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The Basic Historical Identity Formations in Ukraine: A Typology

JOHN-PAUL HIMKA

I AM CALLING THIS ESSAY a typology in reference to Weber's concept of an ideal type.¹ That is, I am going to employ a simplified abstraction, that of two Ukrainian identities, which any concretization would complicate immensely. A certain duality has been noted by most observers of contemporary Ukraine,² a duality that has shown up in the results of every election since independence. Some emphasize the regional split, i.e., between East and West, while others give precedence to the linguistic divide, i.e., between Russian and Ukrainian speakers.³ I intend to focus on two ideal types of national identity, what I call "Central European"⁴ and "post-Soviet" identity. I concede from the outset that reality is more complex than this. Mykola Riabchuk, the Ukrainian public intellectual most identified with the idea of "Two Ukraines," has spent many years now problematizing his own coinage.⁵ And his opponent in debate, the historian Yaroslav Hrytsak, while also accepting a basic duality between Ukraine's "West and the rest," responded with the proposition of "Twenty-Two Ukraines."⁶ After extensive field work in independent Ukraine, the anthropologist Catherine Wanner wrote that "the fracturing of Ukraine goes beyond an east-west dichotomy and creates national and linguistic divides that are far more blurred than the national allegiances that are assumed to follow linguistic lines."⁷

What I intend to do here is to outline a historical narrative of the development of my two ideal types of national identity. Any attempt to construct a historical narrative explaining all the complexities of the real situation, instead of an ideal typology, would result in a monstrous text of the everything-can-only-be-explained-by-everything variety. So I am simplifying the historical result in order to allow for a more ramified, but still serviceable, narrative of causality. When I refer to a national identity in this paper I really mean a discursive national identity project. I am identifying two such projects here. An introductory approximation of them is that the Central European identity is the Ukrainian-speaking one that dominates in the west of the country, and

the post-Soviet identity is the Russophone one that is widespread almost everywhere else in Ukraine. For my ideal-typical purposes, I will consider Galicia as the heartland of the first of these, and pre-1939 Soviet Ukraine as the heartland of the second. The other major characteristic of these two identities is that the Central European one is a “mutually exclusive” identity, while the post-Soviet one allows for a “hierarchy of multiple loyalties.”⁸ This is well illustrated by sociological research conducted from 1994 to 2003, which showed that about 60 percent of Ukraine’s population identified themselves as Ukrainian, about 10 percent as Russian, and nearly a quarter as “biethnors.” In Western Ukraine biethnors made up only 6 percent of the population, while in the East they accounted for 45 percent.⁹

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Let us turn to the history. It makes the most sense to begin with the formulation of the Ukrainian national idea in the early nineteenth century, but a few notes on earlier developments would not be out of place. No territory of Ukraine had a longer association with Poland than Galicia, which was integrated into that state in the 1380s and remained there until the first partition of Poland in 1772. At that time it passed to Austria. Most of the rest of Ukraine entered the Russian sphere in 1654, after the Cossacks sought the protection of the tsar. The whole phenomenon of Cossackdom bypassed Galicia. After 1700 the Orthodox church in Galicia entered into communion with Rome and became known as the Uniate Church (later as the Greek Catholic Church). Small pockets of Uniatism survived until 1875 in the Ukrainian-inhabited parts of the Russian Empire; otherwise the vast majority of the Ukrainian population remained Orthodox, at first under the patriarch of Constantinople and as of 1686 under the patriarch of Moscow.

I trace back a continuous discourse of the Ukrainian idea to the group centered around Kharkiv University that published the journal *Ukrainskii vestnik* in 1816–19. It incorporated into its discursive arsenal some works that appeared earlier, notably the poem *Eneida* by Ivan Kotliarevs’kyi, which is considered to be the first work published in the modern Ukrainian literary language (1798), and the manuscript of the anonymous *Istoriia Rusov*, which, although written in Russian and specifically rejecting the term “Ukrainian” in favor of “Little Russian,” adopted a position of exclusivist national identity, aggressively anti-Russian, anti-Polish, and anti-Jewish. The discourse around the Ukrainian idea diffused to the other university centers on Ukrainian territory, namely Kyiv and Lviv, in the 1830s and 1840s.

The development of the Ukrainian discourse in the Habsburg and Romanov empires until the great international crisis of 1914–20 is here explored with reference to three questions: What was the weight of exclusivity versus mul-

tiplicity in Ukrainian identity during the imperial period? How widespread in society was a sense of Ukrainian identity? How intense was national identity, i.e., how much did national identification matter in politics and in other spheres of life?

For most of the long nineteenth century, the discourse of national identity included both exclusivist and multiple-loyalty identities. The Ukrainian multiple-loyalty identities, in both Austria and Russia, included Ukrainians within either a Polish or Russian national context.

Some Polish romantics like Tymko Padura¹⁰ and the *chtōpomani* at Kyiv University in the early 1860s saw Ukrainian identity as a particularity within a larger Polish political and cultural identity. One of the leading *chtōpomani*, however, Włodzimerz Antonowicz, repudiated his Polish identity entirely, converted to Orthodoxy, and became one of the most prominent historians of Ukraine and activists of the Ukrainian movement in the Russian Empire.¹¹ There were later Polish defections to the Ukrainian camp too, notably the historian and political theorist Viacheslav Lypyns'kyi and his circle at the turn of the twentieth century.¹² The Polish connection was only important for the intelligentsia of Right-Bank Ukraine. Ukrainian activists from the Left Bank and Sloboda Ukraine, such as Panteleimon Kulish, Mykola Kostomarov, and Mykhailo Drahomanov, never considered themselves in any way connected with the Polish nation. However, their milieu had multiple loyalties in the Russian direction.¹³ Although in the early 1860s Kostomarov had articulated an influential argument about how Ukrainians differ from Russians, later in life he favored a bicultural identity.¹⁴ Many Russians considered Drahomanov to be the epitome of a Ukrainian national separatist, yet he wrote regularly in both Ukrainian and Russian, with the latter being his most comfortable language; he was active in both Ukrainian and all-Russian politics, and he sometimes expressed the view that Ukrainian culture was a specific branch of Russian culture. His best biographer categorized him as “an all-Russian liberal with Little Russian peculiarities” in the early 1870s who only later developed into a more distinctly Ukrainian activist.¹⁵ Even in this later period, however, he wrote impassioned polemics against the more thoroughgoing cultural exclusivism of Borys Hrinchenko.¹⁶ Aside from Hrinchenko, the most exclusivist figure in Ukrainophilism in Russia was Mykola Mikhnovs'kyi, who advocated Ukrainian state independence and also the idea that Ukraine should be for the Ukrainians alone.¹⁷

