

CONSTRUCTING
the NARRATIVES *of*
IDENTITY *and* POWER



*Self-Imagination in a
Young Ukrainian Nation*

KARINA V. KOROSTELINA

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Introduction

The twentieth century has challenged the established vision of the nation-building processes: the formation of new states in the interwar period and the movement from colonialism and Communism in the second part of the century have brought about a new type of nationalism aimed at constructing nations within new political boundaries. While nationalist movements are perceived as a preexisting foundation for the formation of new states, these states often find themselves longing for a distinctive shared national identity. This “nationalizing,” “polity-based, nation-shaping” nationalism¹ involves multiple claims by different groups about what constitutes the core of the nation and the rights of specific groups therein; it “invents” nations that never existed before to imbue the newly created state with shared meaning.² This creation of new nations within new states does not simply rest on gradual assimilative and uniting policies, institutions, and transactions as Morton Deutch³ and S. Rokkan⁴ described in their model of national integration. New states with heterogeneous ethnic, religious, or tribal structures cannot be easily “nationalized”: the nation-building process entails conflicts between different—often opposite—positions regarding the nation and the visions of its identity. In this process, national identity is a product of both (1) ethnic history and the identity of continuity, values, and belief systems and (2) dominant ideologies and conscious manipulation, including commemoration, ideology, and symbolism.⁵ The dual process of the social construction of identity involves the discovery and creation of common elements.⁶ These elements—priorities and boundaries—can have different definitions depending on the political, economic, and social goals of the leaders and elites. Conflict can develop when the identity chosen by an individual is incompatible either with the identity imposed by others or with the social context in which identity is constantly being re-created.⁷ In the process of

nation formation, ethnic and regional rivals solidify their competing definitions, and myths, of the nation.⁸ The nationalization of political space involves struggles between national elites over the prevalent concept of national identity and representation of the nation.⁹

The aim of this book is to analyze the structure and functions of national narrative and its impact on conflict in the society. It starts with an overview of the theoretical approaches to the nation-building process and the formation of national identity, emphasizing the constructed nature of national narrative and the role of elites in the production of multiple meanings. Based on this overview, I propose the structural-functional model of national narrative, which represents three major components—*dualistic order*, *mythic narratives*, and *normative order*—and two main functions of national narratives—the development of the meaning of national identity and the legitimization of power. This model is further applied to the case of the young independent nation of Ukraine. Following an overview of current nation-building in Ukraine, I describe major narratives of the national elite and international experts. Further, I describe how the meaning of national narrative influences the forecast of the Ukrainian future among all respondents. I conclude with a summary description of the structure and function of national narrative and its specificity in Ukraine.

This book's most important task has been to highlight the model of national narratives by presenting separate narratives in their complexity and specificity. In order to keep methodological organization clear at all times, using the same structural model in the description of each narrative has been essential. This in turn has made a certain repetition unavoidable while reiterating the structural and functional concepts of this research from narrative to narrative: the reader will find the same structure of analysis—three components and two functions—in the presentation of all narratives of Ukrainian elite and foreign experts. This structure includes:

1. different types of dualistic orders;
2. meaning-making and legitimizing myths and their mechanisms: justification and interpretation;
3. types of normative order;
4. creation and redefinition of the meaning of national identity through the process of embedment of the concept of power into the meaning of national identity;
5. and support and legitimization of power through the shaping of concepts of power based on the meaning of identity.

This structure helps compare narratives of respondents and identify features of national narrative specific for the whole Ukraine.

Following Brubaker's call to focus on the nation as a category of practice and national identity as a contingent event or happening, I analyze the production of the meaning of identity and power in national narratives as a practice of national self-imagination. This meaning-making process incorporates social categorization, definitions of "we" and "other," setting of boundaries and mechanisms of their production, political interests, legitimating accounts of social order, and structures of power represented in the interpretative framework of public discussions and political rhetoric. National narratives frame, mediate, and constitute the definitions of nationhood and power hierarchy within the nation as fundamental social categories, which nevertheless remain dynamic and relational concepts. Different groups within the nation take competitive and distinctive positions claiming to represent authentic and persuasive national narratives that outline the national idea. These competing national narratives constitute the components of the nation-building process, producing dynamic complexity and impediments to the creation of shared nationhood.

Ukraine represents a clear case where conflicts around national identity have been continuous for the twenty years since the country achieved independence in 1991. The absence of a concept of nationhood and a shared national idea accepted by the whole population has led to a controversial and often ambivalent process of national-identity formation, leaving Ukraine's people without clear internal and external social boundaries and a shared meaning of the nation. The question of exactly which national model Ukraine should embrace remains an open question due to high social and cultural polarization, the growing fragmentation of Ukrainian society, and the rise of extremist organizations. The absence of shared national ideals leads to disputes between Ukrainians supporting different concepts of national identity. Ukrainian and foreign scholars and publicists actively promote their ideas about Ukraine and sharply criticize opponents, both in academic journals and the public media. Mass media and the World Wide Web are full of aggressive publications and postings; accusations and justifications saturate discussions about Ukrainian national identity. The fight over national identity even has become a form of popular entertainment: the TV program *Shuster Live* airs every Friday for four full hours, amusing the Ukrainian public with squabbles and conflicts between representatives of the political and intellectual elite.

Despite overwhelming numbers of different views on Ukraine as a nation, several narratives about national identity became more prominent and coherent, solidified and shared among the majority of the population. Some are identified and described at length in the scholarly literature or justified in popular discourse, while others still remain less explored and depicted. These national narratives are underpinned by cultural allusions, shared references, and the production of meaning. Analysis of these narratives facilitates under-

standing of the imaginative creations of the national community and its identities, the construction of new values and reassessments of the past, the production of the essential meanings of national identity and clear boundaries for the nation, and the establishment of its continuity and durability. National narratives construct national identity through the delineations of an ingroup and outgroups and the definition of power relations between them within the nation. In this process they employ symbols, values, and beliefs available in the discursive space of the nation. The view of narrative as a tool for the creation of a particular meaning of social identity and power provides an opportunity to scrutinize the role of memory, ideology, and culture in this process. Deriving from and inspired by the social needs and political interests of the ingroup, national narratives become ideological constructs that define the desirable connotation of a nation and legitimate structures of power. People express their views on the nation and political order through processes of engagement with national narratives depicting the past and present of the nation and its anticipated future.

The analysis presented in this book is based on the mapping of the prevalent narratives about national identity that exist among Ukraine's intellectual and political elite. The role of elites in shaping ideology and national identity with regard to the formation of the nation is stressed by Anderson, Gellner, Smith, and other scholars.¹⁰ As Smith notes, many ideological and nationalist movements have originated in elite circles that "rediscovered, selected and reinterpreted existing ethnic symbols, memories, myths, values and traditions, and out of these elements forged the narratives of the nation."¹¹ Through law, bureaucratic procedures, educational structures, and social rituals, political and intellectual elites define and redefine the perceptions, categorizations, interpretations, and memories that serve as a foundation for national identity. In Ukraine these constructed narratives trickle down through TV and radio broadcasts, publications in newspapers, and new media, infiltrating the national consciousness of the general public and shaping the population's views on national identity.

THEORETICAL CONSTRUCTS

In this book I describe a national narrative as a construction that includes three major dimensions of social perception: (1) value-based and emotional assessments, (2) cognitive narrative constructions, and (3) normative (behavioral) prescriptions. It contains ideas of "Us" and "Them," social boundaries, agency and power, violence and victimization, threat and security, enemies and heroes. A national narrative justifies positions and actions of an ingroup and ascribes responsibility and blame to outgroups. It condemns outgroup wrongdoings while concealing the vices and oppressions of the ingroup. The

positions and policies of the ingroup are glorified and justified in contrast to those of the criticized and censured outgroup. A national narrative encourages the ingroup to establish, maintain, and reinforce specific social relations; it prohibits and denigrates other kinds of social order in the nation. As with all narratives, a national narrative is dynamic, continually being reconfigured as a result of the shifting boundaries of the ingroup and outgroups. It appeals to historic events, sociological data, and scientific theories that are interpreted to solidify the basic foundations of the national narrative. Responding to the demands from the “enemies of the nation,” the ingroup finds solace in their sense of moral superiority to outgroups, which is often associated with the need to preserve the nation and social order.

This book puts forward a conceptual model of national narratives that describes three major components—*dualistic order*, *mythic narratives*, and *normative order*—and two main functions of national narratives—the development of the meaning of national identity and the legitimization of power. These two functions are deeply intertwined and can be separated only for the purposes of theoretical analysis. Their interrelation is constituted by two opposite but entangled processes: national identity defines and is defined by systems of power. Through the first process, *embedding of the concept of power into the meaning of national identity*, the specific meanings of power and power relations between the ingroup and outgroups are incorporated as the core of a particular national identity. The specific concepts of power and power relations between ethnic, religious, and regional groups within the nation are integrated into the very foundation of national identity in the way that people perceive them to be an essential definition of the nation and a characteristic that differentiates them from others. Through the second process, *the shaping of the concept of power through the meaning of national identity*, the meaning of national identity determines, shapes, and gives meaning to the legitimization of political power. The salience and meaning of national identity determine the choice of coercion or legitimization in supporting existing or desired power structures and identify the mechanisms of their realization.

The *dualistic order* represents the fundamental dyadic opposition of “good” and “bad” in the nation central to a particular narrative. It is based on the essential opposition of categories of virtue and vice and reflects the most important axiological antagonism perceived in the nation. Four types of dualistic order—social group duality, binational duality, temporal duality, and ideological duality—represent axiological opposition between two ethnic or religious groups, two nations, modernity and tradition, nationalism and liberal thinking, or totalitarianism and liberty. This opposition is interpreted through a set of binary categorical constructs that has two functions: (1) it identifies the most important criteria for the assessment of the nation and (2) it defines the meaning attached to two axiological opposites (social groups,

nations, time periods, or ideologies). The first function is connected with the establishment of a list of criteria that are central to the processes of “nationalizing” (formation, understanding, and assessment of the nation). Through the second function, the meaning of the binary constructs arises from the values of spirituality-culture, ideology, social order, social relations, and development—and depends on the contrary poles. For example, nationalism can have different connotations depending on whether it is opposed by a pole of “totalitarianism” or a pole of “civic society.” In the former case it indicates liberation and national inspiration of the people, while in the latter it means ethnic dominance and the prevalence of one group over others.

The second component, *mythic narratives*, are constituted by a set of myths that rest on the binary constructs of dualistic order and justify their specific meaning. Myths that fulfill *the first function*, formation of national identity, justify the meaning of the ingroup and outgroup and the social boundary between them through the emphasis on continuity of community. Myths that fulfill *the second function*, legitimization of power, support or challenge the social order and legitimize the power of the ingroup through the invocation of specific events and the history of intergroup relations. The first group includes myths of a Golden Age, ethnogenesis, territory, and foundation, the second, myths of unjust treatment and suffering, rebirth and renewal, and election. The main functions of national narratives—formation of national identity and legitimization of power—are fulfilled through two groups of mechanisms in mythic narratives. The first group includes five mechanisms of justification: (1) impediment by an outgroup, (2) condemning imposition, (3) positive ingroup predispositions, (4) validation of rights, and (5) enlightening. The second group, mechanisms of interpretation, includes two mechanisms: one provides antipodal interpretation of the same subject and another, identical interpretation of the opposite subject.

Normative order rests on value judgments about how the nation should be organized and what structure/concept of power should prevail in the state. It encapsulates a set of moral obligations, rights, duties, and expectations that guides individuals in their interactions, defines a set of rules and resources that are deployed for acting and thinking, and legitimizes group decisions and actions. Normative order concentrates on ideas, policies, and actions that support specific meanings of national identity and legitimize structures of power. The first function of the national narrative, the formation and redefinition of national identity, is fulfilled through the promotion of specific policies based on value judgments of the ingroup and outgroup and outlining of the social boundary between them. The function of justification of the social order and legitimization of power in the normative order is fulfilled through the establishment and promotion of different approaches to legitimacy. The right to power can derive from cultural values that give the ingroup this right to power, validation of the social order and consensus among

groups, acceptance of the structure (system of power) as “right” by both advantaged and disadvantaged groups, and legitimization of the ingroup and delegitimization of the outgroup.

On the each of three levels—dualistic order, mythic narratives, and normative order—the national narrative defines and redefines meaning through the formation and redefinition of national identity and legitimization of power and social order. These two functions are performed at every level of national narratives, and their complex interrelations are constituted by two entangled processes: *embedding of the concept of power into the meaning of national identity* and *the shaping of concepts of power based on the meaning of identity*.

The structure of the national narrative and its functions delineate the foundation of conflicts within the nation. Dualistic order solidifies the rivalry of opposing parties, while mythic narratives justify their positions and normative order supplies prescriptions to the definition of the national idea and legitimizes structures of power. The existence of multiple national narratives generates a mosaic of rivalry pairs representing different strata and spheres of a nation, thus producing multilayered and profound conflict between multiple parties.

As this book intends to show, this dynamics of conflict between competing narratives is evident in Ukraine. In periods of political transition, a symbolic contest between national narratives results in a “zero-sum” competition in which the existence of one national narrative is perceived as an immediate threat to another. Each national narrative in Ukraine has a strong internal logic that justifies its concept of national identity and supports the legitimacy of power, which are different from (and in many features opposite to) those of other narratives. All these features of the narratives lead to the conception of Ukrainian society as an arena of open battle between national narratives, where one narrative must prevail over all others. This book describes the differences and conflicting elements of the national narratives that constitute the contested arena of national self-imagination and nation-building in Ukraine.

METHODOLOGY

The main method of this research is a semistructural interview consisting of six questions regarding the assessment of the current situation in Ukraine, its national identity, the politics of language and history, history textbooks, and possible future developments within Ukraine. Each interview lasted one and a half to three hours. In addition, I used a participant-observation method during several academic roundtables and political discussions, monitored major TV programs that present political discussions (e.g., *Shuster Live*,

Freedom of Speech), and analyzed data available at the libraries and on the websites of academic institutes and independent research centers.

The aim of this research was to interview the political and intellectual elites of Ukraine: scholars, political leaders, and journalists active in the political sphere who impact political discourse. I used a purposive sample with elements of snowballing. For snowballing, seven independent entry points were used. In addition, three widely recognized experts were asked to assess the list of interviewees to ensure that the sample included major representatives of the intellectual elite and equally represented all political and scientific groups. The final sample consists of fifty-eight interviewees, fifty-three in Kiev and five in Simferopol, Crimea. The number of interviews was guided by the principle of saturation: the process of collecting data was stopped when no new type of narrative was produced by the respondents and no more significant information within each narrative was provided.

Among respondents seven are directors or chairs of foreign foundations, sixteen are directors or leading scientists at the academic institutes within the Ukrainian Academy of Science (including the Institute of Philosophy, Institute of History, Institute of Sociology, Institute of Political and Ethnographic research, Institute of World Economy, etc.), ten are directors or leading experts at independent think tanks and research centers, seven are faculty members of leading Ukrainian universities, nine are political leaders (members of government, deputies of Verhovna Rada [Parliament], and directors of the Institute of National Memory and the National Institute for Strategic Studies under the president of Ukraine), and four are leading journalists. Among respondents forty-eight are Ukrainians, and ten are foreign experts from Europe and the United States. The gender representation is influenced by the specificity of the academic and political spheres in Ukraine: among the respondents forty-seven are male and eleven are female.

The analysis utilized in this study treats national narratives as second-order narratives that make sense of the social world and present experiences of the social category.¹² The analysis of narratives concentrates on the production of meaning and the construction of identity¹³ and on descriptions of themes, interpretations, and taxonomies of the mechanisms of presentation of these themes.¹⁴ It is based on the combination of deconstructive, causality, and thematic approaches to narratives. The application of a deconstructive approach¹⁵ in this research includes the search for duality (identification of binary opposites underlining the text, their meaning, and hierarchy), reinterpretation of hierarchy (analyzing the justifications for power hierarchies), and discovery of plot (understanding causality and the attribution of responsibility to different groups). The causality approach¹⁶ requires the analysis of systems of claims and counterclaims utilized in the narratives as well as the multilayered and changing contexts within which they are produced. The

thematic analysis¹⁷ searches for patterns or systemic units of cultural meaning and matches empirically found patterns to prior theoretical predictions.

Objectivity in this study was established through the following tools: (1) reliability, (2) validity, (3) credibility, and (4) standardization. Reliability ensures that similar results can be achieved in other research and is accomplished in the following ways: (1) for interpretive procedures, to arrive at reliable interpretation, theoretical codings are assessed with other passages in the same text; (2) detailed discussion of the entire research process—including assumptions, values, analytic techniques, interpretations of context, and how these shape the research—were conducted along with several colleagues of mine; and (3) verification of the research framework is established through four presentations of preliminary results in the United States and Ukraine with comments from six reviewers. Validity is the “trustworthiness” of the research and ensures that the results match the reality. To address procedural validity, the process of analysis of the structures is standardized: descriptions of three major parts of national narratives—dualistic order, mythic narratives, and normative order—contain exact components. Addressing reflective validity involves routine questioning by the researcher as to whether the findings are grounded in the data and whether the descriptions of functions and structure are appropriate for the analysis of national narratives. Credibility requires that the research process as a whole is scrutinized throughout using data analysis triangulation (the results of the qualitative analysis were compared with the descriptions of similar narratives in the scholarly literature) and reflexivity (the researcher continuously reviews her role and acknowledges her own position on the issues, scrupulously seeking to avoid any bias or misinterpretation in the presentation of results). Standardization aims to ensure the credibility of findings and was introduced in the following ways: (1) a coding system for the structure and functions of national narratives was constantly checked against the data and formalized to provide a means for the analysis of all narratives and (2) the consistency of coding was maintained throughout the analysis by constant checking against the results of the analyses of other narratives. Despite these efforts, certain threats to the validity of this research project do exist because the sample of interviewees is a non-random draw of the population of Ukrainian intellectual elites and international experts.

STRUCTURE OF THE BOOK

Chapter 1, “Structure and Functions of the National Narrative,” emphasizes the view of the nation as an imagined community and stresses the process of self-imagination of the national community. In discussing national identity as linked to categories of nationalist practices and institutionalized cultural and

political forms, the chapter shows how the meaning of cultural symbols evolves and becomes contested in the process of the definition and legitimization of the modern state. National identity constitutes a complex and intricate link between the political order and national culture: through comparison with the other, it creates cultural patterns of social hierarchy and defines norms, values, and beliefs about power and authority. Following the insights of social identity theory, national identity is defined as an acknowledgment of membership in a national group and of differences with other nations, a shared definition and connotation of the nation, and emotional attachment and loyalty to the national group. People believe that they belong to a nation, and this membership defines who they are and precipitates their perceptions and behavior. The chapter proposes a narrative approach to the study of national identity and concentrates on the structure and functions of the national narrative. It describes the triple structure of the national narrative—dualistic order, mythic narratives, and normative order—and discusses its two major functions—the construction of the meaning of national identity and the legitimization of power.

Chapter 2, “The Context of Ukraine,” establishes the context for the analysis of national narratives in Ukraine presented in the following chapters. It briefly describes the challenges encountered over the twenty-year path of the young nation and creates a portrait of Ukraine after twenty years of independence based on the prevailing conceptual models of Ukraine employed by Ukrainian and foreign experts. The absence of a shared defined meaning of national identity in Ukraine during the first years of its nationhood has precipitated a complex and contested process of nation-building. The divisive effect of regional, linguistic, cultural, and ethnic differences was further complicated by ineffective economic reforms, high levels of corruption and authoritarianism, the vacillating policies of Ukrainian presidents, slow democratic development, and the virtual absence of civic society, as well as the foreign policies of Russia and the European Union toward Ukraine. Based on analysis of interviews with Ukrainian political and intellectual elites and foreign experts, the chapter discusses several categories of conceptual models employed by respondents: (1) a state without a national idea and a common identity; (2) a country in an unfinished transition; (3) the degradation of society; (4) a divided society; (5) Ukraine as a colony or “wild capitalism”; (6) a postcolonial and post-genocidal society; and finally, (7) Ukraine as a frontier state. The author conducts a comparative analysis of the views of Ukrainian and foreign experts and defines the major factors affecting the nation-building process in Ukraine.

Chapter 3, “National Narratives of Ukrainian Elites,” analyzes the structure and functions of five major narratives expressed by Ukrainian elites: (1) dual identity; (2) pro-Soviet sentiments; (3) the fight for a Ukrainian ethnic identity; (4) recognition of a Ukrainian ethnic identity; and (5) multicultural-

civic perspectives. Each narrative is characterized by three main features: a coherent structure with a strong internal logic for production of the meaning of national identity and legitimization of power; increasing justification of its main positions through dualistic order, mythic narratives, and normative order; and opposition to other narratives. All these features lead to the perception of the society as being engaged in a zero-sum game where one's own narrative should prevail at the cost of others' narratives. In addition to describing at length the content of each narrative with vivid citations from the interviews, this chapter maps national narratives using different dimensions, including "homogeneous-heterogeneous society," "pro-Russian–pro-Ukrainian sentiments," and "a liberal-primordial ideology."

Chapter 4, "Imagination from Outside: Ukraine in the Narratives of International Donors and Experts," explores the narratives of international experts on national identity and ethnic and regional conflicts in Ukraine, analyzing their structure and functions. These national myths are especially important as they create a foundation for international aid and the foreign treatment of Ukrainian policies. The chapter shows that two major foreign-expert narratives—pro-Ukrainian and pro-civic—are similar to the fight for a Ukrainian ethnic identity narrative and the multicultural-civic narratives of Ukrainian elites.

Chapter 5, "The Image of a Ukrainian Future," analyzes the forecast for the future expressed by Ukrainian elites and foreign experts and describes several scenarios of potential development for Ukraine. The chapter shows that the visions for the future of the nation are deeply rooted in the structure and functions of national narrative. The views on the prospects for the nation are framed by the dualistic order and other specific areas of social relations, as well as being connected with mythic narrative mechanisms and the approaches to legitimacy prevalent in the narrative's normative order. The normative order underpins domestic- and foreign-policy recommendations for the future development of the nation. The assessment of the nation's prospects depends on the projected trajectory of the meaning of national identity and its connotation of power and is developed within an intertwined lattice of meanings of identity and power.

Chapter 6, "Conclusion: The Production of Meaning in National Narratives in Ukraine," analyzes the specific structures of national narratives in Ukraine and the fulfillment of their two major functions—development of the meaning of a national identity and the legitimization of power. The analysis of national narratives in Ukraine reveals the existence of all four types of dualistic order, with a prevalence of social group dualities and ideological dualities. It confirms that a particular type of dualistic order is connected with a specific set of binary constructed values. The chapter also discusses the variety of myths employed for justification of these dualistic orders and shows that the most frequently used myths in Ukrainian national

narratives are myths of foundation, ethnogenesis and territory, and the Golden Age. The analysis of mythic narratives is advanced by scrutinizing the use of justification mechanisms (impediment by outgroup, condemning imposition, positive ingroup predispositions, validation of rights [exclusion], and enlightening) and interpretation mechanisms (antipodal interpretations of the same subject and identical interpretation of the opposite subject). The analysis of approaches to legitimacy shows that legitimization of the ingroup and delegitimization of outgroups is prevalent in most narratives, while validation, group consensus, and legitimization of the rights of one group based on cultural values is employed in only a few narratives. The chapter provides a comparative discussion of the production of the meaning of national identity and legitimization of power as well-intertwined processes of embedment and shaping in the narratives of Ukrainian elites and foreign experts. It concludes with a recommendation to develop a systemic national dialogue that aims to establish common ground and develop a cohesive national identity.

The analysis of national narratives in this book intends to test the theoretical structural-functional model presented in chapter 1. Definitions of these dualities, social values, mythic narratives, mechanisms of justification and interpretation, and approaches to legitimacy are used to develop a coding system for identification of these components in the data. The two functions of social identity are also ascertained in each narrative, and theoretical understanding of the two intertwined processes of embedment and shaping help illuminate the specific fulfillment of these functions in all the narratives. The results of the study show that the proposed structural-functional model of national narratives is generally useful for scrutinizing the structure and functions of each narrative and for comparative analysis among the narratives. The analysis helps identify the multifaceted roots of contradiction and competition between narratives and the sources of profound conflicts underpinning the nation-building process in Ukraine. However, the structural-functional model presented in this book is open to further advances and accommodation to specific national contexts. New types of dualities, social values, mythic narratives, mechanisms of justification, and approaches to legitimacy could be proposed and new components and functions of national narratives put forward to describe the complexity of the nation-building process.

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Chapter One

Structure and Functions of National Narrative

NARRATIVE REPRESENTATION OF NATIONAL IDENTITY

Benedict Anderson's¹ classic concept of a nation depicts it as an imagined political community, a metaphorical kinship of people who will most likely never know each other. This feeling of comradeship and fraternity is deep, and, despite its imaginative nature, national identity leads to the willingness to sacrifice oneself in order to defend the nation. A deep horizontal comradeship arrives, according to Anderson, from both the development of print media and the development of capitalism, resulting in the emergence of a middle-class reading public. Recognition of other people as members of the same national group is also described as based on a shared culture within a specific territory² and as the shared image of the nation and the mutual awareness of its members.³ Despite essential differences with modernists, Anthony D. Smith⁴ agrees that imagined communities comprise dynamic and purposive groups, in which members act in a certain way according to this imagination of a nation. He states that members of nations feel a connection between their interests and needs with those of the nation and have the "need for community"—a social-psychological mechanism that serves a fundamental role in the formation of national identity. Kelman⁵ develops this approach and points out that the dual process of social construction of identity involves discovery and creation of common elements: "The social construction of identity implies a degree of arbitrariness and flexibility in the way the identity is compromised (which elements are admitted into it and which omitted from it), and in what its boundaries are (who is included and who is excluded)."⁶ National priorities and boundaries create the meaning of ingroup and outgroup, underlining loyalty and solidarity with the national group.

Thus, national identity is based not only on common elements and similarities among people but also on their feelings of strong attachment to a nation and solidarity with other members of their nation.

These national identities are treated as rooted in ethnic and religious attachments creating cultural continuity between traditional and modern meanings of nation⁷ or as a product of modernity.⁸ The former approach defines national identity as resulting from ethnic history, identity, and religious and belief systems, as well as from dominant ideology and conscious manipulation, including commemoration, ideology, and symbolism. In the latter, nations are treated as having been invented by nationalism and are created from state centralization, homogenization of the periphery, protracted warfare and universal conscription, standardization of vernacular languages, the establishment of state-sponsored education systems and the development of mass literacy, print capitalism, intensified division of labor, the emergence of institutions of “high culture,” and the increasing penetration of society by ideology and the mobilization of growing numbers of all classes. One of the major points of disagreement between these two approaches is the role of primordial factors in national-identity formation: do ancient traditions and customs underpin national identity, or does it result from the construction of the modern state? The plausible reconciling answer is that the meaning of cultural symbols evolves and becomes contested in the process of the definition and legitimation of the modern state. Some traditions are utilized in the process of nation-building, and some traditions that “appear or claim to be old are often quite recent in origin and sometimes invented.”⁹ The past is always present in national identity but undergoes different levels of interpretations. Thus, despite differences in identifying the timeframe of the “birth” of national identity, both approaches treat national identity as an attachment to categories of nationalist practices and institutionalized cultural and political forms.

Nationalism is described as one of the major mechanisms of national-identity formation through the processes of state-building and the construction of modern industrialized societies¹⁰ and the manipulations of national ideas by political and social elites to obtain and legitimize state power.¹¹ While this instrumentalist approach reveals mechanisms of employment of national identity, the internal logic and effects of nationalism on national identity are downplayed. In their concentration on the logic of emerging nationalism, constructivists emphasize the mechanisms of formation of national identity, including the communal imagination and “spontaneous distillation of a complex ‘crossing’ of discrete historical forces”¹² and its variations in different content (popular and official,¹³ civic and ethnic,¹⁴ and individualistic and collectivist¹⁵). These two approaches are combined in the growing body of literature that analyzes both construction and employment of national narratives to mobilize the population.¹⁶

Culture is another important factor in the process of the construction of nations and national identities. Imagined communities of nations can be interpreted as “systems of cultural representations”¹⁷ in which national culture constructs identities by creating meanings of the nation through stories, memories, and constructed perceptions. Analyzing the role of culture in social-identity formation, Avruch¹⁸ states that elements of culture are projected in the public domain, constituted in social practices and activities, and thus gain potency to unite people within the ingroup. But, as he stresses, the most important function of culture is to erect social boundaries and define the “otherness” of outgroups. This comparison to the other cements cultural traditions as essential parts of national identity and creates cultural patterns of social hierarchy. Together with constituting different norms, values, and beliefs, culture defines orientations toward power and authority. Therefore, national identity constitutes a complex and intricate link between the political order and national culture.

These accounts of nations as “imagined communities” resonates with Tajfel and Turner’s¹⁹ understanding of social categories and identities connected with large social groups. Thus, national identity can be analyzed as a part of an individual’s social identity and as a collective phenomenon that unites people into a national group. “Insofar as a group of people have come to see themselves as constituting a unique, identifiable entity with a claim to continuity over time, to unity across geographical distance, and to the right to various forms of self-expression, we can say that they have acquired a sense of national identity.”²⁰ Acquisition of national identity depends on the adoption of the specific elements of the national identity, including shared beliefs, history, values, assumptions, and expectations, and on the development of an orientation to the nation itself.²¹ National identities that are based on ethnic and religious solidarity rely on myths of common kinship/ancestry and “cultural sameness,” while national identities that rest on civic or political concepts are united by the visions of a common future.²² The social bond among fellow nationals underpins national identity and defines its meaning. National identity creates a moral framework that defines national community and is attained similarly to language in childhood, in constant contact and dialogue with others.²³

In this book, I treat national identity as an acknowledgment of both membership in a national group and differences from other nations, the shared definition and connotation of nation, and emotional attachment and loyalty to a national group. People have a belief that they belong to a nation and that this membership defines who they are and precipitates their perceptions and behavior. They define themselves in terms of national membership and draw boundaries between people based on this social category. People believe that the nation protects their interests in the larger political and social system and

affirms the necessity of preserving group solidarity, thus maintaining the integrity of the nation and its borders.

In the framework of social-identity theory, national identity should be analyzed through three main features: salience, group involvement, and meaning. The salience of national identity is connected with such functions of social identity as increasing self-esteem and security,²⁴ reducing uncertainty,²⁵ a sense of a common fate,²⁶ increasing social status, personal safety, group support and protection, and recognition by the ingroup.²⁷ According to Kelman,²⁸ national identity is constantly reconstructed to serve several functions: (1) to provide a sense of uniqueness and unity as well as a sense of belonging to group members, (2) to develop positive self-image, (3) to offer a basis for cultural development, religious beliefs, and way of life, (4) to grant the foundation for ownership of land and resources, and (5) to justify the claims and grievances of the group. The salience of national identity also depends on the “readiness” of a person to use a national category as her identity (accessibility of the category) and the “conformity” between the social category or ideal image of a nation and the real national community (category fit).²⁹ As Huddy³⁰ argues, four factors influence the acquisition of salient identity: the valence of group membership, the defining social characteristics of typical group members, the core values associated with membership, and the characteristics of common outgroups that help to define what an ingroup is not. Thus, salient national identity derives from positive image of a nation, similarity with a typical representative of the nation, affirmation of national values, and a shared vision of outgroups as allies or enemies. Together with cognitive and emotional factors, social practices—“what people do and how they conceptualize or represent what they do as constituting membership in various groups”—have a strong impact on the development of a salient national identity.³¹

An analysis of national-identity salience requires not only the examination of the level but also the character of a person’s involvement in a national community. Kelman³² describes six patterns of personal involvement in a social group that rest on two motivational bases for extending loyalty to the group: sentimental attachment (a feeling of shared identity with fellow citizens) and instrumental attachment (the perception that the nation meets a member’s individual needs and interests). He stresses that these two sources of attachment are analytically separate but influence and reinforce each other. He also addresses three types of orientation to the nation: the acceptance of rules, the obligation to follow them, and expectations of a fair share of resources (rule orientation); identification with and emotional involvement in national roles (role orientation); and a sharing of the national values and commitment to the nation (value orientation). A rule-oriented loyalty is superficial and brief but arises easily in the context of stressing national symbols and rules. A role-oriented loyalty reflects an enthusiasm and desire

to participate in the life of a nation. A value-oriented loyalty is more stable and deep and serves as a basis for the formation of salient social identities.

The salience of national identity cannot be used as a single explanatory factor for the impact of national identity on individual perceptions and behavior. The meaning of national identity develops on the borders between groups and constitutes both the content of group membership and the specificity of interrelations with outgroups. It is based on the following nine components:³³

1. *National traditions and values (culture)*. This component reflects the specificity of interrelations within a nation, cultural characteristics, values and beliefs, holidays and customs, ways of life, and worldviews. It is a basic characteristic of a nation that portrays everyday experiences.
2. *National language*. It concerns the officially accepted language(s), other common spoken languages, and the influence of worldview and perception on individuals and groups through specific grammatical orders and linguistic structures.
3. *Characteristics of fellow citizens*. This component includes ingroup prototypes as well as stereotypes, valued individual features, and characteristics of the most prominent national figures.
4. *National history*. This element contains historical events, names, and situations that are important to the nation and that assist in defining its concept. Chosen traumas and glories, fairy tales and legends, and heroes are essential parts of national history.
5. *National territory and specificity of landscape*. This component depicts the attachment to a particular territory, the perception that it is an essential definition of national identity, and the influence of specific terrain (wide plains, mountains, oceans) on national character. The imagination of territory can arrive from different historic epochs and does not always reflect the current state; nevertheless it can have a strong inspirational effect on a nation.
6. *National ideology*. This component reflects the main ideas, goals, aspirations, and aims of an ingroup.
7. *Interrelations with outgroups*. This element contains the norms and traditions of interconnections between different nations and groups within a nation; the history of relationships, benefits, gains, and losses that resulted from the interrelations; the record of discriminations; and differences in status and power.
8. *Reverberated identity*. This element refers to a national identity that results from comparisons with outgroups. It includes all national characteristics that develop in opposition to outgroup characteristics. To

understand “who we are,” it is important to define “who we are not” on the basis of “who the others are.”

9. *Outgroup image.* This component reflects stereotypes, attitudes toward outgroups, and the perceived characteristics, culture, and history of outgroups that help define intergroup borders and stress differences between the nation and outgroups.

Studies show that national identity is one of the most salient in the system of multiple social identities.³⁴ It was analyzed through internalization of social and political categories related to the nation,³⁵ internalization of culture and linguistic similarities,³⁶ interrelations between nationalism and patriotism,³⁷ differences between ethnic and civic nations,³⁸ personal attachment to one’s nation and symbolic identification,³⁹ immigration and relations between majorities and minorities,⁴⁰ and social identification, social stereotyping, and intergroup discrimination.⁴¹ Despite differences among these approaches, they all connect nation to the social-categorization system of a person.

However, the relationship between micro-level solidarity and more macro-based processes of ideologization still remains understudied. Analyzing approaches to this problem through survey studies of national identity, Malesevic⁴² postulates that they do not capture the complexity of national identity: “the researcher has to look at the cognitive, emotional, motivational and other psychological dimensions as well as economic, cultural, political, coercive, ideological and other sociological aspects through which this process is developed and articulated.”⁴³ Thus, he concludes that the concept of national identity is misused and overused and must be excluded from the study of the phenomenon of nation. But the complexity of a social concept is not a reason for its elimination; instead, the multifaceted nature of national identity should be acknowledged and alternative rigorous approaches to its analysis developed.

One of the increasingly popular approaches to this problem is analysis of national identity as a narrative that rests on cultural allusion, shared references, and production of meaning. This approach helps comprehend the imaginative creation of the national community and its identity, the development of new values and reconsideration of the past from this standpoint, the definition of the core meaning and clear boundaries of the nation, and its continuity and durability. Underpinning the construction of national identity through narrative is production of a connotation of an ingroup based on symbols, values, and beliefs shared within the ingroup and differences with outgroups within the nation. National narratives are ideological constructs that derive from and are inspired by the social needs and political interests of an ingroup.

As an expression of social identity, narrative has become the focus of research and analysis throughout the social sciences. From a structuralist perspective narratives capture a series of descriptions of occurred events. According to Labov, narrative “is one method of recapturing past experience by matching a verbal sequence of clauses to the sequence of events which (it is inferred) actually occurred.”⁴⁴ The narrative, as organization of “facts,” or plot, can be distinguished from the set of “facts,” or story.⁴⁵ Thus, the narrative is comprehended through a set of structural elements comprising this narrative and functions in individual life stories.⁴⁶

In this book I do not employ the structuralist approach to the analysis of structural elements of national narrative but instead concentrate on its components that play an essential role in the construction of the meaning of national identity, thus providing the analysis of narrative as one of the central mechanisms of national-identity formation.⁴⁷ The view of narrative as a tool for the creation of social-identity meaning provides an opportunity to scrutinize the role of memory, ideology, and culture in this process. The analysis of narrative sheds light on the role of structure and agency in identity formation,⁴⁸ construction of citizenship and discourses of national identity,⁴⁹ employment of history in the process of identification with a nation,⁵⁰ engagement with collective stories of a particular community,⁵¹ and institutionalization of social memory into a coherent story that legitimizes the structure of power or proclaims foundations for resistance.⁵²

The relationship between national and personal narratives is multifaceted and dynamic. The frameworks of understanding for complex social phenomena can be found in social representations that exist both on the level of society and the individual with interconnections between the two.⁵³ On the level of society, the “totalities” of social categories, beliefs and sentiments, common to a particular group in the nation, create a system “with the life of its own.”⁵⁴ Presented in official accounts, old and new mass media, and school textbooks, they serve as a “symbolic reserve” that people use based on their relevance to individual needs.⁵⁵ The connection between the individual and state levels ensures the affective pertinence of national identity despite the evolutionary processes of modernity.⁵⁶ On the individual level, national identity rests on feelings of belonging and attachment, while on the state level it is linked to fulfillment of civic responsibilities and loyalty to the political order and institutions.

Researchers have shown that personal narratives mirror national narratives of history and identity, including key components about social categories, collective memory, and social representations of history and collective identity.⁵⁷ Through national narratives, individuals position themselves as having some relation to the nation, through the active use of language as a tool of establishing connotations and dialogue within a cultural context.⁵⁸ They appropriate and render specific characteristics, values, and beliefs of

the national community to create the meaning of a complex social and political reality.⁵⁹ Thus, people express their views on the nation and political order through the process of engagement with narratives depicting the past and present of the nation and its anticipated future. To reduce the cognitive complexity of multiple meanings of national identity, people link to coherent continuous narratives that provide a comprehensible and legitimate story about the nation and institutionalize collective memory. Developed Western societies have a small repertoire or a single metanarrative that feeds the national identities of their citizens.

In developing national communities with a multiplicity of competing national narratives, this process of engagement becomes a matter of choice for a particular individual. According to Habermas,⁶⁰ in multicultural societies a political national identity rests on an alternative means of national solidarity from nationally specific interpretations of constitutional principles to cultural or ethnic nationalistic sentiments. The idea that individuals within a nation do not share the same image of that nation's common characteristics⁶¹ has been widely acknowledged and supported in numerous studies of nationalist discourses and frameworks. The levels of agreement and engagement with specific narratives can vary among individuals, but their personal narratives in a majority of cases reflect the categorical structure and myths deployed in one of a number of available competing narratives. This connection with a particular narrative chosen among the set of available national narratives provides people with the meaning of identity, connection to the nation, and temporal coherence. It helps clearly define the ingroup and outgroups, their legitimacy, and the boundaries and interconnections between them within the nation. Narratives that reinforce ingroup solidarity tend to emphasize perceptions of intergroup difference and engender antipathy toward members of outgroups within a nation. The outgroups can be perceived as threatening competitors to nation-building or as a "fifth column" that seeks to destroy national sovereignty and prosperity. These negative perceptions of outgroup, in turn, reinforce the competition between different national narratives.

Competing narratives of national identity can be produced on the state, nationalist intelligentsia, and vernacular levels. Through law, bureaucratic procedures, educational structures, and social rituals, political agents and representatives of the state shape the perceptions, categorization, interpretation, and memory that serve as a foundation for national identity.⁶² Representatives of the nationalist intelligentsia adopt historic events to their ideological and political position, sharpening and reshaping them through sound stories and legitimizing accounts.⁶³ They reevaluate and develop different meanings of national identity and posit other groups within the nation as allies or enemies. These narratives of national identity became more manifold and dispersed on the vernacular level while people reflect and assess the rationality and morality of national categorization and identity.⁶⁴ Neverthe-

less, the core patterns of national narratives remain intact and shape conflict within a nation. In situations of social transition and rapid change, social groups can be transformed into charismatic communities that are empowered to produce new national narratives and became agents of change.⁶⁵ In this process of “social becoming” followers became real agents of change and equate leaders with their ability to redefine the meaning of national identity.

BINARIES AS A FOUNDATION OF NARRATIVE

Over the years scholars have developed the idea that complex narratives are underpinned by the “concrete and stable system of symbols,”⁶⁶ “conceptual scaffolding” that is erected to construct new ideologies or to modify existing ones,⁶⁷ or “primary frameworks” that transform “what would otherwise be a meaningless aspect of the scene into something that is meaningful” by offering a point of comparison, or a conceptual structure, through which people can digest information.⁶⁸ Charles Tilly showed the transformation of the complexities of social processes into superior stories that capture the gist of social realities and create symbolic references to and connection with a moral universe.⁶⁹ In social psychology, social perception is analyzed through the categorization of social actors, objects, and experiences and through the development of systems of “social representations” that “conventionalize” people’s knowledge through two mechanisms: “objectification,” which creates a connection between ideas and objects in the physical and social world, and “anchoring,” which connects these categories together to form patterns of general knowledge.⁷⁰ These patterns are created by groups: “classes, nations, professions, and so forth.”⁷¹

These simplistic structures are organized as polarities that replicate the existential and metaphysical contrast between sacred and profane.⁷² The centrality of binary oppositions in culture were analyzed as the set of rules that enables binary oppositions to be ordered into myths,⁷³ the set of binary oppositions,⁷⁴ and fundamental Kabyle house cultural oppositions, such as those between high and low, male and female, fire and water, and light and dark.⁷⁵ Bourdieu remarks that “all the actions performed in a space constructed in this way are immediately qualified symbolically and function as so many structural exercises which is built up practical mastery of the fundamental schemes.”⁷⁶ The simple logic and “retrievability”⁷⁷ of binary systems make them easy to use for supporters of established narrative. Binary oppositions lead to straightforward comprehension of conflict by adversary parties and constant reproduction of conflict.⁷⁸

According to structural semiotic theory, underpinning social narratives are binary symbolic codes that are composed of a positive and a negative value.⁷⁹ Social groups “portrayed themselves as protagonists in simplified

narratives, projecting their positions, arguments, and actions as exemplifications of sacred religious and secular texts. In turn, they ‘cast’ their opponents as narrative antagonists, insincere and artificial actors who were only role playing to advance their interests.”⁸⁰ Smith⁸¹ describes civic and political discourses “as sign systems that arrange concepts in patterns of binary opposition. These concepts mark off the sacred from the profane, the desired from the damned, the civilized from the barbaric.”⁸² Moral binaries increase the perception of narratives as truthful and authentic, create boundaries between a sacred ingroup and profane outgroup, and facilitate the increase in the salience of ingroup identity. The ingroup is described through positive values and legitimacy, while the outgroup represents negative values and is illegitimate. Binary codes regulate and shape social processes by defying values of policies, actors, and institutions. In every social community, including the national one, “there are deeply elaborated narratives about how evil develops and where it is likely to appear, about epochal struggles that have taken place between evil and the good, and about how good can triumph over evil once again.”⁸³ In national narratives, a binary system is constructed to declare the sacred and profane in national history, prospects and treats to national prosperity, and internal and external enemies and allies. These national narratives are created through public discourses, reinterpretations of history and power struggles within the existing order, and define categories of inclusion and exclusion as well as criteria for citizenship. The authenticity of binary systems depends on efficient incorporation of the group culture, expectations of its members, and the specificity of the political context.

Alexander contends that discourses in civil society are fundamentally structured by the single code of liberty—a binary normative code of the civil and the anti-civil. However, recent studies have shown the multiplicity and local variation of codes. In transitional, young democracies, civil-society discourses are often structured by multiple codes: codes of liberty, communism, and Nazism;⁸⁴ codes of liberty and caring in nineteenth-century America,⁸⁵ Hong Kong, and Taiwan;⁸⁶ codes of liberty and corporate code in Brazil;⁸⁷ dynamics between a dominant narrative of communal success and emergent democratic narrative in Hong Kong.⁸⁸ These cultural variations of codes are especially evident in “societies where political culture might be more in flux or potentially more plural as particular traditions are less established and less embedded in the institutions of civil society.”⁸⁹ The meaning of binary systems in national narratives is built up in specific historical contexts⁹⁰ and reflects the fundamental differences between democracy and nationalism, liberal society and communism. Binary codes of nationalism are primordial in their nature and, thus, are most general and powerful, contracting and overshadowing individualistic or civic binary codes.⁹¹ Collectivistic codes of exclusion still prevail in societies across the globe, including codes of primordality and traditionality.⁹² The code of primordality is based on

social categories as gender, kinship, ethnicity, or race; it defines social boundary as rigid and proscribed from crossing because of “a threat of *pollution*.”⁹³ The code of traditionality focuses on the common past of the group as the core of its self-image and on created boundaries based on implicit and explicit rules, traditions, and social routines. The development of a liberal society is connected with the establishment of a code of universality that emphasizes the permeability of social boundary for outsiders. This boundary distinguishes “true” from “false” consciousness; thus every person is permitted to cross the boundary if he is enlightened, educated, or converted.⁹⁴

The support for the idea of the existence of relatively stable multiple binary systems within the society can also be found in the personal-construct theory of George Kelly,⁹⁵ who sees personal constructs as ways of constructing the world. “Man looks at his world through transparent templets which he creates and then attempts to fit over the realities of which the world is composed.”⁹⁶ A construct is a basis on which elements represent symbolic meaning rather than specific situation itself: “an interpretation of a situation and not itself the situation which it interprets.”⁹⁷ Each construct embodies an oppositional pair of two values. These constructs are used to interpret the past, assess the present, and forecast events. People constantly test their repertory of constructs, improving them and uniting them into superordinate constructs that can be applied across social realities. These construction systems can be communicated and can be widely shared within and between groups. They create specific meanings for situations and ignore variations that are not important to the system. These widely shared public-construction systems represent the world in binary terms and are relatively stable in these representations.

Multiple codes can exist simultaneously within the national community, and contestation between them can lead to public tensions, social conflicts, and even disintegration of the civil sphere.⁹⁸ “Because each code denies the legitimacy of the other, these codes will exist in tension with each other as actors vie to establish one or another as dominant, particularly in less established civil societies.”⁹⁹ In periods of political transitions, a symbolic contest between codes can be transformed into a “zero-sum” competition in which the existence of one code is perceived as an immediate threat to another. Liberal individualistic codes threaten collectivistic codes underpinning social loyalties to communism and nationalism that lead to protracted conflicts within societies.

The role of moral duality in contested intergroup relations, conflict, and violence is emphasized in the theory of collective axiology that I developed in collaboration with Daniel Rothbart.¹⁰⁰ A collective axiology is defined through categories of right/wrong, good/bad, and/or virtuous/vicious, drawing on stories of a sacred past and propelled forward in the form of obligations, expectations, requirements, demands, and rights. The virtues (kind-

ness, sincerity, honesty, or personal sacrifice) are contrasted with vices (unkindness, insincerity, dishonesty, or brutality). Collective axiology not only represents but also shapes value commitments that intensify group differences. It provides a sense of life and world, serves to shape perceptions of actions and events, and provides a basis for evaluating group members. A collective axiology defines boundaries and relations among groups and establishes criteria for ingroup/outgroup membership. Through its collective axiology, a group traces its development from a sacred past, extracted from mythic episodes beyond the life of mortals, and seeks permanence. Transcending the finitude of individual life, a collective axiology extends retrospectively from the salient episodes of the past to a prospective vision, presumably into the otherwise uncertain future.

Two variables characterize the dynamics of collective axiology: *the degree of collective generality* and *the degree of axiological balance*. First, the degree of collective generality refers to how applicable certain identity markers—such as characteristics, patterns of behaviors, and capacities/limitations—are within a group.¹⁰¹ A high level of collective generality implies that an outgroup is seen as unitary and homogeneous, demonstrating fixed patterns of behaviors, committed to rigid beliefs and values, wherever those within the outgroup may live in the world. A low degree of collective generality reflects the perception of the outgroup as differentiated, ready for transformation, exhibiting various kinds of behaviors, and relatively limited in scope. The degree of collective generality can change over time, especially in situations of social transition.

Second, the degree of axiological balance refers to the scale of variability in the defining attributes of a group. A high degree of axiological balance implies a parallelism of sorts between both positive and negative characteristics within groups. In the context of identity-based conflict, a group with a high degree of axiology balance tends to recognize virtues and vices among members of both the ingroup and outgroup. In contrast, a group with a low degree of axiological balance perceives the ingroup as morally pure and superior and the outgroup as evil and vicious. This tends to promote a “tunnel consciousness” and a diminished capacity for independent thought. Of course, as identity-based conflicts continue for a long time, a low degree of axiological balance is reduced significantly by exaggeration, inflation, and fabrication, as if the virtues of the ingroup and vices of the outgroup become somehow fixed in a timeless social order and driven in the social-political world of the conflict protagonists.¹⁰²

The meanings captured in binary oppositions are represented on several levels of national narratives. A particular binary is connected with its narrative justifications and normative prescriptions that extend and develop variations of meaning. Within the national narrative, categorical binaries with respective mythic narratives and normative aspects—similar to Levi-

Strauss's units of mythical discourse (mythemes)—“acquire meaning only because they are grouped in bundles and because these bundles themselves combine together.”¹⁰³ The analogies and antipathies constructed in binary codes receive deeper meaning in narratives that provide chronologies. “In symbolizing actors' and audiences' worlds, these narratives and codes simultaneously condense and elaborate . . . to configure social and emotional life in compelling and coherent ways.”¹⁰⁴ The myths and prescriptions incorporated into a narrative help justify the claim about social order, presented in binary codes, and evaluate it to the level of the responsibilities of specific activities. Narratives develop motivations for social and political actions and prescribe forms of social mobilization. Thus, the meaning of categorical binaries operates on several levels simultaneously, creating “levels of meaning”¹⁰⁵ within the national narrative. Each level, myths and normativity, adds meaning to a simple dichotomously structured dualistic order. In addition, narratives unite past and present with the idealized images of a national future.¹⁰⁶ The following two sections present the theoretical discussions on myths and normative order.

MYTHIC NARRATIVES

The meaning of binary codes is extended and further developed in the narratives and myths that constitute the cultural foundation of social group.¹⁰⁷ Myths, as stories of origination, create a vision of the continuity of social community through the recounting of its past. They increase the salience of ingroup identity and define the criteria for membership and exclusion based on ingroup history and current position of groups within the society. In Levi-Strauss's writings, the meaning of myth derives from analogical operations of classifications and resides in unconsciousness. Myth is constituted by the system of relationships among the myth's elements forming a synchronic order; a set of myth types and language elements exists universally across cultures.¹⁰⁸ By denying the relevance of the content of myth and treating events represented in myth as irrational and false, structural analysis loses its connection to everyday life. For Cassirer, mythic thought is a whole form of life that encompasses practices, beliefs, and rituals. He stressed the symbolic nature of myth, seeing it as an enchanted glass through which groups create their own symbolic representation in primitive traditional cultures.¹⁰⁹ According to him, in modern societies, myth is only employed as a “desperate mean” in situations of deep crisis when rationality ceases to be an effective tool or in totalitarian societies where the distinction between the private and public sphere has been dissolved and rituals prevail.¹¹⁰ This enlightening vision of myth is revised in Durkheimian traditions, which treats myth as contextualized within the political life of community. It provides a symbolic

foundation for social order, reinforces social cohesion, and justifies the existing structure of society. It emphasizes and legitimizes the sacred norms and beliefs of a community, defining and redefining the core of social identity. Current anthropology frames myth in daily practice and emphasizes conscious use of myths through which basic postulates of reality are also expressed. Myth expresses the people's "*reality postulates*" about the world and concerns "*a moral universe of meaning*."¹¹¹ Myth does not provide commemoration of mythical events but it reiterates them, making the protagonists of the myth present in contemporary life.¹¹²

In this book, I analyze the mythic underpinnings of moral, social, and political orders. Myth presents the significant features, norms, and beliefs of the ingroup and outgroups, defines the boundary between them, and outlines rules of interaction. Myth contributes to the establishment of nations by determining their foundations, morality, and values. The historical validation of myth is not central to its meaning; rather, the core of myth is constituted by beliefs about criteria for goodness, legitimate participation, and exclusion/inclusion. In this book I do not scrutinize the claims to truth in the myths: the standpoint of their accounts as true or false is less important than the meaning they produce and the effect they have on a community in specific social situations.¹¹³ Moreover, I believe that analysis of national myths reveals a plurality of truths to exist. Thus, myth is one of the crucial mechanisms of cultural reproduction and "management of meaning" through the production and reproduction of significance in a particular context.¹¹⁴ "Myth creates an intellectual and cognitive monopoly in that it seeks to establish the sole way of ordering the world and defining world-views. For the community to exist as community, this monopoly is vital, and the individual members of that community must broadly accept the myth."¹¹⁵ People sharing myth constitute a specific social community with a defined identity and social boundary, whereby all others are excluded.

In collective axiology,¹¹⁶ we define mythic narratives as stories that establish where, why, and how the group was formed, what encounters it had with outgroups, and what shared glories and trauma constitute the evolution of the ingroup. Stories of the threatening Other gain potency through dissemination of shocking images, harrowing anecdotes, and accounts of violence. Over time, such stories solidify perceptions of the Other through seemingly fixed negativities that are grounded, presumably, in a common place of origin, a shared ancestry, or common flaws. Through the power of such images, certain particularities of places, times, and actors become sacred to both storytellers and listeners. Episodes, occurring in a mythic past, shape axiological differences. Mythic events are not presented in chronological time: instead mythic narratives have their own logic and time line. An episode that becomes sacred becomes venerated and central to the myth, creating the logic of mythic events. The sacred episodes shape group con-

siousness and color their perceptions of ingroup and outgroup. The sacred/profane duality at work in the process of axiological differentiation acquires mythic forms of “victims,” “criminals,” or “heroes.”

Mythic narratives often rely on prototypes of positive or negative personalities.¹¹⁷ The need for clarity and coherence in such an evaluation promotes agreement among other members of the ingroup. Members of the ingroup that conform to the positive prototypes are estimated to have positive morality, while members of the outgroup that exhibit characteristics similar to the negative prototypes are estimated to have aberrant or even no morality. Emerging from specific storylines about localized episodes, icons function as graphic expressions of negativities. A particular episode, event, action, or encounter is privileged, venerated, and almost sanctified in this transition in the minds of the faithful. Certain impressions produce demonic images, adding to the religious significance of profane episodes. Viewed through such images, a stranger’s actions function as a prototype of their unjust, immoral, uncivilized, or possibly inhuman character.

Collective past constitutes an essential part of these narratives. In the Durkheimian tradition, shared past is positioned as a core component in the process of reproduction of social identity. Collective memory—the selective recollection of past events perceived as important for the members of a specific community—maintains historical continuity by establishing a connection between myths, symbols, and discourses of national identity.¹¹⁸ “Memory provides individuals and collectives with a cognitive map, helping orient who they are, why they are here and where they are going. . . . Collective memory unifies the group through time and over space by providing a narrative frame, a collective story, which locates the individual and his and her biography within it, and which, because it can be represented as narrative and as text, attains mobility.”¹¹⁹ The interconnection between past and present can be described as “time collapse”: the process “in which the interpretations, fantasies and feelings about a past shared trauma commingle with those pertaining to a current situation,” resulting in chosen traumas and glories.¹²⁰ Myth cannot be accepted if it is constructed based on false information or does not include memory of the community. At the same time, reproduction of the past is influenced by the ingroup’s needs, interests, and positions and by their relevance to the present situation. The same historical event receives multiple interpretations by different groups based on their social identity, “moral projects,” and cultural visions.¹²¹ The events of the past became incorporated into the symbolic meanings of narratives and gain potency to impact the past and future of ingroup, thus reshaping its identity.

Together with defining the meaning of national identity, the use of the past in myth helps strengthen legitimacy of power. Through the “preferred readings” the stories of the past obtain new interpretation, structures, and links to power and established order. The past becomes “usable” as it serves

the interests of elites in controlling mass mobilization, it legitimizes unpalatable social change based on the “tradition of fathers,” it inspires public emulation through morality, and it legitimizes the right of an ethnic community to national territory. To become “usable” in the process of nation building, the past should be authentic, representing shared cultural elements, have potential for inspiration and imagination, and be open to interpretations in the light of social and political needs.¹²² Myth is not created once and for all; it undergoes constant reconstruction and reworking of its narrative core through appropriation by different agents.¹²³ Through the processes of “*rediscovery and reappropriation*,” elites employ specific events from the past to develop legitimizing fables of reference.¹²⁴ Elites not only use the sacred to legitimize their domination but also produce and shape the meaning of the sacred in this process.¹²⁵

Despite the long list of myth’s functions stressed by many scholars, they can be clustered into two major groups: functions of the formation of social identity and functions of the legitimization of power. Thus, among thirteen functions of myth defined by Schopflin,¹²⁶ eight contribute to the development of social identity and five to the support of regime and the legitimization of power. The first group of functions includes functions of identity management that help define and preserve common identity: (1) self-definition and self-attribution of ingroup through the set of roles, functions, and purposes; (2) transfer of identity and assimilation; (3) establishment of solidarity and illusion of the community through symbolic forms; (4) maintenance of collective memory; and (5) connection to culture. The second group includes functions of the definition of intergroup relations and boundaries: (1) offering explanation for the fate of the community; (2) scapegoating; and (3) construction of the enemy. The third group includes functions of the legitimization and support of power: (1) organizing and mobilizing public opinion; (2) simplification of complexity and standardization of knowledge; (3) transfer of political messages; (4) preservation of elites’ power; and (5) assertion of legitimacy and strengthening of authority. The legitimizing function of myth is also analyzed through the approximation-creation of distant events closer to the group¹²⁷ or as a form of ideological control that maintains social systems and legitimizes power relations.¹²⁸ In addition to the legitimizing function, which makes “the presence appear meaningful, necessary, and irreversible,” myth also performs delegitimizing functions by challenging the order and emphasizing the estrangement between the past and present of the nation.¹²⁹ I will return to the legitimizing function in the discussion of the role of normative order in national narrative.

Scholars agree that the variety of myths can be presented through a number of fairly standard forms.¹³⁰ These categories are not exclusive and can overlap or create specific conglomerates. Similar to functions, types of myth are linked to identity formation and the legitimization of power. The first

group of myths provides a sense of common identity, as well as the foundations for a sense of dignity and continuity of traditions. The *myth of kinship and shared descent (ancestry)* concentrates on the depiction of a group as a coherent family and the exclusion of all aliens. It usually underlines ethnocentrism, nationalism, and racism. The *myth of the Golden Age* exemplifies a particular period of history as a period of glory and goodness, a period that defines the best in a particular group and provides lessons for the present and future. Through reestablishment of the authenticity and dignity of a group, this myth creates a model of national destiny. The *myth of civic foundation* promotes a special event in the group's history that indicates a significant change and enhancement of the group. This event gives this group specific rights and justifies its action. The *myth of ethnogenesis and antiquity* helps establish primacy of a group over all other groups on the basis of "being here first," including rights of citizenship for immigrants and ethnic minorities. The *myth of territory (shared homeland)* emphasizes the right of a particular group for the territory where this group formed and developed. Treating territory as a sacred place, this myth supports claims of national community to protect state sovereignty and exclude other alien groups.

