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## The National and the Social in the Ukrainian Revolution of 1917–20

### *The Historiographical Agenda*

Considering their importance, the revolutionary events in Ukraine at the end of and immediately following the First World War have not generated the historiography they deserve.<sup>1</sup> By their importance I do not simply mean that they transpired over an immense territory with a population of tens of millions. Nor do I mean, although it is true, that the outcome of the Ukrainian revolution was a determinant of all the later history of Eastern Europe. Rather, in referring to the importance of the Ukrainian revolution, I have in mind its intellectual importance, the rich possibilities it affords to engage the question of the interrelation of the social and the national.

Except for its westernmost regions, which were in the Habsburg monarchy, Ukraine was part of the Russian empire, and shared in its disintegration under the impact of war. The same social revolution that swept the rest of the empire swept Ukraine too – there were Red Guards in the factories, revolutionized soldiery, peasant revolts, Bolsheviks, Mensheviks, SRs and anarchists. There were, of course, local nuances in the Ukrainian social revolution (more peasant unrest, more anarchists), but the social upheaval was on the same scale and with more or less the same actors as in the Russian revolution as a whole. But in addition to this, there was a national revolution, the attempt to create a Ukrainian national polity, at first as an autonomous unit within Russia and later, after the Bolshevik coup in Petrograd, as an independent state. These two revolutions were often intertwined: many of the Ukrainian national leaders were avowed socialists and the Bolsheviks made major concessions to the Ukrainian national idea. But more often, and more unequivocally as events unfolded, the two revolutions, or the two aspects of the same revolution, confronted one another head on. Both competed for the crucial support of the peasantry in Ukraine, with mixed and interesting results. Both competed for the support of the intelligentsia as well, with results just as mixed and interesting. And, of course, individuals from these same social strata, caught up in the confusing whirlwind of revolution, often switched sides several times.

The intersection of the social and national revolutions in Ukraine provides abundant material for the study of modern social mobilization along national and class lines, but this intellectual opportunity has been largely neglected. The neglect is not so much a failure of imagination or industry on the part of historians as the result of the circumstances created by the defeat of the Ukrainian national revolution and the degeneration into Stalinism of the victorious social revolution. These circumstances produced a highly polarized historiography; historians worked either in the national paradigm or in the Soviet paradigm, with neither paradigm able to integrate both the social and the national. Furthermore, a social history of the national revolution was rendered almost impossible owing to a lack of access to sources. The historiography of the Ukrainian revolution therefore made little substantial progress since the 1920s. Now, however, the situation has changed. East European Communism and the Soviet Union have collapsed, and Ukraine has become an independent state. In the new political environment it is possible to overcome the paradigmatic polari-

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1 I would like to thank Andrii Deshchytsia for assisting me with the research for this essay.

zation of the past and to consult sources that will allow a fresh and more detailed investigation of the instructive complexities of the revolution in Ukraine.

The following historiographical essay will sketch in more detail the problems of polarization and sources and then attempt to outline the agenda for a new historiography of the Ukrainian revolution.

## I. UKRAINIAN NATIONAL HISTORIOGRAPHY

There have been, generally speaking, two views of the revolutionary events that took place in Ukraine in 1917–20: Firstly that they constituted a specifically Ukrainian revolution aimed primarily at establishing national independence and secondly that they were part and parcel of the overall Russian revolution and civil war, at most a regional subset of the same. The first view is found only in works published outside the Soviet Union, generally, but not exclusively, written by Ukrainians. The second view had been the only permissible one in the Soviet Union since the 1920s, but it was also not without influence in the West. In what follows, I will refer to the historiography holding to the first view as »Ukrainian national« and to that holding the second as »Soviet«.

Historians working within the Ukrainian national tradition assess various aspects of the Ukrainian revolution differently, but share the same narrative framework.<sup>2</sup> They start with the Central Rada, the Ukrainian council (soviet) that emerged in Kiev in March 1917 in response to the February revolution in Russia. They trace its evolution, under the presidency of the historian Mychajlo Hruševs'kyj, from a rather loose collective with diffuse aims into the nucleus of a government structure with a clear programme of autonomy. A primary focus in accounts of the Rada is its struggle and negotiations with the Russian Provisional Government in Petrograd for recognition and funding. After the Bolshevik coup in Russia and demise of the Provisional Government, the Central Rada proclaimed the establishment of the Ukrainian National Republic (UNR) on 7 (20) November. Although the UNR was in actual fact independent of Bolshevik Russia, it affirmed nonetheless that it remained in federation with Russia, only not with the Russia that actually existed. Hostility between Soviet Russia and the UNR culminated in war in December and the UNR was forced to abandon Kiev to the Bolsheviks by February 1918. In the meantime, however, in late January, the UNR had declared its complete independence from Russia. The chief motive in declaring independence at that time was to be able, as a sovereign state, to sign a separate peace treaty with the Central Powers. Thus immediately after vacating Kiev, the UNR signed the first treaty of Brest-Litovsk (9 February).<sup>3</sup> In exchange for peace and promises of deliveries of sorely required food, the Germans and Austrians agreed to drive the Bol-

2 The standard works are *John S. Reshetar*, *The Ukrainian Revolution, 1917–1920: A Study in Nationalism*, Princeton 1952; *Oleh Semenovych Pidhainy*, *The Formation of the Ukrainian Republic*, Toronto etc. 1966; *Taras Hunczak* (Hrsg.), *The Ukraine, 1917–1921: A Study in Revolution*, Cambridge, Mass. 1977. A useful chronology is *Jakiv Zozulja*, *Velyka ukrajins'ka revoljucija (Materijaly do istoriji vidnovlennja ukrajins'koji deržavnosti): Kalendar istoričnych podij za ljutyj 1917 roku – berezen' 1918 roku*, New York 1967. The standard, now outdated bibliography is *Oleh Semenovych Pidhainy/Olexandra Ivanivna Pidhainy*, *The Ukrainian Republic in the Great East-European Revolution: A Bibliography*, Toronto etc. 1971. A valuable reference work on all aspects of Ukrainian history, including the revolution, is *Volodymyr Kubijovyč/Danylo Husar Struk* (Hrsg.), *Encyclopedia of Ukraine*, 5 Bde., Toronto etc. 1984–1993.

3 *Stephan M. Horak*, *The First Treaty of World War I: Ukraine's Treaty with the Central Powers of February 9, 1918*, Boulder 1988.

sheviks out of Ukraine. In less than a month the government of the UNR was reinstated in Kiev. Actual control of the situation in Ukraine, however, had passed to the Germans, who soon felt the need for a more pliant and reliable Ukrainian government. With their backing, Pavlo Skoropads'kyj, otaman of the conservative Free Cossacks, deposed the UNR and was proclaimed monarch, using the historical title (held in his family) of Hetman of Ukraine. To what extent the Skoropads'kyj regime was a mere instrument of the Germans<sup>4</sup> and to what extent it represented the authentic aspirations of certain elements of Ukrainian society, to what extent it was dominated by Russians of the old regime and to what extent it adopted a genuinely Ukrainian national programme – these are contested issues within the Ukrainian national historiography. All agree, however, that the overriding concern of Skoropads'kyj was the restitution of private property and hierarchical authority. The attempt to restore what had been undermined by the revolution and the requisitions of grain for the Central Powers provoked a terrible backlash among the peasantry and both Skoropads'kyj and the Germans had their hands full trying to contain peasant upheaval.