In Galicia, too, both identity strands were represented.¹⁸ In the revolution of 1848, some educated Ruthenians, as they were known in the nineteenth century, were allied with the Polish revolutionaries and considered there to be no contradiction between their Ruthenism and Polonism, but most of them organized a separate political organization, the Supreme Ruthenian Council, that opposed Polish aspirations and emphasized, against Polish claims to the

contrary, that Ruthenians constituted a distinct nationality from the Poles.¹⁹ Polish-Ukrainian political and cultural cooperation in Galicia was still possible in the 1890s, but by the early twentieth century the intensity of the Polish-Ukrainian conflict prevented it. A characteristic example is Ivan Franko, the greatest Ruthenian intellectual, who worked in both the Polish and Ukrainian press until the late 1890s, when he wrote something that resulted in his expulsion from the Polish press and even provoked gunfire in his direction; at the time Franko was moving from a socialist internationalist position to Ukrainian nationalism.²⁰ Although there were almost no Russians living in Galicia before World War I, there was a Ruthenian identity that considered itself to be part of a larger, all-Russian identity. These Russophiles,²¹ however, were not adherents of the Ukrainian idea, any more than were the “Little Russian” opponents of the Ukrainian movement in mid-nineteenth century Kyiv.²²

The Ukrainian identity as such in Galicia never included an additional loyalty to a Russian identity, and even vestigial loyalties to a Polish identity disappeared by the turn of the twentieth century. In Russia, however, many Ukrainophiles maintained a certain openness to Russian language, culture, and politics even after the collapse of the empire. Several factors may have nurtured this difference in outcome. It was often in the political interest of the Habsburg dynasty and central government in Vienna to discourage Ruthenians from identifying closely with either Poles or Russians; the tsarist government took decisive measures to separate the Ukrainian movement from Polish influence, but tolerated a Ukrainian identity only insofar as it was compatible with an all-Russian one. The Ukrainians in Galicia were influenced by the exclusivist national politics that dominated the late Habsburg Empire, particularly by the Czech-German conflict. The Ukrainians in Russia had the model of the most serious nationality conflict in the empire, the Polish-Russian conflict, but it was not a model that could inspire emulation: the Ukrainians did not have the resources to mount the kind of insurrectionary resistance that the Poles did. As Orthodox Slavs, ethnic Ukrainians in the Russian Empire could be accepted into the highest levels of the Russian political and cultural elite,²³ while in Galicia after the 1860s the Polish nobility made it impossible for Ruthenians to rise to high positions in the government of the crownland or Cisleithania as a whole; thus Ukrainians in Russia had an incentive to retain multiple identities that those in Galicia did not. Also in Galicia it was much easier to be an exclusivist Ukrainian, since there existed a parallel Ukrainian school system and other institutions, and the Ukrainian language could be used in the courts and government offices; all this was lacking in Russia, where the government severely restricted the use of the Ukrainian language and Ukrainians had to make use of Russian to function in society. Finally, there was an important religious difference: in Galicia the Greek Catholic Church differentiated Ruthenians from Poles (and Russians),

whereas in the Russian Empire Ukrainians and Russians were united by the same Orthodox Church.²⁴

An even more striking difference between the development of Ukrainian identity in Galicia and Russia is that in Galicia it penetrated much more widely and deeply in society. The Ukrainian movement was usually a minority movement among the intelligentsia of Russian Ukraine. There were times when it was quite popular, namely the early 1870s and early twentieth century, but even then it could not be said to have been hegemonic. In Russia, except for the revolutionary era of 1905–7, there were few opportunities for the Ukrainian intelligentsia to create and bring the wider public into a national public sphere. The lack of basic civic freedoms in the Russian Empire and specific regulations that for most purposes proscribed the public use of the Ukrainian language prevented the Ukrainian movement there from creating an infrastructure of urban and rural institutions, Ukrainian-language schools, and a Ukrainian-language press. In constitutional Austria, by contrast, Ukrainian newspapers, political parties, reading clubs, gymnastic clubs, cooperatives, and other associations drew the broad masses of the population into Ukrainian identity politics.²⁵ This critical difference between the Ukrainians of Russia and of Austria would show up dramatically during the revolutionary crisis of 1917–20.

National identity politics were also more intense in Galicia than in Dnieper Ukraine. In the latter territory many issues other than national politics moved the generally rather cosmopolitan intelligentsia, including the democratization or revolutionary transformation of all of Russia. By contrast, in Galicia, as in Austria as a whole, nationality was the key issue in politics, particularly after the reforms of the 1860s, and social questions were secondary. Educated Ruthenians of the late nineteenth century, with very few exceptions, took an active part in the national movement. Also, of course, the sphere for political activity was very constricted under tsarism, while the lifeblood of the Habsburg state was elections, political parties, and coalitions. The integration of almost the whole male population into electoral politics became possible when the suffrage was expanded in 1897 and 1907. In Galicia there were usually two candidates for each seat in the parliament or diet, a Pole and a Ukrainian. Every election was a moment of national contestation.