A second group of myths stresses the uniqueness of a group and legitimizes its exceptional rights. The *myth of election* claims a special mission or function of a group deriving from its moral superiority and unique virtues, including a capacity for modernity, love of freedom, or a culture of honor. The *myth of redemption and suffering* concentrates on the misery of a particular group through the history that gives a group the right to be redeemed and moral superiority as a savior of the world. It glorifies the survival skills of a group and elevates the purposiveness of its destiny. *Myth of unjust treatment* emphasizes terrible suffering to justify the powerlessness and helplessness of a group and legitimize its exceptional moral worth. The *myth of military valor* elevates a group as a winner in the fight with tyranny, armed resistance, war, or revolution. It legitimizes primacy of the group over the individual and violence as a means of progress. The *myth of rebirth and renewal* represents a group as a resurrected phoenix or as a community that has shed its sins through cleansing rituals. It creates a foundation for a clean start and for the transformation of a social order that would bring a group to a better position.

NORMATIVE ORDER

Binary systems also form normative aspects of social relations and political actions within the nation. They provide "moral and mythical solutions to the existential and practical dilemmas of modernity—alienations and anomies, class and ethnic conflict, industrialization and dislocation of traditional

sources of social and moral support.”¹³¹ Binary codes define and demarcate social boundaries, enunciate foundations for protests and demands, and shape the distribution of power and authority.¹³² Thus, the binary codes create a foundation of normative positioning of groups¹³³ or normative order.¹³⁴ Normative order reflects a tension between stability and change, between fixed identities and social-border crossings. More than simply a distillation of prescriptions and injunctions, a normative order encapsulates a set of moral obligations, rights, duties, and expectations that guide individuals in their interactions. A normative order comprises a set of rules and resources that are deployed for acting and thinking, for doing and reflecting, or for living and understanding. The normative order legitimizes group decisions and actions and provides foundation for future activities.

The normative order serves multiple functions, the idea for which can be borrowed from the studies on types of frames.¹³⁵ Gamson¹³⁶ argues that social movements employ three kinds of frames: “aggregate frames,” “consensus frames,” and “collective-action frames.” Aggregate frames label issues as social problems and inspire people to act as individuals. Consensus frames emphasize the resolution of a social problem through collective action. These types of frames construct a strong sense of ingroup identity but do not define the outgroup(s) responsible for the problem. Collective-action frames concentrate on defining a problem as essentially wrong and caused by a certain outgroup; they also establish an adversarial relationship between the ingroup capable of resolving the problem through collective action and a profane outgroup. Collective-action frames can only form if people perceive an issue through all three component frames (injustice, agency, and identity). Snow and Benford¹³⁷ describe “diagnostic framing,” which clearly defines a problem and assigns blame for the problem to a specific agent or agencies; “prognostic framing,” which offers solutions through specific strategies, tactics, and objectives; and “motivational framing,” which increases the motivation to fight for the cause. Based on these ideas about types of collective framing, the role of normative order can be described through (a) definition of the problem, (b) identification of the outgroup that caused the problem, (c) inspiration of the ingroup to deal with the problem, (d) prompting the ingroup to fight with the outgroup, and (e) providing specific prescriptions, strategies, and methods to deal with this problem and with the outgroup.

In this discussion of normative order, it is useful to turn to the concept of power and review what type of power could be employed in normative order positioning and prescriptions. The classic definition of power characterizes it as the ability of one party to influence the behavior of the other party and the ability of the other party to achieve its objectives.¹³⁸ Thus, a group or individual in power can posit a threat to other groups or individuals by creating the conditions in which the superordinate group will feel inadequate to deal with a current situation to satisfy their needs. The degree of this threat de-

depends on the degree of power that can be exercised within the system and can be increased in stressful or ambiguous situations. A person or group in power can possess two groups of values: welfare values (necessary conditions including well-being, wealth, and skill) and deference values, whose necessary conditions including taking into consideration power, respect, and reputation. The rest of the people are dependent on “influencing power” for the satisfaction of their needs and desires or the fulfillments of their goals. The increase of influence of the leader depends on (1) acceptance of the leader by a group, (2) an increase in certainty of the leader’s opinion, (3) a decrease in certainty of other opinions, (4) increased acceptance of the leader’s role, and (5) increased perception of the leader as an expert. Moscovici¹³⁹ also describes power as involving dependence and coercion against people’s will, changing people’s will and beliefs through norms and social consensus.

This concept relies on the notion of power as something “given,” self-perpetuating, durable, and hard to change or alter by people who are dependent on the good will, decisions, and support of the government in a hierarchical system (a top-down approach). It was challenged by Sharp,¹⁴⁰ who introduced the perception of power as something fragile. Government is dependent on people’s good will, must listen to their decisions, and needs their support (a bottom-up approach). The sources of power include not only the resources of a ruler—including authority (a right to command or direct and be obeyed), skills and knowledge, material resources, and sanctions at the disposal of a ruler—but also human resources (people who obey a ruler) and intangible factors (social and psychological factors, including habits and attitudes toward submission, presence of ideology, common faith, etc.). Sharp¹⁴¹ emphasizes that these resources depend on the obedience and cooperation of the subjects and their contributions to the established system. The view of a group as a precondition of influence rather than simply an outcome has been further developed by Turner.¹⁴²

Some scholars also distinguish between “power over” and “power to.” For Weber¹⁴³ power rests on the will of people who can use it to enforce others within a social relations framework: “Power is a probability that one actor within social relationship will be in a position to carry out his own will despite resistance, regardless of the basis on which this probability rests.”¹⁴⁴ The understanding of “power over” as domination was further developed by constructivists, who criticized the imposition of power by social structures. According to Foucault,¹⁴⁵ people are entrapped in the “multiplicity of force relations”¹⁴⁶ represented in discourses and social practices. Bourdieu¹⁴⁷ describes a society through prevailing symbol systems that locate individuals within existing social systems of power.

“Power to” is defined either as the preceding or a precondition to “power over,” a latent form of power, a capacity to exercise power,¹⁴⁸ or an independent form of power that constitutes an important aspect of social life.¹⁴⁹ The

later approach sees “power to” as resting on the interactions in the society—people speaking and acting “in concert.”¹⁵⁰ If “power to” is considered an essential characteristic of the community of individuals, who realize power through communication, then “power over” is described as violence and imposition of will. “In general terms, power is the production, in and through social relations, of effects that shape the capacities of actors to determine their own circumstances and fate.”¹⁵¹ “Power to” as productive power gives people an initial possibility to act and be empowered, developing resistance to existing structures of power or alternative symbolic systems.¹⁵²

Allen¹⁵³ combines feminist and constructivist approaches and introduces “power with” as an ability to work jointly and in solidarity. Building on Boulding’s three “faces” of power,¹⁵⁴ “power over” as domination, “power to” as a creation of material and social goods, and “power with” as creative collaboration, Turner¹⁵⁵ distinguishes between “power over” and a “power through” approaches. “Power over,” control as a capacity to compel actions from people who are not convinced of the validity of the specific belief or act, has two forms: legitimate authority based on the acceptance of the right of the ruler to prescribe specific beliefs, attitudes, or actions and coercion as a power over others against their will. The “power through” approach includes persuasion as the power to convince people of the rightness of a particular order and a shared belief in the validity of a ruler.

The distinction between “power over” and “power to” is reflected in different typologies of power. While scholars differ in defining types of power, they consider power as both dominant and coercive, as well as creative and empowering. The classic typology of French and Raven¹⁵⁶ includes five types: (1) reward power, based on perception that a leader has the ability to mediate rewards; (2) coercive power, based on the perception that a leader can produce a punishment; (3) legitimate power, based on the perception of the legitimate rights of a leaders; (4) referent power, based on identification with a leader; and (5) expert power, based on acknowledgement of the specific knowledge or expertise of a leader. Galam and Moscovici¹⁵⁷ define three types of power: institutional power as a power to dominate the group, generative power as a group’s capacity for mobilizing skills and multiplying resources, and ecological power as a power that mobilizes and directs activities toward the outside world. Four types of power have been distinguished by Barnett and Duval:¹⁵⁸ compulsory power as a direct control over another, institutional power as an actor’s control over socially distant others, structural power as a direct and mutual constitution of the capacities of actors, and productive power as a production of subjects through diffuse social relations. Thus, despite differences in typologies, scholars agree that a leader can have “power over” others by virtue of resources under her or his control or can have a power that results from the mobilization and inspiration to follow the

path outlined by a leader. The former can be defined as a coercive power and the latter as a legitimate power.

In the above discussion of the functions of myths, I emphasized the legitimizing role of mythical narratives. But this role becomes specified and elevated in normative order, where it unites with the prescriptions on changing or maintaining of power. Legitimate power rests on internalized values and acceptance that a leader has the legitimate right to influence people, who have an obligation to accept this influence. Sharp¹⁵⁹ distinguishes three bases of legitimate power: cultural values that give a leader a right to power (“eternal yesterday,”¹⁶⁰ including age, caste, and intellect), acceptance of a social structure, and designation by a legitimate agent. According to Foucault,¹⁶¹ individuals internalize norms and practices presented in social structures and accept them as a norm of life. Based on their own perceptions and forms of expression, habitus, people accept existing forms of power as legitimate even if they are positioned as disadvantaged within this system.¹⁶² Theories of justice¹⁶³ and theories of legitimacy of power¹⁶⁴ describe legitimacy as the acceptance of the structure (system of power) as “right” by both advantaged and disadvantaged groups. This acceptance results in the stability of the system of power. While the legitimacy of the system is easily accepted and supported by the members of privileged groups, members of low-status groups are in conflict with the discriminating system and must deal with this incompatibility. Other theories provide alternative explanations of the support of the system of power through manipulation, validation, and consensus: “dominant ideology,” accepted by the ruled class as a “false consciousness”;¹⁶⁵ validity, acceptance of norms, values, beliefs, practices, and procedures on the collective level and by the people on the individual level;¹⁶⁶ validation, embedment of social norms and beliefs into the validity of the social order;¹⁶⁷ consensus about the group goal(s);¹⁶⁸ and the support of underprivileged groups, coping with epistemic and existential sources of threat and anxiety.¹⁶⁹ Groups and authorities employ both legitimation and delegitimation processes, operating them in tandem, creating a decreasing moral acceptance of one ethnic or regional group and associating it with policies and increasing moral acceptance of another one.¹⁷⁰

The comprehension of legitimacy in social-identity theory and social-categorization theory is particularly useful for understanding of the role of normative order in national narrative. These theories connect legitimacy to the development of a shared social identity, stating that mutual influence creates a basis of power as a capacity to persuade and/or control others to carry out one’s will. Power rests on group identity, reflecting the collective goals, values, and beliefs of group members and social comparisons within and between groups. People interpret and evaluate power use through the lens of their salient group membership: ingroup members are considered as more representative of group goals and to be more normative and persua-

sive.¹⁷¹ Thus, political leaders become influential by employing the basic norms and ideas of social identity and increasing perception of them as prototypical. To increase his or her legitimacy, a political leader should not only be a representative of ingroup identity but also champion the interests of this group, form ingroup identity, and shape the reality in the image of ingroup identity.¹⁷² Legitimate authority is also “based on ingroup norms that a person, role or group has the right to prescribe appropriate beliefs, attitudes or behavior in certain areas. The group agrees (by custom, experience, or formal decision) that they ought to follow a specific person or position (that has the role of leadership or authority) to express their collective will and short-circuit what might be futile, divisive and time-consuming arguments about what is the right course of action.”¹⁷³ Legitimate authority empowers group members to achieve their goals by creating a power structure through which group identity and goals are realized (on the issue of empowerment, see an overview by Avruch¹⁷⁴). Thus, legitimization of power in national narratives is based on the employment, modification, and creation of specific norms and social identity that justify a particular order. To increase or stabilize their power, representatives of competing national narratives must utilize the prevailing meaning of social identity and shape it into desired connotations.

FUNCTIONS OF NATIONAL NARRATIVE

Therefore, the national narrative fulfills two major functions: (1) creation and redefinition of the meaning of national identity and (2) support and legitimization of power. These two functions can be distinguished only for the purposes of theoretical analysis; they are actually intertwined. I argue here that interrelation between two functions of national narrative is constituted by two opposite but tangled processes: national identity defines, and is defined by, systems of power, thus producing *embedding of the concept of power into the meaning of identity* and *shaping of power by the meaning of national identity*. Through the first process, *embedding of the concept of power into the meaning of national identity*, the specific meanings of power and power relations between the ingroup and outgroups are incorporated as a core of a particular national identity. The concept of political power determines, shapes, and gives meaning to national identity. In other words, the specific concept of power (e.g., specific connotations of authoritarianism, democracy, paternalism, meritocracy, egalitarianism) and power relations between ethnic, religious, and regional groups within the nation are integrated into the very foundation of national identity in the way that people perceive them to be a core definition of the nation and a characteristic that differentiates them from others. For example, in Ghana, the power of a chief is

promoted as a basic definition of tribal identity and a source of the group's self-esteem and exceptionality. In Turkey, being a Muslim gradually becomes a core definition of Turkish citizenship, thus supporting the power of the ruling pro-Islamic party. Therefore, the resistance or opposition to existing power or desired order presented in the national narrative is positioned as a fight with national identity and the nation itself. Because of this cementation of the meaning of power into the foundation of national identity, the realization of power manipulations and the development of a potential for resistance against existing prevailing discourses by individuals themselves¹⁷⁵ or through enlightening by intellectuals¹⁷⁶ is transformed into furious competition and conflict between national narratives. In this competition for power and control over the nation, national narratives incorporate the desired meaning of power and power relations into the meaning of national identity.

This process of *embedment of the concept of power into the meaning of national identity* is entangled with the opposite way of interaction between identity and legitimacy—the *shaping of concepts of power based on the meaning of identity*. Through this process, the meaning of national identity determines, shapes, and gives meaning to the legitimation of political power. The meaning of national identity, including definitions of the ingroup and outgroups and the social boundary between them underpins the comprehension of the existing power structure and design of the ideal social order. For example, in Mexico, the salient identity of Zapatistas as working class resulted in specific forms of class struggle while salient indigenous identity led to the fight for cultural autonomy. Perception of a nation as homogeneous or heterogeneous, presentation of specific ingroup features as foundations of ingroup dominance, emphasis on specific historic events and cultural traditions, casting of outgroups within a nation as allies or enemies, assessment of assimilation or integration on the social boundary—all these processes contribute to the connotation of power. For example, in Turkey, the secular vision of Ata-Turk led to the assimilation of all ethnic groups into a common Turkish ethnic identity, thus denying the cultural rights of Kurds; the emerging new national identity based on the Muslim religion treats all Turks and Kurds as Muslims, thus also rejecting Kurds' desire for autonomy. Moreover, the salience and meaning of national identity define the choice of coercion or legitimization in the support of an existing or desired power structure. The prevalence of particular components in the meaning of national identity ("modes")¹⁷⁷ results in the preference of "power over" as pursuing dominance of the ingroup, "power to" as a development of a national concept that can be accepted by others, or "power with" as a collaboration with all groups within the nation in the process of the formation of common national identity. The first approach rests on nationalistic exceptionality and forced subordination of other ethnic groups—the development of an exclusive ethnic concept of a nation. The second approach involves the legitimization of

the dominance of one ethnic group based on persuasion and the formation of a congenial concept of nation. The third approach entails the involvement of civic society—development of multiculturalism and a civic concept of national identity.

These two entangled functions of national narratives—formation of national identity and support and legitimization of power—permeate all three components of national narrative: binary structure, mythic narratives, and normative order. While binary opposites define right and wrong in the nation, mythic narratives justify this duality and normative order provides prescriptions for dealing with conflict or competition. In each of these levels the meaning is produced through the intertwined processes of *embedding* and *shaping* and constitutes the coherence and relative durability of the national narrative. The following analysis concentrates specifically on each of these components showing the continuity of two functions within the structure of the national narrative.

TYPES OF DUALISTIC ORDER

As discussed above, the national narrative rests on the dualistic order of two axiological opposites described by the specific set of binary criteria. I posit that this dualistic order represents binary opposition of the “good” and “bad” in the nation central to a particular national narrative. It reflects the most important axiological antagonism perceived in the nation and depicts it through the essential opposition of categories of virtues and vices. By defining ingroup and outgroup in the nation through the binary idea of who “we” are and who “we” are not, dualistic order fulfills the function of creation of the meaning of national identity. It amalgamates the most important values and deep beliefs that are sacred and vital for the existence of the ingroup within the nation. Dualistic order can be represented by different binaries of ingroup-outgroup: (1) two categorical (ethnic, racial, political, or religious) groups in the nation, (2) the nation itself and a neighboring country, (3) a nation in the past and the present, and (4) two types of ideology. The first type of dualistic order, *social group (ethnic, religious, class, political party) duality*, represents a nation as an arena of zero-sum fights between two ethnic, political, racial, or religious groups. This type of dualistic order rests on a code of primardiality that defines the social boundary as rigid and proscribed from crossing (see discussion on types of codes above and in Kern 2009¹⁷⁸). *social group duality* implies that one social group concentrates all “goodness” in society, promotes the most important values, represents the best in a nation, promotes right and worthy values, and moves the nation toward a prosperous future; thus it has legitimate power within the nation. It is in fight or conflict with another social group that has oppressed

the ingroup in the past and continues to coerce it based on alien values, evil aspirations, and goals of dominance; this outgroup diminishes the positive prospects of the nation and brings it to devastation. The second type of dualistic order, *binational duality*, emphasizes conflict between two countries (and the political and ideological systems they represent) as a major problem for a nation. This type of dualistic order represents a mix of codes of primordality and traditionality, creating social boundaries based on primordial differences as well as on explicit rules, traditions, and social routines. *binational duality* entails that one's own nation has made a right choice for its development, supports sacred and pure values, and represents the "goodness" in mankind. Another nation is an evil enemy that embodies vices and immoral values and aspires to control, dominate, and take over a neighboring nation. The third type of dualistic order, *temporal duality*, emphasizes the gap between a positive moral past and negative corrupt present of a nation. This type of dualistic order rests on a code of traditionality that focuses on the common past of the group as the core of its self-image and creates boundaries based on implicit and explicit rules, traditions, and social routines. *Temporal duality* posits a specific period in nation's past as the best time in the history of a nation when the nation was virtuous, worthy, and upheld the most important values. In comparison to this time, the current period is profane, furthering wrong values and the vices of society. The fourth type of dualistic order, *ideological duality*, describes the nation as an arena of zero-sum fights between two ideologies/mentalities. This type of dualistic order represents a code of universality that emphasizes the permeability of social boundary for outsiders if they are enlightened, educated, or converted. *Ideological duality* implies that one ideology is an essence of all the worth in a nation, representing the most important values and virtues, and showing a way toward national prosperity. It is in constant conflict with another ideology/mentality that rests on profane values, evil aspirations, and the suppression of morality and goodness in the nation.

Thus, four types of dualistic order represent the major variations of binaries within national narratives. All of them show the dyadic view of the problems and dynamics of nations: one side is always depicted as worthy, moral, and progressive, while another side represents evil, vice, and regression/oppression. While other parties and groups can be represented on the level of mythic narratives, the dualistic order always preserves its duality and forms an essential foundation for national identity. This simple dyadic structure of dualistic order increases the stability and strength of the national narrative and protects it from alternative explanations and ambivalence. The clear idea of what is wrong and what is right in the nation decreases anxiety and provides a sense of stability, especially for people with a low tolerance for uncertainty. It helps people feel comfortable and make judgments in novel, unknown, and surprising situations. It also provides assurance in situa-

tions that create ambiguity and protects the national narrative from alteration by contradictory information. Thus, the dualistic order fulfills *the first function* of national narrative and creates a relatively durable simplistic foundation for national identity through the connotation of differences between ingroup and outgroup.

The process of *embedment of the concept of power into the meaning of national identity* is evident in the impact of the power structure on the intensity of the dualistic order. The level of conflict intensity and depth of moral duality differ among dualistic orders. This variation depends on the power structure within the society: the social hierarchy, balance of power, comparative access to power, and conflict and competition between two groups are presented in the duality. A dualistic order that counterposits an ingroup and outgroups whose relations are characterized by structural inequality and protracted conflict is tenser and rests on the conflict of sacred good and evil; it emphasizes a fight between axiological opposites. Such a dualistic order is characterized by a low level of axiological balance (concentration of good and sacred in the ingroup and of bad and profane in outgroups) and high level of collective generality (perception of the ingroup as homogeneous and essentially good and outgroups as homogenous and essentially bad) (see discussion on collective axiology above and in Rothbart and Korostelina 2006, 2011).¹⁷⁹ A dualistic order, which represents the ingroup and outgroups competing for power and resources, is less conflictual and employs less intense contradictions; nevertheless it still emphasizes the polarity of two opposites. In this case, the level of axiological balance could be higher (some negative features and actions could be attributed to the ingroup and some positive features and actions of the outgroup could be acknowledged) and the level of collective generality could be lower (both groups could be perceived as more heterogeneous and variable through the time). The intensity of dualistic order can also vary within the national narrative: for some people the duality can be more poignant and powerful than for others. The differences in intensity level are especially evident in binary constructs that constitute dualistic order.

TYPES OF BINARY CONSTRUCTS

Categorical constructs describe axiological opposites. The set of binary constructs fulfills two tasks, defining the most important criteria for the assessment of the nation and establishing the meaning of two axiological opposites. I posit that while the processes of “nationalizing” (formation, understanding, and assessment) of the nation are complex and multifaceted, only a few criteria are usually used in a particular dualistic order. Often these lists of criteria include widely known and popular social concepts like democracy,

freedom, and multiculturalism. Through the incorporation into dualistic order these concepts receive axiological significance and are transferred into values. Being transformed into values, social concepts acquire emotional significance, importance, and specific meaning. Although all social concepts have multiple meanings, their specific connotation for a particular dualistic order is defined by binary constructs. This meaning depends on the contrary poles that define both positive and negative connotations of categorical constructs (see discussion on Kelly¹⁸⁰ above). Because each positive pole can be counter-positioned by several alternatives, the meaning of a particular positive pole is verified by the connotation of a specific negative pole. The positive pole, always attributed to the ingroup, defines the foundation for ingroup rights for power and a particular position within a nation. The negative pole, always attributed to the outgroup, states a basis for the denial of power and rights to the outgroup. This positioning of ingroup and outgroup as deserving and not deserving through the attachment of particular social categories and values fulfills *the second function* of national narratives—the support and legitimization of power.

Categorical constructs involve several types of values: values of social order, ideology, development, spirituality and culture, and social relations. The first group, social order values, arrives from social concepts that define a type of society, concepts of national identity (ethnic, multicultural, civic), and relations within a nation and between different nations: multiculturalism, nationalism, independence, empire, civic society, and so on. As I discussed above, the meaning of these social concepts is defined by the opposite pole in a binary construct. For example, the binary construct “multiculturalism-ethnic state” defines “multicultural” as a value of support and protection of ethnic differences, while the binary construct “multiculturalism-homogeneous state” characterizes “multicultural” as a positive value of recognition of the existence of different ethnic groups, and the construct “multiculturalism-nationalism” identifies “multicultural” as a value of the flourishing of different national ideas. The binary construct “free will–paternalism” defines “free will” as a value of absence of dependency on the state, while the construct “free will–imposition of ideology” defines “free will” as a value of freedom of speech and beliefs. Nationalism also has different meanings depending on a binary construct: in the constructs “peaceful coexistence–nationalism” and “multiculturalism-nationalism” it has a negative connotation and means tension and a prevalence of one ethnic group, accordingly. In the construct “nationalism–imperial ambitions” it has a meaning of sovereignty and national renaissance.

The second group, ideology values, arrives from social concepts that define a specific ideology: democracy, socialism, totalitarianism, liberalism, and so on. The binary construct “democratic-totalitarian” defines democracy as a value of rights and freedoms, while the construct “democratic-Soviet”

characterizes democracy through civic agency and participation. The construct “pro-Western–pro-Russian, Asian” defines “pro-Western” as a value of European ideals of freedom and democracy, while the construct “pan-Slavic–pro-Western” unites “pro-Western” with a negative connotation of alien-imposed ideology.

The third group, development values, arrives from social concepts of economic, social, and cultural development, as well as from such concepts as progress, conservatism, traditional society, and so on. The construct “industrialization–economic decline” defines industrialization as a value of economic development, while the construct “industrial-traditional” characterizes industrialization as a value of social progress. The construct “progressive-conservative” characterizes progress as a value of forward thinking and conservatism through a negative meaning of decline.

The fourth group, spirituality and culture values, arrives from social concepts of spirituality, authenticity, renaissance, decline, and simplicity. The construct “high spirituality–rural culture” defines spirituality as a value of culture established in developed urban society, while the construct “high spirituality–simplistic” defines spirituality as a value of sophisticated developed culture, and the construct “high spirituality–alien culture” defines spirituality as a value of authenticity.

The fifth group, social relation values, arrives from social concepts of conflict, victimization, oppression, dialogue, cooperation, mutual respect, and so on. The construct “unity-divide” defines unity as a value of commonality, while the construct “unity-conflict” defines unity as peaceful coexistence. The construct “dialogue-mononarrative” defines dialogue as a value of respect for multiple voices, while the construct “dialogue-oppression” defines dialogue as a value of recognition of another point of view.

Thus, categorical construct defines the valence (positive or negative) and connotation of particular social values used in dualistic order. To understand a particular dualistic order a researcher should not rely on his understanding of a social concept but instead analyze what value and meaning this concept acquires in the particular dualistic order through the other pole of the categorical construct. The meaning of binary constructs defines differences and the connotation of the social boundary between the ingroup and outgroup and, thus, the possibility to dominate the outgroup or be dominated by it, to convince it or to pressurize, to engage in conflict or cooperation. This definition of the hierarchy and prospects for coercion or cooperation based on binary constructs constitutes the process of *shaping of concepts of power through the meaning of national identity*.

Dualistic orders of national narratives can include different types of categorical construct values (see table 1.1). If some dualistic orders can include varieties of values, others would have a prevalence of particular values. It could be hypothesized that a particular type of dualistic order will have a

prevalence of the specific set of values as categorical constructs. Because *social group duality* rests on an opposition between different groups in a nation and emphasizes an opposition of cultures and prevalent ideals, it should have a prevalence of values of spirituality-culture, ideology, and social order. *binational duality* rests on an opposition of national ideas, types of societies, and different concepts of national identity; thus it should have a prevalence of values of ideology and social order. Because *ideological duality* stresses an opposition of prevailing social ideals and established interrelations between different social groups in a nation, it should have prevalence of values of ideology, social order, and social relations. *Temporal duality* emphasizes differences between historic periods, and thus it should have a prevalence of development values.

The dualistic order of a national narrative serves as a stabilizing foundation of the narrative, providing simple and steady duality as a perceived core of the nation. These dualities include oppositions of social groups (ethnic, religious, racial, political, class), of two nations, of two periods of history of a nation, and of two ideologies. The meaning of these dualities is defined by binary constructs constituted by social categories and values. Through the definition of their negative pole, these binary constructs acquire a specific connotation and emotional significance and are converted into values of social order, ideology, social relations, development, and spirituality/culture. Each type of axiological duality is formed with the prevalence of specific values that increases the stability of the dualistic order.

Thus, dualistic order fulfills both functions of national narrative: it creates a relatively durable simplistic foundation for national identity through the connotation of differences between the ingroup and outgroup and, through the attachment of particular social categories and values to these groups, positions the ingroup and outgroup as deserving and not deserving of power and specific rights. These two functions are interconnected within the dualis-

Table 1.1. Types of Dualistic Order

<i>Types of dualistic order</i>	<i>Short description</i>	<i>Prevailing types of values in binary constructs</i>
<i>social-group duality</i>	represents the nation as an arena of zero-sum fights between two ethnic or religious groups	spirituality-culture, ideology, and social order
<i>binational duality</i>	emphasizes conflict between two countries	ideology and social order
<i>temporal duality</i>	emphasizes the gap between a positive moral past and the negative corrupt present	development
<i>ideological duality</i>	describes the nation as an arena of zero-sum fights between two ideologies/ mentalities	ideology, social order, and social relations

tic order: the impact of the power structure on the intensity of a dualistic order facilitates the *embedment of the concept of power into the meaning of national identity*, and the meaning of binary constructs (differences and connotation of the social boundary between the ingroup and outgroup) defines the hierarchy and prospects for coercion or cooperation, thus constituting the process of *shaping concepts of power through the meaning of national identity*.

FUNCTIONING OF MYTHIC NARRATIVES

The mythic narratives rest on binary constructs and justify their specific meaning. As discussed in the introduction, such myths solidify perceptions of the ingroup as lawful and faithful to the nation while the Other is represented through seemingly fixed negativities that are grounded in their place of origin, a shared ancestry and history, or common flaws. As dualistic order provides a foundation for mythic narratives, it could be hypothesized that a particular binary construct will be justified by a specific myth. In other words, each binary construct in a dualistic order will be supported by two groups of types of myths (see the discussion on types above and in Schopflin¹⁸¹ and Smith¹⁸²). Myths that fulfill *the first function*, formation of national identity, justify the meaning of ingroup and outgroup and the social boundary between them through the emphasis on continuity of community. Myths that fulfill the second function, legitimization of power, support or challenge the social order and legitimize the power of the ingroup through the employment of specific events and history of intergroup relations. The first group includes myths of Golden Age, ethnogenesis, territory, and foundation; the second, myth of unjust treatment and suffering, rebirth and renewal, and election. In both groups of myths, through the process of *embedment of concepts of power into the meaning of national identity*, desired power relations and dominance of the ingroup are presented as authentic to the nation, forming its core; outgroups are excluded from the nation-building process. At the same time, both groups of myths represent the specific features and history of groups as underpinning their rights to have power and hold specific places in the social hierarchy, thus *shaping the concepts of power based on the meaning of national identity*.

The main functions of national narratives—the formation of national identity and legitimization of power—in mythic narratives are fulfilled through two groups of mechanisms. The first group includes five mechanisms of justification: (1) impediment by outgroup, (2) condemning imposition, (3) positive ingroup predispositions, (4) validation of rights, and (5) enlightening. The second group, mechanisms of interpretation, includes two mechanisms: one provides opposite interpretation of the same subject and

another, the same interpretations for the opposite subject. They can be used in several types of myths or in a specific myth. The justification and interpretation mechanisms are presented in table 1.2.

The first justification mechanism, impediment by outgroup, is a depiction of the fight between two groups, in which the ingroup represents and supports positive values of the nation. The desired values of the nation promoted by the ingroup vary from a monoethnic state based on nationalism to civic society and multiculturalism. The outgroup impedes ingroup activity through the development of conflict, establishment of wrong policies, promotion of wrong ideology, unfair treatment, oppressions, and use of violence. Thus binary opposition between “good” and “bad” groups is justified through the depiction of right actions of the ingroup and wrong actions of the outgroup. In the process of *embedment of concepts of power in the meaning of identity*, this mechanism posits ingroup exclusiveness in defining national identity and outcasts the outgroup as an illegitimate agent of nation building. In the process of *shaping of concepts of power by the meaning of national identity*, this mechanism justifies actions and dominance of the ingroup as representing the rightness in a nation. The impediment by outgroup mechanism can be more prominent in myths of foundation, suffering and unjust treatment, and rebirth and renewal.

The second justification mechanism, condemning imposition, rationalizes the claim that the ingroup represents the interests of all groups in the nation while the outgroup is imposing its own narrow ideology, ideas, policies, traditions, ethnic or regional culture, and language over all people in the nation and wrongly claims to symbolize the nation. The myth explains why the culture or ideology of the outgroup is alien to the people and cannot be accepted by the nation. Thus, binary opposition between “good” and “bad” groups is justified by the claim that the ingroup represents the whole nation while the outgroup represents particular corrupt interests. In the process of *embedment*, this mechanism posits the ingroup as an essential core of the nation, while the outgroup is assigned to a narrow corrupt subculture. In the process of *shaping*, this mechanism justifies the power of the ingroup over all other groups. The condemning imposition mechanism can be more prominent in myths of ethnogenesis, territory, and Golden Age.

Third justification mechanism, positive ingroup predispositions, describes the ingroup as more able, capable, and competent than the outgroup. These abilities can include entrepreneurial ability and skills of innovation, democratic values and cultures, European traditions, and tolerance and support of human rights. The myth describes them as arriving from a long history and development of the ingroup and becoming an essential core of ingroup mentality. By comparison to the ingroup, the outgroup lacks these abilities because of its simplistic culture, regressive mentality, history, and geography of development. As a result, the outgroup is not developed, conservative, and

Table 1.2. Justification and Interpretation Mechanisms Used in Mythic Narratives

<i>Mechanism</i>	<i>Short description</i>	<i>Myths</i>	<i>Dualistic order</i>
impediment by outgroup	fight between two groups in which the ingroup supports positive values of the nation while the outgroup impedes ingroup activity	foundation, suffering and unjust treatment, rebirth and renewal	social group, ideology
condemning imposition	the ingroup represents the interests of all groups in the nation, while the outgroup imposes its own ideology, policies, and culture	ethnogenesis, territory, Golden Age	social group, ideology, temporal
positive ingroup predispositions	the ingroup as more able, capable, and competent than the outgroup	foundation, election	social group, binational
validation of rights (exclusion)	the ingroup has more rights to develop the nation according to their vision; the outgroup has fewer entitlements, or its rights are completely denied	ethnogenesis territory	social group, binational
enlightening	all people are willing to pursue particular goals but have limited abilities; the ingroup has to enlighten them to achieve the desired outcomes	foundation	ideology
opposite interpretations of the same subject	promotes ingroup point of view and condemns outgroup explanation	all	all

<i>Mechanism</i>	<i>Short description</i>	<i>Myths</i>	<i>Dualistic order</i>
same interpretation for opposite subjects	describes values as a core feature of the ingroup, and denounces all claims by the outgroup to use similar positive definitions	all	all

paternalistic but is trying to promote its ideas as ideas for the nation. Thus, the ingroup is required to fight with a backward outgroup to prevent it from influencing the national development. Binary opposition between “good” and “bad” groups is justified by the better abilities of one group to lead the nation. In the process of *embedding*, this mechanism posits the ingroup as progressive and virtuous, defending the nation from a backward outgroup. In the process of *shaping*, this mechanism justifies the power of the ingroup as better able and suited to rule. The positive ingroup predispositions mechanism can be more prominent in myths of foundation and election.

The fourth justification mechanism, validation of rights, describes the ingroup as having more rights to develop the nation according to their vision. These rights are based on advanced authentic culture, historic development on native land, birthright, and international acknowledgement. The outgroup has fewer entitlements because it is not native to the land, came later, does not share ethnic roots, has a simplistic culture and thus cannot be treated as an equal in the nation-building process. In the extreme case—exclusion—the rights of the outgroup are completely denied and it is treated as alien and hostile and excluded is from the nation. The binary opposition between “good” and “bad” groups is justified by validation of the exclusive rights of the ingroup and denouncing the rights of the outgroup. In the process of *embedding*, this mechanism posits the ingroup as legitimately deserving the power and the outgroup as alien to the nation. In the process of *shaping*, this mechanism justifies the power of the ingroup as coming from its history and rights to land. The validation of rights mechanism can be more prominent in myths of ethnogenesis and territory.

The fifth justification mechanism, enlightening, emphasizes the willingness of all people in a nation to pursue a particular goal, including civic society, liberalism, ethnic state, and multiculturalism, but states that their limited abilities reduce their prospects to achieve the desired outcomes. The limitations arrive from a persistent outdated mentality, absence of agency, and dependency on populist leaders and government. The myth supports the claim of the ingroup to identify the visions and aims shared by all the people and to enlighten them in their movement to these goals. Binary opposition between “good” and “bad” groups is justified by positing the ingroup as

legitimate to represent the nation, while people who do not share these visions are perceived as outsiders. In the process of *embedment*, this mechanism posits the ingroup as representing the shared vision of a positive future and the outgroup as not open-minded enough. In the process of *shaping*, this mechanism justifies the power of the ingroup as enlightened and progressive. The enlightening mechanism can be more prominent in myths of foundation.

The second group, mechanisms of interpretation, includes two mechanisms. The first one provides antipodal interpretation of the same subject. The supporters of a particular national narrative are aware of the existence of the different (and often opposite) interpretation of a particular event, data, or idea and use myths to denounce and delegitimize outgroup interpretations. The presentation of ingroup interpretation has a form of discussion, in which the ingroup both promotes its own point of view and condemns the outgroup explanation as completely invented and groundless. This mechanism of interpretations serves in the processes of *embedment of concept of power in the meaning of identity* by reinforcing the binary oppositions established in dualistic order. This mechanism is used in all myths and supports all types of dualistic order.

The second mechanism of interpretation uses identical interpretation of the opposite subject. In this mechanism, both groups define the same positive value (vibrant, progressive, modern, or tolerant) and attribute it to the ingroup while denying it for the outgroup. This attribution has a form of discussion in which, first, the importance of the particular value is established; second, it is described as a core feature of the ingroup; and third, all claims of the outgroup to use similar positive definitions are denounced. This mechanism of interpretations serves in the processes the *shaping of concepts of power based on the meaning of national identity*: different interpretations of the same concepts allow both groups to justify the dualistic orders they use to define their views on the power structure. This mechanism is used in all myths and supports all types of dualistic order.

To justify dualistic order, mythic narratives employ iconic order—a system of symbols, symbolic events, prototypes, historic figures, and current leaders. Iconic order of *social group duality* includes symbols and main events in the history of two social groups as well as the names of historic figures and current leaders representing these groups. Iconic order of *binational duality* represents symbols and main events in the history of two nations as well as names of historic figures and current leaders representing these nations. Iconic order of *temporal duality* represents symbols and main events as well as names of historic figures and current leaders representing two periods in the history of a nation. Finally, iconic order of *ideological duality* represents symbols—names of historic figures and current leaders representing two ideologies/mentalities.

Therefore, through the mechanisms of justification and interpretations of dualistic order, mythic narratives serve to form and reestablish the meaning of national identity and legitimize the power of the ingroup. These two functions, interconnected in dualistic order, become even more intertwined in mythic narratives: the process of *embedment of concepts of power into the meaning of national identity* and the *shaping the concepts of power based on the meaning of national identity* simultaneously contribute to the creation and recreation of meaning. In the process of *embedment* the ingroup is described as an essential core of the nation, exclusive in defining national identity, deserving the better faith, progressive and virtuous, and representing the shared vision of a positive future. The outgroup is depicted as an illegitimate agent of nation-building, alien to the nation, backward, having a narrow and corrupt subculture, and not being open-minded enough. By reinforcing the binary oppositions established in the dualistic order, mechanisms of interpretation strengthen the social boundary between the two groups. At the same time, mythic narratives portray ingroup history and features as a foundation for the rights to have power and a privileged place in the social hierarchy, thus *shaping the concepts of power based on the meaning of national identity*. This process justifies the actions, power, and dominance of the ingroup because it represents the whole nation, symbolizes “rightness” in a nation, has exclusive rights deriving from history and attachment to the land, is better able and suited to rule, and is enlightened and progressive. Through validation of attribution of positive social value to the ingroup and denial of this value to the outgroup, mythic narratives define their views on power structure with domination of the ingroup.

FUNCTIONING OF NORMATIVE ORDER

As discussed above, normative order consists of value judgments on how the nation should be organized and what structure/concept of power should prevail in the state. It includes moral, ideological, and political prescriptions, defines a set of rules and resources that should be employed, and delineates the expected outcomes. Although the recommendation for the improvement of the nation could include multiple areas and spheres of social life, normative orders of national narratives concentrate on the structure of power that rests on the duality of ingroup and outgroup presented in the dualistic order. Normative order is focused on the major ideas, features, and actions of the ingroup and outgroups with the aim to legitimize the former and delegitimize the latter. All other actors and institutions in the society are assessed based on their connections and relations to the ingroup and outgroup.

The first function of the national narrative, the formation and redefinition of national identity, is fulfilled through the promotion of specific policies

based on value judgments of the ingroup and outgroup and the outlining of the social boundary between them. The formation of the meaning of identity in a normative order varies among different types of dualistic order. In national narratives that rest on *social group duality*, normative order focuses on (1) the promotion of rights, cultures, language, and the history of the ingroup as extremely valuable and authentic to the nation; (2) denial of support of the culture, language, traditions, and history of the outgroup as alien or secondary to a nation; and (3) endorsement of assimilation of the outgroup or its exclusion/isolation along the boundary. In national narratives that are based in *binational duality*, normative order concentrates on (1) approval of the concept of the ingroup nation as continuous and virtuous, (2) positioning of the outgroup nation as pursuing wrong goals with profane outcomes, and (3) establishment of the distinction between the two nations. In national narratives that rest on *temporal duality*, normative order concentrates on (1) the endorsement of the ideals and order of a particular historic period, (2) the negative assessment of the current period in the life of the nation, and (3) the establishment of linkages between the past and present. In national narratives that rest on *ideological duality*, normative order focuses on (1) praising ingroup ideology, (2) establishing negativities of outgroup ideology, and (3) encouraging enlightenment and education as a way for boundary dissolution.

The process of *shaping the concepts of power based on the meaning of national identity* produces specific prescriptions for policies and actions that legitimize the ingroup, delegitimize the outgroup, and redefine social boundary. It includes legitimization of the ingroup as an agent of power and delegitimization of the outgroup; confirmation of the legitimacy of the established concept of nation and promotion of the policies supportive for this concept; promotion of actions and policies that restore the previous “virtuous” period; and endorsement of ingroup ideology, delegitimization of outgroup ideology, and promotion of actions and policies that support ingroup ideology.

The function of justification of the social order and legitimization of power in the normative order is fulfilled through the establishment and promotion of different approaches to legitimacy. As discussed above, the right to power can arrive from (1) cultural values that give the ingroup a right to power, (2) validation of the social order and consensus among groups, (3) acceptance of the structure (system of power) as “right” by both advantaged and disadvantaged groups, and (4) legitimization of the ingroup and delegitimization of the outgroup. These four approaches to legitimacy can be used in any of narratives, but in some narratives one of them can prevail over others. The process of *embedment of concepts of power into the meaning of national identity* rests on the employment, modification, and creation of a national identity that justifies a particular order. Such a national identity

empowers ingroup members to achieve their goals by creating a power structure through which ingroup identity and goals are realized.

Thus, normative order concentrates on ideas, policies, and actions that support specific meanings of national identity and legitimize structures of power. Formation and redefinition of national identity rests on the attachment of value judgments to the ingroup and outgroup and the sharpening of the social boundary between them. Through the process of *shaping concepts of power based on the meaning of identity*, normative order defines a power balance between two social (ethnic, class, religious) groups within a nation or between two nations, justifies the prevalence of a particular ideology, and encourages the renaissance of particular historic periods. To ensure the legitimacy of the concept of power, normative order includes four approaches to ingroup legitimacy that arrive from respective justification mechanisms of myths that can prevail in some national narratives: (1) a right to power based on cultural values arrives from mechanisms of positive ingroup predisposition; (2) validation and consensus arrives from mechanisms of enlightening and impediment by the outgroup; (3) acceptance of the structure (system of power) as “right” by both advantaged and disadvantaged groups arrives from mechanisms of validation of rights; and (4) legitimization of the ingroup and delegitimization of the outgroup arrives from mechanisms of condemning imposition. These interrelations represent the most likely connections between mechanisms of mythic narratives and normative order, but other combinations are possible in national narratives of different nations. The employment, modification, and creation of social identity that justifies a particular order constitutes the process of *embedment of concepts of power into the meaning of identity*. Both processes—*embedment* and *shaping*—ensure that the normative prescriptions support the formation and redefinition of a national identity based on the vision of the ingroup and legitimize its power and dominance within a nation.

MODEL OF NATIONAL NARRATIVE

The structural framework of a national narrative is represented in figure 1.1. It depicts three components of national narrative—dualistic order, mythic narrative, and normative order—as well as types of dualistic order, binary constructs, mechanisms of myths, and approaches to legitimacy employed in these components.

Dualistic order entails binary opposition representing the most important antagonism of “right” and “wrong” perceived in the nation. It has several forms depending on the content of this duality. *social group (ethnic, religious, class, political party) duality* represents a nation as an arena of zero-sum fights between two ethnic, political, racial, or religious groups. *bination-*

Dualistic order						
Social group duality	Bi-national duality		Temporal duality		Ideological duality	
<i>Binary constructs:</i>						
spirituality-culture		ideology	social order	development	social relations	
Mythic narratives:						
ethnogenesis	territory	Golden Age	unjust treatment and suffering	election	rebirth and renewal	foundation
<i>Mechanisms of myth:</i>						
Justification			interpretation			
impediment by outgroup	condemning imposition	positive ingroup predispositions	validation of rights (exclusion)	enlightening	opposite interpretations of the same subject	same interpretation for opposite subjects
Normative order						
<i>Approaches to legitimacy:</i>						
based on cultural rights		acceptance by advantaged and disadvantaged groups		legitimization of ingroup/ delegitimization of outgroup	validation of social order and consensus among groups	

Figure 1.1. Structural Framework of National Narrative

al duality emphasizes conflict between two countries (and the political and ideological systems they represent) as a major problem for a nation. *Temporal duality* emphasizes the gap between a positive moral past and the negative corrupt present of a nation. *Ideological duality* describes the nation as an arena of zero-sum fights between two ideologies/mentalities.

Opposites of each dualistic order are described by *categorical constructs* that define the most important criteria for the assessment of the nation and establish the meaning of these opposites. *social order values* arrive from social concepts that delineate a type of society, concepts of national identity (ethnic, multicultural, civic), and relations within a nation and between different nations. *Ideology values* reflect social concepts that define a specific ideology: democracy, socialism, totalitarianism, liberalism, and so on. *Development values* reflect social concepts of economic, social, and cultural development as well as such concepts as progress, conservatism, traditional society, and so on. *Spirituality and culture values* arrive from social concepts of spirituality, authenticity, renaissance, decline, and simplicity. *social relation values* reflect social concepts of intergroup affairs including conflict, victimization, oppression, dialogue, cooperation, mutual respect, and so on.

Mythic narrative serves to rationalize and vindicate specific descriptions and assessments of groups and power relations between them. *Mechanisms of justification* help support specific ingroup claims or legitimize the existing social order. The first justification mechanism, *impediment by outgroup*, is a depiction of the fight between two groups in which the ingroup represents and supports positive values of the nation and the outgroup impedes ingroup activity. The *condemning imposition mechanism* rationalizes the claim that the ingroup represents the interests of all groups in the nation while the outgroup is imposing its own narrow ideology and culture over all people in

the nation and wrongly claims to symbolize the nation. The *mechanism of positive ingroup predispositions* describes the ingroup as more able, capable, and competent than the outgroup. The *validation of rights mechanism* describes the ingroup as having more rights (based on advanced authentic culture, historic development on native land, birthright, and international acknowledgment) to develop the nation according to their vision. The *enlightening mechanism* emphasizes the claim of the ingroup to identify the visions and aims shared by all the people and to enlighten them in their movement to these goals. *Mechanisms of interpretation* provide competing explanations of social phenomena. The first one provides antipodal interpretation of the same subject, while the second allows both the ingroup and outgroup to use the same positive value in self-description while denying it for the outgroup.

Normative order consists of value judgments on how the nation should be organized and what structure/concept of power should prevail in the state. Normative order includes four approaches to ingroup legitimacy: (1) a right to power based on cultural values, (2) validation and consensus, (3) acceptance of the structure (system of power) as “right” by both advantaged and disadvantaged groups, and (4) legitimization of the ingroup and delegitimization of the outgroup.

The function of creation and redefinition of the meaning of national identity: through the *embedment of the concept of power into the meaning of national identity*, the specific meanings of power and power relations between ingroup and outgroups are incorporated as a core of a particular national identity. The function of support and legitimization of power: through *the shaping of concepts of power based on the meaning of identity*, the meaning of national identity determines, shapes, and gives meaning to the legitimization of political power.

The proposed framework also provides an opportunity to define possible prevalent types of values, mechanisms of myths, and approaches to legitimacy for each of the four types of dualistic order. This proposed prevalence arrives from theoretical analysis and does not exclude other connections between the type of duality and values, mechanisms, and approaches. The national narrative based on *social group duality* describes a nation as an arena of zero-sum fights between two ethnic, political, racial, or religious groups. The ingroup represents the right values, traditions, and ideas and leads the nation to prosperity, while the outgroup oppresses the ingroup, represents alien or vicious values and aspirations, and diminishes the positive prospects for a nation. People who think about their nation in terms of opposition between ethnic, class, political, or religious groups tend to evaluate those using categories and values of culture, spirituality, democracy, totalitarianism, secularism, multiculturalism and nationalism, and so forth. To justify social group duality, people tend to employ myths of ethnogenesis, territory, unjust treatment and suffering, rebirth and renewal, and foundation

as essential ideals of groups. The list of mechanisms usually used in these myths includes impediment by the outgroup, condemning imposition, positive ingroup predispositions, and validation of rights. Thus, mythic narratives depict how the outgroup impedes ingroup activity through the development of conflict, establishment of wrong policies, promotion of wrong ideology, unfair treatment, oppression, and use of violence; they show why the ingroup represents the whole nation while the outgroup represents particular corrupt interests; they describe the ingroup as more able, capable, and competent than the outgroup, as well as having more rights to develop the nation according to the ingroup's vision. The normative order focuses on (1) the endorsement of particular types of intergroup (ethnic, class, religious) relations; (2) the promotion of rights, cultures, language, and history of the ingroup; and (3) the denial of ingroup rights for support of its culture, language, traditions, and history. The approaches to ingroup legitimacy are based on cultural rights and legitimization of the ingroup/delegitimization of the outgroup.

National narrative based on *binational duality* posits conflict between two nations (and the political and ideological systems they represent) as a major problem for the nation. The ingroup nation supports the most important and progressive values of mankind, while the outgroup nation is aggressive, backward, and malicious. When people emphasize the conflict between their nation and another nation, they tend to assess both of them using values and categories of democracy, totalitarianism, secularism, multiculturalism, nationalism, and so on. To justify this duality people mostly use myths of foundation, election, territory, suffering, and ethnogenesis. The list of mechanisms usually used in these myths includes positive ingroup predispositions and the validation of rights. Thus, the mythic narrative describes the ingroup nation as more able, capable, and competent than the outgroup nation, as well as having more rights to develop the nation according to its vision. The normative order concentrates on (1) establishment of the difference between the two nations, (2) confirmation of legitimacy of the established concept of the nation, and (3) promotion of the policies supportive of this concept. The ingroup legitimacy is mostly achieved through acceptance of a proposed national identity by advantaged and disadvantaged groups and validity and consensus within the nation.

National narrative based on *temporal duality* emphasizes the gap between a positive moral past and the negative corrupt present of a nation. In comparison to the current period of wrong values and vices of the society, a specific period in the nation's past is considered as the best time in its history. People who emphasize distinctions between different historic periods of their nation have a propensity to assess this divergence using categories and values of development, conservatism, and progress. To justify this duality people mostly use Golden Age myths and myths of foundation that employ mecha-

nism of condemning imposition. Thus, mythic narratives explain why leaders of the glorified past represent the whole nation while current leaders represent particular corrupt interests. The normative order concentrates on (1) endorsing the ideals and order of a particular historic period and (2) promoting actions and policies that restore this period. The ingroup legitimacy is mostly achieved through the legitimization of the ingroup/delegitimization of the outgroup and the establishment of validity and consensus that supports national ideas of the Golden Age.

National narrative based on *ideological duality* represents a nation as an arena of zero-sum fights between two ideologies/mentalities. Ingroup ideology represents the most important values and virtues and creates foundations for national prosperity. Outgroup ideology/mentality rests on profane values and suppression of morality and goodness in the nation. Stressing ideological opposition in the nation, people are more likely to evaluate it using categories and values of ideals including democracy, totalitarianism, secularism, multiculturalism, nationalism, and paternalism, as well as categories and values of conflict dynamics, victimization, oppression, and dialogue. To justify this duality people typically employ foundation myths with mechanisms of impediment by the outgroup, condemning imposition, and enlightening. Thus, mythic narratives depict how outgroup ideology impedes national prosperity through the development of conflict; the establishment of wrong policies, unfair treatment, oppression; and use of violence. They show why ingroup ideology represents the interests of the whole nation while outgroup ideology rests on particular corrupt interests; and they support the claim of the ingroup to identify a specific ideology as an aim shared by all people and enlighten them in their movement to this goal. The normative order focuses on (1) the endorsement of ingroup ideology, (2) the delegitimization of outgroup ideology, and (3) the promotion of actions and policies that support ingroup ideology. The approaches to ingroup legitimacy are based on the achievement of consensus and validity. The vision of national perspectives is dependent on the prevalence of a particular mentality or ideology.

On each of the three levels—dualistic order, mythic narratives, and normative order—national narrative defines and redefines meaning through the formation and redefinition of national identity and the legitimization of power and social order. The production of meaning results from two intertwined processes—the *embedment of concepts of power into the meaning of national identity* and the *shaping of concepts of power based on the meaning of identity*. Table 1.3 shows the interconnection between structural and functional elements of national identity.

Two functions of national narrative—formation of identity and legitimization of power—are performed on every level of national narratives, and their complex interrelations are constituted by two entangled processes of embedment and shaping. On the level of dualistic order the meaning of

Table 1.3. Structural and Functional Framework of National Narrative

<i>Structure of National Narrative</i>	<i>Functions</i>		<i>Processes</i>	
	<i>Formation of Identity</i>	<i>Legitimization of Power</i>	<i>Embedment</i>	<i>Shaping</i>
Dualistic order	Binary opposites define the ingroup and outgroup	In binary constructs, the ingroup and outgroup are presented as deserving (good) and not deserving (bad)	Power struggle defines the intensity of moral duality	The meaning of binary constructs defines a hierarchy and the possibility to coerce or cooperate
Mythic narratives	Myths justify the meaning of the ingroup and outgroup and the social boundary between them through the emphasis on continuity of community	Myths support or challenge the social order and legitimize the power of the ingroup through employment of specific events and the history of intergroup relations	Desired power relations and dominance of the ingroup are presented as authentic to nation, forming its core; outgroups are excluded	Specific features and the histories of groups impact their rights to have power and hold certain places in the social hierarchy
Normative order	Attachment of value judgments to the ingroup and outgroup and outlining of the social boundary between them	Establishment and promotion of different approaches to legitimacy	Employment, modification, and creation of a social identity that justifies a particular order	Definition of specific policies that legitimize ingroup, delegitimize outgroup and redefine social boundary

national identity and power is produced within binary constructs. The national identity is defined by the opposition of ingroup and outgroup and the meanings of binary constructs, while connotation of power arrives from the positioning of groups as deserving and not deserving to hold and exercise power. The existing power relations between groups (competition of conflict) contribute to the intensity of moral duality, with more profound moral gaps connected with conflicts than just competitions. Through this process an existing concept of power is embedded into the meaning of national identity, making it more or less polar and rooted in moral dimensions. The existing connotations of national identity shape the view on a structure of power through assessment of social hierarchy and possibilities to coerce or cooperate.

On the level of mythic narratives, the meaning of national identity set in dualistic order receives further clarification and justification by employment of historic accounts that emphasize the continuity of the national community. The concept of power is advanced through justification of deserving/undeserving claims made in dualistic order: in this process, mythic narratives utilize specific historic events and the history of interrelations between groups to validate a particular political and social order. Desired or existing power relations and dominance of the ingroup are presented as the authentic core of a nation, the order that always existed or arrived from historic accounts, thus facilitating the embedment of concepts of power into the meaning of national identity. At the same time, the ingroup rights to have power and hold a specific place in the social hierarchy are justified by the specific features and history of the ingroup and outgroup.

Normative order furthers justification of claims about ingroup and outgroup identity provided in mythic narratives. It solidifies the meaning of national identity by attaching value judgments to the ingroup and outgroup and outlining the social boundary between them. The mythic accounts of power structures become promoted into different approaches to legitimacy and prescription of policies that support the meaning of national identity and concept of power. The meaning of national identity is modified and even created to justify a particular order, thus supporting the embedment of concepts of power into the connotation of national identity. At the same time, concepts of power are shaped by the existing meaning of national identity: connotation of identity underpins the definition of specific policies that legitimize the ingroup, delegitimize the outgroup, and redefine the social boundary.

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Chapter Two

The Context of Ukraine

In 1991, Ukraine gained its independence and started on a path toward a free market economy and democratic governance. The new nation lacked a clear concept of its identity and the shared vision of a national idea. Now, after more than twenty years of independence, ethnic and regional differences in the perception of the nation still prevail and the process of imagining a national community remains contested and controversial. This chapter aims to set a context for the analysis of national narratives in Ukraine presented in the following chapters. It briefly describes the challenges of the twenty-year path of the young nation and creates a view of Ukraine after twenty-plus years of independence by presenting the prevailing conceptual models of Ukraine employed by Ukrainian and foreign experts.

CHALLENGES OF NATION BUILDING IN INDEPENDENT UKRAINE

Except for a brief period from 1917 to 1920, it wasn't until 1991 that Ukraine became independent. Through all its history, Ukraine was apportioned between different empires and states, including tsarist Russia, the Austrian-Hungarian Empire, Romania, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary. In 1921, the territory under the rule of the tsarist Russian Empire became the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic (Ukrainian SSR). During the 1920s, the social and economic development of the republic was accompanied by liberal national policies supporting a flourishing Ukrainian culture. Joseph Stalin, who considered indigenization dangerous to the unity of the Soviet people, reversed these policies, terminating the activities of the Ukrainian autocephalous orthodox church, organizing repressions against Ukrainian intelligentsia, orchestrating a cruel famine to destroy the peasant middle class (*Holo-*

domor), and promoting forced Russification. In 1939, consequent to the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact, some western Ukrainian lands were annexed from Poland by the Soviet Union and incorporated into the Ukrainian SSR. The rest of Western Ukraine was incorporated from Czechoslovakia and Romania at the end of World War II, and Crimea was transferred from the Russian Soviet federative socialist republic in 1954. Although united under one republic, the population of the Ukrainian SSR continued to be diverse in its cultural traditions and attitudes toward Soviet rule. Western Ukraine considered Soviet power alien and imposed, while Eastern Ukraine did not hold such hostile attitudes. Ukrainian nationalists, united in the Ukrainian insurgent army (UPA) fought against Soviet power from 1942 until the destruction of the UPA in the beginning of the 1950s. Different dissident groups continued to resist Soviet power, often becoming targets of harsh repressions.

Accompanying the liberalization policies of the Soviet Union during the end of the 1980s, former dissidents and nationally conscious people initiated movements for Ukrainian independence. The Ukrainian popular movement for restructuring (RUKH) created an ideological foundation for Ukrainian separation from the USSR. On August 24, 1991, after the collapse of the unsuccessful Moscow coup against Gorbachev, Ukraine declared its independence. The weak loyalties to the Soviet republics developed during the Soviet era resulted in overwhelming support for independence among the population of Ukraine, irrespective of ethnicity. The referendum on independence on December 1, 1991, indicated the support of 92 percent of Ukrainians for the development of a sovereign free Ukraine.

