3 Devastating civilians at home

The plight of Crimean Tatars and Californians of Asian descent during World War II

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Civilian devastation in times of war is not limited to combat settings. Their suffering can also arise from draconian policies of their own political leaders. For these leaders, a militaristic framing of war, which priorities national security and defense, gives them carte blanche to determine the fate of their own citizens. Accusations of treason operate politically as an instrument for recasting citizens as enemy agents. The primary obligation to defend the nation is linked to a mindset which gives government the right to redefine the citizens' identity.

The militaristic framing of war that emphasizes the importance of national security and defense from the evil enemy gives the leaders carte blanche to define the identity of citizens and to totally deny their agency. The attributions of traitorous intentions to fellow citizens, redefinitions of them as enemies of the nation are morally justified by the very ideology of war. The ideas of "necessity" and "obligations to defend the nation" develop a compelling foundation for the government's entitlement to define the identity of fellow citizens. These policies rest on normative assumptions, which can be framed as a collective axiology imposed by the state on a particular ethnic group (Rothbart and Korostelina 2006). The establishment of the iconic order of betrayal and development of mythic narrative that depict the reasons and consequences of the treasonous actions of this ethnic group lead to a specific normative order that prescribes a particular violent action. As I explain below, this action is justified by the high level of collective generality and low level of balance: perception of this group as homogeneous in their aspiration to betray the nation.

The campaigns of brutality by dominant governments against marginalized ethnic groups in times of war are not limited to totalitarian regimes. Democratic states have also imposed draconian measures against civilian minority groups during wartime. In cases of both totalitarian and non-totalitarian oppression, the nation's political leadership broadens its definition of potential enemies to include any ethnic community that is cast as a threat to the innocents of the "home country," as Richard Rubenstein demonstrates in Chapter 2 of this volume. In the current chapter I argue that such characterization reflects a process of collective denigration and stigmatization of internal ethnic groups, supported by the socio-psychological process

of constructing ostensibly fixed boundaries (social, political, and normative) between the “good people” at home and the “enemy within our midst.”

This chapter examines two cases of the selective targeting of ethnic communities during World War II. One case recounts the deportation of 110,000 people of Japanese ancestry (two-thirds of whom were American citizens) to “evacuation centers.” Within the space of a few short months following the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, perceptions of the Japanese-American population—particularly those living in Hawaii and along the West Coast—evolved from peaceful citizens to dangerous enemies. Building upon existing anti-Asian sentiment, the public narrative surrounding this minority ethnic group quickly solidified into demands for their immediate deportation or at least evacuation to internment centers based largely upon the criteria of race. The other case recounts the enormous hardships experienced by Crimean Tatars at the hands of the Soviet government during and after the conquest of Ukraine by the German Wehrmacht. Immediately after the recapture of the Ukraine from the German forces, the Soviet authorities enacted a brutal campaign of propaganda castigating the Crimeans Tatars for their allegedly treasonous collaboration with the Nazis during the German occupation, a campaign that served as a prelude to mass deportation that wrenched them from their homeland and forced them to live in internment camps.

In this chapter I examine the rationale for imposing these brutal policies and propaganda campaigns against both the Japanese-Americans in the U.S. and the Crimean Tatars in the Soviet Union. Such policies were fueled by storytelling practices in various sectors of society about the inherent dangers posed by the presence of each ethnic group, first regarding the threats to security at home from possible attacks by Japanese-Americans, and second, regarding the treasonous actions of the Crimean Tatars during the Nazi occupation of the Ukraine. Each case study begins with a brief review of the ethnic group and their relative social position during World War II, followed by an examination of the negative images of these groups published in U.S. and Soviet newspapers. I then analyze the discursive practice of border construction that underpins these campaigns of ethnic targeting, in which ingroup/outgroup divisions are at one level cast as fixed social/political realities, but at a deeper level are charged with normative meaning. In this respect the constructions of identity and difference are in both cases defined through notions of collective axiology that frame ingroup/outgroup difference in normative dualities of good/bad, right/wrong, and virtue/vice. Such dualities shore up the collective will for brutal attacks against the marginalized groups (Rothbart and Korostelina 2006).

Case 1: Deportation of Japanese-Americans in the United States

The first major influx of Japanese immigrants to the U.S. started in 1884. After coming to Hawaii in the late 1880s, many immigrants moved to the

mainland U.S. in the late 1890s, settling in and around Los Angeles County. During the next two decades, the Japanese population grew from 2,039 to 72,157. A quota system was established to limit the influx of Japanese to the U.S., and in 1924 immigration from Japan was banned altogether.

Prejudice against Japanese people emerged with the first wave of immigrants and intensified with each successive wave. Although the Japanese newcomers comprised less than 1 percent of the total population, their salient ethnic identity and deep cultural differences in relation to white Americans made their presence strongly visible. And the sense of distain against all Asian immigrants, most notably those from China, spilled over to the Japanese. According to Foote (1943: 2),

> By 1900 mass meetings were urging their exclusion and an attempt was made to segregate Japanese-American school children in San Francisco. The California legislature had before it seventeen anti-Japanese bills in 1909, some of which failed only after Theodore Roosevelt's direct intervention.

In October 1906 the San Francisco Board of Education ordered all Japanese students to be separated from the Caucasian students; ninety-three Japanese students (twenty-five of whom were American citizens) were then moved to a segregated school in Chinatown. In 1913 the Alien Land Law of California stripped all alien Japanese of their property, including farmland. Even after these rulings, anti-Japanese attitudes intensified among the general population, leading to a campaign by the "Committee of 1,000" of Southern California to demand a boycott of all Japanese products.

