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Mazepa's Ukraine: Understanding Cossack Territorial Vistas

ZENON E. KOHUT

ACCORDING TO PYLYP ORLYK, Hetman Ivan Mazepa offered this explanation when he switched his allegiance from Peter I to Charles XII of Sweden:

And because this [matter] could no longer be hidden from you I attest before God, for Whom there are no secrets, and swear that I want to do this with God's help not for my own benefit, not for greater privileges, not for greater enrichment, and not for any other desires, but for the sake of all of you, who remain under my authority and leadership, for your wives and children, for the common good of our mother my fatherland poor Ukraine, for all of the Zaporozhian Host and the Little Rossian nation, for the elevation and expansion of the Host's rights and privileges, I want to do this with God's help so that you, with [your] wives and children and the Fatherland with the Zaporozhian Host, would not perish because of the Swedish or Muscovite side.¹

The justification for altering the hetman's political course contains references to "poor" mother Ukraine, the fatherland, the Zaporozhian Host, and the "Little Rossian" nation—concepts that by the time of Ivan Mazepa had become an integral part of Ukrainian political thought. But what vision did Mazepa evoke when he referred to Ukraine, the fatherland, the Little Rossian nation, and the Zaporozhian Host? What territories were envisioned by these terms? Even though various aspects of Ukrainian political culture have been studied, the territorial dimension has been poorly understood. This study attempts to establish how a territorial vision of Ukraine evolved from the establishment of the Hetmanate in 1649 by Hetman Bohdan Khmel'nyts'kyi to the end of the rule of Hetman Ivan Samoilovych and the assumption of the hetmancy by Ivan Mazepa in 1687.

1. RUTHENIAN REGIONALISM AND IDENTITY PRIOR TO BOHDAN KHMEL'NYTS'KYI

Concepts of a Ukrainian territorial entity and of a Ruthenian nation had been well established long before the 1648 revolt. They began to evolve soon after the Union of Lublin (1569). At that time, three Ruthenian palatinates—Volhynia, Bratslav, and Kyiv—were transferred from the Grand Duchy of Lithuania to the Kingdom of Poland. By the 1580s a regional Ruthenian political identity began to emerge, based on the three newly incorporated palatinates and the Rus' (Galicia) and Podillia palatinates that had long been part of Poland. For example, King Stephen Báthory addressed the "lords and knights residing in the Rus', Kyiv, Bratslav, and Volhynian Ukraine."² Toward the end of the sixteenth century an evolving genealogical program for the Princes Ostroz'kyi attempted to link them with the "princes of Old Rus'" and the "land of Rus'." This land proved to be the Ruthenian territories of the Kingdom of Poland: Galician Rus', Volhynia, the Kyiv region, and Podillia.³

By the seventeenth century this growing political territorial identity was accompanied by the articulation of the concept of a Ruthenian nation (*narod*) as an equal partner of the Polish and Lithuanian nations.⁴ This argument was also based on the alleged rights guaranteed at the time of their incorporation into Poland. For example, in the *Justification of Innocence* (1623; attributed to Meletii Smotryts'kyi), the author argues:

For those above-mentioned honorable deeds and audacious acts of courage that the noble Ruthenian nation rendered to the Grand Dukes, their Lords, [and] Their Majesties the Kings of Poland, it has been given the freedom by them to sit in senatorial dignity equally with the two, Polish and Lithuanian, nations, to give counsel concerning the good of their states and their own fatherland, and to enjoy all the dignities, prerogatives, the call to offices, freedoms, rights, and liberties of the Kingdom of Poland. This was given to it as equal to equal and free [nation] to free Polish nation, united and incorporated in joint honor and unity of corporate body: to princes and nobles, the nobility and knighthood, the clerical and lay estates. At the same time, the people of urban condition of that nation were also immediately given their rights and liberties [in return] for their faithful submission and true benevolence.⁵

The issue of territorial identity and territorial-national rights based on the 1569 incorporation is well illustrated by Adam Kysil's presentation of the nobility's grievances at the Sejm (Diet) of 1641. Kysil' equated the four palatinates of Volhynia, Bratslav, Kyiv, and Chernihiv as Rus', considering them as a single territorial unit with rights and privileges stemming from their incorporation

into the Kingdom of Poland (the Chernihiv palatinate was created in 1635 from lands won from Muscovy, and was given the same status as the territories that were incorporated in 1569).⁶ Kysil's vision, therefore, does not include the non-incorporated Rus' (Galicia), Belz, and Podillia palatinates. Nevertheless, the persecution of the Orthodox Church and population anywhere in the Commonwealth was considered a violation of the rights of the Orthodox nobility in the incorporated territories.⁷ Similarly, the violation of the rights of the non-noble strata of the "Ruthenian nation" was a violation of the rights of the Orthodox nobility of the incorporated territories. Thus, Kysil' viewed the "Ruthenian nation" as a community composed of a number of orders.

2. COSSACK UKRAINE AND THE RUTHENIAN NATION

These concepts were very much present during the great Cossack revolt in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. As a result of the uprising, Hetman Bohdan Khmel'nyts'kyi cleared much of Ukraine of Polish rule, and by late 1648 he had reached the Polish-Ukrainian ethnic border and stopped there. The hetman returned to Kyiv where he arranged a triumphal entry for himself into the city. Khmel'nyts'kyi was greeted by the Patriarch of Jerusalem, Paisios, and the Kyivan metropolitan, Syl'vestr Kosiv, with the honorific title "Most Illustrious Ruler," or *illustrissimus princeps*. The Kyivan academy called Hetman Khmel'nyts'kyi "Moses, savior, redeemer, and liberator of the Ruthenian nation from the slavery of the Liakhs [Poles]."⁸

Soon Khmel'nyts'kyi himself began to reiterate the idea of complete Ruthenian liberation. In discussions with Polish envoys in February of 1649 he defined which territories he had in mind:

I shall fight to free the whole Ruthenian nation from bondage! ...I will not cross the border to wage war! I will not raise my sword against the Turks and Tatars! I have enough now in Ukraine [Kyiv palatinate], Podillia, and Volhynia—there is now enough time, wealth, and provisions in my land and principality—all the way to Lviv, Kholm, and Galicia. And when I stand on the Vistula, I shall say to the Liakhs beyond it: sit still and be quiet, Liakhs!⁹

What was Hetman Bohdan Khmel'nyts'kyi's vision of the territorial extent of his political entity and the Ruthenian nation? It was limited to the Ruthenian palatinates of the Kingdom of Poland. In 1649 Khmel'nyts'kyi pursued his Ruthenian project with great enthusiasm. In February he told the senior Orthodox nobleman negotiating on behalf of Poland, Adam Kysil', and his family to "renounce the Liakhs and join the Cossacks, for the Liakh land will perish,

but all the Rus' will rule—this very year, very soon.”¹⁰ However, as the result of betrayal by his Tatar allies, only six months later Khmel'nyts'kyi had to settle for far less than “all the Rus'.” According to the Zboriv Agreement between the Cossacks and the Commonwealth, the Cossack lands (i.e., accepted into the Cossack register) included the Kyiv, Chernihiv, and Bratslav palatinates, but not Volhynia and certainly not Galicia—a modified version of the territories that were incorporated in 1569. The boundaries were defined as follows:

Beginning from the Dnieper on this side [the Right Bank of the Dnieper—ZK] in Dymer, Hornostaipil, Korostyshiv, Pavoloch, Pohrebyshche, Pryluka [Stara Pryluka], Vinnytsia, and Bratslav, and from Bratslav to Iampil as far as the Dnister, and from the Dnister to the Dnieper... and on the other side [the Left Bank of the Dnieper—ZK] in Oster, Chernihiv, Romen, and Nizhen, all the way to the Muscovite border and the Dnieper.¹¹

Since the Zboriv Agreement defined the Cossack lands within the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, the eastern border of the Cossack lands was the official boundary between Muscovy and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. It had been established by the Treaties of Deulino (1618) and Polianovka (1634), and the actual demarcation process had just been concluded by the mid-1640s.¹² Unlike the western borders that were frequently modified because of war and political expediency, the eastern borders remained stable even after the new Cossack political entity came under the protection of the Muscovite tsar. In fact, most subsequent Ukrainian hetmans serving under Muscovy referred to the same eastern borders: Iurii Khmel'nyts'kyi (1659–60), Ivan Briukhovets'kyi (1663–68), Dem'ian Mnohohrishnyi (1669–72) and up to Ivan Mazepa (1687–1709).¹³

The Zboriv Agreement did not establish a principality of the Ruthenian nation, but rather a legally defined territory of the Zaporozhian Host. This territory was divided into sixteen regimental units that administered the area. This regimental system was “laid out more or less equally on both banks of the Dnieper”: on the Right Bank there were nine regiments (Chyhyryn, Cherkasy, Kaniv, Korsun, Bila Tserkva, Uman, Bratslav, Kalnyk, and Kyiv), while on the Left Bank there were seven (Pereiaslav, Kropyvne, Myrhorod, Poltava and Pryluka, representing the present-day Poltava region, as well as the regiments of Nizhen and Chernihiv).¹⁴ The regiments were subsequently adjusted, but the regimental system of administration persisted throughout the existence of the Hetmanate.

