

## **The Greek Catholic Church and the Ukrainian Nation in Galicia**

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This essay surveys the history of the Ukrainian Uniate (Greek Catholic) Church in Galicia in relation to the politics of nation-building and nationalism and then offers some interpretive, comparative reflections on the specific role of Uniatism in national politics.<sup>1</sup> Galicia is a region in Western Ukraine roughly corresponding to the oblasts of Lviv, Ternopil and Ivano-Frankivsk in the former Ukrainian SSR. It also extended into what is now Poland; Przemyśl [Peremyshl] in eastern Poland, was the seat of a Greek Catholic eparchy. It has a complicated history of changing state administrations. Since the mid-eighteenth century it has experienced Polish, Austrian, Russian, Ukrainian, Soviet and German rule. The church under consideration is known by several names, including the Uniate and the Ukrainian Catholic Church. I generally prefer the usage of the crucially formative Austrian period (1772-1918), when Empress Maria Theresa named it the Greek Catholic Church in 1774 to underscore its equality with the Roman Catholic Church.<sup>2</sup> The Ukrainians of Galicia also underwent a change in name; until the early twentieth century, they generally referred to themselves as Ruthenians (*rusyny*, *Ruthenen*).

Although the Greek Catholic Church contributed much to Ukrainian nation-building, it did so only on a local, "Carpathian" level. By the time that the Ukrainian national revival began in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, the Uniate Church had been largely suppressed in most of Ukraine, which was then in the Russian empire. None of the figures prominent in the Ukrainian movement in tsarist Ukraine were connected with the Uniate Church. But however local the

contribution of the Greek Catholic Church, it was not marginal to the development of the Ukrainian national movement. This was because the locality in which it flourished, Galicia, although constituting a relatively small part of Ukrainian ethnographic territory, played a disproportionate role in all-Ukrainian affairs. It is often and justifiably called the Ukrainian Piedmont. The Ukrainian movement here, under the protection of relatively enlightened and later constitutional Austrian rule, had much more freedom to develop than in autocratic Russia. When Ukrainian-language publications were banned in tsarist Russia in 1863 and 1876, Lviv assumed the role of the chief publishing center for all Ukraine. Only in Austrian Ukraine did Ukrainian-language elementary and secondary schools exist.<sup>3</sup> Although Kiev and the rest of Central-Eastern Ukraine took center stage in the period 1917-30, Galicia again rose to disproportionate prominence in the 1930s as Soviet Ukraine experienced the ravages of Stalinism. Thus although the range of influence of the Greek Catholic Church was limited to only one area of Ukraine, this area was of unusual significance.

The Uniate Church in Ukraine (and Belorussia) was the product of the Union of Brest, 1596. To raise the status and bring order into the affairs of their church, the Orthodox bishops of the eastern, Ukrainian and Belorussian territories of Poland-Lithuania entered upon union with the Roman Catholic Church. The latter had also been promoting the idea of church union; particularly active were Polish Jesuits, preachers of the counter-reformation such as Piotr Skarga, who took up the cause with missionary fervor. The original idea of the Union of Brest was to unite the entire Orthodox Church of Poland-Lithuania with Rome, but this proved impossible to effect. Instead, only partial union was achieved and Orthodoxy survived alongside Uniatism; the churches viewed each other as mortal rivals and Ukraine was racked by religious conflict through the end of the seventeenth century. Ironically, although by the mid-nineteenth century Galicia was to be the strongest bastion of Uniatism on Ukrainian territory, in the century of religious conflict following the Union of Brest, Galicia had been the strongest bastion of Orthodoxy. Only at the turn of the eighteenth century did Galician Ukrainians become Uniate.<sup>4</sup>

Thereafter virtually all Ukrainians in Galicia were Greek Catholics, and the Greek Catholics in Galicia Ukrainians.

Uniatism had been a dynamic religious movement in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth century, but by the time the Galicians accepted it much of the original fire had died down. The Galicians adopted Uniatism at the same time as, after half a century of strife, Poland was reconsolidating its rule in Western Ukraine, suppressing the Cossacks and reinstating serfdom.