The defeat of the Central Powers in November signalled the end of the hetman period. Three former leaders of the UNR – Symon Petljura, Mykya Šapoval and Volodymyr Vynnyčenko – formed a Directory that coordinated a massive rebellion against the hetman, who was forced to abdicate his throne by mid-December. The defeat of the Central Powers also affected the Ukrainians under Austrian rule, especially those who inhabited Eastern Galicia. On 1st November the latter declared the establishment of the West Ukrainian National Republic (it was to unite formally with the UNR in January 1919). The West Ukrainian republic was no sooner proclaimed than it found itself at war with the Poles, who also asserted their own claim to Eastern Galicia.<sup>5</sup> As to the Directory of the UNR, it had little respite after ousting Skoropads'kyj; not long after capturing Kiev, it once again had to fight the Bolsheviks.

Both Ukrainian governments suffered military defeat. The UNR abandoned Kiev to the Soviets in February 1919 and the West Ukrainian army retreated from Galicia in the summer. Because the West Ukrainians withdrew to the west and the UNR to the east, both governments and their armies ended up together in a restricted region of Right-Bank Ukraine. Since February, when Vynnyčenko quit the Directory, the UNR and its armed forces had been dominated by Supreme Otaman Petljura.<sup>6</sup> After recuperating, Petljura's army and the Galicians marched on Kiev, which they took for one day at the end of August 1919. They were driven out of the capital this time not by the Bolsheviks, but by Denikin's Volunteer Army. Once again the Ukrainian forces, exhausted by war, demoralized by defeat and ravaged by typhus, were restricted to a small area of Right-Bank Ukraine.

During this difficult period, when it was clear that the Ukrainians had to make peace on some front, the West Ukrainians and the Ukrainians of the UNR proper parted company.

4 An example of the Skoropads'kyj-as-German-puppet interpretation is *Taras Hunczak*, *The Ukraine under Hetman Pavlo Skoropadsky*, in: *Hunczak*, *The Ukraine*, S. 61–81. A much different view of Skoropads'kyj's relations with the Germans, based on an unpublished source, is *Jaroslav Pelenski*, *Hetman Pavlo Skoropadsky and Germany (1917–18) as Reflected in His Memoirs*, in: *Hans-Joachim Torke/John-Paul Himka* (Hrsg.), *German-Ukrainian Relations in Historical Perspective*, Edmonton 1994, S. 69–83.

5 Vgl. *W. Kutschabsky*, *Die Westukraine im Kampfe mit Polen und dem Bolschewismus in den Jahren 1918–1923*, Berlin 1934; *Matthew Stachiw/Jaroslav Sztendera*, *Western Ukraine at the Turning Point of Europe's History 1918–1923*, 2 Bde, Scranton 1969–1971; *Maciej Kozłowski*, *Między Sanem a Zbruczem: Walki o Lwów i Galicję Wschodnią 1918–1919*, Cracow 1990.

6 Petljura is the subject of a fine recent monograph: Vgl. *Rudolf A. Mark*, *Symon Petljura und die UNR: Vom Sturz des Hetmans Skoropadskyj bis zum Exil in Polen*, in: *Forschungen zur Osteuropäischen Geschichte*, Bd. 40, Berlin 1988, S. 7–288.



The West Ukrainians, who had lost their homeland to the Poles, sought an accommodation with Denikin. Petljura, however, looked to the Poles as potential allies. The crisis, exacerbated by political-cultural differences between the eastern and western branches of the nation, resulted in the evacuation of the West Ukrainian government to exile in Vienna; Petljura renounced the UNR's claim to Galicia and entered into an anti-Bolshevik military alliance with Piłsudski. Together with the Poles, the Petljurists captured Kiev one last time in the spring of 1920. The fate of the UNR was finally sealed by the Polish-Soviet armistice and the treaty of Riga. Although soldiers of the UNR waged a campaign in Soviet Ukraine in November 1921, this was the last operation of the UNR army against the Bolsheviks and only involved about 1 200 men. The revolution, as far as the Ukrainian national historiography is concerned, was over.

Within this narrative framework some very good, very professional history has been written. It has even generated lively controversy: historians (and Ukrainian political thinkers) have differed deeply in their assessment of the actions of Skoropads'kyj, Petljura and the Galicians and have also debated, often quite heatedly, whether the UNR was not revolutionary enough or too revolutionary in its social, particularly agrarian, policies.

Yet, the way this historiographical paradigm prefigures investigation and presentation has necessarily resulted in a very partial, and therefore unsatisfactory, body of historical writing. The Ukrainian national paradigm follows the fortunes of the political and military institutions that incorporated, or claimed to incorporate, the Ukrainian national idea. Almost all else falls out of the investigation.

The tale is told exclusively from the point of view of the institutions. Thus the historiography lavishes attention on the laws and decrees of the Central Rada and UNR, but it fails to investigate the impact of this legislation on the society at large or to investigate the concrete mechanisms of its implementation (or lack thereof). For example, the Ukrainian economic historian Illja Vytanovyč has written a study of the agrarian politics of the Ukrainian governments<sup>7</sup>, but no one has attempted an (admittedly more ambitious) study of the peasantry and its participation in the revolution. The Ukrainian national historiography is exclusively history from the institutional top down; it hangs in the air without a corresponding social history from the bottom up, even though the latter would seem to be of great importance when investigating the history of a revolution. It is not that the Ukrainian national historiography is blind to the importance of social factors in the revolution. Almost all who work within this framework understand and, when necessary to their story, recount that the UNR failed to gain the support of the peasantry which took such an active and decisive part in the revolutionary events. This is known, to the extent that it explains something crucial to the narrative, but it is not studied. Thus, for example, Ukrainian national historians recognize that the reason the UNR lost its first military encounter with the Soviets (December 1917–February 1918) was that the peasantry switched its allegiance from the Rada to the socially more radical Bolsheviks.<sup>8</sup> This suffices. Exactly how this turn-about happened, its motives, mechanisms and ramifications, has not been the subject of study. Difficulty of access to the sources, as we will see below, partially accounts for this historiographical omission; then too, it is an uncomfortable topic for the national paradigm

7 *Agrarna polityka ukrajins'kykh urjadiv rokiv revoliuciji j vyzvol'nych zmahan' (1917–20)*, in: *Ukrajins'kyj istoryk* 4, Nr. 3–4, 1967, S. 5–69.

8 »[...] The war in December and January was a struggle for influence over the popular masses, since neither the Rada nor [the Bolshevik commander] Antonov had a strong, disciplined army. The prevailing *Zeitgeist* was profoundly radical, at least in the economic and social sense, but the democratic and moderate Rada failed to grasp it.« *Yaroslav Bilinsky*, *The Communist Takeover of the Ukraine*, in: *Hunczak*, *The Ukraine*, S. 112.

to investigate; but more fundamentally, the omission stems from the imperatives of the paradigm itself.

