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JOHN-PAUL HIMKA

## Priests and Peasants: The Greek Catholic Pastor and the Ukrainian National Movement in Austria, 1867-1900

The clergy often plays a leading role in the early phases of national movements. This has been especially true in eastern Europe, where Slovak pastors and Slovene bishops adorn the national pantheons. As national movements mature, however, clerical leadership seems to wane.<sup>1</sup> No metaphysical Spirit of Modernization is responsible for this progression from clericalism to secularization in national movements. Instead, the progression appears to derive from real ideological and social contradictions inherent in national movements. Such is the burden of this case study of the rise and decline of clerical leadership in one east European national movement. The present article explores the participation of the Greek Catholic or Uniate clergy in the Ukrainian national movement in Austria.<sup>2</sup>

There is a saying about Greek Catholics: they never quite escaped Byzantium, and never quite made it to Rome.<sup>3</sup> Greek Catholicism inhabits

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1. The Czech scholar Miroslav Hroch has measured the extent of clerical involvement in the national movements of seven nations. Although he notes very significant clerical participation in the earliest phases of all these national movements, he concludes that as the movements developed there was "a universal decline in [the clergy's] participation." *Die Vorkämpfer der nationalen Bewegung bei den kleinen Völkern Europas: Eine vergleichende Analyse zur gesellschaftlichen Schichtung der patriotischen Gruppen* (Prague, 1968), p. 132.

2. For a brief survey of the Greek Catholic Church in Galicia under Austrian rule, see *Ukraine: A Concise Encyclopaedia*, Volodymyr Kubijovyč (ed.), 2 vols. (Toronto, 1963-71), II, 185-90.

3. "...pro uniiata kazhut' zvychaino, shcho vin ani vid Tsarhorodu ne utik, ani do Rymu ne

a middle world between Roman Catholicism and Orthodoxy. With Orthodoxy, Greek Catholicism shares ritual and tradition; with Roman Catholicism, dogma and recognition of papal supremacy. Since 1596, when Ukrainian Orthodox bishops at the Council of Brest accepted union with the Roman Catholic Church, the Greek Catholics have been under pressure to conform ever more closely to the Roman Catholic mode of ecclesiastical life. The process of Latinization frequently provoked a reaction among the lower clergy, which sought to preserve traditional religious customs and rituals. Historically, inasmuch as Ukraine has been under Polish rule, Latinization has meant Polonization and the clergy's opposition to it has often therefore been accompanied by and justified in terms of Ukrainian patriotism. Just as the Lithuanian clergy first fought Russification in order to check the penetration of Orthodoxy, so also the Ukrainian clergy opposed Polonization in order to remain faithful to their ancestral religious traditions. In both the Lithuanian and Ukrainian cases, the clergy, in following the particular interests of its station, contributed significantly to the development of the national movement.<sup>4</sup>

In the last part of the nineteenth century, the Ukrainians in the Russian Empire were Orthodox,<sup>5</sup> while those under the Austrian monarchy were Greek Catholic. In Russia, where Orthodoxy was the state religion, religion served to *integrate* Ukrainians into all-Russian society. In Austrian Galicia, however, religion *differentiated* the Ukrainians from the Roman Catholic Poles, who cohabited and — after 1868 — ruled the relatively autonomous crownland of Galicia. Religion, then, was important to the Ukrainian national movement in Austria, but superfluous to the movement in Russia. While in Russia the Orthodox clergy had been Russified and only part of the *secular* intelligentsia identified themselves as Ukrainians, in Galicia the Greek Catholic clergy played an important part in the national movement. In fact, the eminent Polish historian Stefan Kieniewicz has called the Ukrainian national movement in Austria “the most clericalized national movement in Europe.”<sup>6</sup>

This is not to say that the Ukrainian movement formed, as it were, a mere branch of ecclesiastical politics. Whatever the contribution of the clergy to a national movement, the most critical role in initiating and directing mass political movements has always been assumed by the secular urban intelligentsia.<sup>7</sup> It is the intelligentsia — the instigator of the

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dobih.” Natal’ Vakhnianyn, *Prychynky do istorii ruskoj spravy v Halychyni v litakh 1848-1870* (Lviv, 1901), p. 65.

4. Cf., Hroch, p. 132. See also Paul R. Brass, “Ethnicity and Nationality Formation,” *Ethnicity*, III, no. 3 (September 1976), 230.

