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John-Paul Himka

Western Ukraine between the Wars

Recent developments in Ukraine have continued to underscore the persistent importance of regionalism in that country. The west of Ukraine still exhibits a political complexion unmistakably distinguishable from the norm in the republic. Although all regions of Ukraine voted in favour of national independence in the referendum of 1 December 1991, the percentage voting “yes” was highest in the west. In the western oblasts of Ivano-Frankivsk and Ternopil over 98 per cent of those who voted supported independence (compared to 90 per cent in Ukraine as a whole). During the presidential elections, held simultaneously, only Ukrainians in the western part tended to support the former dissident Viacheslav Chornovil over the former Communist Leonid Kravchuk.¹

But current events only serve as a reminder that regionalism is “a key feature of Ukrainian history.”² The purpose of the interpretive essay that follows is to examine a crucial component of historical Ukrainian regionalism—the experience of Western Ukraine in the interwar period. The approach to the problem differs from that of related studies by treating all the Ukrainian-inhabited territories that found themselves outside the USSR in the interwar era and comparing the individual experiences of the smaller subunits within the larger region. The study examines, in turn, the nuances of the political geography of Western Ukraine, the policies of Poland, Romania and Czechoslovakia towards their Ukrainian minorities, economic and social developments, and the changing West Ukrainian political spectrum.

THE POLITICAL GEOGRAPHY OF INTERWAR WESTERN UKRAINE

The concept of “Western Ukraine” is not entirely a static one. As a valid unit of historical analysis it first appears in the late eighteenth century, when the Habsburg monarchy added Galicia (1772) and Bukovina (occupied 1774, annexed 1787) to its collection of territories; already part of the collection was the Ukrainian-inhabited region of Transcarpathia (depending on how one counts, it had been Habsburg since as early as 1526 or as late as the early eighteenth

¹ Peter J. Potichnyj, “The Referendum and Presidential Elections in Ukraine,” *Canadian Slavonic Papers* 33.2 (1991): 123–38.

² David Saunders, “Modern Ukrainian History,” *European History Quarterly* 21.1 (1991): 85.

century).³ Of course, one can also read back certain features unifying Western Ukraine prior to the 1770s, such as the culturally formative influence on all three regions of the medieval Rus' principality, later kingdom, of Galicia and Volhynia, as well as the presence of the Carpathian mountains, which was much more than a matter of mere geology (hence the Russophiles' preferred name for Western Ukraine—Carpathian Rus'). Still, in the centuries prior to their incorporation into the Habsburg monarchy, the three regions had experienced such disparate political histories—Galicia as part of Poland, Bukovina of Moldavia, and Transcarpathia of Hungary—that there is little validity in treating them then as a historical unit.

The incorporation of Western Ukraine into the Habsburg monarchy went hand in hand with the destruction of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth (1772–95) and the absorption of all the rest of Ukrainian territory into the Russian empire, so that at the turn of the nineteenth century all Ukraine was divided between the Habsburgs and the Romanovs, with the latter enjoying by far the lion's share.

Perhaps the real key to understanding Western Ukraine is to think of it as a unity by negation, as those Ukrainian territories *not* under Russian rule. In the nineteenth century, the age of the national revival, the Ukrainians under Russian rule were stunted in their national development by legislation aimed at suppressing a Ukrainian national identity (the prohibition of the use of the Ukrainian language in print, schools or administration) as well as by the long absence of basic civic liberties. In the Habsburg monarchy, Ukrainians were much freer to develop their national culture and political life, although, to be sure, after 1867 the Ukrainians in Transcarpathia, in the Hungarian part of Austria-Hungary, lived under conditions similar to those of tsarist Russia as far as the development of their nationality was concerned.⁴

The exclusion from Russia, in addition to its entirely positive aspects with relation to national development, also had a negative side, since this meant that

³ A note on terminology: Galicia, as an Austrian province, had about as many Poles as Ukrainians; the west was largely Polish, the east largely Ukrainian. Similarly, Bukovina had about as many Romanians as Ukrainians; the north was largely Ukrainian, the south largely Romanian. In Bessarabia, which will be discussed later, the Ukrainians were a minority. Generally when referring to these regions I mean only their Ukrainian-inhabited portions.

⁴ On the state of the Ukrainian national movement in the Russian empire and in Galicia, see Ivan L. Rudnytsky, "The Ukrainian Movement on the Eve of the First World War," in *Essays in Modern Ukrainian History* (Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 1987) 375–88. On Transcarpathia, see Ivan Žeguc, *Die nationalpolitischen Bestrebungen der Karpato-Ruthenen 1848–1914*, Veröffentlichungen des Osteuropa-Institutes München, 28 (Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1965).

Western Ukraine was also separated from the greater part of Ukraine, the heartland with its Cossack traditions. Perhaps this separation lay at the root of the great identity crisis that racked Western Ukraine from the middle of the nineteenth century, i.e., the often bitter internal conflict over whether the Eastern Christian, Eastern Slavic inhabitants of Galicia, Bukovina and Transcarpathia were Ukrainian, Russian or merely Western Ukrainian (Ruthenian or Rusyn).⁵

With the collapse of Austria-Hungary in 1918 and the defeat of the Ukrainian national revolution in 1919-20, Western Ukraine did not disappear as a valid historical unit. Although divided between three of the Habsburg monarchy's successor states (Galicia became part of Poland, Bukovina part of Romania and Transcarpathia part of Czechoslovakia), the West Ukrainian territories had in common their exclusion from the Russian political sphere, which in the interwar era was even of greater importance than it had been in the nineteenth century. The bulk of Ukraine became the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, a constituent part of the USSR. Between the wars it underwent some of the most radical socio-economic changes known to history, and in the 1930s it experienced systematic, extensive terror that threatened to eradicate Ukrainian national culture completely. Ukrainian territories outside this maelstrom of destruction formed a unit whose common denominator was the survival and indeed, despite often difficult conditions, the growth of a Ukrainian civil society.

The exclusion from Russian rule throughout the period of national revival as well as through the years of the most virulent Stalinism lent a certain cultural commonality to Western Ukraine even after its incorporation into the USSR during the Second World War. The remnants of this Western-Ukrainianness could still be felt decades later, especially in Galicia⁶ (Lviv, Ternopil and Ivano-Frankivsk oblasts; Transcarpathia is now the Transcarpathian [*Zakarpats'ka*] oblast, Bukovina is Chernivtsi oblast).

Western Ukraine between the wars was somewhat bigger than it had been under the Habsburg sceptre, because certain Ukrainian-inhabited territories from the former Russian empire were incorporated into Poland (especially Volhynia and Polissia) and Romania (Bessarabia).

⁵ This problem forms the centrepiece of Paul Robert Magocsi, *The Shaping of a National Identity: Subcarpathian Rus', 1848-1948* (Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press, 1978). See also Ivan L. Rudnytsky, "Carpatho-Ukraine: A People in Search of Their Identity," in *Essays* 353-73, and John-Paul Himka, "The Formation of National Identity in Subcarpathian Rus': Some Questions of Methodology," *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 2.3 (1978): 374-80.

