic co-operation aimed at overcoming the legacy of national romanticism, radical nationalism, and the many falsifications issued during the Communist period. In pursuit of this goal, it was recommended that joint groups be formed to elaborate common conceptions and textbooks on Ukrainian-Romanian-Moldovan relations, the history of their common region, the integration of Ukraine, Romania, and Moldova into European and Euro-Atlantic structures, and post-communist processes in those countries.[29]

In September 2004, on my initiative, the second such conference was held in Chernivtsi[30] to continue the dialogue begun in 2001. The third triennial conference, held in September 2007, showed that this meeting was becoming a permanent forum on a broad range of issues in Ukrainian-Romanian-Moldovan relations.[31] The fourth conference, held in September 2010, proved the vitality of this forum. Unfortunately, except for some positive changes in terms of closer scholarly communication at conferences, seminars, and symposia, no other forms of collaboration have arisen.

One of the most serious drawbacks has been the failure to implement, let alone gain support for, joint research projects and publication of academic and educational literature at the regional, let alone international, level (e.g., joint projects involving scholars at Chernivtsi, Suceava, and Iaşi universities, considering that these universities have signed official agreements on mutual co-operation and partnership). But the greatest challenge is that these efforts have not attracted the attention and support of key decision makers in the three countries. Ukrainian, Romanian and Moldovan scholars have been reluctant to abandon their traditional, or rather inertial, methodological approaches to the complicated and, at times, conflictual "grey zones" of the ethno-political history of Chernivtsi Oblast and the heritage of the past. Overcoming the domination of these approaches is yet to be achieved even at the level of the corresponding conceptual frames. Left for the future is the task of compiling a Ukrainian

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[28] See Ştefan Purici, "Trecutul Bucovinei în viziunea istoriografiei ucrainene contemporane (1991–2002)," *Codrul Cosminului* (Suceava), 2002–2003, no. 8–9: 43–52; Daniel Hrenciuc, *"Integrarea polonezilor din Bucovina în Regatul României Mari (1918–1923): Un studiu de caz," in* Omagiu *istoricu*lui Raimund Friedricht Kaindl, *83–90, (*Chernivtsi, 2005); idem, *Din istoria polonezilor în Bucovina (1774–2002)* (Suceava: Uniunea Polonezilor din România, 2002); Florin Pintescu,. "Bucovina – zonă de convergenţă etnică şi spirituala," *Revista română de studii culturale* (Suceava*),* 2000, no. 1: 9–16; George Ostavi Ost, "Etnic si economic în Bucovina," *Suceava: Anuarul Muzeului Judetean al Bucovinei* (Suceava) 24–25 (1998–99): 215–78; and Traian Poncea, "Bucovina istorică: Evoluţie geopolitică şi demografică," *Foaie naţională* (Bucharest), 2010, no. 4: 15–36.

[29] *Ukraina-Rumuniia-Moldova: Istorychni, politychni ta kulturni aspekty vzaiemyn v konteksti suchasnykh ievropeiskykh protsesiv* (Chernivtsi: Bukrek, 2002).

[30] Ibid., vol. 2 (Chernivtsi: Bukrek, 2006).

[31] Ibid., vol. 3 (Chernivtsi: Bukrek, 2009).

textbook on the history of Romania and Moldova; nor have scholars obtained financial support for the their initiative to found an academic centre on European and regional studies in Chernivtsi that, among other areas of research, would also deal with ethno-political processes in contemporary Romania and Moldova.

This does not mean that historians belonging to the minority ethnic communities in Chernivtsi oblast have ignored the processes of regional mythology. Scholars of Jewish origin have been particularly prolific in this respect, and there are obvious grounds for that: it is impossible to imagine the nineteenth- and twentieth-century history of Buko-vyna and Bessarabia without the Jewish population, which sometimes dominated and was the most active and organized among the ethnic communities there. Therefore close attention to this community's past is well justified, and a number of serious monographs have been produced as a result. At the same time, however, Jewish inter-pretations of the regions' histories and ethnic relations there have left a certain im-pression regarding their ethnocentric and, partly, even nationally exclusive perspec-tive.[32]