5. The last Uniate diocese in Russia, the Chełm diocese, was dissolved in the 1870s.

6. Review of Hroch in *Przegląd Historyczny*, LXI (1970), no. 1, 151.

periodical press and of diverse national associations — that is the leaven of national formation. This was true, too, in the case of the Ukrainians in Austria, but the peculiarity of this nation was that the secular intelligentsia allowed the clergy an unparalleled degree of influence on the forms, goals and ideology of national politics.

The unique social origin of the Ukrainian intelligentsia in Austria encouraged “clericalization.” Unlike the Polish intelligentsia in Galicia, derived from the lower nobility and, to a lesser extent, from pre-modern urban classes, the Ukrainian intelligentsia derived partly from the peasantry, but mainly from the clergy. Greek Catholic priests, like Orthodox but unlike Roman Catholic priests, could marry. The offspring of sacerdotal families frequently would enter the free professions or the bureaucracy.<sup>8</sup> Bound to the clergy by a network of family connections, the newly emerging Ukrainian intelligentsia also shared a culture with the clergy, not simply an ethnic, Ukrainian culture, but a peculiarly clerical one.

Frederick Hertz, in his classic study, *Nationality in History and Politics*, has noted that in the course of the development of a national movement there is a tendency for the emerging classes of a nation to copy the style and attitudes of the traditional élite: “In former times each rank had its separate mode of life, and it was even prohibited to adopt the costume or habits of a higher rank than one’s own. The development of national unity, however, broke down these barriers, and each class began to imitate as far as possible the style of living of the next higher class.”<sup>9</sup> Thus it is not surprising that the Polish intelligentsia looked upon the Polish nobility or *szlachta* as a model for behaviour, thereby introducing many aristocratic peculiarities into modern Polish culture. The Ukrainian nobility in Galicia, however, had been Polonized long ago in the seventeenth century. In the latter nineteenth century, when a Ukrainian intelligentsia came into being in Galicia, the highest rank of Ukrainian society was occupied by the clergy. There was nothing unusual, then, in the Ukrainian intelligentsia’s adopting a culture with a pervasive clerical bias. The relatively high prestige of the priestly estate in Ukrainian society as compared to its relatively low prestige in Polish society is evident from the

7. After his comparative, quantitative study of the Czech, Lithuanian, Estonian, Finnish, Norwegian, Flemish and Slovak national movements, Miroslav Hroch concluded: “we can propose only one generalization: the numerically strongest component of patriotic groups consisted of the intelligentsia. With this we are establishing a finding by no means new.” Hroch, p. 118.

8. For an incomplete list of the better known priests’ sons among the Galician Ukrainian intelligentsia, see Isydor Sokhots’kyi, *Shcho daly hreko-katolyts’ka Tserkva i dukhovenstvo ukrains’komu narodovi* (Philadelphia, 1951), p. 39.

9. Frederick Hertz, *Nationality in History and Politics: A Study of the Psychology and Sociology of National Sentiment and Character* (London, 1944), p. 44.

following statistic: between the years 1861 and 1901, in the two Galician universities of Lviv and Cracow, only 9 per cent of the Polish students, but 55 per cent of the Ukrainian students, enrolled in the theological faculty.<sup>10</sup>

Kinship ties between the clergy and secular intelligentsia and the sharing of a complex of cultural, behavioural and intellectual presuppositions held to explain why the Ukrainian national movement in Galicia had a decidedly clerical cast. But the Greek Catholic clergy enjoyed such a powerful position of influence and authority in the national movement that something more is required to elucidate the source of this authority: the Ukrainian intelligentsia's *dependence* on the clergy.

From the start of the constitutional era in 1867, the nationally oriented intelligentsia — the so-called national populists (*narodovtsi*) or Ukrainophiles — stood in dire need of support in the countryside. Unlike its Polish counterpart, the Ukrainian intelligentsia could not struggle for power by mobilizing the urban crowd — there were too few Ukrainians in Lviv, the capital of Galicia.<sup>11</sup> Nor were the Ukrainians able to come to power through the good graces and political calculation of the central Austrian government: the Polish nobility had already made a compact with Vienna in 1868. Finally, the national populists were unwilling to follow the example of the Galician Russophiles, who put their faith in the power of the Russian tsar. If the national populists, then, were ever to transcend the politics of a coffee-house fraternity, they had to harness to their movement the power of the peasantry. To reach the peasantry, however, the intelligentsia needed the clergy, whence the dependence that allowed the clergy such authority in the national movement.