⁶ Roman Szporluk, "West Ukraine and West Belorussia: Historical Tradition, Social Communication, and Linguistic Assimilation," *Soviet Studies* 31.1 (1979): 76-98.

It is difficult to say how many West Ukrainians there were between the wars, because the censuses of most interwar East European states were notoriously inaccurate. According to official Polish statistics, there were 3,898,431 Ukrainians in Poland in 1921 and 4,441,622 in 1931, accounting for about 14 per cent of Poland's total population.⁷ These figures are certainly too low and Ukrainian demographers argue that there were five to six million Ukrainians in Poland in 1931.⁸ About two thirds of the Ukrainians lived in Galicia (the palatinates [*województwa*] of Lviv, Ternopil and Stanyslaviv); the rest lived mainly in the palatinates of Volhynia and Polissia, although there were also Ukrainian populations near Chełm (Kholm) in the Lublin palatinate and in the Lemko region in the Western Carpathians (Cracow palatinate).⁹ There was also a Ukrainian colony in the Polish capital of Warsaw, but this consisted primarily of Petliurist émigrés from Ukrainian territories that had fallen under Soviet rule rather than of West Ukrainians proper.

Romanian statistics, likewise not very reliable, recorded 582,115 Ukrainians in the country in 1930, about 3 per cent of Romania's total population.¹⁰ Ukrainian demographers put the figure higher, at about a million.¹¹ The majority of the Ukrainians lived in Bukovina, but there were also Ukrainian populations in Bessarabia (especially near Khotyn and Akkerman [Bilhorod]) and, much smaller ones, in the Marmureş region.

According to the relatively credible official statistics of Czechoslovakia, there were 461,849 Ukrainians (Ruthenians, Rusyns) in the country in 1921 and 549,169 in 1930, accounting for 3–4 per cent of the total population of Czechoslovakia.¹² Over 80 per cent of the Ukrainians lived in the province of Subcarpathian Rus' and over 15 per cent lived in the adjacent Prešov region in the province of Slovakia¹³ (the division of Transcarpathia into Subcarpathian Rus' and the Prešov region was an innovation of the interwar era). There was

⁷ Joseph Rothschild, *East Central Europe between the Two World Wars* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1974) 36.

⁸ Volodymyr Kubijovyč [Kubiiovyč] estimated 5,902,000 Ukrainians in Poland in 1931. *Western Ukraine within Poland 1920–1939 (Ethnic Relationships)* (Chicago: Ukrainian Research and Information Institute, 1963) 26. In a recent monograph, a prominent Polish scholar estimated that there were about 5.1 or 5.2 million Ukrainians in Poland in 1929. Ryszard Torzecki, *Kwestia ukraińska w Polsce w latach 1923–1929* (Cracow: Wydawnictwo Literackie, 1989) 11.

⁹ Mirosława Papierzyńska-Turek, *Sprawa ukraińska w Drugiej Rzeczypospolitej 1922–1926* (Cracow: Wydawnictwo Literackie, 1979) 20.

¹⁰ Rothschild, *East Central Europe* 284.

¹¹ D. Prutsk'yi, "Ukraintsi u 'Velykii Rumunii,'" *Nova hromada* (Vienna) 1.3–4 (1923): 16, estimated that there were 900,000 Ukrainians in Romania in 1923.

¹² Rothschild, *East Central Europe* 89.

¹³ Magocsi, *Shaping of a National Identity* 354.

also a sizable Ukrainian colony in Prague which, like the one in Warsaw, consisted largely of Ukrainian political émigrés from outside Western Ukraine.

In sum, the total Ukrainian population of Poland, Romania and Czechoslovakia in 1930–31 was just over five and a half million according to official statistics, but the actual number of West Ukrainians may have been more on the order of seven million. For comparison, the population of Soviet Ukraine at this time, also a subject of some controversy (but for different reasons), was over thirty million, of whom over three quarters were Ukrainians (according to the 1926 census, there were 23,218,860 Ukrainians in the Ukrainian SSR).¹⁴

Like much of East Central and Eastern Europe, Western Ukraine was a palimpsest of political cultures reflecting the past fortunes of various conquerors. Parts of Western Ukraine, for example, had known Lithuanian and Turkish rule, although reminiscences of these were no longer relevant by the twentieth century. The heritages of Polish and Moldavian rule were also not particularly relevant to West Ukrainian political culture in the twentieth century, since they were eclipsed by and subsumed into the dominant cultures of the Polish and Romanian states that incorporated much of Western Ukraine between the wars. However, there were three political cultures just below the historical surface of Western Ukraine that continued to affect developments in the interwar era. These were the political legacies of Austria, Hungary and Russia.

The former Austrian territories of Galicia and Bukovina undoubtedly demonstrated the highest levels of national consciousness in all of Western Ukraine. This was a direct result of Austrian policy. In the period of enlightened absolutism, an imperial decision to educate the Greek Catholic clergy created a Ukrainian intelligentsia in Galicia (this process, however, bypassed largely Orthodox Bukovina). In 1848 the peasantry, who made up the overwhelming majority of the Ukrainian population of Galicia and Bukovina, was emancipated from serfdom. Perhaps most crucially, from the 1860s until 1914 the Austrian Ukrainians alone had the right to publish Ukrainian periodicals, to form legal Ukrainian voluntary associations, including political parties, and to attend educational institutions in their own language. This produced the most literate, mobilized and self-assured Ukrainian population of the first half of the twentieth century.

The level of national consciousness was, however, higher in Galicia than in Bukovina, largely because of the long-standing influence of and rivalry with the well developed Polish national movement. The rivalry, and consequent intensification of national consciousness, reached a culmination after the collapse

¹⁴ Bohdan Krawchenko, *Social Change and National Consciousness in Twentieth-Century Ukraine* (London: Macmillan, 1985) 48.

of Austria in 1918–19 when Galician Ukrainians waged an armed struggle for independence against the Poles.

The Hungarian legacy was shared by all the Ukrainians of Transcarpathia: the Ukrainians of Subcarpathian Rus' and the Prešov region in Czechoslovakia as well as those of the part of the former Marmaros county that went to Romania instead of to Czechoslovakia, the Marmureş region. Here Ukrainians had experienced the benefits of Austrian enlightened absolutism, since here too Greek Catholic seminarians attended institutions of higher learning; the Ukrainians of these regions were also liberated from serfdom in 1848. However, the Habsburg monarchy's constitutional reforms of the 1860s exerted a negative effect on the Ukrainian nationality in Transcarpathia, which became part of the autonomous Hungarian portion of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy. The Magyar gentry that controlled Hungary in the wake of the Compromise (*Ausgleich*) of 1867 did little to spread elementary education, resisted even modest democratization of the political system and strove to Magyarize the Ukrainians under its rule. The result was a Ukrainian population almost without a national intelligentsia, a largely illiterate peasant folk without a clear sense of national identity. What national consciousness did develop under the unfavourable conditions of Hungarian rule was not unequivocally Ukrainian in orientation. Most often it took the form of Russophilism, i.e., identification with the Russian nation, or what has been called Rusynophilism, i.e., a purely local or at most strictly West Ukrainian national consciousness. In Galicia and Bukovina, already by the beginning of the interwar era the overwhelming majority of the Ukrainian population considered itself Ukrainian, i.e., part of the larger Ukrainian nation which inhabited also Dnieper Ukraine and which was distinct from the Russian nation (and the Polish and other nations). Subcarpathian Rus' only developed a Ukrainian consciousness in the interwar era, by the end of which the Russophile and Rusynophile currents had still not disappeared; and the Prešov region remained predominantly Russophile and Rusynophile throughout the years between the wars.