In many accounts by Jewish scholars, the other ethnic communities, their activities, and their co-operation are represented mostly as background to the Jewish community or as a threat to its existence. However, such particularities do not represent a direct threat to ethnic stability in Chernivtsi oblast. It is evident that contemporary migratory and demographic trends are increasingly marginalizing this segment of the ethno-cultural spectrum of opinion in the oblast: as previously underlined, the size of the Jewish population has speedily and irreversibly diminished. Moreover, the opinion that Bukovyna and the city of Chernivtsi lost an important, if not essential, part of its legacy with the wartime genocide of the Jewish community and emigration of the survivors can now be found within the local non-Jewish population as well.

The Polish historiography of ethnic relations in Bukovyna is also of undeniable value. Despite the seemingly negligible ratio of ethnic Poles in the region's ethnic structure, region, their high intellectual and social status has fostered a "Polish discourse" about the history of Bukovyna. Kazimierz Feleszko's contributions to this discourse have been the most outstanding ones.[33] Polish historians of Bukovyna have tried to present a well-balanced version of its ethnic history.[34] But the German-lan-guage and particularly the Austrian historiography of Bukovyna and ethnic relations on its terrain also merit special mention.[35]

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[32] See Albert Lichtblau and Michael John, *Jewries in Galicia and Bukovina, in Lemberg and Czernowitz: Two Divergent Examples of Jewish Communities in the Far East of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy* (1996) <www.ibiblio.org/yiddish/Tshernovits/Lichtblau/lichtblau.html>.

[33] Kazimierz Feleszko, Jerzy Molas, and Włodzimierz Strutyński, eds., *Bukowina: Blaski i cienie "Europy w miniaturze."*(Warsaw: Energeia, 1995); Kazimierz Feleszko, ed., *Bukowina po stronie dialogu–* (Sejny: Pogranicze, 1999); and idem, "Bukovyna – miniaturna Ievropa. Lehendy, metody, diisnist," in *Materialy III miznarodnoi istoryko-kraieznavchoi naukovoi konferentsii, prysviachenoi 120-richchiu zasnuvannia Chernivetskoho universytetu, 29 veresnia–1 zhovtnia 1995 roku,* ed. Anatoliy Kruglashov (Chernivtsi: Chernivetskyi derzhavnyi universytet, 1995), 179–87.

[34] See also Zbigniew Kowalski et al, eds., *Bukowina: Tradycje i współczesność* (Piła,Chernivtsi, and Suceava:Dom Polski, 2006).

[35] See Mariana Hausleitner, *Die Rumanisierung der Bukowina: Die Durchsetzung des nationalstaatlichen Anspruchs Grossrumaniens, 1918–1944* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2001); Hannes Hofbauer and Viorel Roman, *Bukowina, Bessarabien, Moldawien: Vergessenes Land zwischen*

Here, it is possible to discern two different schools of research. The Austrian school's members mainly study the Habsburg period of Bukovyna's history and often depict it as its "golden age" (there are grounds for such a views). The other school is represented by German émigrés from Bukovyna who settled in Bavaria after the Second World War II and founded the Institute of Bukovynian Studies in Augsburg.[36]

Although the seriousness and academic value of the findings of the best interpreters of the histories of Bukovyna's and Bessarabia's various ethnic groups cannot be denied, it must be noted that their efforts have been methodologically diverse, ideologically biased, and, most importantly, limited by their authors' ethnicity and ethnically determined perceptions. By relying on received tradition, these authors have become hostages in the fortresses that they enthusiastically erected, and these fortresses which have often been "besieged" by representatives of other ethnic and religious groups. The problem is not that certain scholars are nationalist or chauvinist, but that their views have been propagated and circulated among other members of their ethnic communities both in the region and elsewhere.

Writing an integrated, common version of the region's past that would focus on ethnic relations is still on the agenda. It is evident that this would have to be an international project or, even better, various projects. Logistically and financially complicated as it may seem, Ukrainian researchers should play an important and initiating role in this regard. Surely this would be possible in close communication and partnership with their Romanian and Moldovan counterparts and with the active intellectual and financial participation of European and transatlantic institutions (in Canada and the United States, first of all). Implementation of this project might be a difficult task, but it is achievable.