Such anti-Japanese sentiments intensified in the lead-up to World War II. On October 11, 1941, two months before Pearl Harbor, Jim Marshall warned in an article in *Collier's* that in the event war were to break out between the U.S. and Japan, all people of Japanese ancestry in California would be transported to concentration camps. But he stressed that all responsible organizations, including the Army, Navy, and F.B.I. believed "that the situation is not dangerous and that, whatever happens, there is not likely to be any trouble. With this opinion West Coast newspapermen, in touch with the problem for years, agree almost unanimously" (Marshall 1941). Calls for tolerance and fairness were voiced even in the first days after the Pearl Harbor attack on December 7, 1941. For example, the day after the attack Attorney-General Francis Biddle stressed the loyalty of Japanese Americans: "There are in the United States many persons of Japanese extraction whose loyalty to the country, even in the present emergency, is unquestioned. It would therefore be a serious mistake to take any action against these people" (Biddle 1941). Japanese of American birth were still considered loyal citizens. For example, General DeWitt, who served as the War Department's Provost Marshal General and who later ordered the mass evacuation of Japanese-Americans, said:

> If we go ahead and arrest the 93,000 Japanese, native born and foreign born, we are going to have an awful job on our hands and are very liable to alienate the loyal Japanese from disloyal.... I'm very doubtful that it would be common sense procedure to try and intern or to intern 117,000 Japanese in this theater.... An American citizen, after all, is an American citizen. And while they all may not be loyal, I think we can weed the disloyal out of the loyal and lock them up if necessary.
>
> (Dewitt 1941)

Despite these calls for tolerance, Japanese citizens living in the U.S. were treated as dangerous enemies. By December 21, 1941, the F.B.I. had taken into custody 1,460 Japanese people; others were restricted from travel and ordered to register. Still, up to this point, military leaders regarded the control measures they had put in place as a sufficient and adequate approach to "managing" the Japanese population and did not consider concentration camps as an immediate requirement.

Fear among the general population that Japanese Americans were working as a "fifth-column" to the Japanese government within the U.S. intensified in late December, especially after stories of the attack from evacuees of Pearl Harbor began to circulate widely in the newspapers. On December 30, Navy Secretary Frank Knox confirmed that the attack was aided by the effective fifth-column of Japanese people living in Hawaii (Foote 1943). This statement irrevocably changed the position of Japanese-American residents of Hawaii in the structure of the collective axiology: no longer cast as fellow citizens, they became enemies. Fueled by stories of recent military conquests by the Japanese army in the Pacific, a general suspicion of the entire Japanese-American population swept through the country.

Notions of the identity and difference of Japanese Americans from white Americans were formulated in normative terms. Accounts in the mainstream media and statements by government officials relied on simple and unambiguous dualities, establishing a boundary division between the (pure) American citizens and (dangerous) Japanese aliens.

On January 2, the Joint Immigration Committee of the California Legislature sent a manifesto to California newspapers that portrayed both Japanese aliens and citizens as loyal to the Emperor of Japan and unwilling to assimilate into American society. This manifesto also "exposed" a curriculum of racial supremacy that was presumably shaping instruction in Japanese-language schools. Americans began to tell negative stories about mainland Japanese-Americans. One such story quoted in Herb Caen's *Chronicle* column early in January recounts a Japanese gardener who "snarls" to his white employer: "After the war you'll be cutting the lawn for me" (Foote 1943: 6).

Riding this wave of ethnic hatred, California Congressman Leland Ford launched a campaign for the internment of all Japanese living in the U.S. In his remarks of January 16, 1942, he stated:

> To prevent any fifth column activity ... all Japanese, whether citizens or not, be placed in inland concentration camps. As justification for this, I submit that if an American born Japanese, who is a citizen, is really patriotic and wishes to make his contribution to the safety and welfare of this country, right here is the opportunity to do so, namely, that by permitting himself to be placed in a concentration camp, he would be making his sacrifice, and he should be willing to do it if he is patriotic and working for us.
>
> (Ford 1941)

He garnered immediate support for such a proposal from local and regional government bodies and civic organizations, such as the Los Angeles American Legion, the Alameda and Fresno County Boards of Supervisors, the Seattle American Legion, leaders of the Californian agricultural sector, and Pacific Coast congressmen.

Los Angeles County fired all Japanese-American civil service employees and the County Board of Supervisors called for a total evacuation of all Japanese-Americans. Journalists reported stories that characterized Americans of Japanese decent as enemy aliens. On January 29, 1942 columnist Henry McLemore wrote in the well-known Chicago periodical *Hearst*:

> Why treat the Japs well here? They take the parking positions. They get ahead of you in the stamp line at the post office. They have their share of seats on the bus and streetcar lines ... I am for immediate removal of every Japanese on the West Coast to a point deep in the interior. I don't mean a nice part of the interior, either. ... Let 'em be pinched, hurt, hungry, and dead up against it. ... Personally I hate the Japanese. And that goes for all of them.
>
> (McLemore 1942)

A *Los Angeles Times* editorial stressed the salient differences between Japanese-Americans and the rest of American population and justified severe discriminatory policies:

> A viper is nonetheless a viper wherever the egg is hatched. ... So, a Japanese American born of Japanese parents, nurtured upon Japanese traditions, living in a transplanted Japanese atmosphere ... notwithstanding his nominal brand of accidental citizenship almost inevitably and with the rarest exceptions grows up to be a Japanese, and not an American. ... Thus, while it might cause injustice to a few to treat them all as potential enemies, I cannot escape the conclusion ... that such treatment ... should be accorded to each and all of them while we are at war with their race.
>
> (Niiya 1993: 54)

In the telephone conversation with Mr. Carrington Gill, Colonel Bendetsen mentioned a public opinion survey from February 7–13 that assessed

the general attitudes of the American public toward their Japanese co-habitants. Survey results confirmed that "racial or national antagonism seems to account in large part for the unfavorable attitude toward the Japanese" (Bendetsen 1942); these negative sentiments were particularly strong in southern California. The survey also showed that 50 percent of population in California supported the internment of Japanese aliens, though only 14 percent favored interning American citizens of Japanese descent. The anti-Japanese sentiment had built to such a pitch that finally on February 16 the *San Francisco Chronicle* (1942) reported "a tidal wave of demands" for evacuation.

