Readiness to Fight in Crimea

How It Interrelates with National and Ethnic Identities

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Theories have been developed to explain the social and psychological processes by which category membership influences identity and intergroup conflict (Gaertner et al. 2000; Tajfel and Turner 1986; Turner et al. 1987), but considerably less attention has been given to the interrelations between identities. Research on ethnic conflicts and violence reveals a set of factors that have a significant impact on conflict behavior and negative intentions toward out-groups. Numerous studies show that in weak states with sizable minorities, the presence of salient ethnic identity among those minorities strongly encourages ethnic violence (Berry et al. 1989; Brewer 1991, 1996; Conover 1988; Crocker and Luhtanen 1990; Gellner 1994; Kaiser 1994; Miller et al. 1981). As Brubaker (1996) has pointed out, ethnic identity politics and minority grievances create tensions, and the formation of a new, independent state often leads to conflicts initiated by national minorities. Yet the establishment of new states also encourages the development of a new national identity associated with economic independence, human dignity, and popular self-esteem (Kelman 1997). Such superordinate identity is sometimes more powerful than ethnic identity, encouraging the resolution of ethnic conflicts. Thus, national identity building, which is now taking place throughout the postcommunist world, has contributed in some cases to the escalation of ethnic conflicts and in other cases to their resolution.

The purpose of this chapter is to analyze the impact of the interrelation between national and ethnic identities on the readiness of ethnic minorities to initiate or participate in conflict with other ethnic groups. I argue that the

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salience and meaning of other social identities acts as a powerful moderator of the influence of a specific social identity on a person's attitudes and behavioral intentions. In particular, I investigate how both identity salience and concepts of national identity moderate the impact of ethnic identity on the readiness of representatives of ethnic minorities to clash with out-groups. I also explore how this moderation effect depends on the relative socioeconomic position and population proportion of a given ethnic minority in a particular region. I regard salient ethnic identity, which has been described as an indicator of ethnic conflicts, as an independent variable. Readiness for conflict with other ethnic groups is the dependent variable. I hypothesize that the effect of ethnic identity on conflict readiness or willingness to compromise would vary with the salience of national identity and with different meanings of national identity—ethnic, multicultural, and civic.

The System of Social Identities

Adler (1994), Crenshaw (1998), and King (1988) stress that an individual's system of identities is not simply a combination of that person's ethnic, multicultural, and civic identities, but rather a system in which identities have multiple effects. Some approaches to conceptualizing multiple social identities exist. According to Brewer's (2001) classification of identity theories, theories of person-based social identity (Cross 1991; Phinney 1990; Skevington and Baker 1989) suggest that one's self-concept consists of different stereotypes, attitudes, and values that one receives from membership in groups. Some of these particulars may be more salient than others, but they all serve as parts of a single representation of the individual self. Theories of relational social identity assume that the self is a set of discrete identities, each of which is differentiated from a person's other role identities. This system is organized and structured, and it determines which identity will be salient in a particular social context (Stryker 2000; Stryker and Serpe 1994). Theories of group-based social identities suggest that one's identity system depends on the social context (Turner et al. 1994) but that some social categories can be relatively stable across time and situations (Abrams 1999). The idea of the fluidity of identity in social categorization theory (Turner et al. 1987) grew out of research on situational identities in laboratory settings. Research into ethnic identity reveals, however, that it shows remarkable stability over time (Alwin, Cohen, and Newcomb 1992; Ethier and Deaux 1994; Sears and Henry 1999).

Applying the insights of this scholarship to the matter of identity formation, I define identity as a system that involves core identities, short-term identities, and situational identities. Core identities are fairly stable and dominant: they exist for a relatively long time and change only in situations of considerable social shifting. Some core identities persist throughout an individual's entire lifetime. Short-term identities are inconstant, and changes to

them occur frequently. Situational identities are connected to concrete situations and depend on those situations. They are a "building material" for the creation of short-term and core identities.

All identities are interrelated, and correlations within the subsystem of core identities are the most strong and firm. One identity can influence the development process of another identity, increase or decrease its salience, and strengthen or weaken its impact on attitudes and behavior. In particular contexts of intergroup relations—for instance, when an individual is in a minority position, suffers from discrimination, or engages in conflict—different identities become strongly interconnected and reshape one another. Research has confirmed the existence of strong interrelations between identities. For example, when men, normally the members of the higher-status group, are in the minority, they are more likely to think of themselves in gender-stereotypic terms—and thus to identify with their gender—than are women, the members of a lower-status group (Swann and Wyer 1997).

The theory of social identity stresses that each identity is formed as a result of an individual's membership in an in-group and is in opposition or comparison to members of an out-group (Tajfel and Turner 1979, 1986). The existence of an out-group and the in-group's negative and conflict-ridden relations with it strengthen group identity (concerning the effect of simple social categorization, see, e.g., Allen and Wilder 1975; Billig and Tajfel 1973; Brewer and Miller 1984; Brewer and Silver 1978; Doise and Sinclair 1973). The position, achievements, and losses of the group as a whole are incorporated into the self and respond to personal outcomes (e.g., Hirt et al. 1992).