The differences in how Ukrainian identity was formed during the imperial period became manifest when the empires collapsed. Dnieper Ukrainians proved reluctant to cut their ties with Russia. After the abdication of the tsar in the spring of 1917, a Ukrainian Central Rada formed in Kyiv. It strove for autonomy within a federalized Russia. When the Bolsheviks seized power in Russia in the fall, the leaders of the Rada proclaimed the existence of a Ukrainian National Republic. Even though this new state was isolated from and did not recognize the newly created Soviet Russia, even though Ukraine

was independent *de facto*, the decree proclaiming the Ukrainian republic also declared that the republic was in federation with the Russian state that would be restored, they hoped, in the near future. Only when it needed German aid to combat the Bolsheviks in the winter of 1918 and had to sign the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk as an independent state did the Rada proclaim complete Ukrainian independence.²⁶ Even then the Rada regarded its declaration as a purely tactical and temporary measure. This emerges clearly from a brochure written by Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi, the president of the Rada, in the immediate aftermath of the proclamation of independence, which stated that Ukraine remained true to the principle of federalism even though it was impossible to implement under the present circumstances.²⁷ Nothing of that sort transpired in Galicia. As Austria was collapsing in the fall of 1918, Ukrainian forces seized Lviv and established the West Ukrainian National Republic. The only country with which it was interested in uniting was the Ukrainian National Republic to the east. There were no negotiations about autonomous status within a federally reconstituted Poland. The Galician Ukrainians immediately found themselves at war with the Poles and never negotiated for any settlement short of total independence. There was also no figure in the Galician revolution equivalent to Hetman Pavlo Skoropads'kyi, whose national identity exemplified the type of multiple loyalties. The title of a recently published profile of Skoropads'kyi says it all: "I Love Russia, and/but I Want Ukraine,' or How a Russian General Became Hetman of the Ukrainian State, 1917–1918."²⁸ This is not to say that there did not emerge an exclusivist Ukrainian national identity during the revolutionary era in Russia. There did, and it is associated with the figure of Symon Petliura, who was head of state and commander of the Ukrainian forces in 1919. Characteristically, although Petliura eventually traded Galicia to Poland for military aid against the Bolsheviks, he is the only figure of the Great Ukrainian revolution that entered into the Galician nationalist pantheon.

The difference between the parties to the conflict in both parts of Ukraine is also illuminating. In Galicia, the fight was simple: between the Poles and the Ukrainians. There were only three minor sideshows: a pro-Bolshevik insurrection in Drohobych and a brief Romanian occupation of Pokuttia, both in the spring of 1919, and the Soviet occupation of the Ternopil region during the Polish-Soviet war (summer 1920). In the territory that was to be included in Soviet Ukraine in the 1920s, the major combatants during the revolution and civil war were the Bolsheviks, the Volunteer Army, Petliura's Ukrainian army, Makhno's anarchist army, the Germans, and the Poles. Those who fought in the Ukrainian Galician Army and in Petliura's army became deeply imbued with a Ukrainian political identity, but clearly, given the number of sides in the conflict, national mobilization affected the Galicians more than their Great Ukrainian counterparts. Numbers make the point as well. Reporting to the Ukrainian diplomatic conference in Karlsbad in August 1919, Roman Smal'-

Stots'kyi stated that Petliura's army had 15,000 combat-ready infantry and 1000 cavalry, while the Galician Ukrainian Army, which by then had joined forces with Petliura, had 36,000 combat-ready infantry and also 1000 cavalry.²⁹ Yet there were just over 17 million Ukrainians in Russian Ukraine in 1897³⁰ and just over 3 million in Galicia in 1900.³¹ The revolutionary years intensified a Ukrainian national identity in Galicia more than in Dnieper Ukraine.

Although differences between the regional intensity and degree of exclusivity of Ukrainian identity were noticeable before, it was the interwar years that made the greatest difference. Defeated in battle with numerically superior Polish forces, the Galician Ukrainians failed to achieve statehood. Galicia was incorporated into Poland. The development of their political frustration has been chronicled many times,³² so we can limit ourselves to a brief statement of the major points. Nationalism was the hegemonic ideology of Ukrainian Galicia. Even the Sovietophile current of the 1920s was motivated by national concerns rather than sympathy with Bolshevism's radical ideology. When the pro-Soviet movement collapsed in the 1930s, the hegemony of nationalism was complete. There were still many moderate and conservative nationalists, but the youth was embracing a much more radical variant. Just as Galician Ukrainian nationalism had emerged in a Central European context, so it continued to develop in that context. But the context had undergone transformation after the European crisis of 1914–20. Consider, for example, how the Czech-German conflict had been transformed since Habsburg times. The Germans of Bohemia were now the underdogs, and they looked to the ideology and protection of National Socialist Germany. The new models that the Central European context offered Galicians were Italian fascism, Polish national democracy, and German national socialism. An already exclusivist nationalism became more aggressive in regard to the "other." The language became more violent, the ideology more violent, the political practice more violent. Many of the same impulses that drove the Iron Guard in Romania and Ustaša in Yugoslavia also drove interwar Galician Ukrainian nationalism.

The Ukrainian revolution in the former Russian Empire was not as decisively defeated as that in Galicia. Militarily it was just as decisively defeated, but the Bolsheviks, Lenin in particular, decided that the spirit of nationalism they encountered in Ukraine demanded substantial concessions.³³ One was the creation of a separate Ukrainian Soviet republic within the USSR. The resulting polity, the Ukrainian SSR, although falling short of nationalist ideals, had enough attributes of statehood that it could eventually be transformed into the Ukraine that became independent in 1991. The second major concession was the policy of Ukrainization, which was pursued with particular intensity in the late 1920s. A specific form of modern Ukrainian identity (along with other features of modernization) was acquired by most Ukrainians at that time through the aegis of the Soviet state. The latter fostered a Ukrainian identity in

important ways: through the educational system, through cultural institutions, through Ukrainian-language media, and a little later, in the 1940s, through the unification of all Ukrainian lands and expulsion of some national minorities. The Bolsheviks knew too little about Ukrainian culture to design a proper Soviet version by themselves without relying on the national intelligentsia for ideas.³⁴ In the end, a Soviet Ukrainian identity emerged that differed in many respects from the Central European identity that was being forged in Galicia.