The Uniate church in Galicia suffered from neglect and discrimination for most of the eighteenth century. The vast majority of the clergy, uneducated and poor, lived little better than the peasantry. The elite of the clergy was composed of Basilian monks, from whom the hierarchy was appointed. There were some outstanding figures in the Uniate church, however, particularly the bishop of Lviv, Leo Sheptytsky (1749-79). Sheptytsky was influenced by the Polish enlightenment and used his good connections at the court to undertake some important ecclesiastical reforms.<sup>5</sup>

Galicia passed from Polish to Austrian rule in 1772 as a result of the first partition of Poland. The first decades of the new regime, particularly the reigns of the enlightened absolutists Maria Theresa (1740-80) and Joseph II (1780-90), were distinguished by far-reaching improvements in the affairs of the Greek Catholic church. Inferior in status under Polish rule, the church was now elevated to legal equality with the Roman Catholic Church. The eparchy of Lviv was raised to an archeparchy and Lviv also became the seat of the newly restored, after almost half a millennium's hiatus, metropolis of Halych (1808). The entire secular clergy of the Greek Catholic Church was given formal seminary training at institutions of higher learning in Vienna and Lviv. The income of the secular clergy was regularized and considerably increased by Emperor Joseph II. The Austrian authorities also confirmed Greek Catholic cathedral chapters (*krylosy*) in Lviv (1813) and Przemyśl (1817) and resolved a decades-long conflict between the religious and the secular clergy in the latter's favor. Aside from reforms that directly concerned it, the Greek Catholic church benefitted indirectly from numerous reforms that improved the

socioeconomic position of its faithful, who were overwhelmingly serfs. During the years from 1772 to 1815, not surprisingly, the clergy and hierarchy of the Greek Catholic church developed a profound loyalty to the Habsburg dynasty.

In the following decades (1815-48) the most significant development was the initiation of the Ukrainian national awakening led by the Greek Catholic clergy.<sup>6</sup> A consequence of the education of seminarians was the rapid formation of a stratum of intelligentsia for the submerged, largely enserfed Ukrainian population of Galicia. Influenced by contacts, particularly in Vienna, with the awakeners of other non-German nationalities in Austria, by the example, particularly in Lviv, of Polish romantic and insurrectionary nationalism and also by contacts with the emerging Ukrainian movement in the Russian empire, Greek Catholic seminarians, priests and even bishops began to engage in the "heritage-gathering"<sup>7</sup> work typical of the early stages of national movements. They codified their language, translated classics of world literature, composed poetry and literary prose, researched the history of Ukrainian Galicia and its church and recorded the folk songs, fables and customs of the people. The work was entirely cultural without overt political import. The national identity being defined was generally referred to by the awakeners as Galician-Ruthenian and considered a branch of the Little Russian or Ukrainian nationality. The national awakening absorbed most of the intellectual energy of the Greek Catholic clergy.

Within the church there were some differences of opinion about the national revival. Metropolitan Mykhail Levytsky (1816-58) adopted a conservative attitude, while the seminarians who formed the Ruthenian Triad (Markiiian Shashkevych, Iakiv Holovatsky and Ivan Vahylevych) represented the most advanced wing of the national movement. At issue were such matters as language, with conservative churchmen favoring more emphasis on Old Church Slavonic and the radical youth a pure vernacular, and the degree to which liberal ideas circulating underground in the Vormärz (roughly the period of growing social and political pressure from 1835 to 1848) were to be integrated into the national revival.

The revolution of 1848 brought substantial change to the Greek Catholic population of Galicia. Emancipation from serfdom set the stage for great cultural, social and political advancement over the following decades. The national movement also made the transition from a cultural to a political movement. During the revolution of 1848-9, the Ukrainians of Galicia formed the Supreme Ruthenian Council, over which Bishop Hryhorii Iakhymovych<sup>8</sup> presided and in whose leadership were many Greek Catholic priests. The Council demanded the division of the Austrian province of Galicia, which included ethnically Polish territory around Cracow in the West, into separate Polish and Ukrainian provinces. It also defended the interests of the newly emancipated peasantry. With regard to all-Austrian politics, the Council supported the emperor rather than those who rebelled against him.<sup>9</sup>

The political activism which the Greek Catholic clergy evinced in 1848-9 surfaced again in the 1860s when a constitution and civil liberties were introduced in Austria. Priests were elected as deputies to the Galician diet and the all-Austrian parliament (*Reichsrat*). Although the secular intelligentsia began to assume the leadership of the national movement in the 1860s, priests remained indispensable activists at the local, parish level, founding associations for adult education, economic cooperation and cultural activity as well as agitating for Ukrainian candidates during elections.<sup>10</sup> For many priests, this national activism became an important component of pastoral work; for some, in fact, it even became the overriding concern. The Vatican was not unaware of the growth of nationalism among the Greek Catholic clergy and tried to stem it. The Vatican's opposition to nationalism had many sources, including the papal opposition to Italian nationalism, but the case of Greek Catholicism in Galicia had its own peculiarities.<sup>11</sup>

The national movement in Galicia acquired profound confessional significance as the result of the division between those Ruthenians who identified with the Ukrainian movement in the Russian empire and those who looked instead to the tsarist Russian government. These latter, generally referred to in historical literature as Russophiles, began to argue that the Ruthenians of Galicia formed a branch of the

Russian nationality. The Russophile tendency was dominant throughout the period from the defeat of the revolution in 1849 until 1882. This is not the place to discuss all the reasons for its emergence and consolidation, but most important was the feeling that Austria had betrayed its loyal Ruthenian population by giving control of Galicia to the Polish gentry.