The results of this research and numerous other studies encourage us to understand social identity as an open, unstable system. The factor of asymmetry, the element of chance, and feedback play important roles in the development of such systems. The progressive development of an identity system is a contradictory process. The joining of new groups, the formation of new out-groups, and changes to the status and power of in-groups and out-groups all lead to the reorganization of identity systems, the formation of new identities, and the emergence of contradictions between different identities, which cause changes in a person's social behavior. The rise, development, and disappearance of any identity leads to modifications within the whole system. Such reconstruction affects the subsystem of short-term identities, but correlations within the identity system do not change fundamentally.

An identity system serves five psychological functions for group members: it increases self-esteem, increases social status, provides personal safety, provides support and protection from the group, and grants a sense of recognition by the group (Korostelina 2003b). A person's needs for personal security and social status can change, and these needs exert an influence on the structure of that person's identities. If a new identity begins to fulfill necessary functions, it can lead to the quick disappearance of old identities. If one of the identities ceases to fulfill its functions, it gradually loses its significance and vanishes.

Core identities can remain, however, even in the situation of the destruction and disappearance of their respective social groups: identity-related processes continue to be organized in the same way that they had been within the whole system in the past. Consider, for example, the Soviet identity of the populations of the newly independent states of the former Soviet Union. In spite of the disappearance of the common "Soviet people," Soviet identity still occupies a leading place as a core identity among middle-aged and elderly people. Carl Rogers (1961) has postulated that a sense of identity involves seeing ourselves as we really are—who we have been, who we are today, and who we will become. Thus, a sense of identity can be attained only when we discover and chart our own destinies in life. As Tajfel (1969) observed, situations of rapid social transformation involving changes in out-group and in-group relations play an important role in structuring people's visions of the future. When an identity system functions according to its "memory," without reference to the present or future, it leads to contradiction in the system of identities.

The development of an identity system is not based on the principle of "imposition"; instead, differentiation and integration are its main characteristics. It evolves by means of two basic processes: first, assimilation and accommodation, i.e., the restructuring of new components of the identity system; and, second, estimation, or the evaluation of the significance and value of new and old identities. One of the characteristic features of an identity system is the existence of mechanisms of competition between identities, which ends in the selection of the most stable identities, the rise of new identities, and the breaking of established patterns of behavior. The development mechanism of the identity system ensures the greatest possible initial variety of identities. Within this context, important and insignificant elements are revalued, and irrelevant identities are neglected. Some identities develop on the basis of others; contradictions between identities, mutual strengthening or weakening, and changes in the correlation between core and short-term identities can also arise. This process is most vigorous among adolescents, who "try on" many different identities before selecting core identities to organize the whole system (Phinney 1990). But the same processes, although in more latent forms, take place throughout a person's whole life, especially in periods of social change. When there is rapid social change and new information is introduced, people come to understand that their values, beliefs, and information are out of date. As a result, they do not know where to turn. They become alienated and unsure of how to resolve the problems associated with their identity.

Identity Salience

Stryker (1969) has argued that various identities exist in a hierarchy of salience and that one identity can be invoked over others not only because of its salience but also because of the person's level of commitment to that identity. If an identity has salience for a long period, it becomes a central identity and exerts a

strong influence on behavior. The salience of an ethnic identity may have both stable and situational characteristics. Ting-Toomey et al. (2000) note that "for some individuals, ethnic identity only becomes salient when they are forced to confront interpersonal issues of 'being different' like stereotypes, prejudice, and discrimination." According to Oakes's (1987) functional approach to salience, the use of a particular identity category in a given context depends on the accessibility of the category and the fit between the category and reality. Huddy (2001) has argued that four factors influence the acquisition of identity: the valence of group membership, the defining social characteristics of typical group members, the core values associated with membership, and the characteristics of common out-groups that help to define what the in-group is not. Gerson (2001: 183) maintains that the development and salience of identity are influenced by practices—by "what people do and how they conceptualize or represent what they do as constituting membership in various groups." The salience of any particular identity also depends on its interconnections with other identities and their salience. Thus, research shows that the degree of a person's identification with different levels of identity categorization may be inferred from an examination of the interrelationships between the different categories (Huici et al. 1997).

I would maintain that identity salience is interconnected with the stability of identity systems. Like many unstable systems, the identity system tends to become stable. In various situations, different identities become salient, restoring the stability of the identity system. If any change occurs in the social situation or in the balance of power, then another identity becomes salient, leading to the restructuring of the system of identities. When one of the core identities becomes more salient than another, the changes to the system are less considerable, because correlations between core identities are stable and strong as a rule. But if one of the short-term identities becomes salient, the imbalance within the system grows significantly; much time and restructuring effort are required to return it to a stable position. In many situations, a more numerous, authoritative, and powerful out-group will influence the development of a person's salient identity. But research shows that even the disproportion between groups can increase the salience of identity; for example, children who are in an ethnic minority in their classrooms have strong ethnic identity. Similarly, children who are raised in families in which there are more members of the opposite gender than of their own have stronger gender identity than do children raised in families in which most of the members are of the same gender (McGuire et al. 1978).

Identity and Conflict Readiness

Core identities are connected to stable attitudes and worldviews. Attitudes connected to short-term identities are less stable and tend to change very quickly. Research reveals that individuals who respond more rapidly to traits that are characteristic of both themselves and the in-group have stronger group identity

(Smith and Henry 1996). There is also an echo effect: the intention of a national minority to become autonomous or independent will provoke a nationalistic reaction among the indigenous majority (Hagendoorn et al. 2000).