Even when the national populists, in a radical mood in 1889, called for the “laicization of politics,” they immediately pulled the teeth from their demand by adding the following reservation: “By this we do not mean to dislodge our clerics from work on the nation’s behalf; on the contrary, we think that the priests, since they are in direct contact with the people, have the opportunity and the duty to do very much for our national and civic

10. Józef Buzek, *Stosunki zawodowe i socyalne ludności w Galicyi według wyznania i narodowości, na podstawie spisu ludności z 31. grudnia 1900 r.*, *Wiadomości statystyczne o stosunkach krajowych* (Lviv), XX, no. 2 (1905), 42-43. No official admissions criteria discriminated against Ukrainian applicants to non-theological faculties. In 1900, however, fully a third of Galicia’s Polish-language inhabitants, but only 6 per cent of its Ukrainian-language inhabitants, worked outside agriculture. It is easy to understand why an overwhelmingly peasant people was disadvantaged in seeking to prepare for a professional career, and why that people would think first of the priesthood as the natural route for social advancement.

11. In 1890, 17 per cent of Lviv’s population was Ukrainian by religion and only 7 per cent by language (*Umgangssprache*). *Österreichische Statistik*, XXXII, no. 1 (1892), 106, 163. See also John-Paul Himka, “Voluntary Artisan Associations and the Ukrainian National

cause.”<sup>12</sup> The key to the priests’ significance was their “direct contact with the people.” The priest was spiritual father and counsellor to the peasant; he was, too, the predecessor and physical progenitor of the secular intellectual. The priesthood, then, was the natural bridge from the intelligentsia to the peasantry.

To start the process of building a popular mass movement, Ukrainian intellectuals founded a popular educational society in Lviv in 1868. The organization, called “Prosvita” (Enlightenment), was the Galician Ukrainian equivalent of the numerous *matice* or cultural-educational societies that played such a key role in fostering east European national movements. Prosvita published and distributed inexpensive booklets for the peasantry and aimed at establishing a network of village reading clubs. For the dissemination of its popular booklets, Prosvita in 1875-77 had ninety-one distribution agents in seventy-five localities: forty of these agents were priests, nine were associations (in which the parish priest probably played a major role) and twenty-four were merchants and booksellers (thus concentrated in the cities, not in the villages). Similarly, Prosvita’s Russophile rival, the Kachkovs’kyi Society, had forty-six agents in 1876, twenty-two of whom were priests and twenty-four of which were associations (again, most probably led by the pastor).<sup>13</sup> While intellectuals could write and publish booklets in Lviv, it clearly required the services of clergymen to put the booklets in the hands of peasants. This is confirmed by an analysis of the cumulative membership of Prosvita for the years 1868-74. Excluding peasants, the clergy accounted for 65 per cent of all Prosvita’s members in the countryside. Prosvita’s secular intelligentsia, however, was overwhelmingly concentrated in the cities (80 per cent), especially in Lviv (35 per cent), but also in other cities both within (31 per cent) and outside Galicia (14 per cent).<sup>14</sup>

Thanks to the pastors’ activities, a host of new institutions began in the 1870s to supplement the traditional village institutions of church and tavern: temperance societies, church brotherhoods, reading clubs, coöperative stores, communal granaries, loan funds, schools, choirs,

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Movement in Galicia (The 1870s),” *Harvard Ukrainian Studies*, vol. II, no. 2 (June 1978; forthcoming).

12. The Russian Ukrainian Mykhailo Drahomanov was the author of the 1889 national populist program that appeared as the editors’ programmatic statement in the Lviv journal *Pravda*. Home-grown Galician national populists, however, were responsible for making the reservation about laicization. Mykhailo Drahomanov, “Chudats’ki dumky pro ukrains’ku natsional’nu spravu,” *Vybrani tvory* (Prague, 1937), p. 313.