The confessional implication of Russophilism was a gravitation toward the Russian Orthodox church. This must be understood in perspective, however, because more was involved than simply the influence of politics on religion. Greek Catholicism shared with Russian Orthodoxy descent from the church of Grand Prince Volodymyr (Vladimir); although Catholic, it was indisputably an Eastern Christian church. However, under Polish influence, particularly but not exclusively since the acceptance of the Union at the turn of the eighteenth century, the Galician church adopted certain customs and attitudes from Latin Catholicism. There were always those in the Galician church who opposed Latin influences as a break with religious tradition. With the awakening of national consciousness in the nineteenth century—a national consciousness that was anti-Polish—a movement for an easternizing purification of the Greek Catholic Church emerged, first in the 1830s and 1840s, but much more vigorously in the 1860s. The political Russophiles supported the religious easternizers and held up Russian Orthodoxy as an unsullied model, and the easternizers were often drawn *volens volens* into the Russophile camp because of a certain community of interest. The Vatican opposed Latinization of the Greek Catholic Church, but it worried about the implications of a pro-Russian purification movement, especially since Bishop Siemashko had prefaced his defection from the Union with just such a purification campaign in the much more Latinized Belorussian church. Rome's hesitations and distrust of the Russophiles only played into their hands, as they more and more unmistakably insinuated that the Galician church could only be saved by a break from Rome.<sup>12</sup>

Tensions over these issues became explosive in the 1870s. For one thing, the deterioration of Austro-Russian relations over conflicts in the Balkans meant that the Austrian state was as distrustful of the Russophiles as the Vatican was. Also, in

1875, following a period of intense ritual purification, the last Uniate eparchy in the Russian empire, the Ukrainian eparchy of Chełm [Kholm], became Russian Orthodox. In the suppression of the Union a leading role was played by Galician Russophiles who had been recruited by the Russian government for pastoral and pedagogical work in the Chełm eparchy. The leading Russophile newspaper in Lviv, *Slovo*, was so sympathetic to the conversion to Orthodoxy that the Greek Catholic metropolitan forbade his faithful to read it.<sup>14</sup>

The tensions came to a head in 1882 when the Greek Catholic congregation of Hnylychky in Galicia requested permission to convert to the Orthodox faith. Viennese and Vatican authorities reacted in concert, swiftly and energetically. They forced Metropolitan Iosyf Sembratovych (1870-82) and his chief officials to resign, and a number of prominent Russophiles, including the priest Ivan Naumovych, were put on trial for high treason.<sup>15</sup>

The aftermath of the crisis of 1882 was marked by intense Vatican intervention in the Greek Catholic Church. During this period the priests promoted to higher rank were drawn from the leading lights of the journal *Ruskii Sion*. Founded in 1871, this journal consistently stressed loyalty to Catholicism, opposition to religious Russophilism and the subordination of national politics to religion. Men from this circle included Sylvester Sembratovych, who was made metropolitan in 1885, and the eminent church historian Iulian Pelesh, who became the first bishop of Stanyslaviv in 1886. In 1882 the Vatican also arranged for the reform of the debilitated Basilian monastic order by the Jesuits.<sup>16</sup> This was a reform of great significance for the Greek Catholic Church. Since its implementation, the Basilians have remained an influential factor in the church, known for their contributions in publishing and scholarship as well as for their absolute loyalty to Rome.

After the events of 1882 the Russophiles became both more marginalized and more extreme in their views. For some time, they had already been fighting against the growing power of the national populists (*narodovtsi*), as the adherents of the Ukrainian movement proper were called. The purge in the church and disgrace of the treason trial weakened them beyond recovery.

Although the Ukrainian national movement proper gained by the new Vatican activism vis-à-vis the Greek Catholic Church, it nonetheless opposed it. Vatican influence was equated with Polish influence; and indeed, in the ecclesiastical interventions of the 1880s the interests of the Vatican and the local Polish gentry who controlled the Galician government did, in fact, coincide. Also, although the Ukrainian movement of the national populists was by no means anti-Catholic in the 1880s, it did advocate the relative independence of its national church. Finally, Ukrainian leaders were generally hostile to Metropolitan Sylvester Sembratovych's efforts to promote conciliation between the Ukrainian movement and the Polish ruling class in Galicia; only for about two years (during the so-called New Era) did the metropolitan and the leaders of the national populists work hand in hand.