The third political legacy was that of Russia, which affected Volhynia, Polissia and the Chełm region in Poland and Bessarabia in Romania. Here enlightened absolutism had brought no benefit to the Ukrainian nationality and the peasantry remained enserfed over a decade longer than in the Habsburg monarchy, i.e., until 1861. The Valuev and Ems decrees of 1863 and 1876 prohibited the use of the Ukrainian language in publication. Even when Ukrainian-language publication was permitted as a result of the revolution of 1905, Ukrainian-language education was not. In any case, tsarist Russia did little to educate its population in any language. The Ukrainian population in these regions had even lower literacy rates than the Ukrainians of Transcarpathia. (In

Polish Galicia, 29 per cent of Lviv palatinate, 39 per cent of Ternopil palatinate and 46 per cent of Stanyslaviv palatinate were illiterate in 1921; in Volhynia and Polissia, however, the respective rates were 69 and 71 per cent. In Romania, Bukovina was 34 per cent illiterate in 1930, while Bessarabia was 62 per cent illiterate. Subcarpathian Rus' was 50 per cent illiterate in 1921).¹⁵ The former Russian sectors of interwar Western Ukraine displayed a low level of Ukrainian national consciousness, with a significant percentage of Ukrainians identifying themselves on the census as merely "locals" (*tutejsi*) in Polish Polissia or as Russians in Romanian Bessarabia.

These borders beneath borders figured in the Ukrainian policies of the interwar Polish and Romanian régimes. Both sought to undo certain features of the previous Austrian régime. Both the Poles and Romanians, for example, repealed many of the laws that had protected Ukrainian rights in education and administration. The lack of national rights for Ukrainians in the former Russian territories was exploited by both régimes. The Polish government in particular developed a consistent policy of isolating the former Russian territories from the former Galicia, separating them by the so-called Sokal border.¹⁶ Although this policy is generally associated with the name of Henryk Józewski, who served as voivode of Volhynia from 1928 to 1938,¹⁷ the policy in fact goes back before Józewski to the very first years of Polish rule in the region (concessions offered to Ukrainian politicians outside Galicia if they refrained from joining the Galician Ukrainians' boycott of the parliamentary elections in 1922).¹⁸ This isolation of formerly Russian from formerly Austrian territories was a cardinal point in the Polish régime's Ukrainian policy; in fact, for all their outward devotion to the Catholic church, the Polish authorities preferred to hinder the diffusion of Greek Catholicism into predominantly Orthodox Volhynia, Polissia and the Chełm region lest the Galician-based church, which had become firmly identified with the Ukrainian national movement, change the political complexion of the regions.¹⁹

¹⁵ Rothschild, *East Central Europe* 44, 285, 92.

¹⁶ The name derives from the town of Sokal on the Buh river. For more on the Sokal border, see A. Zięba's article under that title in *Encyclopedia of Ukraine*, 5 vols., ed. Volodymyr Kubijovyč (Toronto, Buffalo, London: University of Toronto Press, 1984–93).

¹⁷ The voivode left interesting memoirs: Henryk Józewski, "Zamiast pamiętnika," *Zeszyty Historyczne* 59 (1982): 3–163; (1982): 65–157; 63 (1983): 3–75. There is a recent Polish monograph on the Volhynian palatinate: Włodzimierz Mędrzecki, *Województwo Wołyńskie, 1921–1939. Elementy przemian cywilizacyjnych, społecznych i politycznych* (Wrocław: Zakład Narodowy im. Ossolińskich, 1988).

¹⁸ Ivan Kedryn, *Zhyttia—podii—liudy. Spomyyny i komentari* (New York: Chervona kalyna, 1976) 126–27.

¹⁹ Torzecki, *Kwestia ukraińska w Polsce* 319–22.

STATE POLICIES TOWARDS UKRAINIANS

The policies of the Polish and Romanian governments toward their Ukrainian minorities were basically similar: assimilatory. This is not surprising considering the similarity of the two states as they emerged after the First World War. Both were distended states that had acquired by conquest and to some extent by diplomacy much more territory than they could integrate. Poland extended far enough to the west that it managed to ingest a German minority of over a million (about 4 per cent of the total population, 1921). Although this particular minority was to figure so prominently in Poland's destruction in 1939, it was but a fraction of the minority populations that Poland absorbed in its eastward expansion—Lithuanians, Belarusians, Ukrainians and Jews.²⁰ Even by its own count, which greatly downplayed the size of national minorities, Poland was only 69 per cent Polish. Romania, in the aftermath of the Great War, acquired Bukovina and Transylvania from Austria-Hungary and Bessarabia from Russia. The result was a country that, again by its own not unimpeachable count, was only 72 per cent Romanian in 1930. Although only about two thirds of both Romania and Poland were composed of citizens of the state nationality, both states constituted themselves as centralized national states and devoted their energies in the years between the wars to the assimilation of national minorities (the Jewish minority constituted a partial exception, since both the Romanian and the Polish régimes by the late 1930s came to prefer mere persecution of the Jews without trying to assimilate them to the state nationality).²¹

Both states took pains to rework administrative-territorial boundaries so as to integrate and assimilate Ukrainian territories. The autonomy that Galicia had enjoyed under Austria, and which the Polish state had promised the Western powers in 1919 and 1922 that it would maintain, was unceremoniously abolished,²² and Galicia in any form disappeared as an administrative unit. The

²⁰ Two useful and complementary surveys of national minorities in interwar Poland are: Stephan Horak, *Poland and Her National Minorities, 1919–39: A Case Study* (New York: Vantage Press, 1961); Jerzy Tomaszewski, *Rzeczpospolita wielu narodów* (Warsaw: Czytelnik, 1985). For an excellent brief survey of the Ukrainian question in particular, see Bohdan Budurowycz, "Poland and the Ukrainian Problem, 1921–1939," *Canadian Slavonic Papers* 25.4 (1983): 473–500. For a thoughtful survey of the relevant literature, see Hans-Jürgen Bömelburg, "Die polnisch-ukrainischen Beziehungen 1922–1939: Ein Literatur- und Forschungsbericht," *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas* 39 (1991): 81–102.

²¹ For a well researched, exceptionally balanced study of the nationality policies of the various Polish governments, see Andrzej Chojnowski, *Koncepcje polityki narodowościowej rządów polskich w latach 1921–1939* (Wrocław, Warsaw, Cracow, Gdańsk: Zakład Narodowy imienia Ossolińskich, 1979).