13. Mykhailo Pavlyk, “Pro rus’ko-ukrains’ki narodni chytal’ni,” *Tvory* (Kiev, 1959), p. 534.

14. “Chleny tovarystva ‘Prosvita,’” *Spravozdanie z dilanii ‘Prosvity’ vid chasu zaviazannia . . . 1868 roku, do nainoviishoho chasu* (Lviv, 1874), pp. 26-32.

amateur theatrical troupes, gymnastic clubs and volunteer fire brigades. The press (and the urban intelligentsia behind it) forged these new institutions into links connecting the isolated rural committees to the wider community of the *nation*.<sup>15</sup>

The literary starting point for the transformation of the Ukrainian village was Father Stepan Kachala's brochure of 1869, *Shcho nas hubyt' a shcho nam pomochy mozhe* (What is Destroying Us and What Can Help Us). This brochure, which proceeded from theological, not socioeconomic principles, traced the origin of the Ukrainian peasant's poverty to sloth, drunkenness and prodigality and prescribed the antidotes of hard work, temperance and thrift in order to achieve prosperity. It was written in simple language in the form of a conversation between a pastor and his parishioners. A sample:

*Pavlo*: It's strange how things happen. So long as the people were still performing compulsory labour [i.e., under serfdom], so long as — as they say — times were bad, the peasants' plots of land were clean [i.e., unmortgaged]. Today there's emancipation, but even if a father does manage to leave his children some little piece of land, that little piece is sure to be in mortgage. And why? Mainly because lack of sense and drunkenness. . . .

*Vasyl'*: It's sad everywhere you look, but could it not be otherwise?

*Priest*: It could be, but there's little hope. It's all the fault of whiskey.<sup>16</sup>

Father Kachala's practical advice was more perceptive than his analysis of what caused the decline of peasant small holdings. He recommended that the peasants arrange public readings on Sunday and holidays instead of sitting in the tavern. He also urged the peasants to found schools, communal granaries and loan funds.

The ideas propagated in Kachala's booklet made a great impression, especially in the ranks of the clergy. Soon after Prosvita published the brochure, the newly appointed Greek Catholic Metropolitan, Iosyf Sembratovych, wrote to Rome about initiating a large-scale temperance campaign. As a consequence of this correspondence, Sembratovych issued a pastoral letter stating that the Roman Pontiff would grant a hundred or more days' indulgence to everyone who joined a temperance society, while priests who set up a temperance society could expect to earn double the number of days' indulgence. Energetic priests in Stanslaviv, with the Metropolitan's support, set up an apostolic mission to rid the Ukrainian countryside of drunkenness.<sup>17</sup>

15. This process of "social reorganization" has been described in reference to the Polish village in William I. Thomas and Florian Znaniecki, *The Polish Peasant in Europe and America*, 2 vols., Dover reprint of 2nd ed. (New York, 1958), II, 1303-1463.

16. [Stepan Kachala], *Shcho nas hubyt' a shcho nam pomochy mozhe. Pys'mo dlia rus'kykh selian* (Lviv, 1869), p. 28.

17. [Volodymyr Navrots'kyi], "Pis'mo iz Galitsii," *Kievskii telegraf*, 9 March 1875, p. 1.

The apostles of sobriety carried their crusade from village to village. They would give advance notice to pastors before descending upon parishes during the holidays. Local pastors would announce the sobriety mission to their parishioners and these, together with their neighbours from other parishes and villages, would gather on the appointed day. As many as six thousand peasants would come, bearing icons, crosses and church banners, to hear the apostles of sobriety. In the village of the mission, the apostles and local pastors would concelebrate the Liturgy and afterwards the apostles would preach outdoors to the assembled multitude. "The people," wrote an observer of these missions, "for the most part weep during the sermon."<sup>18</sup> Following the sermon, a "Golden Book" was produced, in which the names of those who wished to join the temperance society were inscribed. Then the whole throng would carry a large cross in procession to the crossroads or to some other conspicuous place and erect it. The cross would bear an inscription such as "The cross, having vanquished paganism, shall also vanquish drunkenness" or "The commune of such-and-such a village, in memory of its sobering." Following the erection of the cross, the temperance missionaries would preach again, inviting the throng of peasants to vow to abstain from drink. Such impressive spectacles took place even in the winter during snowstorms.

The missions appealed to the peasants' emotions and won many converts to abstinence. But emotions are ephemeral, and so too was abstinence. For instance, four years after the village of Stynava Vyzhnia pledged abstinence, no trace of the pledge remained. A popular newspaper reported: "Whoever did not drink before the introduction of sobriety does not drink even now, and whoever drank then drinks also now."<sup>19</sup>

A more lasting effect of the crusade for abstinence was that it paved the way for village reading clubs. Many parishes established confraternities of sobriety which frequently evolved into reading clubs.<sup>20</sup> Many priests took the advice of Father Kachala and arranged public readings on Sundays and holidays specifically to lure their parishioners away from diversion in their tavern.<sup>21</sup>

The pastor, then, was quite often the moving spirit behind the establishment of reading clubs in the village. Priests, too, such as the national populist Kachala and the Russophile Ivan Naumovych, were

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On Iosyf Sembratovych and the sobriety campaign, see also Irynei I. Nazarko, *Kyivs'ki i halyts'ki mytropolyty. Biografichni narysy (1590-1960)* (Rome, 1962), pp. 200-201.