Independent Ukraine inherited an unfinished process of nation-building complicated by historic, cultural, ethnic, and linguistic differences between regions. The definition of citizenship adopted by the Ukrainian state classifies all citizens of Ukraine as Ukrainians. But the meaning of Ukrainian-ness remains unclear. The majority of scholars writing about the current issues facing Ukraine state that the major problem of the young nation centers on national identity. According to scholars, the national identity is deeply rooted in ethnicity and culture while the civic foundations of national identity are less developed. Based on the legacy of Soviet ethno-federalism and the incorporation of ethnic identity into the state passport system, the development of the nation has come to be perceived in ethnic terms.¹ The contestation of Ukrainian national identity impacts internal conflicts and the current stagnation in its development. Undefined Ukrainian national identity influences foreign policy and defines the vector of international relations, including relations with Russia and NATO.² Ethnic and linguistic identity-based loyalties have significantly affected the outcomes of five presidential elections³ and continued to play an essential role during the tenure of four Ukrainian presidents.

The two first Ukrainian presidents, Leonid Kravchuk and Leonid Kuchma, positioned Ukraine as a European nation-state with a Central European identity. The first president, Kravchuk (1989–1994), saw Russia as an outcast of Europe and focused on building Ukraine up as an independent European state in opposition to the unity of the former Soviet Union. Kuchma (1995–2004) was able to find some balance between pro-Western and pro-Russian orientations. At the beginning of his presidency, Kuchma asserted Ukraine's place in Eurasia and posited Ukraine's vital national interests as concentrated on the territory of the former USSR. However, to secure the support of the national democrats in parliament he soon redefined the national concept. By 1996, Kuchma positioned himself as a supporter of a strong nation-state based on a Western nation-state model and promoted both European integration and cooperation with Russia. President Leonid Kuchma brought an alternative interpretation of the Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky actions: instead of treating them as unification with Russia (as it was described during the Soviet period), he posited them as a national democratic revolution similar to European processes of liberation. Kuchma also argued for closer relations with Europe and integration with NATO. At the same time, Kuchma supported a continuous connection with Russia based on common history and culture. Ukraine's return to Europe always rested on it maintaining both good relations with Russia and launching a reform program. These twin policies were pursued more energetically by Kuchma than by Kravchuk.⁴ Both presidents believed that Ukraine should have good but balanced relations with Russia. Kuchma furthered this idea, endorsing Ukrainian identity as both European and Eastern Slavic. But such an effective partnership between Russia and Ukraine was contested through the processes of building a national identity and defining social boundaries. Russia's perception of Ukraine not as a foreign country but a temporarily lost member of the same ethnic and cultural space has influenced its policies of economic and political expansion.

The presidency of Victor Yushchenko (2005–2010), Ukraine's third president, is considered a missed opportunity to develop a free democratic state based on the expectations of the Orange Revolution.⁵ The high levels of corruption, mistrust in public institutions, and near absence of the rule of law undermined some features of democracy, including free and fair elections and freedom of the media. This period is characterized by policies aimed at increasing the prestige of Ukrainian culture and language, redefining the history of World War II, and emphasizing Holodomor as a major trauma to the Ukrainian population. The relationship with Russia was strained, and Russian culture was proclaimed to be alien to Ukraine. A new president, Victor Yanukovich, reversed the policies promoting Ukrainian ethnic identity and declared an orientation both to Russia and the European Union. Nevertheless he opposed NATO membership as not popular among the pop-

ulation. The prospect of integration with Europe rapidly declined after the imprisonment of the former prime minister and Yanukovych's major political opponent, Yulia Tymoshenko, which was vigorously condemned by the United States and the European Union. While Ukrainian remains the country's only official federal language, a new law accepted in July 2012 elevates Russian as the official regional language in courts, schools, and other government institutions in Ukraine's Russian-speaking southern and eastern regions. This law sharpened the divisions between supporters of Ukraine's independent post-Soviet identity and promoters of close links with Russia.

Thus, Ukraine inherited a sociocultural pluralistic society largely destroyed by Soviet power, but no attempts were made to create a systemic approach to nation-building and transformation to democracy.⁶ As a result, during the years of Ukrainian independence democratic development has been extremely slow, civic society is in an embryonic state, and national identity has remained undefined.

The analyses of election results⁷ show the deep split across many lines, with an increasing tendency to widen rather than narrow over time. Authors propose different models of divide. The four-region framework⁸ places Donetsk, Luhansk, Kharkiv, Dnipropetrovsk and Zaporizhzhia in the east. The north-central region includes Poltava, Kirovohrad, Cherkasy, Kiev, Chernihiv, and Sumy oblasts, along with the city of Kiev. The southern region of Ukraine is composed of Kherson, Odesa and Mikolaiv provinces, and Crimea. The provinces of Zhytomyr, Vinnytsia, Khmelnytskyi, Rivne, Volyn, Chernivtsi, Zakarpatia, L'viv, Ternopil, and Ivano-Frankivsk form the west-central region.

Odushkin⁹ sees five major regions: the east, the west, the south, the center, and Kiev-city. The west is a homogenous region of ethnic Ukrainians, Ukrainian-speaking population with salient religious identity, mostly peasants who have strong anti-Soviet attitudes and a pro-European identity. The region is closest to European countries and has historically been part of European empires. The east is predominantly Russian speaking with a significant Russian minority, low level of religious-identity salience, strong ties with Russia and Soviet values, and a nostalgia for the USSR. It lies on the boundary with Russia, was part of the Russian Empire, and its population has anti-Western sentiments. The center is homogeneously ethnic Ukrainian, Ukrainian speaking, with a middle level of religious-identity salience, a low level of national consciousness, and a history of victimization by the totalitarian Soviet regime. The south is industrial, with a significant Russian minority, predominantly Russian speaking, especially in Crimea, with a pro-Russian identity and Soviet values. Kiev has a Russian-speaking, ethnic Ukrainian majority with a European identity and a high level of national consciousness. Kubicek¹⁰ also defines five regions, but their composition differs from the previous model: his analysis reveals the east, the west, the

center, the south, and Crimea. The eastern region is characterized by a high level of industrialization and urbanization; a high percentage of ethnic Russians, particularly in Donetsk and Luhansk; a majority Russian-speaking population, especially in large cities; close ties with Russia; and a salient Soviet identity and support for Soviet values. The west was not a part of Soviet Ukraine until 1939; it is an agricultural region with developed light industry that has a predominantly ethnic Ukrainian and Ukrainian-speaking population affiliated with the Uniate (Greek Catholic) Church. They have memories of pre-Soviet rule and strong anti-Russian feelings, and they see the West as their ally and partner. The center is mostly Ukrainian speaking, with the exception of Kiev, but it does not have traditions of ethnic Ukrainian nationalism and follows a relatively moderate political course. Its economy consists of industry (largely in Kiev) and agriculture. The south has a significant Russian minority and Russian-speaking population, particularly in the cities, and a low level of Ukrainian national consciousness. It is highly urbanized and has developed industry. The fifth region, Crimea, has an ethnic Russian majority and overwhelmingly Russian-speaking population that have a salient Soviet identity and close ties with Russia. The ethnic composition also includes Crimean Tatars, who advocate for cultural autonomy and still experience the hard process of resettlement.

Some authors note the simplicity of such models and emphasize differences within these regions. For example, Birch¹¹ analyses the divides within western Ukraine and shows that pre-Soviet cleavages, including cultural and historic heritage, ethnicity, geography, and economic interest, play an important role in electoral behaviors. She shows different patterns of voting behaviors between regions of western Ukraine that challenge the perception of the west as a homogeneous region. In his analysis of the south and east, Pirie¹² also found differences within the regions. According to him, Crimea has a large proportion of the population with a Russian identity and is characterized by a viable pro-Russian, separatist movement. In the eastern area, such as the Donbas, the ethnic and national identity of population is mixed and complicated by intermarriages, linguistic Russification, and urbanization. Pirie¹³ notes that “there will be continued support for close ties with Russia and the former Soviet Union, but this support will not be sufficiently strong to sustain a full-fledged movement for the reintegration of Ukraine into Russia.”¹⁴ Barrington and Herron¹⁵ also propose to divide four main regions into smaller units in order to provide a more precise analytical framework of regional differences. Their eight-region model helps reduce the intraregional variation in voting behavior and shows that regional divisions in Ukraine do not rest on a simple east versus west divide or its continuum. According to scholars, “certain regions of the country (the West and Krym [Crimea], for example) differ greatly not only from each other but also from regions next to them.”¹⁶

The nature of these divisions includes such factors as regional loyalties, ethnicity, language, history and culture, and religion. According to Odushkin,¹⁷ “regional divide coincides with the divide between Russians and Ukrainians, between Orthodox Church and Greek-Catholic Church adherents, between Russian and Ukrainian speakers, and between the industrialized East and the more agricultural West.”¹⁸ Birch¹⁹ believes that the most important factors are differences in cultural heritage and Russian versus Ukrainian ethnicity. Cultural heritage is connected with different histories of the west and the east as well as the level of urbanization. The factors of ethnicity are determined on the Russian side by the level of education and result from Soviet-era demographic patterns. Birch’s later research confirmed the importance of the ethnic factor in the regional divide.²⁰ In her comparison of cultural-historical and economic determinants of regional differences, Birch²¹ show that historical factors, especially connected to the former Hapsburg lands, play an important part in Ukrainian regional divide. As she states, “there can be no doubt that cultural differences exert influences above and beyond those of individual-level factors and variations in regional economic conditions.”²² However, economic factors appeared to be more important than historic ones when explaining electoral behavior in support of left parties. In addition, regional economic conditions can reduce or even counterbalance effects of historical and individual-level factors in different regions of Ukraine.

Research shows that regional divisions exist even when language and ethnicity are controlled for.²³ The two regions, east and west, differ in their geopolitical orientations: the northwest is generally Western-oriented, and the east is generally Russia-oriented, with variations along this spectrum. In 2011, 12 percent of the population of western Ukraine positively assessed union with Russia while 62 percent supported this prospect in the south and 73 percent in the east; 63 percent of the population of western Ukraine supported a close relationship with the European Union, while only 20 percent supported this in the south and 9 percent in the east.²⁴ The differences between regions are also evident in celebrations of holidays connected with the history of Ukraine and Soviet ideology. While the population of West Ukraine is more loyal to the nation and reflects a critical assessment of the Soviet union, in the East people are still connected to the Soviet past and do not feel a strong national attachment. Thus, on May 9, 2009, the Day of Victory in World War II was celebrated by 28.9 percent of western Ukrainians and 69 percent of eastern Ukrainians; May 1, the Communist Day of Labor, was celebrated by 13.2 percent of the population in the west and 43.3 percent in the east; the Ukrainian Day of Independence is celebrated by 40.7 percent of the population in the west and 23.2 percent in the east.²⁵ Regional loyalties continue to dominate over a single national one: in 2010, only half of the population stated that national identity is important for them.²⁶

The social distance between two major ethnic groups, Russians and Ukrainians, also diverges among the regions with the strongest social boundary in the western regions and Crimea and a blended social boundary in the central and eastern regions. For example, in 2002, 20.7 percent of the Ukrainian population defined themselves as Russian in some part, and 42.2 percent of Russians in Ukraine considered themselves Ukrainian in some part; in 2007, monoethnic Ukrainians comprised 65 percent of the population, monoethnic Russians just 9 percent of the population, and 22 percent considered themselves both Russian and Ukrainian.²⁷ These differences cannot be explained in solely ethnic terms: despite the fact that southeast Ukraine is predominantly Russophone and the northwest is predominantly Ukrainophone, many Ukrainians are bilingual, especially in the center of the country (22 percent of the population states that they use both languages, according to Vorona and Shulga²⁸). This interplay of language and ethnicity produces, besides Russians and Ukrainians, a third group—Russophone Ukrainians.²⁹ As Barrington and Herron³⁰ note, “one reason for the perception of a fluid or blurred nature of ethnicity in Ukraine is that linguistic and ethnic lines are not complementary. Specifically, the existence of large numbers of Russian-speaking Ukrainians in the country cuts into the ethnic divisions.”³¹ Of the Ukrainian population, Ukrainophone Ukrainians comprise 45 percent, Russophone Ukrainians 34 percent, and Russophone Russians 15 percent.³² Several researchers (A. Wilson and D. Arel) stress that the language divide is a stronger explanatory factor in the understanding of the voting patterns than the ethnic one.

Religion is noted as an important factor that contributes to the division. East and west Ukraine differ significantly in the salience and specificity of religious beliefs. People in eastern Ukraine are less religious, and the majority of them belong to the Orthodox Church. People of western Ukraine have a stronger religious affiliation, and a significant number of them belong to the historically nationalistic Uniate Church. As Gee³³ notes, “loyalty to the Ukrainian language and Ukrainian ethnicity are both associated with religiosity.”³⁴

These regional and linguistic divisions, underpinned by opposite attitudes toward the past, impede the development of a common vision for the nation and a shared meaning of national identity. The issue of historical memory in Ukraine is strongly connected with the justification of current social positions and ambitions as well as with the vision of the future of Ukraine, thus becoming the ground for continued battles.³⁵ As Shevel³⁶ states, “the Ukrainian state’s response to the challenge of divided historical memory was not the promotion of a democratic memory but oscillation between competing ideologically charged narratives of the past.”³⁷ According to Kasyanov,³⁸ in the early 1990s the first significant revisions of history in the process of nationalizing of memory included the history of Ukrainian statehood (with

particular emphasis on the times of Bogdan Khmelnytsky and his successors, and also the 1917–1920 period of statehood), the reassessment of the Soviet period, the history of Stalinism (above all the repressions and the famine of 1932–1933), the history of World War II, and the history of the nationalist movement and the UPA.³⁹

One of the major divisions in the perception of history are the historic interpretations of World War II that are extremely contested and differ between the western and southeastern regions of Ukraine. In particular, one of the most contested issues is the role and position of the Bandera faction of the Ukrainian nationalists organization (OUN) and the Ukrainian insurgent army (UPA). Communists and pro-Soviet groups view the OUN and the UPA as an enemy to their ideals, a violent opposition to Communist rule, and a separatist movement that aimed to divide Ukraine. The nationalist and national-democratic right treats the OUN and the UPA activities as a national liberation struggle of the Ukrainian nation and present them as positive protagonists in the struggle against Communists. According to the narrative popular in the east and south, some people in western Ukraine collaborated with Nazis to bolster their ideas of independence. Some committed violent crimes against Poles, Jews, and Communists. According to this narrative, this history of OUN-UPA cannot be accorded to the whole of Ukrainian society; the people of Ukraine would not justify their actions and support their celebrations. The majority of people see the Great Patriotic War as something they can be proud of and perceive the red flag as a flag of glory and victory. According to the narrative popular in the west of Ukraine, Russia dictates the writing of Ukrainian history, especially the history of World War II. UPA is the only movement that fought with both the totalitarian regimes of Stalin and Hitler, and they see the red flag as a foul flag of totalitarianism.

Therefore, there arises a fight around interpretations of World War II: the population of western Ukraine considers OUN-UPA and Bandera's struggle as an anti-Soviet, antitotalitarian fight rather than collaboration with Germans; the population of southeastern Ukraine glorifies the victories of the Red Army and a Soviet power that liberated the world from Nazism. The Soviet narrative that dominated historic interpretations of these events from 1940 to the 1990s described the OUN-UPA as traitors and fascists who collaborated with the Nazis and were responsible for the mass killing of fellow citizens. President Victor Yushchenko, supported by the population of western Ukraine, came to power in the wake of the Orange Revolution of 2004 and tried to alter this narrative, promoting a perception of OUN-UPA as national heroes and freedom fighters. Many experts agree that there was no evolution or gradual process of altering the values of the Soviet period. The fight over the assessment of the OUN and the UPA spiraled into new levels of intensity after the January 2010 decision of outgoing president Yushchenko to bestow the Hero of Ukraine Order on Stepan Bandera, the deceased

leader of the OUN-B faction. President Victor Yanukovych, who replaced Yushchenko, was supported by a majority of voters in southeastern Ukraine in opposition to the Ukrainian nationalism of Yushchenko. Many experts stress that his government created conflicts around history and language, reintroducing Soviet narratives, norms, and values as a challenge to Ukrainian independence.

The events of spring 2011 represent a vivid example of the conflict over history in Ukraine. On April 21 the Verhovna Rada (Ukraine's parliament) passed a law that supported the official use of a replica of the red flag of victory in the Great Patriotic War. According to this law, replicas of the red flag should be used during the celebrations of Victory Day observed by the state officials, local officials, and other organizations. The law also allows the use of red flags on buildings and flagstaves together with the state flag of Ukraine. This resolution came into law after decisions were made by several southeastern regions of Ukraine—including Zaporozhe, Lugansk, and Crimea—to use replicas of the Soviet red flag during celebrations of Victory Day. These decisions by local and state parliaments aimed to increase the loyalty of the voters who brought the Yanukovych party into power and promoted respect for values connected with the Soviet victory over German Nazism.

This decision was immediately perceived as an insult by the population of western Ukraine and by pro-Ukrainian movements. The local administrations of the western regions immediately made the decision to ban the use of the red flag. They stated that the symbols of a nonexistent state are prohibited because of the repression of the people under Soviet rule. Moreover, some regional western administrations made the decision to rename Victory Day as the Day of Grief and invite veterans into schools to tell pupils about the heroic fights of the UPA against both the Soviet and Nazi regimes.

These decisions, in turn, were negatively perceived by the population of the Eastern regions, especially veterans of the Red Army and Communists. The People's Deputy from the Communist Party, Alexander Golub, stated that he understood why people in western Ukraine wanted to establish a Day of Grief instead of the Day of Victory. "This is because they are descendants of people who fought together with fascist Germany and lost in this war. Thus, for them it is grief and mourning. I understand them very well."⁴⁰ He also said that normal people are proud of the great victory and the Soviet Red Army. Communists and Red Army veterans in L'viv (the major city on the west of Ukraine) lodged a protest against the imposition of nationalistic ideology, rehabilitation of OUN-UPA, and attempts to decrease the world-renowned significance of the victory of the Soviet people in the Great Patriotic War.⁴¹

On May 9, 2011, a group of World War II veterans and representatives of NGOs came to L'viv from the eastern and southern regions of Ukraine to

celebrate Victory Day. They brought with them red flags and flowers that they planned to lay at the tomb of the Unknown Soldier on the Hill of Glory. A group of Russian diplomats under the leadership of Consul General of Russia Oleg Astakhov joined this procession with a wreath, which they also intended to lay at the tomb. These two groups were attacked by a Ukrainian nationalist from the western ultra-right-wing party Svoboda. A group of young men broke through a police cordon outside the Hill of Glory and tried to prevent the unfolding of the red flag. They also crushed the wreath held by the Russian consul general. The police stopped the fight and detained some participants in the clash. The Russian Foreign Ministry immediately reacted by condemning this activity: “The actions by extremist forces resulted in the humiliation of the veterans and citizens who were celebrating the Day of the Victory over fascism.”⁴²

The following quotations are examples of the continuous fight around these events in the media:

Myth no. 1 is that the red flag is a symbol of victory. On the contrary, under this flag, the Soviets started a bloody war on Sept. 1, 1939. This fact is hidden by those who want to enforce Stalin’s interpretation of WWII history. Many Ukrainians do not really know who started the war. It was Josef Stalin and Adolph Hitler!⁴³

Neither the Ukrainian government nor the president needed to have been great statesmen to understand the provocative and subversive character of this suggestion. Even if they watched only Russian TV and used no other sources of information, they would certainly have known that the Soviet flag is absolutely unacceptable for a significant portion of the Ukrainian population, primarily in the Western but also in the central part of the country. They should certainly have known that for millions of Ukrainians the red flag is first and foremost the symbol of occupation, of terror and genocide, gulag and Holodomor, Russification, and national humiliation.⁴⁴

Another important historic event that provokes different interpretations is the Great Famine. The Ukrainian famine of 1932–1933, or the Holodomor, occurred during the mass collectivization of the agricultural sector. It began in 1928 and ended with the government collection of 45 to 46 percent of all harvest. The reserves were then merely denied to the starving population. Furthermore, the Soviet Union continued to export grain in large amounts (1.8 million tons in 1933).⁴⁵ The major targets of famine were *kulaks*, better-off peasants, but the definition of kulaks varied over the course of Stalin’s Terror in the 1930s and across local contexts.

According to Kosar,⁴⁶ the resistance to procurement took many forms (hoarding of food and money, slaughter of livestock, and riots), and those who resisted were deported or killed. Stalin continued to force collectivization by executing the middle peasantry, thus leaving the *kolkhozes* (collective

farms) in the hands of unskilled managers. In addition to poor management of livestock and farming processes, the industrial farm equipment promised by Stalin never came. During the resulting brutal harvest, the government collected larger proportions of the food and left the peasants with little for winter. Those Ukrainian Communist leaders who warned of the unrealistic procurement targets were perceived as counterrevolutionary agents and threatened with removal from office. Stalin forbade any foreign shipments into Ukraine until the procurement quota was met, and, unlike the 1921 famine where Lenin accepted international aid, the 1932 famine was kept secret. Furthermore, Stalin and his government proclaimed the end of poverty for the peasants, who were enjoying the positive results of collectivization, and anyone who spoke of famine was given a five-year prison sentence.

According to scholars, several major factors had led to the famine: a more rapid execution of collectivization in Ukraine in comparison to other regions; unreasonable grain quotas placed on Ukraine; prevention of the migration of starving peasants by closing the borders of Ukraine and the North Caucasus per Stalin's directive of January 22, 1933; absence of a response to information about the situation in Ukraine and the imminence of famine sent by Ukrainian officials to Moscow; Stalin's suspicions of the Ukrainian peasantry and his fear of losing Ukraine (see Stalin's letter to Kaganovich of August 11, 1932); and confiscation of grain, meat, and vegetables by the extraordinary commission in Ukraine led by Molotov (see the decree of November 18, 1932), which ensured the inevitability of the peasants' starvation.⁴⁷ A majority of authors state that the Soviet central government was fully aware of the famine; however, sources vary by the degree to which the government perpetrated and orchestrated the tragedy. There are two main interpretations of the Holodomor, with the first describing it as a completely orchestrated event and the second saying that the policies that went into place contributing to the deaths were criminal but not meant to directly promote genocide. Thus, Boriak⁴⁸ emphasizes the Soviet leadership's full awareness of the famine and that they not only attempted to cover up knowledge of the famine and its policies toward Ukraine but also falsified facts and information. The word *holod* and mention of the famine was forbidden until its first official recognition in 1987.⁴⁹ Grasiozi⁵⁰ puts forth a third interpretation, which suggests a more nuanced situation in which Stalin wanted to break the will of the Ukrainian people through a series of harsh policies and punishments and the famine conveniently presented a situation in which Stalin could further terrorize and punish his enemies.

Some scholars consider the Holodomor to be an example of ethnic genocide of the Ukrainian people and stress the link between the famine and the assault on the Ukrainian nation, as manifested by terror and deportations; furthermore, they emphasize the purge of cultural and national leaders and the cessation of the earlier policy of Ukrainization.⁵¹ Western scholarship on

the Holodomor is also divided between academics who see it as ethnic genocide⁵² and academics who are not convinced that the goal of the famine was to punish ethnic Ukrainians and who partially explain this famine by ecological and natural factors.⁵³ For example, Grasiozi⁵⁴ describes the Holodomor as a genocide facilitated by Stalin and the Soviet central government as a means to break Ukrainian nationalism and the peasantry and to force industrial farming and collectivization. However, unlike the Holocaust, they argue, the Holodomor was not designed to kill an entire ethnic group but rather to kill a large proportion of them in order to bring them to the centralized government. Jilge and Troebst⁵⁵ suggests that it was an especially bad famine that has been used to justify a victim narrative in Ukraine.

This fundamental divide has become a political issue. Those who have supported the genocide argument have been accused of exploiting the issue to prop the nationalistic agenda, while those who oppose it have been perceived as pro-Soviet or pro-Russian in their political leanings.⁵⁶ Some authors state that the history of the Holodomor is used to emphasize the victimization of Ukraine and deny any participation of ethnic Ukrainians as perpetrators in these violent actions.⁵⁷ However, both groups acknowledge that Stalin's policies could not be effective without the active involvement and initiative of his subordinates and local leaders. According to Kasyanov,⁵⁸ "politicians were quick to seize on the political/ideological and mobilization potential this subject offered. . . . The 1932–33 famine fit perfectly into the accusatory/justifying approach that explained current difficulties as arising from disadvantageous historical circumstances."⁵⁹ President Kravchuk used famine as a tool of political legitimization, aiming to separate himself from the Soviet past and his former leadership in the Communist Party. During Leonid Kravchuk's presidency (1991–1994), the 1932–1933 famine became a significant part of the rhetoric of the totalitarian past. President Viktor Yushchenko emphasized the ideological meaning of the famine and centered nation-building politics around this issue. He deliberately used the debates around famine to justify his power during the political battles of 2006–2008. In addition, he hoped that "a nationally oriented policy, with historical politics as a component, could become a source of moral healing for society and help to restore Ukraine's moral and political unity."⁶⁰ Yushchenko also ordered the establishment of the Institute of National Remembrance and organized a nationwide campaign to mark the seventy-fifth anniversary of the famine. As a result, the 1932–1933 famine has become one of the founding symbols of the national historical myth, supported by regular commemorative events throughout the country. The emphasis on the famine also helped state officials from both the right and left to justify current difficulties as consequences of past traumas.

The famine also became the center of a battle on the international level.⁶¹ Yushchenko was a head of the international committee on remembrance of

the seventy-fifth anniversary of the famine, which included representatives of the Ukrainian diaspora. He actively promoted the idea of famine as global national trauma in his speeches abroad. The Ukrainian Foreign Ministry was charged with establishing a permanent working group on the issue and coordinating the efforts of Ukrainian embassies to increase international awareness about the Holodomor. These activities, together with lobbying efforts of the Ukrainian diaspora, resulted in recognition of famine as an act of genocide by the parliaments of thirteen countries, including the United States, Canada, and Australia. International organizations, including the OSCE parliamentary assembly, the European parliament, and UNESCO, also approved special documents on the famine in Ukraine but did not accept it as genocide. Russia actively opposed this Ukrainian campaign, perceiving that international recognition of the famine as genocide could reduce Russia's international stance. Israel issued several statements stressing that in comparison with the Holocaust, the internationally accepted act of genocide, the Holodomor can be recognized as a great tragedy but not genocide.

History textbooks became entwined in the swings of the political pendulum. They were completely rewritten several times: after the fall of the Soviet Union, the Orange Revolution of 2004, and the election of a new government in February 2010. As Janmaat⁶² notes in his analysis of the first change, the Ukrainian government sees history education as a vital tool in the nation-building process. It produced and successfully distributed the required history textbooks in all regions of Ukraine. The first change to textbooks included a more balanced account of all events, including the Soviet era, an emphasis on Ukrainian language and culture, a description of the great October Socialist Revolution and the Bolshevik movement as alien to Ukraine and their lack of support among ethnic Ukrainians, and efforts to rehabilitate the OUN.⁶³ The textbooks of 2004 posited Russia as an alien state and promoted the history of Ukraine as a history of the Ukrainian ethnic group.⁶⁴ By contrast, the most recent government has radically changed the concept of national identity toward Russification and altered the presentation and interpretation of these same events (including Great Rus', the great October Revolution, civil war, repressions, World War II, and the Orange Revolution).⁶⁵ These radical changes in a relatively recent and short time period have forced teachers and history educators to promote opposite ideas during ever-changing identity meaning-making processes. Depending on the change, teachers in different regions have protested curriculum changes that were in divergence with their views, beliefs, and values. For example, in recent research in eastern Ukraine, "many teachers noted how previously they had taught a Soviet interpretation of history, whilst today the 'History of Ukraine' course had been specifically tailored to foster a sense of loyalty to the Ukrainian state and promote national consciousness amongst Ukraine's children."⁶⁶

The absence of a clear national idea is strongly interconnected with the democratic and economic development of Ukraine. After more than twenty years of independence, democracy and civic society are very weak and positive changes in society are undermined by high levels of corruption. Thus, according to Freedom House's annual report in 2011, the level of civic society in Ukraine scored 2.75, democracy scored 4.61, and corruption scored 5.75 (all scores are on a scale from 1 to 7, with 1 being highest). The report further states that national political power in Ukraine is consolidated in the hands of President Yanukovich, who regained control over the cabinet, the security service, and the prosecutor general after the restoration of the constitution in October 2010 to its pre-2004 state. Despite President Yanukovich's pledge to increase the autonomy of local governments, his actions and policies have resulted in the strengthening and centralization of his political power. The Freedom House report also emphasized antidemocratic trends that have impacted civic society and the freedom of the media, including political pressure, arrests, and administrative detentions of NGO activists and journalists. As the report states, a combination of societal apathy and lack of capacity among NGOs prevented them from effectively resisting the antidemocratic trend.⁶⁷ This increase of negative sociopolitical tendencies in Ukrainian society, particularly in the field of democratic rights and liberties, was also affirmed in a 2011 NATO report.⁶⁸

Dissatisfied by the progress of social liberalization and disappointed in the outcomes of the Orange Revolution, the population of Ukraine has become less and less supportive of democratic development. Approval of the change to democracy in Ukraine dropped from 72 percent in 1991 to 30 percent in 2009, a decline of 42 percent—the biggest fall among all post-Soviet countries.⁶⁹ Approval of the change to capitalism also declined from 52 percent to 36 percent, positioning Ukraine in fourth from last place, after Hungary, Lithuania, and Bulgaria. Moreover, 69 percent of respondents prefer a strong leader to a democratic government (20 percent), again the biggest gap in Europe. A preference for having democratic leaders declined from 57 percent in 1991 to 20 percent in 2009. Fifty-five percent of Ukrainians disapprove of democracy (the biggest disapproval rate in Europe). Support for a multiparty system declined from 72 percent in 1991 to 30 percent in 2009. Ukrainian respondents declared that economic prosperity was more important for them than democracy (74 percent versus 50 percent). According to the report 78 percent of Ukrainian respondents, more than seven in ten, say that if they had to choose, they would prefer a strong economy to democracy (while only 12 percent would prefer democracy), the biggest gap in Europe.⁷⁰ Nan described this culture as “individualist, protectionist and survivalist. . . . Successive governments using quasi-democratic parliamentary systems have simply re-enforced this position to the extent that the majority now see democracy as a discredited system that has brought nothing positive.”⁷¹

The promise of President Yanukovich to combat corruption as a major problem in Ukraine has also failed: glaring conflicts of interest among senior officials in the new government, combined with further delays in the passage of anticorruption legislation, have fueled public skepticism about the leadership's pledges to combat graft in 2010.⁷² According to Transparency International's corruption perceptions index, Ukraine's rank out of 178 surveyed countries changed from 134th in 2010 to 144th in 2012.⁷³ The Heritage Foundation's 2013 Index of Economic Freedom put Ukraine in 161st place out of 177 surveyed states.⁷⁴ Corruption was reported as a major national problem by 70 percent of respondents, followed by pollution (64 percent) and crime (56 percent).⁷⁵

In July 2011, *Forbes* placed Ukraine in fourth place among the world's worst economies, stating that Ukraine has rich farmland and generous mineral resources and could become a leading European economy, yet per capita GDP trails far behind even countries like Serbia and Bulgaria. The U.S. State Department blames complex laws and regulations, poor corporate governance, weak enforcement of contract law by courts, and, particularly, corruption.⁷⁶ The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development stated that 35 percent of Ukraine's population could be defined as living in poverty (on the basis of the World Bank's threshold of income of less than a dollar per day).⁷⁷ The Pew Forum survey also shows that 62 percent of Ukrainian people feel worse off than under Communism, placing Ukraine in second place in Europe after Hungary. Forty-seven percent reported that they lost ground in the past five years, while only 26 percent reported making progress.⁷⁸ According to the Institute of Sociology, 74 percent of respondents stated that there is a high level of disorder and uncertainty in the society; 73.4 percent declared that they could not comprehend the changes in society, and 80 percent agreed that the majority of people do not believe in anything.⁷⁹

This complex and problematic situation in Ukraine after over twenty years of independence has been extensively discussed by Ukrainian and international scholars. Some of them have focused on the absence of real political reforms, power, and the persistence of corruption. Kuzio⁸⁰ discusses four factors that have contributed to the Ukrainian state's immobility and corruption: political culture, weak political will and civil society, an absence of institutions that can fight corruption, and a weakness of ideology and dependency of political parties on business. D'anieri concentrates on the factors that impede and contribute to the consolidation of power in Ukraine. According to the scholar, regional divisions, the absence of a natural resource-based economy, and the relative weakness of the post-Communist security services obstruct concentrations of power, while weak institutions, weak norms, and methods of eliminating competitors support concentration of power.⁸¹ Nan also stresses the absence of stability of power because of the

internal competition of five clans within the party of regions and its impact on the degradation of the economy.⁸² The weakness of the Ukrainian political system that sustains political populism is also described by Kuzio, who states that Ukraine's political system remains weak, fractured, highly personalized, and ideologically vacuous, while the judiciary and media fail to hold politicians to account. Such an environment permits social populism to flourish across the entire Ukrainian political spectrum and does not punish politicians for writing one thing, saying another, and ignoring everything that went before.⁸³

Other scholars focus on structural issues. For example, the uncertainty around the Ukrainian model of development has been commented on by Umland as follows: "It is universally acknowledged that Ukraine needs to fundamentally change its political, administrative, economic, social and education system. However, the question of which socio-economic model exactly Ukraine should embrace remains a matter of dispute and source of stagnation."⁸⁴ He also acknowledged high social and cultural polarization, growing fragmentation in Ukrainian society, and the rise of extremist organizations. These divisions within the country were also emphasized by Malan in a NATO report:

Since independence at the end of 1991, Ukraine has been divided between an anti-Russian, pro-European [w]est and a more pro-Russian south and east. Ukrainian nationalism, anchored in the west of the country around L'viv (part of Austria-Hungary only a century ago and part of interwar Poland), is Western-looking, built against Russia as the significant rival, while the [e]astern and [s]outhern parts of the country see themselves as more organically linked to Russia.⁸⁵

The Ukrainian public is similarly divided between those who believe in conflict between the two main regions (41.9 percent) and those who deny such a split (42 percent). The majority of the people who stress the negative relations between regions live in the east of the country (59 percent), while almost half of population in the west (49 percent) do not think that the divide exists.⁸⁶

Many scholars acknowledge that Ukrainian identity depends on the establishment of a clear distinction from Russia, but this identity remains closely tied to Russia. It is extremely sensitive to the changes in Russian policy. The arrogant imperial actions of Russia strengthen the boundary between the two countries, while economic cooperation increases positive sentiments toward Russia. During the 1990s, support for close ties with the country members of the commonwealth of independent states decreased from 40 percent to 22 percent, while support for close relations with Russia and the East Slavonic union increased from 17 percent to 22 percent; support for the development of relations with Western countries was almost unchanged (13 percent to 15

percent), and support for strengthening independence grew from 13 percent to 28 percent.⁸⁷ In 2010, 61 percent of the population supported union with Russia and Belarussia, and 45 percent supported close ties with the European Union. While in 2012 83 percent of Ukrainian population had positive attitudes toward Russia (with regional differences of 91 percent in eastern and southern regions and 63 percent in western regions), only 14 percent want to unite with Russia. Seventy-two percent of the population want to see Ukraine and Russia as independent but friendly states with open economic boundaries.⁸⁸ In 2010, 39.6 percent of people of Ukraine opposed the Russian language as an official language in Ukraine, while 43.3 percent supported this idea.⁸⁹ The 2012 law about the regional status of the Russian language was supported by 65 percent of population, while 27 percent opposed it.⁹⁰

These differences in the perception of Russia and the West as well as the social positions of Russians and Ukrainians within the nation have resulted in competition between multiple groups pursuing different and sometimes opposite goals of national development. This short overview does not pretend to map all existing national narratives produced by scholars and writers. Rather it paints the issue of multiple voices and complexity in the definition of the Ukrainian national idea and the continuous competition to establish the leading meaning of national identity. The debates about national identity are often perceived as existing on a spectrum, with one side positioning Ukraine as a subset of Russia and Russians as superior to Ukrainians and the opposite side opposing inclusion of Russians into definitions of a Ukrainian national identity.⁹¹ Several scholars emphasize the presence of two main national narratives. Shulman⁹² defines two major national identity complexes among Ukrainian elites. The Eastern Slavic national identity complex is underpinned by the beliefs in common heritage and culture of both Ukrainians and Russians. Both groups are positioned as equal members of the nation, similarly native to Ukrainian society. Russians are viewed as an organic part of Ukraine, deeply incorporated into its culture and social life. Ukraine is perceived as a bilingual, bi-ethnic, and bicultural nation as well as a coherent conglomerate of all other ethnic minorities living in the country. Western Ukraine is perceived as alien to the Eastern Slavic culture of spirituality and community. This narrative encourages close relations with Russia and the support of Russian culture in Ukraine and prescribes policies of equal status of both Ukrainian and Russian language and culture. The ethnic Ukrainian national identity complex embodies a view of the nation as based on an ethnic Ukrainian core and dominance of the ethnic Ukrainian culture and language. It rests on three major beliefs: the indigenesness of the Ukrainian ethnic group and alien status of Russians, Russian colonialism as an impediment to Ukrainian culture and language, and the specter of forced Russification that would divide Ukraine into Russophones and Ukrainophones. These three beliefs delegitimize Russians in Ukraine and deny their rights to partic-

ipate in the nation-building process. At the same time, they legitimize the privileged position of ethnic Ukrainians and the formation of national identity exclusively based on Ukrainian ethnic culture and language. This advantaged position is justified by the belief that Ukrainians are more democratic, tolerant, and freedom-loving than Russians. Ukraine is positioned as a part of the European space and alien to imperial and pro-Soviet Russia. Thus, this narrative prescribes policies of preference for Ukrainian language, history, and culture, increases in the knowledge and use of Ukrainian culture and language among the population, and integration with the European Union.

The Eastern Slavic national identity complex is similar to the Eurasian and East Slavism narratives that posit Ukraine as a part of the greater East Slavic culture and mentality (see, for example, Dugin⁹³). This mentality is based on sacred symbols deriving from the histories of Kievan Rus and the Byzantine Empire that constitute a Eurasian economic and cultural space. Ukrainians, Russians, and Belarusians are considered to be East Slavs united by shared values, perceptions, and geopolitical orientations. This idea is grounded in four major myths:⁹⁴ the myth of common origin from Kievan Rus, the myth of cultural synthesis of three ethnic groups, the myth of common cultural space as a collective statehood with open boundaries between three groups, and the myth of outcast western Ukrainians as alien to the Eastern Slavic community. Wilson⁹⁵ further defines divergent narratives of Eastern Slavism: *Dnieper nationalism* that is based on Kievan traditions and is authentically Ukrainian and *Kievocentrism*, positing Ukraine as the main inheritor of Rus culture, which is superior to Russia and Belarussia.

The ethnic Ukrainian national identity complex is reflected in the writings of scholars of Ukraine who consider its history, culture, traditions, and identity authentically European, alienated from Europe by Russian oppression. Grabowicz⁹⁶ argues that Ukrainian culture is still considered to be under Russian pressure. Following the statements of representatives of the Ukrainian intelligentsia, he stresses that in different regions of Ukraine, Ukrainian society and culture exist in “conditions approaching apartheid—as a second-class community, in short.”⁹⁷ This discrimination produces trauma that impacts not only ethnic Ukrainians but also the entire pluralistic society of Ukraine. Grabowicz describes the impact of Soviet mentality on current Ukrainian culture, stressing features such as populism, schematism, hybridity, and mimicry. He further argues for policies that increase the prestige of the Ukrainian language and establish it as the basic medium of communication in Ukraine. Riabchuk⁹⁸ also emphasizes the Russian threat to Ukrainian culture in his concept of creole nationalism—the nationalism of a postcolonial population that is unsympathetic and hostile to the indigenous culture. Around half of the ethnic Russian group, according to Riabchuk, or 10 percent of the Ukrainian population, is unambiguously anti-Ukrainian and supports the imposition of Russian influence over Ukraine. The normal Euro-

pean nation is formed only in the west of Ukraine, while the rest of the country has yet to become a nation with modern consciousness and still supports the idea of Ukraine as Little Russia. Thus, Riabchuk advocates for the exclusive rights of conscious Ukrainians (around 30 percent of the population according to his count) to define the nation-building process. The rest of the population, he says, is unprepared to create a national idea and still holds a negative self-image of domination by the urban modern Russian ethnic group over the rural backward Ukrainians. It is represented by the creole elite that is both anti-Ukrainian and anti-imperial and does not contribute to the development of an authentic Ukrainian national identity.

Isajiw and Kuzio⁹⁹ connect the silence of national identity and absence of regional loyalties with modernization in post-Communist countries. They show the historic link between nationalism and democracy and promote nationalism as the most effective force for nation-building. They argue that development of a civic society in Ukraine is connected with western, essentially Ukrainian lands, while in eastern and southern Ukraine the predominantly Russian population is passive and does not care about nation-building and thus does not support national democrats. Thus, Isajiw and Kuzio attribute to Russophone Ukrainians a low ability to organize collective actions, while depicting Ukrainophones as having a stronger civic society. They further suggest that because democratic nationalists representing the Ukrainian ethnic group did not take power in Ukraine during the early years of independence, the country has not succeeded in the development of a strong nation and modern state. They acknowledge that democratic development in multicultural countries like Ukraine requires some centrist consensus, but then go on to provide a negative assessment of this option because, in their opinion, it reduces the possibility of societal transition to democracy. They base this argument on the history of national-liberation movements of the twentieth century that combined national romanticism and anti-Soviet sentiments and on the history of the democratic movements of Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary, which were based on cultural elites. Thus, they conclude that stronger national identities insure the effectiveness of the modernization processes and connects the development of Ukraine as a civic society with the nationalism of the ethnic Ukrainian group. They further argue that civic-based nationalism is less effective in the process of unification of the population than nationalism combining both territorial-civic and ethno-cultural factors. Their vision of the structure of power in Ukraine derives from a meaning of national identity where a particular nationality (usually defined as the titular or core) will have precedence over all others within the bounded territory of the community.¹⁰⁰ Thus, Isajiw and Kuzio justify the rule of the Ukrainian ethnic group as the most democratic and liberal ethnic group in Ukraine.

Riabchuk¹⁰¹ also defines “two Ukraines”: (1) anti-Communist, anti-Soviet western Ukrainians who support the revival of the Ukrainian language and culture, consider Russia to be an enemy, and are pro-Western, pro-reform, and pro-democratic, and (2) pro-Russian eastern Ukrainians who support a return to the Soviet economic order and authoritarian power. Similarly, Ukraine is perceived to be divided between Westernizers, who support independence and democratic and economic reforms, and Slavophiles, who promote restoration of the Russian Empire and Soviet order and oppose reforms in Ukraine. Westernizers are composed of national democrats (influential under Kravchuk), who stress the differences between Ukraine and Russia and alienate Russia as not a part of Europe, and pragmatic nationalists (influential under Kuchma), who are oriented toward Europe but do not invoke opposition to Russia, acknowledging Russians as the biggest minority in Ukraine as well as the close historic and cultural ties between Russia and Ukraine.¹⁰²

Wilson¹⁰³ discusses the “three Ukraines” model. He argues that the description of Russians in Ukraine as colonists of diaspora significantly reduce the opportunity to understand the complexity of the identity of this numerous minority. The majority of Russians living in Ukraine were born in Ukraine. Only a small percent of them have salient Russian identity and Russian nationalistic sentiments. The majority of Russians, especially in the eastern regions of Ukraine, do have a Russian-Soviet identity but are strongly influenced by the Ukrainian culture and customs and represent the mixed cultural group. However, as Wilson¹⁰⁴ stresses, the most important question is how homogenous or heterogeneous is the Ukrainian ethnic group. This question includes three subquestions: first, the position of Ukrainophone people within Ukraine; second, the influence of western Ukraine on a Ukrainophone population, and third, the impact of diaspora on western Ukraine or country as a whole. He discusses the identity of the third group as “the other Ukraine,” which represents Russian-speaking Ukrainians with a Soviet identity and mixed cultural traditions and customs. The boundary of this group is blurred, especially with Russians in Ukraine. The picture becomes even more complex if we add the functional bilingualism that is very common in Ukraine. People easily switch between languages depending on environment and the person they are speaking to. People can even mix both languages as they speak—using, for example, so-called Surzhik, which does not have standard linguistic rules, structure, or grammar.

Consideration of the impact of the Soviet legacy on the meaning of national identity adds more complexity to the analysis of national narratives. Moroney and Kuzio¹⁰⁵ propose an alternative vision of national division on three main groups: reformists who are oriented toward the United States and European experience, Communists who advocate an orientation to Russia, and centrists who have mixed attitudes toward both the West and Russia.

Different versions of Ukrainian national identity are also evident in “three Ukrainians” model of Hrytsak,¹⁰⁶ which includes narratives of Ukrainophones (an ethnic concept based on Ukrainian culture and language), Russophones (the concept of Little Russia), and Soviets (the concept of Soviet Ukraine). The differences in national narratives also can be attributed to divisions between the unambiguously Ukrainian-right subgroup, the middle group representing Soviet Ukrainians living with the myths of Soviet order, the left subgroup comprised of “hard Soviets” who regret the fall of the Soviet Union and have a pan-cultural identity, and “soft Soviets” who still identify as Soviets.¹⁰⁷ Molchanov¹⁰⁸ stresses the complexities of different levels of social identities and loyalties and defines diverse foundations for identity groups in Ukraine, including ethnic (Russian and Ukrainian), Soviet, and liberal social categories. These complex identities result in multiple and often competing interpretations of the meaning of a Ukrainian national identity.

The vision of Ukraine as a society composed of different cultures of people residing on its territory underpins the inclusive concept of a national identity. Wilson¹⁰⁹ notes that Ukraine is a multicultural society where ethnic Ukrainians constitute around 73 percent of the population. Motyl¹¹⁰ also endorses the development of Ukraine as a multicultural community and identifies three major obstacles to nation-building: a Russian-speaking population holding nationalistic views and exclusionary Ukrainians exacerbating ethnic tensions, Ukrainian nationalists imposing the slogan “Ukraine for Ukrainians,” and Russian aggressive imperial intentions toward Ukraine. In his later writings,¹¹¹ Motyl concluded that the institutional legacies of totalitarian Communism impeded democratic development and nation-building in Ukraine. In comparison with Poland, Hungary, Slovenia, and the Czech and Slovak republics that developed alternative institutions since the 1950s and 1960s and were in close proximity to the West, Ukraine had only Communist institutions and a peripheral position in Europe. Motyl¹¹² stresses that the multicultural meaning of the national identity of Ukraine is build based on several myths. One of the myths invokes the depiction of Ukraine as a freedom-loving peasant nation. The core of this narrative is the prototype of Taras Shevchenko, a nineteenth-century poet. This narrative represents the emergence of the Ukrainian nation, and the image of fertile and beautiful Ukrainian land, which symbolizes the soul of the nation. The image of the land also serves to construct the durability and authenticity of culture. The second component, love of freedom, is justified by the direct relationship with nature and the heritage of the Cossacks, a multicultural, self-governing militant community on the borderland of Ukraine during the fifteenth to eighteenth centuries. This myth is created in opposition to evil and greedy Polish landlords and their Jewish managers but stresses the unity of the people of different cultural descents. The second myth is of Kievan Rus, a state in the territory of present-day Ukraine during the tenth to thirteenth

centuries. This myth provides the continuity of Ukrainian culture and nation and creates foundations for national pride. The third myth is of European roots and the future of Ukraine with Russia as essentially Asian. The multicultural heritage of Ukraine underpins Ukraine's role as a bridge between the two alien worlds of Europe and Asia and as an agent of reconciliation between them.

Thus, the absence of a shared defined meaning of national identity in Ukraine during the first years of its nationhood has resulted in a complex and contested process of nation-building. This process has become an arena of struggles between diverse and often-competing narratives, representing different concepts of national identity. The development of the meaning of national identity depends on the complex interrelations between social-economic and political factors in the society. The dividing effect of regional, linguistic, cultural, and ethnic differences has been further complicated by ineffective economic reforms, high levels of corruption and authoritarianism, vacillating policies of Ukrainian presidents, slow democratic development, and the virtual absence of a civic society, as well as the foreign policies of Russia and the European Union toward Ukraine.

The following section offers a description of the current situation in Ukraine, which sets the stage for competing national narratives. It provides the foundation for understanding different dualities, binary constructs, types of mythic narrative, justification mechanisms, and approaches to legitimization of power in national narratives. It also provides insights for the interpretation of the two functions of national narratives—formation of national identity and legitimization of power. It is based on the results of interviews with Ukrainian and foreign experts regarding the current situation in Ukraine. While answering the question about the problems and achievements of Ukraine after more than twenty years of independence, respondents provided two different types of answers. One group of respondents provided a comprehensive concept or model that describes the current state of Ukraine. The other group of respondents offered a list of problems and achievements.

At the second stage, the models were organized into several categories based on the narrative content from the first stage: (1) a state without a national idea and common identity, (2) a country in an unfinished transition, (3) degradation of society, (4) a divided society, (5) Ukraine as a colony or wild capitalism, (6) a postcolonial and postgenocidal society, and (7) a frontier state. Each category of conceptual models was then further analyzed as a narrative, and corresponding problems were added to the analysis of each narrative. The analysis was conducted within two groups: Ukrainian respondents and foreign experts.

The following narratives are based on the words of respondents and reflect only views and opinions of respondents from a particular group. I have not included any personal opinions, judgments, or comments in these narra-

tives, preserving their authenticity. All statements in the narratives belong only to respondents from the respected group.

Ukraine as a State without National Identity

Ukrainian Respondents

Seven respondents employed this narrative as a conceptual model of current Ukrainian society; forty-one respondents mentioned it among other problems. Thus, this idea is presented in the narratives of 100 percent of Ukrainian respondents.

At the core of this narrative is a concern that the absence of unity of public consciousness impedes the resolution of important problems that Ukraine faces now. The narrative stresses the need for a common national identity. There is a state of Ukraine, but there is no nation: no common view of Ukraine, no national idea, and, as a result, no motivation among the population to contribute to Ukrainian development. As one respondent notes, "People think that we live in a transitional period, but what is the direction of this transition? Without clear perspective, it is hard for society to understand the current period. This perspective impacts everything—interpretation of the past, economic reforms, social development." The absence of a national ideology and political course leads to political apathy. People do not pay attention to political discourses and are not engaged in national policy development. There is no big idea or nationalistic narrative to unite and inspire people. Consequently, society experiences a lack of permanent development, a deficiency of solidarity, a limited long-term outlook, and a generational divide in values and beliefs.

In 1991, when Ukraine gained its independence, there were limited conceptualizations about the direction of development of a national ideology. People who had fought for Ukrainian independence for centuries were inspired by the idea of sovereignty but lacked a comprehensive concept of Ukraine. Several alternative state-building projects of Ukraine were developed during the revolutions of 1917–1920, including the Grushevsky's federalist-autonomic concept of Ukraine. Yet in 1991 there was no vision of a Ukrainian nation-state; independence was declared by Communists who either did not understand the need for a new concept or eschewed enacting radical changes in order to preserve their power. The process of the development of national identity should have started immediately after obtaining independence, but there were few consistent efforts to define it. It was not discussed in universities or among the intellectual elite during the 1990s. Thus, even after twenty-plus years of independence Marxist-Leninist ideas still prevail in the understanding of the society; Soviet concepts such as "national 'nost,'" native people, and national minorities are still included in

the constitution. An ethnic policy has yet to be defined. As such, the process of the development of a national idea has failed and the foundation for a new nation-state was never created.

The end of the Cold War and the fall of the dual ideological world system required a new national formulation that should have instituted a Ukrainian nation-state. Challenges confronted the government, making the government unable to complete the task. In the beginning of 1990s, few knew what to do with the country and the economy. Ukraine, rich with geographic potential, an established industrial base, extensive natural resources, and a stable productive economy, was viewed as a trophy territory by the government and people. This “trophy” perception (steal and squander) prevailed, affecting the people’s value system. As one respondent states,

The major problem of the first ten years is the view of Ukraine as a trophy territory, the absence of a national idea. It was a point of the termination of the dual-world system that was characterized by the search for the new idea, but Ukraine was moving like a crawfish: the government had a “trophy” perception of people as something that could be exploited without any contribution to their well-being. People also had a “trophy” perception of the country and available goods: it was normal to steal everything that was available. It became more popular to deal than to get an education. As a result, the cultural and educational levels decreased, emigration is on the rise, we see the degradation of social capital and an absence of high technology.

The new national identity involved a critical rethinking and assessment of Ukrainian history, but Ukraine’s Soviet heritage had become a major source of conflict. On the one side, it was deemed that the revival of a Ukrainian identity was not feasible without utilizing the experience of the Soviet Union; the people could not distance themselves from the past. The other side argued that the only possibility for Ukraine to prosper was to completely wipe out the Soviet era from the new national narrative.

The only consensus on a national image centered on the ideas of a “fence around the house” that praised individualism and the idea of a “good life” or being in Europe that concentrated on economic well-being. Based on the latter, Ukrainians gave power to oligarchs, people representing success, in the hope that they would know how to build the country and change life for the better. But current governments and oligarchs have not been motivated by nationalistic principles and care little about Ukraine and its future.

A discourse about a common national identity has yet to be formed between politicians and society. Politicians, as well as groups within the society, have differing opinions about national identity. There are no national leaders who promote a nationalistic narrative and who are supported by 80 to 90 percent of the population. Many policies have been formed without public or political discussion—for example, language conception. This absence of a

common national perspective impacts every sphere of Ukrainian society, including disparate interpretations of the past, slowing economic reforms, and inconsistent social development.

The absence of a national narrative has resulted in the view of the nation as a set of dissimilar civilizations and cultures with radical differences in history, politics, and mentality. As one respondent states, “the process of identification is very painful—the majority live in the past, in dangerous myths, and the government has temporary interests.” Multiple processes of social identification, diverse meanings of Ukrainianness among representatives of different regions, and a lack of integration into a united state creates ambivalence in the public consciousness. In turn, these difficulties in finding a balanced compromise in the politics of memory negatively mobilizes the electorate when “rocking the boat” of identity.

Currently, Ukraine is too politically weak to define its place in the world system, making it an easy target for influences from Russia and the West. However, reunification with Russia is unpopular among Ukrainians, especially after the Georgian War and the gas conflicts between Russia and Ukraine. Ukrainians want to live in Europe but feel it is still just a dream, an expectation that Europe will provide for Ukraine. At this time, there are no real reforms being enacted that could bring Ukraine up to European standards.

Thus, this narrative model emphasizes the absence of the common national identity, national ideology, and a unified nation-state concept. The original Communist leadership who brought independence to Ukraine continued to use Marxist-Leninist theories of the society, bypassing public discussions around the state as a nation. Instead, the government and the society, concerned about economic well-being as a higher priority, saw and acted as if Ukraine were a purse for their own profit. The creation of a national identity was also obstructed by conflicts around the role of Ukraine’s Soviet past in the development of the current nation. This resulted in the empowerment of elites who cared little about Ukraine and its prosperity or resolving ethnic and regional tensions and an absence of a clear concept of international relations.

Foreign Experts

Three foreign respondents employed this narrative as their conceptual model of current Ukrainian society; in addition, seven respondents mentioned it among other problems. A total of 100 percent of respondents discussed this issue.

Their narrative also states that Ukraine still lacks a common national identity and national vision and is fragmented politically and socially. Ukraine is a provincial civilization without national aspirations, a full-

fledged Ukrainian culture, or institutions that support its development. Currently there is a regression of any potential national identity, as laws and reforms are infiltrating from Russia through cultural and legal impositions. The government is giving up national interests and support of regional differences and is returning to active Russification. Russian mass media and TV dominate in the media spheres. National ideas are not connected with democracy, while a black-and-white mentality prevails, leading to a further degradation from nationalism to Nazism and other extreme values among the population.

Thus, 100 percent of both Ukrainian and foreign experts expressed a view of Ukraine as a country without a common national identity. But while Ukrainian experts see identity development as a process and emphasize the factors that led to the absence of a national identity, foreign experts concentrate on the current state of Ukrainian society. Ukrainian experts discussed the difficult process of creating a national identity, complicated by the absence of a national vision at the time of independence, the efforts of Communists in the government to conserve Soviet identity in order to preserve their power and their unwillingness to open the discussion in the society, a concentration on economic prosperity instead of national conceptualizations among the people, and the divergence around the role of the Soviet past in the development of the nation. As a result, elites are not concerned about Ukraine and its prosperity, ethnic and regional tensions are growing, and concepts of national security are increasingly vague. Foreign experts describe Ukraine as a provincial, fragmented society without national inspirations, open to influences from Russia and extremist organizations.

Country in an Unfinished Transition

Ukrainian Experts

Ten respondents employed this narrative as a conceptual model of current Ukrainian society; in addition, twenty-eight respondents mentioned it among other problems. A total of 79 percent of Ukrainian respondents described this issue.

This narrative describes Ukraine as a country that is still on the way to modernization and is finding the transition to be very frustrating, painful, and challenging. As one respondent notes, "Ukraine is a country of frustrating, unfulfilled transition. We should have a rule of law, a market economy, but [instead we] have the elemental, inconsequent process of transformation. The only change we see is the consolidation of the elite." Despite a strong eagerness for change expressed in the society, real changes, steps forward or reforms, or shifts from a Soviet to a market economy are few. This failed transitional process results in social pessimism, doubts, and disappointment

among Ukrainians. Further, not only is the transitional process not complete after more than twenty years, but it is also impossible to predict the time frames within which it might be completed.

One of the major reasons for the slow transition is the absence of a common vision about the direction or final outcome of the transitional process from Communism. Ukraine's transformation has been a unique one. As one respondent states,

There is a transformation from Communism, but what is the final aim? The west is not capitalist—it is an informational civic society; socialism is also not popular any more. Transformation does not have similarities; we could not use the experience of other countries. We experience an exit from the communist experiment and live in an aquarium with thin glass between us and the West.

Faced with limited and untested models for overcoming Communism embedded in society, the government never created an image of a new Ukraine as a self-sufficient and integrated nation-state. The population is united by an abstract idea that Ukraine should join the European Union, but it is hard to imagine this European future while being excluded from European experiences. Thus, the West is erroneously perceived as a capitalist society, not an informational civic society. Elites had hoped that the transformation to a free-market type of economy would lead to a change in people's mentality (as Karl Marx had taught), but they now understand that they need to change people's perceptions first.

The transitional process has not been linear; developments have cycled through stages of euphoria and depression. Crises erupt quickly, and as soon as one problem is resolved, another arises. The Orange Revolution was a breakthrough, an inspiration, but soon Ukraine again entered a period of pessimism and an absence of progress. In political spheres there has seemed to be a permanent political crisis starting with the 2000 cassette scandal. Even the opposition, when it has existed, has had a negative impact on progress, blocking opportunities for reform.

Ukraine today cannot be understood without comprehending its Soviet heritage. Its dependency on the Soviet past has been extremely hard to overcome. The Soviet reality still dominates society and is evident in the high level of corruption, paternalism, administrative management, and aversion to innovation. There is an ongoing struggle between the Soviet and post-Soviet identity in which Soviet characteristics still prevail. Communism as an ideology and a form of social life defines the consciousness of the people. Traditionally deprived of their property rights, people without property depended on the state, becoming slaves of the state apparatus. This latent Soviet mentality still exists and results in the continued dependence of the people on the state and the prevalence of the state over society. So deep is this reliance on

government that even after more than twenty years of independence distant government officials continue to make all decisions with little societal input or public discussion. People still struggle to understand that Ukraine is not a fragment of the Soviet Union and labor to overcome the Soviet sociostructural mentality. Many still expect the state to provide for the people, giving them a stable job that can last their entire lives. They see the labor collective as a referent group, a group of support and a guaranty of stability where people have worked for decades. Dissatisfaction with the government is represented by the idea that “government is not thinking about me; I am not wanted by the country.” This uncertainty and increasing mobility leads to insecurity, depression, a loss of one’s bearings, and a low level of adaptation. Many people are nostalgic for Soviet times, seeking to continue the previously effective (or at least idolized) practices of societal creation, sustained by the Soviet type of enthusiasm of the people, and receipt of support from the state. They connected their life with the USSR infrastructures and still identify themselves with the Soviet Union.