²² See Stepan Ripetskyj, *Ukrainian-Polish Diplomatic Struggle 1918–1923* (Chicago: Ukrainian Research and Information Institute, 1963).

very name Galicia disappeared from Polish official language, and Eastern Galicia, where the majority of the Ukrainians lived, was renamed, without any historical precedent, Eastern Little Poland (Małopolska Wschodnia). Ukrainian-inhabited Galicia was divided into three palatinates, the borders of which were drawn up so as to encompass as many non-Ukrainians as possible (Stanyslaviv palatinate was 70 per cent Ukrainian, Ternopil 50 per cent and Lviv 36 per cent). The Polissian palatinate was designed so that Ukrainians made up only 18 per cent of the population.²³ (These figures are from the official statistics of 1921.) The Romanian “Law on Administrative Unification” of 1925 redrew county lines so as to eliminate some largely Ukrainian counties altogether and to dilute the Ukrainian percentage in other counties. The constitution of 1935 did away with provinces as administrative units, including the province of Bukovina.²⁴

Both states made a practice of hiring primarily members of the state nationality into the civil service. They dismantled the Ukrainian school system that had been inherited from the Austrian era and replaced it with a bilingual system in which Ukrainian was treated as a stepchild.²⁵ They used their land reforms for nationalist aims. When large estates were parcelled in Ukrainian-inhabited territories, much of the land was given to Polish and Romanian colonists instead of to the land-hungry local Ukrainian peasantry.²⁶ They gave support to the Russophile vestiges in Galicia and Bukovina, artificially prolonging their life spans as part of a policy of divide-and-rule.

Both régimes also pursued nationalistic religious policies. The Ukrainians in Bukovina were mainly, and in Bessarabia exclusively, of the Orthodox confession, as were most Romanians. The Orthodox church in both these regions was Romanized in the interwar period. In Bukovina, the Ukrainian vicar who had been nominated for episcopal office during World War I was dismissed, a church council of 1921 renamed what had been known officially as the “Greek Oriental” church the “Orthodox-Romanian” church, and in 1925 the autonomous Bukovinian metropolis was subordinated to the Romanian patriarch. Ukrainian clergymen were denied higher office in the church and Ukrainian aspirants to the priesthood were frequently denied admittance to seminaries.²⁷ In Poland such a

²³ Papierzyńska-Turek, *Sprawa ukraińska* 20.

²⁴ *Bukovyna. Ii mynule i suchasne*, ed. D. Kvitkovs'kyi, T. Bryndzan, A. Zhukovs'kyi (Paris, Philadelphia, Detroit: Vydavnytstvo “Zelena Bukovyna,” 1956) 331–34.

²⁵ On Bukovina, see H. Piddubnyi, *Bukovyna. Ii mynule i suchasne (Suspil'no-politychnyi narys...)* ([Kharkiv], 1928) 141–57.

²⁶ For a contemporary Communist critique of the Romanian land reform, see H. Piddubnyi [Gregori Grigorovich], *Bukovyns'ke selianstvo v iarmi* (Vienna: Nove selo, 1925) 18–24.

²⁷ *Bukovyna*, ed. Kvitkovs'kyi 18–24.

powerful vehicle for Polonization did not exist, since the Poles were Roman Catholics and Ukrainians either Greek Catholics (in Galicia) or Orthodox (elsewhere). Still, the Polish authorities pursued a consistent policy of trying to weaken the Ukrainian national aspect in the churches, by supporting Russophile tendencies in the Greek Catholic church in the Lemko region and also by intervening in Ukrainian Orthodox church life to the detriment of Ukrainian national aims. By far the most drastic action on the part of the Polish authorities was the “revindication” (conversion into Catholic churches) and outright destruction of hundreds of Orthodox churches in the Chełm region, Volhynia and Polissia in the late 1930s.²⁸

Perhaps the most egregious anti-Ukrainian incident in East Central Europe between the wars was the “pacification” of the Ukrainian population of Poland in 1930, an action characterized by beatings and the destruction of property, a large-scale, state-sponsored pogrom.²⁹

The result of such policies in both Poland and Romania was the accumulation of political frustration on the part of the Ukrainians, which would eventually be released in the form of political violence (terrorism) and orientation on the leading revisionist power of the age, Nazi Germany. However chauvinistic the policies of the Polish and Romanian governments, it is important to bear in mind that they stopped short of the systematic annihilation of the Ukrainian intelligentsia and the mass murder by famine implemented by the Stalinists in Soviet Ukraine in the 1930s. This meant that the Ukrainian population of Poland and Romania was constantly insulted and frustrated in its efforts, but never effectively broken. Comparing the treatment of Ukrainians in Stalin’s Soviet Union and in interwar Poland and Romania, one is reminded of Machiavelli’s dictum: “Men must either be caressed or else annihilated; they will revenge themselves for small injuries, but cannot do so for great ones; the injury therefore that we do to a man must be such that we need not fear his vengeance.”

Czechoslovakia was quite a different case. In 1848 the leading spokesman of the Czech national movement, František Palacký, had declared that if Austria did not exist it would have been necessary to invent it. When Austria-Hungary did

²⁸ A useful survey of Orthodoxy in the Polish sector of Western Ukraine is Ivan Vlasovs'kyi, *Narys istorii Ukrain'skoi Pravoslavnoi Tserkvy*, vol. 4: (XX st.), part 2 (New York: Ukrain'ska Pravoslavna Tserkva v SShA, 1966) 5–177. A recent Polish monograph concerns Polish government policy towards Orthodoxy between the wars: Mirosława Papierzyńska-Turek, *Między tradycją a rzeczywistością. Państwo wobec prawosławia 1918–1939* (Warsaw: Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe, 1989).

²⁹ Emil Revyuk, *Polish Atrocities in Ukraine* (New York: United Ukrainian Organizations in the United States, 1931). V.J. Kushnir, *Polish Atrocities in the West Ukraine: An Appeal to the League for the Rights of Man and Citizen* (Vienna: Gerold, 1931).

cease to exist in 1918, the Czechs in fact immediately set about reinventing it. Czechoslovakia consisted of Austrian Bohemia (i.e., the Bohemian Lands, including Moravia and Austrian Silesia) and Hungarian Slovakia and Subcarpathian Rus', a simplified, ethnically less heterogeneous version of the late Habsburg monarchy. Of the three successor states of Austria-Hungary that shared Western Ukraine, only Czechoslovakia had its capital in a former Austrian city, Prague, really Austria's second greatest city after Vienna. Poland's capital was Warsaw, late of the Russian empire. Romania's was Bucharest, a Wallachian and, before that, Ottoman-Phanariot city. The Habsburg monarchy that the Czechs reinvented was firmly guided by enlightened Prague; there was no equivalent of the Magyar domination that cast a dark shadow over half of the Dual Monarchy. In the twenty years of Czechoslovak rule, the Ukrainians of Transcarpathia caught up on much that they had missed after the 1860s. This is not to say that Czechoslovakia was a model state, but then neither was the old Austria.