The end of the nineteenth century also witnessed the growth of anticlericalism in Ukrainian Galicia, particularly among the young intelligentsia and younger, more educated peasants. These strata formed the first formal Ukrainian political party in 1890, the agrarian socialist and profoundly anticlerical Radical Party.<sup>17</sup>

The history of the Greek Catholic Church in the first half of the twentieth century is dominated by the figure of Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky (1901-44).<sup>18</sup> When he was named bishop of Stanyslaviv in 1899 and not much later metropolitan of Halych, Ukrainian society suspected that he represented a continuation of the Roman, and consequently Polish, ascendancy in the Greek Catholic Church that had been evident since 1882. This was because Sheptytsky was by birth a member of the Polonized nobility—in fact, a count—who changed from the Latin to the Greek rite in order to enter the newly reformed Basilian order. These suspicions, although persistent, proved to be completely misplaced. Sheptytsky showed himself to be a man of extraordinary vision who handled chronic problems in the Greek Catholic Church in a fresh and principled manner.

One such problem was the Church's relationship to the national movement. For much of the nineteenth century the clergy had been very active in promoting this movement, often allowing national concerns to overshadow religious ones, but in the two decades prior to Sheptytsky's accession relations between adherents of the



national movement and the church had become strained. The new Vatican influence on the church injected a distrust of nationalism that had previously been almost absent in Greek Catholicism and the rise of anticlericalism among the younger intelligentsia further exacerbated tensions. Some clerics decided that the church should withdraw from and even oppose the national movement. The principal representative of this viewpoint was the bishop of Stanyslaviv, Hryhorii Khomyshyn (1904-46). Sheptytsky espoused a different and, for Galicia, new conception. In his view, the church had to remain independent of the national movement, ready to criticize and oppose it when it came into conflict with Christian principles, but equally ready to support it when it did not. Thus in 1908, for example, when a Ukrainian student assassinated the governor of Galicia and the national movement as a whole condoned the action, Sheptytsky strongly condemned the murder and was exposed to many insults as a result. But in numerous other instances, Sheptytsky used his exceptional influence—derived from his personality as much as from his office and aristocratic origin—to promote Ukrainian interests in Galicia. He established, for example, a Ukrainian National Museum in Lviv, to this day and through the most adverse times an outstanding center for the preservation of Ukrainian cultural artifacts. His successful mediation won agreements to increase the proportion of Ukrainian deputies in the Galician diet and to found a Ukrainian university in Lviv. Many scholars would agree that no individual in the first half of the twentieth century contributed as much to the Ukrainian cause in Galicia as Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky.

Another problem he approached with an original and positive vision was that of religious Russophilism. First, he was very tactful in dealing with the Russophiles among his clergy, which sometimes earned him the ire of zealous adherents of the Ukrainian national movement. Second, and much more important, he worked diligently to restore the Eastern traditions of his church, for example, by reviving eastern monasticism according to the Studite rule and, in the postwar period, implementing a thorough, purificatory liturgical reform. Unlike many other Easternizers, however, Sheptytsky was convinced that his restoration of the Byzantine

spirit could be and had to be accomplished within the parameters of what he considered the universal church—i.e., the Catholic Church. He was also extremely distrustful of the contemporary Russian Orthodox Church, which was, of course, closely associated with the tsarist regime. Not only was Sheptytsky an Easternizer free from political Russophilism and gravitation to the Russian synodal church; he actually sought to expand the Union into Russian and other Orthodox territory, travelling *incognito* into Russia before World War I to make contact with sympathizers.

Soon after the world war broke out, Galicia was occupied by Russian forces. The Russian occupation authorities persecuted the Greek Catholic Church, arresting Sheptytsky and undertaking measures for the forcible conversion of the Galician Uniates to Orthodoxy. In the end, however, the unpopular Russian policies only raised the prestige of Sheptytsky and the Greek Catholic Church among the Galician Ukrainian population. After the February Revolution in Russia, Sheptytsky was released. When he returned to Galicia he was welcomed as a martyr for church and nation.<sup>19</sup>

In the fall of 1918 Austria–Hungary collapsed. The Ukrainians of Galicia established the West Ukrainian National Republic, but their right to Galicia was contested by the revived Polish Republic. A Ukrainian-Polish war over Galicia lasted until the summer of 1919, when the Ukrainian forces were beaten back and Poland occupied all of Galicia. During the conflict, the Greek Catholic Church supported the Ukrainian national forces.