Other results confirm the role of subjective group membership in shaping political attitudes and behavior (Conover 1988; Miller et al. 1981). Some researchers report a strong correlation between identification with an in-group and hostility toward an out-group (Branscombe and Wann 1994; Grant and Brown 1995). It has been shown that negative stereotypes can be reinforced, not only as a result of the attribution of antagonistic goals to out-groups, but also by the attribution of goals to the in-group when in-group members assume that out-groups will react in a hostile manner to these shared in-group goals (Hagendoorn et al. 1996). The longitudinal analyses of Duckitt and Mphuthing (1998) demonstrate that black Africans' in-group identification is impacted by their attitudes toward white Africans.

Thus, the salience of social identity affects attitudes: a more salient social identity strengthens attitudes and behavioral intentions to a greater extent than does a nonsalient identity. Moreover, salient identity is connected to the presence of more developed and numerous attitudes than is nonsalient social identity. People with salient national identity have a more developed system of negative attitudes toward and stereotypes about the residents of other countries than do people with a low level of national identity salience (Korostelina 2003a). A salient social identity can also moderate the impact of other social identities on attitudes by strengthening or weakening attitudes connected to it.

Minorities' attitudes toward other ethnic groups show the actual level of active prejudice in a society. Prejudice has been commonly defined as a negative attitude, "an antipathy based on faulty and inflexible generalization" that "may be felt or expressed" and "may be directed toward a group as a whole or toward an individual because he is a member of that group" (Allport 1954: 9). As an attitude, prejudice has three components: cognitive prejudice (thoughts and beliefs about other groups), affective prejudice (feelings and emotions about other groups), and conative prejudice (behavioral predispositions and intended actions) (Esses, Haddock, and Zanna 1993; Zanna and Rempel 1988). Some scholars note that attitudes do not necessarily have all three aspects and that they can be formed primarily or exclusively on the basis of only one component (Eagly and Chaiken 1993). Thus, each component can have a different level of development and a different role in defining the structure and nature of an individual's prejudice. Theories of stereotypes, prejudice, and discrimination posit a wide range of relations between and among the components of prejudice (Stephan and Stephan 2004).

Prejudice is typically measured using standardized scales that contain statements about the attributes of a group, the respondent's feelings about the group, and whether the respondent supports policies that affect the group (Dovidio et al. 1996). Other special methods measure single components of prejudice. Many scholars consider stereotypes to be cognitive components and measure

them by asking respondents to provide descriptions of members of a group or by rating the extent to which specific traits are associated with the group. The affective component of prejudice contains different emotions, such as dislike, hate, discomfort, and anxiety, which interact with cognitive components and lead to negative intergroup perception (Hyers and Swim 1998). Emotions are measured by asking participants to indicate the level at which they experience each of a range of feelings.

Psychological research provides sufficient empirical information about stereotypes and emotions but sheds considerably less light on the conative component of prejudice. Although discrimination is described as a phenomenon separate from prejudice, the results of research on discrimination can in fact be used to understand the behavioral element of prejudice. Discrimination, for example, means denying equality of treatment (Allport 1954) or maintaining the favored position of one's own group at the expense of other groups (Jones 1972). Discrimination has been measured in terms of failure to help, self-disclosure, seating distances, and nonverbal behavior (Dovidio and Gaertner 1998). There is almost no research, however, on behavioral intentions related to the readiness for conflict with another group as a measure of the conative component of prejudice. The readiness for conflict aiming at the dominance of the in-group over out-groups or at defending the status and goals of the in-group is an extreme consequence of intergroup prejudice. It is important to extend research on prejudice to include the intention to fight with another group, since this intention reflects the conflict potential resulting from particular intergroup relations.

One's readiness for conflict with another group reflects one's willingness and eagerness to defend one's own group in situations of real or perceived threat from other groups, to control and prevent actions of the members of other groups that are potentially dangerous or unpleasant for one's own group (or that could increase the status of the other group), or to punish or take revenge against members of the other group. People with a high level of conflict readiness engage in harassment and fighting with members of other groups more often than they do with members of their own group.

Conflict readiness is interconnected with the cognitive and affective components of prejudice. Negative stereotypes, beliefs, feelings, and emotions reinforce it. Cognitive dissonance theory (Festinger 1957) leads us to expect, moreover, that conflict readiness will reshape negative stereotypes and feelings. It predicts that individuals will tend to seek consistency among their cognitions (i.e., their beliefs and opinions). When there is an inconsistency between behavioral intentions and stereotypes, something must change to eliminate the dissonance. In the case of such a discrepancy, it is most likely that stereotypes will be changed to accommodate behavior. Therefore, if people have a high level of conflict readiness, their stereotypes and attitudes will almost certainly become more negative and extreme to avoid dissonance.

When we approach social identity as a system, we can expect the salience of national identity to moderate the impact of ethnic identity on conflict readiness

by strengthening or weakening individuals' readiness for conflict with the members of other ethnic groups. But the salience of identity itself cannot provide complete information about how attitudes and conflict readiness will be moderated. To understand the moderation effect of another identity (in this case, national identity), it is also important to analyze the meaning of this identity. Assessing the impact of concepts of national identity provides an opportunity to develop a deeper understanding of interrelations within the identity system and their effects on conflict intentions.