Political thinking continues to be based on a past culture, one that supports paternalism, infamy, and a craving for a strong leader with a “magic formula” for success. There is an expectation that somebody should come and change the situation, a general hope for a “new land, new sky,” an expression of infantile optimism that resolution will come by itself. As part of a search for an enemy to blame, a negative perception of democracy and the West is prevalent in the popular consciousness. Ukrainians still live predominantly by Soviet—not European—habits, a small percent travel abroad, so few can compare lifestyles, introduce alternative experiences, and counter negative stereotypes. The rest of the population lives in the old world of the traditions of the former USSR.

The political sphere is neither developed nor representative. There are right-centrist parties; Tymohenko and Yushchenko represent liberal-national parties, but they reflect nineteenth-century romantic German nationalism. The extreme right is represented by Svododa, a party that lost part of its support after the events of May 9, 2011. There are no parties on the left, having been completely destroyed as part of the transition from Communism. At times it seems to lean to the right but remains predominantly ideologically neutral. The Verhovna Rada (Ukrainian parliament) does not act as democratic institution, as it is functioning completely independently from public opinion and falls short of European criteria for parliament.

Even if Ukrainians expect the state to provide for them, they do not trust it and due to high levels of corruption have a low confidence in the president and Verhovna Rada. The majority of the population is served by political populists, such as Yulia Tymoshenko and Victor Yanukovych, who promise a system of welfare but not conditions for personal development. This populism is an impediment to the creation of a shared society: there are no di-

alogues within civic society, no interest within civic society, and a need for an agency.

The level of the development of civil society is very low, as reflected by a near absence of civil society organizations, limited opportunities for civic responsibility and participation, and few demands from the society; even freedom of the press is being affected. Further efforts to increase civil society options are stymied by vertical systems of social connections, including Soviet-style government and party systems.

Thus, the country is very far from a political democracy; Ukraine's democracy is weak, not consolidated, there are steps backward, and in many spheres democracy has become tokenism. Ukraine is steadily moving toward an authoritarian state but still preserves some liberal policies toward the mass media. The majority of people do not consider democracy an important value or an aim of the society. Rather, the value of wealth and stability prevails. Ironically, many people think that democracy brings oligarchs and economic problems; achievement of personal wealth has become a common idea that unites people.

It is impossible to destroy the Soviet system: it grows up like a weed. Because of the difficult economic situation, Ukrainian society is concentrated on survival, not social creation. This situation is used by former Communists and komsomol leaders, bandits, and pilferers who have taken over power. Both Yushenko and Yanukovych are servants of these elites. The government itself is an absolute version of the Soviet government: no breadth of views and erudition, and a Soviet style of relations to the populace, which ignore the needs of the society. As one respondent notes, "Ukraine is a typical post-Communist state. A local bourgeoisie is not formed, it could not define national interests, there are increasing capital outflows, brainwashing, and an absence of investments." A local bourgeoisie class that could define a national identity is obstructed from defining national interests and investing in the development of the country.

Therefore, this model narrative describes Ukraine as captured in the unfinished process of transformation without a clear vision as to where it should be heading. This undulating process has been pulling Ukraine from crisis to crisis, albeit with some inspiring periods, like the Orange Revolution. The Communist past deeply impacts the current reality; the people still have a Soviet mentality, view the government as a paternalistic provider, and are waiting for a strong personality that will magically create change. The government itself still reflects Soviet styles of governing, inhibiting a democratic parliament by underdeveloping the party system and not addressing the needs of society. The level of civil society is low; democracy is weak and not consolidated. Thus, this model narrative notes that Communism is very difficult to overcome and that the current government makes little if any effort to change the situation.

International Experts

Four respondents employed this narrative as their conceptual model of current Ukrainian society; in addition, six respondents mentioned it among other problems. In total, 100 percent of respondents discussed this problem.

This narrative describes Ukraine as a society in slow transition, absent of any real change in the ways of thinking, acting, and working. Ukraine lives in the cocoon of a Soviet system similar to that of the 1950s to 1960s, complete with a Soviet government. There is no concept of actual governance nor accountability to the people nor emphasis on society in any way. Maintaining absolute control and power replaces duties to civic service. Instead of changing inherited Soviet structures, the state merely renamed some of them. The government manipulates people's consciousness, proposing low-quality food, soap operas, Soviet movies, and low-quality news. Ukraine has lost from a psychological point of view: it fought for independence to get its own place in the world but did not escape from the mentality of the Soviet era, retaining paternalism, an absence of agency, and a strong nostalgia for Soviet times.

Ukrainian society can be described as a façade democracy and virtual reality: there are state courts and a parliament, but in reality they are just imitations of democratic processes. Decisions are made informally, with policies changing from president to president. People accept this virtual reality as true, believing that just one more step would change life for the better. This virtual world created for the West and the Ukrainian people does not intersect with the real world where corruption is a way of life. This dual system provides people in power an opportunity to manage the country and accumulate capital. Hence they strive to preserve it. They do not face real resistance from society, as any who might oppose them have no power and cannot easily unite. The social engineering that facilitates this system is bringing the country to its destruction.

Thus, Ukrainian democracy is semi-democracy, an authoritarian system with an undefined political regime, low economic development, and a divided society creating a "meaningless trample at the deadlock." There is no direct link between the Verhovna Rada and its constituency; members of Rada do not visit their constituency or even go to the Rada; they do not know what European values are or how democracy works. There is neither rule of law nor a concept of national security nor even national defense. Ukraine suffers only the negatives of centralization, never reaping the benefits usually associated with it. The European Union opened a window of opportunity for Ukraine in 2004, but the political elite missed it, since it was so corrupt and immature, embedded within post-Soviet mentality, had no plans or strategy, and seriously lacked an understanding of democracy and the nature of a sovereign state. It was believed that a market economy would result in wealth

and democracy for all, but this is not, as it turns out, the way democracy evolves. The culture of democracy is embryonic, with democracy as a subject taught only for twelve hours at the university level within a general philosophy course and for three hours at a school level.

The Orange Revolution “replaced a bad tsar with another tsar,” failing to build a civil society with civic responsibilities and citizen agency. Ukrainian society is not united, not organized, has no identity of “us,” no civic accountability, nor even any real interest in such matters. The Soviet legacy of vertical relations impacts all spheres of society: corruption, fear, retribution, an absence of investment in culture and science, and a prevalence of a populist culture. There is a consensus to be part of Europe, but no one is working to change anything. They are waiting for something, believing and even demanding that Europe do more for Ukraine. People feel more anxiety in life, uncertainty, and pessimism, with unfulfilled hopes. The general philosophy among people is “family first, me second, the hell with the rest.” There is no respect for others; a “me first” scenario prevails. Once children, a primary concern, are looked after, a state can do whatever it wants. People proceed to blame the government, but, lacking civic responsibilities to hold the government accountable, they simply augment the problem. They too are only inspired to increase their personal wealth and are waiting for a strong political leader to resolve their problems.

Thus, this narrative describes Ukraine as a country with the mentality of the Soviet era and a Soviet type of government. The democratic institutions are just a façade, completely disconnected from reality, where corruption permeates all spheres. This duality is preserved by the government and the oligarchs. There is a semi-democracy without rule of law, accountability of government and parliament, or a culture of democracy. Civil society is in an embryonic stage with scarce civic responsibilities. It is poor in community agency and is itself subjected to paternalistic attitudes toward the Ukrainian government and the European Union.

Therefore, the second narrative model, a country in an unfinished transition, was used by 79 percent of Ukrainian experts and 100 percent of foreign experts. Both groups of experts have a similar assessment of Ukraine as a country caught in an incomplete process of transformation, without a clear conception of outcomes, with an entrenched mentality of the Soviet era and Soviet styles of government, and with Soviet-based paternalistic attitudes and an absence of civil society. Ukrainian experts put greater emphasis on a general absence of democracy, while foreign experts concentrate on the specific features that make Ukrainian democracy a façade. Namely, Ukraine has a semi-democracy, including a weak culture of democracy, a poor understanding of democratic processes, and inadequate levels of civic responsibility.

Degradation of the Society

Ukrainian Experts

Three respondents presented this narrative as a central theme for their model of Ukrainian society today; in addition, thirty-four respondents mentioned it among other problems. Thus, 77 percent of all respondents mentioned this problem.

The main premise of this narrative is the continuous degradation of Ukrainian society, its economy, and the state. There are several areas where decline is most present:

1. Economic decline (72 percent of respondents)

Ukraine celebrated its twentieth anniversary of independence with a destroyed infrastructure and economy. According to different data sets used by respondents, the current GDP of Ukraine is only 63 to 75 percent of its 1991 level. During twenty years of independence there has been no significant economic development: 15 percent of the economic structure of Ukraine was developed before 1917, 5 to 7 percent during the 1920s–1940s and 80 percent during 1956–1989, and after 1991 there was almost no economic development or reconstruction. Thus, Ukraine is “eating up” old infrastructures and economics and losing its industrial potential. At the source is the loss of the USSR military-industrial establishment, whose intellectual and industrial-technological resources were centered in Ukraine. Now these are completely destroyed.

There is capital outflow, inflation, an absence of investments, a deficiency of fundamental science and technology, and emigration among the educated cadre. It is important to invest in research and development, yet there is no interest among oligarchs to invest into new technologies. Thus, instead of progress, Ukraine faces an involution: a reduction of production and productivity of labor.

Ukraine’s economy is completely dependent on Russia’s economy and energy resources. The USSR’s economic infrastructure has left the two countries’ economies intertwined. Around 1.5 thousand Ukrainian enterprises and military-industrial establishments are connected with Russia’s industrial cycles, making an autonomous Ukrainian economy almost impossible to establish.

2. Corruption (72 percent of respondents)

Corruption has penetrated every sphere of life and every level of society, starting from the top, becoming a generalized moral phenomenon and integrated style of thinking. Corruption on the government level created a self-sufficient state of bureaucracy, commercialization of the state services and

political activity, and control over money flows disregarding responsible uses of proper power. Ordinary citizens are also becoming corrupted, supporting the circle of corruption, resulting in a lack of trust society-wide.

3. A Failing State (68 percent of respondents)

Ukraine is a weak and ineffective state without the foundational principles of an effective administration and a national vision. Problems with an imbalanced apparatus of power, a deficiency of interconnections between the vertical silos of power, and the destruction of executive power by the mass dismissals from executive offices carried out by presidents Yushchenko and Yanukovich contribute to the issue. The relations between the state and society are absent; citizens do not have any ownership of the state, voting for politicians they do not trust. The elite is not well educated and is not concerned about the prosperity of the society.

Ukraine does not have any leverage in international relations, nor does it attempt to position itself in international relations. It was a mistake to give up the atomic resources it once had and along with it the inherent respect of other countries, counterbalancing Russia and Europe.

4. Decreased Level of Education and Culture (65 percent of respondents)

The level of education is seen to be decreasing. There is a drastic decline in the quality of education, the system of education is considered ineffective, there are high rates of absenteeism of teachers in rural areas, and there is a scarcity of school equipment and laboratory instruments. There is no demand for knowledge, good education, or technologies, as the natural inclinations toward these aspirations are suppressed by the government and mass media. Moral cynicism dominates among the population.

Corruption prevails at all levels of education; knowledge is less important than the ability to pay. Not a meritocracy, the state does little to prepare the best representatives of the next generation to manage the country or become good specialists. Most of the public schools are housed in old premises, with the best buildings reserved for privatized schools and kindergartens.

5. Loss of Human Potential (55 percent of respondents)

Ukraine has lost seven million people during its twenty years of independence. Among the reasons are job migration to foreign countries and increased mortality rates among the population due to high levels of inflation and forced privatization of the economy, resulting in increase rates of death due to poverty related factors. Ongoing impacts of Ukraine's twentieth-century history are still felt—civil war, famine, repressions, and oppression of the intelligentsia, and World War II. Thus Ukraine has lost a huge portion of its population and still pays the bills for its former wars.

6. Degradation of Agriculture (30 percent of respondents)

There has been a destruction of agricultural cycles, neglected buildings, absence of machinery, hostile methods of privatization, and misappropriation of lands. The rural population is declining, and people are migrating to the cities.

Thus, this narrative describes Ukraine through a list of major problems representing the degradation of the society: economic decline, corruption, a failing state, the degradation of education and culture, the loss of human potential, and the decline of agriculture.

Divided Society

Ukrainian Experts

Five respondents employed this narrative as their conceptual model of current Ukrainian society; in addition, eighteen respondents mentioned it among other problems. A total of 47 percent of respondents described this problem. While all these experts similarly acknowledge this problem, their narrative descriptions of the nature and sources of the divide differ significantly. Thus, the description of the narrative model will be followed by five submodels that represent alternative interpretations of the schism. These various explanations of this rift by experts not only reflect the divide but also confirm its existence.

The country is divided completely by differences in moral values, ethnic identity, and class. Cultural differences are antagonistic and regionally fixed and rest on the historic character of the regions. These regions had been parts of different states for centuries, developed within fundamentally different state structures and empires, and thus have different histories and experiences. In recent history, Western Ukraine was occupied in 1936 and did not receive anything positive from the Soviet Union; the rest of the Ukrainian population saw both positive and negative sides of the Soviet regime. It resulted in significant differences in geopolitical vectors of development and assessments of history. Despite the common perception that Ukraine is moving toward Europe, the society has multiple trajectories. These differences are strengthened by the disagreements between Europe and Russia around the issue of Ukraine.

The elites in the society do not provide compromises, decisions, or common visions. Instead, the ruling class supports differences and uses ethnic identity to cover class divides and redirect attention from economic issues. The latent Soviet mentality of the people based on black-and-white thinking and a search for an enemy is easily manipulated by those who exploit differences for their political purposes. Different views and beliefs are presented as enmity, threat, and exploitation. The mass media contributes to the problem, using scandals, playing up conflicts, and ignores opportunities for compro-

mise. Differences between regions impede the development of a common national identity but also inhibit the development of a totalitarian society and empire.

There are several models of the divide.

Model 1: The Divide between Nationalists and the Ukrainian Population (pro-Soviet narrative)

The current territory of Ukraine was established in 1945, and so different parts of Ukraine had diverse levels of economic development. Ukraine was completely destroyed after the Great Patriotic War of 1941–1945 but was completely rebuilt, with a national economy reconstructed incorporating the new western regions that previously were colonies of the West, bringing them up to a similar development level with the rest of Ukraine. But this was not enough time to deal with differences. Thus regions still have different perspectives and views of the past and future. For example, the leadership of the west was trying to cancel Victory Day celebrations based on their deep belief that “everything in the past was bad.” Almost half of the public sees strong differences between west and east Ukraine. The population of Galicia is very conservative, rural, and patriarchal; despite calling themselves European, they find the Western European culture alien to them. They are ready to sacrifice the unity of Ukraine to return the territory of Donbas to Russia and rejoin Poland. Others feel that the people of Ukraine paid too much to unite all Ukrainian lands and that real patriots should preserve the country and seek to educate people about the unity of Ukraine and their responsibility to maintain it as a state.

Model 2: The Divide between Ukrainian and Russian Identities (pro-Russian narrative)

The problem of the divide between east and west came out of the Orange Revolution and will remain an issue for decades to come. People of Russian background living in Ukraine want to be considered an equal ethnic group with Ukrainians and do not see themselves as a minority. Further, they oppose imposition of other Ukrainian values and identities on their group. Similarly, Ukrainian nationalists describe themselves as the constantly traumatized, victimized, and colonized subjects of Russia. This divide is symbolically represented in two different names for the monument called the Arch of Friendship, which was built in Kiev during the Soviet time: Russian people still call it an “arch,” while Ukrainian people call it a “yoke.” This divide significantly increased during the period of 2004–2007 because of the intolerance of Ukrainian nationalists who utilize ethnicity-based narratives in every issue. Yushchenko exacerbated the situation by imposing his anti-Russian nationalistic ideas on everyone (raping of society), denying Russian ethnic legitimacy by burying it under a one-rule system, and supporting

western Ukraine control in all societal matters. Currently, Yanukovich supports pluralism of opinions and the de-ideologization of the society. The government, including the minister of education, Dmitry Tabachnyk, consults with all people, but the population of western Ukraine still criticizes them for their lack of support of Ukrainian ideals.

Model 3: The Divide between Ukrainian and Russian Identities (pro-Ukrainian narrative)

The majority of the population is Ukrainian, but there are two Ukraines. The first, the northern region, represents authentic Ukraine, the Rus, people who lived on their own land under different regimes but preserved their Ukrainian language and culture. As the area has been conquered and reconquered, these groups regard all ruling powers as foreign to them, and the people developed a tradition of mistrust toward governments. Historically under attack, their ethnic identity has become more salient, especially during the fight with Poland for Ukrainian independence. Western Ukraine was never a part of the Russian Empire and is generally more democratic than most fragments of the former USSR. For Galicia, the heart of western Ukraine, the inclusion into the USSR provoked very painful reactions. The second Ukraine, the southern region, is a territory colonized by Russia: the plains were colonized during the Romanov dynasty and the southeast during the Soviet era. Three hundred years ago there were just wild plains and wild nomads. People on these new lands incorporated a Russian identity under Soviet rule, a different mentality that is hard to change. These sentiments are supported by the ongoing imperial ambitions of Russia: Ukraine for Russia is the heart of Russia; it is very hard for them to separate these two countries. Soviet and Russian propaganda coming from Moscow is very effective, with Russia spending billions on subversive actions, creating imbalance in Ukraine.

Model 4: The Divide between Western and Soviet Orientations

The Ukrainian territory was developed through a “Lego-connection” of two sociocultural communities: (1) precolonial segment: on the old territory that has a history of Magdeburg law, European renaissance, traditional culture, deep historic heritage, national consciousness, and a deep memory about Ukrainian traditions. This group supports Ukrainian independence, democracy, and the revival of the Ukrainian language; it desires an increase of its status, and wants to move forward toward Europe. (2) Postcolonial segment: pro-Russian and Soviet territories that were industrialized based on immigration; their history is not as deep. Donbas was established in the nineteenth century and many parts of it as late as the 1930s. These people have lost their Russian culture and cut their cultural roots when they moved to Ukraine, so they are not a Russian community of immigrants that is pre-

-serving its culture. These two regions have very different histories since the 1920s: Sovietization in the eastern Ukraine versus a Ukrainian national movement in the western Ukraine. There was a tolerant coexistence between these two regions during the USSR, but it could not be acknowledged as a golden era: all ethnic identities were suppressed by the common Soviet identity. The fall of the Soviet Union resulted in the growth of regional patriotism and an increase of ethno-cultural movements.

Model 5: Intermixed Geographic: Three to Four Parts of Ukraine and Mixed Population

There are three (or four) major regions of Ukraine: western Ukraine, 15 percent; north-center (historic Ukraine, axis Kharkiv-Odesa), 33 percent; southeast, 28 percent (and Donbas and Crimea, 20 percent). These four zones differ by culture and language, with each behaving almost as a separate country. Active national fundamentalists live along the edges of the Ukraine. In the west, national-democratic fundamentalists support populist leaders who promote an ethno-cultural identity. To the east, pro-Russian Stalinists speak out with anti-Ukrainian sentiments. These stridently different regions, divided by culture and mentality, are kept apart by the “swamp” in the middle of Ukraine, limiting direct contact of oppositional territories. In one part of this swamp are clientalists, those who support a Soviet style of society represented by an economic executive leader and a class of workers. Their identity is essentially Soviet, speaking Russian and following Soviet values promoted by the USSR, including the development of an ideal enemy. There are different proportions of Russians and Ukrainians in the various regions, so it is hard to draw the line by Dnepr there are numerous transitional or mixed cultural enclaves, represented by three groups: Russians, Ukrainian-speaking Ukrainians, and Russian-speaking Ukrainians. Many mixed marriages and an interesting mix of Russian language and Ukrainian culture are developing.

Thus, this narrative model describes Ukraine as a divided society, with differences deeply rooted in history, culture, mentality, and inspirations for the future. Political entrepreneurs are actively using these ethno-cultural divides to take attention from economic problems and class divisions. The influence of Russia sharpens the conflict. There are five general explanations for the nature of the schism: a pro-Soviet narrative of the divide between Ukrainian nationalists and the rest of the population, pro-Russian and pro-Ukrainian narratives of ethnic divide, a narrative of divide between pro-Western and Soviet orientations, and, finally, a narrative of multiple identities within Ukraine.

Foreign Experts

Five respondents mentioned it among other problems. A total of 50 percent of respondents discussed this problem.

This narrative describes Ukraine as a big country with regions that differ in culture and history. People have lived together for only sixty years—a very short time to create commonality. People are divided into pro-Russian or pro-Western groups, with each group having a conflictual consciousness of black and white. People in eastern Ukraine believe that they provide for this country and want to let the west go. Similarly, in western Ukraine they want to let Donbas unite with Russia. In Galicia, Svoboda defines policy, in eastern Ukraine Russian TV does the same. The Orange Revolution failed to bring a real leader that could unite the country. Now there is no common idea for Ukraine, and people are mentally divided. They turn to Nazism, extreme “Ukraine for Ukrainians,” or pro-Soviet sentiments. Politicians in power represent eastern groups—Russian nationalists who define their identity by language and history. Thus, this narrative describes Ukraine as divided culturally and mentally into pro-Russian and pro-Western groups. The Orange Revolution was unsuccessful in uniting the country, and the new government is pro-Russian.

The third narrative, Ukraine as a divided society, was used by 47 percent of Ukrainian respondents and 50 percent of foreign respondents. Both groups described Ukraine as a divided society, with its deeply rooted differences manipulated by political entrepreneurs. But while Ukrainian experts proposed five models of explanation reflecting the divide in the society, foreign experts concentrated solely on the Russian and Ukrainian ethnic divide narrative.

Ukraine as a Colony

Ukrainian Experts

Five respondents employed this narrative as their conceptual model of current Ukrainian society; in addition, fifteen respondents mentioned it among other problems. A total of 42 percent of respondents discussed this issue.

This model reflects the idea that the current Ukraine is a colony for oligarchs who accumulate their capital through the use of internal resources. As one respondent states, “Ukraine is a colony of people who finished initial capital accumulation, connect themselves with the West, leave Ukraine, and continue to exploit Ukraine.” There is increasing concentration of capital in the hands of oligarchs, whose financial interests are realized through political, legislative, and financial systems: in May 2011 the government acquitted oligarchs of their tax debt; the taxes on added value taken from all businesses is returned to only to a few oligarchs. The government and oligarchs assume

the right to define national interests and see the economy of the country through their own interests. The system of internal competition and control of the government has been destroyed: previous inter-control between the Communist Party, komsomol, trade unions, economic administration, and government administration has been terminated, and all the parties depend on the sources of big capital from the oligarchs.

Many oligarchs are considered to not be Ukrainian. Having bought citizenships in Western countries, they send their children to Western universities, leaving Ukraine when they can, and continuing to exploit Ukraine as a colony. They see Ukraine only as a territory for the concentration of their gains, as a temporary object for getting money, and do not have respect and pride for the country. Both oligarchs and the government are indifferent to the destiny of Ukraine: they do not develop new markets, technology, or science. There are no capital investments in the economy and no systemic approaches to development, especially in agriculture. They are oriented toward short-term gains or supra-gains in select areas (chocolate, vodka). They are not interested in the future of Ukraine, are not connected with the intellectual elite, and are not concerned about the development of a common national idea.

The social stratification is enormous: there is a chasm between the wealthy and the poor. According to different data sets, the ratio is between 1:47 and 1:50. Citizens are treated as slaves and as a source of wealth for elites. The state does not support the rights of the people and hardly provides opportunities to the population to support themselves through small businesses. As one respondent notes, the state uses people, makes a profit off of people's work, and does not provide opportunities to its citizens. People work for a bureaucratic system but do not see the state as their own state; they vote but do not trust. "Oligarchs are not interested in supporting the older generation or increasing the quality of life of the general population. Social spheres, including social support and security, are neglected. For colonial powers, the most important aim of population management is the increase of the population." Thus the government invests in increasing birth rates and supports immigration of cheap workers from the Caucasus and Central Asia while doing little for their general welfare when they arrive.

Thus, Ukraine is building capitalism as it was described by Karl Marx: the upper bourgeoisie in power, no middle class, and workers without rights. As one respondent states, "we are building capitalism by Marx: in Kiev we have an upper bourgeoisie that does not have a national idea and impedes the development of the middle class and has inclusive rights on workers. The middle class had a hope for power in 2004, but the elite did not give them a chance." While developed countries are building information-based and civil societies with responsible governments, Ukraine has created a system of wild capitalism from the nineteenth century exactly as it was depicted in the

textbooks of Marxism-Leninism. It is paternalistic and a patriarchal society of workers and employers (not a civic society), where power is not controlled by the society but power and capital are merged and legal and legislative powers are limited. The new Ukrainian class structure and distribution of property sustains a new class of employers, suppresses small and medium business, and curtails workers rights. Accordingly, an upper bourgeoisie dominates in Kiev. They do not have a national idea; they obstruct development of the middle class and have exclusive rights on workers. The middle class was hoping to obtain power in 2004, but the elite did not give them a chance, using the exact forcible means described by Marx.

Thus, this narrative describes Ukraine as a colony for oligarchs who accumulate their capital through the use of internal resources. This concentration of capital is supported through the structural changes in political, legislative, and financial systems. Oligarchs do not care about Ukraine, do not invest in its future or development, and are interested only in temporary capital gains. The gap between wealthy and poor is growing, people are treated as slaves, and systems of social support and security have been abandoned. Ukraine is building a model of wild capitalism guided by the images in Marx's books with omnipotent oligarchs, an absent middle classes, and powerless workers.

Foreign Experts

Two respondents employed this narrative as their conceptual model of current Ukrainian society; in addition, six respondents mentioned it among other problems. In total, 80 percent of respondents discussed this issue.

Ukraine is attempting to build a capitalist state based on Marxists theories. It is inadvertently recreating the feared bourgeoisie class system, complete with its cruel system of brutal exploitation of workers who are not united into civic society. There is no understanding of modern capitalism as a system for the people by the people. Oligarchs have all the power and seek to increase their control over society by promoting a culture of pure accumulation of wealth. They regularly abuse power in order to acquire money at all cost through economic and political engineering, misappropriations, and illegal actions. Politicians are also involved in this process; as one respondent noted, they "do not break the law, they use the law." The new tax-codes policies lead to the elimination of potential competition from small businesses, new rules are created against individuals engaging in business, and transparency of government policies and practices is denied. The government sees people as slaves or instruments for the attainment of wealth. Poverty levels are very high, and with the socioeconomic gap growing people are emigrating in such numbers that it is decreasing the overall population. People are suffering from tuberculosis, drug abuse, and hard drinking, even

children. Ukraine has the social structure of a developing country with an educated public similar to that of a modern state.

Thus, this narrative describes Ukraine as a colony of oligarchs who have built the brutal capitalist system described by Marxists textbooks, abusing power to concentrate money into their own hands. People are treated as slaves and are becoming increasingly impoverished.

The fourth narrative, Ukraine as a colony, was used by 42 percent of Ukrainian experts and 80 percent of foreign experts. Both groups emphasized that Ukraine is building a callous capitalistic system similar to that of the nineteenth century as described in Marxists textbooks. But while Ukrainian experts are concentrated on structural factors and descriptions of oligarchs, foreign experts accentuate the differences between Ukrainian society and modern Western society.

Frontier State

Ukrainian Experts

Three respondents employed this narrative as their conceptual model of current Ukrainian society. In addition, four respondents mentioned it among other problems. In total, 15 percent of respondents discussed this issue.

This narrative describes Ukraine as a frontier state between the West and Eurasia. The description of this duality varies: a developed world versus a resource appendage (i.e., for Russia), people potential versus consumption, and, finally, a Western world versus a Muslim world and Russia. But the main idea unites all respondents: Ukraine was, and continues to be, dependent on its neighbors and has fallen victim to all conflicts within and between empires it belonged to: the Soviet experiment, World War II, and the Cold War. As one respondent states, "Ukraine always was at the crossroads [*raz-dorozhie*] of different civilizations, and thus independence is perceived as an external instead of internal process. It was always an object of expansions, influences, and divergent interests and now cannot find common interests or orientations." As a frontier society, Ukraine lies at the crossroads of different orientations, always a desired object of expansions, influences, and interests. Ukraine has always fought with oppressors for their own interest, searched for independence from different external groups, and learned how to adopt and play games with powerful empires. The inertia of dependency impacts all spheres of life, where independence is only a façade, not a reality. This historic experience defines the current situation: the internal war between oligarchs connected with the government and the rest of the society. Only 5 percent of the population is represented in parliament. Another problem that derives from the history of Ukraine's having been a frontier state is its inability to move forward without assistance, independently of neighboring

countries. As one respondent notes, “Ukraine is a frontier state between the developed world and Russia as its resource appendage, between people potential and consumption. That is why Ukraine is fluctuating between Russia and the West.” Thus, this narrative posits that the long experience of being a frontier state impacts Ukrainian ability to deal with internal problems and move forward.

Foreign Experts

Only one foreign expert mentioned this as a problem, noting that Ukraine tried to play the role of buffer between Russia and the West and lost in this game. Three foreign experts stated that it is a mistake to describe the geopolitical position of Ukraine as very important and central to Europe. Ukraine is not in the center of Europe; it is on the border of it.

The fifth narrative, Ukraine as a frontier state, is used by 15 percent of Ukrainian experts and 10 percent of foreign experts. The interpretations of the position of Ukraine as a frontier state differed between Ukrainian and foreign experts. While Ukrainian experts discussed influences of the long history of dependency on its neighbors on all spheres of Ukrainian life, including an absence of trust in government and low resistance to external influences, foreign experts thought that Ukraine overemphasizes its position as a center of Europe, and tries to be a player, not realizing it has already lost the game.

Postgenocidal and Postcolonial Country

Two Ukrainian respondents presented this narrative as their conceptual model of current Ukrainian society; in addition, two respondents mentioned it among other problems. A total of 8 percent of respondents discussed this issue.

This narrative describes Ukraine as a postgenocide and postcolonial country with a perverted mentality, an absence of human values, and a persistent dominance of Soviet values. As one respondent states,

We live in a postgenocide country where the size of the population significantly decreased after several genocides committed by Nazi and Soviets. Communism as a system defines the consciousness; people without property depend on others and the state. Property is a “cocoon” that defends personal position: without property a person becomes a slave. Stalin had led genocide to remove people’s property. This dependence still exists among the population: they have a Soviet mentality of dominance of state over society. We live in a society of a slave-owning system. The development of civic society is not possible because all systems of social connections are vertical (Soviets, party, etc.). Horizontal (religion, civic society) social connections have yet to be developed.

As in all postcolonial societies, Ukraine is divided by different identities; language and history are deemed to be the greatest sources of conflict in the society.

Achievements

Ukrainian experts mentioned the following achievements of Ukraine: Ukraine preserved its independence (29 percent), had a peaceful character of transition with an absence of aggressive confrontations and conflict, supports tolerance (21 percent), has a free political culture, is absent of authoritarian regime traits (12 percent), and provides increased prospects and opportunities to travel abroad (6 percent).

The foreign experts among achievements stated the following: Ukraine is a free and pluralistic society (20 percent), has more diversity in the economy, had changes in economic and social services (20 percent), was an independent state with some potential (20 percent), and is experiencing peaceful development (10 percent).

Therefore, the Ukrainian and foreign respondents are similar in defining the major conceptual models of Ukraine, but their interpretative narratives differ significantly. The analysis of narratives identifies major factors that have led to the current situation in Ukraine. One of the major sources of the current Ukrainian situation is that its independence was a result of the fall of the Soviet Union, not a mass-conscious movement for independence. People who had fought for Ukrainian independence for centuries were inspired by the idea of sovereignty but did not have a comprehensive concept of Ukraine. Thus, in 1991 there was no common notion about a Ukrainian nation or nation-state. The Communist government either did not understand the need for a new concept or were afraid of radical changes. Preserving their power, they did not initiate any serious public discussions and did not make serious efforts to define Ukrainian nationalism and forge a common identity. Thus, a Soviet ideology continued to penetrate the society based on (a) deprivation of property rights that has led to a paternalistic dependence of the people on the state and a prevalence of the state oppressing the society and (b) an absence of governmental accountability, civic responsibility, and collaboration between the government and the public.

It was believed that the creation of a market economy would result in wealth for all, and, thus, a democracy, but instead it created the perception of Ukraine as a trophy territory that could be stolen and squandered through a concentration on economic wellbeing as a common national idea. There was no understanding of the need to change and alter the Soviet consciousness that was inhibiting a culture of democracy from being developed. The Orange Revolution failed to build a civil society with civic responsibility and community agency; instead it deceived the public with false interpretations

of democracy, including the power of the majority without rights for minorities. The formation of a common national identity has also been impeded by the diverse cultural and historic characters of the regions that have obstructed critical rethinking and assessment of the Soviet heritage, as well as by ongoing influences from neighboring Russia. This ethno-cultural divide, sharpened by zero-sum thinking, has been actively used by political leaders to draw attention away from economic problems.

As a result, on its twentieth anniversary of independence, Ukraine was still a country in transition, deeply rooted in its Soviet past and deficient of a national idea, a common national identity, and any objectives for development. Different groups in society have constructed competing national narratives that produce the meaning of national identity and legitimize the power of specific groups within the society. The following chapters offer an analysis of the structure and functions of the five major narratives among Ukrainian intellectual elite and two major narratives among foreign experts. These narratives differ in their visions of Ukrainian society, interpretations of inter-ethnic relations and relations with foreign countries, attitudes toward the past, and forecast for the future. Nevertheless, their analysis reveals similar structure and functions to those described in the chapter 1. The final chapter discusses the specific dualities, binary constructs, types of mythic narratives, justification mechanisms, and approaches to legitimacy found in national narratives in Ukraine.

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Chapter Three

National Narratives of Ukrainian Elite

This chapter analyzes and maps the coherent narratives about national identity that exist among the intellectual and political elite of Ukraine. Despite widespread belief that numerous concepts of Ukrainian national identity exist and differ from person to person, I posit that there is a limited number of articulate, persuasive national narratives shared consciously or unconsciously by Ukrainian citizens. This analysis purposely avoids any judgment or assessment of the merits of existing narratives; it describes them as competing but equally valid ideologies, justified and legitimated by the people of Ukraine.

This chapter is based on forty-eight semi-structural interviews with intellectual and political elites of Ukraine. Each interview consisted of six questions about national identity and lasted for about two to three hours. To complete the analysis all answers were organized into fourteen categories; a 48 x 14 table was created to represent all answers that corresponded to the categories of analysis. Analysis of recorded narratives about Ukraine's national concept and common national idea revealed seven categories with major subthemes. They are as follows: (1) a source of national pride; (2) dynamics of identity during the two most recent presidencies (Vladimir Yushchenko and Victor Yanukovych); (3) concepts of national identity; (4) common unifying factors; (5) the roots of division; (6) the role of language; (6) the politics of history; (7) reactions to changes to textbooks by Dmytro Tabachnyk, the minister of education in Yanukovych's government. Respondents' narratives varied by the level of the development of each category; some categories were not always addressed by each respondent.

At the second stage, all narratives were clustered in groups based on their similarities and consistency within each of the categories of analysis. The analysis revealed five narratives: (1) dual identity; (2) pro-Soviet attitudes;

(3) the fight for Ukrainian identity; (4) recognition of Ukrainian identity; and (5) multicultural-civic identity. Each narrative was analyzed by identifying the core of the narrative (represented by 90 to 100 percent of respondents) for each of the five types. Individual differences within each type were not considered for this analysis.

The following narratives are based on the words of respondents and reflect only views and opinions of respondents from a particular group. I do not include any personal opinions, judgments, or comments in these narratives, preserving their authenticity. All statements in the narratives belong only to respondents from the respective group.

The analysis of narratives was based on the structural-functional model of national narrative described in chapter 1. It rests on three main structural components, dualistic order, mythic narrative, and normative order, and on two main functions, creation and redefinition of the meaning of national identity and support and legitimization of power.

Dualistic order entails binary opposition representing the most important axiological antagonism perceived in the nation. *Social group (ethnic, religious, class, political party) duality* represents a nation as an arena of zero-sum fights between two ethnic, political, racial, or religious groups. *binational duality* emphasizes conflict between two countries (and the political and ideological systems they represent) as a major problem for a nation. *Temporal duality* emphasizes the gap between a positive moral past and a negative corrupt present of a nation. *Ideological duality* describes nation as an arena of zero-sum fights between two ideologies/mentalities.

Categorical constructs describe axiological opposites of dualistic order, defining the most important criteria for the assessment of the nation and establishing the meaning of these opposites. Social order values arrive from social concepts that define a type of society, concepts of national identity (ethnic, multicultural, civic), and relations within a nation and between different nations. Ideology values reflect social concepts that define a specific ideology: democracy, socialism, totalitarianism, liberalism, etc. Development values reflect social concepts of economic, social, and cultural development as well as such concepts as progress, conservatism, traditional society, etc. Spirituality and culture values arrive from social concepts of spirituality, authenticity, renaissance, decline, and simplicity. Social relation values reflect social concepts of conflict, victimization, oppression, dialogue, cooperation, mutual respect, etc.

A myth's *mechanisms of justification* help support specific ingroup claims or legitimize the existing social order. The first justification mechanism, *impediment by outgroup*, is a depiction of the fight between two groups in which the ingroup represents and supports positive values of the nation and the outgroup impedes ingroup activity. *Condemning imposition mechanism* rationalizes the claim that the ingroup represents the interests of all

groups in the nation while the outgroup is imposing its own narrow ideology and culture over all people in the nation and wrongly claims to symbolize the nation. *Mechanism of positive ingroup predispositions* describes the ingroup as more able, capable, and competent than the outgroup. *Validation of rights mechanism* describes the ingroup as having more rights (based on advanced authentic culture, historic development on native land, birthright, and international acknowledgment) to develop the nation according to their vision. *Enlightening mechanism* emphasizes the claim of the ingroup to identify the visions and aims shared by all people and to enlighten them in their movement to these goals.

A myth's *mechanisms of interpretation* provide competing explanations of social phenomena. The first one provides antipodal interpretation of the same subject, while the second uses the same positive value that is used in outgroup's self-image but attributes it to the ingroup while denying it for the outgroup.

Normative order consists of value judgments on how the nation should be organized and what structure/concept of power should prevail in the state. Normative order includes four approaches to ingroup legitimacy: (1) a right to power based on cultural values; (2) validation and consensus; (3) acceptance of the structure (system of power) as "right" by both advantaged and disadvantaged groups; and (4) legitimization of the ingroup and delegitimization of the outgroup.

The function of creation and redefinition of the meaning of national identity: through the *embedding of the concept of power into the meaning of national identity*, the specific meanings of power and power relations between ingroup and outgroups are incorporated as a core of a particular national identity. Function of support and legitimization of power: through *the shaping of concepts of power based on the meaning of identity* the meaning of national identity determines, shapes, and gives meaning to the legitimization of political power.

RESULTS

Dual Identity Narrative (28 percent of respondents)

Pride Subtheme

In the dual identity narrative, the major source of pride for Ukraine is the prominent spirituality of the people and their orientation toward higher values. As one respondent emphasizes, "At the center of Ukraine is a historic core of Rus identity, considered to be a sacred center of Eastern Slavic civilization; thus, Ukraine is the modern successor of the Rus. This orientation has colossal mental potential and deep emotional connections to sacral

symbols.” This narrative notes that it is important to preserve Russian culture in Ukraine because it embodies Ukrainian culture uniquely and is different from Russian culture in Russia (e.g., writers Nikolai Vasilievich Gogol and Mikhail Afanasyevich Bulgakov wrote in Russian, but their work had a distinctly Ukrainian cultural basis). These multicultural roots help Ukraine to resolve its conflicts without violence and prosper as a peaceful society. Respondents also believe that Ukraine can develop a democratic European identity different from the authoritarian Russian state; this democratic identity is tolerant, inclusive of different cultures and religions, and supportive of the dual identity of citizens educated in both (Russian and Ukrainian) cultures.

Identity Dynamics Subtheme

The first independent Ukrainian governments were perceived to be lacking in moral principles and values, aimed solely at personal profiteering and “easy money,” and served as the trendsetters of national identity. At this beginning, Ukrainian identity was formed in opposition to other identities and functioned through the imposition of a primitive Ukrainian idea and the suppression of cultural conflict. As one respondent states, “At the beginning of the 1990s all conflicts were suppressed, including liquidation of the Greco-Catholic Church, prohibition of discussions about collectivization, and the cult of Shevchenko. All these conflicts are in the open now but do not involve violence.” Following the term of President Leonid Kuchma, Ukraine slowly came apart as conflicts around values emerged and grew. This Ukraine existed in marginal circumstances, uncomfortably adrift between two key projects of the state: exiting the sphere of Russia on the one hand but failing to enter the space of Europe on the other.

The Orange Revolution represented an explosion of a new Ukrainian national identity with hegemonic ambitions. President Victor Yushchenko tried to destroy Ukraine’s old symbols and beliefs, but he failed to fulfill the expectations of the people, eventually leading Ukraine into a state of further degeneration. He utterly failed in his attempts to implement a systemic ethno-cultural agenda and build an ethnocentric concept of national identity. He supported nationalism and the dominance of one cultural group over others; he encouraged expunction of the Russian language and the development of strong social boundaries vis-à-vis Russia, portraying Russia as an enemy of Ukraine. As one respondent mentions, “One cannot impose his or her ideas on everyone. This is the raping of society.” Another respondent stresses, “Yushchenko has a set of simplistic beliefs; he has everything but lost everything. With his style ‘*Bat’ko* [dad] should decide everything,’ he has the highest anti-rating among all presidents.” Yushchenko’s approach to the use of history (i.e., Holodomor, victimization, Stepan Bandera) did not have majority support and led to an increase in national tensions. As another

respondent states, “With the law about Bandera he [Yushchenko] wanted to take revenge because of his feelings of hurt pride. His surrounding supported Holodomor just to gain promotion. He spent time in vain and led Ukraine to degradation.” The idea of revenge is explored by another respondent: “The Ukrainian ethnic group is poorer, less mobile, discriminated against, and needs compensation in the cultural sphere: this led to problems in definition of national identity and the imposition of a Ukrainian identity onto all the people.”

People subsequently supported Victor Yanukovich in opposition to Yushchenko’s overt and discriminatory form of Ukrainian nationalism. As one respondent states, “The new government aims to ‘clean the blockages’ of the past and show more common sense than Yushchenko.” Yanukovich’s government has avoided nation building; while there has been no aggressive imposition of cultural or ethnic identity as before, there is also no alternative agenda. President Yanukovich’s program echoes the previous president, Kuchma, concentrating on economics and the de-ideologization of society, thus avoiding or suppressing conflicts. As Yanukovich has pursued this generic platform, his party has become amorphous. As one respondent mentions, “Yanukovich’s policy has two directions: returning back to Kuchma and cleaning up after Yushchenko.”

Overall, the assessment of all presidents is critical. As one respondent concludes, “The governments were very primitive in their values and interests with the prevalence of personal profits and easy money and absence of moral principles and values. Thus, from 1991 the nation was built through the imposition of a primitive Ukrainian idea with the rejection and contradiction of all Soviet and Russian ideas: ‘Ukraine for Ukrainians.’”

Identity Subtheme

Ukraine has a multilayered national identity: (1) the heritage of the Rus, with the historical Ukrainian language being Russian, (2) the modern Ukrainian language of the nineteenth century, and (3) ethno-cultural development of the Russian language in Ukraine as a regional phenomenon. However, the first and third pieces—as well as values of Eastern Ukraine—are not present in current conceptions of national identity. As one respondent states, “Both ethnic groups are equal; we are a common nation with two ethnic groups, neither better or worse. If the nation is defined through ethnic Ukrainian group membership, then all Ukrainians in the world are members of the nation, which is inaccurate.” Yet basing the current identity on being born in Ukraine also leads to incorrect interpretations. Additionally, the category “Russian speaking” does not reflect Russian ethnic identity. As one respondent mentions, “According to polls, the number of people with Russian identity is in decline because of the secondary status of this ethnic group, thus

advancing Ukrainian-language identity while diminishing the population of people with Russian identity. Consequently, pride in the great culture of Russia is lost.”

Ukraine has not developed its own pride to replace this loss, resulting in underutilized or destroyed mechanisms of nationalist promotion (i.e., cinema production has been lost, etc.). Instead, as one respondent states, “The prevalent idea of national identity is victimization: Ukrainians are presented as miserable, orphaned, and unhappy.” Another respondent echoes, “Nationalists have the complex of a minority, making the Other permanently guilty, and increase self-esteem through hate and invectives. The most important question is: ‘Who to sell ourselves to?’” In this narrative the culture of Ukraine should be developed only through support of both Russian and Ukrainian cultures; the ideology of one culture cannot be anathema to another. Hegemony and domination must give way to commonality. Europe and Russia each have their own internal problems: Ukraine must resolve its problems as a common nation with two equal ethnic groups.

Common Subtheme

All Ukrainians share a common European Christian culture, a Ukrainian national character, and humor. Everyone is united by Ukraine’s independence and common territory, but the central idea shared by people today is a “get rich” ideology without moral or cultural values.

Divide Subtheme

The major divide in this narrative is not between Russians and Ukrainians but between the west and east of Ukraine. These regions have different histories, shared experiences, and moral values; they were developed in fundamentally different state structures and empires for centuries and thus have divergent geopolitical vectors of development and assessments of the past. This divide increased after the Orange Revolution and is likely to persist for decades to come. As one respondent states, “People often believe that the divide in Ukraine is sharpened and manipulated by politicians, but the society is truly divided. Ethnic conflicts between west (European and traditional) and east (market-based and industrial) are increasing.” As another respondent stresses, “The nationalists try to move Ukraine to another civilizational space with the prevalence of Polish culture, the Greco-Catholic Church, and anti-Byzantine discourse. They want to mix European and Ukrainian culture to undermine the Orthodox Church’s authority.” Another respondent echoes, “There is forced actualization of Ukrainian identity. Western Ukraine considers itself to have a justifiable monopoly on national identity and imposes ethno-cultural, ‘messianic’ nationalism: as they say, ‘Galicia will remain, Pridneprovie will become Galicia.’” Aggressive anti-Russian nationalism in

western Ukraine is based on a declared connection with ethno-national projects of Europe in the nineteenth century and the traumas experienced during the Soviet period. Eastern Ukraine has both a less salient ethno-cultural identity and a Russian Orthodox religious identity. The radical Russian identity is a reaction to western Ukraine's nationalism and a result of manipulation by Russian politicians (who promote the idea of Russia as Motherland).

Language Subtheme

According to this narrative, Ukraine is a stable bilingual state with two mother tongues, Russian and Ukrainian, as components of an ethno-political process. Based on the 1989 language law (which is currently in force), Russian should be taught within the territory of Ukraine, yet it is not taught in many regions. As one respondent states, "There are a lot of faults in language policies. According to the constitution, the Russian language should enjoy freedom of development, but the current law does not support this. People do not have assurance that with the Russian language they will have the opportunity for self-realization and equal status. To be successful you have to study the Ukrainian language." Another respondent echoes, "While the Ukrainian language is taught universally, Russian is taught only at the request of parents. Regional governments often manipulate this matter, denying parents an opportunity to choose the language of instruction." In Riga, there are sixty-four Russian schools, yet in Kiev there are only four. For the last twenty years, the use of Russian in education has decreased from 50 percent to 20 percent. This state policy has led to the use of Surzhyk: children speak Russian but write Ukrainian, ultimately losing the intact value of both languages and cultures. For eastern Ukraine this is a very painful issue: more than 5.5 million people there do not speak Ukrainian. Ukrainian nationalists' promotion of the supremacy of the Ukrainian language and culture impedes the development of a common national identity and leads to conflicts. As one respondent states, "The policy of oppression of the Russian language is coming from Western Europe and the U.S., thus language policy impedes the development of a common national identity." Another respondent stresses that "de-Russification is not humane. There are no descriptions on medications in Russian; how can people, especially older ones, understand? The cruelty of the Ukrainian language law is compensated for by people ignoring it." Russians in Ukraine are different from Russians in Russia, as their identity has become a *mélange* of cultures. They want to live in Ukraine but also seek to preserve their Russian language and heritage.

Language is a dividing factor in Ukraine: 50 percent of the population is bilingual, but 50 percent speak only one language, Russian or Ukrainian, with a preponderance of Russian speakers. A dual-language law is needed to support and preserve both cultures and give an opportunity for Russian cul-

ture to flourish. This law would most likely provoke temporary discontent, but the society is generally tolerant; in time, the people would accept it and the law would reduce overall tensions in the society. Many people in Ukraine feel that they live in a foreign country: the nation should give them an opportunity to speak their own language. Russia aims to end the suppression of the Russian language and culture among the Russian community. If a dual language law is adopted Russia will not have cause to intervene to defend the Russian language. There is also some need to move toward teaching English, but currently Russian remains the language of international communication, science, and international paradigms. Ukraine could not survive without continued use of the Russian language.

History Subtheme

History plays an important role in Ukrainian society, where history is represented in very insensitive and extreme forms. There is no common concept of history; interpretations of traumatic events in history are bipolar and provoke conflicts. Presently Ukrainian history is saturated by the concept of victimization (“tears and fears”) and by opposition to “threatening” entities: Russia and Poland. The narrative of Holodomor is used by the people of western Ukraine—people who never experienced it—for their own political purposes, capitalizing on the human tragedy. As one respondent states, “Historians should be honest. Holodomor was not perpetrated against the Ukrainian people; it was a class phenomenon.” Another respondent provides similar thoughts: “Though Ukrainians were also complicit in these crimes (they served in the Red Army as well), they prefer not to admit it.”

Ukrainian history remains ambivalent: people celebrate the holidays of both sides of the nationalist divide. Nationalists and Communists dislike this ambivalence, and history has become an instrument of politics. The events of May 9, 2011, represent a clash between Svoboda ultranationalists and Ukrainians celebrating the great Soviet Victory during World War II. Some respondents consider the red flag law that requires the use of Soviet flag replicas during holidays in Ukraine to be a poor idea but believe that since 70 to 80 percent of people have acquiesced to this social manipulation they will preserve their beliefs regardless of the policy. Other respondents support the law. As one respondent stresses, “This law is a normalization of the situation. According to polls, 93 percent consider this to be a holiday (70 percent as a great holiday), and 53 percent positively feel about the red flag. The opponents are more aggressive and socially active, so it looks like that nation disapproves of it.” Ukraine needs to create a national idea, establish a dialogue about Ukraine’s history, and cease the cynical use of the politics of memory by embracing its divergent past.

History Textbooks Subtheme

The “Orange” history textbooks were poorly written, oriented toward memorization, and were in need of updating. Textbooks written during the Orange Revolution resemble western Ukrainian textbooks of the 1930s: nationalist rhetoric, notions of victimhood, and discussion of Ukrainians’ miserable destiny proliferate throughout. The textbooks glorified the Orange Revolution and Ukrainian ethnic values and vilified Russia and Russians. Newer textbooks aim to revise depictions of World War II, the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA), Stepan Bandera, Ivan Mazepa, and Holodomor. As one respondent states, “New textbooks aim to stop the process of Banderization. We need a tolerant history of Ukraine.” Another respondent mentions, “New textbooks restore balance and present both Orange and Blue values.” These new texts promote tolerance, emphasizing that Ukraine was part of the Russian empire but was not colonized and that the USSR brought both negative and positive experiences to the lives of Ukrainians. Ideally, textbooks should represent the social history that was diminished by Yushchenko’s use of ideology, which deformed and distorted representations of history. Any change that promotes democratic culture, accommodates pluralism in political thought, and stimulates thoughtful reflection on southern and eastern Ukraine is positive.

Structure of National Narrative

Dualistic Order

The dualistic order that defines the *dual identity* national narrative is based on axiological opposites of Russian and Ukrainian ethnic groups, wherein concentration of the “good” of the nation is connected with the Russian side. A set of four categorical constructs defines the connotation of this social group duality (see table 3.1).

The first three binary constructs reflect historical and cultural roots and inspirations and incorporate the spirituality and culture value and social order value. The first construct, spirituality, is based on the spirituality and culture value and defines the Russian ethnic group as spiritual, with old, deep cultural traditions while the Ukrainian ethnic group is defined as a group with a simplistic, rural culture. The second binary construct, locus of inspiration for the nation, is also based on the spirituality and culture value and establishes a dichotomy of internal-external, domestic-alien inspirations. The Russian ethnic group finds its inspiration in the Orthodox Church and Byzantine culture, while Ukrainians are positioned to be inspired by an alien Polish culture and the Greco-Catholic Church. The third binary construct, type of nation, is based on the social order value and defines Russians as supporting a multi-

Table 3.1. Dualistic Order of *Dual Identity* National Myth

<i>Categorical Constructs</i>	<i>Russians</i>	<i>Ukrainians</i>
Spirituality	High spirituality, developed culture	Rural culture, simplistic culture
Inspiration for the nation	Domestic inspiration: Orthodox Church and Byzantine culture	Foreign (alien) inspirations: Polish culture, Greco-Catholic Church
Type of nation	Multicultural, multiethnic	“Messianic” nationalism
Temporal orientation	Progressive, industrial, market-based	Conservative, agrarian, traditional

cultural idea of the nation and Ukrainians as supporting an ethnic concept based on “messianic” nationalism.

The fourth binary construct, temporal orientation, is based on the development value and represents the developmental orientations of the ethnic groups. This construct defines the Russian ethnic group as a progressive industrial group with a market-based mentality, while Ukrainians are defined as being a conservative agrarian group with a traditional mentality, inclined to support old ways of life.

In this dualistic order, the first function of a national narrative, the development of the meaning of national identity, is fulfilled by the establishment of connotation of Ukraine as a nation composed of two ethnic groups—Russians and Ukrainians. The Russian ethnic group is positioned as spiritual, culturally developed, deeply rooted in Eastern Slavic culture and the traditions of Orthodox Church, and supporting multiculturalism and industrial progress in Ukraine. The Ukrainian ethnic group is defined as a conservative agrarian group with a traditional mentality with a simplistic and rural culture, inspired by alien cultural and religious traditions and supportive of “messianic” nationalism. The existing competition for power within Ukraine contributes to the establishment of a rigid social boundary filled with intense axiological differences—for example, spiritual-simplistic, authentic-alien, and inclusive-exclusive. Thus, the existing connotation of power as competition is *embedded* in the meaning of national identity, making the social boundary between groups impermeable.

The second function of national narrative, legitimization of power, is fulfilled by the value positioning of the Russian ethnic group as more developed, progressive, and authentic for Ukraine than the Ukrainian group. This value positioning serves to restore the balance of power in Ukraine where the Ukrainian ethnic group is privileged as titular, comprising the core for nation building. The existing meaning of Russian identity as deeply spiritual and superior to Ukrainians contributes to the *shaping* of the concept of power in

which both groups are considered equal and the Russian position in social hierarchy increases.

Mythic Narratives and Iconic Order

The mythic narratives and iconic order are constituted by four myths that rest on dichotomous binary constructs and justify their specific meaning. The first myth is a combination of myths of election and myths of ethnogenesis and antiquity. This myth deploys the validation of rights mechanism that helps emphasize the rights of Russians based on their deeper culture in comparison with Ukrainians. It represents Russian culture as deeply rooted in ancient Rus that constitutes the sacred foundation not only for Ukraine but also for all Eastern Slavs. The colossal mental potential of Russians living in Ukraine rests on these cultural connections. While the Russian language arrives from the heritage of the Rus, the modern Ukrainian language is very young and was developed only in the nineteenth century. The culture of western Ukraine is a rural, simplistic culture that does not have foundations to develop its own pride and replace the great culture of Russia. In comparison with the Russian language, there are very few books published in Ukrainian, and Ukrainian cinematography is almost absent or destroyed.

The second myth is a variation of myths of territory. The condemning imposition mechanism is used to blame Ukrainian nationalists for the imposition of the ethno-cultural values and traditions of one ethnic group on the whole society of Ukraine. It states that two major regions of Ukraine, west and east, have different histories and moral values rooted in the different empires that ruled over these territories. Thus, Russians living in Ukraine and Ukrainians in the west have opposite geopolitical vectors of development. The national inspirations of the Ukrainians of western Ukraine are rooted in the alien ethno-national projects of nineteenth-century Europe, Polish culture, the Greco-Catholic Church, and anti-Byzantine discourse. Ukrainian nationalists have tried to move Ukraine to a civilizational space alien to the majority of the Ukrainian population. Russians of Ukraine represent a Russian Orthodox identity and Byzantine culture that unite the many peoples of Ukraine and build bridges with other East European Slavic nations.

The third myth is a variation of myths of unjust treatment. Through the use of the impediment by outgroup mechanism the supporters of the dual identity narrative blame Ukrainian nationalists for obstruction of the development of a multicultural society. It describes Russians living in Ukraine as a tolerant group that supports a multiplicity of cultures and sees Ukraine as a multiethnic state that includes different cultures and religions and should support the dual identity of people educated in both (Russian and Ukrainian) cultures. They also stress that Russians in Ukraine are different from Russians in Russia, as their identity has become an intermixture of cultures and

their identity differs from the authoritarian Russian one. They want to be in Ukraine but seek to preserve their Russian language and culture. But Russians in Ukraine are treated unfairly by Ukrainian nationalists, who merge them with Russia and Russian imperial ambitions and deny their rights for language and culture. Western Ukraine aims to impose an ethno-cultural, “messianic” nationalism and considers itself as having a monopoly on national identity: “Galicia will remain, Pridneprov’ie will become Galicia.” During the presidency of Yushchenko, an ethno-centric concept of national identity with the imposition of a Ukrainian ethnic identity on the entire population was developed; policies of dominance by Ukrainians over other ethnic groups and the ousting of the Russian language were encouraged. Ukrainian nationalists’ promotion of a monopoly of Ukrainian language and culture posit a threat to the Russians of Ukraine and denies their rights for equal citizenship.

The fourth myth is a variation on myths of foundation. The positive ingroup predispositions mechanism is employed to describe the Russian group as having more abilities in industrial and economic development. It states that the Russian ethnic group promotes progressive industrial development. It is responsible for the economic development of industrial eastern regions that constitute the foundation for the economic well-being of Ukraine. Ukrainians can only develop agriculture in old traditional ways; they are very individualistic and do not care about the economic development of the country. Currently eastern Ukraine is “feeding” and supporting its western part but can no longer be a “Sugar Daddy” for this undeveloped region. The iconic order includes the following positive icons associated with the Russian ethnic group: ancient Rus, the Russian Orthodox Church, East Slavic unity, writers Nikolai Gogol and Mikhail Bulgakov (who used the Russian language but had a Ukrainian cultural basis), giant factories in the east of Ukraine, the space industry, and heavy engineering industry. Negative icons of this myth includes “Ukrainians as Polish servants,” Ukrainian nationalism, Stephan Bandera, OUN/UPA, and Nazi Galicia.