The Czechs had promised Subcarpathian Rus' autonomy, but postponed granting it until the troubled twilight of the interwar era, when Hitler began his dismemberment of the country in the fall of 1938 (the Munich agreement was signed 30 September 1938, Subcarpathian Rus'/Carpatho-Ukraine became autonomous *de facto* on 11 October and *de jure* on 22 November).³⁰ The procrastination with regard to autonomy was one of the two issues that soured the Transcarpathians' attitude towards Prague. The other was the western border of the province of Subcarpathian Rus', which left so many Ukrainians outside their own province in the Prešov region of the province of Slovakia. Still, there had been no Ukrainian, or largely Ukrainian, administrative unit in old Hungary, and the creation of Subcarpathian Rus' represented an advance in that regard. Moreover, the province of Subcarpathian Rus' never disappeared as an administrative entity, as did Galicia and Bukovina in Poland and Romania; the latter regions, furthermore, had been created as administrative units by the preceding Austrian régime. Finally, Prague generally respected the essential Ukrainian character of both Subcarpathian Rus' and the Prešov region and recruited local Ukrainians into the civil service, albeit primarily in subordinate and auxiliary capacities.

In no sphere was the essential difference between the natures of the régimes so apparent as in education. Poland had inherited a Ukrainian elementary school system from Austria. In 1924 there were 2,151 Ukrainian elementary schools in Poland; in that same year, however, the Ukrainian school system fell victim to

³⁰ See Peter G. Stercho, *Diplomacy of Double Morality: Europe's Crossroads in Carpatho-Ukraine 1919–39* (New York: Carpathian Research Center, 1971).

the so-called “lex Grabski” which left only 716 Ukrainian schools in existence five years later, most of the rest having been converted to bilingual Polish-Ukrainian schools. Romania inherited 216 Ukrainian schools from the Austrian period; within a decade *all* had been converted to bilingual Romanian-Ukrainian schools and even pure Romanian schools. Czechoslovakia inherited almost nothing in the way of a Ukrainian school system from the former Hungary. In the 1913–14 school year there were only 34 elementary schools in all of Transcarpathia with some form of Ukrainian (or Russian) in the curriculum. By 1931 the Czechoslovak authorities had established 425 schools in Subcarpathian Rus' in which some variant of the local language served as the language of instruction; about a hundred such schools also existed in the Prešov region. As for higher education, the Polish state reneged on its promise to the Western powers to establish a Ukrainian university,³¹ closed down the pre-existing Ukrainian chairs at the University of Lviv, restricted Ukrainian attendance at the latter institution in the 1920s and drove the underground Ukrainian university, which had flourished in the 1920s, out of existence. No Ukrainian institution of higher learning was permitted in Romania either and the pre-existing chair of Ukrainian language at the University of Chernivtsi was abolished. By contrast, Czechoslovakia, with a Ukrainian population less than a tenth the size of Poland's, hosted and partially subsidized the Ukrainian Free University in Prague (1921–30) and the Ukrainian Husbandry Academy in Poděbrady (1922–35).

The land reform in eastern Czechoslovakia was slow, but it benefitted primarily the local Ukrainian peasantry;³² the land was not parcelled out to Czech and Slovak colonists. It should be noted, however, that the landowners in Transcarpathia were Magyar, while those in Galicia and Volhynia were Polish and those in Bukovina Romanian. Hence the Polish and Romanian régimes had more to lose, from the national point of view, than did the Czechs from the land reform.

The Czechoslovak régime did meddle in the debate over national identity in Subcarpathian Rus', shifting from a Ukrainophile to a Russophile to a Rusynophile policy. The latter policy, pursued in the mid-1930s, was intended to instill loyalty to the Czechoslovak state as well as to weaken support for the

³¹ Martha Bohachevsky-Chomiak, “The Ukrainian University in Galicia: A Pervasive Issue,” *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 5.4 (1981): 497–545.

³² In Subcarpathian Rus' 239,000 hectares became subject to distribution in 1920. By the end of 1934, however, only 57,000 hectares had actually been distributed, with the local Ukrainian peasantry forming the overwhelming majority of recipients (86 per cent). (Another 36,000 hectares were left in the possession of the original owners). Jos. Jirkovský, “Pozemková reforma na Podkarpatské Rusi,” in *Podkarpatská Rus*, ed. Jaroslav Zatloukal (Bratislava: Klub přátel Podkarpatské Rusi, 1936) 147–48.

dynamic Ukrainian movement, which Prague viewed with increasing suspicion. Still, the Czechoslovak government was intervening in an ongoing debate carried on among the Ukrainians of Czechoslovakia themselves, not merely constructing Trojan horses, as was the case with government support of Russophilism in Poland and Romania.

The religious policy of the Czechoslovak régime in Transcarpathia concentrated on the elimination of Magyar influence in Ukrainian ecclesiastical life. The authorities permitted the reemergence of the Orthodox church, which was Russophile in orientation, and encouraged Rusynophilism in the Greek Catholic church.

In sum, Ukrainians in Czechoslovakia lived under the rule of law in a state that sought to guide them, educate them and retain their loyalty. The Czechoslovak state did not live up to all the hopes invested in it or to all the promises it made, but it did stop well short of the sort of assimilatory policies pursued in both Poland and Romania.

ECONOMY AND SOCIETY

Poland and Romania, like East Central Europe more generally, were economically underdeveloped, with larger agrarian than industrial sectors. Indeed, in the whole region only Czechoslovakia had a developed capitalist economy. In 1930, for example, only 22 per cent of the gainfully employed males in Poland and 11 per cent of the same in Romania worked in manufacturing; in Czechoslovakia the rate was 41 per cent, higher than that of Austria (33 per cent) and approaching that of Great Britain (50 per cent). Poland's and Romania's exports consisted largely of foodstuffs, raw materials and semi-manufactures (77 per cent and 99 per cent respectively in 1929–38); Czechoslovakia's exports were mainly finished goods (71 per cent).³³ The general poverty of Poland and Romania was shared by their Ukrainian populations, the relative prosperity of Czechoslovakia was not—Transcarpathia remained an economic backwater in the interwar era.

The population of Western Ukraine consisted overwhelmingly of peasants. In 1921, 94 per cent of the Ukrainian population of Eastern Galicia and 95 per cent of the Ukrainian population of Volhynia lived in the countryside. The situation was similar in Bukovina. In Subcarpathian Rus' and the Prešov region 83 per cent of the Ukrainian population was employed in agriculture and forestry in 1930. The holdings of West Ukrainian peasants were small. In the early

³³ Antony Polonsky, *The Little Dictators: The History of Eastern Europe since 1918* (London and Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1975) 175, 178.