Furthermore, the narrative concentrates only on such territory as the Ukrainian national governments actually controlled at a given time. Once a territory is lost by the Ukrainian forces it is also lost to study. The actual territory of Western Ukraine is only studied until the Ukrainian Galician Army withdraws to the Right Bank in July 1919. It is true that the Ukrainian national historians follow the subsequent fate of the West Ukrainian government in exile and West Ukrainian representations at the peace conference, but they do not investigate what happened in Galicia under Polish rule in the months following the expulsion of Ukrainian forces. Galicia falls out of history in July 1919. With very few exceptions<sup>9</sup>, historians of the national paradigm even lose sight of most of Ukrainian territory when it falls to the Bolsheviks (as in the winter of 1918, the spring of 1919, the spring of 1920). Ukrainian territory under Denikin's control does not seem to have been studied at all from the perspective of the Ukrainian national paradigm. The brief accounts one does find in this literature are too often based on inadequate, unverified, anecdotal evidence. No attempt has been made within the Ukrainian national paradigm even to sketch the contours of the Ukrainian revolution in its territorial totality let alone to use the total-territorial framework as the guiding idea of a study. Moreover, although the Ukrainian national historiography does not see the territorial whole, it falls short of conscious regional or local studies as well. There is, for example, no monograph on the capital city in the years 1917–20 and no monograph on a particular rural district in the same period, even though such regional studies form an important component of the historiography of other revolutions. Again, the fault lies mainly (but not exclusively) with how the topics of investigation are prefigured. It is not the revolutionary process as a whole that interests the Ukrainian national historiography, but only a certain complex of themes; when Odessa is not under Ukrainian rule it is no longer part of the complex.

## II. SOVIET HISTORIOGRAPHY

Although the Ukrainian national historiography is self-limiting and particular in its approach and although this exposes it to charges of subjectivity and intellectual shortcomings, it is far more innocent of both of these charges than the competing paradigm of Soviet historiography. The problems that plagued the Soviet historical establishment as a whole, such as the heavy-handed intrusion of politics into scholarship, were more acute in Ukraine and in relation to Ukrainian history than in Russia and in relation to Russian history. Given the long-standing sensitivity of the Soviet authorities to any manifestation of Ukrainian nationalism, scholars who worked on the history of the revolution in Ukraine had to tread carefully on the ideologically correct path.

In Soviet historiography there was no Ukrainian revolution as such; instead there was the history of the Great October Socialist Revolution and civil war on the territory of Ukraine.<sup>10</sup>

9 The best of these exceptions is *Jurij Borys*, *The Sovietization of Ukraine 1917–1923: The Communist Doctrine and Practice of National Self-Determination*, 2. Aufl., Edmonton 1980.

10 Among the more important Soviet works vgl. *A. V. Licholat*, *Razgrom nacionalističeskoj kontrrevoljucii na Ukraine (1917–1922 gg.)*, Moscow 1954; *M. A. Rubač*, *Očerki po istorii revoljucionogo preobrazovanija agrarnych otnošenij na Ukraine v period provedenija Oktjabr'skoj revoljucii*, Kiev 1957; *Je. M. Skljarenko*, *Borot'ba trudjaščych Ukrajinny proty nimec'ko-avstrijs'kich okupantiv i het'manščyny v 1918 roci*, Kiev 1960; *N. I. Suprunenko*, *Očerki istorii graždanskoj vojny i inostrannoju voennoj intervencii na Ukraine (1918–1920)*, Moscow 1966; *Ukrajins'ka RSR*

The Soviet story begins with the February revolution and the emergence of workers' and soldiers' soviets throughout Russia, including in a number of Ukrainian cities. The Bolsheviks engaged in agitation and propaganda and gained numerous adherents, in Ukraine as well. The bourgeoisie in Ukraine reacted by forming the counter-revolutionary Central Rada, which collaborated with the equally counter-revolutionary Provisional Government. Lenin's April theses impressed the proletariat of Ukraine and the number of Bolsheviks there tripled by August. Bolshevik-led demonstrations against the Provisional Government and the war took place throughout Russia, including Ukraine. After the July days, peasant unrest increased markedly and the peasantry moved closer to the working class; this happened, of course, in Ukraine too. The counter-revolutionary forces also consolidated: in Ukraine, the Central Rada and Provisional Government came to an agreement with regard to Ukrainian autonomy; the agreement was far from satisfying the legitimate national aspirations of the Ukrainians, but in the face of the revolutionary menace and following its narrow class interests, the Central Rada was willing to sacrifice Ukrainian national interests. At this point only the Bolshevik party was decisively defending the Ukrainian people nationally as well as socially. No wonder that the number of Red Guards rose so rapidly at this time. The October revolution was greeted with great enthusiasm in Ukraine; soviet power was established in several localities and the workers and revolutionary soldiers of Kiev defeated the local forces of the Provisional Government. However, the bourgeois-nationalist Central Rada took advantage of the workers' and soldiers' victory to proclaim its own authority over the territory of Ukraine. The usurpers did all in their power to stifle the revolutionary movement and thus provoked the anger of the workers and peasants.

In December Lenin issued the Rada an ultimatum to stop aiding the counter-revolution; soon thereafter the Ukrainian toilers represented at the First All-Ukrainian Congress of Soviets proclaimed the Ukrainian Soviet Republic. Armed uprisings against the Rada erupted throughout Ukraine; particularly important was the uprising of the Arsenal workers in Kiev.<sup>11</sup> In order to retain power, the Rada again betrayed Ukrainian national interests, invited in the German imperialists and unleashed civil war in Ukraine. In the Soviet paradigm, the history of this civil war is part and parcel of the history of the entire civil war in the USSR, 1918–20. Thus the context for the German occupation of Ukraine in February–April 1918 is the Romanian occupation of Bessarabia, the English seizure of Murmansk and Archangel'sk, the Japanese intervention in eastern Siberia and so forth. The role of Ukrainian national forces in the reconquest of Ukraine is suitably minimized (the Germans and Austrians sent in an army of nearly 450,000, while the vestiges of Petljurist bands numbered only some 2 000). In spite of heroic resistance, the numerically overwhelmed So-

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v period hromadjans'koji vijny 1917–1920 rr., 3 Bde., Kiev 1967–1970; *Peremoha Velykoji Žovtnevoji socialistyčnoji revoljuciji na Ukrajinі*, 2 Bde., Kiev 1967; *A. I. Smolinčuk*, *Bol'sheviki Ukraїny v bor'be za sovety (mart 1917–janvar' 1918 gg.)*, L'viv 1969; *Velykyj Žovten' i hromadjans'ka vijna na Ukrajinі*, Kiev 1973; *Borot'ba za vladu rad na Ukrajinі*, Kiev 1977; *Ukraina v 1917–1921 gg.: Nekotorye problemy istorii: Sbornik naučnych trudov*, Kiev 1991. A detailed chronology is *Velikaja Oktjabr'skaja socialističeskaja revoljucija i pobeda soveckoj vlasti na Ukraїne: Chronika važnejšich istoriko-partijnych i revoljucionnyh sobytij*, 2 Bde., Kiev 1977–1982. An earlier, less dogmatic Soviet chronology of events in the Kiev region is *V. Manilov* (Hrsg.), *1917 god na Kievščine: Chronika sobytij*, Kiev 1928. A useful reference work on all aspects of the Soviet view of Ukrainian history, including the revolution, is *Radjans'ka Encyklopedija Istoriji Ukraїny*, 4 Bde., Kiev 1969–1972. A special encyclopedia devoted to Great October and the civil war in Ukraine is *Velykyj Žovten' i hromadjans'ka vijna na Ukrajinі: Encyklopedyčnyj dovidnyk*, Kiev 1987.