These mythic narratives fulfill the first function of national narrative—the development of the meaning of national identity—by furthering the meaning of Russian identity established in the dualistic order as deeply spiritual and superior to the Ukrainian one. To justify this superiority, mythic narratives emphasize the coherence of Russian culture and identity and employ the depiction of four historic continuities: ancient Rus as the sacred foundation not only for Ukraine but also for all Eastern Slavs and as a root source of the Russian language; Russian Orthodox identity as a continuation of the history of the Byzantine empire; the history of unification of all Eastern Slavs by Russians highly educated in both (Russian and Ukrainian) cultures; and economic development of industrial eastern regions by Russians, which underpins the economic well-being of present-day Ukraine. Mythic narratives also

contribute to the *embedding* of the concept of power into national identity through justification of two boundaries. First, the resistance to imposition of Ukrainian culture and language results in the sharpening of the boundary and differences between eastern and western regions based on the histories of the different empires that ruled over these territories and led opposite geopolitical vectors of development. Second, the right of Russians to be equal agents of nation building is justified by strengthening the boundary between Russia and Ukraine and by stressing the differences between Russians in Ukraine and Russians in Russia. The identity of Ukrainian Russians is presented as a historical intermixture of cultures and separate from the authoritarian Russian one.

The second function of national narrative, legitimization of power, is fulfilled by the furthering of value positioning of the Russian ethnic group as more developed, progressive, and authentic. The mythic narrative employs the stories of comparison: between developed Russian culture, the prevalence of Russian language, literature, and mass media and very low levels of publication of Ukrainian books and a destroyed Ukrainian cinematography; between modern industrial development of Ukraine as an inspiration for Russians and the alien ethno-national projects of nineteenth-century Europe as an inspiration for the Ukrainians; between tolerance and support of all cultures among Russians and narrow-minded nationalism among Ukrainians; and between Russians' sacrifices for the economic development of Ukraine and individualism and the patriarchic mentality of Ukrainians. These accounts of the preeminence of the Russian ethnic group vindicate the rights of Russians to be equal agents of nation building together with privileged titular Ukrainians. In addition, the justification of the equal status of Russians and their right to rule the country is underpinned by stories of their deep spirituality, developed culture, and industrial abilities thus *shaping* the concept of power in Ukraine through the meaning of Russian identity.

Normative Order

The normative order emphasizes an imbalance of power, with the Ukrainian ethnic group prevailing over Russians. The normative order posits the power of the Ukrainian group as illegitimate because Ukraine consists of two major coequal groups and because Russians have made a bigger contribution to the economic development, spirituality, and culture of the country. The normative order prescribes equal power to Russians and Ukrainians and sees this as a legitimate structure of power. It includes the needs to improve relations with Russia, support Russian culture and language, adopt a language law that promotes two equal state languages—Russian and Ukrainian—improve education in the Russian language, and develop a multicultural concept of national identity based on the history of two cultures. The deformations in the

representations of history in history textbooks during Yushchenko's time should be repaired, and a common history without prejudice against Russians and Russia should be presented. Thus, the lawfulness of the power of the Russian ethnic group is justified through two approaches to legitimacy: (1) legitimization of the Russian ingroup and delegitimization of the Ukrainian outgroup and (2) proclaiming the Russians' right to power based on cultural values and their contribution to the development of Ukraine.

Normative order establishes the position of Russian culture and industrial skills as superior to those of Ukrainians and legitimizes their power in Ukraine further. It solidifies the meaning of Russian identity by prescribing policies supporting its culture—for example, support for Russian culture and language and improvement of education in the Russian language. The legitimacy of the power of Russians is supported by policies aimed at increasing their social and political status—for example, improvement of relations with Russia, adoption of the two-language law, and development of a multicultural concept of national identity. The meaning of national identity as multicultural is created to justify Russians' access to power within the nation, thus supporting the *embedding* of the concept of power into the connotation of national identity. At the same time, the concept of a social hierarchy is shaped by an existing meaning of national identity as created based on titular culture: Russians oppose this meaning, vigorously legitimizing their ingroup and delegitimizing Ukrainians as a group in power.

Thus, the dual identity narrative rests on *social group duality* that describes the nation as an arena of zero-sum fighting between two ethnic groups—Russian and Ukrainian. The dual identity narrative includes two values of spirituality—culture and values of development and social order. They define Russians as an ethnic group with high spirituality, contributing to the development of national culture, supportive of multiculturalism, and progressive, while Ukrainians are defined as an ethnic group with a rural, simplistic, and alien culture, who are nationalistic and conservative. To justify this duality, four myths are employed: ethnogenesis and antiquity, territory, unjust treatment, and foundation. These myths state that (1) the east and west of Ukraine have different histories and values, but Ukrainian nationalists are trying to move Ukraine to an alien civilizational space of Polish culture and the Greco-Catholic Church; (2) Russian culture is deeply rooted in ancient Rus and has colossal mental potential, while Ukrainians have a simplistic culture with a young language and very few literary products; (3) Russians are a tolerant group that support a multiplicity of cultures and the dual identity (Ukrainian and Russian) of people who want to belong to Ukraine, but they are treated unfairly by Ukrainian nationalists who unite them with Russian imperial ambitions and want to impose ethno-cultural messianic nationalism; and (4) Russians in the east developed industrial Ukraine and provided for rural, underdeveloped Ukrainians in the west who

do not contribute into the economy of the nation. Through the use of the impediment by outgroup mechanism, the supporters of the dual identity narrative blame Ukrainian nationalists for obstruction of development of a multicultural society. The condemning imposition mechanism is used to blame Ukrainian nationalists for the imposition of ethno-cultural values and the traditions of one ethnic group on the whole society of Ukraine. The positive ingroup predispositions mechanism is employed to describe the Russian group as having more abilities in industrial and economic development. The validation of rights mechanism helps emphasize the rights of Russians as having more authentic culture in comparison with Ukrainians. The normative order (1) endorses equal powers of Russian and Ukrainian groups and a multicultural society, (2) promotes the support of Russian culture and language and better relations with Russia, and (3) calls for the revision of nationalistic textbooks. Both functions, formation of identity and legitimization of power, work through the structure of the national narrative, interacting through the processes of *embedding* of the rights of Russians to infiltrate the concept of national identity as multicultural and *shaping* of the concept of power through presentations of the Russians as a superior group. The legitimization of the rights of the ingroup is based on the belief that Russians have a deeper culture and better industrial skills; thus they should be treated as equal builders of a Ukrainian national identity. The legitimization of power also includes vigorous delegitimization of Ukrainians as an exclusive group that can impose their culture and traditions over all of Ukraine.

Pro-Soviet Narrative (7 percent of respondents)

Pride Subtheme

In this narrative the sources for pride are rooted in the cultural values and history of Ukraine, including Kievan Rus, the national revolution under the leadership of Bohdan Khmelnytsky, victory in the Great Patriotic War, and the technological achievements of Soviet Ukraine (e.g., airplanes, rockets, science). As one respondent states, “We are involved in European processes: we had a national revolution under the leadership of Bogdan Khmelnistkiy. It was hard to exist under two different empires, but Ukraine accumulated the potential of liberation and left behind many countries in their search for national independence.” The Ukrainian Soviet Republic established Ukraine as one of the world’s ten most developed countries, and Ukraine was invited to be one of the founding states of the UN in recognition of its contribution to the defeat of Fascism.

Dynamics Subtheme

Yushchenko was an authoritarian personality, not concerned with broader Ukrainian society and willing to impose his personal experience of history onto all of Ukraine. He constructed a national memory grounded in negative assessments of Ukrainian history from 1918 to 1991. His regime fomented conflict by promoting a partisan, univocal national story instead of a search for common ground based on the multiple experiences of Ukraine's citizens. As one respondent stresses, "Yushchenko is very primitive, snobbish, with a shallow historic consciousness. He developed a deformed view on history with political distortion and manipulation of the facts. The problem of the crimes of Stalinism is very important and should be discussed but not used for any political purpose. Holodomor was not an ethnic genocide; it was class-based violence." As another respondent mentions, "The attempt to build a national memory on negative historic assessments is definitely a defective approach. To criticize Ukrainian history during 1918–1991 based on specific moral judgments is not a scientific approach." Yet another respondent states that "Yushchenko has an authoritarian personality; his politics were very conflictual instead of a search for consensus." Yanukovych declared that his new government would reflect greater common sense than Yushchenko's. But in the place of inclusive, fully conceptualized national idea, Yanukovych has merely instituted a set of simplistic beliefs.

Identity Subtheme

The interviewees describe Ukraine as a European country where perception as being European is highly valued. Ukrainian society represents a unity of different social realities: Soviet, European, Russian, Ukrainian, Crimean Tatar, Hungarian, Jewish, and so on. Regional identities prevail over any common national identity. The postgenocide national narrative is considered neither valid nor well founded. As one respondent states, "Ukraine was one of the ten most developed countries in the twentieth century, with high levels of economic development and technological progress (e.g., rocketry, Paton's Institute, biotechnology, etc.). There was no cultural sense of trauma, but for twenty years the younger generation was taught that Ukraine paid more in blood than any of its neighbors." The respondents indicated a need to build a nation on both positive and negative historical examples, to view Ukraine as a product of historic development resulting from the activities of all the various people who lived there. As one respondent mentions, "There is no national idea, but there is a Ukrainian national character. Gas wars with Russia help Ukraine to develop its identity."

Common Subtheme

The Ukrainian people are united by a common destiny, the desire for a good life, and a shared will to preserve Ukrainian identity. As one respondent states, “Ukraine is united by a common destiny, big plans with similar cultures, and a wish for a good life for everyone in the same boat.”

Divide Subtheme

Ukraine was created by the joining of two distinct sociocultural communities: (1) western territories that experienced Magdeburg law and the European Renaissance but preserve a traditional agricultural culture (these regions were economically developed after WWII to raise them to the level of the rest of Ukraine) and (2) new industrialized territories whose development was based on immigration from Russia and assimilation by Russian people. There was a tolerant coexistence of these two communities during the period of the USSR based on a common Soviet identity. Since independence, this has given way due to the growth of regional patriotism, increases in ethnocultural movements, an emphasis on ethnic differences, and willingness to sacrifice the unity of Ukraine by Ukrainian nationalists. As one respondent stresses, “The people of Ukraine paid too high a price in the past to unite all of Ukraine’s lands, and the people should work hard to preserve their country against disunity.”

Language Subtheme

The issue of language is politicized and divides Ukraine. As one respondent states, “The idea of a ‘Russian World’ advanced by Russia is not realistic: nobody in Ukraine wants to unite with Russia. People in Donbas speak Surzhyk—a language composed of 80 percent Ukrainian.” Russian, as a second state language, is not deemed necessary and would likely lead to tensions between the two communities. Russian can be treated as a regional language, through the decisions of local governments, but the Ukrainian language is most widely known. As one respondent states, “Ukrainian as a state language should remain, but equal opportunities should be developed for everyone. Ukrainian-speaking people should not have to defend their language by fighting with other languages.” Yet another respondent argues, “We do not need a state language, similarly to Ireland and the U.S., which do not have state languages. We need to support all languages, including Ukrainian. We should not think of using Russian in the categorical term of a ‘language of another state.’ It is wrong to develop the Ukrainian language at the expense of Russian. For Ukrainian nationalists the main enemy is a Russian person speaking the Ukrainian language. We need either to make both languages equal or abolish a state language.”

Because there are people who cannot learn new languages, the problem of language must be approached very liberally. For example, create conditions in which language becomes a need, a foundation for self-realization; develop high-quality products both in Russian and Ukrainian, and build schools and classes for the Russian language without treating it as a threat to the Ukrainian language. With the degradation of a language, culture falls into decline as well: some children who cannot write in Russian are losing their deep cultural background. Linguistic assimilation, according to the respondents, is useless.

History Subtheme

The role of Ukraine's history is underestimated: historic education is superficial, politicized, and lacks a defined connection with the Motherland. It was not possible to achieve an understanding of history and a common assessment of the past because of differences in the social-historic experiences of people from various Ukrainian regions. People in the 1930s perceived Joseph Stalin's regime ambiguously. Some Ukrainians collaborated with the Nazis in order to support their aspirations for independence, but others committed violent crimes against Poles, Jews, and Communists. As one respondent states, "It was not possible to impose this version of history (OUN/UPA) on all of Ukrainian society: we could not justify their actions and support their celebrations." According to respondents, a majority of people see the Great Patriotic War as a source of national pride. They believe that Ukraine must rethink its ideas about history but must not deny the achievements of the twentieth century, including BAM (the Baikal–Amur railway) and industrialization. Politicians should try to minimize conflict between the opposing groups that commemorate the Great Patriotic War and the OUN/UPA. As one respondent stresses, "To build the nation, we need to stand on the shoulders of the great Soviet era, which brought many achievements. Now is a time of minor action, and there is no imagination on the part of the state."

Textbooks Subtheme

Older textbooks tend to provoke division in society. A gap exists between Ukraine's generations, propagated by the exclusion or negative interpretations of many historical events from texts. For example, in some books, a description of Ukraine as a Russian colony has replaced the account of the history of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic. As one respondent states, "In current textbooks a lot of events are excluded—for example, the partisan war. People want to restore justice and understand their past. We need textbooks that are not written by dilettanti but rather are grounded in a scientific approach and portray a truth that combines both positive and negative assessments of Ukraine and its history."

Structure of National Narrative

Dualistic Order

The dualistic order that defines the *pro-Soviet* national narrative is a *temporal duality* based on the axiological opposites “order of Soviet Ukraine” and “disorder of current Ukraine,” where concentration of the “good” in the nation is connected with its Soviet past. A set of three binary constructs defines the connotation of this *temporal duality* (see table 3.2).

The first binary construct, ethnic relations, is based on the social order value and defines Soviet Ukraine through the peaceful coexistence of different ethnic groups, whereas current Ukraine is divided by the ethnic conflict. The second binary construct, economic development, is based on the development value and defines Soviet Ukraine as an industrially developed society while present-day Ukraine is characterized by economic decline. The third construct, cultural development, is also based on the development value and defines Soviet Ukraine as supporting multiple flourishing cultures while currently Russian culture is in decline.

In this dualistic order, the first function of national narrative, the development of the meaning of national identity, is fulfilled by the establishment of a positive connotation of Ukraine as developed during the Soviet period. The Ukraine of the Soviet period is defined as peaceful, tolerant, and culturally and economically advanced, as opposed to present-day Ukraine, which is divided by conflict and is on the decline culturally and economically. This duality is presented as an unfortunate and wrong turn rather than a protracted conflict, and thus axiological differences are not intensified and present a duality of “presence and absence” of particular values, such as development. The boundary is defined by the time frame. Thus, the existing connotation of power as a process of deterioration is *embedded* in the meaning of a national identity, emphasizing the negative connotation of national identity in the current Ukraine.

The second function of national narrative, legitimization of power, is fulfilled by the value positioning of the Soviet regime as more developed and contributing to the prosperity of Ukraine than the current one. This value positioning serves to justify the return to a Soviet type of governance and

Table 3.2. Dualistic Order of a *Pro-Soviet* National Myth

<i>Categorical Constructs</i>	<i>Order of Soviet Ukraine</i>	<i>Disorder of Current Ukraine</i>
Ethnic relations	Peaceful coexistence	Nationalism
Economic development	Industrialization	Economic decline
Cultural development	Thriving cultures	Cultural decline

economics. The positive meaning of the Soviet identity together with the negative meaning of identity associated with the current Ukraine contributes to the shaping of the concept of power, which highlights the advantages of the Soviet regime.

Mythic Narratives and Iconic Order

The mythic narratives and iconic order are constituted by three myths that rest on dichotomous categorical constructs that justify their specific meaning.

The first mythic narrative is a variation of myths of a Golden Age. The condemning imposition mechanism is used to blame Ukrainian nationalists for the destruction of the achievements of Soviet Ukraine and replacement of them with regional and ethnic traditions and ideology. It describes the society of Soviet Ukraine as a brotherhood of Russian, Ukrainian, Crimean Tatars, Hungarian, and Jewish people. This tolerant coexistence was based on a common Soviet identity, a wish for a good life, and a common will to make the Motherland better. Yushchenko, despite the actual experiences of people, promoted negative historical assessments of the Soviet period and led Ukrainian society into conflict. The histories of nationalistic movements that committed mass killings of Ukrainian citizens, including Jews and Communists (OUN/UPA), were imposed on all of society, and their actions were justified. Ukrainian nationalism, regional patriotism, and ethno-cultural movements with an emphasis on ethnic differences are now thriving in Ukraine.

The second mythic narrative is also a variation of myths of a Golden Age. The condemning imposition mechanism is used to blame Ukrainian nationalists for the destruction of Ukrainian economic prosperity through the imposition of their vision of economy. This myth states that with its high level of economic development and position at the vanguard of technological progress, Ukraine was among the ten most developed countries in the twentieth century. When the western territories were returned to Ukraine in 1939, the Soviet Union expended a lot of effort to economically develop these regions to the level of the rest of Ukraine. Yushchenko has brought the Ukrainian economy to a state of stagnation, and the task of the current government is to return it to the economic level of 1991.

The third mythic narrative is also a variation of myths of a Golden Age. The condemning imposition mechanism is used to blame Ukrainian nationalists for the destruction of the cultural richness of Soviet Ukraine and replace it with one culture through the imposition of Ukrainian ethnic traditions and forced assimilation. It states that during the Soviet time, all cultures were equal and evenly flourishing. Current Ukraine promotes assimilation into Ukrainian culture, Russian language and culture are declining, and children are losing their rich cultural background.

The iconic order includes the following positive icons associated with Soviet Ukraine: Kievan Rus, the national revolution under the leadership of Bogdan Khmelnistkiy, Taras Shevchenko, the victory in the Great Patriotic War, the defeat of Fascism, membership in the UN, the BAM (Baikal–Amur railroad), industrialization, and the economic and scientific achievements of Soviet Ukraine (airplanes, space rockets, Paton’s Institute of Physics, biotechnology). Among negative icons associated with the current Ukraine are UPA/OUN, Stephen Bandera, division SS “Galicia,” nationalism, and Victor Yushchenko.

These mythic narratives fulfill the first function of a national narrative—the development of the meaning of national identity—by advancing the meaning of Soviet identity established in the dualistic order as superior to the identity of the current independent Ukraine. To justify this superiority, mythic narratives emphasize a break in the coherence of a Ukrainian national identity and employ the depiction of three historic disparities: between feelings of brotherhood and a common will to make the Motherland better during the Soviet period and current aggressive and individualistic nationalism; between a position among the ten most developed countries during the Soviet period and the current economic crisis; and between support for all cultures in Soviet Ukraine and imposition of Ukrainian culture over all others in the current Ukraine. Mythic narratives also contribute to *embedment* of the concept of power—the empowerment of people during the Soviet period and the current disempowerment of the majority—into the meaning of national identity: the achievement of positive identity is possible only by returning to a Soviet meaning of national identity.

The second function of the national narrative, legitimization of power, is fulfilled by the further value positioning of Soviet Ukraine as more developed, progressive, and advanced. The mythic narrative employs the stories of achievements in Soviet Ukraine and the ability of the Soviet order to bring prosperity to the nation, the establishment of tolerant coexistence based on a common Soviet identity (*Sovetskiy narod*), economic development of the western territories after their returned to Ukraine in 1939, and significant support of cultural development of all ethnic groups. These accounts of the prevalence of the Soviet type of social order justify the return to this type of governance and economy as more prosperous and furthering the advancement of the country. In addition, justification of the superiority of the Soviet regime is underpinned by stories about wrong actions and manipulations of history by Ukrainian nationalistic leaders thus *shaping* the concept of power in Ukraine by using the negative identity of the current independent Ukraine.

Normative Order

The normative order compares the structure of power in the Soviet Union, which leads to positive development, and power in current Ukraine, which leads to the destruction of the country. It states that power of the Ukrainian ethnic group is illegitimate because Ukraine as a modern state was created by Soviet people living in Ukraine. Ukraine should be independent from Russia but preserve a Soviet type of relations. This normative order prescribes the unification of Ukraine based on common identity and respect for all people, who have paid too much in the past to unite and develop all Ukrainian lands. The great model is the common identity of the Soviet Ukraine, *sovetskii narod*. Ukrainian should be the only state language, but Russian should be an optional regional language, and based on the decisions of local governments it should be promoted and developed. Ukraine needs to rethink its history and include achievements of the twentieth century: history textbooks should not be written by nationalistic dilettanti but rather unite the experiences of all the people of Ukraine. Thus, the legitimacy of the Soviet regime is justified through legitimization of the Soviet order and delegitimization of the current social and political order and stressing the consensus and validation of the Soviet order by the “brotherhood” of Soviet people.

Normative order further develops the positioning of the Soviet regime as better suited for Ukraine and legitimizes the Soviet order justified in mythic narratives. Normative order promotes the positive meaning of Soviet identity by prescribing the preservation of a Soviet type of relations. It legitimizes the use of this common identity of the Soviet people as the best model for the current Ukraine and delegitimizes the power of the Ukrainian ethnic group as not fully representing the Soviet people who contributed to the development of the current Ukraine. The meaning of national identity as Soviet is created to justify the rule of former Soviet elites and the reestablishment of paternalistic totalitarian order, thus supporting the *embedding* of a concept of power into the connotation of national identity. At the same time, a concept of social power is shaped by the positive meaning of national identity in Soviet Ukraine: support of all cultures, industrial development, and monopolization of the social sphere by the government, thus creating a common uniting identity.

Therefore, the pro-Soviet narrative rests on a *temporal duality* that emphasizes the gap between a positive Soviet past and the corrupt present of Ukraine. This duality includes two values of development and a value of social order. It defines the Soviet period as an era of peaceful coexistence, industrialization, and blooming cultures, while the current Ukraine is characterized as nationalistic, suffering economic and cultural decline. To justify this duality, three myths of Golden Age are employed. These myths state that (1) Soviet Ukraine was a tolerant national brotherhood based on the common

identity of the Soviet people (*Sovetskii narod*), but now nationalists impose their vision of history and society on the whole nation and ruin the peaceful nation; (2) Soviet Ukraine was one of the top ten economically developed nations and brought development to its newly acquired western regions, but since the Orange Revolution representatives of these western regions—Ukrainian nationalists—have taken over the country and brought it to economic stagnation; and (3) Soviet Ukraine provided opportunities for the flourishing of all cultures, but now Ukrainian nationalists impose assimilation and the enforced Ukrainization of society, diminishing possibilities for other cultures. The condemning imposition mechanism is used to blame Ukrainian nationalists for the destruction of the achievements of Soviet Ukraine and to replace them with regional and ethnic traditions and ideology, as well as the destruction of Ukrainian economic and cultural prosperity through the imposition of their vision of economy and society. Through the interpretation mechanisms the red flag is depicted as a flag of the great victory, unification of the Soviet people, and grandiose economic achievements, which is in opposition to nationalistic accounts of the red flag as totalitarian and vicious. Normative order (1) supports a government that represents all the people of Ukraine and a common identity of the Soviet people and (2) stipulates policies that promote the return to a Soviet type of regime: support for regional status of the Russian language, positive analysis of twentieth-century history, and revision of Ukrainian nationalistic textbooks. The Soviet meaning of identity is presented as ideal and most suited for Ukraine. The legitimization of Soviet order based on this identity arrives from the belief that the identity of the Soviet people—which created a peaceful brotherhood of people, developed industrial Ukraine, and led it to the victory in World War II—should be restored and serve as a foundation of power.

Fight for a Ukrainian Ethnic Identity Narrative (23 percent of respondents)

Pride Subtheme

The source of pride, according to this narrative theme, is Ukraine's original history, culture, language, literature, and democratic traditions. Ukraine has survived as a nation, escaping and recovering from past slavery, and emerged like a phoenix rising from the ashes. As one respondent states, "For a thousand years our nation was colonized, discriminated, threatened, Russified; but it survived." Its success is due to liberal cultural nationalism. Ukraine has avoided civil war and conflicts because of its traditions of tolerance, which serve as a foundation of Ukrainian culture. As one respondent explains, "Support of democracy is a historic Ukrainian tradition starting from the

Middle Ages. Ukrainian people never had an autocracy rather a patriarchic democracy: people resolved all problems through negotiation and dialogue in the community. Ukrainians have an internal protest against authoritarianism and violence.”

Dynamics Subtheme

Yushchenko understands the European roots of western Ukraine and tried to develop these values for the whole nation. He accomplished a great deal including introducing a correct policy that ended the ambivalent policy of Kuchma, establishing Holodomor as a Holocaust and a key event that changed the nation, unveiled the truth about the 1920–1930s and World War II, creating a new national dynamic, and destroying old Soviet myths. But he did not take into consideration the strong opposition of Ukraine’s eastern regions and its Russian-speaking population. As one respondent says, “Yushchenko tried to revive culture and history that was banned for decades. He provided a wider view and developed a historic program for the future. He introduced Bandera as a fighter for the national liberation of Ukraine. The truth became real. But he became a victim of the fight of ideologies: some people strongly criticized him, using history as a trigger for ideological opposition.” Thus Yushchenko’s national project was not fully developed or realized; he did not develop a balanced approach, explain his policy adequately, or promote it sufficiently through the mass media and educational systems. As one respondent describes, “We put our attention to the 1920–1930s and WWII—they were the most obvious events to start with their analysis was abolished and even prohibited in the USSR. Yushchenko did not have a deep understanding of history; he consulted with historians but sometimes made his own decisions. For example he stated that Holodomor took ten million lives, whereas in reality around 4.5 millions died, the rest is cumulative loss. It was not right to make Bandera a national hero, but Holodomor was a successful company; now everyone knows about it, but there is still some resistance: Jews do not want to see it as a Holocaust, Russians not as ethnic genocide. But the idea that Holodomor is a key event that changed the nation, made an impact on society, and killed the best part of a population now has a strong impact on the national consciousness.” As another respondent stresses, “There was no nationalism in Yushchenko’s vision of history: people who criticize it do not want to see Ukraine Ukrainian. This vision could be accepted by all regions of Ukraine.”

Yanukovych’s present government creates conflict around history and language, introducing the red flag law as a provocation and a challenge to Ukrainian independence. He has underscored eastern ideas from Ukraine’s Soviet past and a Russian model alien to the people of western Ukraine, but he failed to transform it into a successful national concept. As one respondent

states, “Yanukovych is not interested in nation building. He remains aloof from the sphere of culture and the national idea. At the same time he turns to Soviet ideas because it was the simplest alternative. Now the government wants to return to the past.” Another respondent stresses, “Yanukovych destroyed the balance and provoked polarization of the country.”

Identity Subtheme

We need to form the Ukrainian nation with a distinctly Ukrainian core. Discussions about a civic society distract attention from a national idea based on the Ukrainian renaissance and the revival of the Ukrainian language. As one respondent stresses, “Civic society is an abstraction. Ukrainian cultural development is the priority of the state.” Yushchenko created and promoted a concept of Ukraine as a postcolonial, postgenocidal, posttotalitarian country. Independent Ukraine must prohibit the use of the red flag and proscribe the detestable model of Soviet-Ukrainian diffidence and stop the continuation of the colonial regime engendered by Great Russian brown nationalism and rife with Russian imperial ambitions. Democracy should be developed explicitly based on Ukrainian ethnic history and identity; Russian identity should be repudiated as it rests on violence by the state and represents the dependency produced by state welfare systems. As one respondent states, “In Russian history we see that the violence of the state, welfare provided by the state, risk agriculture, and population regulation were based on the support of the state—state resources of grains—and thus the population was grateful to the state.” Another respondent echoes, “We need to stop Great Russian (*Veliko-Russkii*) brown nationalism with imperial ambitions. It is a specific type of colonialism: assimilation, famine, cultural genocide, and the extinction of culture and language. Through Ukrainian history and identity we can develop democracy; Russian identity leads to totalitarianism.” Ukrainian nationalism is not ethnically based: it is inclusive and based on the idea of the nation’s return to European membership.

Common Subtheme

Eighty percent of the people of Ukraine represent the Ukrainian ethnic group from three to four separate subcultures. The people are united by their common territory and country.

Divide Subtheme

The major division in Ukrainian society is between those promoting a Soviet ideology and those moving Ukraine toward more-European ideals. The country is divided by culture and language into four separate zones: western Ukraine, 15 percent; north-central (historic Ukraine), 33 percent; southeast-

ern (colonies of Catherine the Great and Peter the Great, with a mixed population), 28 percent; and Donbas, Crimea (of Soviet development and Russian population), 20 percent. The most divergent regions by culture and mentality—the west and the east—are furthest from each other with the “swamp” in the middle of the country between them. The west-east divide extends from core differences: (1) in the west, there is support for Ukrainian independence and democracy based on deep historical heritage, national consciousness, connections with European history, Magdeburg law, and the Ukrainian national movement of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, and (2) in the east, a postcolonial, pro-Russian, and pro-Soviet sector was developed in the nineteenth century and again in the 1930s. The north region is “authentic Ukraine,” comprising Kievan Rus, where Ukrainians have lived on their own land under different regimes but preserved their own culture and identity. As one respondent states, “Western Ukraine was not in the Russian Empire; thus it remained more democratic than the Russian empire. Their ethnic identity is more salient especially because of the fight with Poland.” Another respondent stresses, “L’viv and Uzgorod have deep historic heritage and a national consciousness. They are connected with European history and the Magdeburg law. You can see the boundary by the comfort of the restrooms.” The south is a Ukraine colonized during the Russian Romanov dynasty and then the Soviet period; people there retain Russian identities and Soviet mentalities. As one respondent explains, “Three hundred years ago there were no people, just wild plains and wild nomads. People on these new lands have a Russian identity and a different mentality that is hard to change.” This divide is used by Russia, which spends billions of dollars on destructive initiatives and seeks to create instability in Ukraine.

Language Subtheme

This narrative laments a lost opportunity over the past twenty years for greater development of the Ukrainian language; instead, the dynamics of pushing the Ukrainian language out of the social sphere has continued even after years of independence. The Ukrainian language remains suppressed and faces continued internal and external threat. As one respondent explains, “The Ukrainian language has a tragic destiny: rural people speak Ukrainian, people in cities speak Russian (the product of imperial Russia), and it is hard to force people, and hard to teach them, but we need to defend the Ukrainian language.” Another expert echoes, “During the years of independence the dynamics of pushing the Ukrainian language out from the social sphere has continued, despite the Ukrainization of schools. Yushchenko and Yanukovich did not seriously work on this issue: administrative methods are not working there were no specific structures to motivate people speak Ukrainian, no requirements to speak Ukrainian.” The mass media and publications

are dominated by the Russian language; Ukraine does not have its own film industry, high-quality translations of significant texts, or Ukrainian-language popular media. Nothing has been done to support Ukrainian language and culture; administrative methods alone are ineffectual without strong, enforceable requirements to speak Ukrainian and without specific policy and program structures to motivate people to use the language.

The Ukrainian language serves as a genetic code of the nation and a symbol of independence and should be the only language of Ukraine. As one respondent states, "The Ukrainian language can be a uniting factor because all people were learning Ukrainian in schools. People realized that even if they speak Russian, the Ukrainian language can serve as a uniting function for Ukraine. The idea of Russian as a second language is the result of a political fight. Yanukovich exploited this issue and took linguistic revenge. Russian should not be supported, as it is promoted instead of Ukrainian." Any attempts to accord Russian status as a second state language will lead to the loss of political power and pose a direct threat to the Ukrainian language. For Ukrainian-speaking people, this matter is one of the survival of the language. As one respondent stresses, "It is important to defend the oppressed Ukrainian language; it is under internal and external threat." Another respondent explains, "We need to promote love and respect for the Ukrainian language: it is very democratic, based on the people's language, intelligent, and supported by youth. Russian was formed under the influence of the state; it is complicated, artificial, and not connected with people."

Ukrainian as the sole state language should be enforced, and all citizens should be compelled to learn it. Russian could exist as a regional language at the discretion of local governments, but for all state offices and universities Ukrainian should be the only language. As one respondent stresses, "There is no need to defend the Russian language; people have an opportunity to speak Russian; most of the mass media is in Russian. If Russian were to be deemed a state language, Ukrainian would be under the threat, though it is the language of the native people. The Russian language is used as a threat to Ukrainian independence, influenced from Russia, and it can lead to ethnic conflict. The idea of a bilingual people is a cover for people who do not want to study Ukrainian." The Yanukovich government is specifically noted for not speaking Ukrainian. The government should provide economic motivation for citizens to learn Ukrainian by providing additional remuneration for those embracing Ukrainian and imposing financial penalties on regions that elect to use the Russian language. Parents may be empowered to choose the language of education in the schools their children attend, but Ukrainian should remain the primary language for instruction. As one respondent explains, "Children should study in two languages or one—Ukrainian. Everyone should study Ukrainian. In primary school the language of the minority

could be used, but in secondary school all subjects should be taught in Ukrainian.”

Language is a dividing factor: half of the people speak only one language (Russian or Ukrainian), but 90 percent of these live either in the west or the east. Russian-speaking people typically oppose speaking Ukrainian and protest against Ukrainian schools; their fight for the continued use of Russian exemplifies a fight against Ukrainian independence. According to this narrative, the establishment of a Ukrainian state language does not represent pressure against the Russian language. People retain a choice of education for their children. There is no shortage of Russian schools; everyone who speaks the official state language can also speak their own tongue. The Russian-language issue is exploited by Communists who support the influence of a strong hand, friendship with foreign Russia, authoritarian values, and socialist ideas. Thus it is important to be cautious in evaluating people’s needs and preferences: those who support the Russian language also support Russia and its political influence in Ukraine.

History Subtheme

The role of history is very important to the foundation of the nation. Ukraine does not need mythologization: it is important to use European traditions as a basis for Ukraine’s history. History should teach people to think, but instead it is presently used to manipulate sociopolitical consciousness. As one respondent stresses, “Russia dictates how our history ought to be written, but our history is not a regional Russian history.” The respondents indicated a need to build up Ukraine’s distinct history and stop the practice of idealization of the Soviet period as a Golden Age. One respondent states, “It is important to find common ground different than that dictated during the Soviet past—for example, Yaroslav the Wise. We need great positive prototypes; we do not need more pro-Soviet prototypes like Pavlik Morozovs, who committed treason for his father because of loyalty to the Soviets.” Another respondent echoes, “The red flag is not a flag of battle or victory; it is a myth created by Stalin. The people were not fighting under the red flag; it was invented later. This foul red flag represents imperial memory, dominance, and arrogance. Russia dictates to us how to write our history; we need to stop this very dangerous process.”

Holodomor is very important to Ukrainian identity as a core symbol and resource for Ukraine’s national idea. One respondent explains, “Famine touched every Ukrainian ethnic village; the borders were closed to prevent people from escaping; Ukrainians were targeted victims.” Another respondent echoes, “1932 to 1933 are years of apocalypse: the number of people who died equals the number of people in all other genocides taken together. It is a European catastrophe. It is important to support the idea of genocide.

Mechanisms developed during that time continue to work now. Ukraine is a victim of genocide and the ecological catastrophe of Chernobyl: they both are bigger than any other devastations in the world. Now the government is telling us that Holodomor was not a genocide—it is dangerous, surrealistic, grotesque.”

Since such dual consciousness remains, Ukrainian history has not become a foundation of national identity. The lies of the Soviet-authored history of 1931–1991 have not all been disproved; indeed, only fragments of it have been refuted. Yanukovich supports the Soviet model that portrays a positive past: the USSR as virtuous and good, the UPA as Nazis. But the UPA was the only movement fighting against the totalitarian regimes of both Stalin and Hitler. As one respondent describes, “There is a dispute over differing interpretations of World War II: Bandera’s struggle as an anti-Soviet fight rather than collaboration with Germans; alternately, those Ukrainians who worship the Red Army are not criminals because of their allegiance.” Another respondent echoes, “Ukraine needs to overcome the myth of Stalinism and acknowledge how many people were sacrificed during World War II and the Red Army’s rape of Europe.” This Ukrainian model of history leads to truth, whereas the Russian model leads backward to totalitarianism. These respondents feel that the state should influence the mass media in an effort to destroy these Soviet myths that dominate newspapers and TV. Ukraine must defend and support state TV efforts to this end and work with private channels to support a national idea of Ukrainian history.

Textbooks Subtheme

New textbooks are the result of political and symbolic battles as well as the influence of Russia. This represents a return to the old style of textbooks notable for Soviet values centered on the Great Patriotic War and a lack of any reference to Holodomor. These new textbooks will only precipitate resistance by educated children; they will not be accepted by society. Instead they will lead to frustration and greater internal conflicts; hopefully, they will soon be replaced by more balanced texts. As one respondent stresses, “New textbooks will be not accepted by the society. This is a result of the influence of the Russian Church.” Another respondent echoes: “I am in a chafe. This textbook is the result of a political and symbolic fight. The Russian patriarch Kirill encouraged Minister Tabachnyk to produce changes. This textbook will lead to irritation and conflict in society.”

Structure of National Narrative

Dualistic order

The dualistic order that defines the *fight for a Ukrainian ethnic identity* national narrative is based on axiologically opposite Russian and Ukrainian ethnic groups, where concentration of the “good” in the nation is connected with the Ukrainian side. A set of four categorical constructs defines the connotation of this *social group duality* (see table 3.3).

The first binary contract, victimization, is based on social relations value and posits the Russian ethnic group as an aggressive perpetrator, while the Ukrainian ethnic group is depicted as a permanent victim. The second categorical construct, inspirations, is based on ideology value and states that the Ukrainian ethnic group promotes values of national renaissance and independence and is Western-oriented and European, while the Russian ethnic group supports Russian imperial beliefs and is oriented to Russia and Asian consciousness. The construct ideological inspirations is also based on ideology values and defines the Ukrainian ethnic group as representing values of democracy, rights, and freedoms, while the Russian ethnic group is inspired by Communist ideology and has totalitarian, authoritarian, and paternalistic values.

In this dualistic order, the first function of a national narrative, the development of the meaning of national identity, is fulfilled by the establishment of a connotation of Ukraine as authentically Ukrainian, rooted in such genuine Ukrainian values as peacefulness, national renaissance, democracy, rights, and freedoms. The Russian ethnic group is positioned as alien, oriented toward Russia, aggressive, and totalitarian. The existing protracted conflict around power in Ukraine contributes to the establishment of an impervious social boundary characterized by intense axiological differences—for example, victim-aggressor, authentic-alien, and democratic-totalitarian. Thus, the existing connotation of power as a vital fight is *embedded* in the

Table 3.3. Dualistic Order of the Fight for a Ukrainian Ethnic Identity Narrative

	<i>Ukrainians</i>	<i>Russians</i>
<i>Victimization</i>	Victims	Aggressive, perpetrators
<i>Inspirations</i>	Nationalist with values of national renaissance, West-oriented, European	Imperial, Russia-oriented, Asian
<i>Ideology</i>	Democratic values, support of rights and freedoms	Communist, totalitarian, authoritarian and paternalistic

meaning of national identity, bringing the meaning of the identity to the extreme and making the social boundary between the groups rigid and impermeable.

The second function of national narrative, legitimization of power, is fulfilled by the value positioning of the Ukrainian ethnic group as democratic, pro-Western, and promoting a national renaissance for Ukraine while Russians desire dominance, totalitarianism, and submission to Russia. This value positioning serves to cement the power of Ukrainians as the only legitimate ethnic group. The existing meaning of Ukrainian identity as deeply democratic and authentic to Ukraine, as well as destruction of the boundary between Russians in Ukraine and imperial totalitarian and aggressive Russia, contribute to the *shaping* of a concept of power in which the Ukrainian ethnic group should hold all power in Ukraine.

Mythic Narratives and Iconic Order

The mythic narratives and iconic order are constituted by three myths that rest on binary constructs that justify their specific meaning.

The first mythic narrative is a variation of myths of suffering. Through the use of the impediment by outgroup mechanism, this myth defines Russians and Russia as enemies of an independent Ukraine. Ukraine is perceived to be a postcolonial, postgenocidal, posttotalitarian country. Holodomor is the core symbol of victimization that impacted every Ukrainian ethnic village where Ukrainians were targeted as victims. This suffering continues even after independence: the Ukrainian language is still oppressed and is under internal and external threat. The fight for continued use of the Russian language is a fight against Ukrainian independence. The Russian language dominates in the mass media and publications, and the Russian historic narrative is replacing the Ukrainian one.

The second mythic narrative is a variation on myths of rebirth and renewal. This myth employs two mechanisms. The validation of rights mechanism helps stress that Ukrainians deserve to rule the country and define national identity because, through the centuries of humiliation, they preserved their authentic culture and European roots. The impediment by outgroup mechanism states that liberal ideology and civic society are an impediment to positive Ukrainian ethnic nationalism. Ukraine survived as a nation, escaped slavery, and recovered like a phoenix. The foundations of the Ukrainian renaissance are cultural nationalism and Holodomor (as a resource for the national idea). Ukrainian nationalism has European roots and connections with the Magdeburg Law and the Ukrainian national movement of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The Ukrainian language is a core of national consciousness, the genetic code of the nation, and a symbol of independence. Ukrainian nationalism creates a great foundation for democracy, while dis-

cussions about civic society distract attention from the national idea. Russian imperialism posits a threat to Ukrainian nationalism.

The third mythic narrative is a variation on myths of territory and myths of ethnogenesis. The validation of rights mechanism also helps stress that Ukrainians should have more rights in their own land than Russians, who have to accept the Ukrainian ethnic idea or move to their ethnic land—Russia. It stresses that authentic Ukrainian lands in the north and west constitute the core of the Ukrainian nation while southeastern parts of Ukraine are populated by people supporting the Soviet past and Russia and are alien to the Ukrainian national idea. These former colonies of the Russian Romanov dynasty and the Soviet Union support continuation of the colonial regime, the Great Russian brown nationalism, and Russian imperial ambitions. Their mentality rests on ideals of violence, a totalitarian regime, forced assimilation, and socialist ideas.

The iconic order is constituted by negative images of the USSR, Stalin, Hitler, the red flag, and the Red Army “that raped half of Europe.” Another negative image is of the Russian Orthodox Church imposing its influence on Ukraine. Positive icons include Bandera and UPA, while Holodomor is a powerful icon representing suffering and rebirth.

The function of the development of the meaning of national identity is fulfilled in these mythic narratives by validating the established meaning of Ukrainian ethnic identity as democratic, promoting vital national values, and authentic to Ukraine, while Russians are alien to Ukraine. To justify this superiority, mythic narratives emphasize the coherence of Ukrainian culture and identity and employ the depiction of three historic continuities: long centuries of victimization by colonial and totalitarian regimes, including genocides that did not conclude with Ukrainian independence (Ukrainian continuously suffering under Russian dominance); and the idea of a national renaissance as rooted in European culture, the Magdeburg Law, and the Ukrainian national movement of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The core of the Ukrainian national idea is developed on authentic Ukrainian lands in the north and west while southeastern parts of Ukraine continue a legacy of colonization by the Russian Romanov dynasty and the Soviet Union. Mythic narratives also contribute to the *embedment* of the concept of power into national identity by justification of processes on two boundaries. First, the continuous oppression of Ukrainians by Russians within Ukraine results in a sharpening of the boundary and ontological difference between Russians and Ukrainians. Second, because of the strong support of Russian imperial ambitions by Russians in Ukraine, the boundary between Russians in both countries is destroyed. Thus, the major social boundary is drawn across ethnic rather than national borders, placing pro-democratic and pro-Western ideals on the Ukrainian side and pro-totalitarian, pro-Asian ideals on the Russian side.

The second function of a national narrative, legitimization of power, is fulfilled by the further value positioning of the Ukrainian ethnic group as more democratic, progressive, and authentic. The mythic narrative employs historic events both to legitimize the power of Ukrainians and to delegitimize the power of Russians: Holodomor is used as symbolic tool to stress the current need to defend the Ukrainian language oppressed by Russians in Ukraine and by Russia; the history of Ukrainian nationalism underpins the development of democracy, which is under threat of Russian imperialism; and an authentic history of Ukraine is connected with the north and west, while the southeast's history is a product of colonization. These historic accounts vindicate the rights of Ukrainians to be exclusive agents of nation building and exclude Russians from this process. In addition, the justification of the privileged status of Ukrainians and their right solely to rule the country is underpinned by stories of their deep national-democratic core and renewal after a long history of suffering, thus *shaping* the concept of power in Ukraine according to the meaning of Ukrainian identity.

Normative Order

The normative order emphasizes conflict of power: while the Ukrainian ethnic group should finally legitimately prevail in Ukraine, the Russian ethnic group with the support of Russia still holds power and posits a threat to the Ukrainian ethnic idea. The legitimacy of the power of the Ukrainian ethnic group is based on their long fight for independence and on the democratic nature and European roots of Ukrainian culture. The power of Russians is not legitimate in independent Ukraine because they promote totalitarian, imperial, and Soviet values. The normative order prescribes support of the Ukrainian language and culture: strong requirements to speak Ukrainian, enforcement of Ukrainian as the state language, a ban on Russian as a second state language, the provision of additional salary for speaking Ukrainian, and imposition of financial obligation on regions that vote for use of the Russian language. The normative order also stipulates a prohibition of the red flag, opposition to Soviet myths dominating Russian language mass media and among the Russian-language population, and increasing support of state TV and private channels that promote national ideas. Thus, legitimacy of the power of the Ukrainian ethnic group is justified through legitimization of the ingroup and delegitimization of the outgroup and through proclaiming the right to power based on Ukrainian cultural values and development.

Normative order positions the pro-democratic, peaceful, and authentic cultural values of Ukrainians as superior to Russians and legitimizes their power in Ukraine further. At the same time, normative order prescribes policies that delegitimize power. Normative order states that Russians have to accept the Ukrainian ethnic idea or move to their own ethnic land—Russia.

The meaning of national identity as essentially Ukrainian is created to justify the exclusive access of Ukrainians to power, thus supporting the *embedment* of the concept of power into the connotation of national identity. At the same time, concept of social hierarchy is *shaped* by the existing meaning of Ukrainian identity as an identity of a victimized group: Ukrainians vigorously legitimize their ingroup and delegitimize Russians.

Therefore, the fight for a Ukrainian ethnic identity narrative is based on *social group duality* that describes Ukraine in a fight between two ethnic groups—Russian and Ukrainian. This duality contains two values of ideology and one value of social order. They define Ukrainians as pro-Western, democratic, and victimized, while Russians are depicted as pro-Asian, totalitarian, and oppressive. To justify this duality, three myths are employed: ethnogenesis and territory, suffering, and rebirth and renewal. These myths state that (1) the Ukrainian ethnic group has developed in Ukraine and has Ukraine as its own territory while Russians have their own ethnic country—Russia—and came to Ukraine as colonialists who should leave or accept the Ukrainian ethnic state; (2) Ukraine is a postcolonial, postgenocidal, posttotalitarian country with Holodomor as the core symbol of such victimization, which continues now because the Ukrainian language and culture are oppressed by the dominant Russian language; and (3) Ukraine survived as a nation and recovered like a phoenix based on cultural nationalism, the idea of Holodomor, its European roots, its national movement, and the Ukrainian language as the genetic code of the nation; it will prosper despite obstructions from liberals and Russian nationalists. Through the use of the impediment by outgroup mechanism the supporters of the fight for a Ukrainian ethnic identity narrative define Russians and Russia as enemies of an independent Ukraine and state that liberal ideology and civic society are impediments to a positive Ukrainian ethnic nationalism. The validation of rights mechanism helps stress that Ukrainians deserve to rule the country and define national identity because, through centuries of humiliation, they have preserved an authentic culture and European roots. The validation of rights mechanism also helps stress that Ukrainians have more rights in their own land than Russians, who have to accept the Ukrainian ethnic idea or move to their own ethnic land—Russia. Through the interpretation mechanisms, Ukraine is described as an ethnic state of Ukrainians while all other ethnic groups are depicted as a result of immigration or colonialism, thus denying the multicultural nature of Ukrainian society; Holodomor is presented as a unique genocide committed by Russians against Ukrainians; the red flag is described as a foul flag that represents imperial memory, dominance, and arrogance; the decline of the number of people with Russian identity is viewed as the result of a free choice by people who have a double identity; and the fact that the Russian language is used more broadly than Ukrainian is interpreted as a cause to protect the Ukrainian language. Normative order in

the fight for a Ukrainian ethnic identity narrative (1) supports the dominance of the Ukrainian ethnic group based on its history and the threat from Russian culture and language, (2) emphasizes the importance of the development of a Ukrainian language and culture, and (3) promotes a ban on Russian as a second language and opposition to Soviet myths and Russian domination in the media. The legitimization of the rights of the ingroup is based on the belief that the Ukrainian ethnic group is more democratic, European, and modern than the Russian ethnic group and thus has exclusive rights to build the nation. The legitimization of the ingroup based on its cultural values arrives from the belief that Ukrainians were victimized and have been suffering for a long time yet preserve the ideals of democracy and freedom; hence they deserve to build their own ethnic state.

Recognition of a Ukrainian Ethnic Identity Narrative (23 percent of respondents)

Pride Subtheme

Pride derives from the view that Ukrainian people are hard-working, devoted to their land, and have supported democratic traditions since the Middle Ages. Ukraine is a peaceful, free society not dependent on power, patronage, or totalitarian ideology, all of which highlight the importance of preserving its difference from Russia.

Dynamics Subtheme

Yushchenko wanted to unite the nation, but his effort fell short of success. His willingness to develop a national idea was positive, but his policies were ineffective, failing to reach society and provoking resistance. He was inconsistent and careless in his invocation of the historic past. He initiated a reevaluation of Ukraine's history, presenting information about Holodomor as a crime against Ukrainian peasants who resisted Soviet evil; but he also discredited UPA and Bandera. As one respondent states, "Yushchenko's willingness to develop the national idea is positive, but his policy was not effective and did not reach society. The development based on the historic past can lead to conflict; thus his policy was not right, not careful. The institute of national commemoration glorified nationalists who collaborated with Nazis and had a Nazi ideology." Another respondent echoes, "Yushchenko destroyed the Soviet myth. Brezhnev created a myth of the Great Patriotic War as a political myth. Yushchenko initiated the reevaluation of history: Why were Ukrainian soldiers sacrificed? Why was DneproGES destroyed? He actualized the information about Holodomor as a devastation of Ukrainian peasants who fought against Soviet evil. But the majority of his actions were only declarations and discussions; he did not change anything.

He did not finish the task.” Another respondent explains, “Yushchenko emphasized Holodomor but did not give compensation to victims and their families. It was necessary to prepare the society, explain the situation, and use a dialogue with the society instead of the law. He did not transform it into a common belief, so the Holodomor memorial is a huge futile expenditure.” Yanukovych and his government, on the other hand, promote a pro-Russian policy and support the revival of Soviet myths but try to avoid any proper review of Ukraine’s history.

Identity Subtheme

Ukraine is an ethnic state of chiefly Ukrainians with small groups of Tatars, Russians, Hungarians, and others. Thus, national identity according to these respondents should be based on Ukrainian traditions and the unity of Ukrainian history, language, and culture; it should integrate Russians, Hungarians, and Crimean Tatars into its national identity. As one respondent stresses, “National identity is a very sensitive issue; some people think that we are a multiethnic society, but in reality the majority is Ukrainian, and there are small groups of Tatars, Russians, Hungarians, and Jews. So, Ukraine is an ethnic state of Ukrainians—it is supported by international organizations.” Another respondent echoes, “Ukrainians are part of a European nation, and other groups are the results of migration. Ethnic Ukrainians have high standards of democracy and are closer to a European mentality.” Ukraine possesses a unique identity rooted in high standards for people’s rights and freedoms and Ukrainian values of democracy. Union with Russia is not a popular idea in Ukraine even among its Russian population; this is a Russian idea brought from outside, one that Russia is using to fuel internal Ukrainian conflicts for its own benefit. As one respondent explains, “The Russian world is not influential and cannot influence or divide the people of Ukraine: we are very similar, with common culture, morals, and manners.” Another expert states, “Unity with Russia is not a popular idea in Ukraine. Russia exploits the Great Patriotic War, but it looks despairing. They could not support their thesis with economic achievements: why do losers live better than winners? This question killed the Soviet Union.”

Common Subtheme

People are united by aspirations for Ukraine’s own path of development based on notions of citizenship grounded in the Ukrainian culture and traditions of diligence, tolerance, and spirituality. Ukraine is not inferior to Europe in any such regard and is capable of fashioning itself into a European state. As one respondent stresses, “We are united as citizens of the country, Ukrainian culture and traditions, conceivability in views. People chose their way of development—Ukrainian culture and language.” Another respondent

says, “Common is the hope for a strong person who will resolve all problems, hope that Russia or the West will help.” The majority of respondents states that Ukrainian people are united by a common enemy—Russia.

Divide Subtheme

A majority of respondents do not see Ukrainian society as divided. Some of them acknowledge that the opposition between the west and east of Ukraine is induced and financed by Russia and its imperial ambitions.

Language Subtheme

The majority of people speak Ukrainian and do not have a problem using the language. As one respondent explains, “People are tolerant: in everyday life there are no problems with language. As polls show, 80 percent of people are Ukrainians, 60 percent state that their mother tongue is Ukrainian, and 40 percent speak Ukrainian. This gradation shows the unfinished process of Russification. Now people speak Russian only in the east.” As the acceptance of a Ukrainian ethnic identity has significantly increased (only around 15 percent of people report nostalgia for the Soviet era and see themselves as Russian), there has been an accompanying trend to see oneself as a representative of the Ukrainian language. Russian is considered a regional language in some parts of Ukraine, and it has retained its position in society; people continue to speak it, and TV channels are in Russian. Some Russian speakers do not want to learn Ukrainian and refuse to provide an opportunity for their children to do so. The major obstacle here is the manipulation of the language issue by politicians as a distraction from economic problems. All resulting conflicts are portrayed as the result of political manipulation from Russia. This narrative’s major requirement is the widespread use of the Ukrainian language. Ukrainian should be studied everywhere and should be the sole state language. As one respondent states, “There is a need for Ukrainian schools and classes everyone should study Ukrainian. It will influence the national identity of Ukraine where everyone will finally speak Ukrainian.” It is important to increase recognition of the Ukrainian language as a language of power. For the future of Ukraine’s children, more schools must teach and use the Ukrainian language, with the ultimate goal of producing high-quality literary products in Ukrainian.

History Subtheme

An independent Ukraine cannot be created without effective history. There are still differences in the perception of history in different regions of Ukraine, and thus there are no integrated narratives of Ukrainian history. Society needs to understand the bad and good of its past in order to be able to

move properly into the future. As one respondent states, “We cannot deny that Ukraine became a modern state as the Ukrainian SSR. The nation needs a more complex assessment of the Soviet Union and World War II without the distortion of ideological interpretation.” However, the groups controlling the state have not defined any novel concept of history and instead have borrowed a historical model from Russia. Ukraine has a distinct history from Russia, but Russia perceives any reformulation of Ukrainian history to be a threat to Russia and its efforts to reestablish the Soviet myth. As one respondent discusses, “Before Yanukovich there were no problems with history, but the obtrusion of the red flag provoked a chain reaction. For people in western Ukraine, Nazis and Communists are similar. It is also hard to explain people who believe that Stalin won the war that Stalin also represents fascism: the Red Army is not a liberator but another fascist force. The myth of the freedom of land is replacing real understanding of freedom. We speak about different freedoms. People believe in myths. We need to show the absence of difference between Stalin and Hitler and separate regimes from peoples. Many Russians are identified themselves with the regime and Stalin based on implicit belief.” The complexity of history is stressed by another respondent: “The Ukrainian fight for independence is not based just on nationalism and UPA, but some people are trying to impose this idea. The myth of UPA fighting against everyone is not a reality. There were ethnic cleansings of Poles, Jews, and Communists.” Another respondent emphasizes, “We need fewer accents on history; we do not know the contemporary history well. We need to leave aside ideological interpretations; people will decide for themselves. We need to find a common history.” According to the majority of respondents, Ukraine should be developed using a historical model that includes a commonly accepted past: Kievan Rus, the Cossack state, Taras Shevchenko, and Sobornost’ of Ukraine.

Textbooks Subtheme

Current changes to textbooks are the result of Russian influence. They reveal attempts by some to unite with Russia and undermine distinct Ukrainian culture and history. Such changes to textbooks forecast the destruction of national values, discarding one set of facts for another. This is a big mistake: these textbooks will not last long and will be challenged by children who have access to different and competing sources of information. As one respondent stresses, “Each new government creates its own textbooks; there is no strategy, no understanding of where we are going, no consolidation of society. Changes in textbooks provoke destruction of values and fluctuations from one to another direction.”

Structure of National Narrative

Dualistic Order

The dualistic order that defines the *recognition of a Ukrainian ethnic identity* national narrative is based on axiological opposites of “Ukraine” and “Russia,” where concentration of the “good” is connected with Ukraine while Russia is presented as the evil enemy. A set of two categorical constructs defines the connotation of this *binational duality* (see table 3.4).

The first binary construct, *ambitions*, is based on social order value and defines Ukraine as the independent state of the Ukrainian ethnic group with a peaceful homogeneous society, while Russia has imperial aspirations and wants to control Ukraine. The second construct, *core of society*, is based on ideology values and exemplifies Ukraine as a society with values and high standards of rights, freedoms, and democracy while Russia is characterized as a patronage society with dependency on power, a totalitarian ideology, and a Soviet mentality.

This dualistic order establishes the meaning of national identity through two major connotations: as democratic and peaceful, and as homogeneous with Ukrainian culture accepted by all citizens. In the first connotation Ukrainian national identity is defined as an opposition to Russian national identity, which is aggressive, imperial, totalitarian, and pro-Soviet. In the second connotation, Ukrainian national identity is depicted as solely based on authentic Ukrainian culture. The existing connotations of power as Ukrainian resistance to Russian expansion and as the power of Ukrainians in Ukraine accepted by the population are *embedded* in the meaning of national identity, making the social boundary between nations impermeable and dissolving boundaries between ethnic groups within Ukraine. The existing competition for power between imperial Russia and independent Ukraine contributes to the establishment of a rigid social boundary between two nations filled with ontological axiological differences—for example, peaceful-aggressive and democratic-totalitarian. The view of a nation ruled by Ukrai-

Table 3.4. Dualistic Order of Recognition of a Ukrainian Ethnic Identity Narrative

	<i>Ukraine</i>	<i>Russia</i>
<i>Ambitions</i>	Independent, peaceful, homogeneous state of Ukrainians	Imperial ambitions
<i>Core of society</i>	High standards of rights and freedoms and Ukrainian values of democracy	Dependence on power and patronage, a totalitarian ideology and Soviet mentality

nians through popular consensus underpins the destructions of social boundaries between ethnic groups within Ukraine.

The second function of a national narrative, legitimization of power, is fulfilled by the value positioning of Ukraine as an independent democratic state defending itself from Russian influence and a homogenous nation based on the rule of the Ukrainian ethnic group. This value positioning serves to protect Ukraine from the imperial ambitions of Russia and cements the power of Ukrainians in Ukraine. The existing meaning of national identity as peaceful, democratic, and homogenous contributes to the *shaping* of the concept of power as widely accepted rule of Ukrainians in independent Ukraine.

Mythic Narratives and Iconic Order

The mythic narratives and iconic order are constituted by two myths that rest on binary constructs that justify their specific meaning.