National and Ethnic Identities

Since a usual characteristic of nations is their residence in common territory, many people in newly nationalizing states become members of these states only because they reside within their borders. As Kelman (1997) pointed out, the establishment of new states creates incentives for the creation of ethnic homogeneity and thus systematic efforts to marginalize or destroy ethnic "others." Conflict can develop when the identity chosen by an individual is incompatible with the identity imposed by others or with the social context in which identity is constantly being re-created (Kelman 1982; Stein 1998; Stern 1995).

Yet national identity building may also create a tolerant new common identity and opportunities for the de-escalation of conflict. According to a common in-group identity model (Gaetner et al. 2000), possession of a new common identity changes people's conceptions of their membership—they shift from perceiving themselves as members of different groups to perceiving themselves as members of a single, more inclusive group—and it makes individuals' attitudes toward former out-group members more positive, even if the two groups have a long history of conflict. The new superordinate national identity provides a strong feeling of unity with other groups, self-esteem, confidence, and dignity, and it can reduce intergroup biases and conflict. For example, when American identity is the most important one for members of diverse ethnic and racial groups in the United States and they see themselves as members of their ethnic or racial groups only secondarily, they exhibit less conflict behavior (Citrin, Wong, and Duff 2000). Research on ethnic and racial identities in the United States and Israel also suggests that a sense of patriotism is connected to weak identity as a member of a subordinate group and to the possession of strong national identity (Sidanius et al. 1997). Thus, when an individual has salient national identity, national identity is important to that individual, who usually has strong feelings of belonging to the nation, shared positive attitudes toward the in-group, and shared negative attitudes toward the citizens of other countries. Salient national identity has a strong influence on behavior, and for some people national identity can become a central identity.

Concepts of National Identity

The meaning of a new national identity can have a significant impact on people's conflict readiness. Research stresses the importance of meaning in both shaping identities and determining whether behavior is conflict seeking or tolerant (Deaux 1993; Gurin, Hurtado, and Peng 1994; Huddy 2003; Simon and Hamilton 1994). Breakwell (2001) shows that the different meanings of identity in different European countries shape reactions to policies designed to create a European Union. The meaning of African-American identity influences African-Americans' readiness to support programs designed to improve the situations of other minority groups (Sellers et al. 1998). Research also shows that the meaning of national identity can influence attitudes toward other groups and toward those in other political situations. Thus, individuals with a nativist sense of American identity regard immigrants negatively and see the adoption of American customs as an obligation of immigrants (Citrin, Wong, and Duff 2000).

The central problem of national identity formation concerns the interrelations between the majority and the minority, between dominant and small minorities, and between natives and immigrants. The core question for the national identity concept is the position of ethnic minorities within the nation, that is, whether the minority will be oppressed by the majority or whether members of the minority will have opportunities to maintain their ethnic culture. The analysis of relations between ethnic groups shows that people can have three different concepts or ideas of national identity: an ethnic concept, a multicultural concept, and a civic concept. People with an ethnic concept of national identity perceive their nation as built around a core ethnic community into which ethnic minorities must assimilate. They see their nation as monoethnic and monolingual, and they believe that those who have inherited or assimilated the values and attributes of the ethnic core should have higher status within the nation. Those with a multicultural concept of national identity view their nations as offering equal rights—and even some elements of autonomy and self-governance—to all ethnic groups. They see their states as societies within which ethnic minorities should be guaranteed resources to maintain their ethnic cultures and communities. The different ethnic groups must have an opportunity to receive education in their native language, and their cultural heritage must be part of the country's heritage. Those with a civic concept, finally, perceive their citizenship as a contract between the people and the state that involves rights and obligations. They view the constitution, the rule of law, and civic responsibility as the main features of the nation, and they see ethnicity as insignificant. They perceive their nation as built on a distinctive nonethnic civic culture into which all citizens must integrate.

Citizens in countries such as France and Germany developed a common understanding of their nation and national identity over centuries.

But in newly developing nations, people often differ in their understanding of national identity, and this influences their estimations of their situation, their expectations, and their behavior (Korostelina 2003a). The meaning of national identity shapes people's attitudes and behavior toward different ethnic groups within their own nations as well as their approaches toward other nations. Research shows that concepts of the nation are associated with specific models of integrating immigrants into society; for example, they influence the process of integrating a nation into the broader European community (Münch 2001). Thus, an ethnic concept of national identity in Germany leads to the rejection of immigrants as members of the German nation and to the belief that they are granted too many rights. A multicultural concept of national identity in the United States produces the appreciation of different cultures and the acceptance of differences among citizens and other permanent and temporary residents. And a civic concept of national identity in Great Britain makes possible the integration of immigrants into society by providing them a place in the community of citizens. Because the meaning of national identity influences individuals' attitudes and behavior, the concept of national identity can influence the readiness of both majorities and minorities to fight with other groups and can increase or decrease the influence of other identities.

Ethnic Identity Salience

As Phinney (1991) shows, people with strong ethnic identity salience are more prejudiced and show greater readiness for conflict behavior toward other groups. Research demonstrates, for example, that South Africans' strong identification with their own racial and ethnic group influences their need for group solidarity and reinforces their antipathy toward out-groups and their feelings of threat and intolerance (Gibson and Gouwa 1998). Other results also suggest that salient group membership has a role in shaping political attitudes and behavior (Conover 1988; Miller et al. 1981) and find a correlation between salient group identification and hostility toward out-groups (Branscombe and Wann 1994; Grant and Brown 1995).