11 This uprising forms the centrepiece of Oleksandr Dovženko's film *Arsenal* (1929).



viet Ukrainian government evacuated to Taganrog whence a special bureau directed revolutionary activities in Ukraine. Calls to resistance found a ready response as the Ukrainian population suffered ruthless requisitions of grain, cattle and other goods by the invaders. Strikes proliferated, including the all-Ukrainian railway workers' strike of 1918. The first congress of the Communist Party (Bolshevik) of Ukraine (CP[B]U), held in Moscow in July 1918, created the Military-Revolutionary Committee to coordinate partisan resistance in Ukraine. Mass peasant uprisings made it impossible for the invaders to collect the quantities of grain they required.

The revolution in Austria-Hungary and Germany led to the disintegration of the occupying armies and new opportunities for the re-establishment of Soviet power in Ukraine. The Provisional Workers'-Peasants' Government of Ukraine, formed at the end of November, led a major uprising, aided by regular Soviet troops, against the hetman's regime. Since the latter was only propped up by the occupiers' bayonets, it collapsed. However, the nationalist Directory was able to preserve bourgeois rule. It used demagoguery to confuse some of the peasant insurgents and marched on Kiev. The Germans let the Directory's troops pass. The Directory proclaimed its authority throughout Ukraine; in essence, it retained the bourgeois-kulak dictatorship initiated by the hetman. But the rule of the Directory was short-lived: Soviet troops and popular insurrections put an end to it. Soviet Ukraine then had to turn its attention to French interventionists who had landed in Odesa.

Meanwhile a bourgeois-nationalist counterrevolutionary centre had emerged also in Western Ukraine: the West Ukrainian National Republic. This entity was so counter-revolutionary that during the Polish-Soviet war, in the summer of 1919, it gave up fighting the Poles altogether. The toilers of Western Ukraine founded the Communist Party of Eastern Galicia in 1919 and in April of the same year organized an armed uprising in Drohobych.

After defeating Kolchak, the young Soviet state had to fight Denikin and his Volunteer Army. These White Guards were objectively aided by various Petljurist bands who fought against Soviet power. Then in the summer of 1919 the West Ukrainian army of 45,000 joined up with the Petljurists and began to march on Kiev while the Soviet army was busy fighting Denikin. Denikin took almost all Ukraine and instituted a reign of terror. Bolshevik partisans harried him the whole time. But Denikin overextended himself and Lenin devised a brilliant plan to smash him militarily. By late December 1919 Charkiv and Kiev were liberated. The All-Ukrainian Revolutionary Committee set to work rebuilding the country, but the peace was short. In April and May bourgeois-landlords' Poland attacked Ukraine, using Petljura as a cover for its imperialist ambitions. The Red Army was able to drive back the Poles and even enter Galicia, where a Soviet government (the Galician Revolutionary Committee) was set up. But reversals led to the abandonment of Galicia and the signing of the treaty of Riga (March 1921). Also in 1920 the Soviets defeated the forces of General Wrangel who was based in the Crimea region and threatened the Ukrainian Donbas. Finally all foreign interventionists and domestic counter-revolutionaries were defeated; the toiling population of Ukraine gained important experience from the bitter civil war and thereafter always linked its fate with the Communist party that led it to victory.

The main problem with this paradigm is immediately apparent; it is too ideologically driven. It is an elaboration of a founder's myth, not an intellectually usable history. Unfortunately, but understandably given the political circumstances under which this paradigm was formulated, the ideological distortion does not exist only on the generalizing level, but also on the level of more detailed, monographic research. Evidence is interpreted one-sidedly and, if too inconvenient, suppressed altogether. If the Ukrainian national historiography suffers from neglecting to investigate what occurred on territory occupied

by opposing forces, Soviet historiography not only neglects to study the opposing regimes, but lampoons them *holus bolus*. There are also numerous taboos surrounding personalities: nothing good can be said of some, nothing bad of others. In all, the historiography suffers from Manicheism.

The shortcomings of the Soviet historiography on the Ukrainian revolution are disappointing not only in and of themselves, but also in light of what one might wish that historiography had become. One could wish that the Soviet historiography had generated a social history of the revolution in Ukraine, one that, when read together with the national history generated by the other paradigm, would allow the articulation of a synthetic view of the collision and convergence of social and national elements in the revolution. But this has been prevented by ideological imperatives. There were moments, for example, when the peasantry preferred the Rada to the Bolsheviks. Surely more complex causalities were at work than confusion under the influence of nationalist demagoguery. And even if it were as simple as that, what were the elements constituting this confusion? Some Ukrainian SRs who originally supported the Rada transferred their allegiances to the Bolsheviks. Why? In the Soviet historiography this is a non-question, partly because the Ukrainian left SRs were subsequently purged and therefore the prudent historian avoids researching them too carefully, but mainly because it is axiomatic that all conscious toilers eventually come to see the wisdom of the Bolshevik programme. But then some of these same left SRs turned against the Bolsheviks and brought thousands of insurgent peasants with them. Why did the peasants follow these by definition counter-revolutionary leaders? Could it really have been just the kulak influence? And if so, where are the studies of these peasant forces that show the preponderance of kulaks? In this paradigm, one cannot entertain the notion that something about the Bolshevik programme or Bolshevik activities might have alienated the rank-and-file Ukrainian peasant. The tale of the revolution in Ukraine was too central to the ideological core of the Soviet state to allow the sort of inquiry necessary in order to formulate interesting research questions and to investigate authentic social history. Moreover, the Soviet historical establishment, and even more so the Soviet Ukrainian historical establishment (purged in 1972), cultivated an isolation from the historical styles popular in the West, including social history, even though this particular type of history was better suited than others to fit within a Marxist framework. But again, the Soviet historiography on the Ukrainian revolution is constructing a founder's myth, not asking questions, not even social questions or even Marxist questions.

The ideological stunting of Soviet historiography is also disappointing considering the resources otherwise available to its development. Unlike the Ukrainian national historiography, which was written by exiles and later by individual academics at universities in the West, the Soviet historiography has benefitted from state sponsorship, from nurturing in the Academy of Sciences and state universities. The Soviet historiographical output on the revolution in Ukraine is enormous. Moreover, the Soviet historiography alone had access to the sources necessary to develop a more sophisticated history of the revolution.

At this point I must offer a perhaps obvious, but nonetheless necessary note about culpability. The failure of Soviet Ukrainian historiography is not to be ascribed to individual historians or even to the Soviet Ukrainian historical profession as a whole. It is not as if Soviet Ukrainian historians worked up their own paradigm and then found themselves trapped in it. The paradigm was determined in its essentials by the political authorities; the historians only made the facts fit the prescribed framework. The political authorities did not tolerate historical work done outside the paradigm, and failure to conform involved serious repercussions.

In sum, then, the historiography of the Ukrainian revolution has been highly polarized between the Ukrainian national and Soviet perspectives. Both views are quite partial and obscure a synthetic understanding of the revolutionary events in Ukraine in 1917–20. The



Ukrainian national historiography is limited in vision, but quite sound as far as it goes. The Soviet historiography, however, is fundamentally flawed by its rigid ideological framework.