The first mythic narrative is a variation of myths of ethnogenesis. The validation of rights mechanism helps stress that Ukrainians have a greater right to power in their own land than other ethnic groups who have accepted the Ukrainian ethnic idea. It represents Ukraine as an ethnic state of Ukrainians while all other ethnic groups, including Tatars, Russians, Hungarians, Jews, and so forth, are small and happily assimilated within the Ukrainian ethnic state. They came to Ukraine as migrants and accepted the Ukrainian language, traditions, and culture. Thus, Ukraine should not be treated as a multicultural state; it is a homogeneous ethnic state of Ukrainians who are very similar in their culture, morals, and manners. But Russia, with its imperial ambitions, is fueling internal Ukrainian conflicts for its own benefit. It wants to regain control over Ukraine and impose the Russian language, culture, and church.

The second mythic narrative is a variation of myths of election. The positive ingroup predispositions mechanism is employed to depict Ukrainians as essentially democratic and European, thus having the ability to build Ukraine as an independent European country. According to this myth, the Ukrainian ethnic group has supported democratic traditions since the Middle Ages, and its unique identity is rooted in high standards for people's rights and freedoms, values of democracy, and traditions of diligence, tolerance, and spirituality. Ukraine's neighbor, Russia, has developed as a totalitarian society with a prevalence of the state over the people. Thus, the Russian ethnic group is characterized by patronage and a totalitarian ideology. It is important to preserve a separation from a Russia that wants to undermine Ukraine's distinct culture and history.

The iconic order is composed of the negative icon of Russia and positive icons of uniting Ukrainian figures, ideas, and events including Kievan Rus, the Cossack state, Taras Shevchenko, and Sobornost' of Ukraine.

These mythic narratives fulfill the first function of a national narrative—the development of the meaning of national identity—by advancing the meaning of Ukrainian identity established in a dualistic order as democratic, peaceful, and homogeneous. To justify the democratic and peaceful meaning of national identity, mythic narratives emphasize the coherence of these values in the Ukrainian national identity by depicting two historic continuities: the history of western Ukraine that supports democratic values in communities since the Middle Ages, and the Cossack traditions of communal democracy and self-governance. The meaning of national identity as homogeneous is validated through three historic accounts: the history of Kievan Rus that created foundations for Ukraine as a state of Ukrainians, Taras Shevchenko's ideals of an independent country for Ukrainians, and Sobornost' of Ukraine as a foundation for the unity of all citizens who have accepted Ukrainian culture. Mythic narratives also contribute to the *embedment* of the concept of power—the rule of Ukrainians based on national consensus and the absence of influence from Russia—into the meaning of national identity: it is homogeneous and completely differs from Russia.

The second function of a national narrative, legitimization of power, is fulfilled by the further value positioning of Ukraine as independent and pro-democratic, with the widely accepted rule of Ukrainians. To support the idea of independence the mythic narratives employ stories of aggressive intentions of Russia that seek to bring Ukraine patronage and a totalitarian ideology, undermining Ukraine's distinct culture and history. To justify the meaning of homogeneity, mythic narratives utilize stories about tolerant Ukrainians and happily assimilated ethnic minorities that came to Ukraine as migrants and accepted the Ukrainian language, traditions, and culture, as well as accounts of the Russian impact on internal conflicts in Ukraine. In addition, the justification of the power of Ukrainians is underpinned by stories about their essential democratic and tolerant nature and ability to build an independent democratic country, thus *shaping* the concept of power in Ukraine through the positive meaning of the Ukrainian ethnic identity.

Normative Order

The normative order supports the legitimacy of the power of the Ukrainian ethnic group because it is accepted by all the people of Ukraine as well as by international organizations. The normative order prescribes the widespread use of the Ukrainian language as the sole state language. According to this normative order, everyone should study Ukrainian, and it should become the only language of education, mass media, and power. Ukrainian history

should unite people and differentiate them from Russia. Thus, the legitimacy of the exclusive rule of Ukrainians is justified through this consensus and validation by the assimilated minorities and legitimization of independence and delegitimization of imperial Russian ambitions.

Normative order advances the positioning of an independent state based on Ukrainian culture as the only model for Ukraine and legitimization of the exclusive rule of Ukrainians as justified in mythic narratives. Normative order promotes the positive meaning of Ukrainian identity as both pro-democratic and homogenous by prescribing policies promoting Ukrainian language as the only language of education, everyday interactions, mass media, and power. It legitimizes the use of this political and social order as the best model for the current Ukraine and delegitimizes the influence of Russia by the promotion of a history separated from Russia. The meaning of national identity as authentically Ukrainian is created to justify the rule of the Ukrainian ethnic group, thus supporting the embedment of the concept of power into the connotation of national identity. At the same time, the concept of social power is shaped by the positive meaning of Ukrainian ethnic identity as pro-democratic: Ukraine should build a democratic society based on the ethno-national ideals of the Ukrainian ethnic group.

Therefore, the recognition of a Ukrainian ethnic identity narrative is based on a *binational duality* that emphasizes the conflict between Ukraine and Russia and the political and ideological systems they represent as a major problem for Ukraine. The recognition of a Ukrainian ethnic identity narrative contains values of ideology and social order. They depict Ukraine as a homogeneous and democratic country, while Russia is described as totalitarian country with imperial ambitions. To justify this duality, two myths are employed: ethnogenesis and election. These myths state that (1) the Ukrainian ethnic group developed in Ukraine and has Ukraine as its own territory while Russians have their own ethnic country—Russia—and came to Ukraine as immigrants who accepted the dominance of Ukrainian culture and (2) Ukrainians have supported democracy, tolerance, and human rights since the Middle Ages, and thus it is important to preserve its differences from Russia, which has developed as a totalitarian paternalistic society. The positive ingroup predispositions mechanism is employed to depict Ukrainians as essentially democratic and European and thus having the ability to build Ukraine as an independent European country. The validation of rights mechanism helps stress that Ukrainians have a greater right to power in their own land than other ethnic groups who have accepted a Ukrainian ethnic idea. Through the interpretation mechanisms, Ukraine is described as an ethnic state of Ukrainians while all other ethnic groups are depicted as a result of immigration or colonialism, and thus the multicultural nature of Ukrainian society is denied; Holodomor is presented as a unique genocide committed by Russians against Ukrainians; the decline of the number of

people with Russian identity is viewed as the result of free choice by people who have a double identity; and the fact that the Russian language is used more broadly than Ukrainian is interpreted as cause to protect the Ukrainian language. Normative order (1) prescribes separation of Ukrainian and Russian history and defense against Russian imperial ambitions, (2) promotes dominance of the Ukrainian ethnic group as accepted nationally and internationally, and (3) encourages widespread use of the Ukrainian language as the only language of education, government, and public policy. The legitimization of ingroup power arrives from the belief that Ukrainians were victimized and have been suffering for a long time and so they deserve to build their own ethnic state. The legitimization of the ingroup is based on acceptance of the structure (system of power) as “right” by both advantaged and disadvantaged groups as well as validation and consensus arrived at from the belief that Ukrainians are native to Ukraine and all other immigrant ethnic groups have already accepted the Ukrainian ethnic state and assimilated into Ukrainian culture and society.

Multicultural Civic Narrative (16 percent of respondents)

Pride Subtheme

The sources of pride are the achievements of the Ukrainian people and the beauty of its land. As one respondent states, “The basis of pride is a love of the land that you know from the childhood. I love my own plains; I trust the plains.” Another respondent echoes, “I love Ukraine stupidly and consistently.”

Dynamics Subtheme

Yushchenko provoked many problems with his chaotic actions and ethnocentrism; he worked counter to the unity of the people and discredited the idea of Ukrainian culture. He developed the concept of Holodomor without any methodology for the collection of data and allowed a lie to destroy an alternative explanation. His fervent actions to promote OUN/UPA and Bandera quashed the valuable idea to create a revised Ukrainian history. As one respondent explains, “Yushchenko has brought chaotic actions and primitivism without any complex and developed approach. It is good to love the Motherland but not right to impose one’s own vision on all of Ukraine. He discredited the idea of Ukrainian culture.” There was no graduated process of altering values left over from the Soviet era. As another respondent states, “There was no evolution of ideology; Yushchenko behaved as a post-Soviet official.” Yanukovich, on the other hand, came to power using anti-Ukrainian slogans but now wants to become a president for the whole of Ukraine. He employs Soviet myths, the red flag, and the psychology of the Soviet

regime and sells out ideological positions in exchange for Russian gas. As one respondent stresses, “Yanukovych is a Soviet person; he lives in his own world. He brings Ukraine back into Soviet space, and he is doing it partly because of his mentality as a Soviet person but also because he has advisors from Russia. Azarov is representative of the Soviet approach to society: he acts and explains his own actions.”

Identity Subtheme

According to these respondents, Ukraine is a multicultural society without a common national identity that unites all ethnic groups as coequal members of the nation. As one respondent stresses, “We need to unite all ethnic groups. There are no small and big cultures—everyone is equal.” Ukraine remains split between two language groups, but the percentage of mixed marriages is very high. The regional distribution of bilingual people is unequal, with 45 percent in the east and only 6 percent in the west. Thus, people with two ethnic identities have greater affinity with Russians. A key mistake is to believe that Russian propaganda works effectively in Ukraine and that people want to be in union with Russia. People actually want to live in a Ukraine that has a common shared society and an aim to joining the European Union. As one respondent says, “Ukraine is a multicultural society it was established based on a referendum of all the people. People want to live in a common shared society, a better society, and want to join EU. They put less attention toward history and culture: there are very few people who can name cultural figures, those people who contributed to history and culture.” Ukraine should build its own civic identity and civic society, but this project is undermined by two major and conflicting ideologies. On the one side, the Ukrainian narrative builds national identity based on the ethnic identity of one group, excluding all others, and does not develop a civic component. As one respondent explains, “The national idea of ‘one language, one culture’ is mixed with the Soviet legacy of social opposition—the idea of the ‘castle under siege,’ a need always to fight against an enemy.” Another respondent echoes, “Ukrainian narratives do not include other ethnic groups and do not have ideas about civic society.” On the other side, the civic concept is transformed into a Soviet concept without any liberal values, resting on collective consciousness, with imperial values influenced by Russia.

Common Subtheme

People are united by common territory, a “common shell” connected to the idea of Ukrainian independence.

Divide Subtheme

The narrative does not emphasize the divide in the society. As one respondent explains, "Ukraine is a multicultural society; it was established based on a referendum of all the people. People are not conflictual, but Yushchenko and Yanukovych do swing the pendulum." The divide is connected with social ideology and language. The narrative holds two models of divide. The first model emphasizes ideological difference. On the one hand, nationalist fundamentalism is represented by national-democratic fundamentalists, supporting ethno-cultural populists in the west and anti-Ukrainian Stalinists in the east. On the other hand, clientalists support a Soviet style of society with an economic executive leader and workers. According to the second model, the people also are divided by language: Ukrainian-speaking Ukrainians, Russian-speaking Ukrainians, and Russian-speaking Russians. As one respondent stresses, "51 to 55 percent of people speak the Russian language natively but belong to the Ukrainian culture." A majority of people want closer relations with Russia but do not want to return to the Soviet period. All groups desire to join the European Union in the future.

Language Subtheme

According to the interviewees, the Ukrainian language should be the sole state language in order to promote a common national identity. The policy aimed at increasing the status of the Ukrainian language was misguided: forced rapid transformation led to resistance by and confrontations with the Russian-speaking population. As one respondent states, "It is impossible to develop language by the order of the president. The Ukrainian language should become a high-status language." The Ukrainian language should be supported through promoting structures and state assistance. Establishing Russian as a secondary state language will serve to divide the bilingual society and decrease its stability. People have adapted to both languages and speak both languages to one another. A majority of young people speak Ukrainian even if their family speaks Russian. Most people accept Ukrainian as a state language, but in some regions problems remain, sharpened by the influence from Russia. As one respondent stresses, "Language dived Ukraine, but people are not divided by the language; they do not pay a lot of attention to the language they speak. Language is used for the polarization of the electorate; it is a problem that is imposed on Ukrainian society by Russian politicians." People ought to be free to use Russian by personal choice, and Russian can be treated as a regional language.

History Subtheme

History is the basic foundation of a common Ukrainian identity that connects people to the country, including concepts of citizenship, love, pride, and moral principles. National identity should be built on the multiplicity of and multiple voices from Ukrainian history. All people who lived in the territory of Ukraine have contributed to Ukrainian identity. Historic narratives should be presented in continuity, a connection of the will and efforts of all Ukrainian citizens. As one respondent states, “Cossacks represent a neutral history, while Bandera and Petlura symbolize differences in perceptions. Use of Soviet history also leads to a divide. It is hard to unite people who have different histories.” Another respondent echoes, “Today the world is resolving the problem of unity in diversity. The fight for independence should not lead to the imposition of one ethnic history over others.” Ukraine has a common shared history in Bogdan Khmel’nitskii and Taras Shevchenko. The Soviet past should be understood through both its negative and positive aspects; Holodomor should be presented as a result of class struggle. Historic beliefs are easily mobilized by politicians through the use of Soviet symbols (the red flag law), war monuments, Soviet monumentalism, and the celebration of Soviet holidays. As one respondent emphasizes, “Ukraine is a country with an undefined historic past. The language and culture do not play an important role but are easily mobilized by politicians.” Restoration of a glorified picture of the Soviet period is dangerous for Ukrainian society and for civic identity.

History Textbooks Subtheme

New textbooks that proffer a kind of naked patriotism will meet resistance from children who have been exposed to other concepts of Ukrainian identity. Textbooks should provide a depiction of civic society, relate multiple perspectives, and avoid fear-mongering and accusations toward groups.

Dualistic Order

The dualistic order that defines a *multicultural civic* national narrative is based on axiological opposites of ideological entrepreneurs and civic society, where concentration of the “good” is connected with civic society while ideological interpreters (Russian and Ukrainian nationalists and pro-Soviet leaders) are presented as evil. A set of three binary constructs defines the connotation of this *ideological duality* (see table 3.5).

The first binary construct, aspiration, is based on social relations value and defines ideological entrepreneurs as willing to divide Ukraine for their political purposes while civic society has aspirations to unite the people of Ukraine. The second construct, vision of society, is based on social order

Table 3.5. Dualistic Order of a Multicultural Civic Narrative

	<i>Civic society</i>	<i>Ideological entrepreneurs</i>
<i>Aspiration</i>	Unite people	Divide the country
<i>Vision of society</i>	Multicultural	Homogenous (ethnic or soviet)
<i>Perception of people</i>	Free will and agency	Followers with paternalistic values

value and posits ideological entrepreneurs as promoting a homogenous society (of the Ukrainian ethnic group or as a Soviet people) while civic society emphasizes multiculturalism and differences of opinions. The third construct, perception of people, is also based on social order value and defines civic society as promoting the free will and agency of people while ideological entrepreneurs treat them as paternalists and followers.

In this dualistic order, the meaning of a national identity is set as potential and arrives from the positive axiological positioning of civic national identity as the best option for Ukraine. The meaning of this potent identity is defined as uniting, multicultural, and empowering. The ideological entrepreneurs (pro-Soviet and nationalistic) are positioned as an outgroup for the civic ideology: they are described as divisive, manipulative, and disempowering. These ideological entrepreneurs are defined as abusers of social power rather than enemies or competitors.

The second function of national narrative, legitimization of power, is fulfilled by the value positioning of civic society as promoting unification of the people, multicultural values, and civic agency while ideological entrepreneurs divide Ukraine for their political purposes and promote a paternalistic and populist mentality to rule the country. This value positioning justifies the power of civic society as the most legitimate agency for a democratic Ukraine. The potential meaning of Ukrainian identity as democratic and multicultural contributes to *shaping* the concept of power in which empowered people are positioned as agents of change.

Mythic Narratives and Iconic Order

The mythic narratives and iconic order are constituted by three myths that rest on binary constructs and justify their specific meaning.

The first mythic narrative is a variation on myths of foundation. Through the use of the impediment by outgroup mechanism this myth stresses that narrow-minded nationalistic ideology destroys the prospect for a tolerant civic society. The myth describes civic society as the only positive option for the Ukrainian people to be united. People of Ukraine desire living in a common shared society with perspectives on joining the European Union.

Ukraine can build its own civic identity, but the major impediment is the use of conflicting ideologies. Ukrainian nationalists stress the importance of defending Ukrainian culture and language from the threat of Russia; Russian nationalists and anti-Ukrainian Stalinists emphasize threats to the Russian language and culture and blame the Ukrainian ethnic group. Language and history are used to polarize and mobilize voters. Employment of the histories of UPA, World War II, and the Soviet Union lead to the divide in society. While Yushchenko, promoting OUN/UPA and Bandera, suppressed the possibility of the creation of a common Ukrainian history, Yanukovich employs Soviet myths and the values of the Soviet regime.

The second mythic narrative is a variation on myths of ethnogenesis. The condemning imposition mechanism is used to blame Ukrainian nationalists for the imposition of ethno-cultural values and traditions of one ethnic group on the whole society of Ukraine. According to this myth, Ukraine is a multicultural society with equal ethnic groups. No culture can be big or small, and all people should be treated equally and respect each other. Ideological entrepreneurs are trying to impose their vision on the whole of society. Ukrainian nationalists form national identity on the basis of the ethnic identity of one group, excluding all others. Russian and pro-Soviet leaders want to impose a Soviet concept of "Soviet people" (*sovetskii narod*) or a pan-Slavic concept of the common destiny of Eastern Slavs. Both these concepts undermine the multiplicity of identities of the people of Ukraine.

The third mythic narrative is a variation on myths of foundation. Through the use of the impediment by outgroup mechanism, this myth stresses that fundamentalism and populism destroy prospects for social agency. Civic society promotes the active participation of citizens in political processes, the accountability of political leaders, and the free will of all people. Nationalist fundamentalism (both Russian and Ukrainian) promotes populism among the people who have to blindly support virulent nationalism. Pro-Soviet leaders encourage clientelists' support of a Soviet style of society with an economic executive leader and inferior workers, political paternalism, and dependence on the government. Civic society is a major enemy and a threat for both nationalists and pro-Soviet leaders because it liberates people and increase their agency and ability to resist manipulation.

Iconic Order

Positive icons include Bogdan Khmel'nitskii, Taras Shevchenko, Lina Kostenko. Negative icons include Stepan Bandera, Joseph Stalin, UPA/USO, and the red flag.

These mythic narratives fulfill the first function of a national narrative, the development of the meaning of national identity, by advancing the civic identity established in dualistic order as the best concept of national identity

for an independent Ukraine. To justify this prospective meaning of identity, mythic narratives describe Ukraine as a multicultural nation that is longing for democracy: mythic narratives emphasize the willingness of people in Ukraine to live in a free, democratic, multicultural society and their inability to resist the ideological manipulations of Ukrainian nationals and pro-Russian Stalinists. Mythic narratives also contribute to the embedment of the concept of power—the empowerment of people by civic society and the current disempowerment of the majority through ideological manipulations—into the meaning of national identity: the achievement of positive national identity is possible only by the development of the civic meaning of national identity.

The second function of a national narrative, legitimization of power, is fulfilled by the further value positioning of civic society as tolerant, supporting all cultures as equal, and promoting civic responsibility and agency of the people. The legitimization is based on the idea of a common desire to live in a shared society with perspectives on joining the European Union. To delegitimize ideological opponents, mythic narratives employ accounts of impediments to this prospective society by Ukrainian nationalists and pro-Russian Stalinists: their utilization of conflicting ideologies; misuse of histories of OUN/UPA, World War II, and the Soviet Union; employment of Soviet myths and a pan-Slavic concept of the common destiny of Eastern Slavs; and promotion of populism, virulent nationalism, and political paternalism. In addition, the justification of the positive prospect of a civic society is underpinned by stories about such leaders as Bogdan Khmel'nitskii, Taras Shevchenko, and Lina Kostenko, thus shaping the concept of power in Ukraine (promotion of civic society and support of all cultures) by the meaning of national identity as multicultural and leaning toward democracy.

Normative Order

The normative order posits all manipulations by political and ideological entrepreneurs, including Russian and Ukrainian nationalist and pro-Soviet leaders, as illegitimate and destructive to the country. The fight for independence should not lead to the imposition of one ethnic history or political ideology over others. This order prescribes the creation of unity in diversity. To promote a common national identity the Ukrainian language should be the sole state language, but policies toward the Russian language should be liberal. The promotion of Ukrainian language should be based on motivation and state assistance instead of force of law. Ukrainian history should represent multiple voices and different interpretations. Historic narratives should be presented in continuity, as a connection of the will and efforts of all Ukrainian citizens. The legitimization of civic society based on validation and consensus derives from the belief that the people of Ukraine should be

enlightened and educated to fully appreciate the values of democracy and civic society and so that they can understand ways for building a society of socially responsible people.

Normative order further develops the positioning of Ukraine as a multicultural and potentially democratic society and the legitimization of civic society as the best prospect for Ukraine. Normative order promotes the positive civic meaning of national identity by prescribing the creation of unity in diversity. It legitimizes the formation of a multicultural civic society by promoting liberal policies toward all languages but supporting the Ukrainian language as a sole state language through incentives and state assistance and presentation of multiple voices and different interpretations of Ukrainian history. Normative order stresses that the creation of democratic society requires the development of the civic meaning of national identity, thus supporting the *embedding* of the concept of power into the connotation of national identity. At the same time, the concept of civic society is shaped by meaning of national identity as multicultural with different histories and diverse voices.

Therefore, the multicultural-civic narrative is based on *ideological duality* that describes Ukraine as an arena of a conflict between liberal ideology and nationalistic and pro-Soviet extremists. The multicultural-civic narrative contains values of social order and social relations. They define liberalism as an ideology of unity, multiculturalism, and free will while nationalistic and pro-Soviet mentalities lead to division, a homogenous state, and paternalism. To justify this duality, three myths are employed: two myths of foundation and one myth of ethnogenesis. These myths state that (1) Ukrainian and Russian nationalists and Stalinist-Communists obstruct the development of peaceful civic society through conflict ideologies; (2) they diminish the people's agency through populism and paternalism; and (3) the Ukrainian nation is authentically multicultural and was formed as a conglomerate of different ethnic groups but Ukrainian nationalists are trying to form the nation on the basis of one group. Through the use of the impediment by outgroup mechanism, the supporters of the multicultural-civic narrative stress that narrow-minded nationalistic ideology and populism destroy prospects for a tolerant civic society and social agency. The condemning imposition mechanism is used to blame Ukrainian nationalists for the imposition of the ethno-cultural values and traditions of one ethnic group on the whole society of Ukraine. Through the interpretation mechanisms Ukraine is presented as a multicultural state with coequal ethnic groups, and attempts of Ukrainian nationalists to form a Ukrainian nation on the basis of one ethnic group are criticized. Normative order (1) endorses unity in diversity and multiculturalism, (2) denounces all types of extremists (nationalists, Stalinists, and Communists), and (3) encourages a dialogue of histories, incentives to speak Ukrainian, and support of other languages. The legitimization of civic society based on validation

and consensus arrives from the belief that the Ukrainian people should be enlightened and educated to fully appreciate the values of democracy and civic society and to understand how to build a society of socially responsible people.

Mapping Narratives

The results show that the five narratives found in this study fulfill two major functions of a national narrative—formation of the meaning of national identity and legitimization of power—and yet differ from each other in how these functions are fulfilled on the levels of dualistic order, mythic narratives, and normative order. Thus, the analysis revealed the existence of five different narratives about Ukraine's national identity and concepts of legitimate power. Each narrative is characterized by three main features: (1) it is coherent and articulate, with strong internal logic and increasing justification of the concept of national identity and legitimacy of power from level to level; (2) it is connected with a specific conception of power and morality; and (3) it is different and in many features opposite from other narratives. All these features of the narratives lead to the perception that conceiving a society is a zero-sum game where one narrative must prevail over all others. This produces aggression, enemy hunts, antagonism, and hostility among people supporting conclusions of the theoretical discussions on competing narratives represented in chapter 1 of this book. At the same time, these features of the narratives ensure that there can neither be an overwhelming victory of one narrative over others nor a satisfying compromise between them. The realization of this fact is very important for the opening of a much needed real dialogue in the society. The main themes of the narratives are presented in the table 3.6.

The dual identity narrative describes Ukraine as a country with a dual identity comprising two coequal ethnic groups. People supporting this narrative are proud of their Ukrainian Russian culture and heritage and insist that it differs from Russian culture in Russia. They see the country as divided by regional differences and believe that Ukrainian nationalists are the ones responsible for increasing tensions in the country. The Russian language is perceived to be under threat and should be established as a second state language. Regions have distinctive histories and approaches to the past that impede the development of a common national identity. Textbooks should be revised to remove Ukrainian nationalistic interpretations of history and culture.

Table 3.6. Major Themes of National Narratives

<i>Categories</i>	<i>Dual Identity</i>	<i>Pro-Soviet</i>	<i>Fight for Ukrainian</i>	<i>Recognition of Ukrainian</i>	<i>Multicultural</i>
Pride	Russian culture in Ukraine: spirituality and deep values	History of Ukraine including achievements of Ukr. SSR	Ukraine recovered as phoenix and is fulfilled with liberal nationalism	Free country with deep democratic traditions	Achievements of Ukrainian beauty
Identity dynamics	Yushchenko: imposition of Ukrainian identity Yanukovich: Absence of ideology	Yushchenko: wrong politics of memory Yanukovich: absence of national concept	Yushchenko: right policy but did not do enough Yanukovich: Pro-Soviet and Russian	Yushchenko: right policy but did not unite nation Yanukovich: influenced by Russia	Yushchenko worked unity of Yanukovich employ myths
Identity	Dual identity with two equal ethnic groups. Threat to Russian identity	Multilayer identity that needs incorporation of positive achievement of the past	Ukrainian nationalism as a core Threat of Soviet pro-Russian mentality	Ethnic state of Ukrainians with small minorities Different from Russia	Multicultural society build citizens It is off-national Soviet
Common	Christian culture and independence	Common destiny and independence	Ukrainian culture and territory	Ukraine's own way of development	Common and independent
Divide	Between east and west region; Ukrainian nationalism as a trigger	Between two ethnic groups based on history of 20th century	Between authentic democratic Ukraine and pro-Soviet migrants	No real divide, tensions provoked by Russia	Based on ideology and territory
Language	Dividing factor, discrimination of Russian language; need for bilingual law	Ukrainian as a state language with the support of and liberal policy toward Russian	Ukrainian as a state language is under the treaty by Russians and must be protected	Ukrainian as commonly accepted state language. Problems developed by politicians	Ukrainian language liberal freedom language

<i>Categories</i>	<i>Dual Identity</i>	<i>Pro-Soviet</i>	<i>Fight for Ukrainian</i>	<i>Recognition of Ukrainian</i>	<i>Multicultural</i>
History	Two regions with two histories and approaches to the past	Need to be build on the balances assessment of 20th century	Ukrainian model of history is threatened by Soviet myths	Need for common history different from Russian	Multiple history components
History textbooks	Good change based on the need of revisions and corrections	Good change based on the need of a balanced approach	Return to Soviet values that will produce resistance	Result of the influence of Russia, will provoke conflicts	Naked instead of perspective

Those who profess a pro-Soviet narrative orient their views toward the reassessment of the history of the Soviet Union and aim to increase national pride and unity by incorporating Soviet achievements into the core of the country's national identity. Ukraine is thus portrayed as a multicultural society where all internal conflicts are provoked by nationalists. The narrative confirms Ukrainian as the only state language but stresses the importance of support for a liberal policy toward use of the Russian language. The historic narrative of Ukraine should include both positive and negative assessments of its Soviet past, and history textbooks should be revised to correct the present one-sided presentation of history.

The narrative "fight for Ukrainian ethnic identity" describes Ukraine as a homogenous culture of ethnic Ukrainians with enclaves of pro-Soviet Russians that have resulted from colonization and immigration. Ukraine is a postcolonial, postgenocidal society that was able to survive, preserve its culture and language, and achieve independence. But Ukrainian culture, language, and history remain under the threat from its pro-Soviet population and the present government, which is supported by Russia. The major divide in the society is between authentic Ukrainian democratic values and pro-Soviet Russian totalitarian ideals. It is important to protect the Ukrainian language and history from pro-Soviet influences and create policies that enforce Ukrainian as the sole state language.

The recognition of a Ukrainian ethnic identity narrative describes Ukraine as a homogenous culture of ethnic Ukrainians with small ethnic minority groups: Russians, Crimean Tatars, and Hungarians. The society is united by the deep democratic traditions of Ukrainian culture, which differs from Russian totalitarianism. The majority of people speak the Ukrainian language and accept Ukrainian as a sole state language. The Russian-speaking population enjoys sufficient opportunities to preserve their language; linguistic tensions are provoked only when Russia manipulates the issue. Despite regional differences in the interpretation of history, Ukraine has one common historical past, distinct from Russia. Ukraine should defend its independence from Russian influence in both politics and education.

The multicultural civic narrative describes Ukraine as a multicultural society with coequal ethnic groups that should build a civic, not ethnic, concept of national identity. This society is the product of the efforts of all Ukrainian citizens, united by the idea of independence. The civic concept is undermined by Ukrainian and Russian nationalists as well as by the pro-Soviet population. The Ukrainian language as a sole state language serves to unite Ukraine but ought not be enforced. The ability to use Russian in other spheres should be a free choice of the people. The historic narrative that forms the foundation of Ukraine's common identity should be grounded in inclusive ideas of citizenship and should reflect the plural voices of Ukrainian history.

All these narratives rest on opposing interpretations of various features of society. Ukraine is perceived to be a multicultural society in the dual identity narrative, the pro-Soviet narrative, and the multicultural-civic narrative. However, both of the Ukrainian narratives describe the country as a mainly homogeneous society of ethnic Ukrainians. The definition of “the enemy” is absent only in the multicultural-civic narrative, while the dual identity and pro-Soviet narratives posit Ukrainian nationalists as the enemy. The recognition of Ukrainian ethnic identity narrative posits Russia as an enemy. The fight for a Ukrainian ethnic identity narrative identifies the Russian-speaking population in Ukraine as an enemy that is influenced by Russia.

The “Us-Them” perception evident in two narratives—dual identity and fight for Ukrainian ethnic identity—can serve as one dimension for the mapping of existing narratives. One side of the continuum is characterized by the predominance of pro-Russian sentiments, the other by pro-Ukrainian sentiments. Another dimension for mapping derives from the interpretation of Ukrainian society as mostly homogeneous or heterogeneous. Thus, the map of prevailing narrative will be the following (as seen in figure 3.1):

Based on the two dimensions of homogeneous-heterogeneous society and pro-Russian-pro-Ukrainian sentiments, the narratives of the fight for Ukrainian ethnic identity is placed in the heterogeneous society/pro-Ukrainian quadrant. The recognition of a Ukrainian ethnic identity narrative is placed in the homogeneous society/pro-Ukrainian quadrant. The pro-Soviet narrative is placed in the homogeneous society/pro-Russian quadrant, and the dual




Figure 3.1. Map of the Narratives (Version 1)

identity narrative is placed in the heterogeneous society/ pro-Russian quadrant. The multiethnic-civic narrative is placed on the heterogeneous society side but could not be defined by the pro-Russian-pro-Ukrainian sentiments dimension. Hence, the proposed map of the predominant narratives must be reconsidered to include the multiethnic-civic narrative.

Another version of mapping (figure 3.2) could include a dimension reflecting a concept of national identity represented by the civic concept (a liberal ideology) and the ethnic concept (a primordial ideology). The concept of civic society (as opposed to an ethnic society) is developed only in the multicultural-civic narrative. It is nearly absent in the dual identity and recognition of a Ukrainian ethnic identity narratives. The civic society concept is considered a threat in the pro-Soviet and fight for a Ukrainian ethnic identity narratives. The interpretations of history and the status of the Russian language differ completely among the narratives. The second dimension, homogeneous-heterogeneous society, can remain.

The second map places the dual identity narrative and fight for a Ukrainian ethnic identity narrative in the heterogeneous society/ethnic concept quadrant. The pro-Soviet and recognition of a Ukrainian ethnic identity narratives are placed in the homogeneous society/ethnic concept quadrant; and the multicultural-civic narrative is placed in the heterogeneous society/civic concept quadrant. This mapping has several advantages: it provides an opportunity to place all narratives on the map and to recognize what narratives are missing in the society. The map shows that four out of five narratives rest




Figure 3.2. Map of the Narratives (Version 2)

on a primordial ideology and employ ethnic concepts in the development of the national idea. Only one narrative, the multicultural-civic one, represented by 16 percent of respondents, is based on a liberal ideology and civic meaning of national identity. Nevertheless, this narrative recognizes the ethnic diversity of Ukrainian society. Thus, the intellectual landscape of Ukraine is deficient in civic liberal ideologies that define society as a community of equal citizens independently of their ethnicity, language, or religion.

One of the greatest threats to the civic-based national narrative is the pro-Soviet narrative that masks itself under the pretense of a common identity for citizens who comprise Ukrainian society. A major difference is the horizontal relations (active participation, agency of the people, and civic responsibility) that characterize the former democracy-focused systems versus vertical relations (paternalism, submission to the state, and blind patriotism) in the latter, Soviet-style, systems. Ukraine's national idea should include civic education and the increase of democratic culture among its citizens.

Chapter Four

Impact from Outside: Ukraine in Narratives of International Donors and Experts

This chapter analyses perception of Ukrainian national identity among foreign experts working in Ukraine for different European and U.S. organizations and foundations. All experts interviewed for this study deal with the issues of nation building, interethnic relations, and civic society in Ukraine. Among ten interviewed experts, six are male and four are female, with ages from thirty-five to fifty.

The perception of foreign experts working in Ukraine is important for several reasons. First, experts form the international view on Ukraine through their presentations, reports, and publications. Second, they promote or facilitate specific views among Ukrainian intellectuals who weigh their own views against views of foreign experts or even correct their views toward views of foreign experts. Third, through their recommendations foreign experts shape the international policies toward Ukraine. And fourth, as many of them chair foundations and international organizations, they contribute into the development of the specific meaning of national identity through the support of specific activities and programs. Thus, foreign experts contribute to the process of national self-imagination through two dimensions: (1) internal-external impact and (2) verbal impact-practice impact. Table 4.1 represents four types of impact.

It is important to analyze if all interviewed experts share similar views or differ in their perceptions and normative prescriptions and what are these perceptions and prescriptions are.

Table 4.1. Type of Impact by Foreign Experts

	<i>Internal impact</i>	<i>External impact</i>
<i>Impact through ideas</i>	Inspiration of elite	Information for international community
<i>Impact through practice</i>	Support of specific activities or projects	Formation of policies toward Ukraine

NATIONAL PRIDE

Experts express several different views on the sources of national pride in Ukraine. Forty percent of experts defined Ukrainian national pride as rooted in its own unique culture, language, mysticism (pagan and Christian values), love of land, and achievements in sport and culture. For example, foreign experts mention the winning of Maryna Vroda's short film *Cross* at the Cannes Festival in 2011 and boxing-champion brothers Vitali and Wladimir Klichko. Thirty percent of experts stress the history of Ukraine as a foundation of national pride: they said that a quest for a sovereign state was a defining model for the last millennium. The rebirth of the nationalist movement of the nineteenth century should be celebrated and honored. And, finally, that independent Ukraine has existed for twenty years provides positive perspectives for its future and is also supported by the spirit of freedom during the Orange Revolution. Thus, according to one expert, ethnic Ukrainians have a stronger foundation for national pride. Twenty percent of experts think that the source of national pride is the belief that, in comparison with Russia, Ukraine has more freedom, a more liberal society, and greater opportunity for people to make their own decision. However, experts disagree in their interpretation of this belief: while one expert emphasizes that the Cossacks movement represents a valuing of freedom and Ukrainians have a different mentality from Russians, so they do not want to be ruled, another expert stresses that these beliefs are irrational and do not represent reality. Ten percent of experts emphasize that people of Ukraine have different sources of pride (e.g., OUN-UPA and the Great Patriotic War), different historic inheritances, and different religions and sets of values.

Thus, while the majority of foreign experts believe that culture and history are sources of pride for Ukrainian people, some of them have considered that such beliefs may be an illusion or even a foundation for conflicts.

IDENTITY

The majority of foreign experts perceive Ukraine as a synthetic nation with a lot of mixed marriages between ethnic groups in the middle of country but

significant differences in views on Ukraine in the west and the east. Several experts stated that no efforts were made to build a national identity of Ukraine. Freedom was given to Ukraine as a result of the crash of the Soviet Union; nobody (or very few people, according to other experts) fought for it and developed values of independence. Thus, no foundations for a common national identity were established, and no underlining philosophy was discussed among the elites. The people of Ukraine did not develop their shared national identity, nor did they create a society they could be proud of. The majority of people do not know what country Ukraine is and where they are going. The Ukrainian government also does not have any concept of national identity or values that can create a foundation for it.

All experts agree that the regional identity with different historic models prevails but differ in their views on the meaning of these identities. Some experts believe that the people of western Ukraine have a strong ethnic consciousness, salient Ukrainian identity, and strong democratic traditions. Other experts believe that west Ukrainians have the consciousness of a miserable, discriminated, and oppressed people, with a lot of stereotypes, retrograde meanings of identity, and no symbiosis of culture (only in pop culture). Yet another expert states that Ukrainians are too nice and too friendly, afraid of taking risks, lacking self-respect, and retreating under the psychological pressure of the Russian language.

Similarly, experts differ in their perceptions of the regional identity of the east. Some experts believe that people in the east and Crimea consider themselves Russian, not Ukrainian. Other experts state that people in the East Ukraine have Soviet, not Russian, identity; they have developed a Russian culture that is abstract for them; instead it is a mix of Russian, Ukrainian, and Jewish cultures. Now they perceive themselves in a situation of choice between Russia and the West and are waiting for help without any understanding that to be accepted they need to meet the standards of developed societies. According to another expert, the people of Ukraine already made a choice to be with Europe, but implementation is problematic. Many people become more skeptical about the European Union and see it as pressure on Ukraine. People who support Russia share its anti-Western sentiments.

One expert expressed the belief that the best model for Ukrainian-Russian relations might be the relations between Austria and Germany. These two countries have a social boundary and cultural differences but live in harmony, pluralism, and tolerance.

Thus, all experts agree that Ukraine does not have a common national identity; instead the regional identities prevail. Experts diverge in their views on the meaning of identity in the east and west of the country. Ukrainian ethnic identity is perceived to be based on a deep ethnic consciousness or as retrograde, concentrated on oppression and discrimination. Identity in the southeast is perceived to be Russian or Soviet with mixed culture. Relations

with Russia play an important role in the formation of a Ukrainian national identity.

DYNAMICS

According to foreign experts, Kuchma tried to be safe and promoted different sides of Ukrainian identity, did not establish differences with Russia, and did not define Ukraine as a separate state.

The assessment of the presidency of Yushchenko has been negative; only one expert compliments him for positioning Ukraine as separate from Russia and defining Ukraine through a separate history, different from the Soviet one. The majority of foreign experts believe that the populist policy of Yushchenko did not create a national concept of Ukraine. The narrative that he created was not supported by all people of Ukraine and was too narrow to be shared among the population. While 20 percent of experts believe that Yushchenko did not have a consistent policy or the political courage to make a significant change while people waited for more real actions from him, 60 percent of experts consider Yushchenko to be too aggressive, promoting forced policies and making decisions by himself without promoting dialogue in society.

Foreign experts put specific attention on Yushchenko's abuse of history and national culture and his use of history as a political game. They state that Yushchenko tried to introduce Holodomor as a uniting idea, but this was wrong and manipulative (including the presentation of Bandera as a hero of Ukraine). "It is wrong to impose the idea of western Ukraine on all of Ukraine; thus, Yushchenko just spent money and time in vain and did not succeed in creating a compromise and uniting national history. He tried to manipulate the idea of the Holocaust without a real understanding of the concept. Yushchenko should agree that Holodomor (famine) was created by Soviet power in many places." By describing it as ethnic cleansing he did not give Russia a way out. Thus, instead of a constructive approach to the past, the issue of Holodomor led to conflict not only between Russian and Ukraine but also within Ukraine. Another source for conflict was Yushchenko's promotion of a Greco-Catholic Church as an opposition to Orthodox Moscow patriarchy, perceiving Orthodox religion as a spiritual expansion of Russia.

In addition, 30 percent of foreign experts stress the corruption of Yushchenko's government. He put people from western Ukraine as people of first-rate, ignored other people, and served specific capitals. Timoshenko also does not have any concept or idea, her one and only motivation is profit.

The presidency of Yanukovych is perceived as a return to Soviet history by 40 percent of foreign experts. The current government has a Soviet men-

tality and increasingly promotes Soviet myths and lifestyle, rewriting history to depict Soviet history as a Golden Age and Ukrainian history as wrong.

Fifty percent of foreign experts describe another motivation for the current change in policies. They agree that Yanukovych is pragmatic: he is interested in power and money; thus he sees history as a something that also could be sold. Because he needs to pay off Russia, Yanukovych is selling consciousness and history as non-significant value (exchange “air for money”). As a result, there is a regression of Ukrainian identity: laws and reforms are coming from Russia. Cultural and legal imposition from Russia is growing. The Ukrainian government is giving up national interests and differences, losing sovereignty over the last two years. New pro-Russian laws play an increasing role in the public sphere: the mounting use of the Russian language in education, the suppression of Western universities, and a return to active Russification.

Another problem stressed by 50 percent of foreign experts is continuing populism, effect of façade, declarations about reforms without the promotion of real reforms. Yanukovych creates a “pocket” opposition and tries to position himself as a reconciler, but he could not fool the Ukrainian society.

Thus, experts negatively assess the roles of presidents Kuchma, Yushchenko, and Yanukovych in the formation of the common national identity. Kuchma played all sides but did not contribute to the uniting idea. Yushchenko did not succeed in the creation of a common national identity because he was not consistent and active enough, according to one group of experts, and too aggressive and imposing a narrow identity, according to another group of experts. He abused history, was unable to effectively use the issue of Holodomor and provoked conflicts in the society. In addition, his policies and the government were populist and corrupt. According to one group of experts, Yanukovych is promoting the Soviet version of history and politics because he has a Soviet mentality; another group of experts believes that he pragmatically accepts a Russian influence in historiography and education in exchange for economic gains. Foreign experts also agree that he continues populism and effect of façade in his politics without real changes in the Ukrainian economy and society.

COMMON

In their description of the common foundations of Ukrainian national identity all foreign experts provide completely different answers; thus there is no agreement among them regarding uniting factors in Ukraine. However, some groups of factors can be identified. The first group describes events of history as a foundation for common identity, including the acceptance of Holodomor by all citizens of Ukraine and a negative assessment of Joseph Stalin. The

second group of factors concerns a common culture, including perception of Taras Shevchenko as an all-Ukrainian poet, the Ukrainian language, national food, and Vyshivanka as the national costume. The third group of factors includes common political orientations, including (1) a view of Ukraine as a part of Europe and European integrations as a uniting theme among elites and (2) the impact of the Soviet past that had negative sides, including the totalitarian control, but also brought a lot of satisfaction; thus people now see it as the only way of the country's development. The fourth group includes a critical view of uniting factors, including consumerism, low levels of social consciousness, an absence of social responsibility, poverty, and misery as uniting feeling among the population.

Thus, foreign experts believe that common features of a Ukrainian national identity include some elements of culture, several historic events, a political orientation on Europe, and a feeling of disempowerment. There is no agreement among experts what elements are considered more important for a Ukrainian national identity.

DIVIDE

Sixty percent of foreign experts state that Ukrainian society is divided between East and West. Ukraine is on the edge of two civilizations, thus there are different influences in social and political life of these two regions. People are divided for pro-Russian and Western with the mentality of "Ukraine for Ukrainians" or a pro-Soviet one. The Orange Revolution did not bring a real leader and did not succeed in uniting the country and in developing a common idea for Ukraine. Nationalists from both sides define their identity through language and history and have a dual consciousness of black and white. Politicians further divide the country by stating that their regions play the defining role in the development of the country.

Thirty percent of foreign experts believe that there are two major groups in the society, but it is a cultural difference. Ukraine is a big country with regions different in culture and history. People in these regions have lived together only sixty years and have had very little time to create common views. However, people accept Ukraine as an independent country and Ukrainian as a state language.

Twenty percent of foreign experts state that the east-west divide is not a central issue. Ukrainian society is divided not ethnically but economically. They refer to current public opinion research where 90 percent of respondents name corruption as the major issue and only 9 percent believe that language is the major problem in Ukraine.

LANGUAGE

All foreign experts believe that Ukrainian should be the only state language in Ukraine. However they differ in their perception of the status of the Russian language. Half of foreign experts state that government, education, and court system must be in Ukrainian, but they need to communicate in a language that people can understand. Thus, use of the Russian language should not be prohibited. "Even if the government has promised to create the law that supports two official languages—Russian and Ukrainian—now they do not make any move because they understand that it will provoke a lot of conflicts and will not be useful. Instead the new language law should establish Ukrainian as the only state language but support minorities' right for their language. People of Ukraine need to respect both cultures, Russian and Ukrainian, and show reciprocity in understanding of both cultures." Russian should be accepted as a second language in many regions as people in the eastern Ukraine predominantly speak Russian, and those in central Ukraine are bilingual. The use of two languages is divided between two spheres: Ukrainian is mostly used in professional spheres while Russian is widely used at home and interpersonal relations (friendship). But Ukrainian nationalists deny Russian as the language of communication and discriminate against it.

Another half of foreign experts state that while Ukrainian is the official state language, it needs to be developed and preserved rather than used a political issue. These experts believe that the current government discriminates against the Ukrainian language based on political agendas as their electoral base is Russian speaking, and thus, in order to ensure reelection, Russian is promoted over Ukrainian. They state that government officials do not even know Ukrainian. The prevalence of Russian can also be seen in cultural milieus. For instance, Russian literature prevails in the marketplace, thus publishing in Ukrainian becomes a matter of cultural preservation. Additionally, this group argues that language is divisive in schools as well: Russian-speaking parents send their children to Russia to study; and that supporting two languages in the educational system produces chaos. These experts state that the government is key to the language issue in Ukraine and that it should invest in the preservation of the Ukrainian language and culture, and help promote Ukrainian by providing Ukrainian language courses.

Twenty percent of foreign experts state that the geographical reality of Ukraine requires people to learn English. Thus, every child should speak English; it should be required and supported by state policies.

Thus, while all foreign experts agree that Ukrainian should be the only official state language, they differ in their consideration of status of the Russian language. Half of the experts believe that the Russian should be recognized as a regional language in Eastern and Central Ukraine, and that minor-

ities' rights should be protected in its use. The other half of experts state that the Russian language is a threat to Ukrainian culture, and that the Ukrainian language should be protected and actively promoted. Several of these experts also believe in the importance of learning English and teaching it in schools.

HISTORY

History is a very important issue in Ukraine due to this nation acquiring its independence only twenty years ago. As the nation is still young, history is perceived differently in various regions, which impedes the formation of a unified national identity. Two wars—the Civic War in the 1920s and World War II—divided Ukraine and remain divisive issues today. Legacies of these wars, such as perceptions of OUN/UPA and the Red Army, and understanding of Holodomor as ethnic cleansing or a class struggle, are still very controversial in contemporary society. Other contested histories include interpretations of Ukraine as either colonized by Russia or as part of the Russian empire, and acceptance of Soviet achievements or crimes. These differences in interpretations are connected with geographical divides: history is part Soviet and part western Ukrainian. As many Ukrainians have studied Soviet history in school, they preserve Soviet myths and Soviet interpretations of historic events. These beliefs and ideologies are now hard to question or challenge, thus making a unified national Ukrainian identity difficult to achieve.

Different groups, including the Ukrainian government, have manipulated history to reach their goals. The very foundations of the politics of memory are wrong and exclude part of the population. “There is no integrated or common historic narrative. Contradictions still prevail. There is no continuity of history; every new government is changing textbooks and the politics of memory. Yushchenko supported one side of history but was not capable to bring a change. Yanukovich is reversing historic narrative with Russian and Soviet interpretation of history.” His government is replacing one story with another story with no attempts to find a common ground. This one-sided, exclusive policy toward history and religion leads to conflict. It is also used to distract public attention from economic problems by promoting black-and-white interpretations of history.

Many foreign experts emphasized that historical narratives dictated by the government is akin to totalitarianism. Ukraine needs to replace the culture of demonization with more liberal approach. History should become a subject for debates and dialogues. Debates about historical figures such as Khmelnytsky and Bandera are critical to the foundation of a common historical narrative. Ambivalence should be acknowledged and different interpretations should be properly discussed. Now all discussions are conducted by publi-

cists, not scholars or historians. In its quest for common history, Ukraine should not oppress the minorities. For instance, Germany was able to resolve its painful history; Poland went from victimization to modernization. Yet Ukraine is still trapped in debates about language and history.

Thus, foreign experts believe that Ukraine has many contested events in its history with opposite interpretations based on regional affiliation. These controversies are further manipulated by the government that does not create a coherent historic narrative but instead promotes politics of reverse history. Ukrainian society is in desperate need for scholarly debates about history, an acknowledgement of ambivalence, and moving forward from black and white interpretations of history.

TEXTBOOKS

Most experts agree that changes to history textbooks shows inconsistent policies within the Ukrainian government. Each new administration changes textbooks, making history a recurrent pendulum swing. “New revision is very ideological and takes out all events that offer interpretation different from Russian historians: objectives of UPA and Orange Revolution are removed; Mazepa is described as a traitor. All information added during the Orange Revolution is removed as anti-Soviet. The Ministry of Education does not initiate any discussion and is not involved in existing discussions.”

Twenty percent of experts state that new textbooks are primitive in their description of society. Individual agency is absent from these textbooks, and people are described as merely followers of strong leaders.

Thus, the changes in history textbooks are perceived as a recurrent swing of pendulum that now promotes a pro-Soviet view of history. New textbooks also diminish the role of people and their contribution to the development of the country.

CONCEPTS OF A UKRAINIAN NATIONAL IDENTITY AMONG FOREIGN EXPERTS

The analysis shows that the level of agreement regarding the national identity of Ukraine among foreign experts is low. Several areas of shared perceptions include a vision of Ukraine as a synthetic nation with significant differences in views on Ukraine in the west and the east and prevailing regional identity; almost negative assessment of the roles of presidents Kuchma, Yushchenko, and Yanukovich in the formation of the common national identity; the belief that Ukrainian should be the only state language; the idea that differences in regional conceptions of history impede the formation of national identity; and the belief that recent changes in history textbooks show an absence of

consistency of Ukrainian government. Experts significantly differ in their views on the sources of pride and common national identity, perceptions of the divide and meanings of regional identities, the status of the Russian language, and the interpretations of the threat to the Ukrainian language.

The results help identify two major groups of experts. The first group, pro-Ukrainian (30 percent), supports the renaissance of Ukrainian nationalism and perceives Ukraine as a country without common national identity but deep foundations for a national idea within Ukrainian ethnic culture. They see the long fight for independence as a source of national pride and believe that people of western Ukraine have strong ethnic consciousness and salient Ukrainian identity different from Russian one. Ethnic Ukrainians are perceived as people with traditions of democracy and freedom, while ethnic Russians as supporters of pro-Soviet ideas and anti-Western sentiments. This group of experts believes that Yushchenko did not do enough to promote his ideas and did not show consistency in his policies, while Yanukovych gradually promotes Russian culture and returned Russification of Ukraine. Now the Ukrainian language is under the threat and needs to be protected and developed. This group of experts also sees the Soviet history and ideology as a major peril for national historic narrative and interprets changes in history textbooks as an ideological victory of a Soviet mentality.

The second, pro-civic, group of experts perceives Ukraine as a synthetic nation comprised of several ethnic groups with different histories and cultures. They have different views on the sources of pride and common foundations of national identity but believe that Ukraine is divided between the east and west. They think that ethnic Ukrainians are too concentrated on the concepts of victimization and colonization while ethnic Russians still long for the Soviet era. Yushchenko did not succeed in the development of common national identity because he imposed one narrow identity on all population of Ukraine, while Yanukovych was not successful because of his Soviet mentality and his pragmatic attitude toward history and readiness to “sell” it to a higher bidder. These experts support the regional status of the Russian language and reciprocal respect of both cultures. They believe that the major threat to a common historic narrative is a “black-and-white” approach of both ethnic groups and that the change in history textbooks is a recurrent pendulum swing that now rises in opposition to Yushchenko’s policies of memory and promotes a pro-Soviet view of history.

The divergence in foreign experts’ views on what is better for Ukraine and what should be done to foster its development is reflected in the national myths of both groups. Usually national myths are ascribed to the members of a nation, but I am arguing here that the foreign experts’ views on Ukraine have a structure similar to national myths of the nation members. This analysis shows two national myths prevalent among foreign experts that impact their positions and policies.

Pro-Ukrainian Narrative

Dualistic Order

The dualistic order of the first group rests on the contradiction between axiological opposites of a Ukrainian and Russian ethnic group. The experts attached the positive value-system to a Ukrainian ethnic group and use four binary constructs to define the connotations of axiological opposites. This *social group duality* is represented in table 4.2.

The first binary construct, democracy, is represented by the ideological value and defines Ukrainians as a group with democratic values, in opposition to Russians, who permanently support totalitarianism. The second construct, geopolitical orientation, is also represented by the ideological value and defines the Ukrainian ethnic group as oriented toward the West while Russians are rooted in Asia. The third construct, inspiration, is based on the social order value and defines Ukrainians as fighters for independence while Russians are defined as inspired by imperial ambitions of conquest. The fourth construct, victimization, is based on the social relations value and defines Ukrainians as innocent victims of aggressive Russians.

In this dualistic order, the first function of national narrative, the development of the meaning of national identity, is fulfilled by the establishment of a connotation of Ukrainian national identity as deeply rooted in Ukrainian ethnic values of democracy, a pro-Western orientation, and national renaissance, but one that has been victimized by the aggressive policies and actions of Russians. The Russian ethnic group is positioned as totalitarian, pro-Asian, imperial, and aggressive. The existing protracted conflict around power in Ukraine contributes to the establishment of an impermeable social boundary characterized by intense axiological differences—for example, victim-aggressor, independent-imperial, and democratic-totalitarian. Thus, the existing connotation of power as a vital fight between independent Ukraine and imperial Russians is *embedded* in the meaning of national identity as opposition to the Russian ethnic group, supported by Russia.

The second function of national narrative, legitimization of power, is fulfilled by the value positioning of the Ukrainian ethnic group as democrat-

Table 4.2. Dualistic Order of a Pro-Ukrainian Group of Foreign Experts

<i>Categorical constructs</i>	<i>Ukrainians</i>	<i>Russians</i>
Political system orientation	Democratic	Totalitarian
Geopolitical orientation	Europe	Pan-Asia
Inspirations	Fight for independence	Imperial ambitions
Victimization	Victims	Oppressors

ic, pro-Western, and promoting a national renaissance for Ukraine, while Russians are described as aggressive, supportive of totalitarianism, and inspired by imperial ambitions of conquest. This value positioning justifies Ukrainians as the only legitimate ethnic group to hold and wield power. The existing meaning of Ukrainian identity as deeply democratic and supporting independence, as well as the erection of a boundary between Russians and Ukrainians, contribute to the shaping of a concept of power in which the Ukrainian ethnic group should hold all power in Ukraine.

Mythic Narratives and Iconic Order

The first mythic narrative is a variation on a foundation myth. The positive ingroup predispositions mechanism is employed to depict Ukrainians as essentially democratic and thus more able to build a democratic Ukraine. It states that Ukrainians have a history of Magdeburg law and self-governance as well as preserved democratic values as a core of their identity. They resisted Soviet power even during the period of the Soviet Union and support principles of egalitarianism and freedom. On the contrary, Russians always supported authoritarian government, they brought totalitarian Soviet rule to Ukraine, and democracy is an alien ideology to them.

The second mythic narrative is also a variation of a foundation myth. The positive ingroup predispositions mechanism is employed to depict Ukrainians as essentially European and thus being more able to build Ukraine as a European country. It describes Ukrainian culture and traditions as rooted in Europe and stress that Ukrainians share common values and inspirations with other European nations while Russians represent Asian culture, have anti-Western sentiments, and connect themselves with the pan-Asian community.

The third mythic narrative is a variation on a myth of renewal. Through the use of the impediment by outgroup mechanism, this myth defines Russians and Russia as enemies of an independent Ukrainian state. It states that Ukrainian ethnic group was always inspired by the idea of independence and for centuries fought to achieve sovereignty of a Ukrainian nation-state. This fight is not over even now, after twenty years of Ukrainian independence. Ukrainians should have their own state where they can have free and prosperous development. Russians have imperial ambitions and do not want to lose control over Ukrainian territory. They support the activities of their counterparts in Ukraine, manipulate the Ukrainian government to promote reverse Russification, and strengthen the divide in Ukrainian society.

The fourth mythic narrative is a variation on a myth of suffering. Through the use of the impediment by outgroup mechanism, this myth defines Russians and Russia as aggressive perpetrators trying to dominate Ukraine. It emphasizes that throughout history, Russians suppressed Ukrainian longing for independence using oppressive policies and Holodomor. Ukrainian peo-

ple, with their peaceful, feminine identity could not fully resist aggressive and violent expansion of Russian power, culture, and language.

The iconic order includes Holodomor as the most powerful icon, as well as positive icons associated with Ukrainian ethnic group (Magdeburg law, UPA/OUN, Ukrainian dissidents) and negative icons associated with the Russian ethnic group (the Stalinist regime and current authoritarian Russia, the Soviet intervention of 1939, and repressions).

The mythic narratives fulfill the function of developing the meaning of national identity by validating the established meaning of a Ukrainian ethnic identity as democratic, pro-Western, peaceful, and favorable to national interests while characterizing Russians as aggressive and totalitarian, posing an ongoing threat to independent Ukraine. To justify this identity, mythic narratives emphasize the continuity of the features of Ukrainian national identity using historic accounts: preservation of democratic values through the history of the Magdeburg Law; resistance against Soviet power by OUN/UPA and Ukrainian dissidents; Ukrainian culture as rooted in European history; the long historical fight for the independence and sovereignty of the Ukrainian nation state that continues even now; and a long history of oppression by Russians that is not over. The Russians are presented as essentially totalitarian, barbaric and aggressive. The definition of Ukrainian identity as peaceful is effected through the construction of this identity as feminine and incapable of resisting aggression. The concept of power as a constant fight for independence and democracy is *embedded* into the meaning of national identity through a sharpening of the boundary and ontological difference between Ukrainians and Russians, presenting them as ideologically, politically, and culturally opposite groups.

The second function of national narrative, legitimization of power, is fulfilled by the further value positioning of the Ukrainian ethnic group as more democratic, pro-Western, and supportive of independence. The mythic narrative employs historic events both to legitimize the power of Ukrainians and delegitimize the power of Russians: the Ukrainian capacity for democratic self-governance is set in opposition to Russian authoritarian governance and the totalitarianism of Soviet rule; the Ukrainian orientation on the West in the nation-building process is set in opposition to the anti-Western sentiments of Russians; the Ukrainian desire to build a free and prosperous state is set in opposition to Russian imperial ambitions to control Ukrainian territory; and the Ukrainian fight for independence is set in opposition to oppressive policies and Holodomor. These historic accounts vindicate the rights of Ukrainians to be exclusive agents of nation-building and to dismiss Russians as incapable of creating a free, democratic country. In addition, the justification of the exclusive ability of Ukrainians to build a democratic society is underpinned by stories of their deep national-democratic core and pro-West-

ern ideals, thus *shaping* the concept of power in Ukraine to the meaning of Ukrainian identity.