Such important geopolitical processes as the enlargement of NATO and the EU and Ukraine's aspirations to become part of "Europe" require the sustained development of regional borderlands. Implementing related large-scale research projects would not only have academic value, but also useful socio-political applications.

Current Ethnic Relations in Chernivtsi Oblast

Sociological surveys of the ethno-political situation in Chernivtsi Oblast were conducted in 2002, 2003, and 2009 under my direction by the Department of Political Science and Public Administration (previously Political Science and Sociology) of Chernivtsi National University in co-operation with the Chernivtsi Regional Centre for the Professional Development of Public Servants of the Chernivtsi Oblast State Administration.[37] A total of one thousand respondents living in the oblast's eleven raions or in the oblast capital city were interviewed. They comprised a representative sample in terms of age, gender, educational background, and ethnicity.

Westeuropa, Russland und der Türkei (Vienna: Promedia, 1997); Emanuel Turczynski, *Geschichte der Bukowina in der Neuzeit: Zur Sozial- und Kulturgeschichte einer mitteleuropäisch geprägten Landschaft* (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 1993); and Andrei Corbea-Hoisie, *Czernowitzer Geschichten: Über eine städtische Kultur in Mittel(Ost)Europa* (Vienna: Böhlau, 2003).

[36] See Johannes Hampel and Ortfried Kotsian, *Das Bukowina-Institut in Augsburg*, 2d ed. (Ausburg: Das Bukowina-Institut, 1994).

[37] I thank the centre's director, Mykola Yarmysty, for his assistance in implementing the first part of the project.

The survey's results revealed that peaceful relations among the various nationalities in Chernivtsi Oblast have been maintained up to the present day. The overwhelming majority of the respondents (69.7 per cent in 2002, 70.5 per cent in 2003, and 80.27 per cent in 2009) defined their attitude to representatives of other ethnic groups as positive. A much smaller percentage (13.0 in 2002, 14.5 in 2003) was neutral in this regard, and only 4.5 per cent in 2002 and 5.9 per cent in 2003 was negative. In 2009 16 per cent stated that inter-ethnic relations in the oblast were strained, but only 3.72 per cent assessed them as conflictual (the evaluation scale had been somewhat changed at that time).

Altogether up to 5 per cent of the oblast's population had a negative attitude toward representatives of ethnic-minority groups. On one hand, this figure does not seem alarming. On the other hand, however, sociometric analysis reveals that this group of negatively inclined respondents is overwhelmingly represented by ethnic Romanian or Moldovan residents and members of other ethnic minorities, , while the ratio of such attitudes among the oblast's Ukrainians and Russians is considerably lower. Moreover, in 2003 the ratio of the Romanian or Moldovan population who were negative toward other ethnic groups doubled from what it was a year earlier. By 2009 this percentage was 14.91 per cent of all Moldovan and 16.02 of all Romanian respondents. The Romanian or Moldovan population and representatives of other ethnic minorities have exhibited the highest degree of ethnic prejudice towards the Ukrainian, Russian, and Jewish communities. A general overview of the surveys conducted in 2002 and 2003 indicates that the ratios of negative attitudes in Chernivtsi Oblast were the following.

- Ukrainians: up to 3 per cent toward Moldovans and up to 2 per cent toward Russians;
- Russians: 14 per cent toward Jews and up to 3 per cent toward Ukrainians, Romanians, and Moldovans;
- Romanians: 7 per cent toward Ukrainians, 5 per cent toward Russians, and 8 per cent toward other nationalities;
- Moldovans: 10 per cent toward Ukrainians, 7 per cent toward Russians, and 13 per cent toward Jews and other minorities;
- Jews: almost 10 per cent each toward Romanians and Moldovans, Russians, and Ukrainians;
- Other nationalities: 7 per cent toward Romanians and Moldovans.

In 2009 an amended measurement scale provided the results enumerated in table 1.