### III. EXCEPTIONS AND PARTIAL EXCEPTIONS

Although the historiography of the Ukrainian revolution is, as I have argued, polarized between competing paradigms, there are some works that are exceptions or almost exceptions to the rule. These are works that deal with the Ukrainian revolution, but fall outside the two main paradigms because they are concerned neither with Ukrainian national nor Soviet history. Instead they deal primarily with an actor other than the Ukrainian national forces and the Bolsheviks. A excellent work of this type was inspired by a debate within German historiography, namely the debate inaugurated by Fritz Fischer's study of German aims in the First World War. Fischer, of course, argued that the Germans already had imperialist ambitions in Eastern Europe during that conflict, and another German historian, Peter Borowsky, examined the German intervention in Ukraine in 1918 with Fischer's argument in mind.<sup>12</sup> The same debate also inspired a solid, archivally researched monograph by a Ukrainian historian, Oleh S. Fedyshyn, on the same topic.<sup>13</sup> (The two historians arrived at divergent conclusions about the validity of Fischer's thesis.) The book by Fedyshyn was a bit of a hybrid – outside but strongly influenced by the Ukrainian national paradigm. Other works of relevance to the understanding of the revolution in Ukraine, but outside the two main paradigms, include, for example, studies of the Volunteer Army<sup>14</sup> and Piłsudski's federalist plans.<sup>15</sup>

A special, and characteristic, case are the studies of the anti-Jewish pogroms in Ukraine during the revolutionary period. Jewish scholars have assiduously gathered information about the pogroms; their main concern has been to establish where and when pogroms took place, how many victims each pogrom claimed and who were the perpetrators.<sup>16</sup> Since Jewish scholars generally agree that Ukrainian units under the command of Petljura were responsible for most of the pogroms, the Ukrainian national historiography has been uncomfortable about incorporating these incidents into its narrative. Scholars of the Ukrainian national paradigm prefer to write about the rights of national minorities, including Jews, as guaranteed by the legislation of the UNR and about the participation of Jews and other minorities in the Ukrainian government.<sup>17</sup> The pogroms are so indigestible that some Ukrain-

12 *Peter Borowsky*, *Deutsche Ukrainepolitik 1918 unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der Wirtschaftsfragen*, Lübeck etc. 1970. See also *Peter Borowsky*, *Germany's Ukrainian Policy during World War I and the Revolution of 1918–19*, in: *Torke/Himka*, S. 84–94.

13 *Oleh S. Fedyshyn*, *Germany's Drive to the East and the Ukrainian Revolution, 1917–1918*, New Brunswick 1971. See also the review article by *Fritz T. Epstein*, *The Ukrainian Question in 1917–1918*, in: *Russian Review* 31, 1972, S. 286–293.

14 *Peter Kenz*, *The Civil War in South Russia, 1918: The First Year of the Volunteer Army*, Berkeley etc. 1971; *Peter Kenz*, *Civil War in South Russia, 1919–1920: The Defeat of the Whites*, Berkeley etc. 1977.

15 *M. K. Dziewanowski*, *Joseph Piłsudski: A European Federalist, 1918–1922*, Stanford 1969.

16 The historiography of the pogroms is discussed in *Gershon David Hundert/Gershon C. Bacon*, *The Jews in Poland and Russia: Bibliographical Essays*, Bloomington 1984, S. 217 f.

17 The Ukrainian Research and Information Institute published a translation of a work by the official responsible for Jewish affairs in the UNR: *Solomon Goldelman*, *Jewish National Autonomy in Ukraine 1917–1920*, Chicago 1968. Although it does not fall within the paradigms discussed here, a

ian scholars even deny that Petljura was responsible for any pogroms at all.<sup>18</sup> Here too, then, we are dealing with a highly polarized historiography. And again, because of paradigmatic constraints the intellectually interesting questions are ignored.

One of these interesting questions is: why did the Ukrainian movement turn against the Jews during the revolution? In the immediate decade or so before the revolution, the Ukrainian national movement of which Petljura was an exponent was opposed to anti-Semitism. The movement was strongly influenced by both liberalism and socialism, Jewish and Ukrainian nationalists had worked out a political alliance by 1905-7 and both were threatened by Black-Hundreds Russian nationalism in Ukraine. Ukrainian nationalism then (and later) never developed the concentrated anti-Semitic tendencies that became prominent in German, Russian, Polish or Romanian nationalism. Somehow, however, the Ukrainian-Jewish political co-existence broke down. But why it broke down has never been studied. Generalities can be found here and there: the chaotic conditions unleashed traditional Ukrainian anti-Semitism (Jewish historiography); the Jews sided with the Bolsheviks (Ukrainian historiography). But these generalities are very problematic and have never been investigated empirically.

The pogroms constitute such a painful moment that no one has investigated them from the perspective of social history. They were, after all, a mass social movement. They began in 1914 (the Russian army committed anti-Jewish pogroms when it occupied Galicia) and lasted into 1920. They were committed by all or almost all armed forces in Ukraine, including the Bolsheviks and the Poles.<sup>19</sup> What engendered this movement? What were the social forces behind it? What economic and/or political conjunctures fostered it? Who exactly were the pogromists and what were their specific motivations? At present generalized answers to such questions cannot be provided, because some of the basic research has been neglected. There is a need for case studies and, in particular, a need for studies that concentrate on the pogromists and their motivations. The historiography has to move beyond victimology on the one hand and denial on the other; it has to grapple with the interplay of social and national factors that led to the pogroms. A violent mass social movement in which the groups in conflict differed in religious, national, political and socio-economic constitution deserves a more complex treatment in the historiography than it has so far received.

Another, less contentious, partial exception to the two main paradigms are studies on the anarchist leader Nestor Machno and his peasant movement. Machno represented neither the Ukrainian national nor the Soviet idea. He figures only marginally in the Ukrainian paradigm, since the steppe region under his control was generally quite isolated from the

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book by a historian who later became president of the Polish People's Republic on Polish national autonomy in Ukraine should also be mentioned: *Henryk Jabłoński*, *Polska autonomia narodowa na Ukrainie 1917-1918*, Warsaw 1948.

18 The classic text is: *Taras Hunczak*, *A Reappraisal of Symon Petliura and Ukrainian-Jewish Relations, 1917-1921*, in: *Jewish Social Studies* 31, 1969, S. 169-183 (see also the rebuttal by *Zosa Szajkowski*, in: *Ebd.*, S. 184-213). The same tendency is evident in an article published recently in independent Ukraine: *Oleh Romančuk*, *Zirka Davyda i tryzub Volodymyra na tli kremlja: »Ukrajins'kyj antysemityzm« 1917-1920 rr.: Mify i real'nist'*, in: *Dzvin* 1991, Nr. 9, S. 81-90, Nr. 10, S. 83-91. According to *Hundert/Bacon*, S. 217: »Ukrainian historians have engaged in exercises in apologetics in order to dissociate their shortlived independent state from charges of anti-Semitism.«

19 For a listing of who perpetrated how many pogroms, see *Henry Abramson*, *Jewish Representation in the Independent Ukrainian Governments of 1917-1920*, in: *Slavic Review* 50, 1991, S. 548. This excellent article is sensitive to the points of view of both Ukrainian and Jewish national historiography and combines elements of them both; however, it does not transcend the questions posed by the national historiographies.

territory under the control of the UNR. The Soviet historiography downplays Machno, because it is not willing to admit that this anarchist's support was crucial in the defeat of Denikin. As Machno was such a colourful figure and as this was the largest and most successful anarchist uprising in history, he has attracted more attention from Western historians than any other figure in the Ukrainian revolution; much of the literature on Machno, however, lies on the border between popular and scholarly historiography.<sup>20</sup> The literature on the Machno movement constitutes only a partial exception to the main paradigms; there are clearly discernible tendencies (in Western scholarship) either to examine Machno within the context of and as a factor in the Ukrainian national revolution<sup>21</sup> or to place him instead within the general context of the Russian civil war. This dichotomy is evident in the titles of two of the better books on Machno: the Ukrainian Michael Palij wrote *The Anarchism of Nestor Makhno, 1918–1921: An Aspect of the Ukrainian Revolution*<sup>22</sup> and the non-Ukrainian Michael Malet wrote *Nestor Makhno in the Russian Civil War*.<sup>23</sup>

#### IV. DIFFICULTIES WITH SOURCES

The Ukrainian national historiography has laboured under the handicap of inadequate access to primary sources from the revolutionary period, the most important collections of which were housed in Soviet Ukraine and closed to historians from the West in general, but especially to such as might be interested in Ukrainian national themes. The lack of sources has served to reinforce the limitations of the Ukrainian national paradigm and to prevent the development of a social history of the revolution.