The main points of the Treaty of Zboriv dealt with Cossack immunities, the right to recruit Cossacks within these territories up to an army of 40,000, royal pardons, and Cossack rights to distill alcohol (but not to sell). In addition

to meeting Cossack demands, the liberties of the Ruthenian nation were not forgotten: special privileges were accorded only to adherents of the "Greek religion," special prerogatives were granted to the Kyivan metropolitan, and Ruthenian schools and royal offices were limited to Orthodox Ruthenians. Thus, on the territory of the Zaporozhian Host there was indeed a fusion of the Host with the Ruthenian nation into a single political and social structure—the Hetmanate. With respect to the Ruthenian nation now located outside the Hetmanate, the Zboriv Agreement contained only a very muddled point that hints at the possibility of considering the abolition of the Church Union in both the Kingdom of Poland and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. This provision echoes the constitutional theory developed previously, according to which the Orthodox nobility in the incorporated areas had the right to speak on behalf of the Orthodox population in the entire Commonwealth, except that the nobility's role was now assumed by the Cossacks.

With its confirmation by the Sejm, the Zboriv Agreement was the first legal act that established the administrative division and borders of the Cossack-controlled lands. While Khmel'nyts'kyi considered the Zboriv Agreement as simply a humiliating truce forced upon him through the mediation of the Crimean khan, the agreement subsequently was considered a foundational document of the Cossack state. In fact, these territories were regarded as the possession of the Zaporozhian Host, irrespective of what ruler was the Host's protector. Consequently, Khmel'nyts'kyi was forced to sign an even more humiliating agreement restricting his polity only to the Kyiv palatinate (the Treaty of Bila Tserkva, 1651). Nevertheless, the Cossacks looked at Zboriv as granting them permanent possession. In this respect the Zboriv Agreement had to be a starting point and constant point of reference in the future, whenever the issue of the Hetmanate's borders was brought up. According to the Ukrainian scholar Oleksandr Hurzhii, the Cossack-controlled lands were roughly equivalent to the later Kyiv, Chernihiv, and Poltava gubernias with an estimated territory of 180,000 square kilometers.¹⁵

It was this Cossack polity that was placed under the protection of the Muscovite tsar by the Pereiaslav Agreement of 1654. In the articles of the Muscovite tsar's treaty with the Cossacks (13 March 1654) and the tsar's manifesto to Bohdan Khmel'nyts'kyi (27 March 1654) there is no reference to specific boundaries or territories (except for those awarded to the hetman for his service to the tsar), but rather references to "the hetman," "Little Rus'," "Cherkassian [*Cherkasskie*] towns" and "the Host" being under the Muscovite monarch's scepter.¹⁶ In essence, the western borders were no more than military demarcation lines. Drawing from contemporaneous sources, Ivan Kryp'iakevych made an attempt to define the borders of the Cossack-controlled territory in 1653–54. The border with Poland was established along the line: Iaruha-Chernivtsi-Murakhva-Krasne-Vinnytsia-Pryluka (Podillia)-Sambil-Karpilivka, while the

borders with the Muscovite state and the Khanate of Crimea (“Dyke Pole”) remained unchanged.¹⁷

In establishing the Cossack Hetmanate, Bohdan Khmel’nyts’kyi never abandoned his Ruthenian project—to bring all the Ruthenian areas of the Kingdom of Poland under his rule.¹⁸ The military operations that took place between the time of the Zboriv Agreement and the Pereiaslav Agreement were attempts at gaining some of these lands. Following his alliance with Muscovy, Khmel’nyts’kyi made preparations for a large-scale Galician campaign.¹⁹ He was prevented from carrying it out because Muscovy made the conquest of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and the northern lands its priority. During the incursion into the Grand Duchy, the Cossack commanders organized a Belarusian Cossack regiment and established a protectorate over the Slutsk principality, Stary Bykhaŭ, Pinsk, Mazyr, and Turaŭ.²⁰ These actions generated considerable conflict between the two allies, Muscovy and the Hetmanate.

Khmel’nyts’kyi’s activities in southern Belarus raise questions as to the nature of his Ruthenian project. Up until this time Khmel’nyts’kyi had claimed only the Ruthenian territories of the Kingdom of Poland. Did he have a larger Ruthenian project that would include the Grand Duchy? Serhii Plokhyy believes that Khmel’nyts’kyi did have such a project and that his failure to announce such intentions was largely tactical: to secure the neutrality of the Grand Duchy while he pursued his Polish policies.²¹ However, even during the Cossack incursion into southern Belarus there was no call for the liberation of the Ruthenians in the Grand Duchy. It is my conclusion that the claims to southern Belarus were not based on any Ruthenian project but on the rights of the Zaporozhian Host. The territory was conquered and organized into a Cossack structure and subsequently treated as a possession of the Zaporozhian Host.

Since Muscovy was less interested in pursuing a campaign against the Kingdom of Poland and was in fact negotiating a truce with the Commonwealth (Vilnius, 1656), Khmel’nyts’kyi began negotiating the partition of the Commonwealth among Transylvania, Sweden, and the Hetmanate. The sticking point was the fate of Galicia and Podillia (the Rus’ and Belz palatinates). The Swedish envoy reported to the king that the Cossacks were refusing to negotiate until “Your Royal Highness recognizes their right to the entire old Ukraine, or Roksolaniia, [the territory] where there exists the Greek faith and their language [is spoken] up to the Vistula.”²² Sweden’s refusal to concede the western Ukrainian territories to Khmel’nyts’kyi caused the breakdown of Ukrainian-Swedish negotiations. It forced the king to dispatch a new mission to Khmel’nyts’kyi in 1657 with more favorable terms.²³ Khmel’nyts’kyi, however, was already on his deathbed, but the treaty signed by his successor, Ivan Vyhovs’kyi, recognized not only the western Ukrainian territories but also the Brest and Navahrudak palatinates in the Grand Duchy as part of the Hetmanate.²⁴ Thus, by the time Khmel’nyts’kyi died the ideal territorial vistas of the Ruthenian-Cossack pol-

ity and nation were clear: they encompassed the Ruthenian territories of the Kingdom of Poland and the Cossack possessions.

3. COSSACK UKRAINE, THE RUTHENIAN NATION, AND A RUTHENIAN-UKRAINIAN POLITY

Increasing dissatisfaction with Muscovite interference led Hetman Ivan Vyhovs'kyi to break with Muscovy and return to the suzerainty of the Polish king under the Union of Hadiach (1658). In negotiating this union, the Cossack Council suggested the formation of a Grand Principality of Rus' that would be in a tripartite Commonwealth with the Kingdom of Poland and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. The Grand Principality of Rus' was to include all the Ruthenian palatinates of the Kingdom of Poland (Belz, Bratslav, Volhynia, Kyiv, Podillia, Ruthenia (Galicia), and Chernihiv) and the Pinsk and Mstyslaŭ areas of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. Such a territorial expanse would completely encompass the Ruthenian nation and polity as envisioned by Bohdan Khmel'nyts'kyi.²⁵

These proposals were not accepted by the Polish side, and the actual treaty limited the "Grand Principality of Rus'" within the borders of the palatinates of Bratslav, Kyiv, and Chernihiv—in essence confining the principality to the borders of the Zboriv Agreement.²⁶ The new status of Ukraine and the Cossack Host, as reflected in the hetman's new title, was established as "the hetman of Rus' and the first senator of the palatinates of Kyiv, Bratslav, and Chernihiv."²⁷ There was no detailed description of Ukraine's border (towns, rivers, etc.). However, it is clear from the articles that those three palatinates constituted "Ukraine," "Little Rus'," and the "Grand Principality of Rus'-Ukraine" as is evidenced by the hetman's title, "hetman of the Grand Ruthenian-Ukrainian Principality."²⁸ The Zaporozhian Cossack Host was to have 60,000 registered Cossacks (the actual figure dropped to 30,000), plus 10,000 hired troops, financed from the taxation, as approved by the Sejm, from the palatinates of Kyiv, Bratslav, and Chernihiv.²⁹

There was another attempt to enlarge the territory of the Principality of Rus'. The members of the large Cossack delegation (almost 300 people) attending the ratification procedures in the Sejm brought with them a document entitled "Provisions for the Implementation of the Treaty Statutes," which again suggested "that the Volhynia, Rus' [Galicia], and Podillia palatinates be united to the Grand Principality of Rus'," thus reaffirming the idea of a larger political entity consisting of the Hetmanate and the Ruthenian areas of the Kingdom of Poland.³⁰ The Sejm did not consider such a proposition, and the Principality of Rus' was limited primarily to the territory of the Zboriv Agreement. In fact, all Cossack formations outside of the Principality were to be dismantled. Thus, the

Hetmanate of the Zboriv Agreement was confirmed by the Hadiach agreement as a polity of the Cossack Host and the Ruthenian nation.