Table 1. Attitudes toward Other Ethnic Groups

How would you accept representatives of the ethnic groups listed?

	No. of respondents	Percentage	As family members	As friends	As neighbours	As co-workers	As residents of Ukraine	As visitors to Ukraine	Would not allow to enter Ukraine
Jews	758	93.81	11.74	20.32	8.97	5.28	20.05	22.43	11.21
Moldovans	759	93.94	16.21	22.27	15.28	5.93	17.79	17.52	5.01
Germans	762	94.31	12.47	18.50	9.06	7.87	16.67	28.35	7.09
Poles	766	94.80	13.71	21.02	11.88	4.83	16.84	28.46	3.26
Russians	784	97.03	24.62	25.51	10.33	6.12	15.05	14.03	4.34
Romanians	757	93.69	19.82	20.34	15.46	3.04	16.38	18.63	6.34
Ukrainians	797	98.64	75.66	10.79	3.01	1.25	6.52	1.88	0.88
Roma	786	97.28	5.22	4.20	3.94	1.15	19.34	21.50	44.66

Despite a climate of generally friendly ethnic relations in Chernivtsi Oblast, there have been tensions between certain ethnic communities, in particular between the Romanians and Moldovans on one side and the Jewish and other minorities on the other.

Special attention should be paid to the ethno-social needs of individuals of other ethnic minorities (e.g., Belarusians, Germans, Georgians) who have not lived compactly in the oblast. Of the respondents in this category, 83.3 per cent stated they occasionally experience negative attitudes from persons of other nationalities, and 66.7 per cent believe they have limited opportunities to achieve their personal goals.

In 2009 the Department of Political Science and Public Administration conducted a study of the most general indices of ethnic tensions in the oblast and the well-being of its residents. The data are reflected in table 2.

Table 2. Ethnic Tensions

How often have you experienced negative attitudes because of your ethnic background?	No. of respondents	Percentage
Quite often	16	1.98
Often	25	3.09
Seldom	51	6.31
Quite seldom	97	12.00
Never	619	76.61

It is unfortunate that socio-cultural, informal conflicts lead among the manifestations of ethnic tension. This fact points to lacunae in educational, cultural and information policies, which would prevent such phenomena. It is also curious that in 2003, as compared to 2002 (data of 2009 are not applicable in the case), a greater number of respondents pointed to the interference of neighbouring countries in ethnic relations in the oblast. Obviously, one may observe signs of cultural segregation between the Romanian and Ukrainian community in the oblast. It is evident that such feedback reflects respondents' perception of a clear and present danger of deteriorating stability in the oblast due to hostile activity by external actors.

And yet, it is not the external but internal factors that play a crucial role in forming the ethno-political situation in the oblast. The analysis of variables that influence ethnic relations in the oblast revealed an overwhelming impact of socio-economic factors as compared to political ones. For instance, 43.8 per cent of the respondents suggested that ethnic relations depend on living standards; 23.1 per cent stated they depend on political and civic associations. Thus, the unsatisfactory pace of post-communist transformations and the contradictory nature of reforming efforts nurture both social and ethno-political tension in society. Interviewing also disclosed increasing negative tendencies. Inequitable redistribution of the common wealth in Ukraine is oftentimes explained by deteriorating attitude to residents of other nationalities.

Over the recent years, the tendency of loosening civic allegiance, and, concomitantly, rising emigration aspirations, which may be inferred from responses to the question about respondents' preferred citizenship, has been observed. The majority of the respondents would, under propitious conditions, opt for the citizenship of other countries: Europe, the former USSR, the United States, Canada, Australia, and so on. Such sentiments dominate among ethnic Ukrainians and Russians (see table 3).