The Soviets discouraged the development of any anti-Russian side to this Ukrainian identity, particularly from 1930 on. As a "gardening state," the Soviet Union weeded out representatives of the wrong kind of Ukrainian identity; offenders not only lost their positions, but were often imprisoned, exiled, or executed. The Soviet Ukrainian identity otherwise fostered a certain amount of xenophobia, towards the bourgeois West always, and at times towards Poles and Jews. In different periods and with different intensities the state encouraged Ukrainian-Russian bilingualism and intermarriage and migration between republics. Ukrainians were expected and encouraged to participate in all-Soviet culture and society rather than just in the Soviet Ukrainian national culture that had been created.

The consequences of these different political cultures were played out during World War II. In the late 1930s radical Galician nationalists hoped that Hitler would play the Ukrainian card against the Soviet Union. They therefore flocked to Carpatho-Ukraine after the Munich settlement and formed the bulk of its armed forces. They were disappointed when Carpatho-Ukraine was given to Hungary in March 1939 and more disappointed when Hitler made common cause with Stalin to divide Poland between them at the end of the summer. When Galicia came under Soviet rule, many Ukrainian nationalists fled to Kraków in the German zone. As tensions developed in the Nazi-Soviet alliance, the Ukrainian nationalists again became useful to the Germans, and they were eager to please. When Germany attacked the Soviet Union in June 1941 the nationalists were supportive in many ways, and the Ukrainian population of Galicia welcomed the Germans as liberators from Bolshevik misrule. The nationalists were again disappointed when the Germans would not allow them to establish a Ukrainian state, not even along the lines of Tiso's Slovakia or Ustaša Croatia.³⁵

The attitudes of Galician nationalists are legible in the two fighting forces that they established during the war. One was the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, generally known as UPA from its Ukrainian initials. It became active in the spring of 1943, but at first outside Galicia, in neighboring Volhynia. UPA engaged in some anti-German actions, but this did not constitute the primary focus of their activities. Their first main target was the Polish population in Volhynia, which they proceeded to massacre. As the Soviet front approached,

they established a friendly neutrality vis-à-vis the Germans and turned their attention to the Soviets. UPA launched a massive anti-Soviet insurgency that lasted until the early 1950s and claimed many ten thousands of lives. Altogether, at its peak in 1944, UPA had between 25,000 and 40,000 soldiers, not all of whom were Galician.³⁶ The second force was the Waffen-SS Division Galizien, also formed in the spring of 1943, but in Galicia and composed overwhelmingly of Galician Ukrainians. The Ukrainian Central Committee, headed by Professor Volodymyr Kubijovyč, had been lobbying for the formation of a Ukrainian unit in German service since the war began. When permission was finally granted, 80,000 Ukrainians volunteered for it, although fewer than 20,000 actually served in its ranks. The Ukrainians who joined it felt that they were creating the nucleus of a national army that would serve them in good stead when the Germans withdrew from Ukrainian territory.³⁷

The response to the German invasion on the territory of pre-1939 Ukraine was quite different.³⁸ The initial attitude of the population to the Germans was wait and see. After they waited and saw, the vast majority became anti-German and wanted the Red Army to return and restore the Soviet regime. **No pro-German military formations were established.** There seem to be two reasons for this different attitude. First, the kind of Ukrainian identity that led the Galicians to understand the Germans as allies was absent in the old Soviet Ukraine; Galician nationalists who made expeditions into these parts were met with incomprehension and hostility by the local population.³⁹ Secondly, the treatment of the Ukrainian population in pre-1939 Ukraine was much harsher than the treatment of the Ukrainians in Galicia. The populations were in two completely different administrative units—Galicia in the Generalgouvernement and the old Soviet Ukraine mainly in the Reichskommissariat Ukraine. **Ukrainians in Galicia received preferential treatment as a counterweight to the Polish population. Ukrainians in the Reichskommissariat also experienced some preferential treatment compared to Russians, but it did not make much of a difference because the overall policy was so harsh.** Certain aspects of Nazi policy were resented in both jurisdictions, e.g., the recruitment of forced laborers for work in Germany (*Ostarbeiter*). But some applied differentially to the Reichskommissariat, e.g., the maltreatment of Soviet POWs, or only to the Reichskommissariat, e.g., the deliberate decision to starve the urban population. The vast majority of Ukrainians from the Reichskommissariat who fought in the war served exclusively in the Red Army.

With the restoration of Soviet rule came the great reckoning. In Galicia the Soviets had to expunge the nationalist insurgency. In the course of suppressing UPA, over 100,000 West Ukrainians were exiled to Siberia, and many others were simply executed or died in combat. In the old Soviet Ukraine the record of what each Communist did during the war was carefully examined, and those who failed the test were expelled from the party or worse. About 90 percent



of those who remained behind on occupied Ukrainian territory were excluded from the party as a result of this review.⁴⁰ Red Army veterans were the ones who took over local leadership positions in Soviet Ukraine.

In the postwar era, the Central European version of Ukrainian identity disappeared from public life. The Greek Catholic Church was liquidated in 1946,⁴¹ and its priests were given the choice between conversion to Russian Orthodoxy or exile to Siberia. After the death of Stalin, and particularly in 1956, many UPA veterans, other suspected nationalists, and Greek Catholic priests were amnestied and returned to Ukraine. The Greek Catholic Church and to a much lesser extent nationalist networks continued a precarious and minimal underground existence in Galicia, though even here the Soviet version of Ukrainian identity was gaining ground. Occasionally a Galician dissident would emerge who espoused views that were recognizably of the old Central European nationalist variety, e.g., Valentyn Moroz,⁴² but most Galicians tried to avoid politics and cultural politics, retreating, as most Soviet citizens did, into close networks of family and friends. **Where the Central European Ukrainian identity did survive was in the diaspora.** About 150,000 Galicians emigrated to the West, primarily to North America, in the aftermath of World War II.⁴³ They established branches of the nationalist political parties that had existed in Galicia, veterans' associations for the members of the Division Galizien and for the much smaller number of emigré survivors of UPA, and many other institutions informed by their own type of identity politics. They also became a force within the Greek Catholic Church, which had existed in North America since the late nineteenth–early twentieth century, when it was brought by an earlier wave of economic immigrants.