The publication of this report marks a definitive point in the creation of a normative border between Japanese-Americans and the rest of population, and the full formation of a collective axiology that presented Japanese citizens as enemies. The general public were not only ready to accept discriminative policies against fellow citizens but actively demanded them as justified measures.

The perceptions of Japanese-Americans were also rapidly changing among military leaders. By the end of January, intelligence sources provided information about the underground espionage net of Japanese aliens, including first and second generation Japanese. Based on this and other information, General DeWitt concluded that any enemy attack on the west coast would be supported by "a violent outburst of coordinated and controlled sabotage" among the Japanese population (Conn 1959: 132). In his final report on the eventual evacuation, he stressed the need for imposing harsh measures against the Japanese population in order to protect Americans from their treasonous actions:

> Emperor-worshipping ceremonies were commonly held and millions of dollars had flowed into the Japanese imperial war chest from the contributions freely made by Japanese here. The continued presence of a large, unassimilated, tightly knit and racial group, bound to an enemy nation by strong ties of race, culture, custom and religion along a frontier vulnerable to attack constituted a menace which had to be dealt with. Their loyalties were unknown and time was of the essence. The evident aspirations of the enemy emboldened by his recent successes made it worse than folly to have left any stone unturned in the building up of our defenses.
>
> (DeWitt 1943b: para. 2)

Nevertheless, popular support would be required to impose discriminatory policies against fellow citizens, including innocent men, women and children. On January 27, 1943 General DeWitt met with Governor Culbert L. Olson of California regarding the treatment of the Japanese population. Following this meeting, the general then declared that the U.S. public demanded the evacuation of all Japanese-Americans:

> There's a tremendous volume of public opinion now developing against the Japanese of all classes, that is aliens and non-aliens, to get them off the land, and in Southern California around Los Angeles—in that area too—they want and they are bringing pressure on the government to move all the Japanese out. As a matter of fact, it's not being instigated or developed by people who are not thinking but by the best people of California. Since the publication of the Roberts Report they feel that they are living in the midst of a lot of enemies. They don't trust the Japanese, none of them.
>
> (Conn 1959: 133)

By this time, the country's leadership also supported such extreme policies. At a private conference held on February 11, President Franklin D. Roosevelt authorized the War Department to use all actions necessary against possible saboteurs as determined by the military necessity of the situation. Based on this authorization, General DeWitt advocated a policy of forced evacuation of every American-born Japanese from several areas on the West Coast.

On February 13, the Pacific Coast Congressional Subcommittee on Aliens and Sabotage forwarded the following recommendation to the President: "We recommend the immediate evacuation of all persons of Japanese lineage and all others, aliens and citizens alike, whose presence shall be deemed dangerous or inimical to the defense of the United States from all strategic areas" (Recommendations 1942). On February 17 several army officials met with Justice Department officials at the home of Attorney General Biddle to discuss the draft of a proposed Presidential Executive order ordering the removal of both citizens and aliens from areas of military importance. On February 19, President Roosevelt issued Executive Order 9066 which authorized military commanders to:

> prescribe military areas in such places and of such extent as he or the appropriate Military Commander may determine, from which any or all persons may be excluded, and with respect to which, the right of any person to enter, remain in, or leave shall be subject to whatever restrictions the Secretary of War or the appropriate Military Commander may impose in his discretion.
>
> (Roosevelt 1942)

The text of the order did not specify a particular ethnic group or targeted people by region. But on February 21, the Secretary of War sent Congress a letter that confirmed plans for the partial or complete evacuation of the Japanese people from the Pacific coast (Conn 1959).

The support for the evacuation was prompted by more than an assessment of military necessity and national security. A San Francisco representative of the Office of Government sent General DeWitt several reports emphasizing the danger to Japanese citizens and requested measures for

protecting them by evacuating from southern California. The reports stated that there was a "serious possibility of mob violence and vigilante committees if the Army does not work fast enough" (Conn 1959: 139.)

Enjoying the support of both the state government and the nation's Department of War, General DeWitt announced on March 2 establishment of two military areas. In his press release he stated that all persons of Japanese ancestry would be excluded from Military Area No. 1, which encompassed the western halves of the three Pacific Rim states (California, Washington, and Oregon) and southern Arizona (Conn *et al.* 2000). General DeWitt urged the Japanese to move voluntarily into the interior from prescribed Military Areas and promised those who did so that they would not be disturbed again.

Nevertheless, the proclamation was not supported by the local or federal governments, who refused to assist in transporting and resettling the evacuees. Thus, only about 2,000 Japanese residents actually moved out of the delineated Military Areas. To facilitate the evacuation of the remaining 20,000 to 30,000 Japanese, the Army selected two sites—one in the Owens Valley of California and the other along the Colorado River in Arizona. According to Conn (1959: 139), in mid-March,

> most of the interior states west of the Mississippi River had made it known officially that they would not permit free settlement of citizen or alien Japanese within their borders, it became obvious that if the Japanese were to be evacuated en masse they would have to be put in government-operated camps under armed guard.