Table 3. Distribution of citizenship preferences in 2002 and 2003, in per cent

		Ukraine	A European country	The former USSR	Elsewhere
Ukrainians	2002	49.0	36.9	9.0	5.4
	2003	50.1	35.9	6.7	7.5
Russians	2002	29.2	33.7	27.0	10.1
	2003	34.0	34.0	30.2	1.9
Romanians	2002	21.7	63.9	10.8	3.6
	2003	40.7	41.6	11.9	6.2
Modovans	2002	17.7	51.2	25.2	6.1
	2003	33.3	52.4	9.5	4.8
Jews	2002	29.2	50.0	4.2	16.7
	2003	80.0	20.0	NA	NA
Other	2002	33.3	33.3	NA	33.3
	2003	50.0	37.5	12.5	NA

In coming years the ethno-political situation in Chernivtsi Oblast may deteriorate because of land claims by states bordering on the oblast. Recent events on the Ukrainian-Romanian border have highlighted existing problems. The number of respondents who emphasized the urgency of revising the border doubled from 8.4 per cent in 2002 to 17.0 per cent in 2003. Despite governmental efforts on both sides to resolve issues, this position is ubiquitous among the oblast's Romanian and Moldovan population, suggesting that anti-state, unfriendly sentiments proliferate among part of that population. This attitude has been exacerbated by the circulation of ideas about the "historical justice" of the existing borders both internally and externally. Such surveys were not repeated in 2009. But this indicator needs to be revisited, because the number of ethnic Moldovans in the oblast opting for border revision had increased threefold, from 11.5 per cent in 2002 to 38.1 per cent in 2003, and 2.5 times among ethnic Romanians, from 7.2 per cent in 2002 to 17.7 per cent in 2003. At the same time the number of ethnic Ukrainians favouring political irredentism similarly increased, from 7.4 per cent in 2002 to 16.1 per cent in 2003.

Conclusion

The multi-ethnic phenomenon of Bukovyna remains important for research as a successful example of the regional model of ethnic relations well grounded in a culture of tolerance and co-operation between major ethnic groups. The regional model of ethnic coexistence had been established in the Austrian period as a result of both internal and external factors favourable and complementary to a culture of ethnic tolerance. The interwar period of Romanian rule in Bukovyna started the process by which the structure and value system the regional society and authorities had elaborated before 1914 began crumbling.

The Soviet regime suppressed ethnic tensions, but they had accumulated and were subsequently revealed at the end of Gorbachev's Perestroika. In Chernivtsi Oblast the post-Soviet independent Ukraine has had to face a dissolving traditionally multi-ethnic community that is becoming more ethnically and culturally homogeneous and structurally simpler than it was during previous historical periods. All of the stages in the region's history have contributed to shaping a specific type of regional identity

there, combining and integrating competing or overlapping ethnic, religious, and social cleavages and identities. This Bukovynian identity has become flexible and ambiguous, and its carriers have tended to avoid sharp and confrontational manifestations of their cultural distinctions.

Preliminary analysis of the ethno-political situation in the Chernivtsi oblast has not revealed any flagrant, direct threats to ethnic stability. However, there are a number of challenges that may provoke ethnic confrontation and demand our attention.

1. The negative, periodically intensive interference of certain political and non-governmental organizations in ethnic relations in the oblast.

2. Low living standards, which have prompted large-scale emigration and occasionally engendered negative and aggressive socio-political sentiments and ethnic intolerance.

3. Relations of the oblast's ethnic Romanian and Moldovan inhabitants with their Jewish, Russian, and Ukrainian neighbours have been characterized by mistrust, alienation, and even open hostility.

4. Representatives of other nationalities that are under-represented in the region have exhibited high levels of dissatisfaction with their ethno-cultural prospects, and the authorities' efforts at addressing these needs have been inadequate.

5. Very low levels of civic consciousness, national allegiance, and Ukrainian political identity, that is, of the bases for consolidating the titular nation and other ethnic communities in support of a democratic Ukrainian state.

6. The conspicuous popularity of revisionist ideas, particularly among the oblast's Romanian and Moldovan population, that threaten the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Ukraine.

7. The dissemination of intolerant and prejudiced attitudes by the Romanian and Ukrainian mass media, highlighting issues in a provocative manner and exploiting ethnic stereotypes of the "other," thereby exacerbating ethnic tensions in the oblast.

8. A lack of resources for academic analysis and permanent monitoring of the evolving ethno-political situation, and in their stead a Pandora's box of incompetent speculations and the repetition of popular prejudices and negative stereotypes.

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