Moreover, the reinforcement of paradigmatic limitations has been all the greater because of the type of sources that the Ukrainian national historiography has chiefly relied on: memoirs and histories written by prominent participants in the Ukrainian revolution.<sup>24</sup> The most influential of these have been: the four volumes of »notes and materials« compiled by the SR Pavlo Chyrtjuk, who served as minister of internal affairs and state secretary in the UNR;<sup>25</sup> »rebirth of a nation«, the bolshevizing memoirs of the former head of the Rada's government, Volodymyr Vynnyčenko;<sup>26</sup> the memoirs and history of the revolution by the conservative historian Dmytro Dorošenko, the most important nationally conscious Ukrainian politician in Skoropads'kyj's government;<sup>27</sup> the memoirs of Isaak Mazepa, who

20 For a discussion of the literature on Machno, see *Serge Cipko*, Nestor Makhno: A Mini-Historiography of the Anarchist Revolution in Ukraine, 1917–1921, in: *The Raven: Anarchist Quarterly* 13, 1991, S. 57–75.

21 There is a fine study of the extent to which Machno was a nationally conscious Ukrainian: *Frank Sysyn*, Nestor Makhno and the Ukrainian Revolution, in: *Hunczak*, The Ukraine, S. 271–304.

22 Seattle 1976.

23 London 1982.

24 For a bibliography of memoirs published in the immediate aftermath of the revolution, see: *Ivan Kalynovyč*, Ukrajin's'ka memuarystyka 1914–1924 (bibliohrafičnyj reješt), L'viv 1925.

25 *Zamitky i materijaly do istoriji ukrajin's'koji revoljuciji 1917–1920 rr.*, Reprint New York 1969.

26 *Vidrodžennja naciji*, 3 Bde., Kiev etc. 1920. This was reprinted in Kiev in 1990. Vynnyčenko's diary, published much later, has had little impact on the historiography: *Ščodennyk*, Bd. I: 1911–1920, Edmonton etc. 1980.

27 *Moji spomyny pro nedavnye-mynule (1914–1920)*, 2. Aufl., Munich 1969. Extracts from these memoirs were published in *Ukrajin's'kyj istoryčnyj žurnal*, 1992, nos. 6–9, 12. *Istorija Ukrajin 1917–1923. rr.*, 2 Bde., Užhorod 1930–32, Reprint New York 1954. One volume of this history has been published in English translation: See *Dmytro Doroshenko*, *History of Ukraine 1917–1923*, Bd. 2: The Ukrainian Hetman State of 1918, Toronto etc. 1973.



was prime minister of the UNR in 1919-20;<sup>28</sup> the history of the revolution in Western Ukraine, with emphasis on diplomatic developments, by Mychajlo Lozyns'kyj, who served in the West Ukrainian government as undersecretary of foreign affairs;<sup>29</sup> and the memoirs of Osyp Nazaruk, a Galician who was active in the UNR.<sup>30</sup> Reliance on such works has contributed to maintaining the top-down, Ukrainian-governmental focus of the national historical literature.

The excavation of archival sources available in the West and relevant to the history of the Ukrainian revolution has proceeded very slowly. The first great breakthrough came with the publication of four volumes of documents from the Austrian State Archives in the late 1960s.<sup>31</sup> The next significant contribution were two volumes of documents from the Piłsudski archives in New York.<sup>32</sup> Some valuable documentation has been lying fallow in the West for decades. The archives of the West Ukrainian National Republic, for example, were preserved in Vienna until the 1960s, when they were transferred to Rome (they are in St. Clement's Ukrainian Catholic University). It is only very recently, however, that they have been used for scholarship.<sup>33</sup> The type of archival material available in the West refines the information contained in the Ukrainian national narrative, but it does not provide the instruments for constructing a new, social history of the revolution; rather, it reinforces the institutional perspective.

A source underutilized in the Ukrainian national literature, but crucial for the development of new perspectives are contemporary newspapers. Published in Russian, Ukrainian and Yiddish, they are a window on the hidden world of local developments and popular attitudes during the revolution. Effective use of newspapers is one of the characteristics of the work of Michail Frenkin, a former Soviet historian who emigrated to Israel with copious notes on the revolutionary period. Although his books concern the Russian revolution as a whole, they give considerable attention to Ukraine and include many new facts that complicate and enrich traditional views of the Ukrainian revolution.<sup>34</sup> Some of the new literature on the revolution appearing in Ukraine today also puts newspapers to good use.<sup>35</sup> As these examples suggest, the integration of newspapers as a source requires access to the major newspaper collections in Ukraine, and this partially explains why the Ukrainian national historiography, which developed in the West, neglected newspapers. Yet, some newspapers from the revolutionary period have been available in microform editions in Western research libraries, and it has been possible to conduct new research on the basis of them: the doctoral dissertation of Steven L. Guthrie uses the press to explore the political work of Ukrainian SRs at the village level.<sup>36</sup> That more has not been done cannot thus be as-

28 *Ukrajina v ohni j buri revoljuciji 1917-1921*, 2. Aufl., 3 Bde., o. O. 1950-51.

29 *Halyčyna v. rr. 1918-1920*, Reprint New York 1970.

30 *Rik na Velykij Ukrajinі: Konspekt spomyniv z ukrajins'koji revoljuciji*, Vienna 1920.

31 *Theophil Hornykiewicz* (Hrsg.), *Ereignisse in der Ukraine 1914-1922: Deren Bedeutung und historische Hintergründe*, Philadelphia 1966-1969.

32 *Taras Hunczak* (Hrsg.), *Ukraine and Poland in Documents 1918-1922*, New York etc. 1983.

33 A young historian from Ukraine used them for his candidate's dissertation on Eastern Galicia in European politics: *Oleksandr Vjačeslavovyč Pavljuk*, *Schidna Halyčyna v jevropejs'kij polityci 1918-1919 rr.*, *Avtoreferat dysertaciji*, Kiev 1993.

34 For example: *Zachvat vlasti bol'shevikami v Rossii i rol' tylovyh garnizonov armii: Podgotovka i provedenie oktjabr'skogo mjateža 1917-1918 gg.*, Jerusalem 1982.

35 For example, the article by *Romančuk* cited above, on the UNR and the Jews, is based primarily on contemporary newspapers; the picture that emerges is quite different from those dominating the literature at present.