Glasnost' and *perestroika* were slow to affect Ukraine, but the transformation initiated by the Gorbachev reforms was well underway by 1988–89. Of course, a key element of this transformation was the reassertion of Ukrainian national identity. The first manifestations seemed to break free of the dichotomy between the Central European and Soviet versions. The original program of the Ukrainian popular front Rukh in 1989 envisioned a state that was pro-Ukrainian without being anti-anyone.⁴⁴ Ukraine's first president, Leonid Kravchuk, adopted this program as his own. He promoted Ukrainian nation-construction, but avoided divisive issues, such as evaluating the legacy of UPA and the Division Galizien, and emphasized the rights of all citizens regardless of ethnicity. Both Rukh and Kravchuk attempted to find a middle ground between an ethnically based Ukrainian identity and a civic identity based on Ukrainian citizenship. This attempt was not successful, however, and over the 1990s, the new quasi-civil conception gave ground to the two older, historically formed identities.

In Galicia the Central European concept of national identity was *reconstituted* in the 1990s. I observed this as a frequent visitor to Lviv in 1989 and after,

but the subject has yet to be researched by scholars. It is often forgotten that the Soviet version of Ukrainian identity had made substantial progress in Lviv by the mid-1980s. The language of the school playgrounds was at that time largely Russian. The population of the city had undergone tremendous social advancement under Soviet rule. The murder of the Jews, the deportation of the Poles, and the emigration of the nationalists had almost emptied the city, and tens of thousands of Ukrainians came to Lviv from the countryside, especially in the 1960s and 1970s.⁴⁵ The urbanization of former peasants had thus occurred under Soviet auspices, as had the electrification and modernization of the villages. Although the Soviet regime had been introduced into Galicia by tremendous violence, that violence ended in the 1950s, and since then people had benefited from and grown used to the Soviet system. Characteristically, collectivized agriculture, though imposed by force, has been very difficult to dismantle, since many feel it serves their interests better than privatization would. The old Central European nationalism did not simply survive: it was, I argue, reconstituted. That attitudes were different closer to 1989 is illustrated by opinion polls in Western Ukraine in 1990 concerning church preferences: at that time in Lviv oblast only 28 percent of the population wanted to return to the recently restored Greek Catholic Church and the same percentage wanted to remain under the Moscow patriarchate; in Ivano-Frankivsk oblast the percentages were 22 and 29, in Ternopil oblast 12 and 49.⁴⁶ Today the vast majority of believers in the Galician oblasts belong to the Greek Catholic Church, and the percentage of parishes under the jurisdiction of the Moscow patriarchate has declined (1998) to 2 each in both Lviv and Ivano-Frankivsk oblasts and to 14 in Ternopil oblast.⁴⁷ (It should be noted that the northern portion of Ternopil oblast lies outside historic Galicia and includes Pochaiv monastery, an important center of Orthodoxy.)

The resurgence of the Central European nationalism had many sources. Of course, throughout Central and Eastern Europe the fall of Communism initiated a renewed interest in and respect for the pre-Communist political heritage. Many who were "execrated until very recently as nationalists, Fascists and Nazi collaborators...would now have statues raised in honour of their wartime heroism..."⁴⁸ As elsewhere in the region, there was the influence of the diaspora. Many Ukrainians from North America and Central and Western Europe migrated to Ukraine and occupied influential positions. The Greek Catholic Church has been run by individuals from the diaspora since its reemergence in 1989. The first metropolitan installed in Lviv was an American citizen, as was the second (and currently reigning) metropolitan. Both rectors of the Lviv Theological Academy (later Ukrainian Catholic University) came from abroad. The first minister of justice after the Orange Revolution was an American-Ukrainian who adopted Ukrainian citizenship. Leading publishing projects from the diaspora, including the journal *Suchasnist'* and the publish-



ing company Smoloskyp, moved from America to Ukraine. The head of the Bandera wing of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists transferred her residence from Germany to Ukraine and was elected to the Ukrainian parliament. Numerous NGOs and foreign-aid organizations have hired Ukrainians from Canada and the United States to key positions. The influence of the diaspora has by no means been limited to Galicia—Kyiv is rather the primary recipient of the return migration of the diaspora (except for work in the Greek Catholic Church). In Galicia a crucial moment for the reconstitution of the Central European vision of identity was the 1990 local elections, which transferred power in the three Galician oblasts to V'iacheslav Chornovil and other former political prisoners. They formed a "Galician Assembly," pursued a more radically nationalist agenda, and created the conditions locally for a shift in public attitudes. Not many years previously families might have been more inclined to remember relatives who were murdered by UPA, but now they remembered those who fought in its ranks.⁴⁹ Similarly, where once grandparents hid the fact that they had spent years in a labor camp, now they told not only their grandchildren but the public at large of their experiences. Pride in the Ukrainian nationalist tradition grew.

For both Galicia and the rest of Ukraine, the possibility of a new, unifying national idea was badly damaged by the failure of the Ukrainian state in the first decade of its existence to foster the prosperity that it promised would result from independence. The quasi-civic nationalism that had been held up as an ideal in 1989–90 depended on a positive attitude towards the state and the new society formed after independence, but that positive attitude disappeared with the purchasing power of the currency in the early 1990s. Disillusionment led to nostalgia for the Soviet past in most of Ukraine, at least among the older generation, and to aspirations for a past-informed nationalist future in Galicia. Anything seemed preferable to the present, to the reality.