In the interwar era and into the years of World War II, the Greek Catholic Church remained a prominent factor in Ukrainian national affairs. This was partly due to the continuing prestige and influence of Metropolitan Sheptytsky (Bishops Khomyshyn of Stanyslaviv and Iosafat Kotsylovsky [1917-46] of Przemyśl, on the other hand, were rather unpopular, especially for introducing a celibate parish clergy in their eparchies). Another factor, however, was the deterioration of the position of the Ukrainian secular intelligentsia. In the last decades of Austrian rule the Ukrainian secular intelligentsia had assumed the leading position in Ukrainian

national life. They still remained the leaders in interwar, Polish-ruled Galicia, but their effectiveness was greatly reduced. The new Poland was less democratic than the old Austria, and the elected leaders of national minorities were essentially powerless. The Ukrainian educational institutions that Poland inherited from Austria were largely dismantled, meaning that Ukrainian educators and scholars had difficulty finding work commensurate to their interests and talent.<sup>20</sup> Discrimination against Ukrainians and other non-Poles for the most part closed opportunities for them to make careers in the civil service. The weakening of the secular intelligentsia under the new regime raised the relative importance of the clergy and the church in national life. The Ukrainian priest was naturally a more crucial factor in a village without a Ukrainian teacher, and in the absence of other Ukrainian institutions of higher learning the Greek Catholic Theological Academy, founded by Sheptytsky in Lviv in 1928, became the leading center of advanced education and scholarship for Galician Ukrainians as a whole.<sup>21</sup> Similarly, for a nation without a state an imposing figure like Sheptytsky could function as a surrogate president. The Greek Catholic Church's leadership-by-default accounts for the unusual prestige of this church as an institution in interwar Galician Ukrainian society.

In the interwar years and especially during the years of the Nazi occupation of Galicia (1941-4), the Church faced a much more acute version of a problem it had already confronted in the Austrian period: what Sheptytsky called "politics without God." Frustrated in their aspirations for independent statehood, a minority in an authoritarian, nationally oppressive state, Ukrainian nationalists resorted to political terrorism in the 1920s and 1930s to further their aims, accomplishing several spectacular assassinations. The Church, and in particular Sheptytsky, condemned these actions as murder and reiterated the view that political motivation cannot excuse grievous sin. During World War II Sheptytsky condemned the bloody factional struggle between the Bandera and Melnyk wings of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists as well as the murder of Jews by the Nazis and Nazi collaborators. In this context, in November 1942 he issued a pastoral letter entitled "Thou Shalt Not Kill," which once again made explicit the church's teaching that political murder is

a sin and which in fact made murder a reserved sin that only the bishop could absolve. Judging by the frequency with which Sheptytsky had to speak out against political murder and by the historical record of politically motivated bloodshed in Galicia during the interwar years—in, particular, during World War II—it seems that the Church's prestige as a national institution did not readily translate into effectiveness as a moral force.

As a result of the Hitler–Stalin pact and division of the Polish state, Galicia came under Soviet rule in 1939. Although the Germans expelled the Soviets in 1941, the Soviets reconquered the region in 1944 and it remained under Soviet rule until the proclamation of Ukrainian independence in 1991. The communist authorities began to persecute the Greek Catholic Church as soon as they acquired Galicia in 1939, but the persecution became relentless after Sheptytsky, with whose popularity the authorities reckoned, died in November 1944. All the bishops of the church were arrested and exiled, as were great numbers of priests. In 1946 the secret police orchestrated the (uncanonical) Synod of Lviv, which formally united the Greek Catholic Church of Galicia with the Russian Orthodox Church. There was probably a complex of motives behind the Stalinists' elimination of the Greek Catholic Church, but a prominent motive must certainly have been to put an end to the Church's role as a Ukrainian national institution. The Church continued an underground existence in Galicia, particularly starting in the 1950s, when many of its priests were amnestied.<sup>22</sup> As a catacomb church it enjoyed great prestige among Ukrainian dissidents in the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s.

With the introduction of some democratic reforms in the Soviet Union in the late 1980s, the Greek Catholic Church reemerged as a public force; at the end of 1989 it began to function legally, primarily in Galicia but also elsewhere in Ukraine. The church today views itself and is viewed by many others as a national church.<sup>23</sup> However, it has been challenged, even and indeed especially in Galicia, by the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church, which also considers itself a national church. The adherents of the autocephalous Orthodox Church argue that Uniatism is a local, West Ukrainian phenomenon unacceptable to the majority of Ukrainians

living in Central and Eastern Ukraine, who are by tradition of the Orthodox faith. The emergence of two national churches on the same territory has engendered a bitter religious conflict in which questions of national political strategy are primarily at issue.