The Union of Hadiach did recognize certain prerogatives of the Ruthenian nation and Orthodox faith living outside this polity. Some demands (e.g., freedom of religion, church property (Eastern-rite and Roman, etc.) were included in a much wider territory: the three palatinates mentioned above, the palatinate of Volhynia, and the palatinate of Podillia, as well as other subjects of the “reestablished” Commonwealth (the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, Belarus, and the Siversk region).³¹ This again echoes the claims made for the Union of Lublin, namely, that the violation of certain religious and cultural rights anywhere in the Commonwealth was a violation of the rights of the Ruthenian nation in the privileged area—now the Grand Principality of Rus’.

The Union of Hadiach had very little chance of success. It was not acceptable to Muscovy, the Polish *szlachta*, or many rank and file Cossacks. Although Vyhovs’kyi decisively defeated the Muscovite forces at the Battle of Konotop, a revolt against him on the Left Bank of the Dnieper River resulted in the election of another pro-Muscovite hetman. In essence, the Cossack-Ruthenian polity—the Hetmanate—was divided along the Dnieper, each bank with its own hetman, army, and administration. The Right-Bank polity recognized the Polish king, while Left-Bank Ukraine recognized the Muscovite tsar.³²

4. THE EMERGENCE OF A UKRAINIAN FATHERLAND

The Union of Hadiach helped shape a new concept: that of a Ukrainian fatherland. The agreement anticipated a triune Commonwealth sharing a common fatherland. The text of the agreement (6 September 1658) affirmed the creation of a “common fatherland,” in which its three components were to enjoy equal rights.³³ The “Cossack version” of this treaty included the following formula: “In the common state there will be common privileges and benefits to both confessions.”³⁴ It emphasized “the return” of the Cossacks to “their common fatherland,” stating that the Cossack hetman, together with the entire Host of Zaporozhian Cossacks, who had been separated from the Commonwealth, was returning under the power of His Majesty the King while renouncing the protection of all other rulers.³⁵

While the pro-Polish Right-Bank hetmans had to utilize the terminology of a common fatherland, the pro-Muscovite Left-Bank hetman, Ivan Briukhovets’kyi, countered this concept with the idea of a “Little Rossian/Ukrainian fatherland.” For example, in July–August 1663 he issued a manifesto to the populace of Right-Bank Ukraine (under Hetman Teteria’s rule):

Ivan Briukhovets’kyi, hetman of the Zaporozhian Host, faithful to His

Majesty, the tsar. Wishing the good health and brotherly union with us in the name of Our Lord to all faithful Orthodox Russian people/nation of both lay and clerical status, all officers and commoners...our beloved brothers, who reside on the other bank of Dnieper's towns and villages, we would like to inform you about the following. While observing with the knights of our Zaporozhian Host that our beloved fatherland, Little Russia, because of domestic disputes and frequent Muslim, Polish, and other foreign troops' [invasions], and discord among the [Cossack] leaders is drawing near the abyss...we...single-heartedly and with one brotherly thought and love, seek to achieve...good order in our suffering fatherland.³⁶

What was this Ukrainian/Little Russian fatherland? It was the Hetmanate, the Ruthenian-Cossack polity of the Zboriv Agreement and the ratified version of the Union of Hadiach. It was this Ukrainian fatherland that was split by the armistice between Muscovy and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth (Andrusovo, January 1667). The third paragraph of the armistice agreement stipulated that the Commonwealth ceded the entire Siversk region with Chernihiv and the Palatinate of Chernihiv; all of Left-Bank Ukraine; the city and area of Kyiv (the latter were to be returned to the king on 15 April 1669) (paragraph 7); the Zaporozhian Sich Cossacks remained under the joint authority of the king and the tsar (paragraph 5). As the most noted authority on the agreement, Professor Zbigniew Wójcik, put it, the truce was nothing less than an agreement about the partition of Ukraine.³⁷ It was a partitioning that was not acceptable to the Cossack elite. In breaking with Muscovy, the Left-Bank hetman, Ivan Briukhovets'kyi, explained:

It was not only because of our own decision, but after the advice, taken from the Cossack officers of the Zaporozhian Host, that we broke the allegiance and friendship with Moscow. There were good reasons for doing so: ...the Muscovite envoys and the Polish commissars negotiated peace between them, and swore to plunder and depredate our beloved fatherland, Ukraine, from both sides, Polish and Muscovite.³⁸

5. UNITING THE FATHERLAND: PETRO DOROSHENKO

As Briukhovets'kyi changed his pro-Muscovite orientation, he attempted to lead an uprising on the Left Bank in 1668. He entered into talks with Petro Doroshenko, hetman of Right-Bank Ukraine, who had accepted Ottoman protection, and sent a delegation to Istanbul. By June 1668 Briukhovets'kyi's armies had driven the Muscovite garrisons from a number of Ukrainian towns.


As the Right-Bank regiments commanded by Doroshenko entered Left-Bank Ukraine, the Left-Bank Cossacks rebelled against Briukhovets'kyi, killed him, and elected Doroshenko hetman of a united Hetmanate.³⁹

For Doroshenko, the June 1668 election to a united hetmancy was the apex of his career. For a brief moment, and in defiance of both major powers, Doroshenko achieved the single overriding purpose of his hetmancy: uniting both banks of the Dnieper under one rule. Doroshenko describes this event in a proclamation issued to the Baturyn Convent:

Because upon the death of the late Briukhovets'kyi both sides of the Dnieper due to God's intercession came together as they once used to be, and that all of the Zaporozhian Host unanimously agreed upon this and handed to me the office of hetman of the Zaporozhian Host, then I have to fulfill the duties of my office so that nobody suffers the slightest indignity or a single infraction of one's rights.⁴⁰

Throughout his strenuous tenure as hetman (1665–76), Petro Doroshenko never wavered from the goal of uniting the Zaporozhian Host within the territory that was rightfully its own—the territory of the Zboriv Agreement. However, he also consistently made claims on behalf of the Orthodox faith and the Ruthenian nation residing in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. The hetman also had ambitions of carving out a specific Ruthenian/Ukrainian political entity that would include a united Hetmanate and all the Ruthenian areas of the Polish Crown. This vision was similar to Bohdan Khmel'nyts'kyi's original Ruthenian project and the Cossack proposals for Hadiach (see map at right).

The first two policies were clearly enunciated in Doroshenko's numerous and constant negotiations with the Poles. In all the discussions and treaty proposals there were two basic elements: the Zaporozhian Host and the Ruthenian/Ukrainian people/nation. The Zaporozhian Host was to have control over the territories of Zboriv as a minimum, and as a maximum—control over additional territories in Podillia and the Belarusian regiment that had existed at the time of Bohdan Khmel'nyts'kyi. Of course, neither the Commonwealth nor Doroshenko controlled all of these territories, because some of them were under the control of his opponent, the pro-Muscovite Left-Bank hetman. Thus, the Host's territorial demands were at times adjusted in the negotiations to reflect reality. Beyond the basic territory of the Host, every negotiation included extensive provisions for the Ruthenian/Ukrainian nation (people) living not only in the territory controlled by the Host but by the entire Commonwealth. These included the abolition of the Church Union, the rights of Orthodox clergy, printing presses, schools, the Ruthenian language, and other pressing matters.



The Cossack-Polish negotiations, which continued on and off from 1669 to the mid-1670s, reaching their pinnacle during the work of the so-called Ostrih Commission (10 May–22 December 1670) provide a good example. Even though the negotiations ultimately failed, the twenty-four articles concluded by the members of both the Ukrainian and the Polish delegations contain invaluable information regarding Hetman Doroshenko's political outlook. Article 10 indicates Doroshenko's consistency in upholding the political borders of Cossack Ukraine on the basis of the provisions of the Treaty of Zboriv, ruling that the Zaporozhian Cossack Host with all its members were to remain within the boundaries of the Kyiv, Chernihiv, and Bratslav palatinates and to continue living freely on those lands as well as on the lands owned by the crown, magnates, gentry, clergy, towns, and villages without any infringement of the Cossacks' rights.⁴¹

In addition, Hetman Doroshenko continued upholding the rights of the Orthodox Church and the Ruthenian nation within the borders of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. Article 1 of the document states: "The ancient Greek Ruthenian Faith and ancient Rus' itself joined the Polish Crown in order to retain their liberties and the free use of their language as far as the language of the Ruthenian nation is heard in all cities, towns, and villages of the Polish Crown as well as in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania."⁴² Article 2 ruled: "That Greek Faith [Church] is to possess property, freedom of expanding old and building new churches and monasteries as well as freedom of repairing them," stipulating that no ancient Orthodox churches can be transferred to the followers of the Union.⁴³ Article 21 demanded that the metropolitan of Kyiv be elected freely by the Orthodox clergy and laity of the Ruthenian/Ukrainian nation, the hetman, and the Zaporozhian Cossack Host. No intrusion in the election was to be permitted; no hierarch living outside the Ukrainian lands was to take the title of metropolitan of Kyiv.⁴⁴

Issues of education and native language were addressed in three articles. Article 5 noted that an academy was to be established in Kyiv and that it had to function freely, teaching the Ruthenian nation in the Greek, Latin, and Ruthenian languages; and it was to enjoy rights and privileges similar to the ones of the Cracow Academy.⁴⁵ Article 6 ruled that another academy was to be established either in Mahilioŭ, the Belarusian lands, or "here" in Ukraine, if a suitable place were found. The academy was to enjoy the same rights and privileges as the Kyivan one.⁴⁶ Article 7 specified that both schools and printing houses were to be established and to function freely.⁴⁷ Clearly, this was a very comprehensive program for the Ruthenian/Ukrainian nation of the Commonwealth.