The post-Soviet Ukrainian identity is not well articulated. A Polish scholar managed to write an entire, otherwise very perceptive book on debates over identity in independent Ukraine without finding a single textual formulation of it.⁵⁰ There are such formulations,⁵¹ but they are not as plentiful or well known as texts expressing what I call Central European identity. I would characterize the post-Soviet identity as follows. It is not particularly interested in nationality questions, but it is strongly opposed to the ethnic nationalism espoused by Galicians. It mirrors culturally the "multivector" policy of the Kuchma government, open, that is, to both the West and, somewhat more, to Russia. In daily life and for most purposes, it makes use of the Russian language, but is comfortable with the use of Ukrainian for official purposes. The post-Soviet identity also is characterized by a strong sense of region.⁵²

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The way history as a discipline works is that it explains by narrative the origins of the present situation. As the present situation changes, the questions asked of history change as well, but history as such does not have much to say about the direction of change, that is, about the future, and it at least formally refrains from advocating such a direction. Instead of a conclusion that summarizes what has already been said, I would like to depart a bit from pure history and to offer some speculation about the future direction of national identity in Ukraine as well as to say a few words about what I think ought to be done.

To begin with the point I abstracted from at the commencement of my study: the reality is always more complex and more varied than the ideal type. In reality there are many other tendencies discernible in the country than the two main ones whose historical development I have outlined above. In Transcarpathia, for example, there has developed in addition to both standard Ukrainian identities a local Rusyn identity. I doubt that this will have much influence within the Ukrainian political context as a whole, but another locally rooted identity formation probably will. I have in mind what seems to be developing in Kyiv. I call this the Euro-Ukrainian identity, and it was much in evidence during the Orange Revolution. Kyiv is the administrative capital of Ukraine, and the city's population benefits immensely from the existence of the Ukrainian state. It has the most all-Ukrainian identity in Ukraine. The elite of the city looks culturally to both Russia and, somewhat more, to the West. As does the bulk of Ukraine, it speaks Russian and uses Ukrainian like Ukrainians once used Church Slavonic, for ceremonial and official purposes. But it votes like Galicia. Something may well be incubating in the capital that will put an end to Ukraine's fundamental identity divide. I must note too that there are also present in Kyiv some strands of extreme xenophobia and anti-Semitism that are local products,⁵³ even though they find considerable resonance in Galicia. From the vantage point of the present, of course, it is not possible to predict future outcomes, and here what I am really doing is warning against imagining that historical development has such inertia that the past is the sole determinant of the future.

As to what should be done, I take the position that it is necessary to radically rethink the Ukrainian idea and work out a better version of it, one that supersedes the old dichotomy and offers a humane, tolerant alternative, an identity that could form the background of Ukraine's development into a more productive and contributing global citizen. It is precisely with such an optimistic, if inchoate, vision that I undertook this historical review of the two basic historical Ukrainian identities.

NOTES

1. I would like to thank Mark Baker and Catherine Wanner for their comments, and also the many scholars who took part in the discussion which followed my presentation of an earlier version of this paper at the National Convention of the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies, Salt Lake City, 3–6 November 2005.
2. One could cite many other examples, but a good one is Andrew Wilson, *Ukrainian Nationalism in the 1990s: A Minority Faith* (Cambridge, 1997), passim, and esp. 194–96.
3. Numerous articles by Dominique Arel are the best exponents of the role of the language factor in modern Ukrainian politics. See, for example, “The ‘Orange Revolution’: Analysis and Implications of the 2004 Presidential Election in Ukraine,” Third Annual Stasiuk-Cambridge Lecture on Contemporary Ukraine, Cambridge University, 25 February 2005. The text is available as a PDF file on the website of the Chair of Ukrainian Studies, University of Ottawa: http://www.ukrainianstudies.uottawa.ca/pdf/Arel_Cambridge.pdf.
4. I chose this name as a deliberate provocation to the “Central European” nostalgia project. See John-Paul Himka, “What’s in a Region? (Notes on ‘Central Europe’),” HABSBURG, 8 May 2002, archived in H-Net Discussion.
5. Mykola Ryabchuk, “Two Ukraines?” *East European Reporter* 5, no. 4 (July–August 1992): 18–22; Mykola Riabchuk, *Dvi Ukraïny: real’ni mezhi, virtual’ni viiny* (Kyiv, 2003).
6. Iaroslav Hrytsak, *Strasti za natsionalizm: Istorychni ese* (Kyiv, 2004), 216–28; see also 189–93, 195, 263, 275, 322.
7. Catherine Wanner, *Burden of Dreams: History and Identity in Post-Soviet Ukraine* (University Park, Penn., 1998), xxvi.
8. See Paul R. Magocsi, “The Ukrainian National Revival: A New Analytical Framework,” in his *The Roots of Ukrainian Nationalism: Galicia as Ukraine’s Piedmont* (Toronto, 2002), 51–54.
9. Myroslav Popovych, “Problem of National Self-Identification in Ukraine,” *The Action Ukraine Report*, no. 575, article 12, 2 October 2005.
10. This is a figure badly in need of a modern scholarly biography. Until such appears, see [K. Wyld], “O życiu i pismach Tomasza Padurra,” in Tymko Padurra, *Pyśma* (Lviv, 1874).
11. Bohdan Klid, “Volodymyr Antonovych: The Cultural Politics of Nationbuilding and Ukrainian Populist Historiography,” in *Historiography of Imperial Russia: The Profession and Writing of History in a Multinational State*, ed. Thomas Sanders (Armonk, N.Y., 1999), 373–93. There is a great deal more about these issues in Klid’s unpublished dissertation: “Volodymyr Antonovych: The Making of a Ukrainian Populist Activist and Historian” (Ph.D. diss., University of Alberta, 1992).
12. Jaroslaw Pelenski, ed., *The Political and Social Ideas of Vjačeslav Lypyns’kyi*, special issue of *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 9, no. 3–4 (1985).