On March 19, 1942 after brief debate, the Public Law 503 for mass relocation passed both houses of Congress, and on March 21 the President signed the enforcement act. On March 29, the termination of voluntary migration was followed by a policy of forced evacuation. By June 7, more than 100,000 persons of Japanese ancestry were evacuated from Military Area No. 1; the evacuation from Military Area No. 2 in California was completed by early August. In the fall of 1942, all Japanese-Americans then interred were transferred from temporary, Army-controlled Assembly Centers to ten permanent inland Relocation Centers in seven Western states, under the control of the War Relocation Authority.

The relocations were conducted with little respect for the evacuees' dignity. With only forty-eight hours notice the majority of Japanese-American internees were forcibly removed from their homes, allowing them to carry a few light possessions. They were housed in extremely crowded tarpaper-covered barracks and were provided communal areas for washing, laundry, food preparation, and eating. Sometimes two or three families were crowded into a single room with an area of twenty to twenty-four feet. The harsh conditions of extreme temperatures, inadequate medical care, and poor nutrition contributed to the fatalities of some internees.

Four explanations have been advanced for the forced evacuation of so many Japanese-Americans during this time: military necessity; the protection of those evacuated; political and economic pressures; and racial prejudice. Analyzing the evacuation program, the War Relocation Authority concluded that "a selective evacuation of people of Japanese descent from the west coast military area was justified and administratively feasible in the spring of 1942" (War Relocation Authority 1942: 182). But it also stressed that the mass evacuation was never justified.

Military leaders gave two reasons for such internment: military necessity and the protection of the Japanese population. Thus, the Assistant Secretary later explained in his report:

> As you know, the Japanese were removed from the West Coast, first, because of the proximity of the West Coast to the Japanese theater of operations and, second, because of the very large number of Japanese concentrated in that area, and thirdly, because of the fear that direct action might be taken against the Japanese as a result of the rather antagonistic attitude of the local population.
>
> (Conn 1959: 149)

Despite these official justifications of military security and protection of the Japanese population as the major rationales for evacuation, the testimonies of military leaders are laced with the rhetoric of bigotry. Thus, DeWitt testified to Congress in 1943:

> I don't want any of them [persons of Japanese ancestry] here. They are a dangerous element. There is no way to determine their loyalty. ... It makes no difference whether he is an American citizen, he is still a Japanese. American citizenship does not necessarily determine loyalty. ... But we must worry about the Japanese all the time until he is wiped off the map.
>
> (DeWitt 1943a)

Even if the evacuation was supported by the general public, some leaders and authors vigorously objected to the evacuation as unnecessary and motivated by rampant ethnic discrimination. The head of the F.B.I., J. Edgar Hoover, also opposed the evacuation on the grounds that the policy was prompted by public political pressure rather than factual information about Japanese Americans (Weglyn 1976: 284). Thus, in September 1942, Roger Baldwin, a well-known pacifist and author who was one of the founders of the American Civil Liberties Union, stressed that "military necessity had less to do with their unprecedented treatment than race prejudice" (Baldwin 1942). Floyd Schmoe, a fellow activist and author living in Seattle, stated that the idea of evacuation contradicted the ideals of American justice:

> The reason for evacuation considered most valid by many persons is that of “protective custody”–the Japanese must be taken into camps and guarded for their own protection. But what a breakdown of the Anglo-Saxon conception of justice in a democracy such thinking betokens. ... The very words “protective custody” (*Schutzhaft*) were “made in Germany,” not here. How could it accord with American justice that if a man were dangerous to his neighbors they should be put into custody rather than he?
>
> (Schmoe 1942)

The Supreme Court upheld the interment program in two rulings: *Hirabayashi* v. *U.S.* (1943) and *Korematsu* v. *U.S.* (1944). But in a third case—Ex Parte Mitsuye Endo (1944)—the court ruled unanimously that the federal government had no right to detain admittedly loyal U.S. citizens indefinitely. Within two days of the ruling, the government announced that most of the Japanese were free to return home. In March of 1946 the last of the camps were closed down. Many Japanese-Americans returned to the West Coast and found jobs as farmers and in small businesses. In 1988, the U.S. Congress issued Public Law 100-383 which acknowledged the injustice of the internment, apologized for it, and provided a $20,000 cash payment to each internee.

Case 2: Deportation of Crimean Tatars in the Soviet Union

Crimean Tatars are a Turkic-speaking people. They represent a mixture of the ancient Gothic and Alan populations who settled in Eastern Europe in the seventh century. The name “Tatars” first emerged in the thirteenth century, when the Mongol Golden Horde occupied the peninsula. As the non-Turkic population became assimilated with other Crimeans through shared religion, language, and culture, Tatars formed an independent state known as the Crimean Khanate—a political entity ruled by a khan, on the model of the invading Mongols. This state remained independent until the Russian Empire began to expand in the seventeenth century.

Upon Russian annexation of the Crimean peninsula in the eighteenth century, the Crimean Khanate lost autonomy. Tensions between Crimean Tatars and the Russian Empire periodically intensified, culminating in the Crimean War in 1854. The mutual mistrust between the imperial Russian and Crimean Khanate governments further strained relations, motivating many Tatars to leave for the Ottoman Empire for fear of retaliation and possible resettlement within the Russian heartland, leading to extensive Tatar migration throughout Russia. Though many Tatars remained in Crimea, by 1917 Tatars comprised only a quarter of the population there (Williams 2002).