Even at the end of his career the embattled Hetman Doroshenko was negotiating with the Poles on the basis of the Zboriv Agreement and the Union of Hadiach. In February 1675 he sent to King Jan III Sobieski of Poland "articles"

based upon the Zboriv and Hadiach conditions. Article 3 of the document demanded that the Zaporozhian Cossack Host was to receive its own territory within the borders of the palatinates of Kyiv, Chernihiv, and Bratslav, as well as an additional regiment in Belarus and the city of Mahilioŭ. Polish troops were not to be stationed there, and Polish landlords and officials were forbidden to enter those territories.⁴⁸ As for the "religious issue," the document went even farther than Doroshenko's previous demands: as stated in Article 1, considering the fact that the Church Union had become deeply rooted and could not be undone entirely, the Uniate Church had to unite completely with the Roman Catholic Church, while all ancient Orthodox monasteries and churches in the Crown and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania must be taken away from the Uniates and given back to the Orthodox according to the privileges of Władysław IV (1632) as well as the conditions of the Zboriv Agreement and the Union of Hadiach.⁴⁹

Doroshenko's vision of a specific Ruthenian/Ukrainian polity that would extend beyond the Hetmanate could hardly be made part of Polish negotiations, since such a polity was to be carved out of the Polish Crown. Nevertheless, the Polish authorities were aware of Doroshenko's expansive territorial view and were leery of dealing with him. In the "Relacja" compiled by the Polish negotiators (commissars), special attention was paid to Doroshenko's wish to "secure for himself the title of a duke or a prince and upon subjugating the Cossacks to rule over Ukraine," with its border along the border of the Commonwealth running from "Cracow, at the confluence of the river Wislok to Vistula, that is from this side of the Vistula directly to Kazimierz; then from Kazimierz through Lithuania to Belarus up to Samogitia and Smolensk along this bank of the Dnieper."⁵⁰ During his speech to the Sejm in 1672 the Crown hetman, Jan Sobieski, noted Doroshenko's wish to "push the border of Rus' up to Lublin and Cracow reaching as far as the name [of Rus'] and the Church of Rus' are to be found."⁵¹

The vision of a polity consisting not only of the Hetmanate but also the Ruthenian lands of the Kingdom of Poland was revealed in Doroshenko's dealings with the Muscovites. In December 1667 a resident of Novhorod-Siversk, Fedir Chekalovs'kyi, was sent by the Muscovite boyar, Petr Sheremetev, to learn Doroshenko's views and plans.⁵² Chekalovs'kyi returned to Kyiv on 25 December 1667 (Julian calendar) and submitted his report to the boyar:

Petro Doroshenko was saying those words to me, Fedir Chekalovs'kyi, in Chyhyryn: ...I have genuine trust in the Lord and the Holy Theotokos, that for the glory of His Tsarist Majesty and through my effort not only this side of Ukraine, where we live, will be placed under the high hand of His Tsarist Majesty, but [also] all of the country, which is to belong to us, that is, the Principality of Rus' within the limits: Przemysł, Iaroslav,

Lviv, Galicia, Volodymyr, all those chief cities of the Principality of Rus', I place hope in the Lord and want to serve His Majesty faithfully [adding] that territory to the Principality of Rus's ancient capital of Kyiv, placing it under His Majesty's high hand.⁵³

This prospect was offered to the Muscovites only months after the ratification of the Treaty of Andrusovo, which not only negated Doroshenko's claims to the Ruthenian lands of the Kingdom of Poland, but split the Hetmanate itself. The adamant position of the two major powers (Poland and Muscovy) made negotiations with the Muscovites pointless. This situation changed somewhat after the Turks forced a humiliating treaty on the Poles. In the Buchach (Buczacz) Peace Treaty of 1672, Poland renounced all claims to Cossack Ukraine. Such a renunciation seemed to preempt point 4 of the Treaty of Andrusovo, which had left the Right Bank to Poland. The Muscovite official who had taken over the Little Russian Department, Artamon Matveev, was prepared to test the limits of the armistice.⁵⁴ As a result, there began protracted negotiations between Muscovy and Doroshenko. The chief sticking point in the negotiations was Doroshenko's insistence that there be one Hetmanate on both sides of the Dnieper, with himself as hetman.⁵⁵ The tsar, showing loyalty to the Left-Bank pro-Muscovite hetman Ivan Samoilovych, was only willing to recognize Doroshenko as hetman of the Right Bank.⁵⁶ On one occasion, in late June 1673, Doroshenko stated that "on both banks of the Dnieper there must be one hetman and I am ready to give up my office if there is one who is better than me, who would not let down His Majesty the tsar and would not allow perishing both himself and Ukraine.... [As of now] Our Lord has bestowed the hetman's office onto me for my [own] heavy sins for I have no peace and calm whatsoever...[and] always have to think how not to lose myself or this corner of Ukraine."⁵⁷ Thus, the unity of the Hetmanate was of paramount importance to Doroshenko, who considered the territory he controlled only a corner of Ukraine.

Doroshenko's vision of the territorial extent of Ukraine can also be seen from his dealings with the Ottomans. On 10 (20) August 1668 Hetman Doroshenko completed a draft treaty with the sultan. As expected in such a document, Doroshenko acts on behalf of the "Cossack host" ("войско Казацкое") and "Ruthenian nation" ("Рускій народъ").⁵⁸ Article 6 of the treaty makes reference to the Cossack "fatherland," forbidding the Ottoman allies to persecute the Christian faith and plunder the Rus' churches in "the fatherland and in their lands and towns."⁵⁹ This was a reference to the fatherland of the Host—the Hetmanate of both banks of the Dnieper. However, the draft treaty also contains a much broader idea of a Ruthenian nation:

The Ruthenian nation is now divided into different countries (lands),

but shares the common faith with the Greeks, and not only among themselves in those countries, but also in the borderlands, first, from the country where Przemyśl, Sambir, and the city of Kyiv are located and then twenty miles to the second country, from the river Vistula, and from the third one, i.e., Memn [Nemunas], and from the fourth country, where Sevsk and Putyvl are, all of them are Cossacks, we hope that they will join us in our decision and will be in agreement with us...and will be freed from their bondage...[for they are currently] subjects of the Poles and the Muscovites, and are enslaved by their rulers with persuasions and, even more, with punishments.⁶⁰

Thus, in addition to the Hetmanate, the Cossack core, Doroshenko was proposing to carve out a principality from the Kingdom of Poland (Przemyśl, Sambir, the lands east of the Vistula) and Nemunas (the Cossack part of Belarus), and the Muscovite state (Sevsk and Putyvl). In essence, the hetman was making the traditional claim for the Ruthenian lands of the Polish Crown and the Hetmanate, including the Belarusian Cossack lands. In this vision, however, Doroshenko pushes the very stable boundary of the Hetmanate with Muscovy further east (Sevsk and Putyvl).

6. UNITING THE FATHERLAND: IVAN SAMOILOVYCH

Hetman Doroshenko's archrival, Ivan Samoilovych, was elected as the hetman of Left-Bank Ukraine in 1672. Unlike Doroshenko, who had been elected hetman of the Right Bank without Polish approval and acted independently of the Poles, Samoilovych was completely controlled by his Muscovite overlords. The election treaty points with Moscow even acknowledged the partition of Ukraine. According to Article 5 (of the Hlukhiv Articles), "places [towns] beyond [the river] Sozh were to be transferred to the Polish side in accordance with the Treaty of Andrusovo."⁶¹

Although he was loyal to the tsar and acknowledged the limitations of the Treaty of Andrusovo, Samoilovych de facto subverted that policy and believed as fervently as Doroshenko in a united Ukrainian Hetmanate. Samoilovych, of course, would like to have been the hetman of such a united country and greatly feared losing his hetmancy to Doroshenko. Samoilovych subverted the Muscovite negotiations with Doroshenko and constantly urged the tsar to defeat Doroshenko militarily.