In modern Ukrainian history the Greek Catholic Church stands out for its contribution to the national awakening and organized national movement. Its role as a national church, albeit on a local, Galician level, is particularly apparent when contrasted to that of the Russian Orthodox Church, to which most Ukrainians, the population of Central and Eastern Ukraine, adhered. In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, with few exceptions, the clergy and even more so the hierarchy of the Russian Orthodox Church in Ukraine remained apart from and often hostile to the Ukrainian national movement. The Russian Orthodox Church functioned, in fact, as an instrument of Russification, both in tsarist times and in the Soviet period.

The contrast suggests some interesting questions: to what extent was the difference in attitudes toward the national movement a reflection of some fundamental differences between Catholicism/Uniatism and Orthodoxy? Was there something about Uniatism that made it a more suitable national church, particularly for stateless, submerged nations like the Ukrainians of Galicia or Romanians of Transylvania?

A rather strong case can be made against the view that Uniatism was inherently a more suitable vehicle for nation-building than Orthodoxy. One does not have to look very far from Ukrainian Galicia to find either a national Uniatism or national Orthodoxy. On the other side of the mountains from Galicia, in the Hungarian-ruled region of Transcarpathia, the Greek Catholic clergy was unsympathetic to the Ukrainian or Rusyn national movement in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Greek Catholic priests there promoted Magyarization and Hungarian patriotism rather than the development of an autochthonous Ukrainian or Rusyn culture and the pursuit of political self-determination for the local population.<sup>24</sup> There was also in Ukraine an example of a nationally conscious Orthodoxy,<sup>25</sup> the above-mentioned Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church. This church emerged during and immediately after the failed revolution to establish an

independent Ukrainian state in 1917-20. It was really a deliberate creation of the national movement, which reacted to the hostility of the traditional Russian Orthodox Church by establishing a new ecclesiastical organization that would be both Orthodox Christian and pro-Ukrainian at the same time. The examples of Transcarpathia and Ukrainian autocephaly have more complexities than can be suggested here, but they do indicate that there is no simple congruence between Uniatism and support for national aspirations, on the one hand, and Orthodoxy and national indifference or hostility, on the other.

A major problem in trying to ascertain to what extent religious differences account for differing attitudes toward national movements is that other critical factors also come into play. In particular, the role and nature of the state deserve careful consideration. The Greek Catholic Church functioned in relatively democratic Austria, where the Ukrainian movement was allowed to develop with only minor hindrances after 1867. Priests could establish and take part in voluntary associations, write for Ukrainian newspapers and run for parliament, generally with minimal negative repercussions. The Orthodox church faced completely different conditions in autocratic Russia, where the Ukrainian language was banned from print and schools and where participation in the Ukrainian movement could bring severe reprisal from the state. It is important to note that the state had a particularly powerful influence on Russian Orthodoxy, one that could easily determine its relation to the Ukrainian national movement. During the imperial period, the Russian Orthodox Church was virtually a branch of the government, and in the Soviet period it was reduced to the status of a marionette.

The case of the national Uniate church in Transcarpathia can also be explained in terms of its relationship to the state. The Hungarian part of the Habsburg empire after 1867 was relatively undemocratic, and the government systematically pressured Slavs and Romanians to assimilate to the Magyar national identity. Similarly, the case of the national, Autocephalous Orthodox Church shows the influence of the state: Ukrainian autocephaly only emerged after the collapse of

tsarism in the unsettled revolutionary and post-revolutionary period, and it was brutally eradicated in the 1930s by a totalitarian and anti-Ukrainian Soviet regime.

The Austrian state influenced Uniatism in Galicia (and to some extent in Transylvania as well) by infusing it with a more modern, secular, service-oriented spirit than existed in Orthodoxy. The Greek Catholic Church owed its very name and much of its institutional structure and intellectual formation to the Austrian enlightened absolutists. It was thus inevitable that this church would assimilate the outlook of the Austrian enlightenment, including many Josephinist principles. Such a "modernizing" underlayer was absent in Russian Orthodoxy, and this difference may well account for part of the divergence in the two churches' receptivity to the Ukrainian national movement.