1920s dwarf holdings of less than two hectares accounted for 14 per cent of the farms in Volhynia, 53 per cent in Lviv palatinate, 55 per cent in Ternopil palatinate and 68 per cent in Stanyslaviv palatinate.³⁴ Although the land reform helped alleviate Ukrainian land hunger in Czechoslovakia, this relief was meager and short-lived and pressure on the land soon mounted again. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, emigration from Western Ukraine to North America had helped to reduce rural overpopulation and bring extra money into the region; but between the wars both America and Canada enacted legislation aimed at restricting the immigration of Southern and Eastern Europeans as well as Asians. The closing of this traditional escape route cast a pall over West Ukrainian rural life between the wars. There was also no development of industry in Western Ukraine to absorb excess rural population; farms grew smaller and smaller as they were divided among children. The great depression of the 1930s only intensified the misery.

The only aspect of Ukrainian economic activity that flourished in the interwar period was the cooperative sector. The cooperatives of Galicia, with about 350,000 members in 1930, were particularly successful, but Ukrainian cooperatives also existed in Volhynia, Bukovina and Subcarpathian Rus'.³⁵ Among the most profitable of the cooperatives was Maslosoiuz, which exported butter and other dairy products across Europe. The Ukrainian cooperative movement in Poland was able to employ educated Ukrainians who would otherwise have been without jobs, to fund publications and to support other political and cultural activities. The success of the cooperative movement reflected, and was dependent upon, the mobilization of the female population, since in the traditional Ukrainian farmstead women had responsibility for the cows and poultry whose products constituted the mainstay of cooperative commodities.

Western Ukrainian society consisted, as already noted, primarily of peasants. They had only recently emerged from a natural economy and they were retreating back into it in the face of the economic difficulties of the interwar era. They were less mobile than they had been before 1914, and in Galicia and Bukovina the quality of the education available to them declined. The cities were largely non-Ukrainian. Polish was the language of Western Ukraine's greatest city, Lviv, and non-Ukrainians—Poles, Romanians, Jews, Czechs and Magyars—formed the majority of Western Ukraine's urban population.

³⁴ Papierzyńska-Turek, *Sprawa ukraińska* 24, 26. Magocsi, *Shaping of a National Identity* 355.

³⁵ On the cooperative movement in Western Ukraine between the wars, see Illia Vytanovych, *Istoriia ukrains'koho kooperatyvnoho rukhu* (New York: Tovarystvo ukrains'koi kooperatsii, 1964) 315–496.

There was a small but dynamic Ukrainian intelligentsia able to provide national leadership and develop the national culture. In Poland and Romania this intelligentsia was frustrated in its advancement by the discriminatory policies of the régimes, which tended to exclude Ukrainians from the civil service and also curtailed opportunities for Ukrainians to be employed in educational and other cultural institutions funded by the state.

There were also several thousand clergymen in Western Ukraine who enjoyed an influence quite disproportionate to their number. The Greek Catholic clergy of Galicia and Bukovina and the Basilian order in Transcarpathia tended to be nationally conscious Ukrainians.³⁶ The Orthodox clergy, however, was often drawn into anti-Ukrainian political orientations. The Orthodox clergy in Transcarpathia was almost exclusively Russophile, a good portion of the Orthodox clergy in Bukovina and Bessarabia succumbed to Romanization and some Orthodox churchmen in Volhynia and Polissia, particularly higher clergy, preferred to preserve the traditional Russian character of their church. The secular Greek Catholic clergy in Transcarpathia tended to be Rusynophile in national orientation, sometimes with a pro-Hungarian slant as well.

In Galicia Ukrainian society was highly disciplined. When Galician Ukrainian political leaders issued a call in 1922 to boycott Polish parliamentary elections, so as not to imply recognition of Polish rule over Western Ukraine, the people obeyed; while in the mainly Polish palatinates of Warsaw and Poznań 84 and 87 per cent of the eligible voters took part in the elections, the participation in Lviv palatinate was 52 per cent, in Ternopil 35 per cent and in Stanyslaviv 32 per cent.³⁷ Galician Ukrainian society was also highly organized. Some of the most important organizations were: the adult-education society Prosvita, which had 11,065 members in 1925 and sponsored 2,036 reading halls with a combined membership of 121,651; the Ridna shkola society, which, in the face of government harassment, established and maintained Ukrainian private schools (23 elementary schools and 10 secondary schools in the 1926–27 school year); the scouting organization Plast, which had about 6,000 members in Western Ukraine when it was banned by the Polish authorities in 1930 (it continued to exist underground); and the Union of Ukrainian Women (Soiuz ukrainok) which was able to organize an impressive mass demonstration in

³⁶ See Andrew Dennis Sorokowski, "The Greek-Catholic Parish Clergy in Galicia, 1900–1939" (Ph.D. diss., U of London, School of Slavonic and East European Studies, 1991).

³⁷ Papierzyńska-Turek, *Sprawa ukraińska* 135.

Stanyславiv in 1934.³⁸ With the exception of the women's organization, all the associations named above had been founded back in the Austrian period, as had been the Maslosoiuz cooperative. After Galicia, Bukovina was the most organized of the West Ukrainian territories. In Transcarpathia most types of organizations existed in duplicate or even triplicate, because of the rivalry among the national orientations. Thus, for example, two significant adult-education societies competed in the region—Prosvita, with a Ukrainian orientation, and the Russophile/Rusynophile Dukhnovych Society.

THE POLARIZATION OF WEST UKRAINIAN POLITICAL LIFE

What was true of European politics as a whole in the interwar era was true also of Western Ukraine: there was an intense polarization between left and right and a drastic decline by the 1930s in the size and effectiveness of democratic and moderate forces.³⁹

Communism figured prominently in Western Ukraine, especially in the 1920s. West Ukrainian Communism was essentially of two types. The first type was that of the former Austrian territories of Galicia and Bukovina. In these regions Communism was not a mass movement, especially not among the Ukrainian population, but it did exert a powerful attraction on intellectuals. What attracted them, besides the radical political doctrine that sought to transform human relations, were the developments in neighbouring Soviet Ukraine. The Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic was a state-like entity where the state apparatus was being systematically Ukrainianized in the mid-1920s and where a vibrant Ukrainian culture was being created. It appeared much more attractive than Poland and Romania. A number of Galician and Bukovinian intellectuals actually emigrated to the USSR in the twenties. Aside from the Sovietophile intelligentsia, there were also hardcore Marxist revolutionaries who worked in the illegal Communist parties of Poland and Romania. The Communist Party of Western Ukraine, an autonomous unit within the Polish Communist party, had a particularly distinguished history.⁴⁰ In 1928 it became

³⁸ Martha Bohachevsky-Chomiak, *Feminists despite Themselves: Women in Ukrainian Community Life, 1884–1939* (Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 1988) 149–280.

³⁹ Programmatic political documents from interwar Western Ukraine can be found in *Ukrains'ka suspil'no-politychna dumka v 20 stolitti*, Taras Hunczak [Hunchak] and Roman Solchanyk [Sol'chanyk] eds., II ([Munich]: Suchasnist', 1983). Ukrainian political parties in interwar Poland are surveyed in Jerzy Holzer, *Mozaika polityczna Drugiej Rzeczypospolitej* (Warsaw: Książka i Wiedza, 1974) 241–53, 531–51.