In January 1674 Hetman Samoilovych got his wish and, together with Prince Grigorii Romodanovskii and 80,000 poorly provisioned troops, crossed the Dnieper River. Doroshenko immediately asked for help from his Tatar and Ottoman allies. Faced with such a large army, Doroshenko quickly lost control

over most of the Right Bank and was forced to retreat to his well-fortified capital, Chyhyryn. Muscovite and Ukrainian forces besieged the city but repeatedly failed to take it. On 15 March 1674, in Pereiaslav, a Council of Colonels of Right-Bank Ukraine, in the presence of Muscovite diplomats, elected Ivan Samoilovych "hetman of both banks of the Dnieper."⁶²

The fates of war negated this attempt at incorporating Right-Bank Ukraine as a Muscovite protectorate. Doroshenko was able to hold onto his capital until the arrival of his Tatar allies. Romodanovskii and Samoilovych quickly lifted the siege and retreated. But Samoilovych would never give up his claim and title of "hetman of both banks." In the following year, while he was again besieging Doroshenko's capital, Chyhyryn, on 6 November 1675 Samoilovych issued a manifesto to the residents of the town, encouraging them to convince Doroshenko that he had to surrender to Samoilovych:

And we desire that Doroshenko arrive in Baturyn and submit an oath of allegiance to us...for not only he, but all of you know that two years ago in Pereiaslav, I, with God's grace and the grace of His Tsarist Majesty, was elected hetman, on my part unwillingly and unexpectedly, owing to the consent of the officers on both sides of the Dnieper and people of lower ranks, and was invested in this office by His Majesty's decree. In view of this...we persuade you to advise [Doroshenko] that...if he wants our fatherland Ukraine to enjoy peace without bloodshed and calamities, then he must come to us...with an announcement of his allegiance to His Majesty and to us.⁶³

Samoilovych viewed Doroshenko's surrender to him as a final vindication of his claim of being hetman of "both banks." In his correspondence he never tired of declaring that "to us, the Zaporozhian Host belongs to the other side of the Dnieper."⁶⁴ In a letter to Colonel Illia Novyts'kyi (8 September 1676) Samoilovych declared that he "brings our fatherland, torn apart Ukraine, under one monarch and regiment [that is, the hetman's rule—ZK] in unity."⁶⁵

Assuming and retaining the title of "hetman of both banks" were a far easier task than controlling them. In fact, Samoilovych's policy of reuniting both banks under his authority was opposed by all major powers. Both the Commonwealth and the Ottoman Porte (based on Doroshenko's submission to their authority) had claims to Right-Bank Ukraine, while Muscovy was not willing to risk abrogating completely its very tenuous truce with the Commonwealth. Samoilovych devoted considerable effort to subverting or, at least, modifying the Muscovite position in the on-and-off negotiations between the tsar's envoys and the king. For example, in 1677, along with a petition prepared by his officer's council, Samoilovych sent a personal message to the tsar, advising that the Muscovites should not even discuss with the Poles the surrender of Right-Bank Ukraine, particularly Kyiv and Chyhyryn.⁶⁶

In addition to these diplomatic maneuvers, Samoiloivych made an extremely bold move. In the late 1670s, as part of the anti-Ottoman campaign, Samoiloivych occupied the Right Bank. In his efforts to deny support to the Ottomans (who were promoting their puppet hetman, Iurii Khmel'nyts'kyi, as Doroshenko's replacement) as well as to the Poles, Samoiloivych pursued probably his most controversial policy: the forced resettlement of population from Right-Bank Ukraine to the Left Bank. In two waves, one in 1678 and another in 1679, he forced not only the Right Bank regiments to cross over but also the entire population, burning towns and village homesteads. It was this population transfer policy that completed the devastation of the Right Bank, turning it into a wasteland.⁶⁷

Having deprived both the Ottomans and the Poles of the human and physical resources on the Right Bank, Samoiloivych favored a Muscovite settlement with the Ottoman Porte rather than the "Eternal Peace" with the Commonwealth. Samoiloivych's efforts in that direction were so intensive that the Ukrainian scholar V'iacheslav Stanislavs'kyi considers Hetman Ivan Samoiloivych a major contributor to the conclusion of the Peace of Bakhchisarai (1681), which was signed by the tsar and the sultan.⁶⁸ Apparently, Samoiloivych expected to be rewarded with those territories on the Right Bank. He was bitterly disappointed when the Peace of Bakhchisarai assigned the "barren territories" to the Ottoman Porte. In his letter to the tsar (August 1682), Samoiloivych wrote that the concluded treaty was not in the best interests either of Muscovy or the Hetmanate and requested that the "barren territories," ceded to the Ottomans, should be granted to him, the hetman, for his faithful and perpetual service and also in order to reverse the loss of honor; for, even though he was hetman of both sides of the Dnieper, part of that honor was transferred to the sultan. In the hetman's words, "the tsar should order that the entire nation be united under his, the hetman's, authority and mace."⁶⁹

Not only did Samoiloivych fail to establish his authority over the "barren areas," but Muscovy and the Commonwealth were inching toward signing a comprehensive "Eternal Peace" and forging an anti-Ottoman alliance. Attempting to intervene in those negotiations, Samoiloivych continued to plead three issues before the Muscovite monarch: the Right Bank, the position of Orthodox Ruthenians in the Commonwealth, and the small Belarusian territory beyond the Sozh River still held by the Cossacks despite earlier accords between the Muscovites and the Poles.⁷⁰ In this respect, Samoiloivych's requests very much reflected the traditional views of hetman—from Bohdan Khmel'nyts'kyi to Petro Doroshenko, who had consistently defended the rights of the Ruthenian faith and nation in the Commonwealth and the territorial integrity of the Hetmanate.

Samoiloivych attempted one more adjustment to the boundaries of the Hetmanate, shifting his attention to the Cossack state's eastern border. Some of the population from the Right Bank had settled on territory belonging to

Muscovy—Sloboda Ukraine. On that basis, Samoilovych initiated a project to incorporate the Cossacks of Sloboda Ukraine into the Hetmanate under his authority. It was an attempt to shift the territory of the Ukrainian fatherland eastward. In late 1680 and early 1681 Samoilovych sent Ivan Mazepa to Moscow to conduct negotiations on this matter.⁷¹ Muscovy had no intention of transferring the Cossacks of Sloboda Ukraine to the jurisdiction of the Hetmanate, and the project became moribund.

Samoilovych's continued attempts to secure the Right Bank also ended in failure. The "Eternal Peace" was finally signed in Moscow in April 1686. It did indeed permanently split the Hetmanate between Muscovy and the Commonwealth more or less along the Dnieper River.⁷² It assigned to the Polish king the lands beyond the Sozh River (the small area around today's border between Ukraine and Belarus), still being held by the Cossacks as part of the Hetmanate. Samoilovych's desiderata did have some impact on the peace agreement: the city of Kyiv and a considerable chunk of surrounding territory on the Right Bank were granted in perpetuity to the tsar; the Zaporozhian Sich Cossacks were assigned solely to the domain of the tsar, and the treaty contained provisions whereby "His Majesty the King would not force the Roman Catholic faith and the Union upon the Lord's Greek-Rus' [Orthodox] faith, churches, and bishoprics: [the bishoprics of] Lutsk, Galicia, Przemyśl, and Belarus."⁷³ Hetman Samoilovych's greatest impact on the agreement was the following provision:

Regarding those desolate towns and places, from the town of Staiky, downstream the Dnieper, along the river Tiasmyn, namely: Rzyshchiv, Trakhtemyriv, Kaniv, Liushny, Sokolnia, Cherkasy, Borovytsia, Buzhyn, Voronkiv, Kryliv, and Chyhyryn...those envoys and boyars agreed upon and ruled that those towns must remain empty [desolate] as they are now.⁷⁴

Thus, although these areas were recognized as the domain of the king, he was denied any use of them.

Such tactical victories were insufficient to assuage Samoilovych. He was allegedly "very sad" upon the signing of the "Eternal Peace."⁷⁵ The members of the hetman's family described Samoilovych's attitude as follows: "Our Ivan is very angry and blames Moscow profoundly; but he will not act the way [the late] Ivan Briukhovets'kyi did."⁷⁶

While Samoilovych did not break his lifelong allegiance to the tsar, neither did he accept the "Eternal Peace." In a memorandum to the Polish king, Samoilovych states that

on the Chyhyryn side of the Dnieper those lands and beyond belonged

to the mace of the Zaporozhian Host from the first hetmans and were from time immemorial our strength; however, according to the current peace agreement, which was allowed by our sovereigns, these lands were passed to the king's side, which we have implemented without complaint, but these lands were really subordinate and belong to us.⁷⁷

The hetman continues petitioning, claiming that "these lands should remain with us for although they are now barren, they still belong to us and should be ours."⁷⁸

These actions, words, and activities of Ivan Samoilovych contributed to his ouster and arrest in 1687. Among the chief proofs of the hetman's alleged treason was that "he spoke fiercely about the lands on the other side of the Dnieper: it will not be as the Muscovites and the Poles have determined in their treaties. We will act in accordance to our [own] needs."⁷⁹

It is clear that Hetman Samoilovych had a precise vision of the territorial extent of the Cossack Ukrainian Hetmanate. In fact, he attempted to enlarge it by incorporating such Muscovite territories as Sloboda Ukraine. Moreover, he also held onto the concept of the hetman as a protector of the Ruthenian faith and nation in the entire Commonwealth. However, did Samoilovych have a concept of a Ruthenian/Ukrainian polity that would extend beyond the Hetmanate?