13. The classic study for the first half of the nineteenth century is George S. N. Luckyj, *Between Gogol' and Ševčenko: Polarity in the Literary Ukraine: 1798–1847*, Harvard Series in Ukrainian Studies 8 (Munich, 1971).
14. Thomas M. Prymak, *Mykola Kostomarov: A Biography* (Toronto, 1996).
15. Anatolii Kruhlov, *Drama intelektualna: politychni ideï Mykhaila Drahomanova* (Chernivtsi, 2000), 293.
16. "Chudats'ki dumky pro Ukraïns'ku natsional'nu spravu," in M. P. Drahomanov, *Vybrane: ...mii zadum zlozhyty ocherk istorii tsyvilizatsii na Ukraïni*, Pam'iatky istorychnoi dumky Ukraïny (Kyiv, 1991), 461–558.
17. Taras Hunczak [Hunchak] and Roman Solchanyk [Sol'chanyk], eds., *Ukraïns'ka suspil'no-politychna dumka v 20 stolitti: dokumenty i materialy*, 3 vols. (New York, 1983), 1:61–72, 110–13.
18. For a comprehensive survey of identity choices in Habsburg Galicia, see John-Paul Himka, "The Construction of Nationality in Galician Rus': Icarian Flights in Almost All Directions." In *Intellectuals and the Articulation of the Nation*, ed. Ronald Grigor Suny and Michael D. Kennedy (Ann Arbor, 1999), 109–64.
19. Jan Kozik, *The Ukrainian National Movement in Galicia: 1815–1849*, ed. Lawrence D. Orton (Edmonton, 1986).
20. For a brilliant recent treatment of Franko's intellectual evolution, see Yaroslav Hrytsak, "Franko's Boryslav Cycle: An Intellectual History," *Journal of Ukrainian Studies* 29, nos. 1–2 (Summer–Winter 2004): 169–89; see also his *Prorok u svoïi vitchyzni: Franko ta ioho spil'nota (1856–1886)* (Kyiv, 2006).
21. Anna Veronika Wendland, *Die Russophilen in Galizien: Ukrainische Konservative zwischen Österreich und Rußland, 1848–1915* (Vienna, 2001).
22. Alexei Miller, *The Ukrainian Question: Russian Nationalism in the 19th Century* (Budapest, 2003).
23. Andreas Kappeler, "Mazepisten, Kleinrussen, Chochols: Die Ukrainer in der ethnischen Hierarchie des Rußländischen Reiches," in his *Der schwierige Weg zur Nation: Beiträge zur neueren Geschichte der Ukraine*, Wiener Archiv für die Geschichte des Slawentums und Osteuropas, Veröffentlichungen des Instituts für Osteuropäische Geschichte der Universität Wien, 20 (Vienna, 2003), 36–53.
24. For a stimulating comparison of the Ukrainian movement in Austria and Russia, see Kappeler, "Die ukrainische Nationalbewegung im Russischen Reich und in Galizien: Ein Vergleich," in *Der Schwierige Weg*, 70–87.
25. John-Paul Himka, *Galician Villagers and the Ukrainian National Movement in the Nineteenth Century* (Edmonton, London and New York, 1988); Andriy Zayarnyuk, "Framing the Ukrainian Peasantry in Habsburg Galicia: 1846–1914 (with Focus on the Sambir Area)" (Ph.D. diss., University of Alberta, 2003). A revised version of this important work is expected to be published by the Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies Press.
26. According to the Rada's president, Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi, "the first motivation" for declaring independence was "the conclusion of the peace." "The need for a more decisive policy in the struggle with the crusade of Great Russia under the leader-

- ship of the People's Commissars against Ukraine" was "the second motivation." Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi, "Ukraïns'ka samostiinist' i ii istorychna neobkhdnist'," in *Vybrani pratsi: vydano z nahody 25-richchia z dnia ioho smerty (1934–1959)*, ed. Mykola Halii (New York, 1960), 37.
27. "Ukraine has become an independent, separate state. How long it will remain in this condition, i.e., how soon it will have the real possibility of establishing a federative link with other republics, no one can say for certain at this moment." Hrushevs'kyi, "Velykyi oboviazok," in *Vybrani pratsi*, 35. (The brochure consisted of a series of short articles.) "Not breaking with the traditional idea of federalism, leaving the last word in this matter to the Ukrainian Constituent Assembly, the Central Rada nonetheless has considered it necessary for the given moment to underscore the complete and absolute independence of the Ukrainian Republic, i.e., its full right to manage itself.... With those with whom it has common interests, it will establish a federative link.... Not breaking with the federalist tradition, as the leading idea of our national-political life, we must firmly say that now our slogan is independence." Hrushevs'kyi, "Ukraïns'ka samostiinist'," 37, 39.
 28. Mark von Hagen, *Journal of Ukrainian Studies* 29, nos. 1–2 (Summer–Winter 2004): 115–48.
 29. Taras Hunczak, ed., *Ukraine and Poland in Documents 1918–1922*, 2 vols.; Sources for the History of Ruś-Ukraine 12 (New York, 1983), 1:265.
 30. Bohdan Krawchenko, *Social Change and National Consciousness in Twentieth-Century Ukraine* (London, 1985), 4.
 31. Volodymyr Okhrymovych, "Z polia natsional'noi statystyky Halychyny," *Studii z polia suspil'nykh nauk i statystyky* 1 (1909): 67–68.
 32. Bohdan Budurowycz, "Poland and the Ukrainian Problem, 1921–1939," *Canadian Slavonic Papers* 25, no. 4 (December 1983): 473–500; John-Paul Himka, "Western Ukraine between the Wars," *Canadian Slavonic Papers* 34, no. 4 (December 1992): 391–412; Andrzej Chojnowski, *Koncepcje polityki narodowościowej rządów polskich w latach 1921–1939* (Wrocław, 1979); Alexander J. Motyl, *The Turn to the Right: The Ideological Origins and Development of Ukrainian Nationalism, 1919–1929* (Boulder, Colo., 1980); Janusz Radziejowski, "Kształtowanie się oblicza ideowego radykalnego nacjonalizmu ukraińskiego (1917–1929)," in *Polska - Polacy - mniejszości narodowe*, ed. Ewa Grześkowiak-Łuczyk (Wrocław: 1992), 303–28; Shimon Redlich, "Jewish-Ukrainian Relations in Inter-War Poland as Reflected in Some Ukrainian Publications," *Polin* 11 (1998): 232–46.
 33. Much of my account here is inspired by Terry Martin, *The Affirmative Action Empire: Nations and Nationalism in the Soviet Union, 1923–1939* (Ithaca, N.Y., and London, 2001).
 34. This was true not only in the 1920s, but even at the height of Stalinism. See Serhy Yekelchuk, *Stalin's Empire of Memory: Russian-Ukrainian Relations in the Soviet Historical Imagination* (Toronto, 2004).
 35. The best general account of Ukrainian nationalism in Galicia during World War