Soon after the Russian Revolution, the new Soviet regime initially supported ethnic minorities by establishing administrative institutions. By 1935, the government granted administrative authority to certain districts

according to the ethnic composition of the population. In Crimea, 177 regional self-regulatory bodies, the majority of them for Crimean Tatars, were created, including units in the Alushta, Balaklavsky, Bakhchisaray, Karasubazarsky, Kuibyshev, Sudak, and Yalta regions. Moreover, a number of ethnic schools were established, and newspapers and magazines were published in the Crimean Tatar language.

During his leadership of the Soviet Union, Joseph Stalin reversed many of the liberalized policies regarding the localized administrative rule of certain districts. In a campaign to promote unity among all peoples, Stalin imposed repressive measures against religious communities, including mass arrests of religious leaders and large-scale destruction of mosques, temples, and synagogues. As the ethnically-based administrative autonomy of certain districts ended, Crimean Tatars—among others—lost their religious freedoms and their right to provide education in their native language.

Crimea was among the first Soviet territories occupied by the Wehrmacht. Taking the British colonial rule in India as their model, the Nazis resorted to a divide-and-rule strategy for dominating the occupied population. Because they lacked a sufficient labor force for complete administration control, the German army sought support from certain segments of the local population, recruiting Tatars for positions in the local police force and low government posts.

To bolster these recruitment programs the Wehrmacht carefully exploited ethnic tensions by favoring Crimean Tatars over other groups. Enticing Crimean Tatars with special privileges, the Nazis released Crimean Tatar prisoners of war, excused Tatars from labor duty, and distributed to the Tatars gardens that had been previously expropriated during collectivization. Crimean Tatars were also relieved of heavy tax duties, allowed to practice their religion openly, and permitted to offer education in the Tatar language. A Muslim Committee was created in Simferopol, and Crimean Tatars were appointed to administrative positions within it. Such policies garnered strong support for the occupying force from many Crimean Tatars, particularly among older residents whose suffering under Stalin's brutal collectivization policies was not forgotten. In exchange for such privileges, some Tatars did in fact collaborate with the Nazis by transmitting key strategic information regarding Soviet forces, such as the positions of partisan troops as well as Soviet army plans.

However, most Tatars refused to work for the Wehrmacht, and were not swayed by the policies of "divide and rule," in large measure because of the brutality exhibited by the Germans against inhabitants of Tatar villages and towns. Furthermore, during this time 10 percent of the Crimean Tatar population was forcibly mobilized and compelled to fight on the front lines for Hitler (Williams 2002); almost every family had a close relative serving. In addition, a majority of Crimean Tatars remained loyal to the Soviet government, motivated in part by the demands of the Soviet leadership to resist the Nazi occupiers.

At the beginning of the war, Soviet newspapers recounted acts of courage and heroism by Tatar soldiers. These accounts fostered patriotism in Crimean Tatars, and intensified their own as well as wider national hatred toward the Germans. Every newspaper published accounts of atrocities committed by the Nazi army, the progress of the Soviet army, and the courage of Crimean Tatar soldiers and guerillas. The leading Crimean newspaper, *Krasnyi Krym*, generally portrayed the Tatar people as coexisting peacefully for centuries with their "older brother—the great Russian nation." In these narrative accounts, all nationalities in the Soviet Union were portrayed as acting in unison against their common, and evil, adversary (*Krasnyi Krym* 1943a, 1943b). One such article recounts the brutality of the German army:

> Brother-Tatars! You are in the occupied territory among the enemy. You see and feel the horrors of the Fascist occupation. The Germans send your sons to the frontline. They rape your daughters; they turn you into powerless slaves. They condemned you to starvation and death.
> (*Krasnyi Krym* 1943b)

As Crimean Tatars were increasingly positioned in unity with other nationalities in the "Soviet family," the boundary divisions between Crimean Tatars (as "brothers") and Germans (as the "vicious enemy") intensified.

Newspaper accounts repeatedly cast the Germans as colonizers seeking to destroy the cultural heritage of the people: "The Germans try to sow discord among people of the Crimea. They set Russians against Jews, Tatars against Russians. This is an old trick of colonizers" (*Krasnyi Krym* 1943a). The Nazis' proclamation that they would bring freedom to Tatars was unmasked in these narratives as part of a devious campaign of colonization, linked to their true mission to destroy the nation's honor and pride, and to plunder the rich Crimean soil (*Krasnyi Krym* 1943b). But the Soviet army—it was promised—would soon reenter the peninsula and dispel the Wehrmacht. These narratives contribute to and reflect a perception of disparate but unified members of a single "family" fighting for a common cause and united by an overarching and shared nationality.

Some of the articles did reference the occurrence of collaboration by Crimean Tatars with the German army, but the reports explained such acts as occurring after Nazi deception, provocation, and coercion. Even so, the collaborators were viewed traitors to the nation. According to one article,

> [The Germans] created the so-called Tatar Committee, but it is clear to everyone that this committee is the slave of the German-colonizers, it works for Fascists and helps rob and deceive the Tatar people.
> (*Krasnyi Krym* 1943a)

The articles cite an old Russian proverb that "there is no village without a dog," implying that every community has its own "degenerates" (*urody obshestva*) and there are some traitors within any community—but such

cases were presented as rare. In general, the Crimean Tatar population remained loyal to Soviet rule and was viewed as such.

Within their propaganda and throughout the media, Soviet authorities drew upon cultural images of tight-knit Crimean Tatar communities, which emphasized family security and respect for elders, to show that the willingness of some Crimean Tatars to join the Nazi army was like an act of youthful rebellion against the wider family. By casting enemy collaboration in familial terms, these narratives paved the way for the notion that forgiveness for such transgressions and reunification with the greater Soviet family could result, presumably, from acts of repentance on the part of the "rebellious child."