⁴⁰ Janusz Radziejowski, *The Communist Party of Western Ukraine 1919–1929* (Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 1983). Roman Solchanyk, “The

the first Communist party to correctly assess the danger posed by Stalinism and in the following year its leaders were expelled from the Comintern for objecting to Stalinist nationality policy in Soviet Ukraine. Among the party's theoreticians was the brilliant Marxist historian and interpreter of Marx's thought, Roman Rosdolsky.⁴¹

Stalinism put an end to the popularity of Communism among Galician and Bukovinian intellectuals. In the 1930s some of the leaders of the Soviet Ukrainian cultural renaissance were killing themselves in protest against Stalin's policies; many more, however, were perishing in the White Sea region and other places of punishment. The West Ukrainian intellectuals who had emigrated to Soviet Ukraine were rounded up and condemned to death. Worst of all, in 1932–33, in connection with the total collectivization of agriculture, a man-made famine took five to six million lives in Soviet Ukraine. The infatuation with Communism was over for the Ukrainian intelligentsia of Galicia and Bukovina.

The second type of Communism survived into the thirties. Its geographical base was Transcarpathia and Volhynia, i.e., territories of the Hungarian and Russian legacies, poor regions with more than the normal West Ukrainian share of illiteracy. Here, as in Western Belarus, Communism was a mass movement. In the last reasonably free elections of interwar Poland, those of 1928, Communist front parties in Volhynia received 48 per cent of the vote (in Eastern Galicia they received 13 per cent). In Subcarpathian Rus' the Communist party, which was legal in Czechoslovakia, received 39 per cent of the vote in 1924, while the victorious government coalition only received 40 per cent; in 1935 the Communists were still able to poll 24 per cent of the vote. In these regions not Soviet nationality policy, but the social utopian appeal of Communism determined the loyalties of the adherents, land-hungry and poorly educated peasants.

The center of the political spectrum was occupied by the Ukrainian National Democratic Alliance, best known by its Ukrainian acronym UNDO. It was formed in Lviv in 1925 by a union of moderate nationalist groups. It published an excellent daily newspaper, *Dilo*, dominated Ukrainian representation in the Polish diet and enjoyed close relations with the cooperative sector and other voluntary associations, especially with Prosvita and the Union of Ukrainian

Foundation of the Communist Movement in Eastern Galicia, 1919–1921," *Slavic Review* 30.4 (1971): 774–94. Roman Solchanyk, "The Comintern and the Communist Party of Western Ukraine, 1919–1928," *Canadian Slavonic Papers* 23.2 (1981): 181–97.

⁴¹ Janusz Radziejowski, "Roman Rosdolsky: Man, Activist and Scholar," *Science & Society* 42.2 (1978): 198–210.

Women. UNDO was the Ukrainian mainstream party in Galicia. In the 1930s it began to lose the ability to attract youth, not only because most places in the leadership were occupied, but also because its moderate policies proved both ineffective vis-à-vis the Polish régime and unsatisfying to a new generation of frustrated, angry young men and women. In 1935 UNDO embarked on a program of "normalization," i.e., an attempt to reach a *modus vivendi* with the Polish state. This foundered badly because the state authorities made no substantial concessions to the Ukrainians. Nonetheless, and in spite of opposition to the normalization from within UNDO itself (among the editors of *Dilo*), this attempt at accommodation lingered on until 1939. There was a party similar to UNDO in Bukovina, the Ukrainian National Party, which was founded in 1927 and lasted until 1938, when all political parties in Romania were dissolved. The weekly *Ridnyi krai* was associated with the Ukrainian National Party. The so-called "national-democratic" tendency, which UNDO and the Ukrainian National Party represented, was a survivor from the Austrian period, to which it was better suited.

Also surviving from the previous era were moderate socialist parties. The radical party, which was in fact the oldest Ukrainian political party (founded 1890), was an anticlerical, agrarian socialist party based in Galicia. In the mid-1920s it united with what remained of the Ukrainian socialist-revolutionary party in Volhynia to form the Ukrainian Socialist Radical Party. The radicals constituted a more or less loyal opposition to UNDO within Galician Ukrainian society.⁴² Ukrainian social democratic parties were active in both Galicia and Bukovina, as they had been since before the world war. In the interwar era social democracy in both territories wavered between pro- and anti-Communist programs.⁴³

In discussing the moderate currents in Ukrainian politics, it is necessary to mention that there were also West Ukrainian political activists and groups who cooperated with, rather than opposed, the government parties. Because in both Romania and Czechoslovakia Ukrainians formed such a small percentage of the total population, it made some sense for Ukrainians to work within Czechoslovak or Romanian parties. This was, of course, much more fruitful and much more widespread in Czechoslovakia than in Romania. The few Ukrainian politicians in Poland who joined the Non-Party Bloc for Cooperation with the Government were ostracized by their conationals.

⁴² See the memoirs of an interwar radical activist: Ivan Makukh, *Na narodnii sluzhbi* (Detroit: Vydannia Ukrain'skoi vil'noi hromady Ameryky, 1958).

⁴³ The memoirs of an interwar Galician social democrat: Antin Chernets'kyi, *Spomyny z mohu zhyttia* (London: Nashe slovo, 1964).

Although moderate, Austrian-born national democracy seemed to dominate West Ukrainian political life, this appearance became more clearly recognizable as a mirage as the interwar era advanced. Already in the early 1920s a new, postwar ideology—Communism—was demonstrating considerable dynamism and even, in the form of Sovietophilism, penetrating deeply into the national democratic camp. In the 1930s national democracy lost even more ground to another specifically postwar ideology: the nationalism of the radical right.

Before turning directly to an account of radical-right nationalism, it will be useful to sketch some of the internal sources of its ideological and organizational formation.⁴⁴ The leading theorist of radical-right nationalism, Dmytro Dontsov,⁴⁵ took some of his ideas from the conservative Ukrainian right. This conservative right had two distinguishable, but often over-lapping currents: a monarchist current, associated with the ideologue Viacheslav Lypynsky,⁴⁶ and a conservative Catholic current, the outstanding representative of which was Osyp Nazaruk,⁴⁷ editor of the newspaper *Nova zoria*. Ukrainian monarchism was an entirely postwar (or more precisely: postrevolutionary) phenomenon, while Catholic conservatism had its predecessors in prewar Galicia. As was the pattern elsewhere in Europe at the time, the radical right in Western Ukraine borrowed certain ideological principles from the conservative right, but was both willing and able to harness to its ideology a mass movement. The conservative right was content to remain a numerically limited elite.

The most important organizational predecessor of radical-right nationalism was the Ukrainian Military Organization, known by its Ukrainian acronym UVO.⁴⁸ After the suppression of the Ukrainian National Republic in both

⁴⁴ See the special monograph devoted to this problem: Alexander J. Motyl, *The Turn to the Right: The Ideological Origins and Development of Ukrainian Nationalism, 1919–1929* (Boulder: East European Monographs, 1980).

⁴⁵ Mykhailo Sosnovs'kyi, *Dmytro Dontsov. Politychnyi portret. Z istorii rozvytku ideolohii ukrains'koho natsionalizmu* (New York: Trident International, 1974).