- II remains John A. Armstrong, *Ukrainian Nationalism*, 2nd ed. (Littleton, Colo., 1980).
36. *Encyclopedia of Ukraine*, 5 vols, ed. Volodymyr Kubijovyč and Danylo Husar Struk (Toronto, 1984–93), s.v. “Ukrainian Insurgent Army” by P. Sodol.
 37. Probably the best book on the Division is Andrii Bolianovs’kyi, *Dyviziiia “Halychyna”: Istoriiia* (Lviv, 2000).
 38. Karel C. Berkhoff, *Harvest of Despair: Life and Death in Ukraine under Nazi Rule* (Cambridge, Mass., 2003). I have also learned from Oleksandr Ivanovych Melnyk, “Behind the Frontlines: War, Genocide and Identity in the Kherson Region of Ukraine, 1941–1944” (M.A. thesis, University of Alberta, 2004).
 39. Amir Weiner, *Making Sense of War: The Second World War and the Fate of the Bolshevik Revolution* (Princeton and Oxford, 2001) 240–51. Kate Brown, *A Biography of No Place: From Ethnic Borderland to Soviet Heartland* (Cambridge, Mass., 2004), 214–16.
 40. Weiner, *Making Sense of War*, 122.
 41. Bohdan Rostyslav Bociurkiw, *The Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church and the Soviet State (1939–1950)* (Edmonton and Toronto, 1996).
 42. Valentyn Moroz, *Boomerang: The Works of Valentyn Moroz*, ed. Yaroslav Bihun (Baltimore, 1974).
 43. My estimate is based on Ann Lencyk Pawliczko, “Historical Background of Emigration from Ukraine,” in Ann Lencyk Pawliczko, ed., *Ukraine and Ukrainians throughout the World: A Demographic and Sociological Guide to the Homeland and Its Diaspora* (Toronto, 1994), 117; Volodymyr Bandera, “Ukraiñtsi v ZSA,” in *Ukraiñs’ki poselennia: dovidnyk*, ed. Atanas M. Milianych et al., *Ukraiñs’kyi sotsiolohichnyi instytut, Zapysky Naukovoho tovarystva im. Shevchenka 200* (New York, 1980), 265; Lubomyr Y. Luciuk, *Searching for Place: Ukrainian Displaced Persons, Canada, and the Migration of Memory* (Toronto, 2000); Wsevolod W. Isajiw and Andrii Makuch, “Ukrainians in Canada,” in Pawliczko, *Ukraine and Ukrainians throughout the World*, 334.
 44. The key passage: “*Rukh* considers as one of its most important tasks the democratic and just resolution of those problems that concern the existence and development of the Ukrainian people, the safeguarding of its equality with other peoples, as well as the fulfillment of the national needs of the Byelorussians, Bulgarians, Crimean Tatars, Gagauz, Germans, Greeks, Gypsies, Hungarians, Jews, Moldavians, Poles, Russians, Slovaks and other nationalities that reside in the republic.” The Popular Movement of Ukraine for Restructuring Rukh, *Program and Charter* (Kyiv, 1989), 27.
 45. Hrytsak, *Strasti za natsionalizmom*, 236.
 46. Friedrich Heyer, *Kirchengeschichte der Ukraine im 20. Jahrhundert: Von der Epochenwende des ersten Weltkrieges bis zu den Anfängen in einem unabhängigen ukrainischen Staat* (Göttingen, 2003), 394.
 47. Information from Serhii Plokhly, then director of the Church Studies Program, Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies.

48. Tony Judt, *Postwar: A History of Europe since 1945* (New York, 2005), 824.
49. I do not think the case of my wife's family is atypical. Of the siblings of her father and mother, one was exiled for belonging to UPA, two were killed by UPA, and one both served UPA as a courier and was killed by UPA.
50. Ola Hnatiuk, *Pożegnanie z imperium: ukraińskie dyskusje o tożsamości* (Lublin, 2003).
51. For example: P. P. Tolochko, *Vid Rusi do Ukraïny: vybrani naukovo-populiarni, krtytchni ta publitsystychni pratsi* (Kyiv, 1997); P. P. Tolochko, *Nespovidymi puti Ukraïny: vybrani naukovo-populiarni ta publitsystychni pratsi* (Kyiv, 2004). Tolochko sees Ukrainians and Russians as inextricably linked. He also (at least in 1995) shows the influence of the quasi-civic program of Rukh and Kravchuk: "The national idea is not an ethnic category, but state-political. Accordingly, it should be close and comprehensible not only for ethnic Ukrainians, but for Ukrainian Russians, Belarusians, Tatars, Hungarians, Romanians, Bulgarians, Jews, and other peoples, for whom Ukraine constitutes the motherland" ("Imeet li Ukraina natsional'nuu ideiu?" in Tolochko, *Vid Rusi do Ukraïny*, 334–35).
52. For a well thought-out analysis, see Andrii Portnov, "Svoboda ta vybir na Donbasi," *Krytyka* (March 2005): 5–6.
53. I have in mind such phenomena as the Interregional Academy of the Administration of Personnel (MAUP), the publications of Vasyl' Yaremenko, and the vicious beating of a Jewish student on 28 August 2005.