Normative Order

The normative order resulted from the mythic narratives prescribes ethnic nationalism as the only possible option to preserve national independence of Ukraine and ensure its prosperous development. The Ukrainian language and culture should be protected from the threat of Russian expansion, the separation of Ukrainian and Russian/Soviet history should be strongly promoted, and ethnic minorities should accept Ukrainian culture and values and assimilate into the Ukrainian nation-state. Thus, the legitimacy of the power of the Ukrainian ethnic group is justified through legitimization of the ingroup and delegitimization of the outgroup and by proclaiming a right to power based on Ukrainian cultural values and the history of the group's development.

Normative order advances the position of pro-democratic, peaceful, and pro-national independence Ukrainians as superior to Russians and legitimizes their power in Ukraine. It solidifies the meaning of Ukrainian identity by proscribing policies supporting its culture and enforcing differences with Russia and Russians—for example, the protection of the Ukrainian language and culture from the threat of Russian expansion and the separation of Ukrainian and Russian/Soviet history. The legitimacy of Ukrainians' power is supported by policies aimed at increasing their social and political status—for example, promotion of ethnic nationalism as the only possible option to preserve national independence for Ukraine and assimilation of ethnic minorities and their compulsory acceptance of Ukrainian culture and values. A meaning of national identity based on Ukrainian ethnic nationalism is created to justify Ukrainians' exclusive access to power, thus supporting the *embedding* of the concept of power into the connotation of national identity. At the same time, the concept of power is *shaped* by the existing meaning of Ukrainian identity as that of a victimized group: Ukrainians protecting the independence of Ukraine from an aggressive, imperial Russia.

Therefore, pro-Ukrainian foreign experts' narratives define Ukraine through the conflict between two groups—Russian and Ukrainian. The *social group duality* includes two values of ideology and values of social order and social relations. These define Ukrainians as pan-European, democratic, supportive of a national renaissance, but victimized, while Russians are depicted as pan-Asian, totalitarian, imperialistic, and oppressive. To justify this duality, four myths are employed: two myths of foundation and one each of suffering and renewal. These myths state that (1) Ukrainians have a history and culture of democratic values since the Magdeburg Law and can create a democratic society, while pro-Soviet and totalitarian Russians support a paternalistic society; (2) Ukrainians have European roots and traditions and can

lead Ukraine into Europe, while Russians are Asian and look back to Russia; (3) Russians suppressed the Ukrainian search for independence through Holodomor and Soviet repressions, but the Ukrainian people had a feminine identity and were too peaceful to resist these oppressions; and (4) the fight for independence that inspired Ukrainians is not over due to Russia's imperial ambitions and the government's policies of Russification. Through the use of the impediment by outgroup mechanism, the supporters of the pro-Ukrainian foreign experts' narrative define Russians and Russia as enemies of an independent Ukrainian state. The "positive ingroup predispositions" mechanism is employed to depict Ukrainians as essentially democratic and European and thus more capable of building Ukraine as a democratic European country. Through the interpretation mechanisms Holodomor is presented as a unique genocide committed by Russians against Ukrainians; the decline of the number of people with Russian identity is viewed as the result of free choices by people who have a double identity; and the fact that the Russian language is used more broadly than Ukrainian is viewed as a cause to protect the Ukrainian language. The pro-Ukrainian foreign experts' narrative (1) promotes ethnic nationalism as the only option for the successful development of an independent Ukraine, as well as acceptance of the Ukrainian culture and language by all ethnic minorities, (2) requires protection of the Ukrainian language, and (3) endorses the separation of Ukrainian and Russian history. The legitimization of the rights of the ingroup is based on the belief that the Ukrainian ethnic group is more democratic, European, and modern than the Russian ethnic group and thus has exclusive rights to build the nation. The delegitimization of the outgroup derives from the belief that Ukrainians have been victimized by Russians and are long-suffering, so they deserve to build their own ethnic state.

Pro-civic Narrative

The dualistic order of the pro-civic group of foreign experts rests on the axiological opposites of "liberalism-oppression." This *ideological duality* has four dichotomous categorical constructs (table 4.3).

The first binary construct, mentality, is based on the ideology value and sets the dichotomy between the totalitarian Soviet way of life and the open democratic value system. The second binary construct, national concept, is based on the social order value and defines opposition between an ethnic concepts with the supremacy of one ethnic group over others and multicultural concepts that support the rights of all ethnic groups within the nation. The third construct, approaches to history, is based on the social relations value and defines imposition as the dominance of one group's history over others, while tolerance leads to acceptance of different views. The fourth construct, way of thinking, is also based on the social relations value and defines black-

Table 4.3. Dualistic Order of Pro-Civic Group of Foreign Experts

<i>Categorical constructs</i>	<i>Liberalism</i>	<i>Oppression</i>
Mentality	Democratic	Soviet
National concept	Multicultural	Ethnic
Approaches to history	Tolerance	Imposition
Way of thinking	Ambivalence	Black and white

and-white thinking as the acceptance of only one view as right and true in opposition to ambivalence that supports multidimensional views of events.

In this dualistic order, the meaning of national identity is set as a desired connotation and derives from the positive axiological positioning of a liberal civic national identity as the best option for Ukraine. The meaning of this ideal identity is defined as democratic, multicultural, tolerant, and ambivalent in its assessment of history. The current meaning of this identity is described as totalitarian, nationalistic, and conflictual. This existing connotation of power as captured in hands of pro-Soviet and nationalistic leaders is *embedded* in the meaning of national identity: it is defined through the prospect of the development of liberal democracy.

The second function of national narrative, legitimization of power, is fulfilled by the value positioning of liberal democracy as promoting open democratic values, multiculturalism, tolerance, and multiperspectivity, while the current leadership divides Ukraine for its political purposes and promotes pro-Soviet and nationalistic ideas, fomenting conflict and black-and-white thinking. This value position justifies the power of liberal democracy as the most legitimate political order for independent Ukraine. The potential meaning of Ukrainian identity as democratic and multicultural contributes to *shaping* the concept of power in which enlightened and educated people are positioned as agents of change.

Mythic Narratives

The first mythic narrative is a variation on a foundation myth. The enlightening mechanism justifies the importance of the promotion of the values of democracy and liberalism. It is developed based on the first categorical construct and represents Ukraine as a country that is craving to exit its long history of oppression and become liberal, but is not succeeding in this effort. It is still stuck in the Soviet mentality that prevails among the population in the east and south of Ukraine, a population trapped in Soviet history and myths, nostalgia for the “good Soviet time,” and which is under the threat of Ukrainian nationalism does not see other acceptable options for the social order.

The second mythic narrative is also a variation on a foundation myth. The condemning imposition mechanism is used to blame Ukrainian nationalists for the imposition of the ethno-cultural values and traditions of one ethnic group onto the whole society of Ukraine. It states that Ukrainian nationalists oppose a view of Ukraine as multicultural society and, inspired by the long history of the fight for independence, are imposing their national identity on all Ukrainian population, denying cultural and linguistic rights of ethnic minorities living in Ukraine.

The third mythic narrative is a variation of a foundation myth. The “condemning imposition” mechanism is used to blame Ukrainian nationalists and pro-Soviet elites for the imposition of the history of one group onto the entire society of Ukraine. In their efforts to develop an ethnic concept of national identity, Ukrainian nationalists promote a one-sided historic narrative of the Ukrainian ethnic group. In opposition to it, the pro-Soviet elite promote a Soviet narrative of history that denies the rights of the Ukrainian ethnic group. Each new government rewrites history textbooks to promote their own vision of history. Neither side is engaged in constructive dialogue about the past and future of Ukraine.

The fourth mythic narrative is a variation on a foundation myth. The enlightening mechanism justifies the importance of the promotion of multi-perspectivity and tolerant thinking. The myth emphasizes that accusations and denials abound from both sides of the divide and black-and-white thinking is thriving, ruining all possibilities for the development of a common national identity.

The iconic order includes positive icons associated with democracy (European democracy, multiculturalism, national dialogue) and negative icons associated with oppression (the Soviet Union, Nazis, nationalists, extremists, and radicals).

These mythic narratives fulfill the first function of national narrative—the development of the meaning of national identity—by advancing the ideal meaning of national identity established in dualistic order as liberal, multicultural, and tolerant. The development of this prospective meaning of identity is based on negative features of nationalists and pro-Soviet leaders: the imposition of an exclusive ideology and culture, totalitarianism, and black-and-white thinking. Mythic narratives also contribute to the *embedding* of the concept of power—the establishment of liberal democracy—into the ideal meaning of national identity: it should be multicultural, tolerant, and liberal.

The second function of national narrative—legitimization of power—is fulfilled by the further value positioning of liberal democracy as the best option for independent Ukraine. This legitimization is based on the belief that the people of Ukraine are craving an exit from the long history of oppression in order to become liberal. To delegitimize nationalist and pro-

Soviet leaders, mythic narratives employ accounts of their negative influence on Ukraine: the promotion of a Soviet mentality that denies the rights of the Ukrainian ethnic group and the imposition of a Ukrainian national identity on the entire population, denying the cultural and linguistic rights of ethnic minorities living in Ukraine and, thus, strengthening conflict in the society. In addition, justification of the positive prospect of civic society is underpinned by stories about European democracy, multiculturalism, and national dialogue, thus shaping the concept of power in Ukraine (the promotion of liberal democracy) to the meaning of national identity as democratic and multicultural.

Normative Order

The normative order resulting from these mythic narratives prescribes the support of the development of civic society and the formation of a multicultural national identity as an equitable way forward for Ukraine. The language and cultural rights of all people independent of their ethnic identity should be protected, and the Russian language should have regional status. There should be reciprocal respect of all cultures and religions. The national dialogue that promotes a constructive approach to the past and to the current notion of common national identity should be established.

The legitimization of a civic society based on validation and consensus derives from the belief that the people of Ukraine should be enlightened and educated in order to fully appreciate the values of democracy and civic society and to understand ways for building a liberal democracy.

Normative order further develops the position of Ukraine as a multicultural and potentially democratic society and the legitimization of liberal democracy as the best prospect for Ukraine. Normative order promotes the liberal meaning of national identity by prescribing the formation of a multicultural national identity and promoting reciprocal respect among all cultures and religions. It legitimizes the development of a liberal democracy by promoting the support of civic society development, language and cultural rights for all people, and a national dialogue on the past and present of Ukraine. The normative order emphasizes that the creation of a liberal democratic society requires the development of the civic meaning of national identity, thus supporting the *embedment* of the concept of power into the connotation of national identity. At the same time, the concept of a liberal democracy in Ukraine is *shaped* by the meaning of national identity as multicultural, with different histories and diverse voices.

Therefore, the pro-civic foreign experts' narrative rests on an *ideological duality* that describes Ukraine through the conflict between liberal ideology and nationalistic and pro-Soviet mentalities. The pro-civic foreign experts' narrative contains two values of ideology, a value of social relations, and a

value of social order. They define liberalism through democracy, multiculturalism, tolerance, and ambivalence, while the ideology of nationalists and pro-Soviet groups is described as totalitarian, nationalistic, and oppressive with black-and-white thinking. To justify this duality, four myths of foundation are employed. These myths state that (1) the people of Ukraine are longing for a liberal society but are stuck in a Soviet mentality or Ukrainian nationalism; (2) people want to understand different sides of historic events but are involved in an ongoing conflict of interpretation and espouse black-and-white thinking; (3) Ukrainian and Russian nationalists and Stalinists-Communists obstruct the establishment of a national dialogue because they promote only nationalistic or pro-Soviet concepts of society and refuse to accept other points of view; and (4) Ukrainian and Russian nationalists oppose the development of a peaceful multicultural society in Ukraine. The condemning imposition mechanism is used to blame Ukrainian nationalists and pro-Soviet leaders for the imposition of ethno-cultural values and the traditions of one ethnic group as well as a Soviet mentality on the entire society of Ukraine. The enlightening mechanism justifies the importance of the promotion of values of democracy and liberalism as well as a tolerant, ambivalent mentality. Through the interpretation mechanisms Ukraine is presented as a multicultural state with co-equal ethnic groups; attempts by Ukrainian nationalists to form a Ukrainian nation on the basis of one ethnic group are criticized. Normative order of the pro-civic foreign experts' narrative (1) furthers liberal ideology, multicultural identity, and respect for all cultures; (2) condemns nationalists and Communists; and (3) prescribes support of a civic society, regional status for the Russian language, and a national dialogue on history. The legitimization of the ingroup based on consensus and validation derives from the belief that Ukraine's people need to appreciate fully the values of democracy and civic society and understand ways for building a liberal democratic society.

Two foreign experts' narratives are very similar to two Ukrainian narratives: the fight for a Ukrainian ethnic identity and multicultural-civic narratives. The production of the meaning of the nation in the pro-Ukrainian foreign experts' narrative is comparable to the production of meaning in the fight for a Ukrainian ethnic identity narrative. Both narratives establish the meaning of Ukrainian ethnic identity as essentially democratic and tolerant while depicting the Russian outgroup as completely contrary to the Ukrainians: totalitarian and aggressive at its core. Both narratives legitimize the exclusive right of the Ukrainian ethnic group to rule the country. They both use a *social group duality* of Russians and Ukrainians with a prevalence of ideology values. Both narratives justify this duality using myths of suffering, rebirth, and renewal and employ the impediment by outgroup mechanism to blame Russians for aggressive, imperial, and totalitarian actions and intentions. But the narratives differ in use of two other myths and mechanisms: the

fight for a Ukrainian ethnic identity narrative employs myths of territory and ethnogenesis and the validation of rights mechanism, stressing the cultural and territorial rights of Ukrainians compared to alien Russians; the pro-Ukrainian foreign experts' narrative uses two myths of foundation and the mechanism of positive ingroup predispositions to stress the essentially democratic and tolerant nature of Ukrainians and the totalitarian and aggressive nature of Russians. These differences are furthered in normative order: the fight for a Ukrainian ethnic identity narrative concentrates on promoting policies that support the cultural renaissance of the Ukrainian culture and language, whereas the pro-Ukrainian foreign experts' narrative prescribes the political development of ethnic nationalism. Despite this difference, normative orders for both narratives legitimize exclusive power for Ukrainians and delegitimize the right of Russians to be equal agents of nation-building.

The production of the meaning of the nation in the pro-civic foreign experts' narrative is comparable to the production of meaning in the civic-multicultural narrative. Both narratives establish an ideal meaning of Ukrainian national identity as democratic, multicultural, and tolerant while depicting an outgroup of nationalists and pro-Soviet leaders as totalitarian, exclusive, and aggressive. Both narratives legitimize the development of democracy in independent Ukraine. They both use the *ideological duality* of democracy and extremism (nationalism, Stalinism, Soviet totalitarianism) with a prevalence of social order and social relations values. Both narratives justify this duality using myths of foundation but differ in their employment of justification mechanisms. The civic-multicultural narrative utilizes the impediment by outgroup and condemning imposition mechanisms to position ideological entrepreneurs (pro-Stalinists and nationalists) as enemies of a civic society while the Pro-Civic Foreign Experts' narrative uses "enlightening" and "condemning imposition" mechanisms to show the pro-Soviet and nationalistic mentality as a hindrance to the development of a liberal democracy. These differences are furthered in normative order: the civic-multicultural narrative concentrates on promoting civic society and empowering the people as socially responsible agents of change and the pro-civic foreign experts' narrative proscribes changes in the mentality and political development of a liberal democracy. Both narratives legitimize the development of democratic Ukraine and delegitimize the use of nationalistic and pro-Soviet ideologies as divisive to the country and harmful to prospects for democracy. These two types of national narratives among foreign experts result in differences between four types of impact (see table 4.1) that foreign experts have in Ukraine. The pro-Ukrainian group inspires pro-Ukrainian elites who see the foundation of a common national identity in the consciousness of ethnic Ukrainians. This group provides support for projects that protect and advance Ukrainian culture and language, promoting a positive view of a nationalistic Ukraine. They represent Ukraine as a country of ethnic Ukrainians who are

building their own independent state separate from Russia based on a history of their independence movement, a deep ethnic consciousness, and democratic principles. They also posit Russia as the major enemy of Ukrainian development. This group promotes and lobbies for international policies that support pro-Ukrainian leadership, increased divergence with Russia, and the treatment of Ukraine as an ethnic nation-state.

The pro-civic group encourages the elite that promote a multicultural and civic concept of a Ukrainian national identity. This group supports projects that protect the rights of minorities, form a civic concept of national identity, and develop a shared society. They represent Ukraine as a divided multicultural society that still preserves a Soviet mentality and style of government and needs to develop a civic society and a civic responsibility of its citizens. This group promotes and lobbies for international policies that support the growth of a civic society, multiculturalism and shared society, rule of law, and democratic governance.

The different directions of international and internal impact resulting from two competing national narratives supported by foreign experts produce not only contradictions within Ukraine's policies and projects but also lead to the conflicts of interests within the international community. It results in ineffective policies and slows positive changes in the political and social life of Ukraine.

Chapter Five

The Image of a Ukrainian Future

THE PERCEPTION OF THE FUTURE OF UKRAINE AMONG UKRAINIAN EXPERTS

The representatives of Ukrainian elite split their opinions about the future of Ukraine. Sixty-seven percent of respondents expressed a generally pessimistic view on Ukraine and 20 percent view the state of ethnic relations negatively (see table 5.1). Thus, 87 percent of Ukrainian respondents are pessimistic and only 13 percent optimistic about the future of Ukraine. With an additional 9 percent believing that the only positive option for Ukraine is a compromise between Russia and the West but also that this is not an option for the immediate future, the proportion of people who negatively assess Ukraine's future comprises 96 percent of the population.

This pessimistic view of the future of Ukraine in general is connected with continuous government control over all resources, the absence of a market economy and free economic competition, growing political hypocrisy, the absence of elites who support national interests, continuous exploitation of the country by oligarchs, the worsening socioeconomic position of the population, long-term economic stagnation, the absence of a bona fide opposition and the consolidation of civic society, fights between political parties (and their radicalization), and the loss of connection with the culture among the population. Nineteen percent of respondents believe that the situation can be changed through civic pressure and the changing of passive views regarding the people's influence on social processes. People should demand accountability by the government and economic elites. Seventeen percent of respondents state that Ukrainian ethnic identity should be a model for the future of Ukraine because it reflects democratic values and pragmatic thinking. Thus, civic society should be built based on the democratic values of the

Table 5.1. Views on the Future of Ukraine among Ukrainian Experts

<i>%</i>	<i>View on the future of Ukraine</i>	<i>%</i>	<i>Variants of overcoming the problem</i>
67	Pessimistic view	19	Reduce passive view of the society on the social processes
		17	Overcoming totalitarian society, Ukrainian ethnic identity as a foundation for civic society
		17	No recommendations
		14	Civic society
63	Future of Ukraine is connected with its position between the European Union and Russia	30	Orientation on NATO and the EU
		17	Closer relations with Russia
		9	Ukraine needs a compromise between Russia and Europe
		7	Ukraine has the role of mediator between Russia and the EU
		7	Ukraine has the role of mediator between Russia and the EU
20	Future of Ukraine depends on resolution of ethnic conflict	10	Further development of the Ukrainian culture and language
		6	Dual language law and federalization
		4	Crimean Tatar Autonomy
		4	Multiculturalism
13	Optimistic view	13	Multiculturalism and civic society

Ukrainian ethnic group. Fourteen percent of respondents believe that the development of civic society and civic responsibility would be the best path for Ukraine to overcome its current situation. Seventeen percent of respondents do not provide any recommendation or recipe for dealing with the current stagnation.

The negative view of the future of interethnic relations expressed by 20 percent of the population complements the generally pessimistic view of the future of Ukraine. Ukraine's future is described as caught in the ethnic divide between two differing ethnic groups and regional loyalties. Respondents see the possibility of worsening of the conflict, and perhaps even the splitting of Ukraine, under pressure from Russia. Respondents provide different recipes for the resolution of this conflict. Ten percent of respondents advocate for the further development of the Ukrainian language and culture. They see a prosperous Ukraine as a country with Ukrainian as its widely accepted and sole official language. Six percent believe that the conflict can be resolved only

by accepting both Russian and Ukrainian as state languages, accompanied by the federalization of Ukraine. Four percent see a positive future in multiculturalism. And 4 percent emphasize that ethnic tensions will be reduced only through the establishment of Crimean Tatar autonomy.

The majority of respondents (63 percent) connect the future of Ukraine with its position between the European Union (EU) and Russia. Some respondents describe the EU as increasingly unfriendly, demanding, and manipulative, while others believe that integration with the EU will have a positive effect on Ukraine. Similarly, respondents are divided in their perceptions of Russia: it is viewed alternatively as aggressive and demanding or friendly and sharing similar values and interests. Consequently, 30 percent of respondents support an orientation toward the EU and NATO. They believe integration with Europe complements the national interests of Ukraine—and that cannot succeed without external support. They also stress that to gain EU membership, Ukraine should have a plan emphasizing modernization, economic development, and overcoming traditional authoritarian-style regimes. They emphasize that a union with Russia would be a disaster in which Ukraine would lose its independence. Seventeen percent of respondents see the possibility of a positive future for Ukraine more closely connected with Russia. Respondents believe that the EU will not accept Ukraine as a member and that it has its own economic and social problems. Instead, Ukraine should build closer ties to Russia, a growing world leader with power and resources. Nine percent of respondents believe that Ukraine's positive development is impeded by the fight between Russia and Europe and that only a compromise between these two leading forces will allow domestic democratic development. Without this compromise, Ukraine would remain a poor country on the outskirts of Europe. Seven percent of respondents see a positive future for Ukraine as a mediator between Russia and the West, a role for which Ukraine needs positive relations with both Europe and Russia.

An optimistic view on the future of Ukraine is shared by 13 percent of respondents. Their positive forecast is based on the belief that the new generation will be different: they will be better educated, have more liberal views, and embrace independent thinking and civic responsibility. They believe Ukraine can overcome the totalitarian Soviet model and its historical conflictual ethnic concepts of identity and grow into a multiethnic, multicultural state. New leaders will emerge from civic society and will increase the agency of the people and their ability to have an accountable government.

Overall, the representatives of the Ukrainian elite express divergent and even opposing views on the future of Ukraine. Further analysis will identify the perceptions of Ukraine's future among respondents who support different narratives of national identity.

VIEWS ON THE FUTURE OF UKRAINE AMONG RESPONDENTS SUPPORTING DIFFERENT NARRATIVES OF NATIONAL IDENTITY

Dual Identity Narrative

In the dual identity narrative, 66 percent of respondents are very pessimistic about the future of Ukraine and stress that factors of distraction are prevailing over factors of development. Oligarchs exploit cheap labor of the working class and use policies of “hit and run,” providing no support for the country itself. If not improved, the economic situation will lead to worsening socioeconomic positions for the population; Ukraine risks turning into a “swamp” with no possibilities for change. Support for the government has decreased, but there is no *bona fide* opposition, meaning that the people of Ukraine need to change their situation through civic pressure, galvanizing public opinion against current electoral laws. These respondents believe that Ukraine should muster the strength to resolve its own problems. The state should serve the people, not exploit them. Electoral laws should give everyone the opportunity to be elected. Ukrainian society should exert purposeful influence and reform its existing passive view on social processes.

Fifty-eight percent of these respondents associate the future of Ukraine with its position between the European Union and Russia. The EU is described as unfriendly and having its own problems (the Euro currency crisis, an aging population, a growing immigration crisis, and economic uncertainty). Dual identity respondents state that nationalists follow Brzezinski’s example by dangling the “carrots” of Europe and the United States in front of the Ukrainian population. Ukrainian elites want independence, but Europe also has exacting standards and will not invest in Ukraine. Such respondents believe that the EU will not accept Ukraine as a member; rather, it plays with Ukraine in a “cat-and-mouse” game where all discussions about EU membership are mere rhetoric. Because of visa problems experienced by the Ukrainian population, and growing economic contradictions, negative feelings toward the EU are on the rise.

Russia is perceived as a growing leader that has power, natural gas, and oil. Some respondents believe that a union with Russia is the best option for the future of Ukraine; however, Ukrainian oligarchs feel threatened by Russia and are afraid to lose their grip on power, and thus oppose the basic premise of Slavic unity. Other respondents believe that Russia demands too much from Ukraine, pursuing its own interests and increasing pressure on Ukraine. They contend that Ukraine will not benefit from dilution into Russia; Ukraine remains different from Russia, uniting both Europe and Eurasia but experiencing less Asian pressure and influence than Russia.

All respondents who stress the positioning of Ukraine between the EU and Russia believe that Ukraine is in the middle of a fight between two leading forces and that in order to develop a democratic society Ukraine needs to find a compromise between Russia and Europe. Positive relations and integration into a common Euro-East will make Ukraine an organic part of this new civilizational foundation. Without this compromise, Ukraine will remain a poor country on the outskirts of Europe.

Twenty-five percent of these respondents concentrate on the future of interethnic relations. They state that Ukraine is constituted by two friendly ethnic groups, with two languages—Russian and Ukrainian—which provides for shared communication. But currently conflict within the society is growing and threatens destruction if unaddressed. If the society is not integrated under one common identity, the situation promises to take a tragic turn. If Russia ramps up its influence to protect Ukraine's Russian-speaking population, Ukraine might split, the east opting for Russia. The acceptance of a dual-language law and the federalization of Ukraine would mitigate this conflict potential and increase levels of culture nationally.

Fifteen percent of these respondents connect the future of Ukraine with Russian development. Two alternatives are mentioned: (1) Russia might remain strong and aggressive in response to Yushchenko's previous policies while Ukraine becomes weaker and more divided between its regions; in this scenario, Russia could use differences between western Ukraine and Crimea as a conflict trigger; (2) Russia might change its behavior and move toward a policy of friendship and support. In either case, Ukraine cannot survive without Russia, and even nationalists would not oppose close relations with Russia.

The respondents identified several needs in Ukrainian society:

1. A need for administrative reform and federation. Ukraine does not need twenty-seven regional subjects (oblast') for forty million residents. More specifically, the number of regions in the north and west of Ukraine should be reduced.
2. A need for a national dialogue on common identity to resolve inevitable conflicts and promote stability in society. This dialogue should emphasize that conflictual elements emerging in Ukraine are expected elements in a developing system.
3. A need to deconstruct established myths, especially those about events described as ethnic conflict between Russians and Ukrainians, rather than class conflict (e.g., Holodomor). The concept of victimization ("tears and fears") needs to be changed.
4. A need to promote civic education and establish a motivation for the self-realization of Ukraine as a nation.

5. A need for a new policy of national identity, the reanimation of the culture, mass media, and cultural industry of Ukraine. The ethno-cultural component of this should be minimized, and fear of losing the Ukrainian language should be overcome, with both languages being treated equally and similarly supported.

Respondents supporting the *dual identity* narrative are, first of all, pessimistic about the future of Ukraine and link change with the development of a responsible government; second, they believe that a positive future for Ukraine is connected with positive relations between the EU and Russia, which will put Ukraine in the middle of a civilizational space instead of on the front line; third, they support a multicultural concept of Ukraine and inclusion of the Russian language; and fourth, they promote positive relations with Russia. Thus, in the dual identity national narrative the interrelations between the production of the meaning of national identity and legitimization of power impact the vision of the future of Ukraine. The process of *shaping of the concept of power by the meaning of national identity* transfers the view of Ukraine as a historically multiethnic state into the perception of a continuous illegitimate domination of the Ukrainian ethnic group. The European Union and the United States are criticized for their support of Ukrainian ethnic nationalism. The meaning of shared Russian culture between Russia and Ukraine contributes to the perception of Russia's support as restoring a power balance within Ukraine and providing the Russian ethnic group with strength and a foundation for influence. Relations with Russia dominate the assessment of the future: 73 percent of respondents discuss it as a factor that impacts the prospects of Ukraine, stating that Ukraine cannot survive without Russia. The embedment of the concept of power into the meaning of national identity is also evident in the vision of the future. The unenthusiastic view of the role of Russia (sharing a culture, and strong but bullying) defines a pessimistic view on the future of the Ukrainian nation. A positive assessment of the future is connected with equal status of Russians and thus, a prosperous national identity in the future is connected to national dialogue and a flourishing Russian language and culture.

Pro-Soviet Narrative

For this narrative, 65 percent of respondents stress the position of Ukraine as a frontier state between the EU and Russia as a major factor impacting the future of Ukraine. They express assurance that Ukraine can create a European state without making a choice between Russia and Europe. These respondents are critical in their assessment of EU membership and believe that because the EU has its own hierarchy, joining it will not bring about prosperity swiftly. The European economic crisis provides an opportunity to reflect

on and participate in the transformation of Europe, but Slavs are not considered originators of Europe and thus are almost excluded from the process. Thus, close relations with Russia are necessary to the success of Ukrainian development and will not reduce Ukraine's independence. Nevertheless nationalists will use it for their political purposes to mobilize the population against eastern Ukraine where people are more connected to Russia's information sphere and maintain a strong regional identity.

Thirty-five percent of these respondents focus on the ethnic divide in Ukraine and speak about the necessity to bring people together, unite them, and integrate ethnic and social aspects of life. Ukraine should provide everyone an opportunity to speak the language they choose, cultivate a feeling of shared society, and promote inclusive citizenship in Ukraine.

Thus, processes of embedment and shaping influence the view of the future of Ukraine among respondents supporting the pro-Soviet narrative. Through the embedment of the concept of power into the meaning of national identity, the imminent power of pro-Communist leaders is justified as providing support for multiculturalism and a shared society in Ukraine. Through shaping the concept of power by the meaning of national identity, the assessment of the Ukrainian SSR as a "Golden Age" for Ukraine defines the view of a positive future for Ukraine as one connected with Russia. The necessity of this connection also derives from negative opinions about the European Union and its impact on Ukraine.

The Fight for a Ukrainian Ethnic Identity Narrative

In this narrative 80 percent of respondents are pessimistic about the future of Ukraine and link positive change with overcoming a totalitarian past. They state that only 20 percent of the population supports the government but that there is no bona fide opposition. Elites do not want to develop Ukraine: they are not connected to it. Ukraine has many people motivated by good will, but they are disconnected and unable to consolidate their efforts. Ukraine must be a country in which people are motivated to contribute their efforts and improve their lives. Such respondents believe that a Ukrainian ethnic identity should serve as a model for the future of Ukraine because it represents democratic values and pragmatic thinking. Russians, alternately, are caught in a Soviet mentality, still sharing a strong collective consciousness and devotion to Soviet myths. There is nostalgia for the Soviet period in the southeast and in Kiev, where living standards were higher. Consequently, the fight between old and new will continue. To overcome its totalitarian past completely, the government should start listening to and become connected with the people. When young people with a salient Ukrainian identity who embrace a strong national idea come to power, Ukraine's totalitarian past will be overcome. These respondents also believe that Ukraine will not face a

new totalitarian regime because of divisions within Ukraine; problems of integration have not been resolved, and differences are used instrumentally by politicians. Differences among the views, beliefs, and values of people in the west and east make it difficult to build a new dictatorship in Ukraine.

Seventy percent of these respondents concentrate on the connection between the future of Ukraine and its relations with the EU and Russia. They stress that national interests should be the basis for all decisions. Ukraine will join Europe and catch up with the Baltic states. The respondents positively view the West and the EU, and stress the need to be involved in NATO and the EU because of Ukraine's dependence on external support for its success. The majority of the population wants to join the EU, and Ukraine continues drifting toward Europe. They state that only 5 percent of the population wants to unite with Russia, indicating that Ukrainian statehood is valuable to the majority of the population. These respondents stress that while economic exchange with Russia grew by 32 percent, the Ukrainian population saw no economic change. Yanukovich and the oligarchs want to join the EU and do not want to be controlled by Russia. One expert even stresses that because of its unwillingness to join Russia, Ukraine might face a Russian-Ukrainian war sometime in the future.

Among the needs for Ukrainian society, the respondents mention the following:

1. A need for increasing support for the Ukrainian language and culture.
2. A need for a stronger connection with the EU.
3. A need for an improved legal system.
4. A need for a dialogue on history and a democratic state as the foundation for dealing with contested history.
5. A need for a comprehensive vision of Ukraine as self-efficient, modern, and based on civilized values.
6. A need for a humanitarian strategy and an influential humanitarian council.

The process of embedment of the concept of power into the meaning of national identity contributes to the vision of the future: respondents connect a positive future for Ukraine with its orientation toward the West and EU membership. Thus, Russia and the Russian ethnic group in Ukraine are blamed for preservation of the Soviet totalitarian and Russian imperial values that impede the development of democratic Ukraine and positive national identity. The prospects for a positive national identity are also perceived to be impeded by the diminishing potential of supremacy for Ukrainian ethnic nationalism. The positive future of Ukraine is connected with a continuous revival of Ukrainian culture and language with the support of the EU and the United States. The process of shaping the concept of power by the meaning

of national identity also impacts perceptions of Ukraine's prospects: the respondents are overwhelmingly pessimistic about the future of Ukraine if its totalitarian regime is not overcome and a national idea based on the values of Ukrainian ethnic identity is not developed.

Recognition of a Ukrainian Ethnic Identity Narrative

In this narrative, 70 percent of respondents express a pessimistic view of the future of Ukraine. They anticipate long stagnation for Ukraine with no alternatives for positive development. The government has no perspective on the future and hoards all resources, the opposition is in a frozen state, and the constitution is not perceived as law. The situation is characterized as going from bad to worse. The country lacks foundations for any positive change and is at the edge of a technogenic catastrophe. Yushchenko and Yanukovich have done nothing for the middle class and civic society. There is no bona fide opposition; all parties are either afraid of or have an aversion to others. The nation is decades away from understanding that everyone needs to work hard for the nation. Additionally, the people are losing their cultural roots, as provincialization and loss of connection to culture grows.

Sixty percent of these respondents believe that the future of Ukraine is connected with its integration with the EU. Ukraine is oriented toward the EU because business is Western-oriented and the people of Ukraine have European, not Asian, values. To become a member of the EU, Ukraine needs support from Europe and the United States and should have a plan for modernizing and overcoming its authoritarian legacy. To join the twenty most developed countries, Ukraine needs to play by rules, not with rules. Union with Russia would be a disaster; even the government is afraid of this prospect. Ukraine should be a strong player vis-à-vis Russia, but at present we have asymmetric relations: Russia is a member of the G8 and the UN Security Council. Relations between Russia and Belorussia offer a cautionary example for Ukraine.

Fifty percent of such respondents stress the importance of resolution of Ukraine's ethnic problems. They describe an ideal future Ukraine as a country where the Ukrainian language prevails and Russians accept the Ukrainian language as the sole state language but continue to preserve the Russian language and culture. The history of Ukraine would be a required subject in all universities and the Ukrainian culture and language would be supported by comprehensive policies and further development. Russians would be a minority but an important component of Ukrainian society. Pro-Russian feelings would decrease among regional ethnic communities, even in Crimea. Ukraine does not require federation, which could destroy the common space and unity of the state.

Forty percent of these respondents (4) connect a positive future for Ukraine with the development of a strong political opposition and civic society, a constructive connection between government and society, and an understanding of the necessity of dialogue.

Among Ukraine's needs that the respondents stressed were:

1. A need for conversation and dialogue in society.
2. A need to develop a common national identity that is based on Ukraine's independence, the democratic organization of the society, a market economy, and social orientations.

The process of embedment of the concept of power into the meaning of national identity impacts the perception of Ukraine's prospects: respondents connect a positive future with the resolution of ethnic tension, the preservation and recognition of the Ukrainian language accompanied by preservation of minority cultures, and, thus, further development of Ukrainian society as predominantly homogenous with assimilated ethnic minorities. Through the process of shaping the concept of power by the meaning of national identity, the respondents who see Russia as a major enemy and believe that current Ukrainian government is under Russian influence are not optimistic about Ukraine's future and attach any positive changes to EU membership. They emphasize the importance of a strong political opposition that would support the development of Ukrainian ethnic culture and language.

Multicultural Civic Narrative

Fifty-eight percent of people connect the future of Ukraine to its relations with Russia and the EU, but varying perceptions of these relations are ambivalent. While some respondents believe that a Western orientation will prevail, others say that Ukraine is drifting further from Europe. All respondents agree that Ukraine could act as a mediator between Russia and the West and must maintain positive relations with both Europe and Russia.

Fifty-eight percent of these respondents have an optimistic view of Ukraine. They state that Ukraine has human potential and is stronger than Poland and the Baltic states. Children are becoming more educated, and as the old generation passes, the new generation will think differently and not expect or wait for the state to resolve their problems. Ukraine has an opportunity to jump from a post-Soviet or ethnic concept of identity and become a multiethnic, multicultural state. Through this transition to independent thinking, the people will be united. Ukraine requires new leaders who have a strong sense of national responsibility.

Forty-two percent of these respondents have a pessimistic view of the future of Ukraine. Even if Ukraine remains independent, its social and eco-

conomic growth will be very slow. In its future, Ukraine faces stagnation, fights between political parties, diminishing national-democratic parties, and more Nazi parties. This government does not understand the task of reform and manages the country as in the Soviet period, not including the people in governance. Elites also are not concerned about the people and fear losing their capital. There is no bona fide opposition to the current government. Ukraine needs new leaders to emerge from civic society who better understand the situation.

Fifteen percent of such respondents think that in the future Ukraine may split: without common ground, regions differ by culture, language, history, orientations, values, and religion. Because the state of Ukraine is a fabricated project, it will remain in constant conflict.

These respondents identify the following needs:

1. A need to have a common history to eschew national fracture. Ukraine should support people who espouse a tolerant consciousness and should create a common history based on reconciliation and civic responsibility. The people of Ukraine must accept the many faces of history, which is possible based on the tolerant culture of Ukraine.
2. A need to create a good investment climate with stability of power.

Thus, the processes of embedment and shaping impact the perception of the future of Ukraine. The process of embedment of the concept of power into the meaning of national identity contributes to the vision of the future: because they emphasize the destructive effects of political and ideological manipulations, these respondents think that Ukraine may split if it fails to develop and support a common national identity. The process of shaping the concept of power by the meaning of national identity also contributes to the perception of Ukraine's prospects: based on the view of Ukraine as a multicultural society and on the criticism of manipulations from neighboring countries, the respondents have ambivalent views of future relations with Russia and the EU but believe that Ukraine should build positive relations with both sides. They also promote civic society and shared power because of their belief in a positive future for Ukraine as a multicultural civic state; lastly, they have a pessimistic view of the future of Ukraine if the people do not develop civic responsibility.

Views on the Future of Ukraine among Foreign Experts

Half of the foreign experts are pessimistic about the future of Ukraine. They believe that Ukraine will continue to remain a Soviet, peripheral state. The current government with its ideology of "power is money by any means" is leading to the collapse of, long stagnation for, or even conflict in Ukraine.

There are no reforms that bring change, including competitiveness or modernization. Though the popularity of Yanukovych is declining, there are no new real political leaders. Ukraine could ultimately be divided and split between the east and the west.

The other half of foreign experts have an optimistic view of Ukraine and believe that change should come from inside. They state that federation could create an impulse for development and strengthen the opposition, keeping Ukraine from becoming an authoritarian state. Ukraine will prosper and become democratic as the younger generation comes into power in ten to fifteen years. The older generation has nothing to offer except nostalgia, which is exploited by certain politicians. The future of Ukraine is in the hands of young people educated abroad. People can and must realize that they are being robbed by the government and must start fighting for their rights. The hope is that the people will rebel more actively, develop political agency and a voice, and require accountability of the government. People must learn to tell politicians what they want and how they see the government.

Forty percent of these respondents discuss the impact of the EU on the future of Ukraine. They believe that European integration is very important for Ukraine; without it there will be no flow of capital and modern industry into Ukraine, dooming it to economic and cultural lag. Ukraine needs to stop thinking that it has a strong geopolitical position between the West and Russia. Ukraine lacks the specific resources or interests that can attract investors independently. Ukraine depends on the EU and Russia and needs more attention from the EU because Putin will continue to pressure Ukraine from Russia.

Among Ukraine's major needs mentioned by foreign experts are:

1. A need to understand independence as independence from the ruling party. The people need to have a voice.
2. A need for an open dialogue about history and culture.
3. A need for new politicians who eschew dualities in their politics.
4. A need to support European integration.
5. A need for a civic nation.

Thus, the foreign experts are divided in their view of the future of Ukraine. While half of these experts are pessimistic about the future, the other half believe in the promise of positive change based on the growing civic abilities of a new generation. In addition, these experts stress the importance of European integration for the future of Ukraine.

The supporters of the pro-Ukrainian narrative emphasize the threat of continuous pressure from Russia on the future of Ukraine. They also stress that the propaganda against the Orange Revolution decreases the possibility of future protests against the government. The embedment of the concept of

power into the meaning of national identity shapes the vision of a positive future for Ukraine: respondents connect the future of Ukraine with the younger generation that will bring change and democracy to the country based on ethnic nationalism. The process of shaping the concept of power by the meaning of national identity also contributes to the perception of Ukraine's prospects: Ukraine is envisioned as being ruled by Ukrainian ethnic elites who further develop an ethnic meaning of national identity.

The supporters of the pro-civic narrative state that the future of Ukraine is connected with the internal ability of the people to oppose the current government and demand its accountability. They emphasize that the European Union should put more attention and support toward pro-democratic forces in Ukraine. The process of embedment of the concept of power into the meaning of national identity contributes to the vision of the future of Ukraine: the civic meaning of national identity is perceived to be the best option for imminent democratic rule. The process of shaping the concept of power by the meaning of national identity also contributes to the perception of Ukraine's prospects: without civic society development, Ukraine is perceived as doomed to stagnation, and the hope for a positive future is connected with the people's rising consciousness.

The vision of a nation's future can include multiple aspects and different spheres of social life. Nevertheless, in a national narrative the view of the prospects of a nation is framed by the dualistic order and specific areas of social relations. The list of positive and negative factors that impact the future of a nation depends on the type of duality: social group dualities are connected with a vision of the future as dependent on the positions and power of social (ethnic, religious, class) groups; *binational dualities* lead to the perception of national prospects from the angle of future relations between two nations and the impact of the outgroup nation on the internal affairs of the ingroup nation; temporal dualities are connected with the views of the future from the perspective of a return to former order, values, customs, and types of social relations; and *ideological dualities* result in a vision of national perspectives as dependent on the prevalence of a particular mentality or ideology.

The vision of the future is also connected with the mechanisms used in mythic narratives and the approaches to legitimacy prevalent in normative order for a particular national narrative. Positive prospects for the future are connected with a restored balance of power, the increase of the power of the ingroup and delegitimization of outgroup power, establishments of ingroup rights, and the definition of ingroup members as legitimate agents. Negative prospects for the nation's future are connected with continuous domination by the outgroup and impositions of its traditions, ideas, and ideology. Thus, the vision of the nation's future arrives from the structure of national narra-

tive (type of duality, mechanisms of mythic narratives, and approaches to legitimacy in normative order) and is specific to each national narrative.

The dual national narrative functions of the production of the meaning of national identity and legitimization of power also contribute to the vision of the future of Ukraine. The process of embedment of the concept of power into the meaning of national identity influences the vision of the future of the nation: when respondents see the prospects for the power of the ingroup or increased the status of the ingroup, they have a positive assessment of the future of the national idea and present this meaning of national identity as the only option for future development. When respondents sense diminishing possibilities for the ingroup in the future, they condemn the nation-building process and propose an alternative meaning of national identity. The process of shaping the concept of power according to the meaning of national identity also contributes to the perception of Ukraine's future: positive assessment of the prospects for the development of a desired type of nation (ethnic, multicultural, or civic) and intergroup relations within the nation (either prevalence of one group or equal status) lead to optimistic expectations regarding the existing or imminent power of the ingroup, while views of the nation as going in the wrong direction for nation-building diminish any positive forecast about ingroup power and status within the nation.

Thus, the vision of the future of the nation is deeply rooted in the structure and functions of the national narrative. The prospects for the nation are assessed within the framework of a specific duality employed in the national narrative. The mythic narratives serve as a foundation for justification of positive and negative assessments of the future, thus bringing the nation's past into its future. Normative order underpins the domestic and foreign policy recommendations for the future development of the nation. The assessment of the national prospects depends on the projected trajectory of the meaning of national identity and its connotation of power and is developed through the intertwined impact of the meanings of identity and power.

Chapter Six

Conclusion: Production of Meaning in National Narratives in Ukraine

THE STRUCTURE OF NATIONAL NARRATIVES

Dualistic Order

The analysis of national narratives in Ukraine revealed the existence of all four types of dualistic order. The first type of dualistic order, *social group duality*, forms the foundation for the dual identity, the fight for a Ukrainian national identity, and pro-Ukrainian foreign experts' narratives. *Social group (ethnic) dualities* in these three narratives represent the nation as an arena of zero-sum fighting between two ethnic groups—Russian and Ukrainian. These dualistic orders imply that one ethnic group symbolizes the decency of society, represents the best and most important values in the nation, and moves the nation toward a prosperous future. It is in conflict with an oppressive ethnic group that has values and history alien to Ukraine, malevolent aspirations, and goals of domination. The second type of dualistic order, *binational duality*, forms a basis for the recognition of a Ukrainian ethnic identity narrative. It emphasizes conflict between Ukraine and Russia and the political and ideological systems they represent as a major problem for Ukraine. It states that an independent Ukraine has made the right choice for its development, and supports the values of democracy and progress. Russia remains an evil enemy that aspires to control, dominate, and take over Ukraine. The third type of dualistic order, *temporal duality*, forms the foundation for a pro-Soviet narrative that emphasizes the gap between a positive Soviet past and the corrupt present of Ukraine. It posits the period of the Ukrainian SSR as the most virtuous and worthy time in the history of Ukraine, compared to the current environment in which profane values and

vices of society are furthered by nationalists and extremists. The fourth type of dualistic order, *ideological duality*, forms the basis for the multicultural civic and pro-civic foreign experts' narratives. It describes the nation as an arena of a fight between liberal ideology and nationalistic and pro-Soviet extremism. It implies that liberal ideology represents the worthy in Ukraine, promotes the values and virtues of equality and democracy, and creates a foundation for national prosperity. It is in constant conflict with both the ideologies of nationalists and Stalinists, which rest on profane values and suppress the morality and goodness of the nation.

Types of Binary Constructs

The analysis of national narratives in Ukraine shows support for the hypothesis described in chapter 1, that a particular type of dualistic order is connected with the specific set of values as binary constructs. Among national narratives with *social group (ethnic) duality*, the dual identity narrative includes two values of spirituality—culture and the values of development and social order. The binary construct “Russian high spirituality–Ukrainian rural, simplistic culture” defines Russian spirituality as a value of a sophisticated, developed culture established in an urban society, whereas the binary construct “Russian high spirituality–Ukrainian alien culture” defines Russian spirituality as a value of authenticity for the nation. The binary construct “Russian multiculturalism–Ukrainian nationalism” identifies “multicultural” as a value of the flourishing of different national ideas and cultures. The binary construct “progressive Russians–conservative Ukrainians” characterizes progress as a value of forward thinking and conservatism as a negative concept indicating decline.

The fight for a Ukrainian ethnic identity narrative contains two values of ideology and one value of social order. The binary construct “pro-Western Ukrainians–pro-Asian Russians” defines “pro-Western” as a value containing the European ideals of freedom and democracy. The binary construct “democratic Ukrainians–totalitarian Russians” defines democracy as a value comprising rights and freedoms. The binary construct “Ukrainian victimhood–Russian oppression” defines victimhood as a value reflecting nonaggression and peace.

The pro-Ukrainian foreign experts' narrative includes two values of ideology and values of social order and social relations. The binary construct “pan-European Ukrainians–pan-Asian Russians” defines “pro-Western” as a value containing the European ideals of freedom and democracy. The binary construct “democratic Ukrainians–totalitarian Russians” defines democracy as a value comprising rights and freedoms. The binary construct “Ukrainian nationalism–Russian imperial ambitions” attributes a meaning of sovereignty and national renaissance to nationalism. The binary construct “Ukrainian

victimhood–Russian oppression” defines victimhood as a value reflecting tolerance and peace.

The national narrative with *binational duality*—recognition of a Ukrainian ethnic identity—contains values of ideology and social order. The binary construct “Ukrainian independence–Russian imperial ambitions” defines independence as a foundation for the sovereignty of national identity. The binary construct “democratic–totalitarian” defines democracy as a value comprising rights and freedoms.

The national narrative with *temporal duality*—pro-Soviet—includes two values of development and a value of social order. The binary constructs “Soviet peaceful coexistence–current nationalism” defines nationalism as a source of tensions. The binary construct “Soviet industrialization–current economic decline” defines industrialization as a value encompassing economic development, and the binary construct “Soviet bloom of different cultures–cultural decline” defines a multiplicity of cultures as a value of cultural development.

Among the national narratives with *ideological duality*, the multicultural-civic narrative contains values of ideology, social order, and social relations. The binary construct “liberal unity–nationalistic and pro-Soviet divide” defines unity as the value of commonality. The binary construct “liberal multiculturalism–nationalistic homogeneous state” characterizes “multicultural” as a positive value meaning recognition of different ethnic groups. The binary construct “liberal free will–soviet paternalism” defines “free will” as a value reflecting an absence of dependency on the state.

The pro-civic foreign experts’ narrative contains two values of ideology, a value of social relations and a value of social order. The binary construct “democratic mentality–soviet mentality” characterizes democracy through civic participation and responsibility, and the binary construct “liberal multiculturalism–nationalistic ethnic state” defines “multicultural” as a value indicating support and protection of ethnic difference. The binary construct “liberal tolerance–nationalistic and pro-Soviet imposition” defines tolerance as a value containing an absence of imposition and control. The binary construct “liberal ambivalence–nationalistic and Soviet black-and-white thinking” defines ambivalence as a value reflecting complexity and tolerance.

Thus, the theoretical hypothesis predicting a connection between types of dualistic order and the specific values used in categorical constructs is confirmed: *social group duality* rests on values of spirituality-culture, social order, and ideology; *binational duality* rests on values of ideology and social order; *ideological duality* rests on values of ideology, social order, and social relations; and *temporal duality* rests on development values. These dualities, of course, include other values, but specific types of values remain prevalent.

Mythic Narratives and Iconic Order

The research on national narratives in Ukraine reveals a variety of myths employed for justification of dualistic order. Thus, narratives that are based on *social group duality*—dual identity, fight for a Ukrainian ethnic identity, and the pro-Ukrainian foreign experts' narratives—employ three myths of foundation, three myths of unjust treatment and suffering, two myths of rebirth and renewal, two myths of ethnogenesis, and two myths of territory. Two narratives that are based on *ideological duality*—multicultural-civic and the pro-civic foreign experts' narratives—employ six myths of foundation and one myth of ethnogenesis. The narrative that is based on *binational duality*—recognition of a Ukrainian ethnic identity—is justified by the myths of ethnogenesis and election. The narrative that is based on *temporal duality*—pro-Soviet—employs three myths of a Golden Age.

The myths most often used in Ukrainian national narratives are myths of foundation: nine myths of foundation were used to support *social group* and *ideological dualities*. Mythic narratives describe different types of foundations: economic development, civic society, democratic values, European traditions, liberalism, multiculturalism, and dialogue. Four of these myths emphasize impediments to one group's particular values or ideals by another group: (1) Ukrainian and Russian nationalists and Stalinists-Communists obstruct the development of a peaceful civic society through conflict ideologies, (2) they diminish people's agency through populism and paternalism, (3) they obstruct establishment of a national dialogue because they promote only nationalistic or pro-Soviet concepts of society and refuse to accept other points of view, and (4) Ukrainian and Russian nationalists oppose the development of a peaceful multicultural society in Ukraine. These myths condemn particular groups (nationalists and Communists) as obstacles to the achievement of a peaceful, multicultural, liberal nation through the establishment of civic society and legitimize the moral right of the ingroup to lead the nation. Ukrainian and Russian nationalists and pro-Soviet groups are perceived to be enemies of civic society who see liberalism as a hindrance to their goals.

Three other foundation myths justify the moral predominance of one group over another established in dualistic order: (1) Russians in the east industrially developed Ukraine and supported rural, underdeveloped Ukrainians in the west who were noncontributors to the economy of the nation; (2) Ukrainians have a history and culture of democratic values since the Magdeburg Law and are capable of creating a democratic society, while pro-Soviet and totalitarian Russians continue to support a paternalistic society; (3) Ukrainians have European roots and traditions and can lead Ukraine into Europe, while Russians are Asian and look backward to Russia. All these myths use specific events and data to legitimate the power of one group and

justify its right to lead the nation while diminishing the right of the other group.

The other two foundation myths justify dualistic order by emphasizing a specific desire of all Ukrainian people and their inability to achieve their goal: (1) the people of Ukraine long for a liberal society but are stuck in a Soviet mentality and Ukrainian nationalism and (2) people want to understand different sides of historic events but are involved in an ongoing conflict of interpretations and possess black-and-white thinking. The nation is portrayed as both understanding the ideas of a liberal shared society and also not ready to pursue them. These two foundation myths rationalize the importance of the promotion of the ideals supported by the group and justify the moral right of this group to represent the nation and establish its objectives.

The second most used myths in Ukrainian national narratives are myths of ethnogenesis and territory: four myths of ethnogenesis and two myths of territory were used to justify *social group*, *binational*, and *ideological dualities*. Two myths of ethnogenesis justify dualistic order by positioning one group over other. These myths state that one ethnic group has a greater right to represent the nation than the other: (1) Russian culture is deeply rooted in ancient Rus' and has colossal mental potential, while Ukrainians have a simplistic culture with a young language and very few literary products and (2) Ukrainians are the authentic native culture of Ukraine, while all other groups are the products of migration and will readily accept an ethnic Ukrainian state. These myths use spirituality, development, and authenticity of culture to explain the prevalent position of the group within the Ukrainian nation and to legitimize its power.

One myth of ethnogenesis and one myth of territory justify dualistic order by rationalizing exclusion of one ethnic group from the process of nation-building: the Ukrainian ethnic group has developed in Ukraine and has Ukraine as its own territory, while Russians have their own ethnic country—Russia—and came to Ukraine as colonialists who should now either leave or accept the Ukrainian ethnic state. These myths deny the right of a particular ethnic group to be a coequal part of the nation and legitimize the dominance of the ethnic ingroup. Another myth of ethnogenesis and myth of territory justify dualistic order by stressing that one group wants to take over the entire Ukrainian nation. These myths emphasize that the ideals of all the Ukrainian people are impeded by one ethnic group: (1) the Ukrainian nation is authentically multicultural and was formed as a conglomerate of different ethnic groups, but Ukrainian nationalists are trying to form a nation on the basis of just one group, and (2) the east and west of Ukraine have different histories and values, but Ukrainian nationalist are trying to transpose Ukraine onto the alien civilizational space of Polish culture and the Greco-Catholic Church. These myths delegitimize the claims of one particular ethnic group to repre-

sent the Ukrainian nation and support the rights of all ethnic groups to be equal builders of the nation.

The third group of myths used in Ukrainian national narratives concerns myths of a Golden Age. Three myths of Golden Age are used to justify *temporal duality*. All of these myths stress that one group took over the nation and destroyed all that was positive in Ukraine: (1) Soviet Ukraine was a tolerant brotherly nation based on the common identity of the Soviet people (*Sovetskii narod*), but now nationalists impose their vision of history and society on the whole country and are ruining the peaceful nation; (2) Soviet Ukraine was one of the top ten economically developed nations and brought development to newly acquired western regions, but since the Orange Revolution representatives of these western regions—Ukrainian nationalists—have taken over the country and brought it to economic stagnation; and (3) Soviet Ukraine provided opportunities for all cultures to flourish, but now Ukrainian nationalists demand assimilation and enforce the Ukrainization of society, diminishing possibilities for other cultures. These myths delegitimize the power of Ukrainian nationalists and emphasize that the only way to achieve Ukrainian prosperity is to return to the order of Soviet Ukraine.

The fourth group of myths in Ukrainian national narratives contains myths of suffering and unjust treatment. Three myths of suffering and unjust treatment justify *social group duality*. Two of these myths describe victimization of the ingroup by the aggressive actions of an outgroup: (1) Ukraine is a postcolonial, postgenocidal, posttotalitarian country with Holodomor as the core symbol of its victimization, which continues now because Ukrainian language and culture are oppressed via the hegemonic Russian language, and (2) Russians suppressed Ukrainians' search for independence through Holodomor and other repressions, but the Ukrainian people possess a feminine identity and are too peaceful to resist. This outgroup cruelty completely delegitimizes the perpetrator and delimits its role in nation-building processes, while Ukraine's victimization heightens the right of the oppressed group to represent national ideas and define the future of the nation. Another myth of unjust treatment and suffering stresses the attribution of negative intentions and unfair treatment of the ingroup to the outgroup: Russians are a tolerant group that support a multiplicity of cultures and dual identity (Ukrainian and Russian) for the people; they want to belong to Ukraine but are treated unfairly by Ukrainian nationalists who attribute Russian imperial ambitions to them and want to impose their own ethno-cultural messianic nationalism. In this myth, positive aspirations of the ingroup are not recognized by the oppressing group. This myth legitimizes the victimized ingroup and emphasizes its right to be a part of the nation while condemning the actions of the aggressive outgroup.

A fifth group of myths in Ukrainian national narratives includes two myths of rebirth and renewal that justify *social group duality* and a myth of

election that justifies *binational duality*. The myths of rebirth and renewal celebrate the national recovery after a long period of oppression but emphasize the persistent threat to national independence from different groups, including liberals, Russian nationalists, and Russia: (1) Ukraine survived as a nation and recovered like a phoenix based on cultural nationalism, the idea of Holodomor, European roots, a national movement, and the Ukrainian language as the genetic code of the nation, and it will prosper despite interference from liberals and Russian nationalists, and (2) the fight for independence that inspired Ukrainians is not finished because of the imperial ambitions of Russia and the government's policies of Russification. These myths legitimize the claim of the ingroup to define the nation and national identity as a sacred right of the reborn Phoenix and proscribe participation of outgroups (liberals, Russian nationalists) in nation-building because they are enemies of the renewed nation. The myth of election posits one nation (Ukraine) as better and more moral than the other nation (Russia). It counterposes two national groups and provides a historic background to justify the claim of chosen destiny: Ukrainians have supported democracy, tolerance, and human rights since the Middle Ages, and thus it is important to preserve the differences from Russia, which has developed as a totalitarian, paternalistic society. The myth justifies the right of one nation to independence and the definition of its own future while condemning the other nation as having selected an immoral path of development.

The impediment by outgroup mechanism is used in the mythic narratives of four national narratives in Ukraine: dual identity, fight for a Ukrainian ethnic identity, pro-Ukrainian foreign experts, and multicultural-civic. In the dual identity narrative, it is used in a myth of unjust treatment that shows that Russians want to be a part of a Ukraine that is multicultural and supports different ethnic groups, while Ukrainian nationalists treat them as Russian nationalists with imperial ambitions, denying the equality of their rights with Ukrainians. In the fight for a Ukrainian ethnic identity narrative this mechanism is applied in a myth of suffering and unjust treatment and in a myth of rebirth and renewal. These myths describe Ukraine as a country victimized over the centuries by Russian repressions and Holodomor, but which has recovered and received independence based on its democratic traditions and European roots. The building of a new independent state is impeded by continuing oppression from Russia and the dominance of the Russian language, as well as a liberal ideology that downplays the importance of the ethnic state. This mechanism is also used in the rebirth and renewal myth of the pro-Ukrainian foreign experts' narrative that emphasizes that the fight for independence that inspired Ukrainians continues because of Russia's imperial ambitions and the government's policies of Russification. Finally, in the multicultural-civic narrative this mechanism is employed in two foundation myths that emphasize the importance of tolerance, civic participation, and

agency as important features of civic society. But Russian and Ukrainian nationalists, Stalinists, and Communists impede their development by promoting conflicting and bigoted ideologies and supporting populism and paternalism. Thus, the impediment of outgroup mechanism is used by several opposing dyads in Ukrainian society. The supporters of the dual identity narrative blame Ukrainian nationalists for obstruction of the development of a multicultural society, while supporters of the fight for a Ukrainian ethnic identity narrative and pro-Ukrainian foreign experts' narrative define Russians and Russia as enemies of the independent Ukrainian state. The supporters of the fight for a Ukrainian ethnic identity narrative state that liberal ideology and civic society are an impediment to positive Ukrainian ethnic nationalism, while the supporters of multicultural-civic nationalism believe that a narrow-minded nationalistic ideology and populism destroy prospects for tolerant civic society and social agency.