My previous research (Korostelina 2004) showed that salient ethnic identity itself—measured by responses to the statements "I am proud to be a member of my ethnic group" and "It is important for me to be a member of my ethnic group, and I share my values and ideas with other members of my ethnic group"—did not have a strong effect on conflict readiness. These statements measure internal sources of self-esteem (Korostelina 2003b) and identity salience. Individuals who agree with them have a strong sense of membership because they are proud of their own group; they do not have a need to compare their group to other groups or to view out-groups negatively. But combined with ethnocentrism—measured by responses to the statements "There are no people in the world better than those of my ethnic group" and "The more the

culture of my ethnic group influences the culture of other nations, the better it is for these nations"—the salience of social identity *does* have a significant impact on conflict readiness. This second group of statements measures the degree to which the respondent has external sources of self-esteem and identity salience: the in-group itself does not provide a source of pride, and the individual instead tends to perceive out-groups negatively and to discriminate against them. Negative comparison provides a basis for strong identification with the in-group.

Ethnocentrism has the following characteristics: individual members give their primary loyalty to their own ethnic community; this loyalty supersedes their loyalty to other groups; and their ethnic community has a positive estimation of the in-group and negative attitudes toward out-groups. Ethnocentric individuals have a strong feeling of own-group centrality and superiority, and they attempt to maintain the security of their own-group stereotyping and their misplaced suspicion of others' intentions (Booth 1979). Most stereotypes are inaccurate and lead to all sorts of biases and prejudices (Allport 1954; Fiske and Taylor 1991). Ethnocentric attitudes cause people to understand events in ways that further strengthen their positive views of the in-group and their negative views of out-groups (Crocker and Luhtanen 1990). Pettigrew (1979) called such a predisposition the "fundamental attribution error": it involves a tendency to make internal attributions for in-group success and external ones for in-group failure and to make internal attributions for out-group failure and external ones for out-group success. Hewstone (1990) reviewed the many studies documenting this attribution error and found that it escalates conflict between groups. The greater the perceived differences in the typical characteristics of the in-group and out-groups, the greater the likelihood of hostility (Oakes 1987; Turner et al. 1994).

Intergroup dynamics and the need for positive identity both act to produce enemy images even in the absence of hostile intentions by the other party. They generate behavior that is hostile and confrontational, increasing the likelihood that the other party will respond with hostile action. Negative stereotypes can in fact be reinforced by the in-group's attribution of hostile goals to the out-group, and by the expectation that out-groups may react with hostility to the in-group's shared goals (Hagendoorn et al. 1996).

Research shows that in-group bias is stronger among minority groups than among majority groups (Brewer and Weber 1994; Ellemers, Kortekaas, and Ouwerkerk 1999; Simon and Hamilton 1994). In particular, members of lower-status minority groups show more discriminatory behavior (Espinoza and Garza 1985; Otten, Mummendey, and Blanz 1996). Minority group members experience a stronger collective self, have more elaborate positive and negative self-stereotypes, and process more group-level information than majority group members (Ellemers, Kortekaas, and Ouwerkerk 1999; Simon 1992; Simon and Hamilton 1994). They also perceive more in-group homogeneity and in-group similarity than do majority group members (Brewer and

Weber 1994). The stronger in-group bias of minority groups can be explained by minority group members' concerns about social identity (Gerard and Hoyt 1974; Mullen 1983) and their need to compensate for insecurity (Sachdev and Bourhis 1984). Minority groups are often low-status groups and therefore their members need more group support than do the members of majority groups. Their members are highly motivated to improve the fate of the in-group (Mummendey and Otten 1998) and identify more strongly with the in-group than do majority group members (Perreault and Bourhis 1999; Kinket and Verkuyten 1999; van Oudenhoven and Eisses 1998; Verkuyten and Masson 1995). The evidence on this matter is not conclusive, however. Mullen, Brown, and Smith (1992) found that in-group bias is weaker among low-status groups, and Ellemers et al. (1992) report a stronger sense of collective self among minority groups only when the status of the minority group is high. Nonetheless, if strong in-group identification contributes to in-group bias (Brewer 1996; Deaux 1996; Perreault and Bourhis 1998), then minority groups appear to be more prone to bias.

Some studies show that stronger in-group identification does not lead to more in-group bias in the same way for majority groups as it does for minority groups. The in-group identification of majority group members is provoked primarily by perceptions of intergroup conflict, while minority group members have high levels of in-group identification for a variety of reasons (Jackson 2002; Verkuyten and Masson 1995). Under conditions of perceived intergroup conflict or out-group threat, in-group bias may be stronger among majority group members than among minorities. This suggests that the relationship between identity and bias is contingent on the position of groups as majorities or minorities.

The Context of the Research

The research for this chapter took place in Crimea in Ukraine, where Russians and Crimean Tatars, both ethnic minority groups within Ukraine, are now in the process of adopting a new national identity. Crimea was a nominally independent khanate of the Ottoman Empire until 1783, when it was annexed by Russia. After the Russian Revolution, Crimea was independent from 1917 to 1918 and was then incorporated into the Soviet Union as an autonomous republic of the Russian Federation in 1921. Its autonomous status was abolished in 1944. In 1954, Crimea was transferred to the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, and its status as part of Ukraine continued when Ukraine became independent in 1991. The current population of Crimea is nearly 2.5 million. Ethnic Russians, though a minority in Ukraine, make up 64 percent of the Crimean population; of the remaining population, 23 percent are Ukrainians, 10 percent are Crimean Tatars, and 3 percent are Belorussians, Armenians, Greeks, Germans, Jews, and others.