36 *The Roots of Popular Ukrainian Nationalism: A Demographic, Social and Political Study of the Ukrainian Nationality to 1917*, Diss. University of Michigan, Ann Arbor 1990.

cribed wholly to the difficulty of access to the contemporary press; the neglect of newspapers has also been a result of the paradigm's concern with a type of history for which the contemporary press is an unreliable source. Newspapers offer a goldmine of information, but information often irrelevant to a conception of the revolution in which a cabinet shuffle in Petljura's armed-camp government is more important than a description of living conditions and attitudes in Katerynoslav.

The final corpus of sources that deserves mention are documentary collections published in the Soviet Union.<sup>37</sup> These collections are difficult to use because they are so tendentious and selective. They are also of little relevance to the Ukrainian national paradigm, since they concentrate on the Bolshevik side of the revolution. Still, they constitute a daunting mass of documentary material, and if read carefully with an eye to social history, they can be revealing.

## V. TOWARDS A NEW AGENDA

The situation in which both the Ukrainian national and the Soviet paradigm worked has changed dramatically with the collapse of Communism and the emergence of an independent Ukrainian state. Ukraine declared independence on 24 August 1991. Already in the previous year, the censorship was relaxed and the Ukrainian SSR was growing more independent of Moscow (a critical turning point was the declaration of sovereignty of the Ukrainian SSR, 16 July 1990).

As far as the historiography of the revolution is concerned, the alteration of the political situation has had a much more fundamental impact on the historical literature produced in formerly Soviet Ukraine than on that produced by Ukrainian historians in the West. For the latter, the implications of the changes still lie in the future: the establishment of an independent Ukrainian state should result in a psychological liberation from the impulse to focus intensely and exclusively on the state-building aspects of the revolution of 1917–20 and, more substantively, the collapse of Soviet power should mean that Western scholars will have normal access to the voluminous documentation in the archives of Ukraine and to as complete a collection of the press of the revolutionary period as exists. However, so far there seems to be no Western historian who has taken advantage of the new opportunities. This is not altogether surprising, since the number of historians of Ukraine in the West is rel-

37 Among the more important collections: *Podgotovka Velikoj Oktjabr'skoj socialističeskoj revoljucii na Ukraine* (Sbornik dokumentov i materialov), Kiev 1955; *Bol'shevistskie organizacii Ukrainy v period podgotovki i provedenija Velikoj Oktjabr'skoj socialističeskoj revoljucii* (mart-nojabr' 1917 g.): Sbornik dokumentov i materialov, Kiev 1957; *Bor'ba za vlast' sovetov na Kievščine* (mart 1917 g.-fevral' 1918 g.): Sbornik dokumentov i materialov, Kiev 1957; *Radjans'ke budivnytvo na Ukrajiniv roky hromadjans'koji vijny* (1919–1920): Zbirnyk dokumentiv i materialiv, Kiev 1957; *V bor'be za Oktjabr'* (mart 1917–janvar' 1918): Sbornik dokumentov i materialov ob učastii trudjaščichsja Odessy v bor'be za ustanovlenie Soveckoj vlasti, Odessa 1957; *Velikaja Oktjabr'skaja socialističeskaja revoljucija na Ukraine*: Fevral' 1917–aprel' 1918: Sbornik dokumentov i materialov, 3 Bde., Kiev 1957; *Bol'shevistskie organizacii Ukrainy v period ustanovlenija i ukreplenija soveckoj vlasti* (nojabr' 1917–aprel' 1918 gg.): Sbornik dokumentov i materialov, Kiev 1962; *Radjans'ke budivnytvo na Ukrajiniv roky hromadjans'koji vijny* (lystopad 1918–serpen' 1919): Zbirnyk dokumentov i materialov, 3 Bde., Kiev 1967. See also the bibliographies of documentary publications (referring to the whole territory of the USSR): *E. N. Gorodeckij* (Hrsg.), *Soveckaja strana v period graždanskoj vojny 1918–1920*: Bibliografičeskij ukazatel' dokumental'nych publikacij, Moscow 1961; *E. N. Gorodeckij* (Hrsg.), *Velikaja Oktjabr'skaja socialističeskaja revoljucija*: Bibliografičeskij ukazatel' dokumental'nych publikacij, Moscow 1961.

atively small, the demands of the current political situation have siphoned some of their attention away from pure scholarship and, for whatever reasons, the revolution has not generated the same interest among the middle and younger generation of Ukrainian historians in the West as have other topics (such as Soviet Ukraine in the 1920s and 1930s, Western Ukraine in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries and the Cossack period). It is probable, though, that the current conjuncture is only temporary and that before long there will be new monographic studies on the revolution making use of the expanded source base.

In Ukraine the political changes have already been reflected in the historiography. There has been a general reorientation from the Soviet to the Ukrainian national paradigm, and many historians are writing the exact opposite of what they wrote only a short time ago. For example, A. P. Hrycenko published an article in 1991 on »the heroic work of the railway workers of Ukraine on the front and in the rear during the concluding phase of the civil war«;<sup>38</sup> In 1992 she published a short book on »Ukrainian workers on the path of creating a national state«, a discussion of the first all-Ukrainian workers' congress sponsored by the Central Rada.<sup>39</sup> V. F. Soldatenko wrote a series of articles in the principal Ukrainian historical journal on military aspects of the revolution. The first article included an attack on »the statements of political leaders from the anti-Soviet camp«, whose works, he regretted, »are now increasingly being circulated in Ukraine« and considered by some to be »absolutely objective, genuine investigations«.<sup>40</sup> Not a year passed before his stance changed completely; now he attacked Soviet historiography and its formulations on the Ukrainian revolution. He admitted, however, that »at one time the author of these lines did not refrain from offering tribute to the dominant historiographical tradition.«<sup>41</sup> Such examples could be continued.

Effort is presently concentrated on filling in the »blank spots« left by the old Soviet paradigm. Memoirs of Ukrainian revolutionary activists have been republished<sup>42</sup> as well as key documents of the Central Rada, the UNR and the West Ukrainians.<sup>43</sup> Hitherto taboo personalities – such as Hetman Skoropads'kyj<sup>44</sup> and the anarchist leader Machno<sup>45</sup> – are now the

38 In *Ukraina v 1917–1921 gg.*, S. 66–101. The article was submitted in September 1989.

39 *Ukrajins'ki robitnyky na šljachu tvorennja nacional'noji deržavy* (1-j vseukrajins'kyj robitnyčyj z"jizd 11–14 [24–27] lypnja 1917 r.), Kiev 1992.

40 Do pytannja pro počatok hromadjans'koji vijny na Ukrajinі, in: *Ukrajins'kyj istoryčnyj žurnal*, 1991, Nr. 7, S. 20.

41 Stanovlennja ukrajins'koji deržavnosti i problema zbrojnych syl (berezen' 1917 r.-kviten' 1918 r.), in: *Ukrajins'kyj istoryčnyj žurnal*, 1992, Nr. 5, S. 39. Other articles by Soldatenko in the new vein: Central'na rada ta ukrajinizacija armiji, in: *Ukrajins'kyj istoryčnyj žurnal*, 1992, Nr. 6, S. 26–39; Zaprovažennja avtonomiji Ukrajiny i zbrojni syly respubliky, in: *Ukrajins'kyj istoryčnyj žurnal* 1992, Nr. 7–8, S. 24–38. On the ukrainization of the army during the period of the Central Rada, see also O. J. Šus', *Vseukrajins'ki vijs'kovi z"jizdy*, Kiev 1992 (she had written on the Kiev Military District of the Red Army in 1919, in: *Ukraina v 1917–1921 gg.*, S. 173–216).