The condemning imposition mechanism is employed in the mythic narratives of four national narratives in Ukraine: dual identity, multicultural-civic, pro-civic foreign experts, and pro-Soviet. In the dual identity narrative, it is used in a myth of territory that describes Ukraine as a country with different histories and values, open to different cultures. However, Ukrainian nationalists are transposing Ukraine to the alien civilizational space of Western European culture and the Greco-Catholic Church. In the multicultural-civic narrative this mechanism is employed in a myth of ethnogenesis that emphasizes that Ukrainian nationalists form the nation on the basis of one ethnic group and impose their culture on the entire multicultural nation. This mechanism is used similarly in the foundation myth of the pro-civic foreign experts' narrative: Ukraine is described as a multicultural society challenged by Ukrainian nationalists who forcibly developed an ethno-national state dominated by one ethnic group. Finally, this mechanism is utilized in three Golden Age myths of the pro-Soviet narrative. They describe Soviet Ukraine as a brotherhood of nations, with multiple flourishing cultures and high levels of economic development, which is all now completely destroyed because Ukrainian nationalists from western regions imposed their ideas, values, and culture over all of Ukraine and brought it to economic stagnation. Thus, in Ukrainian national narratives the condemning imposition mechanism is used to denounce Ukrainian nationalism for imposing their ideology on the multicultural society of contemporary Ukraine and the identity of Soviet people (*sovetskii narod*). The supporters of dual identity, multicultural-civic, and pro-civic foreign experts' narratives blame Ukrainian nationalists for the imposition of the ethno-cultural values and traditions of one ethnic group on the whole society of Ukraine. The supporters of the pro-Soviet narrative blame Ukrainian nationalists for destroying the achievements of Soviet Ukraine and replacing them with regional and ethnic traditions and ideology.

The positive ingroup predispositions mechanism is employed in the mythic narratives of three national narratives in Ukraine: dual identity, recognition of a Ukrainian ethnic identity, and pro-Ukrainian foreign experts. In the dual identity narrative this mechanism is utilized in a foundation myth that emphasizes that entrepreneurial, industrially developed Russians created the well-being of Ukraine and still provide for rural backward Ukrainians in the west of the country. In the pro-Ukrainian foreign experts' narrative this mechanism is employed in two myths of foundation that state that the Ukrainian ethnic group has a history and culture of democratic values and European traditions that provides ethnic Ukrainians with the capacity to build a European democratic country, while the Russian ethnic group developed within Asian culture with paternalistic and totalitarian values and thus is alien to democracy. Finally, in the recognition of a Ukrainian ethnic identity narrative this mechanism is similarly used in a myth of election that describes the Ukrainian ethnic group as supporting democracy, tolerance, and human rights since the Middle Ages, pro-democratic in its core, and working to build a free and independent European country while Ukraine's neighbor, Russia, is totalitarian and imperialistic in its nature and cannot build a democratic society. Thus, the positive ingroup predispositions mechanism is used by two ethnic groups: Russians and Ukrainians. The supporters of the dual identity narrative describe Russians as having a greater ability to effect industrial and economic development, while the supporters of the recognition of a Ukrainian ethnic identity and pro-Ukrainian foreign experts' narratives depict Ukrainians as essentially democratic and European and thus more capable of building Ukraine as a European country. Both groups deny these abilities in the other group: according to the supporters of the dual identity narrative Ukrainians cannot develop an industrial modern country and, according to supporters of the recognition of a Ukrainian ethnic identity and pro-Ukrainian foreign experts' narratives, Russians cannot build a democratic society.

The validation of rights mechanism is employed in the mythic narratives of three national narratives in Ukraine: dual identity, fight for a Ukrainian ethnic identity, and recognition of a Ukrainian ethnic identity. In the dual identity narrative this mechanism is utilized in a myth of ethnogenesis that emphasizes the colossal mental potential and inherent spirituality of Russian culture, deeply rooted in ancient Rus', that validates Russians' rights to participate in nation-building in Ukraine, while Ukrainians represent a rural, simplistic culture with a young language and few literary products. In the fight for a Ukrainian ethnic identity narrative this mechanism is used in a myth of ethnogenesis and a myth of territory that emphasize that Ukrainian people are native to Ukraine's territory and developed there as an ethnic group and have exclusive rights to build the nation of Ukraine. Russians came to Ukraine as a result of colonialism and have their own ethnic land—

Russia—and should be excluded from nation-building in Ukraine. Finally, in the recognition of a Ukrainian ethnic identity narrative this mechanism is employed similarly in a myth of ethnogenesis that states that Ukraine is the ethnic state of the Ukrainian ethnic group and this fact has been confirmed internationally. All other groups are merely immigrants and have accepted a national idea that is based on the ethno-cultural Ukrainian identity. Thus, in Ukrainian national narratives, the validation of rights mechanism helps validate the exclusive rights of the Russian or Ukrainian ethnic group. The supporters of the Dual identity narratives emphasize the rights of Russians as having deeper culture in comparison with Ukrainians, while the supporters of the fight for Ukrainian ethnic identity and recognition of a Ukrainian ethnic identity narratives stress that Ukrainians have greater rights in their own land than Russians, who either have to accept the Ukrainian ethnic idea or move to their ethnic land—Russia.

The enlightening mechanism is employed in three foundation myths of the pro-civic foreign experts' narrative. These myths state that the Ukrainian people appreciate values of liberalism, tolerance, and dialogue and want to build Ukraine's society based on these ideals. Unfortunately, they do not have the ability to achieve their goals because they are stuck in a Soviet mentality, involving conflicting ideologies of nationalism, and support only one vision of society. They should be enlightened about how to achieve desired outcomes of a liberal democratic society. Thus, in Ukrainian national narratives, the enlightening mechanism justifies the importance of promoting the values of democracy and liberalism.

Myths in Ukrainian national narratives also contain mechanisms of interpretation. The first one provides antipodal interpretations of the same subject. Thus, in the myths of ethnogenesis of the fight for Ukrainian ethnic identity and recognition of a Ukrainian ethnic identity narratives, Ukraine is described as an ethnic state of Ukrainians while all other ethnic groups are depicted as a result of immigration or colonialism; the multicultural nature of Ukrainian society is denied. In the foundation myths of multicultural-civic and pro-civic foreign experts' narratives and the myth of unjust treatment in the dual identity narrative, Ukraine is presented as a multicultural state with coequal ethnic groups, and attempts by Ukrainian nationalists to form a Ukrainian nation on the basis of one ethnic group are criticized. Holodomor is interpreted in the myths of territory and unjust treatment in the dual identity narrative as a result of a class struggle that took place in many parts of the Soviet Union, whereas in the myths of suffering and rebirth in the fight for a Ukrainian ethnic identity, recognition of a Ukrainian ethnic identity, and pro-Ukrainian foreign experts' narratives, it is presented as a unique genocide committed by Russians against Ukrainians. The red flag is depicted as a flag of the great victory, the unification of the Soviet people, and grandiose economic achievements in the myths of a Golden Age in the pro-Soviet

narrative while it is described as a foul flag that represents imperial memory, domination, and arrogance in the myth of suffering in the fight for a Ukrainian ethnic identity narrative.

The decline of the number of people with a Russian identity is interpreted in the myths of unjust treatment and territory in the dual identity narrative as a result of coercive pressure and a lower status imposed on those with Russian identity, while in the myths of ethnogenesis, territory and rebirth in the fight for a Ukrainian ethnic identity, recognition of a Ukrainian ethnic identity, and pro-Ukrainian foreign experts' narratives it is viewed as the product of free choices by people who have a double identity. The fact that there are four Russian language schools in Kiev is interpreted to be discrimination against the Russian-speaking population in the myth of unjust treatment in the dual identity narrative ("only four schools in the city in which the majority of the population speaks Russian") but in the myths of ethnogenesis, territory and rebirth in the fight for a Ukrainian ethnic identity and recognition of a Ukrainian ethnic identity narratives it represents the free conscious decision of people who chose to live in a Ukrainian ethnic state ("parents have an option to choose the language of education for their children, so they choose Ukrainian even if they themselves speak Russian"). The fact that the Russian language is used more broadly than Ukrainian is interpreted as representing a need to introduce a second official language in the foundational myth in the dual identity narrative and as cause to protect the Ukrainian language in the suffering and rebirth myths in the fight for a Ukrainian ethnic identity, recognition of a Ukrainian ethnic identity, and pro-Ukrainian foreign experts' narratives. Similarly, in the myths of the dual identity narrative, the possibility of introduction of the Russian language as a second state language is perceived as a way to reduce conflicts, whereas in the myths of all the pro-Ukrainian narratives it is considered a way to divide the country.

Yushchenko's policies are perceived to be an imposition of Ukrainian ethnic identity in the foundation, ethnogenesis, and territory myths of the dual identity, pro-Soviet, multicultural-civic, an pro-civic foreign experts' narratives. However, they are evaluated as proper policies that were improperly implemented in the ethnogenesis, suffering, and rebirth myths of the fight for a Ukrainian ethnic identity narrative. The myths of ethnogenesis and rebirth in the recognition of a Ukrainian ethnic identity narrative evaluate Yushchenko's actions as good policy that was not well explained and did not validate the stories of different groups within Ukraine. Yanukovych is described as not having any concept of national identity or national idea in the myths of foundation, a Golden Age, and unjust treatment in the dual identity and pro-Soviet narratives, while the myths of all other narratives describe him as pro-Soviet and pro-Russian.

The second mechanism of interpretation uses the same axiological interpretation for antipodal subjects. For example, the idea of a vibrant, devel-

oped, people-centered language as the core of an ethnic group is used both in the myth of ethnogenesis in the dual identity narrative and in the myth of rebirth in the fight for a Ukrainian ethnic identity narrative. The former states that “while the Russian language arrives from the heritage of the Rus’ and represents the colossal mental potential of Russian culture and world-famous writers, the modern Ukrainian language is very young and was developed only in the nineteenth century.” The latter emphasizes that the “Ukrainian language is very democratic, based on the people’s language, intelligent, and supported by the youth. Russian was formed under the influence of the state; it is complicated, artificial, and not connected to the people.” The concept of progress as an essential feature of an ethnic group is employed in (1) the foundation myth in the dual identity narrative and in (2) the myths of foundation and renewal in the pro-Ukrainian foreign experts’ narratives, as well as the myths of renewal and election in the fight for a Ukrainian ethnic identity and recognition of a Ukrainian ethnic identity narratives. In the first case, Russians are depicted as an economically progressive group that developed the industrial potential of Ukraine and supported the rural, patriarchic, and backward Ukrainians in the west. In the second case, Ukrainians are portrayed as a socially progressive, democratic group with deep European traditions, while Russians are seen as a socially backward group with a patriarchal culture and values of paternalism and totalitarianism. The concept of tolerance is used in (1) the myth of unjust treatment in the dual identity narrative, (2) the Golden Age myths in the pro-Soviet narrative, and (3) in the myth of election in the recognition of a Ukrainian ethnic identity narratives and the myth of foundation in the pro-Ukrainian foreign experts’ narrative. In the first case, Russians are depicted as a tolerant group that suffer repression by the Ukrainian nationalists; in the second case, Soviet people are depicted to be a tolerant brotherhood of ethnic groups, while Ukrainian nationalists are described as aggressive, imposing their ideology on all the people of Ukraine; in the third case, Ukrainians are perceived as a peaceful people with deep traditions of tolerance while Russia, and pro-Russian and pro-Soviet groups are described as aggressive, with totalitarian and imperial ambitions.

Normative Order

In national narratives that rest on *social group duality*—for example, in the dual identity narrative, normative order (1) endorses the equal powers of Russian and Ukrainian groups and multicultural society, (2) promotes support for Russian culture and language and better relations with Russia, and (3) calls for the revision of nationalistic textbooks. Normative order in the fight for a Ukrainian ethnic identity narrative (1) supports the dominance of the Ukrainian ethnic group based on its history and the threat present from the Russian culture and language, (2) emphasizes the importance of develop-

ment of the Ukrainian language and culture, and (3) promotes a ban on Russian as a second language, and is antagonistic toward Soviet myths and Russian domination in media. The pro-Ukrainian foreign experts' narrative (1) promotes ethnic nationalism as the only option for the successful development of independent Ukraine, as well as the acceptance of Ukrainian culture and language by all ethnic minorities, (2) requires protection of the Ukrainian language, and (3) endorses separation of Ukrainian and Russian history.

In national narratives that are based in *binational duality*—for example, in the recognition of a Ukrainian ethnic identity narrative, normative order (1) proscribes separation of Ukrainian and Russian history and defensiveness against the imperial ambitions of Russia, (2) promotes the dominance of the Ukrainian ethnic group as accepted nationally and internationally, and (3) encourages widespread use of the Ukrainian language as the only language of education, government, and public policy. In national narratives that rest on *temporal duality*—for example, the pro-Soviet narrative, normative order (1) supports the power of all people of Ukraine and the common identity of the Soviet people and (2) stipulates support for the regional status of Russian language, embraces a positive analysis of twentieth-century history, and encourages revision of Ukrainian nationalistic textbooks. In national narratives that rest on *ideological duality*, for example in the multicultural-civic narrative, normative order (1) endorses unity in diversity and multiculturalism, (2) denounces all types of extremists (nationalists, Stalinists, and Communists), and (3) encourages dialogue about histories, promotion of Ukrainian language use, and support for other languages. In the pro-civic foreign experts narrative, normative order (1) furthers liberal ideology, multicultural identity, and respect for all cultures, (2) condemn nationalists and Communists, and (3) proscribes support for civic society, regional status for the Russian language, and a national dialogue on history.

In Ukrainian national narratives, legitimization of the rights of one group based on cultural values prevails in the fight for a Ukrainian ethnic identity and pro-Ukrainian foreign experts narratives. It derives from the mechanism of positive ingroup predisposition used in the foundation and election myths of these narratives: the Ukrainian ethnic group is more democratic, European, and modern than the Russian ethnic group and thus has the exclusive right to build the nation. It is also prevalent in the dual identity narrative and also derives from the mechanism of positive ingroup predisposition used in the myth of ethnogenesis. Russians are perceived as having deeper culture and spirituality, and thus they are deemed equal builders of Ukrainian national identity.

The second approach to legitimacy, validation and group consensus, is prevalent in the foundation myths of the multicultural-civic and pro-civic foreign experts narratives and derives from the employment of mechanisms

of enlightening. These narratives state that the people of Ukraine need to fully appreciate the values of democracy and civic society and come to understand ways to build a society of socially responsible people. Thus, they can become legitimate agents of power. This approach also derives from the mechanism of impediment by outgroup used in myths of unjust treatment, suffering, and rebirth in the pro-Ukrainian narratives. Ukrainians were victimized and long-suffering, so they deserve to build their own ethnic state, and this right is accepted by the national and international communities. This approach also prevails in the recognition of a Ukrainian ethnic identity narrative. It derives from the validation of rights mechanism in the myths of ethnogenesis and territory: Ukrainians are native to Ukraine, and all other immigrant ethnic groups have already accepted the Ukrainian ethnic state.

The third approach to legitimacy, legitimization of the ingroup and delegitimization of outgroups is prevalent in most narratives. In the dual identity narrative the legitimacy of the power of the Russian ethnic group is justified through legitimization of the Russian ingroup and delegitimization of the Ukrainian outgroup, proclaiming the Russians' right to power based on superior cultural values and development. In the pro-Soviet narrative, the legitimacy of the Soviet regime is justified through legitimization of Soviet order and delegitimization of the current social and political order, stressing the consensus and validation of Soviet order by the "brotherhood" of all Soviet people. The identity of Soviet people, which produced a peaceful brotherhood, developed industrial Ukraine and led it to the victory in World War II; it should be restored and serve as a foundation of power. In the fight for a Ukrainian ethnic identity narrative and pro-Ukrainian foreign experts' narrative, the legitimacy of the power of the Ukrainian ethnic group is justified through legitimization of the ingroup and delegitimization of the Russian outgroup.

Future

As discussed in chapter 5, the vision of the nation's future derives from the structure of national narrative (type of duality, mechanisms of mythic narratives, and approaches to legitimacy in normative order) and is specific for each national narrative. In national narratives based on *social group dualities*, the vision of the future is connected with the positions and power of social (ethnic, religious, class) groups. The supporters of the dual identity narrative connect a positive future with improved relations with Russia, increased status of the Russian language, and restoration of a balance of power. They see impediments to positive developments in the European Union's support of Ukrainian nationalism. Supporters of the fight for a Ukrainian ethnic identity narrative are optimistic about the future of Ukraine as long as national identity is built on the Ukrainian ethnic idea, the government sup-

ports the revival of the Ukrainian language, and relations with the European Union grow stronger. They see negative prospects attached to ongoing Russian influence and continuation of the totalitarian regime. The supporters of the pro-Ukrainian foreign experts' narrative connect a positive future with growing protests against the current government and a younger generation bringing change and pro-Western ideas to Ukraine. They see threats in Russian imperial ambitions and propaganda opposing the Orange Revolution.

The national narrative built on *binational dualities*, the recognition of a Ukrainian ethnic identity narrative, includes a perspective on national prospects from the angle of future relations between Russia and Ukraine. The supporters of this narrative ground the positive future of Ukraine with enhanced relations with the European Union, development of a political opposition that supports Ukrainian culture and language, and increased national unity through common acceptance of Ukrainian culture. They see the barriers to a positive future in ongoing Russian influence and imperial ambitions.

The national narrative built on *temporal dualities*, the pro-Soviet narrative, embraces a future that promotes a return to Soviet order, values, and customs. The supporters of this narrative are optimistic about the future of Ukraine if it develops strong connections with Russia and returns to the ideals of Soviet Ukraine. They see the influence of the European Union as a threat to positive prospects for the country.

National narratives resting on *ideological dualities* consider national perspectives to be dependent on the prevalence of liberal ideology or nationalistic and pro-Soviet mentality. The supporters of the multicultural-civic narrative see a positive future connected to the development of Ukraine as a multicultural state and improved relations with both Russia and the European Union. They see the absence of civic responsibility as a threat, and predict the split of Ukraine if no civic society is established. The supporters of the pro-civic foreign experts' narrative are optimistic about the future of Ukraine if the internal capacity of citizens to oppose the current government grows; civic society will become vibrant, and relations with the European Union will grow stronger. They believe that these prospects will be demolished if a Soviet mentality and nationalistic ideology continue to prevail in Ukrainian society.

FUNCTIONS OF NATIONAL NARRATIVE

The Formation of the Meaning of Identity

In the dual identity narrative the meaning of national identity is established through the presentation of Ukraine as a nation comprising two ethnic groups—Russians and Ukrainians. Russians are positioned as culturally and economically superior and more progressive, in contrast with the simplistic,

rural culture, and “messianic” nationalism of Ukrainians. Historic accounts are employed to cement the coherence of Russia’s deep spirituality and ingenuity, including the history of ancient Rus’, the Byzantine Empire, the history of unification of all Eastern Slavs, and the Soviet economic development of Ukraine. The meaning of Russian identity is solidified through the prescription of policies supporting its culture.

The meaning of national identity in the pro-Soviet narrative is defined through the positive image of Soviet Ukraine (peaceful, tolerant, culturally and economically advanced) in opposition to the present state of Ukraine, divided by conflict and culturally and economically in decline. This meaning is advanced through stories comparing Soviet brotherhood to Ukraine’s current nationalism, Soviet industrial progress with the current economic crisis, and tolerance in Soviet Ukraine with the imposition of Ukrainian ethnic culture in present day Ukraine. This meaning is consolidated in the normative prescription to preserve/return to Soviet style relations.

In the fight for a Ukrainian ethnic identity narrative the meaning of national identity is established as authentically ethnic Ukrainian, rooted in such genuine Ukrainian values as peacefulness, national renaissance, and democracy, while the Russian ethnic group is positioned as alien, aggressive, and totalitarian. This meaning is validated by historic invocations of Ukrainian culture and identity as rooted in European culture, the Magdeburg Law, the Ukrainian national movement of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, and the development of authentic Ukrainian lands in the north and west, as well as remembrance of long centuries of victimization and suffering. Alienation of Russians is justified through the history of colonization of southeastern Ukraine by the Russian Romanov dynasty and the Soviet Union. This ethnic meaning of national identity is solidified by policies prescribing support for Ukrainian culture.

This meaning of national identity is similar to the meaning of national identity produced in the pro-Ukrainian foreign experts’ narrative that establishes the connotation of Ukrainian identity as feminine, deeply rooted in Ukrainian ethnic values of democracy, pro-Western orientation, national renaissance, and victimization through the aggressive policies and actions of imperial, totalitarian Russia. This meaning is validated through the histories of the Magdeburg Law and Europe, resistance to Soviet power by OUN/UPA and Ukrainian dissidents, and the long experience of oppression by Russians. It is further toughened by policies that prescribe support for Ukrainian culture and separation from Russia and Russians.

The meaning of national identity in the recognition of a Ukrainian ethnic identity Narrative is developed through two major connotations: as democratic and peaceful in opposition to imperial and totalitarian Russia, and as homogeneous based on acceptance of Ukrainian culture by all the citizens. The first meaning is justified through two historic continuities: a history of

communal democracy in western Ukraine and the Cossacks' traditions of self-governance; and historic accounts of Kievan Rus', Taras Shevchenko's ideals, and Sobornost' of Ukraine. These meanings are advanced by prescribing policies promoting the Ukrainian language as the only language for all spheres of social and political life.

The multicultural-civic narrative defines the meaning of national identity as potentially deriving from the positive axiological positioning of a civic concept of national identity, which is viewed as uniting, multicultural, and empowering. This meaning is shaped in opposition to ideological entrepreneurs who divide, manipulate, and disempower the people. The prospective meaning of identity is advanced by accounts of Ukraine as a multicultural nation that longs for democracy but is unable to resist the ideological manipulations of Ukrainian nationalists and pro-Russian Stalinists. Normative prescriptions to create unity in diversity cement this meaning.

This production of the meaning of national identity is comparable to the one in the pro-civic foreign experts' narrative, which defines national identity through the comparison between the desired connotation of liberal civic national identity as democratic, multicultural, and tolerant and the current meaning of national identity as totalitarian, nationalistic, and conflictual. The development of this prospective meaning of identity derives from the negative positioning of nationalists and pro-Soviet leaders, who impose exclusive ideologies and cultures, totalitarian authority, and "black-and-white" thinking. This meaning is further solidified by prescribing the formation of a multicultural national identity and reciprocal respect for all cultures and religions.

The meaning of national identity is produced through definition of the core values and features of the nation and the comparison with an outgroup positioned as axiologically inferior. It can be attached to the nation as a whole or to a specific ethnic group positioned to represent a nation exclusively. In Ukraine, national narratives can define the concept of national identity as ethnic with the dominance of the Ukrainian ethnic group, a homogeneous mix with assimilated minorities, as comprised of two equal groups—Russian and Ukrainians—or as multicultural, represented by multiple ethnic groups. Production of the meaning of national identity derives from comparisons between Russian and Ukrainian ethnic groups, Russia and Ukraine, Soviet and post-Soviet Ukraine, and liberal democracy versus the current political mix of nationalism and Soviet totalitarianism. The meaning of national identity can have one or more leading connotations, arriving from comparison with other groups and based on internal values and order. If the meaning of national identity derives from the past, historical accounts are employed to justify the connotation. The most popular historic accounts in national narratives in Ukraine include Kievan Rus', the Magdeburg Law, the Cossacks, unification with Russia, colonization of eastern Ukraine by Russia, Holo-

domor, annexation of western Ukraine in 1939, OUN/UPA, and World War II. If the meaning of national identity is established as desirable, it is validated as something sought by the majority. National narratives promote either a return to the Soviet identity or the development of a liberal mentality as the best options for Ukrainian national identity. Normative order advances the established meaning of the narrative further by prescribing specific cultural policies and enlightening actions.

Legitimization of Power

The dual identity narrative serves to restore the balance of power in Ukraine, where the Ukrainian ethnic group is privileged as titular, by positioning of the Russian ethnic group as more able to bring development, progress, and prosperity to Ukraine. To justify the equality of Russians as agents of nation-building, stories of comparison between Russians and Ukrainians are used: between a highly developed Russian culture and a lower caliber Ukrainian one; the modern development of Ukraine by Russians versus the ethnonational project of Ukrainians, attached to ideas of nineteenth-century European nationalism; the tolerance of Russians and narrow-minded nationalism of Ukrainians; and the ingenuity of Russians versus the patriarchal mentality of Ukrainians. The legitimacy of the power of Russians is supported by policies aimed at increasing their social and political status.

In the pro-Soviet narrative, the Soviet regime is positioned as more effectively contributing to the prosperity of Ukraine than the current one. This legitimization of a return to Soviet-style governance and economics is validated by stories of the achievements of Soviet Ukraine: tolerant coexistence, industrial development, and support for all cultures. This narrative legitimizes the Soviet order as the best model for present-day Ukraine and delegitimizes the authority of the Ukrainian ethnic group as poorly representing the common identity of the people who contributed to the development of modern Ukraine.

The fight for a Ukrainian ethnic identity narrative cements Ukrainians as the only legitimate ethnic group authorized to rule over the country based on their ability to build a democratic and pro-Western regime and support the national renaissance of Ukraine. The authority of Russians is denied based on their desire for domination, totalitarianism, and submission to Russia. Historic accounts of Holodomor, Ukrainian nationalism, and the development of the north and west as authentic Ukrainian lands are used both to legitimize the power of Ukrainians and delegitimize the power of Russians. The legitimacy of the power of Ukrainians is further solidified by the prescription of policies aimed at increasing their social and political status and delegitimizing the power of Russians, who are compelled to accept the Ukrainian ethnic idea or return to their ethnic land—Russia.

The production of the meaning of power in this narrative is similar to the legitimization of the exclusive power of the Ukrainian ethnic group in the pro-Ukrainian foreign experts' narrative. It also praises the democratic, pro-Western, and nationalistic inspirations of the Ukrainian ethnic group, simultaneously denying access to power to aggressive, totalitarian, and imperial Russians. It employs historic events both to legitimize the power of Ukrainians and delegitimize the power of Russians: the Ukrainian historic capacity for democratic self-governance and the totalitarianism of Soviet rule; the Ukrainian orientation to the West and the anti-Western sentiments of Russians; the Ukrainian desire to build a free state and Russian imperial ambitions; and the Ukrainian fight for independence in opposition to oppressive policies and Holodomor. The legitimacy of the exclusive power of Ukrainians is further supported by the prescription of policies aimed at increasing their social and political status.

The recognition of a Ukrainian ethnic identity narrative establishes the exclusive rule of the Ukrainian ethnic group in a homogenous nation defending itself from imperial Russia. This cementing of the power of Ukrainians in Ukraine is justified through stories of the aggressive intentions of Russia, tolerant Ukrainians, and happily assimilated ethnic minorities. The narrative legitimizes the exclusive power of Ukrainians by proscribing stronger policies of assimilation within Ukraine and further separation from Russia.

In the multicultural-civic narrative, the concept of power is defined through the development of a civic society that promotes unification of the people, multicultural values, and civic agents in opposition to ideological entrepreneurs, who divide Ukraine for their political purposes and promote a paternalistic and populist mentality for ruling the country. This positioning of civic society as the most legitimate model for democratic Ukraine is based on the idea of a common desire to live in a European country, and the delegitimization of ideological opponents through negative accounts of conflicting nationalist ideologies, misused histories, employment of Soviet myths, promotion of populism, virulent nationalism, and political paternalism. The narrative further legitimizes the formation of multicultural civic society by promoting liberal policies.

This vision of power is also shared in the pro-civic foreign experts narrative that positions liberal democracy (favorable to open democratic values, multiculturalism, tolerance, and multiperspectivity) as the most legitimate political order for independent Ukraine. The legitimization of this political order is based on the acceptance of a shared longing to exit the long history of oppression to become liberal, as well as on the delegitimization of nationalist and pro-Soviet leaders based on accounts of their negative influence (including promotion of the Soviet mentality, imposition of the Ukrainian national identity, and denial of the cultural and linguistic rights of ethnic

groups). This legitimization is advanced by the promotion of liberal policies and enlightening of the people.

So, the production of the meaning of power in national narratives is based on legitimization of the exclusive power of one group, restoration of the balance of power or equality within the nation, and promotion of a desirable type of order. In Ukraine, national narratives legitimize the exclusive rights of the Ukrainian ethnic group to rule the country, validate the Russian ethnic group as an equal agent in nation-building, or promote Soviet or liberal types of social order. The legitimization of power is further achieved through the employment of historic accounts. In Ukraine, national narratives use histories of Holodomor, Ukrainian nationalism, development of the north and west, the contribution of Russia in the development of Ukraine, and the achievements of Soviet Ukraine. Legitimization is also advanced through accounts of the negative actions and intentions of outgroups in the past and present, the promotion of specific types of social order, governance, and ideological and geopolitical orientations. In Ukraine, Russian and Ukrainian ethnic groups blame each other for aggressive actions and attempts at dominance; pro-Soviet and pro-democratic forces promote their preferred political orders through accounts of previous and potential achievements. The normative prescriptions include policies that advance a particular group, ban the rights of another group or exclude it from the nation-building process, and endorse the return to a previous order or the formation of the new political order and the enlightenment of the population. In Ukraine, national narratives promote policies that support the rights and power of Russian and Ukrainian ethnic groups, delegitimize the Russian ethnic group, and support a return to the Soviet order or the development of liberal democracy and the democratic education of the Ukrainian public.

The two functions of national narrative are interconnected through the processes of the *embedment of the concept of power into the meaning of national identity* and the *shaping of the concept of power by the meaning of national identity*. These processes make the production of the meaning of identity and power in national narratives complicated and intertwined.

Process of Embedment

In the dual identity narrative the existing competition for power between Ukrainian and Russian ethnic groups contributes to the establishment of a rigid social boundary and axiological separation between them as well as between the eastern and western regions of Ukraine. In addition, the narrative justifies the right of Russians to be equal agents in nation-building by erecting this boundary and stressing the differences between Russians in Ukraine and Russians in Russia, creating the meaning of national identity as a historical intermixture of different cultures.

In the pro-Soviet narrative the existing connotation of power as a process of deterioration is embedded in the negative connotation of the national identity of present-day Ukraine. To justify the rule of former Soviet elites and reestablish a paternalistic totalitarian order, the return to a Soviet meaning of national identity is presented as the only possible way to achieve a positive national identity. This is justified by stories of the empowerment of the people during the Soviet period and the current disempowerment of the majority because the Ukrainian ethnic group in power does not fully represent the Soviet people, who contributed to the development of modern Ukraine.

In the fight for a Ukrainian ethnic identity narrative, the existing connotation of power as a vital fight for the power of the Ukrainian ethnic group creates a strong victimized Ukrainian ethnic identity and sets an impermeable social boundary between the two ethnic groups by invoking accounts of continuous Russian oppression. Legitimization of the exclusive power of the Ukrainian ethnic group results in the definition of national identity as authentically and ethnically Ukrainian as well as the rejection of Russians as alien to Ukraine through the dissolution of the boundary between Russians in Russia and Ukraine. Thus, the major social boundary is redrawn across ethnic rather than national borders, placing pro-democratic and pro-Western ideals on the Ukrainian side and pro-totalitarian, pro-Asian ideals on the Russian side. Russians thereby have to accept the Ukrainian ethnic idea or return to their ethnic land—Russia.

A similar process of embedment of the concept of power into the meaning of national identity can be found in the pro-Ukrainian foreign experts' narrative. The concept of power as a constant fight for independence and democracy results in a meaning of national identity defined by an impermeable social boundary and ontological distinction between Ukrainians and Russians, presenting them as ideologically, politically, and culturally opposite groups. The vision of power in Ukraine as based on Ukrainian ethnic nationalism and the exclusive access of Ukrainians to power is embedded in this connotation of national identity as essentially Ukrainian, with the Russian ethnic group positioned as alien to the nation and arising from aggressive policies of Russian colonization.

In the recognition of a Ukrainian ethnic identity narrative, the existing connotations of power as Ukrainian resistance to Russian expansion and the accepted exclusive power of Ukrainians in Ukraine results in an impermeable social boundary between Russia and Ukraine and in dissolved boundaries between ethnic groups within Ukraine. To justify the rule of the Ukrainian ethnic group the meaning of national identity is defined as homogeneous, authentically Ukrainian, and completely different from Russia.

In the multicultural-civic narrative the meaning of national identity is defined through the prospect of the development of a civic society. The idea

of empowerment of people through civic society and the current disempowerment of the majority through ideological manipulations results in the perception that positive national identity can be achieved only by the development of its civic meaning.

Similarly, in the pro-civic foreign experts' narrative the meaning of national identity is defined through the prospect of the development of liberal democracy: national identity should be multicultural, tolerant, and liberal. The creation of a liberal democratic society requires development of the civic meaning of national identity.

Thus, the process of the *embedment of the concept of power into the meaning of national identity* in national narratives interconnects two functions of national identity and is performed through the (1) establishment/dissolution of social boundaries, (2) presentation of a desired social order as an essential feature of national identity, (3) depiction of the degeneration of national identity under the current order, and (4) promotion of a specific ideology as the best foundation for a positive national identity. In Ukraine, the social boundary between Russians and Ukrainians is set as impermeable in three narratives (dual identity, fight for a Ukrainian ethnic identity, and pro-Ukrainian foreign experts) to justify the prevalence of one group—Russian or Ukrainian. It is dissolved in the recognition of a Ukrainian ethnic identity narrative to justify the complete assimilation of Russians; the impermeable social boundary between Russia and Ukraine is set in the recognition of a Ukrainian ethnic identity narrative to support the independence of Ukraine. The national identity is defined as comprising two ethnic groups to justify the equal status of Russians in the dual identity narrative; it must be authentically Ukrainian to justify the exclusive power of Ukrainians and the exclusion of Russians in the fight for Ukrainian ethnic identity and pro-Ukrainian foreign experts' narratives; it has to be homogeneous to justify the exclusive power of Ukrainians through the assimilation of Russians and other ethnic groups in the recognition of a Ukrainian ethnic identity narrative. The national identity is depicted as deprecated by the forced domination of the one of the two ethnic groups in the dual identity Narrative, the continuous dominance of an alien and totalitarian ethnic group in the fight for a Ukrainian ethnic identity and pro-Ukrainian foreign experts' narratives, the aggressive actions of neighboring Russia in the recognition of a Ukrainian ethnic identity narrative, the destruction of Soviet Ukraine's achievements in the pro-Soviet narrative, and by bringing the country to conflict and totalitarianism in the multicultural-civic and pro-civic foreign experts' narratives. In the pro-Soviet narrative the Soviet identity is defined as the best meaning of positive identity to justify a return to Soviet order and paternalism; in the multicultural-civic and pro-civic foreign experts' narratives the civic meaning of national identity is promoted to validate the formation of civic society and liberal democracy. In all these cases the new meaning of national identity

is produced and presented as continuous and essential to the nation based on the concepts of power desired by particular social groups.

Shaping of Concept of Power by the Meaning of National Identity

In the dual identity narrative, the existing meaning of Russian identity as deeply spiritual and superior to Ukrainian identity contributes to a concept of power in which both groups are considered equal but the Russians' position in the social hierarchy increases. At the same time, the existing meaning of national identity as based on titular culture impacts the concept of power hierarchy: Russians vigorously legitimize their ingroup and delegitimize Ukrainians as the titular group.

In the pro-Soviet narrative, the positive meaning of the Soviet identity together with negative meaning of identity in present-day Ukraine contribute to a concept of power that highlights the advantages of the Soviet regime and promotes a return to the Soviet political and economic order.

The fight for a Ukrainian ethnic identity narrative invokes the existing meaning of Ukrainian ethnic identity as deeply democratic and authentic to Ukraine, as well as the destroying the boundary between Russians in Ukraine and imperial, totalitarian, aggressive Russia to elaborate a concept of power in which the Ukrainian ethnic group should exclusively wield power in Ukraine. At the same time, the existing meaning of Ukrainian ethnic identity as that of a victimized group results in a social hierarchy where Ukrainians strongly legitimize their ingroup and delegitimize Russians.

A similar process of shaping the concept of power is evident in the pro-Ukrainian foreign experts' narrative. The meaning of Ukrainian ethnic identity as deeply democratic and pro-Western in comparison with the meaning of Russian ethnic identity as totalitarian and aggressive contributes to a concept of power in which the Ukrainian ethnic group possesses the exclusive ability to build a democratic society and deserves all power in Ukraine. The existing meaning of Ukrainian identity as that of a victimized group results in a concept of power in which Ukrainians must protect the independence of Ukraine from aggressive, imperial Russia.

In recognition of the Ukrainian ethnic identity narrative, the meaning of national identity as peaceful, democratic, and homogenous contributes to the concept of power as widely accepted rule by Ukrainians of all assimilated minorities in independent Ukraine. In addition, the meaning of a Ukrainian ethnic identity as essentially democratic and tolerant defines an exclusive right of the Ukrainian ethnic identity to build an independent democratic country based on ethno-national ideals.

Table 6.1. Structure and Functions of National Narratives

<i>Narrative</i>	<i>dual identity</i>	<i>Pro-Soviet</i>	<i>Fight for Ukrainian Ethnic Identity and Pro-Ukrainian</i>	<i>recognition of a Ukrainian ethnic identity</i>	<i>Multiculturalism and Pro-</i>
<i>Vision of the nation</i>	Comprises two equal ethnic groups: Russians and Ukrainians	Based on the idea of Ukrainian SSR: friendship of the people and paternalism	Continues the fight of the Ukrainian ethnic group against dominant totalitarian Russians	Homogeneous society of Ukrainians and assimilated Russians; threat from Russia	Multiculturalism, longing for civic society
<i>Dualistic order</i>	Advanced, discriminated-against Russians vs. backward, nationalistic Ukrainians	Developed Soviet Ukraine vs. the current crisis and nationalism	Democratic, victimized Ukrainians vs. aggressive, totalitarian Russians	Independent democratic Ukraine vs. totalitarian imperialistic Russia	Liberal society, nationalistic Communism, Stalinism
<i>Mythic narratives</i>	Ukraine belongs to the Eastern Slavs' cultural space; Ukrainian nationalists impose alien values	Soviet Ukraine as a Golden Age: economically developed, tolerant, supportive of all cultures	Ukrainian ethnic group as native, more democratic, and victimized with exclusive rights to build the nation	Ukraine-ethnic state of pro-democratic, tolerant Ukrainians, where Russians are happily assimilated	Nationalism, Stalinism, Communism, obstructive formativism, multiculturalism and civic society
<i>Normative order</i>	Support of Russian culture and language and better relations with Russia	Support for regional status for the Russian language and a positive analysis of 20th-century history	Development of Ukrainian language and culture, ban on Russian language, opposition to Soviet myths and Russian domination	Separation of Ukrainian and Russian history, widespread use of Ukrainian language as the only language	Denouncement of all types of extremism, encouragement of dialogue, historical support, language, culture

<i>Narrative</i>	<i>dual identity</i>	<i>Pro-Soviet</i>	<i>Fight for Ukrainian Ethnic Identity and Pro-Ukrainian</i>	<i>recognition of a Ukrainian ethnic identity</i>	<i>Multicultural and Pro-</i>
Source of deterioration	Prevalence of Ukrainian ethnic group	Destruction of the achievements of Soviet Ukraine	Dominance of an alien and totalitarian Russian group	Aggressive influence of totalitarian Russia	Bringing to conflict totalitarian
Concept of power	Equal power of Russian and Ukrainian groups in a multicultural society	Government that represents all the people of Ukraine and a common identity of the Soviet people	Ukrainian ethnic group has exclusive rights to power	Dominance of the Ukrainian ethnic group as accepted nationally and internationally	Civic society in diverse multicultural

In the multicultural-civic narrative, the potential meaning of Ukrainian identity as democratic and multicultural contributes to a concept of power in which empowered people are positioned as agents of change. The desired civic meaning of national identity delegitimizes the power of nationalistic and pro-Soviet leaders.

A similar process of shaping the concept of power is evident in the pro-civic foreign experts' narrative. The meaning of Ukrainian identity as multicultural with multiple histories and diverse voices creates a concept of power as liberal democracy, in which enlightened and educated people are positioned as agents of change and European democracy, multiculturalism, and national dialogue flourish.

Two functions of national narratives are interconnected by *the shaping of the concept of power by the meaning of national identity*. This process is performed through (1) the establishment of a specific social hierarchy between groups as a result of the meaning of their ethnic identity and the meaning of national identity, (2) legitimization of the exclusive right of a particular group to rule over the country and delegitimization of the outgroup based on their essential ethnic features, (3) specific patterns of assimilation and integration of ethnic minorities, and (4) the return to a previous order or development of a new order as the restoration/formation of a positive meaning of national identity. In Ukraine, the social hierarchy is defined through the equality of two ethnic groups (culturally and economically superior Russians and titular Ukrainians) in the dual identity narrative. In the fight for a Ukrainian ethnic identity and pro-Ukrainian foreign experts' narratives the legitimate right of the Ukrainian ethnic group to exclusive power is based on their essentially democratic and pro-Western identity and the delegitimization of Russians as fundamentally alien and totalitarian. The complete assimilation of Russians based on a homogenous meaning of national identity is justified in the recognition of a Ukrainian ethnic identity narrative. In the multicultural-civic and pro-civic foreign experts' narratives the return to Soviet order as representing a positive identity for Ukraine is promoted in pro-Soviet narratives, and the development of liberal democracy based on a multicultural-civic meaning of national identity is otherwise promoted. In all these cases the concept of power is created from the meaning of ethnic and national identity, as representing the essence of a specific ethnic group or nation.

General differences between national narratives are represented in table 6.1. The national identities have different meanings: the authentically Ukrainian in the fight for a Ukrainian ethnic identity and pro-Ukrainian foreign experts' narratives, the homogeneous Ukrainian in the recognition of a Ukrainian ethnic identity narrative, composed of two ethnic groups in the dual identity narrative, based on the Soviet model of friendship of people in the pro-Soviet narrative, and a multicultural model in the multicultural-civic

and pro-civic foreign experts' narratives. The major divide in the nation is presented through the opposition of Russian and Ukrainian ethnic groups in the fight for a Ukrainian ethnic identity, pro-Ukrainian foreign experts', and dual identity narratives; as a conflict between independent Ukraine and imperial Russia in the recognition of a Ukrainian ethnic identity narrative, as contradictions between the positivity of the Soviet past and the current crisis in the pro-Soviet narrative, and a fight between liberal and nationalistic/totalitarian ideologies in the multicultural-civic and pro-civic foreign experts' narratives.

Mythic narratives place Ukraine within the Eastern Slavic cultural space in the dual identity narrative, the post-Soviet region in the pro-Soviet narrative, Western Europe in the fight for a Ukrainian ethnic identity, recognition of Ukrainian ethnic identity, and pro-Ukrainian foreign experts' narratives, and a liberal European mental space in the multicultural-civic and pro-civic foreign experts' narratives. Mythic narratives blame Ukrainian nationalists for the imposition of one culture and language on the entire country in the dual identity narrative and for the destruction of the achievements of Soviet Ukraine in the pro-Soviet narrative; both Ukrainian and Russian nationalists as well as Communists-Stalinists are blamed for blocking the development of a liberal civic society in the multicultural-civic and pro-civic foreign experts' narratives, and Russian nationalists and supporters of totalitarianism are called to account in the fight for a Ukrainian ethnic identity, recognition of a Ukrainian ethnic identity, and pro-Ukrainian foreign experts' narratives.

The right to build the nation is attributed to both Ukrainian and Russian ethnic groups in the dual identity narrative, to the Ukrainian ethnic group exclusively in the fight for a Ukrainian ethnic identity, recognition of a Ukrainian ethnic identity, and pro-Ukrainian foreign experts' narratives, to pro-Soviet economic and political leaders in the pro-Soviet narratives and to liberal democratic society in the multicultural-civic and pro-civic foreign experts' narratives. Normative order prescribes support of the Russian language and culture and closer relations with Russia in the dual identity narrative, support for the Ukrainian language and culture (in opposition to Russia) in the fight for a Ukrainian ethnic identity, recognition of a Ukrainian ethnic identity, and pro-Ukrainian foreign experts' narratives, support of all languages (based on the Soviet model of "friendship of people") and a return to the Soviet economic and governance model in the pro-Soviet narrative, and development of a multicultural civic society in the multicultural-civic and pro-civic foreign experts' narratives. The source of current national deterioration is located in the prevalence of the Ukrainian ethnic group in the dual identity narrative, the destruction of Soviet Ukrainian achievement in the pro-Soviet narrative, the continuous dominance of the alien and totalitarian Russian ethnic group in the fight for a Ukrainian ethnic identity and pro-Ukrainian foreign experts' narratives, the aggressive influence of imperial,

totalitarian Russia in the recognition of a Ukrainian ethnic identity narrative, and the escalation of conflict by nationalists and Communists-Stalinists in the multicultural-civic and pro-civic foreign experts' narratives. The concept of legitimate power is described as apportioned equally to Russian and Ukrainian groups in the dual identity narrative, to the people restoring the Soviet model in the pro-Soviet narrative, exclusively to the Ukrainian ethnic group and exclusion of Russians in the fight for a Ukrainian ethnic identity and pro-Ukrainian foreign experts' narratives, exclusively the Ukrainian ethnic group with the consent of assimilated Russians in the recognition of a Ukrainian ethnic identity narrative, and to the multicultural civic society in the multicultural-civic and pro-civic foreign experts' narratives.

Thus, the national narratives of Ukraine involve all four types of duality: they oppose Russian and Ukrainian ethnic groups, countries of Ukraine and Russia, Soviet past and current independence, and ideologies of nationalism and civic society. These dualities employ different values to describe opposite poles: the opposition of Russian and Ukrainian ethnic group is described through values of spirituality-culture, social order, and ideology; the opposition of Russia and Ukraine rests on values of ideology and social order; the opposition of nationalism/totalitarianism and civic society is depicted through values of ideology, social order, and social relations; and the opposition of Soviet past and current independence rests on development values. These dualities represent different lines of tensions within the society and multiplicity of narrative divides.

Each national narrative employs different myths to describe Ukraine's past, stressing either common Eastern Slavic cultural and historic space, legacy of Soviet past, or connection with Western European history, values, and mentality. The mostly often used myths—myths of foundation—condemn particular groups as obstacles to the achievement of prosperous society, justify the moral predominance of one group over other, and legitimize the moral right of the ingroup to lead the nation. The responsibility for current problems is attributed to different groups: to Ukrainian nationalists for the imposition of one culture and language on the entire country and for the destruction of the achievements of Soviet Ukraine, to both Ukrainian and to Russian nationalists and Communists-Stalinists for blocking the development of a liberal civic society, and Russian nationalists and pro-Soviet supporters for impediments in the development of independent Ukraine.

The second most used myths in Ukrainian national narratives are myths of ethnogenesis and territory. These myths use spirituality, development, and authenticity of culture to explain the prevalent position of the group within the Ukrainian nation, to legitimize its power, and to rationalizing exclusion of another ethnic group from the process of nation-building. The exclusive right to define the nation is attributed to the brotherhood of Ukrainian and

Russian ethnic groups, to the Ukrainian ethnic group solely, to pro-Soviet economic and political leaders, or to liberal democratic society.

Normative order prescribes different paths for the development of Ukraine: support of the Russian language and culture and closer relations with Russia, exclusive support for the Ukrainian language and culture, a return to the Soviet economic and governance model and a “brotherhood” of all ethnic group, and development of a multicultural civic society. The idea of legitimate power in Ukraine varies from equality of Russian and Ukrainian groups to the restoration of the Soviet model and prevalence of the Ukrainian ethnic group and exclusion of Russians from the nation-building process to the multicultural-civic society.

These profound differences show the multilayered nature of the conflict within the Ukrainian nation represented by different rival pairs of ingroup and outgroup, different social boundaries within the nation, and different incentives for conflict among the parties. These differences result in divergent definitions of national identity and conceptions of legitimate power. The understanding of conflict in Ukraine as a division between east and west, Russian and Ukrainians, or pro-Soviet and pro-Western groups oversimplifies the multifaceted structure of conflict in which perceptions of rival parties are asymmetric.

Thus, the dual identity narrative is in direct conflict with the fight for a Ukrainian ethnic identity, recognition of a Ukrainian ethnic identity, pro-Ukrainian foreign experts’ narratives regarding the balance of power between Russians and Ukrainians; it shares some similarities with the pro-Soviet narrative based on the perspective on the position of Russians in Ukraine and relations with Russia and the West, and some similarities with the multicultural-civic and pro-civic foreign experts’ in the perception of Ukraine as a multicultural state.

The fight for a Ukrainian ethnic identity, recognition of a Ukrainian ethnic identity, pro-Ukrainian foreign experts’ narratives are in conflict with dual identity narrative as regards the position of the Russian ethnic group and relations with Russia and the West, in conflict with the pro-Soviet narrative regarding positioning of Soviet past, and in conflict with the multicultural-civic and pro-civic foreign experts narratives regarding the role of civic society.

The pro-Soviet narrative is in conflict with fight for a Ukrainian ethnic identity, recognition of a Ukrainian ethnic identity, pro-Ukrainian foreign experts’ narratives regarding the position of the Ukrainian and Russian ethnic groups and idea of democracy, they diverge from the multicultural-civic and pro-civic foreign experts narratives regarding liberal ideology and civic society; they are similar to the dual identity, multicultural-civic, and pro-civic foreign experts narratives with regard to the perception of Ukraine as a

multicultural state and similar to the dual identity narrative regarding close relations with Russia and negative attitudes toward the West.

The multicultural-civic and pro-civic foreign experts narratives are in conflict with the fight for a Ukrainian ethnic identity, recognition of a Ukrainian ethnic identity, pro-Ukrainian foreign experts' narratives regarding the role of Ukrainian nationalism in the nation-building process, at odds with the pro-Soviet narrative regarding perception of the Soviet past and liberal ideology, and differ from the dual identity narrative regarding relations with Russia and the West; they are similar to the dual identity narrative in their perception of Ukraine as multicultural society. These multifaceted, complex conflictual attitudes open spaces for bilateral and trilateral negotiations and opportunities to find common ground among multiple parties.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

As I have argued, the national narrative comprises the imaginative creation of national identity, the establishment of new values, a reassessment of the past from this new perspective, the definition of a core meaning, and the establishment of clear boundaries for the nation that provide its continuity and durability over time. Underpinning the legitimization of power through narrative is the production of a connotation of intergroup relations and social hierarchy, establishment of patterns of exclusion and inclusion, commitment to a dominant political ideology, and definition of a type of regime. National narratives are ideological contracts that derive and are inspired by the social need for identity and the political interests of the ingroup.

People express their views on nationhood and political order through processes of engagement with national narratives depicting the past and present of the nation as well as its anticipated future. To reduce the cognitive complexity of multiple meanings of national identity, people link to coherent continuous narratives that provide a comprehensible and legitimate story about the nation and effectively institutionalize collective memory. Reinforcing solidarity within the ingroup, national narratives emphasize intergroup difference and social boundaries within a nation. They position outgroups as threatening competitors in the nation-building process, alien outcasts, enemies, or "fifth columns" that want to destroy national sovereignty and prosperity. These negative perceptions of the outgroup reinforce the competition between different national narratives. Multiple national narratives can exist simultaneously within the national community, and competition between them can result in public tensions, social conflicts, and even disintegration of the civil sphere. National narratives exist in tension with each other and deny the legitimacy of one another. In periods of political transitions and social change, the contest between the production of meaning of national identity

and power transforms into “zero-sum” competitions in which the existence of one national narrative is perceived as an immediate threat to another.

In Ukraine, the absence of a settled national idea and a common national identity is a major source of competition between national narratives. The ineffectiveness of attempts to unify disparate national conceptualizations has resulted in the absence of a clear vision for the transition of independence and the determination of final societal outcomes, slowing the processes of transformation and increasing economic deprivation. The lack of a nationally conscious elite, endemic corruption, and growing ethno-cultural and class divides continue to contribute to the crisis. The competition between national narratives reinforces “black-and-white” thinking and results in an absence of intercommunity and government dialogue; the search for enemies and zero-sum approaches to Ukraine’s national identity characterizes the competition among different groups. Liberal national narratives threaten national narratives underpinning social loyalties to communism and nationalism, all of which leads to protracted conflict within Ukraine.

The analysis of two functions of national narrative, formation of the meaning of national identity and legitimization of power, and the two processes of their interconnections, embedment of the concept of power into the meaning of national identity and shaping of the concept of power by the meaning of national identity, reveals the axiological disparities generated by national narratives. Depending on the narrative, the nation of Ukraine is perceived to be homogeneous with completely assimilated Russians, essentially ethnically Ukrainian with an aggressive alien Russian ethnic group, comprising two equal ethnic groups, Russians and Ukrainians, or as multicultural with different histories and multiple voices. The concepts of legitimate power differ, from the exclusive power of the Ukrainian ethnic group to power shared by two ethnic groups—Russian and Ukrainians—to a return to Soviet type of regime, or to the creation of multicultural liberal democracy. The study of the structure of national narratives, including types of dualities, values, myths, mechanisms of myths, and approaches to ingroup legitimacy, furthers our understanding of protracted and sometimes irreconcilable differences between existing national narratives.

The policy-relevant implications of this study emphasize the ineffectiveness of the development of one common vision of the Ukrainian nation. The attempts to create one common history or establish one common set of values and beliefs will only exacerbate existing conflicts and further divide between ethnic or ideological groups. Acceptance of Ukraine as multiethnic with different cultural vectors of development will create a foundation for a peaceful shared society.

Only through systemic dialogue can common ground be established and a cohesive national identity develop—one based on unifying ideas, including ideas of civic society and a civic concept of national identity, human rights,

and the equality of every citizen independent of his or her religion, ethnicity, and language. In divided societies, dialogue becomes an essential political practice that contributes to building relationships and expanding understanding between groups. The dialogue in divided society should not illuminate conflict but rather transform the nature of that conflict. Any democratic society contains conflicts as an essential part of political life, and thus the dialogue's aim is to transform "violent conflict into non-violent forms of ongoing political struggle."¹ Thus, dialogue practice is less about finding the "truth" or some form of consensus about the history of the conflict, but rather about "seeking accommodation between conflicting accounts in such a way as to make a conflict more liveable."² Such dialogue rests on the ideas of agonistic pluralism³ that converts antagonism into agonism, promotes engagement of adversaries across profound differences, and involves "a vibrant clash of democratic political positions."⁴

Starting with disagreements as a departing point, agonistic dialogue does not aim to overcome these disagreements through the finding or creation of a consensus. "Acknowledging issues of power and conflict as a central feature of dialogue," it "highlights the shifting nature of relationships concerned with power, identity, and vulnerability and continues to privilege conflict as a crucial and potentially productive element of social change."⁵ Agonistic dialogue helps expand existing and create new political spaces; it promotes openness to distinction and conflicting views and the development of new understandings of social identity. The practice of agonistic dialogue is based on "the need to acknowledge the dimension of power and antagonism and their ineradicable character" as well as their impact on the development and functioning of social identities.⁶ Such dialogue should be sustainable over time; embroil a deep level of engagement of all parties involved; create positive relationship and trusts between participants; build a "safe space" for expressions of deep hopes, fears, and interests; and increase understanding of the complex, multidimensional character of the problems. These procedures help create a democratic society where people can "live together productively, even harmoniously, with conflict."⁷

One of the major threats to a civic-based national narrative is the pro-Soviet narrative. This narrative masks the idea of a common identity for citizens comprising Ukrainian society. One major difference is the horizontal relations (active participation, the agency of people, and civic responsibility) in former, democracy-focused systems versus vertical relations (paternalism, submission to the state, and blind patriotism) in the latter, Soviet-style systems. The national idea should include civic education and increase democratic culture among the citizens of Ukraine.

The escape from Soviet constructions of power is possible by changing existing norms and beliefs in the society. This normative change rests on a redefinition of existing themes and the introduction of new ones.⁸ These may

include generative themes whose syllabic elements could be recombined to form new themes, ultimately generating a culture of democracy. These may also include invader themes that completely refigure the Soviet meaning of power, hinge themes that connect the existing meaning of power with one or more elements of a culture of democracy, and losable themes that provide cultural change through everyday conversations. Divisive national narratives should be challenged through gradual redefinition and connection with the themes of democracy and democratic participation in governance. This change can be produced by communicating and acting “in concert” with one another.⁹ The analysis of the production of the meaning of national identity and power in national narratives in Ukraine creates a foundation for just such a national dialogue on finding common ground in the young Ukrainian nation.

NOTES

1. Oliver Ramsbotham, *Transforming Violent Conflict: Radical Disagreement, Dialogue and Survival* (London: Routledge, 2010), 52, 211.

2. Adrian Little, “Rhetorics of Reconciliation: Shifting Conflict Paradigms in Northern Ireland,” in *Theorizing Post-Conflict Reconciliation: Agonism, Restitution and Repair*, ed. Alexander Hirsch, 1st ed. (New York: Routledge, 2011), 75.

3. Bashir Bashir, “Accommodating Historically Oppressed Social Groups: Deliberative Democracy and the Politics of Reconciliation,” in *The Politics of Reconciliation in Multicultural Societies*, ed. Will Kymlicka and Bashir Bashir, Reissue (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), 48–69; Alexander Hirsch and Sonali Chakravarti, eds., “Agonism and the Power of Victim Testimony,” in *Theorizing Post-Conflict Reconciliation: Agonism, Restitution and Repair*, 1st ed. (New York: Routledge, 2011), 11–26; Chantal Mouffe, *The Democratic Paradox* (London and New York: Verso, 2000); Chantal Mouffe, “Democracy as Agonistic Pluralism,” in *Rewriting Democracy: Cultural Politics in Postmodernity*, ed. Elizabeth Deeds Ermarth (Burlington, Vt.: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2007), 36–45; Andrew Schaap, “Agonism in Divided Societies,” *Philosophy & Social Criticism* 32, no. 2 (March 1, 2006): 255–77, doi:10.1177/0191453706061095.

4. Mouffe, *The Democratic Paradox*, 13.

5. Ganesh Shiv and Heather M. Zoller, “Dialogue, Activism, and Democratic Social Change,” *Communication Theory* 22 (2012): 77.

6. Mouffe, “Democracy as Agonistic Pluralism,” 40.

7. David Louis Schoem et al., “Schoem, David, Hurtado, Sylvia, Sevig, Todd, Chesler, Mark, and Sumida, Stephen H. (2001) ‘Intergroup Dialogue: Democracy at Work in Theory and Practice,’” in *Intergroup Dialogue: Deliberative Democracy in School, College, Community, and Workplace*, ed. David Louis Schoem and Sylvia Hurtado (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2001), 15.

8. Richard Howards and Joanna Swanger, “Culture Change: A Practical Method with a Theoretical Basis,” in *Handbook on Building Cultures of Peace*, ed. Joseph de Rivera, 2009 ed. (New York: Springer, 2008), 57–70.

9. Arendt, *On Violence*.

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