As the war progressed, Soviet propaganda sought to intensify national pride by promoting images of the heroism of a multicultural Soviet army. Acts of enemy collaboration by a few individuals were presented as cases of character flaws, likened to the betrayal of selling one's ancestral land. Newspaper stories stressed the inclusion of all racial and ethnic groups in the Soviet army, in stark contrast to the racist policies of the Nazi army that considered all non-Arians as *Untermenschen.* Many articles offered personalized accounts of the hardships of Crimean Tatar troops and featured the life stories of those who demonstrated outstanding courage (*Krasnyi Krym* 1943c). The combination of Soviet propaganda, newspaper accounts, and public opinion formed a discursive foundation that encouraged Crimean Tatar resistance to the occupying German army, and promoted a unified front that essentially expanded the Soviet army's fighting force and military aims.

But as the Soviet army recovered its territory from the Wehrmacht in the later stages of the war, the number of articles glorifying the heroic deeds of Tatars rapidly decreased. The Soviet propaganda machine shifted its mission from promoting a strong commitment towards unity of purpose and sacrifice during the war to bolstering a sense of normalcy in the population after so many years of war. Following a new government campaign, the newspapers abandoned their earlier characterization of Crimean Tatars as rebellious younger brothers and portrayed them, among other ethnic groups, as enemy accomplices. These portrayals castigated these groups as traitors who deserved severe punishment. Moreover, this characterization emphasized that future generations of Crimean Tatars should be condemned for the actions committed by their ancestors during the war. Dehumanizing images of Tatars disseminated like wildfire throughout the general population, contrasting sharply with the previous portrayals of patriotic Tatars serving valiantly in the Red Army.

Once the Soviet propaganda machine shifted its mission from promoting unity to creating a sense of normalcy, the government returned to its pre-war aim of opposing the independence of ethnic minorities and crushing them into submission to the dominant Soviet culture. As a result, plans to "cleanse" the Soviet homeland of such minorities led to policies of discrimination and deportation. The official decision to deport all Tatars

from Crimea required careful planning at the highest levels of government. In his secret correspondence to Stalin months prior to the decision to deport Tatars, Levrentii Beria, the head of NKVD (the organization preceding the KGB), characterized all Crimean Tatars as traitors. In one transmission Beria writes:

> The devastating situation in the occupied territories of Crimea can be explained by the diversion group. 1178 people who helped the German army were arrested. The Tatar national committee, which had branches in various regions in Crimea, mobilized volunteers into the Nazi Tatar division and sent the non-Tatar population to the labor camps in Germany.
>
> (L. Beria, personal telegram, April 25, 1944, Archive, Lenin's Library, Moscow)

In another letter, Beria states that during World War II, Crimean Tatars acted as accomplices to Nazi occupiers:

> Many Crimean Tatars betrayed their Motherland, deserted from the army and joined the army of the enemy, participated in the voluntary Nazi divisions, [and] participated in the barbaric and cruel killings of the Soviet people.
>
> (L. Beria, personal communication, May 11, 1944, Archive, Lenin's Library, Moscow)

As such correspondence was taking place, the People Commissar on Internal Affairs and the People Commissar on State Security imposed a law (Ukaze) in April 1944 designed to punish all anti-Soviet elements operating in areas previously occupied by the Wehrmacht. According to this law, the Crimean peninsula was to be cleared of "agents of German and Romanian intelligence, traitors, collaborators, [and] members of crime organizations" (Ukaze of the People Commissar on Internal Affairs, April 13, 1944, Archive, Lenin's Library, Moscow). The law's intent was conveyed as follows:

> To clear the territory of the Crimean region from the agents of foreign intelligence agencies and contra-intelligence groups, of those who betrayed their country and traitors, who actively helped Nazi-German occupation forces and their agents, of participants of anti-Soviet organizations, bandit groups and other anti-Soviet elements that helped occupations forces.
>
> (ibid.)

Interestingly, the law lacked particular reference to any specific ethnic affiliation of the "enemy elements."

In a secret wire to Stalin, Molotov, and Malenkov two weeks later, Beria reported on the number of members of each nationality living in Crimea

who were killed, taken to labor camps by the German army, or evacuated by the Soviets:

> On Crimea. The population of the Crimea before the war—1,126,000 people, including 218,000 Tatars. Killed 67 thousands of Jews, Karaimov, Krymchakov, taken to Germany—50,000 people, evacuated 5,000 people.
>
> (L. Beria, The Telegram of the People Commissar on Internal Affairs L. Beria to the State Defense Committee, April 29, 1944 Archive, Lenin's Library, Moscow)

Beria explained that the high number of casualties in Crimea resulted from the work of saboteurs and anti-Soviet elements among the Crimean Tatars. The Tatar National Committee was cited as working closely with voluntary German divisions, supplying intelligence on Soviet operations, and sending non-Tatar natives to the German labor camps. The document stated:

> The Tatar National Committee, having its own branches in every Tatar district in Crimea, recruited intelligence agents to work in the occupied territories, enlisted volunteers to the created German Tatar division, [and] sent the local non-Tatar population for work in Germany.
>
> (L. Beria, The Telegram of the People Commissar on Internal Affairs L. Beria to the State Defense Committee, April 29, 1944 Archive, Lenin's Library, Moscow)

Crimean Tatar families, women, and elders were identified as traitors aiding those hiding from the Soviet army. These accusations had the effect of intensifying prevailing divisions between the "loyal" Soviet peoples and the "treasonous" Crimean Tatars.

In a later telegram to Stalin, Beria fixed for the first time an ethnic identity to anti-Soviet elements operating during the war. He wrote that more than twenty thousand Crimean Tatar soldiers deserted the Soviet army and joined Nazi forces.