18. [Navrots'kyi], *Kievskii telegraf*, 9 March 1875, p. 1.

19. "Z Stryshchyny," *Bar'kivshchyna*, 4 April 1890, p. 181.

20. Pavlyk, pp. 518, 522-23.

21. See, for example, Tsentral'nyi derzhavnyi istorychnyi arkhiv URSS u L'vovi [TsDIAL], 663/1/110, pp. 178-79. Cf. Oleksii Zaklyns'kyi, *Zapysky parokha Starykh Bohorodchan* (2nd ed.; Toronto, 1960), p. 99.

often involved in the reading-club movement in the wider sense, propagating the doctrine of reading clubs through the press and through all-Galician institutions like Prosvita or the Kachkovs'kyi Society. But the real significance of the reading clubs had less to do with the clergy than with the secular intelligentsia: reading clubs linked the peasantry with the urban intelligentsia.

The parliamentary elections of 1879 — in which only three “enlightened Ruthenians” (i.e., Ukrainians) were elected — spurred the national populist intelligentsia to more intense activity. They founded a popular newspaper, *Bat'kivshchyna* (Patrimony), written for the peasants and highly political.<sup>22</sup> With an organization like Prosvita, a newspaper like *Bat'kivshchyna* and the support of some of the clergy, the national populists set to work transforming the villages from the capital.

At the village level, the main instrument of transformation was the reading club. Only a pair of reading clubs figured in the membership list of Prosvita between 1868 and 1874.<sup>23</sup> By 1886, however, the Vice-royalty reported 461 Ukrainian reading clubs in Galicia.<sup>24</sup> By 1908, Prosvita alone was the patron of 2,048 Galician reading clubs.<sup>25</sup> These clubs, generally with about fifty members,<sup>26</sup> gathered on Sundays and holidays for public readings. Thus, although statistics show that in 1890 well over three-quarters of the Ukrainian peasants were completely illiterate,<sup>27</sup> a kind of ersatz-literacy was being introduced into the Ukrainian village thanks to these public readings by literate individuals. But more than literacy was involved. Joining an organization to listen to or read newspapers and booklets gave the Ukrainian peasant membership in a community wider than the village commune, a community that included other peasants in other villages as well as editors and writers in the capital. In short, by joining reading clubs, peasants joined the nation. And the nation itself grew, was formed, by this expanding infrastructure of village institutions.

22. On the origins of *Bat'kivshchyna*, see Pavlyk, p. 45.

23. “Chleny tovarystva ‘Prosvita,’ ” *Spravozdanie*, pp. 26-32.

24. *Rocznik statystyki Galicyi*, III (1891), 130. Some of these were associated exclusively with the Russophile Kachkovs'kyi Society, not with Prosvita.

25. Mykhailo Lozyns'kyi, *Sorok lit diial'nosty “Pros'vity”* (Lviv, 1908), pp. 46-47.

26. Mykhailo, “Spravy ruskykh chytalen’,” *Bat'kivshchyna*, 21 November 1884, p. 295. The information in this article was taken from statistical and descriptive data collected by a Ukrainian student club. A check of seven reading clubs in *Bat'kivshchyna*, 1890, confirms that their average membership was fifty-two.

27. *Österreichische Statistik*, XXXII, no. 1 (1892), 125. This figure excludes Lviv and Cracow. Considering that most of the literate outside these two cities would be concentrated in the other Galician cities and towns, that Polish-inhabited western Galicia had a better developed primary educational system than Ukrainian-inhabited eastern Galicia, and that in the countryside non-peasant classes (nobles, stewards, tavern keepers, priests, teachers) made up a great part of the rural literate, to estimate that nine out of ten Ukrainian peasants could neither read nor write may err on the side of understating their illiteracy.