As the hetman of Left-Bank Ukraine and as the result of the official truce between the Commonwealth and Muscovy, Samoilovych had no basis or occasion to discuss the fate of Lviv or Volhynia. In practice, he was totally preoccupied with reconstructing the Hetmanate of both banks. Nonetheless, he was well aware that the Hetmanate was part of a much larger Ukraine, and he tried to make that clear to the Muscovite government, which was negotiating an "Eternal Peace" with the Commonwealth. In early 1685 Samoilovych sent a petition to Moscow, in which he recommended that the Commonwealth return all lands inhabited by Ukrainians, because

all that side of the Dnieper, and Podillia, Volhynia, Pidiashshia, Pidhir'ia and all of Chervona Rus' with the glorious cities of Galicia, Lviv, Przemyśl, Iaroslav, Lublin, Lutsk, Volodymyr, Ostrih, Zaslavl, Korets, and other ones, from the beginning of the existence of our peoples to [the time] of the Rus' monarchs [had been in our possession] and only some hundred years ago the Polish kingdom took hold of them.⁸⁰

Thus, Hetman Ivan Samoilovych also had a concept of a "Greater Ukraine" that would include the Hetmanate and the Ruthenian lands of the Kingdom of Poland.

7. THE UKRAINIAN FATHERLAND AND THE SICH COSSACKS

Any study of early modern territorial visions of Ukraine would be incomplete without considering the role of the Lower Zaporozhian Host, or the Sich Cossacks. These Cossacks, who provided Bohdan Khmel'nyts'kyi with military backing for the 1648 uprising, continued to exist as a separate entity beyond (below) the Dnieper rapids; hence the Lower Zaporozhian Host. As such, the Sich Cossacks were part of the political entity created by Hetman Khmel'nyts'kyi, and the hetman was able to exert his authority over them. Subsequent hetmans were not able to maintain their control over the Sich Cossacks, and under the leadership of an elected chieftain (*koshovyi*), they became important, independent political and military players in the southern steppe. Thus, the Sich Cossacks de facto were not within the boundaries of the Hetmanate.

Nevertheless, the Sich Cossacks continued to be inherently intertwined with the Hetmanate. Most hetmans attempted to assert their authority over the Sich. At times they were successful. For example, Bohdan Khmel'nyts'kyi's successor, Ivan Vyhovs'kyi (1657–59) received assurances from the Sich Cossacks that they recognized the hetman's authority and did not "harbor any disobedience," but were "obeying [their] lordship's will."⁸¹

The Sich Cossacks were also a focal point for uprisings against the hetman and were used as a power base by those aspiring to the hetmancy. For example, Hetman Ivan Briukhovets'kyi (1663–68) first established himself at the Sich and then used his position to capture the hetmancy on the Left Bank. However, once he was in control of both the Left Bank and the Sich, Briukhovets'kyi moved immediately to curb the power of the Sich Cossacks, breaking up their settlements into smaller units and forbidding them to deal directly with the Muscovites. In his note to Moscow Briukhovets'kyi insisted that the Sich Cossacks were to "report to the hetman regarding all matters and not deal with Moscow without the hetman's consent," just as it used to be during the time of Hetman Vyhovs'kyi.⁸²

The relationship of the Sich Cossacks with the Hetmanate was, of course, greatly complicated by the partitioning of Ukraine and the emergence of competing Right- and Left-Bank hetmans with their opposing protectors and alliance systems. This gave the Sich Cossacks greater opportunities for independent action. For example, the chieftain, Ivan Sirko, maneuvered between hetmans Doroshenko and Samoilovych. In the mid-1660s he supported Doroshenko's attempt to throw off Polish protection on the Right Bank and to unify Ukraine. However, Sirko was an opponent of Doroshenko's 1668 Ottoman treaty, and with his attacks on the Tatars he dealt a death blow to Doroshenko's efforts. Sirko favored a pro-Muscovite course. Despite his opposition to Doroshenko, Sirko maintained a relationship with him. He was even godfather to one of

Doroshenko's children,⁸³ and when Doroshenko was forced to capitulate, he insisted that he would do this only in front of Sirko rather than the hated Samoiloivych.⁸⁴

Sirko's relations with Hetman Samoiloivych were strained. Nevertheless, he endorsed Samoiloivych's consistent pro-Muscovite stance and recognized his authority as hetman. In a letter dated 14 December 1677 Sirko assures Samoiloivych: "We all do not separate ourselves from you, for this would do great harm to our beloved fatherland, but rather seek unity and your guidance, which under the present circumstances we find necessary for the entire Zaporozhian Host, and to this we truly vouch."⁸⁵ Sirko also recognized that the Sich Cossacks were linked to a Ukrainian fatherland. In July 1677 Sirko wrote to Samoiloivych, informing him that "it is well known to your lordship that we are waging war, our only craft, where it is necessary for the protection and unity of our bewailed fatherland Ukraine."⁸⁶ He did not hesitate to express similar views either to the tsar or to Muscovite officials. In one of his letters to Prince Grigorii Romodanovskii, Sirko writes: "Beseeching Your Princely lordship, our benevolent patron and His Majesty, I am asking for your kindness to our fatherland, Little Rus', and to us, the Zaporozhian Host."⁸⁷ On 14 December 1677 Sirko wrote a letter to the Muscovite tsar, saying: "Even though we concluded this truce during the infidels' attack on Ukraine, our fatherland, we believe that we have done no harm to anyone by taking this step, for it was a necessary one."⁸⁸

Although the Lower Zaporozhian Host was defending the Ukrainian fatherland, it remains an open question whether it considered itself part of that fatherland. In analyzing the eighteenth-century Cossack chronicles, Frank Sysyn has shown that the Lower Zaporozhian Host Cossacks considered themselves as originating from the fatherland but having emigrated beyond its borders. Thus, they could have been defenders of the fatherland without being part of that fatherland.⁸⁹

Nevertheless, from the time of Bohdan Khmel'nyts'kyi to Ivan Samoiloivych, the Lower Zaporozhian Host Cossacks were very much part of the territorial vision of Cossack Ukraine, as an autonomous appendage connected to the Hetmanate.

CONCLUSIONS

In the four decades since the 1648 revolt, the territorial vistas of the Ukrainian Cossacks were remarkably consistent. At its core were the possessions of the Zaporozhian Host that included the areas covered by the Zboriv Agreement, a small part of conquered Belarus, and the semi-independent Lower Zaporozhian Host (Sich Cossacks). These territories were united as a single political entity

under Hetman Bohdan Khmel'nyts'kyi, but subsequently were fragmented into a Right-Bank Hetmanate, a Left-Bank Hetmanate, and the Sich Cossacks. It was this Hetmanate that was viewed as the fatherland—a fatherland that was torn asunder by the Muscovite-Commonwealth accords of 1667 and 1686.

The second territorial delineation was that of “Greater Ukraine” combining Cossack Ukraine with the Ruthenian lands of the Kingdom of Poland. It was vigorously pursued as a political project by Hetman Bohdan Khmel'nyts'kyi, was included in the proposals for the Union of Hadiach, and held by both Hetman Petro Doroshenko and Hetman Ivan Samoilovych. The “Greater Ukraine” idea predates the Cossack revolution and was already present in the late sixteenth century. The consistency of this territorial delineation for over a century is, in my opinion, indicative of the development of a specific Ukrainian political-territorial identification that separated Ukraine from Belarus.

These two territorial delineations were linked to a specific constitutional interpretation. The original incorporation of the Ruthenian lands into the Kingdom of Poland in 1569 guaranteed certain prerogatives to the Ruthenian nation. While these rights were supposedly guaranteed to the Ruthenian nation (the Orthodox nobility) of the incorporated lands, their violation anywhere in the Commonwealth was considered a violation of the rights of the nobility (and, later, of the Cossacks) in the incorporated territories. Thus, the Orthodox nobles and, subsequently, Cossack hetmans acted as protectors of Ruthenian religious and cultural institutions in the entire Commonwealth. The responsibility for the Orthodox Ruthenian faith and culture throughout the Commonwealth delineated the third most expansive territorial vista of the Cossacks, encompassing the entire Kyivan metropolitan see (see map on p. 11, above). It is in exercising this responsibility that Doroshenko defended the use of the Ruthenian language within the entire Commonwealth, or Samoilovych pressed so hard to have some guarantees for the Orthodox of the Commonwealth incorporated into the “Eternal Peace” between Muscovy and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth.