The Crimea of the 1990s had substantial potential for ethnopolitical violence. Multiple "nested autonomies" conflicts arose due to the resettlement in Crimea of 250,000 Crimean Tatars who had been deported to Central Asia by Stalin in 1944. The resettlement changed the ethnic balance of the population by inserting an ethnically divergent group, and it resulted in land and property disputes as well as citizenship claims by the new arrivals. During the 1990s, approximately half of the remaining deported ethnic Tatars and their descendants returned to their "homeland," only to find that they were repeatedly denied citizenship rights and access to education, employment, and housing. In May 1999, 20,000 Crimean Tatars joined in protest against these discriminatory practices and in support of the idea of an autonomous Crimean Tatar republic, provoking a negative reaction from the ethnic Russian population. Russians fear that return migration and population growth will make the Tatars a numerical majority and that this will reinforce their claim for autonomy (Korostelina 2000; Sasse 2002; Shevel 2000). Russians also fear that Muslim fundamentalism will take root among Crimean Tatars (Helton 1996).

Crimean Tatars received state donations and funds for resettlement. This fact increased negative attitudes toward Crimeans among Russians, who had also experienced economic deprivation. Russians had better access to jobs and education than Crimean Tatars, but the collapse of the Soviet Union nonetheless engendered irredentist autonomy claims by the Russians as Crimea's majority ethnic group. The unraveling of the communist system of government posed challenges of new political institution building, social reorientation toward a market economy, and the definition of new concepts of post–Cold War national security for Ukraine as a newly independent state.

Russians and Crimean Tatars differ in their conceptions of the legitimacy of their positions in Ukraine (Korostelina 2000, 2003a). Crimean Tatars consider it legitimate to reclaim their possessions and re-establish national and territorial autonomy. Russians aspire to establish closer relations with Russia and perceive Crimean Tatar autonomy as a step toward Crimean incorporation into the Muslim world. Conversely, Crimean Tatars fear that local autonomy will never be granted if Crimea is part of Russia. Hence, the goals of Russians and Crimean Tatars are incompatible with the formation of a common national identity. The collective adoption of a Ukrainian national identity, however, could provide self-esteem and human dignity to these members of ethnic minorities, making them feel that they are equal citizens of an independent state. National shared identity may smooth away splits between the peoples of Ukraine and unite them in the development of a common state. The meaning of national identity is still in flux among politicians and peoples; thus, we expect that representatives of Russians and Crimean Tatars will have different concepts of national identity.

Empirical Study

Research Design

Schematically, the impact of the meaning of national identity building can be represented like this:



Based on this scheme, I proposed some prospective interrelations between the independent and dependent variables and the moderator:

Proposition 1. Possession of salient national identity will decrease readiness to fight with other groups and weaken the effect of ethnic identity salience on conflict readiness.

Proposition 2. Possession of the ethnic concept of national identity will increase readiness to fight with other groups and strengthen the effect of ethnic identity salience on conflict readiness.

Proposition 3. Possession of the multicultural concept of national identity will reduce readiness to fight with other groups and weaken the effect of ethnic identity salience on conflict readiness.

Proposition 4. Possession of the civic concept of national identity will reduce readiness to fight with other groups and weaken the effect of ethnic identity salience on conflict readiness. This effect will be more significant than the effect of the multicultural concept.

Proposition 5. The meaning of national identity will have a different effect on minority groups than on majority groups.

Method

Sampling. To test these propositions, I designed an opinion survey that was conducted between January and May 2003 in several towns and villages in Crimea. The sample was stratified by location, number of resettlements, and rural-urban status. The survey strata include the towns of Simferopol and Alushta and the counties of Bahchisarai (including the city of Bahchisarai), Krasnoperekopsk, and Sudak, with 997 respondents distributed across these locations in equal proportion.

Questionnaire Design. In addition to asking respondents to provide basic demographic and socioeconomic data about themselves (including estimated income level, occupation, age, level of education, gender, and indigenous language competence ranked in one of five categories from excellent to none), the questionnaire dealt with the following issues. First, it measured identity salience in two ways: (1) it measured the salience of ethnic identity with five statements such as "I am proud to be a representative of (ethnic group)" and "There are no people in the world better than those of my ethnic group"; (2) it measured salience of national identity with three questions such as "I am proud to be a citizen of Ukraine." Second, the survey measured the meaning of national identity in three ways: (1) it assessed the ethnic concept of national identity with three statements such as "The Ukrainian nation must be created on the basis of single Ukrainian culture" and "To be strong and independent, Ukraine should unite around the Ukrainian ethnonational idea"; (2) it assessed the multicultural concept of national identity with three statements such as "Ukraine has to provide an opportunity for each citizen to speak and study in every language" and "All ethnic groups in Ukraine must have the right to autonomy and self-governance"; (3) it assessed the civic concept of national identity with three statements such as "For citizens of Ukraine, ethnic identity should not play any role and cannot be used for political purposes" and "Citizenship of Ukraine is only a contract between citizens and the country about duties and rights." All statements were to be answered on a five-point scale from disagree to agree. Finally, the survey measured readiness for conflict with the questions "How will you behave to defend your ethnic group in a situation of out-group threat?" and "How will you behave to accomplish the aims of your ethnic group in Ukraine?" to be answered on a three-point scale (reject fighting, use legal methods of fighting, or use any methods of fighting). Five-point scales were recoded to four-point scales, excluding "No answer." All missing data and the "do not know" answers were deleted from the analysis.