> Considering treacherous action of the Crimean Tatars against the Soviet people and considering unfeasibility of the further residency of Crimean Tatars on the border of the Soviet Union, NKVD asks for your consideration of deportation of all Crimean Tatars from the territory of Crimea.
>
> (L. Beria, The Telegram of the People Commissar on Internal Affairs L. Beria to the State Defense Committee, May 10, 1944, Archive, Lenin's Library, Moscow)

In this communiqué, Beria recommended to Stalin that the entire Crimean Tatar population be deported to the Uzbek Soviet Republic. Before writing this memo, Beria had informed the head of the Central Committee of

Uzbekistan about this impending deportation, seeking to forestall objections to his proposal of this state-sponsored brutality. He stated that the operation would start on May 21 and last for about ten days. In the letter to Stalin, Beria wrote "The issue of settling the Tatars in Uzbek SSR is arranged with the Secretary of the Central Committee of Uzbekistan, comrade Usupov" (L. Beria, The Telegram of the People Commissar on Internal Affairs L. Beria to the State Defense Committee, 10 May, 1944, Archive, Lenin's Library, Moscow).

The day after receiving this correspondence, Stalin signed the deportation decree. A top-secret document dated May 11, 1944 recounts that the Soviet State Defense Committee set the decree in motion, ordering the deportation of the entire Crimean Tatar nationality from the Crimean peninsula. Many Crimean Tatars were accused of treason, deserting their military units, embracing the enemy's goal of conquest, and serving in *Schutzmannschaftsbataillonen* (police battalions). The document additionally asserted that Crimean Tatars acted inhumanely against the Soviet guerillas, actively engaged in transporting Soviet people to German labor camps, gathered intelligence for the enemy, and sabotaged Soviet military operations. Instead of being cheered as war heroes or scolded as younger brothers, the Crimean Tatars were now repositioned as a dangerous enemy bloc acting in unison, whose recent campaign of treachery necessitated the deportation of their entire population to the Uzbek Soviet Republic by June 1, 1944. These drastic measures were allegedly required to prevent any additional collaboration of Crimean Tatars with potential sympathizers to the retreating Nazi army.

Moreover, although the Nazis were by that time losing the war, the idea that they could have used Crimean Tatars to establish alliances with Turkey and segments of the Muslim population prompted concern among Soviet officials that the Tatars could threaten the cohesion of the Soviet Union by fostering Muslim solidarity across the region. Despite such frenzied accusations, the few documented cases of collaboration by Crimean Tatars were wildly exaggerated by propagandists.

The Soviet fear of losing the Crimea to the Wehrmacht army even after their departure prompted the authorities to deport "unreliable elements" of the population to Central Asia. But even in possession of totalitarian controls, the Soviet leaders still needed a public justification for launching such severe actions against this ethnic group. With vitriolic hatred of Germans still deeply ingrained in the collective psyche, the process of formulating intergroup boundaries shifted to establish a new enemy group and provide the justification for deportation. As the boundaries were redrawn, normative associations emerged regarding the Tatars. Unlike the German invaders, Tatars had inhabited the land for centuries and lived freely among the Soviet people. Their perceived betrayal felt personal, close to home, and fratricidal. Many segments of the general population found in the Tatars convenient scapegoats for the current hardships they experienced. Tatars were blamed for the miserable conditions of service in the Soviet army, and the lack of basic necessities for survival for many

members of the general population. The positioning tactics of the propaganda campaign established a normative order that exiled the outgroup not only physically but socially, forever tainting them with the stain of treason. The Soviet political elite skillfully exploited the emotional trauma among the population left by the wake of war, and successfully established a rationale for their brutal policies.

On 18 May 1944, deportation of the Crimean Tatars began. With little forewarning, Tatar women, children, and the elderly (between 187,859 and 188,626 people) were forced onto freight trains and transported to Central Asia. They settled in Uzbek in the Soviet Socialist Republic, Mariisk in the Autonomic Soviet Socialist Republic, and also regions in Gorky, Sverdlovsk, and Kostroma. Sadly, Tatars were not the only minorities deported from Crimea. Deportees included 9,620 Armenians, 12,420 Bulgarians, and 15,040 Greeks. A total of 228,392 people were exiled from the peninsula during this period. Lacking food, water, or adequate sanitation, many Tatars died in transit. Those who survived the journey were confined to "special zones" for their residency. Because of horrendous living conditions in their new settlements, the years 1944–1948 saw 44,878 people (approximately 20 percent of the total number of deportees) die of starvation, disease, and exposure.

The deportation not only resulted in the displacement, misery, and death of the exiled population, but also intensified misconceptions about the deported ethnic groups' treachery, which was to haunt them for decades. The vigilance of lower Party officials to meet pre-established quotas resulted in many Tatars abandoning their property and personal possessions. The settlements of Crimean Tatars in Uzbekistan turned into permanent residences. Tremendous economic, political, and social hardships ensued. Beria's plea to Stalin to implement a cleansing process of Crimean population from the "anti-Soviet elements" resulted in thinking clinically about the whole operation. Almost every day for four months preceding the final arrests and deportations, Stalin received progress reports which reduced the tragic events for thousands of families to numerical measurements—the number of people deported, the number of arrests, and the number of appropriated houses, cattle, and other domestic animals.