These were the territorial vistas of the Cossack administration when Ivan Mazepa became hetman in 1687. Was he aware of them? Mazepa almost certainly was. He had served both hetmans, Doroshenko and Samoilovych, and would have been aware of Doroshenko's negotiation points with the Poles. In addition, as chief negotiator with the Tatars, he would have known of the 1668 treaty with the Ottomans, in which Doroshenko's territorial vistas were outlined.⁹⁰ Moreover, while in the service of Hetman Samoilovych, Mazepa traveled to Moscow with proposals to expand the hetman's authority to Sloboda Ukraine, and he was also involved in Samoilovych's negotiations to alter the “Eternal Peace” of 1686.⁹¹

NOTES

1. Orest Subtel'nyi, *Mazepyntsi: Ukraïns'kyi separatyzm na pochatku XVIII st.* (Kyiv, 1994), 170. For further discussion of the term "Rossian," see note 4 below.
2. Natalia Yakovenko, "Choice of Name versus Choice of Path: The Names of Ukrainian Territories from the Late Sixteenth to the Late Seventeenth Century," in *A Laboratory of Transnational History: Ukraine and Recent Ukrainian Historiography*, ed. Georgiy Kasianov and Philipp Ther (Budapest; New York, 2009), 135.
3. *Ibid.*, 123.
4. The term *narod* can mean a group of people or a nation in the cultural-linguistic sense. Polish usage influenced Ukrainian usage in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. As David Althoen has shown, the predominant use of *narod* in Polish was for a cultural-linguistic and not a political group (thus, Italian or German nation and almost never Venetian or Württembergian nation). In this way, Ruthenian (*rus'kyi*) *narod* refers to the community of Ruthenians (Belarusians-Ukrainians) that was seen as such a community or nation. After 1569 the Commonwealth was referred to as "of these two nations," referring to the Kingdom of Poland and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania—i.e., political entities, but ones that had a dominant or titular nation as its core. In any event, as the use of "Ruthenian nation" after 1569 and Althoen's research demonstrate, *narod* continued to be used more commonly for cultural-linguistic nations. No similar research has been done on the use of *narod* in Ukrainian and in the Cossack Hetmanate. Thus, in some instances the meaning of *narod* is clear: e.g., Orthodox people, not nation. However, whenever *narod* is preceded by an adjectival form, such as "Rus'"; "Ukrainian," or "Little Rossian," it may signify a nation or people of a specific land. It is clear that the adjectival form of Rus' generally refers to the Ruthenian nation. It is less evident whether adjectival forms of Little Russia or Ukraine refer to a cultural ethnic nation or to the inhabitants of those lands. In instances where "Little Rossian" or "Ukrainian" is an obvious replacement for the older term "Ruthenian," one can talk about a Ukrainian or Little Rossian nation. See David Althoen, "That Noble Quest: From True Nobility to Enlightened Society in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, 1550–1830," 2 vols. (Ph.D. diss., University of Michigan, 2000; rev. for DMA Printing and Publishing, 2001), 1:152–217; and Frank Sysyn, "Concepts of Nationhood in Ukrainian History Writing, 1620–1690," *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 10, nos. 3–4 (December 1986): 393–423. There is a problem in translating various adjectival forms of Rus'. In the Commonwealth *Rus'* and *Rusyny* were used in describing the Ruthenian nation. In the seventeenth century a Hellenized version,

- Rossiane*, displaced *Rusyny* and was rendered *rossiiskyi* in the adjectival form. Thus, *rossiiskyi narod* still designated the Ruthenian nation (meaning Ukrainians, possibly Belarusians, but not Russians). However, *rossiiskyi* was also being introduced to designate the Muscovite tsar and his realm: e.g., the *rossiiskyi* monarch. In translating various forms of *rossiiskyi*, I use “Rossian” when it refers to Ukraine, and “Russian” when it refers to the tsar. See Hans Rothe, “What Is the Meaning of ‘Rossijski’ and ‘Rossija’ in the Polish and Russian Conception of the State in the 17th Century?” *Ricerche slavistiche* 37 (1990): 111–21.
5. Serhii Plokyh, *The Origins of the Slavic Nations: Premodern Identities in Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus* (Cambridge, 2006), 188–89. Cited in Mykhailo Hrushevs’kyi, *Istoriia ukrains’koi literatury*, vol. 6 (Kyiv, 1995), 295. See also an English translation of this account in Meletii Smotryts’kyi, *Rus’ Restored: Selected Writings of Meletij Smotryc’kyj, 1610–1630*, trans. David Frick, (Cambridge, Mass., 2005), 330.
 6. Frank E. Sysyn, “Regionalism and Political Thought in Seventeenth-Century Ukraine: The Nobility’s Grievances at the Diet of 1641,” *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 6, no. 2 (June 1982): 175–76.
 7. *Ibid.*, 176–80.
 8. Mykhailo Hrushevsky, *The Cossack Age, 1626–1650*, vol. 8 of *History of Ukraine-Rus’*, trans. Marta Daria Olynyk (Edmonton; Toronto, 2002), 517.
 9. *Ibid.*, 535.
 10. Hrushevsky, *History of Ukraine-Rus’*, 8:534.
 11. *Ibid.*, 593; Dmitrii Bantysh-Kamenskii, *Istochniki malorossiiskoi istorii* (Moscow, 1858), 19.
 12. Mykola Vasylenko, “Terytoriiia Ukraïny XVII viku,” *Iuvileinyi zbirnyk na poshanu D. I. Bahaliia*, vol. 1 (Kyiv, 1927), 112.
 13. *Ibid.*, 116–17.
 14. Hrushevsky, *History of Ukraine-Rus’*, 8:641–47.
 15. Oleksandr Hurzhii, *Ukrains’ka kozats’ka derzhava v druhii polovyni XVII–XVIII st.* (Kyiv, 1996), 20.
 16. Bantysh-Kamenskii, *Istochniki malorossiiskoi istorii*, 58–62.
 17. Hurzhii, *Ukrains’ka kozats’ka derzhava*, 24.
 18. *Dokumenty Bohdana Khmel’nyts’koho*, ed. I. Kryp’iakevych (Kyiv, 1961). See documents no. 264, 271, and 273. In his introduction to the English edition of vol. 9 (pt. 2) of Hrushevs’kyi’s *History of Ukraine-Rus’* (Edmonton, 2010), Iaroslav Fedoruk argues against Hrushevs’kyi’s assertion that after the Battle of Zboriv (1649) the hetman did not return to that intention until 1655, supposedly under the stimulus of the Swedish king’s incursion into the Commonwealth.

19. *Dokumenty Bohdana Khmel'nyts'koho*, nos. 264, 271, and 273.
20. "When God gracefully allowed for the unification of the county of Pinsk with us, which happened willingly and wholeheartedly." See Bohdan Khmel'nyts'kyi's manifesto to the nobility of Pinsk county (28 June 1657) in *Pamiatniki, izdannye Kievskoiu komissieiu dlia razbora drevnikh aktov*, vol. 3 (Kyiv, 1848), 245–49. See also Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi, *Istoriia Ukraïny-Rusy*, vol. 9, pt. 2 (New York, 1957), 961–65, 52–59, 1257–77; Serhii Plokyh, *Origins of the Slavic Nations*, 320, 327–28.
21. Plokyh, *Origins of the Slavic Nations*, 238.
22. Valerii Smolii and Valerii Stepankov, *Ukrains'ka derzhavna ideia XVII–XVIII stolit': problemy formuvannia, evoliutsii, realizatsii* (Kyiv, 1997), 93.
23. *Pamiatniki, izdannye Kievskoiu komissieiu*, 3:238–40; Hrushevs'kyi, *Istoriia Ukraïny-Rusy*, vol. 9, pt. 2, 1394–96.
24. Hrushevs'kyi, *Istoriia Ukraïny-Rusy*, vol. 9, pt. 2, 1404–05, 1429, 1435; Plokyh, *Origins of the Slavic Nations*, 238.
25. Vasyl' Herasymchuk, "Vyhovshchyna i Hadiats'kyi traktat," *Zapysky naukovooho tovarystva im. Shevchenka* (hereinafter *ZNTSh*) 89 (Lviv, 1909): 82.
26. Hurzhii, *Ukrains'ka kozats'ka derzhava*, 37.
27. "Universaly ukrains'kykh het'maniv vid Ivana Vyhovs'koho do Ivana Samoilovycha (1657–1687)," in *Universaly ukrains'kykh het'maniv: Materialy do ukrains'koho dyplomatariiu*, series I (Kyiv; Lviv, 2004), 47.
28. "Тетману Великого княженія Русского Украинского." See *Universaly ukrains'kykh het'maniv*, 46–47.
29. *Universaly ukrains'kykh het'maniv*, 42.
30. Tetiana Tairova-Iakovleva [Tat'iana Tairova-Iakovleva], "Hadiats'ka uhoda—tekstolohichniy analiz," in *Hadiats'ka uniiia 1658 roku* (Kyiv, 2008): 38–39.
31. *Universaly ukrains'kykh het'maniv*, 44–45.
32. Political developments in Ukraine during this historical period are also discussed in Petro Sas, *Politychna kul'tura ukrains'koho suspil'stva (k. XVI–persha pol. XVII st.)* (Kyiv, 1998); Tetiana Iakovleva [Tat'iana Iakovleva], *Het'manshchyna v druhii polovyni 50-kh rokiv XVII stolittia: prychny i pochatok Ruïny* (Kyiv, 1998); Viktor Horobets', *Elita kozats'koï Ukraïny u poshukakh politychnoi lehitymatsii: stosunky z Moskvouiu ta Varshavoïiu (1654–1665)* (Kyiv, 2001); Valerii Smolii and Valerii Stepankov, *Stanovlennia ukrains'koï dyplomatychnoi sluzhby: Zovnishnia polityka uriadu B. Khmel'nyts'koho (1648–1657)* (Kyiv, 2001); V. A. Smolii, ed., *Istoriia ukrains'koho kozatstva*, vol. 1 (Kyiv, 2006).
33. *Universaly ukrains'kykh het'maniv*, 34.