Results

Crimean Tatars identify more strongly with the ethnic Tatar in-group ($M=16.74$ on a scale from 3 to 20) than Russians identify with the ethnic Russian in-group ($M=12.46$; $F(1,827)=50.52$; $p<.001$). Crimean Tatars also identify more strongly with the nation of Ukraine ($M=7.29$ on a scale from 3 to 12) than Russians do ($M=6.64$), but the difference is not significant ($F(1,828)=.50$; n.s.).

The multicultural concept of national identity is stronger among Crimean Tatars ($M=9.29$ on a scale from 3 to 12) than it is among Russians ($M=8.81$; $F(1,828)=8.74$; $p<.005$), while the civic concept of national identity is stronger among Russians ($M=7.63$ on a scale from 3 to 12) than it is among Crimean Tatars ($M=7.51$; $F(1,826)=5.35$; $p<.05$). The ethnic concept of national identity does not differ significantly between the groups ($F(1,827)=2.35$; n.s.). Crimean

Tatars and Russians have very similar levels of conflict readiness (M=4.52 and M=4.51; n.s. on a scale from 1 to 8).

A partially saturated general linear model was used to simultaneously test the effects of all the above-mentioned predictors on conflict readiness. For both ethnic groups, a salient ethnic identity strengthens conflict readiness, and a salient national identity reduces conflict readiness. The results also show that a salient ethnic concept of national identity among Russians contributes to conflict readiness, while among Crimean Tatars it substantially reduces conflict readiness (table 3.1).

Table 3.1 Significance and Effects of the Concepts of National Identity on Conflict Readiness

	Russians			Crimean Tatars		
		Mean readiness to fight score			Mean readiness to fight score	
	Beta	W/ concept	W/o concept	Beta	W/ concept	W/o concept
Ethnic concept	2.05*	4.67	4.14	3.44**	4.07	4.81
Multicultural concept	1.90*	4.33	4.51	3.92**	4.68	4.20
Civic concept	2.27**	4.28	4.56	3.04**	4.16	4.71

Notes: * = p<.05; ** = p<.01. Standardized Beta coefficients from a partially saturated general linear model of data from the 2003 Crimean survey. Scores on a scale of 1 to 8, where 8 is the highest readiness to fight. Model and data available from the author.

Among Russians, the multicultural concept of national identity reduces conflict readiness, while among Crimean Tatars, it makes a significant contribution to conflict readiness. The civic concept of national identity significantly reduces conflict readiness among both Russians and Crimean Tatars; this impact is more significant for Crimean Tatars.

The moderating roles of identity salience and of the different concepts of national identity were determined by comparing the direct effect of ethnic identity on conflict readiness relative to the model above, in which salience and each concept of national identity operated as a moderator. Identity salience and possession of the different concepts of national identity do have moderating effects on the impact of ethnic identity for Russians and Crimean Tatars (table 3.2).

Possession of a salient national identity and of the ethnic concept of national identity strengthens the influence of salient ethnic identity on conflict readiness among Russians and weakens it among Crimean Tatars. Possession of the multicultural concept weakens the influence of salient ethnic identity on conflict readiness among Russians and strengthens it among Crimean Tatars. Possession of the civic concept weakens the influence of salient ethnic identity on conflict readiness among representatives of both ethnic groups.

TABLE 3.2 The Moderating Effects of National Identity on Conflict Readiness among Russians and Crimean Tatars

Effects of Ethnic Identity	Russians	Crimean Tatars
Without salient national identity	2.56*	3.73**
With salient national identity	3.01**	2.20*
Without ethnic concept	1.95*	2.47*
With ethnic concept	2.54*	2.02*
Without multicultural concept	4.01**	2.23*
With multicultural concept	3.25**	3.03**
Without civic concept	4.02**	2.27*
With civic concept	3.12**	1.93*

Notes: * = p<.05; ** = p<.01. Standardized Beta coefficients from a partially saturated general linear model of data from the 2003 Crimean survey. Model and data available from the author.

Discussion

The results of my survey demonstrate that the possession of salient national identity increases the influence of ethnic identity on the personal and group conflict readiness of Russians. When Russians adopt a salient national identity and believe that they are the main and more powerful minority group in Ukraine, their readiness to fight with other ethnic minorities is strengthened. When Russians accept Ukrainian identity without adopting a salient ethnic identity and ethnocentric views, however, they perceive the Ukrainian identity as common to all ethnic groups in Ukraine. Conversely, ethnic identity among Crimean Tatars with low national identity salience leads to readiness to fight with other ethnic minorities who can compete with them, but if national identity is salient, it decreases the influence of ethnic identity on conflict readiness.