The secrecy of Soviet institutions kept the general population ignorant of the numerous atrocities committed by the Soviet government against its people. Those who expressed disapproval of inhumane treatment of minority groups were denounced as enemies of the people. Nevertheless, stories about mass deportation and arrests began to circulate unofficially throughout the country. Many segments of the general population learned about the deportation of Crimean Tatars to Uzbekistan, as well as the dispersion of Chechens, Koreans, and Volga Germans to Kazakhstan. Other small ethnic minorities, such as the Karachay, Ingush, Balkar, and Kalmyk, were also scattered across vast Soviet territories. But few realized the scale of the tragedy, or the full extent of the demonization campaign against the Tatars and other minorities.

During postwar reconstruction in the Soviet Union, a large number of deportees sought to return to their homeland. But the government officials refused to authorize such mobility, citing the difficulties associated with controlling the movement of multiple nationalities. The Supreme Committee of the Soviet Union passed a Ukaze (law) imposing severe punishment on anyone attempting to repatriate, declaring that returning Crimean Tatars would serve as agents for foreign governments. The law demanded that each ethnic group be assigned a particular place of residence. Like so many of the edicts of the Soviet government, this law was established in secret (A. Kalinin, The Letter of the Chief of Crimean Division of the Ministry of Internal Affairs A. Kalinin to the Minister of Internal Affairs S. Kruglov, Archive, Lenin's Library, Moscow).

In the early 1950s, the situation changed yet again; the lack of skilled and unskilled workers in certain regions led to campaigns to entice families with two or more capable adults to live in the Crimean kolkhoz (collective farming area). After Stalin's death in 1953, Khrushchev instituted liberal policies that included the right of return for certain nationalities to the peninsula. Crimea was only one of many Soviet regions that received a large influx of newcomers. Although Crimean Tatars were completely exonerated of all crimes in 1967, their requests for repatriation were continually denied. The peninsula's new residents became the lawful owners of property previously held by Tatars. Now primarily Slavicized, Crimea gained important military significance, especially because of its access to the sea which was critical to the Soviet Fleet. It also became a major national resort, and summer camps, resorts, and parks were located on former properties belonging to the Crimean Tatars.

Despite these restrictions, the Crimean Tatars slowly began to repatriate. A small Tatar group launched a movement advocating the rights of deportees. The gradual return of the Tatar population was still perceived as a threat to the existing social and local infrastructure. While the number of Crimean Tatars living in Crimea remained rather low at the time, their increasing presence prompted fears among some residents that the returnees would demand reinstatement of an autonomous Crimean republic. So, to avoid possible social upheaval, the Soviet authorities sought to severely limit the number of those returning to Crimea.

To justify this policy of selective denial, Soviet propagandists revived earlier denunciations of Crimean Tatars, castigating them as longstanding enemies who committed "unforgivable acts of treason" during the war. The secretary of the Communist party of Ukraine persuaded Khrushchev that it would be inadvisable to pardon Crimean Tatars and permit their repatriation. The secretary's report resurrected earlier accusations of desertion from the Soviet Army, collaboration with the Nazis, and sabotage against the Soviet army. Stories of treachery and collaboration were once again actively crafted to dehumanize the Tatars en masse. Familiar normative borders between Crimean Tatars and other ethnic groups were thus retrieved using time-honored discursive practices of mass media and

propaganda. The "outgroup" of the Crimean Tatars was re-established in order to justify a continuous cycle of denigration and violence.

Conclusion

During World War II, both a democratic government and a totalitarian government launched campaigns of denigration and brutality against ethnic minorities living within national borders: the internment of Japanese-Americans into concentration camps in the United States and the deportation of Crimean Tatars from the Crimean Peninsula to Central Asia. While in both cases the perceptions of the government and public opinion played an important role in sanctioning state discrimination against their own citizens, the magnitude of their impact differed. In the United States, government officials were motivated in part by the wave of anti-Japanese sentiment that swept the nation, both before and after the attacks on Pearl Harbor. In the totalitarian Soviet society, the government orchestrated a campaign to collectively reclassify certain ethnic minorities and manipulated public opinion as a prelude to the deportation of Crimean Tatars.

Nevertheless, the mechanisms of gradual border reestablishment, demonization, and dehumanization in both analyzed cases were operative. In both countries a similar collective axiology was established: an ethnic group was excluded from the ingroup of fellow citizens and redefined as an evil enemy through narratives of threat and treachery. In both countries, intergroup borders were shaped by the symbols of the evil Other that essentialized the enemy's degenerate character. This process was based on three steps of the establishment of a collective axiology. First, the iconic order of treason as an evil but highly probable action was established. Second, the mythic narrative that depicts Japanese people in the U.S. as traitors was developed. Both U.S. and Soviet leaders exploited information about a few cases of treachery among Japanese-Americans and minimal instances of Tatar collaboration with the Nazis to support this mythic narrative. In addition, the high level of generality of this collective axiology allowed uniting fellow citizens and representatives of other nations. The demonization of a militaristic Japan by the U.S. government and the uncompromisingly evil Nazis by the Soviet regime aggravated latent hatreds toward alleged collaborators. The low level of axiological balance of this new collective axiology rested on demonic images of an enemy intensified notions of outgroup vices and ingroup virtues. At the third stage, the normative order of the actions against traitors was established: it supported the deportation of fellow citizens as a fair and legal act of the state. This collective axiology of low level of balance and high level of generality justified acts of violence and marginalization against fellow citizens.

The analysis of the mechanisms of defining normative borders between citizens of the same nation provides ample information about the roots of civilian devastation so common during times of war. The victims of these

acts in these cases were loyal fellow citizens, neither enemy combatants nor even civilian representatives of the enemy country. The simple fact of belonging to a specific ethnic group, a social category imposed by the dominant nation state, was a sufficient reason for these governments to justify policies of discrimination and violence against innocent civilians in their midst.

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