34. *Akty, otnosiashchiesia k istorii Iuzhnoi i Zapadnoi Rossii: Sobrannye i izdannye arkhograficheskoi kommissiei* (hereinafter *AluZR*) (St. Petersburg, 1862–92), 4:141–44 (on p. 142).
35. *Ibid.*, 143.
36. *Universaly ukrains'kykh het'maniv*, 291–94.
37. Zbigniew Wójcik, *Traktat Andruszowski 1667 roku i jego geneza* (Warsaw, 1959), 255.
38. *Universaly ukrains'kykh het'maniv*, 353. At this time “Ukraine” was becoming the more popular designation for the territory of the Hetmanate, and “Ukrainian fatherland” was becoming the most common designation. However, various forms of Rus’ were also utilized, particularly “Little Rus’” or “Rossia.” The latter appeared more frequently in association with Muscovy and probably reflects official nomenclature after the addition of “Little Russia” to the tsar’s title. As a consequence of these terminological changes, the term “Ruthenian nation” was beginning to be displaced by “Little Rossian” or “Ukrainian nation.” The terminological shifts are explained well in Serhii Plokhyy’s study, *Origins of the Slavic Nations*, 161–202; and Natalia Iakovenko’s *Narys istorii Ukraïny z naidavnishykh chasiv do kintsia XVIII stolittia* (Kyiv, 1997), 430–38; see also her article “Choice of Name,” in *Laboratory of Transnational History*, 131–32.
39. *The Eyewitness Chronicle*, Harvard Series in Ukrainian Studies, vol. 7, pt. 1 (1878; reprint, Munich, 1972), 97–100. See also Vitalii Eingorn, *Ocherki iz istorii Malorossii v XVII veke: Snosheniia malorossiiskago dukhovenstva s Moskovskim pravitel'stvom v tsarstvovanie Alekseia Mikhailovicha* (Moscow, 1899), 416–19.
40. *Universaly ukrains'kykh het'maniv*, 411.
41. *AluZR*, 9:200–201.
42. *Ibid.*, 196–208 (on p. 197).
43. *Ibid.*, 195.
44. *Ibid.*, 204.
45. *AluZR*, 9:199.
46. *Ibid.*
47. *Ibid.*
48. Dmytro Doroshenko, *Het'man Petro Doroshenko: ohliad ioho zhyttia i politychnoi diial'nosti* (New York, 1985), 535.
49. *Ibid.*, 534.
50. Smolii and Stepankov, *Ukrains'ka derzhavna ideia*, 159.
51. *Ibid.*, 159–60.
52. *AluZR*, 6:240.
53. *Ibid.*, 241.
54. Vitalii Eingorn, “Otvstavka A. L. Ordina-Nashchokina i ego otnoshenie k malorossiiskomu voprosu,” *Russkaia mysl'* (September 1901): 102–3.

55. Doroshenko, *Het'man Petro Doroshenko*, 461.
56. *Ibid.*
57. Eingorn, *Ocherki iz istorii Malorossii*, 918.
58. Bantysh-Kamenskii, *Istochniki malorossiiskoi istorii*, 208–10.
59. *Ibid.*, 209.
60. *Universaly ukraïns'kykh het'maniv*, 381.
61. Bantysh-Kamenskii, *Istochniki malorossiiskoi istorii*, 15.
62. *Eyewitness Chronicle*, 116. See also Taras Hunchak [Taras Hunczak], ed., *Tysiacha rokiv ukraïns'koi suspil'no-politychnoi dumky: u dev'iaty tomakh*, vol. 3, bk. 1, *Tretia chvert' XVII st.* (Kyiv, 2001), 585.
63. *Universaly ukraïns'kykh het'maniv*, 697.
64. Taras Chukhlib, "Osoblyvosti zovnishn'oi polityky I. Samoilovycha ta problema mizhnarodnoho stanovyshcha ukraïns'koho het'manatu v 1672–1686 rr.," *Ukraïns'kyi istorychnyi zhurnal*, no. 2 (2005): 48–67, here 52.
65. *Akty, otnosiashchiesia k istorii Zapadnoi Rossii* (hereafter *AZR*), vol. 5 (St. Petersburg, 1853), 140.
66. Chukhlib, "Osoblyvosti zovnishn'oi polityky I. Samoilovycha," 53.
67. *Eyewitness Chronicle*, 147. See also Taras Chukhlib, *Het'many i monarkhy: Ukraïns'ka derzhava v mizhnarodnykh vidnosynakh 1648–1714 rokiv* (Kyiv; New York, 2003), 206, 294–95.
68. V'iacheslav Stanislavs'kyi, "'Statti' het'mana Ivana Samoilovycha shchodo 'vichnogo myru,'" *Ukraïna v tsentral'no-skhidnii Evropi*, no. 1 (2000): 348–85, here 349. Stanislavs'kyi's article includes several original documents detailing Samoilovych's interventions with the Muscovites on the issue of the "Eternal Peace" between Muscovy and the Commonwealth; *ibid.*, 357–85.
69. Chukhlib, "Osoblyvosti zovnishn'oi polityky I. Samoilovycha," 56.
70. Stanislavs'kyi, *'Statti' het'mana Ivana Samoilovycha*, 350; Chukhlib, "Osoblyvosti zovnishn'oi polityky I. Samoilovycha," 58.
71. Oleksander Ohloblyn, *Het'man Ivan Mazepa ta ioho doba*, ed. Liubomyr Vynar [Lubomyr Wynar] (New York; Kyiv; Lviv; Paris; Toronto, 2001), 65–66.
72. See *Polnoe sobranie zakonov rossiiskoi imperii* (hereafter *PSZRI*), vol. 2 (St. Petersburg, 1830), 770–86.
73. *Ibid.*, 777.
74. *PSZRI*, 2:776.
75. Compare Hetman Samoilovych's reaction to that of Petro Doroshenko: After the latter learned about the Muscovite-Polish settlement at Andrusovo (1667), he was ill for two days. See Bantysh-Kamenskii, *Istochniki malorossiiskoi istorii*, 298.
76. *Ibid.*
77. Chukhlib, "Osoblyvosti zovnishn'oi polityky I. Samoilovycha," 63.

78. Ibid.
79. Bantysh-Kamenskii, *Istochniki malorossiiskoi istorii*, 302; Sergei Solov'ev, *Istoriia Rossii s drevneishikh vremen*, vol. 7 (Moscow, 1962), 397; Chukhlib, *Het'many i monarkhy*, 302.
80. Valerii Smolii, "Pravoberezhna Ukraïna druhoï polovyny XVII–pochatku XVIII st.: provintsiia Rechi Pospolytoï chy chastyna samostiinoï derzhavy?" *Pol's'ko-ukraïns'ki studii*, no. 1 (1993): 118; Smolii and Stepankov, *Ukraïns'ka derzhavna ideia*, 181–82; Chukhlib, *Het'many i monarkhy*, 299.
81. *AIuZR*, 4:60.
82. Eingorn, *Ocherki iz istorii Malorossii*, 246.
83. Doroshenko, *Het'man Petro Doroshenko*, 31–32.
84. Ibid., 573.
85. *Lysty Ivana Sirka: Materialy do ukraïns'koho dyplomatariiu*, ed. Iu. A. Mytsyk and M. V. Kravets' (Kyiv, 1995), 45–47 (on p. 46).
86. *Lysty Ivana Sirka*, 43.
87. Ibid., 16.
88. Ibid., 47–50 (on p. 48).
89. Frank E. Sysyn, "Fatherland in Early Eighteenth-Century Ukrainian Political Culture," in *Mazepa and His Time: History, Culture, Society*, ed. Giovanna Siedina (Alessandria, 2004), 51–52.
90. Ohloblyn, *Het'man Ivan Mazepa*, 63.
91. Ibid., 66.