Another factor must also be taken into consideration. Eastern-rite Christianity, whether Uniate or Orthodox, was an effective differentiating factor in relation to the Poles (and most Magyars) who were of the Latin rite, but it was an integrating factor in relation to the Russians and Romanians who shared the Eastern rite. In Bukovina, in spite of the linguistic distance between the local Ukrainian and Romanian Orthodox populations, there was considerable assimilation of Ukrainians to the Romanian nationality (and vice-versa) via the shared church and rite. Thus the divergence between Greek Catholicism and Russian Orthodoxy with regard to the national question can be understood as a natural result of the circumstance that one differentiated Ukrainians from the rival, politically and socially dominant nationality, while the other integrated them into it.

In light of what has been said above, it may seem that the differences between Uniatism and Orthodoxy as such had nothing to do with the dissimilar national stances assumed by the Greek Catholic Church in Galicia and the Russian Orthodox Church in Central and Eastern Ukraine. So many causes and subtle determinations enter into the picture, it is difficult to pronounce on the question with any certainty. However, two further factors that must be taken into account for a complete explanation do relate to the essential qualities of Orthodoxy and Uniatism.

First, Uniatism, by virtue of its union with Rome, has an important dimension of local transcendence that is lacking in Orthodoxy. The Roman administration of the Catholic church—i.e., the pope and his colleges and secretariats—has certain rights of intervention into the affairs of the particular Uniate churches, and the policies it pursues in these interventions are often dictated by the perceived interests of the universal church rather than by local interests. This Roman dimension gave the Uniate churches some degree of freedom from the immediate political (or political–ecclesiastical) authorities. Rome functioned as the ecclesiastical equivalent of Vienna, which at times intervened to mitigate Magyar domination of the Romanians in Transylvania and Polish domination of the Ukrainians in Galicia. The existence of an interested and authoritative third party outside the arena of national conflict tended to work to the advantage of the weaker, submerged nationalities like the Ukrainians and Transylvanian Romanians. In Orthodoxy not only was this dimension absent, placing the weaker, stateless nationalities in a more difficult position, but the traditional close association between Orthodox churches and existing state structures also worked in favor of the dominant nationality. Thus it would seem that Uniatism had greater potential than Orthodoxy to intervene positively in the national development of the "nonhistoric" peoples of East Central Europe.

Second, Uniatism incorporated many spiritual values and institutional arrangements of the Catholic counter-reformation, which had in fact contributed to its emergence. This particular formative substratum was absent in Orthodoxy, which knew neither reformation nor counter-reformation. The participation of Uniatism in the major readjustment of Christianity to the more secularized society of early modern Europe may also have had an effect on the eventual receptivity of Uniatism to national movements. In any case, this question requires more elaboration and investigation.



## Notes

1. The portion of this essay dealing with the period from 1772 to 1914 is based on my article, "The Greek Catholic Church in Nineteenth-Century Galicia," in *Church, Nation and State in Russia and Ukraine*, ed. Geoffrey A. Hosking (London: Macmillan in association with the School of Slavonic and East European Studies, University of London, 1991), pp. 52-64. Material drawn from the earlier article is used with permission of the publisher.
2. The best general histories of the Greek Catholic Church in Galicia are: *Mykhail Harasevych* [Michael Harasiewicz], *Annales Ecclesiae Ruthenae* (Lviv, 1862); and Iulian Pelesh [Julian Pelesz], *Geschichte der Union der ruthenischen Kirche mit Rom von den aeltesten Zeiten bis auf die Gegenwart*, vol. 2 (Würzburg, Vienna, 1881); Anton Korczok, *Die griechisch-katholische Kirche in Galizien* (Leipzig and Berlin, 1921). A detailed bibliography may be found in Isydor I. Patrylo, *Dzherela i bibliohrafiia istorii ukrains'koi tserkvy*, *Zapysky ChSVV*, II, Sektsiia I: Pratsi, 33 (Rome, 1975); additions by the same author and under the same title have appeared in *Analecta OSBM*, 10 (16) (1979), pp. 406-87, and 12 (18) (1985), pp. 419-525.
3. Ivan L. Rudnytsky, "The Ukrainians in Galicia under Austrian Rule," in *Essays in Modern Ukrainian History* (Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 1987), pp. 315-52.
4. Przemyśl eparchy accepted the Union in 1692, Lviv eparchy in 1700 and the Stavropegial Brotherhood in Lviv in 1708.
5. See John-Paul Himka, "The Conflict between the Secular and the Religious Clergy in Eighteenth-Century Western Ukraine," *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 15, no. 1-2 (June 1991): 35-47.