42 See the notes to section IV above.

43 D. B. Janevs'kyj, *Malovidomi konstitucijni akty Ukrajiny 1917–1920 rr.*, Kiev 1991 (this includes an extensive introduction). *Universalny Central'noji Rady*, in: *Ukrajins'kyj istoryčnyj žurnal*, 1991, Nr. 8, S. 20–23, Nr. 9, S. 18–22. For commentary on the decrees (universals of the Central Rada), see Ju. M. Hamrec'kyj, *Universalny – vyznačal'ni vichy istoriji Central'noji Rady*, in: *Ukrajins'kyj istoryčnyj žurnal*, 1991, Nr. 8, S. 23–30, Nr. 9, S. 23–29 (In *Ukraina v 1917–1921 gg.*, S. 6–38, Hamrec'kyj had written on »parliamentary illusions and the struggle for the realization of the slogan »all power to the Soviets«).

44 R. Ja. Pyrih/F. M. Prodanjuk, Pavlo Skoropads'kyj: Štrychy do politycnoho portreta, in: *Ukrajins'kyj istoryčnyj žurnal*, 1992, Nr. 9, S. 91–105.

45 Ihor Krol', Bat'ko Machno: Vid Huljajpolja do Paryža, in: *Vijs'ko Ukrajiny* 4, 1993, S. 39–49. This is the first installment of a colourful, generally positive biographical sketch.



subjects of articles. A useful guide to the first Ukrainian governments of 1917 has also been prepared.<sup>46</sup>

So far, and inevitably under the circumstances, historians in Ukraine have been engaged in a migration from one paradigm to another. There has been at least one interesting attempt at synthesizing the narratives of the Ukrainian national and Soviet paradigms: the account of the revolution prepared for a new secondary-school textbook; this is now perhaps the best brief survey of the revolution's history.<sup>47</sup> As far as I can establish – but *nota bene*: at present publications from Ukraine are received very irregularly – no one has sought to move beyond the existing paradigm to ask new questions. Also, at this stage, when the priority is to absorb the existing information of the Ukrainian national paradigm, there has not been much original research in the archives. I know of only one book (on Machno) that is based on the study of newly available archival sources.<sup>48</sup>

The scholars of Ukraine will soon begin to re-explore their archives and newspaper collections, but it will take longer for them to produce work of more than local interest. Switching from one ready paradigm to another can be done very quickly and easily, as the examples cited above demonstrate; absorbing the work of the Annalists and other Western social historians and learning to make up new questions will only come with time and effort. The historians in Ukrainian studies who have been trained in the West have, at least temporarily, an advantage over their colleagues in Ukraine. In recent years there has been some fruitful collaboration and exchange between the two groups of Ukrainian historians and this should facilitate the development of a more interesting historiography of the Ukrainian revolution.

It is not possible to map out in detail the directions in which a new historiography should proceed. But the general direction is clear: in the first place toward a social history of the national revolution and eventually toward the understanding of the social and national revolution in Ukraine as a totality.<sup>49</sup>

A first, practical step toward the elaboration of a new history of the Ukrainian revolution would be to examine a ready-made, successful model: the social history of the Russian revolution that has flourished in the West, mainly in the anglophone West, for well over a decade.<sup>50</sup> Already some of the new social historians of the Russian revolution have strayed into Ukrainian territory. Rex A. Wade's study of the Red Guards, for instance, includes a separate chapter on Charkiv;<sup>51</sup> and Allan K. Wildman's detailed study of the disintegration of the Russian imperial army contains references to the impact on soldiers of the Bolshe-

46 O. I. Halenko/D. B. Janevs'kyj, *Peršyj urjad demokratyčnoj Ukrajinjy*, Kiev 1992.

47 Chapters have been published in the main Ukrainian historical journal: S. V. Kul'čyc'kyj, *Central'na Rada. Utvorennja UNR*, in: *Ukrajins'kyj istoryčnyj žurnal*, 1992, Nr. 5, S. 71–88; S. V. Kul'čyc'kyj, *Ukrajins'ka Deržava časiv het'manščyny*, in: *Ukrajins'kyj istoryčnyj žurnal*, 1992, Nr. 7–8, S. 60–79.

48 V. F. Verstjuk, *Machnovščyna: Seljans'kyj povstans'kyj ruch na Ukrajinj 1918–1921*, Kiev 1991. Unfortunately, I have not seen this book; it is reviewed, however, by Ju. I. Tereščenko, in: *Ukrajins'kyj istoryčnyj žurnal*, 1992, Nr. 7–8, S. 148–151.

49 Some important suggestions are made in Geoff Eley, *Remapping the Nation: War, Revolutionary Upheaval and State Formation in Eastern Europe, 1914–1923*, in: Peter J. Potichny/Howard Aster (Hrsg.), *Ukrainian-Jewish Relations in Historical Perspective*, Edmonton 1988, insb. S. 230–240.

50 Useful points of entry into this historiography: Ronald Grigor Suny, *Toward a Social History of the October Revolution*, in: AHR 88, 1983, S. 31–52; Edward Acton, *Rethinking the Russian Revolution*, London 1990.

51 *Red Guards and Workers' Militias in the Russian Revolution*, Stanford 1984.

viks' »dangerous competitors, the Ukrainian Rada«<sup>52</sup>, but the topic begs for fuller development. There should be: local histories of the Ukrainian revolution in Kiev, Charkiv and particular provincial localities, similar to Richard Sakwa's case study of Moscow during War Communism<sup>53</sup> and Donald J. Raleigh's study of Saratov in 1917;<sup>54</sup> case studies of the revolution in the Ukrainian countryside, similar to Orlando Figes' study of the rural Volga region;<sup>55</sup> and studies of the industrial proletariat in Ukraine, similar to Diane Koenker's study of the Moscow workers<sup>56</sup> and S. A. Smith's study of the Petrograd workers.<sup>57</sup>

As important as the assimilation of the new social history of the Russian revolution is, the history of the Ukrainian revolution cannot simply be modelled on it. The Ukrainian revolution had something more to it than the Russian revolution: the national factor. Using the approaches developed in the literature on the Russian revolution and applying them to the national revolution in Ukraine should produce rewarding results; and the literature on the Russian revolution should be enriched by related studies dealing with Ukraine; but this will not suffice. The particularities of the Ukrainian revolution will, once new research commences, call for new questions and new methods. If historians are sensitive to what the sources suggest, imaginative in the conceptualization of historical problems and creative in methodology, the literature on the Ukrainian revolution will realize its potential and make a major contribution to the understanding of social and national mobilization and their interrelation.

52 *The End of the Russian Imperial Army*, Bd. 2: *The Road to Soviet Power and Peace*, Princeton 1987, S. 277 f., S. 352–354, S. 377 f.

53 *Soviet Communists in Power: A Study of Moscow during the Civil War, 1918–21*, London 1988.

54 *Revolution on the Volga: 1917 in Saratov*, Ithaca etc. 1986.

55 *Peasant Russia, Civil War: The Volga Countryside in Revolution, 1917–1921*, Oxford 1989.

56 *Moscow Workers and the 1917 Revolution*, Princeton 1981.

57 *Red Petrograd: Revolution in the Factories 1917–1918*, Cambridge 1983.