⁴⁶ *The Political and Social Ideas of Vjačeslav Lypyns'kyj*, ed. Jaroslaw Pelenski (*Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 9.3–4) (Cambridge, MA., 1985).

⁴⁷ Ivan Lysiak-Rudnyts'kyi, "Nazaruk i Lypyns'kyi: Istorii ikhn'oi druzhby ta konfliktu," in *Viacheslav Lypyns'kyi. Arkhiv VII: Lysty Osypa Nazaruka do Viacheslava Lypyns'koho*, Ivan Lysiak-Rudnyts'kyi, ed. (Philadelphia: Skhidn'o-evropeis'kyi doslidchyi instytut im. V.K. Lypyns'koho, 1976) xv–xcvii.

⁴⁸ *Sribna surma. Spohady i materiialy do diiannia Ukrains'koi viis'kovoï orhanizatsii*, Zbirnyk 1, Zynovii Knysh, ed. (Toronto: Sribna surma, [1963]). Zynovii Knysh, *Vlasnym ruslom. Ukrains'ka viis'kova orhanizatsiia vid oseny 1922 do lita 1924 roku*, Sribna surma, statti, materiialy i dokumenty do diial'nosti Ukrains'koi viis'kovoï orhanizatsii, Zbirnyk 4 (Toronto: Sribna surma, 1966). Zynovii Knysh, *Na povni vitryla! (Ukrains'ka viis'kova orhanizatsiia v 1924–1926 rokakh)* (Toronto: Sribna surma, 1970).

Galician and Dnieper Ukraine, the UVO continued an underground war against what it perceived to be the Polish régime of occupation. Its methods of struggle—assassinations and assaults on Polish institutions on Ukrainian ethnic territory—were to be adopted by its radical-right successor, the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN). The UVO took part in the founding congress of the OUN in 1929 and gave the new organization its own exceptionally gifted and dedicated leader, Ievhen Konovalets.

Introducing these progenitors does not suffice as an explanation for the phenomenal rise of the OUN in the 1930s. So many factors seemed to conspire to bring about its creation and subsequent popularity that one can speak of the rise of the OUN as being (to borrow a concept from Freud and Althusser) “over-determined.”

Some of the crucial factors in its rise have already been alluded to: the accumulation of political frustration in Poland and Romania, the great depression, the damage done to the left by Stalinism in Soviet Ukraine. To these must be added the collapse of democracy. Already at the start of the interwar era Western democracy was compromised in the eyes of West Ukrainians because of what they perceived as the hypocrisy of the Western powers; while proclaiming the principle of national self-determination, the great democratic powers—France, Britain, America—nonetheless ignored and opposed the aspirations of Ukrainians to independent statehood⁴⁹ and, in particular, awarded indisputably Ukrainian Galicia to Poland. Then democracies began to disappear from the whole continent—Italy started the trend—until by the eve of the Second World War enervated Britain and France were the only European powers to hold to the old faith. Throughout Eastern Europe, with the exception of Czechoslovakia, dictatorships emerged in the 1930s. The generation of the 1930s in Poland and Romania learned nothing in school about democratic principles and knew of free elections only through the tales of their impotent elders. They had lost all experience of as well as all faith in democratic values.

Fiercely nationalistic, desperate, unencumbered by democratic scruples, the West Ukrainian youth of the 1930s could only take cheer from the rise of Hitler in Germany. After 1933 there existed a power in Europe, increasingly the greatest single power in Europe, that was openly revisionist, that unequivocally stood for overturning the postwar settlement that the West Ukrainians found so hateful. Nazi Germany, with its concept of *ein Volk, ein Reich*, seemed to aim at redrawing Europe’s borders on the ethnic principle (which is what Hitler

⁴⁹ The Western democracies’ lack of sympathy for Ukrainian national aspirations emerges clearly from *Anglo-American Perspectives on the Ukrainian Question, 1938–1951: A Documentary Collection*, ed. Lubomyr Y. Luciuk and Bohdan S. Kordan (Kingston, ON.: Limestone Press, 1987).

actually did until March 1939). Hitler's anti-Communist, anti-Russian and anti-Polish policies could not but appeal to the youth of Western Ukraine. OUN grew with the popularity of Germany among West Ukrainian youth. They chose to close their eyes to the anti-Slavic racism of the Nazis, although they saw (and generally underestimated) the anti-Semitism, which ended up infecting many of them.⁵⁰

The key point of OUN's ideology was the subordination of absolutely everything to the goal of establishing an independent Ukrainian nation-state.⁵¹ Voluntarism, irrationalism, social Darwinism and the *Führerprinzip*⁵² were also ingredients in the heady ideological concoction that the nationalist youth imbibed. The young nationalists had their own tight discipline, salute, code of conduct, banner, greeting—everything which went with the radical-right political style. They had immense faith in the future, great hopes for the European cataclysm they saw coming. They represented the end of the interwar era.

Western Ukraine was, in sum, in an unenviable position in the interwar period. Denied its right to national self-determination in the aftermath of World War I, it was occupied by neighbours who sought, however futilely, to assimilate it. Only Czechoslovakia was better disposed, but its Ukrainian population was the smallest and overall the most backward. Economic development throughout Western Ukraine was at best stagnant and in some respects retrogressive. Peasants without hope—or with wild, transrational hopes—and a profoundly frustrated, down-at-the-heel intelligentsia provided fertile soil for the growth of radical, twentieth-century ideologies, first of the left, then of the right. Although the overall environment was so unfavourable, and unhealthy, not all that was

⁵⁰ Anti-Semitism in Ukraine is a poorly researched topic. It is clear, however, that anti-Semitism was never prominent in the platform of OUN or Ukrainian nationalism generally. In this respect right-wing Ukrainian nationalism differed profoundly from its Hungarian, Polish and Romanian counterparts.

⁵¹ For a collection of official OUN documents, see *OUN v svitli postanov velykykh zboriv, konferentsii ta inshykh dokumentiv z borot'by 1929–1955 r.*, Biblioteka ukrains'koho pidpil'nyka, 1 (N.p., 1955).

⁵² "Ukrainian nationalism will build the structure and social life of the state on the healthy principles of *leadership*. The foundation and personification of this principle will be the Head of State, the Leader of the Nation, as the bearer of sovereignty, the symbol of its spiritual and political unity, as its highest authority and helmsman." "Peredmova," *Politychna Prohrama i Ustarii Orhanizatsii Ukrains'kykh Natsionalistiv* (N.p., 1940) 17. On the OUN's "outright adherence to the *Führerprinzip*," see also John A. Armstrong, *Ukrainian Nationalism*, 2nd ed. (Littleton, CO.: Ukrainian Academic Press, 1980) 39.

nurtured in Western Ukraine was tainted. A vital self-reliance was forged in this era that carried over into the emigration and contributed much to the construction of the impressively organized Ukrainian diaspora in North America. An exceptionally dynamic national consciousness was cultivated in this period, too, one which has not only served the diaspora well, but which contributed disproportionately in recent years to the survival and revival of the Ukrainian national idea in Ukraine itself.