I expected to find that possession of the ethnic concept of national identity would increase conflict readiness and strengthen the negative impact of ethnic identity. This hypothesis was confirmed for Russians, but it failed for Crimean Tatars, for whom possession of the ethnic concept of national identity decreases conflict readiness and weakens the impact of ethnic identity. I also assumed that possession of the multicultural concept of national identity would reduce conflict readiness and weaken the impact of conflict indicators. This hypothesis, too, was confirmed for Russians but failed for Crimean Tatars, among whom the multicultural concept of national identity contributes to conflict readiness and strengthens the impact of ethnic identity. My hypothesis that possession of the civic concept of national identity would reduce the influence of conflict indicators was completely confirmed. Therefore, my research shows that different concepts of national identity *do* affect readiness for conflict with out-groups among ethnic minorities. They also moderate the impact of salient ethnic identity on conflict readiness.

These effects depend, however, on the position of an ethnic minority in Ukrainian society. Thus, Russians and Crimean Tatars have different ethnic conceptions of national identity: the Russians have a concept of Russian-Ukrainian national identity, while the Crimean Tatars have a concept of simple Ukrainian national identity. For Russians, a numerous and powerful minority particularly in Crimea, possession of an ethnic concept of national identity increases the impact of the salience of ethnic identity on the readiness to fight with other ethnic groups. When Russians have an ethnic concept of national identity, they perceive the nation as a single ethnic entity in which Ukrainian Russians must have the highest status among other groups (Korostelina 2003a). They think that national identity in Ukraine has to be built around the Russian community. Therefore, as the dominant minority (and even the absolute majority in Crimea), Russians are ready to fight other ethnic groups for their privileged position. When Crimean Tatars, a small minority in Ukraine, have an ethnic concept of national identity, on the other hand, they accept the leading role of the Ukrainian ethnic group in the nation. They feel themselves to be secure within the nation and are ready to accept Ukrainian culture and language if Ukraine will help the Crimean Tatars deter the pro-Russian movement in Crimea (ibid.). Thus, the possession of an ethnic concept of national identity weakens the impact of ethnic identity on the readiness of Crimean Tatars to fight with other groups.

Possession of a multicultural concept of national identity decreases the impact of ethnic identity on conflict readiness among Russians and increases its impact among Crimean Tatars. When Russians have a multicultural conception of national identity, they see Ukraine as a society within which ethnic minorities should be guaranteed resources to maintain their ethnic cultures and communities. As a numerous and powerful minority, Russians expect that they will receive major benefits from the state, and they want to preserve their position without having to struggle against other ethnic groups. Such beliefs reduce the influence of salient ethnic identity among Russians in Crimea. When Crimean Tatars, as a small minority, see the nation as multicultural one, however, they are more ready to fight against other ethnic groups for their rights and some privileges. They believe they can get more resources than other ethnic groups because of their history of deportation and their unique position as an endogenous people. In this case, the multicultural concept strengthens the impact of salient ethnic identity on readiness to fight for resources to maintain the ethnic culture and community of Crimean Tatars.

Possession of a civic concept of national identity reduces the impact of salient ethnic identity for both groups. When people perceive their nation as built on a distinctive nonethnic civic culture into which all citizens should integrate, their ethnic identity does not have an important influence on their conflict readiness. If representatives of both large and small minorities see civic responsibility as the main feature of the nation, their ethnicity is less significant. Thus, the civic

concept of national identity mitigates readiness to fight among ethnic minorities and moderates the impact of ethnic identity. (This finding accords with David Brown's predictions in the first chapter of this volume.)

The hypotheses, which were derived from conventional theory, suggested that possession of the ethnic concept of national identity would increase readiness to fight with other groups and strengthen the effects of ethnic identity salience on conflict readiness. They also predicted that possession of the multicultural concept of national identity would reduce readiness to fight with other groups and weaken the effects of ethnic identity salience, ethnocentrism and economic deprivation on conflict readiness. My results show that such propositions are accurate for some groups and incorrect for others. The critical moderating variable, I would suggest, is the position of a minority within the state as a major or minor minority: For numerous and powerful minorities, possession of the ethnic concept of national identity strengthens their willingness to fight for the privileged position within the society; the multicultural concept, on the other hand, reduces their readiness to fight, because they expect to obtain the major benefits in a multicultural nation. For small minorities, possession of the ethnic concept encourages assimilation and reduces willingness to fight, while possession of the multicultural concept evokes competition with other ethnic groups for rights and social and economic position within the society. Generalizing from my findings, I would propose that the position of a minority within a nation regulates the impact of the ethnic and multicultural concepts of national identity on members of that minority's readiness to fight with members of other groups. The only proposition that appears to have been correct for both groups is my hypothesis about the moderation effect of the civic concept. My results show that possession of the civic concept of national identity significantly reduces conflict readiness among ethnic minorities.

Conclusion

The findings provide ample empirical support for my hypothesis that a salient social identity can influence the impact of other identities on conflict intentions. I have shown that possession of a salient national identity can mitigate the impact of ethnic identity on readiness for conflict with other ethnic groups. I have also demonstrated that the meaning of another social identity can be a powerful moderator of the influence of a particular identity on behavioral intention: the three different concepts of national identity, I argue, weaken or strengthen the impact of ethnic identity on the readiness for conflict among ethnic groups. Thus, my study confirms that analysis of the impact of social identity on attitudes or behavior requires assessment of the interconnections between different identities. To understand the effects of a single social identity, it is necessary to analyze the influence, salience, and meaning of other social identities.

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