6. See Jan Kozik, *The Ukrainian National Movement in Galicia: 1815-1849*, ed. Lawrence D. Orton (Edmonton, 1986).
7. Paul R. Magocsi, "The Ukrainian National Revival: A New Analytical Framework," *Canadian Review of Studies in Nationalism* 16, 1-2 (1989): 50.
8. There is a good scholarly biography of this bishop and later metropolitan (1860-3): Luigi Glinka, *Gregorio Jachymovyč—Metropolita di Halyč ed il suo tempo (1840-1865)*, 2nd ed., Analecta OSBM, Series II, Sectio I: Opera, 30 (Rome, 1974).
9. Martha Bohachevsky-Chomiak, *The Spring of a Nation: The Ukrainians in Eastern Galicia in 1848* (Philadelphia, 1967).
10. See John-Paul Himka, *Galician Villagers and the Ukrainian National Movement in the Nineteenth Century* (Edmonton, 1988), especially pp. 105-42.
11. Very revealing is a survey of the ecclesiastical affairs of the Slavs and Romanians in the Habsburg empire prepared by the Viennese Nuncio Mariano Falcinelli Antoniaci in March, 1864. The document is published in Gabriel Adriányi, *Ungarn und das I. Vaticanum* (Cologne: 1975), pp. 396-407.
12. For example: "The Union was always and remains to the present time the most insidious and dangerous invention in all respects—religious, national and political. The Union was contrived by the Jesuits as a means to catholicize the Orthodox and polonize the Russians...." "Polytycheskoie znachenie relyhioznoi unii," *Slovo*, 15, no. 6 (16 [28] January), p. 1.
13. Luigi Glinka, *Diocesi ucraino-cattolica di Cholm (Liquidazione ed incorporazione alla Chiesa russo-ortodossa) (Sec. XIX)*, Analecta OSBM, Series II, Sectio I: Opera, 34 (Rome, 1975).
14. I. K., "Odna duzhe vazhna sprava...", *Ruskii Sion*, 5 (1875), p. 301.

15. Excellent archival documentation on these issues can be found in Archivio Segreto Vaticano, Archivio della Nunziatura di Vienna, vols. 570 and 587, and in Vienna's Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv, Administrative Registratur, F. 28, K. 11.
  
16. In *Documenta Pontificum Romanorum historiam Ucrainae illustrantia* (1075-1953), vol. 2: 1770-1953, ed. Athanasius G. Welykyj, Analecta OSBM, Series II, Sectio III: Documenta romana Ecclesiae Unitae in terris Ucrainae et Belarussiae (Rome: PP. Baasiliani, 1954), pp. 452-9.
  
17. On radicalism, see John-Paul Himka, *Socialism in Galicia: The Emergence of Polish Social Democracy and Ukrainian Radicalism* (1860-1890) (Cambridge, 1983).
  
18. *Morality and Reality: The Life and Times of Andrei Sheptyts'kyi*, ed. Paul R. Magocsi (Edmonton, 1989). Cyrille Korolevskij, *Metropolit Andre Szeptyckyj 1865-1944*, Opera Theologicae Societatis Scientifica Ucrainorum, 16-17 (Rome, 1964). An as yet unpublished English language translation of this work has been prepared by Rev. Brian [Serge] Keleher. Gregor Prokoptschuk, *Metropolit Andreas Graf Scheptyckyj: Leben und Wirken des grossen Förderers der Kirchenunion*, 2nd ed. (Munich, 1967). Of particular merit is: Sophia Senyk, "Le métropolit André Šeptyc'kyj: Dimension spirituelle de sa vie et de son oeuvre," *Irenikon* 64, no. 1 (1991): 57-71.
  
19. *Tsars'kyi viazen' 1914-1917* (Lviv, 1918).
  
20. For example, the outstanding historian Ivan Krypiakevych had to earn his living teaching secondary school and writing popular and semi-popular works.
  
21. Krypiakevych taught there from 1934 to 1939.
  
22. Bohdan R. Bociurkiw, "The Uniate Church in the Soviet Ukraine: A Case Study in Soviet Church Policy," *Canadian Slavonic Papers* 7 (1965): 89-113.

23. Vasyl' Ivanyshyn, *Ukrains'ka tserkva i protses natsional'noho vidrodzhennia*, 2nd ed. (Drohobych, 1990).
24. Atanasii V. Pekar, *Narysy istorii tserkvy Zakarpattia*, vol. 1: *Ierarkhichne oformlennia*, *Analecta OSBM, Series II, Sectio I: Opera*, 22 (Rome: PP. Basiliani, 1967), pp. 95-112.
25. Of course, Orthodoxy played a role in the development of Russian, Serbian, Greek and Bulgarian nationalism—but a different role in each case.