The reading clubs met regularly on Sundays and holidays, sometimes in buildings specifically designated for this purpose (often housing coöperative stores as well), sometimes in private homes, school buildings,<sup>28</sup> or even cemeteries.<sup>29</sup> Every parish contained a potential reading club. Since the village clergy played an important part in initiating the clubs, often in connection with the temperance movement, it is not surprising that priests were sometimes elected to preside over the clubs.<sup>30</sup> According to Rev. Isydor Sokhots'kyi, a Greek Catholic priest writing in 1951, the Greek Catholic clergy "established the majority of reading clubs and led them."<sup>31</sup> If Father Sokhots'kyi exaggerates a little, he nonetheless is correct to underscore the important role of the priest in bringing reading clubs to the villages, and in serving as the crucial mediator between the urban intelligentsia and the peasantry.<sup>32</sup>

The priest's mediation, however, became obsolete at the moment when institutions and the press connected the village more directly and more effectively to the wider community of the nation. The priest's historical mission in the village — to put this in grand nineteenth-century terms — was to replace himself with institutions. In other words, the priest was important in the very first phase of the villages' transformation, in the initial germination of the movement to found institutions and read newspapers; but once the movement in a village passed this primary stage and began to run on its own momentum, the priest became an expendable part of the process and very often, in fact, an opponent of the educational movement.

The clergy did not awaken to its own expendability all at once. The reading clubs penetrated individual villages at different times, so that while Denysiv might be in its primary phase in the 1870s, Khlivchany might not get there until the 1900s. So it is difficult to pinpoint a moment in history when the clergy as a whole realized the danger of the reading club. Still, if forced to choose such a moment, one might settle upon the late 1890s, when the Basilian Fathers established the magazine *Misionar'* (The Missionary) to combat the pervasive influence of radically secular periodicals.<sup>33</sup> In 1899, the Lviv Metropolitan, Iuliiian Sas-Kuilovs'kyi,

28. See, for example, *Bat'kivshchyna*, 1890, pp. 85 and 194.

29. *TsDIAL*, 663/1/110, p. 179.

30. *Bat'kivshchyna*, 1890, p. 117.

31. Sokhots'kyi, p. 65.

32. "Perhaps the most important role the clergy played in all lands under investigation was mediator between the peasant masses and the surrounding world. The clergy long into the capitalist era, especially in poorer agrarian regions, was the most important connecting link that controlled the route by which the peasants obtained news of the world and, conversely, by which this 'world' received information about the rural population." Hroch, p. 131.

33. "Misiia protiv 'Misionaria,'" *Hromads'kyi holos*, 1899, no. 7, pp. 54-55.

issued his circular on reading clubs: “Instead of confirming in the nation the doctrine of the holy Gospel and the holy Church, [pastors] have found reading clubs, which bring more spiritual harm than benefit. Instead of national love, they have awakened in our peasant self-love and arrogance.”<sup>34</sup>

Clerical opposition to the development of reading clubs can also be found before 1899. Sometimes this is even reflected in articles written by peasants and published in the national populist press<sup>35</sup> (although it is reasonable to suspect that national populist editors would normally choose not to print material showing the clergy in a bad light). There were two broad categories of discord between priest and reading clubs: intellectual and economic.

Before the coming of the reading club, the priest had a monopoly on education in the Ukrainian community in the countryside. The priest was also the interpreter of the only ideology known to the Ukrainian peasants — Greek Catholicism. But with participation in the national movement, the peasants came to understand that there were also secular ideologies and secular knowledge. In fact, as Miroslav Hroch has noticed: “A precondition for national activation in the case of the peasantry was not only its emancipation, but also a certain level of education that first allowed it to understand the connections between its own interests and an ideology that was *extra-religious*.”<sup>36</sup> The acquisition of secular knowledge by the peasantry generally involved some limitation on the authority of the priest. Intellectual peasants began to think independently and to question the previously unquestioned moral and intellectual authority of the pastor. In short, as Metropolitan Kuilovs’kyi put it, the peasants developed “arrogance.” This intellectual arrogance often came to the fore over issues of morality. What right had the clergy to forbid them to “settle on faith,” i.e., live together without marriage?<sup>37</sup> What right had the clergy to forbid them to drink?

In the parish of Monastyrsk, for example, a booklet of the temperance society was found in 1876 with inscriptions attacking the sobriety campaign:

Eh. You shouldn’t try to befuddle people with this piece of paper. We, though simple people, know this isn’t from God but is a contrivance priests use to dupe the people. Even though we’ve taken the oath, we

34. Quoted in “Mytropolyt Kuilovs’kyi pro rus’ke dukhovenstvo,” *ibid.*, 1899, no. 22, p. 182.

35. See, for example: Parokhiiane z Romanova, “Prosvitytel’ naroda,” *Bat’kivshchyna*, 7 February 1890, p. 69; “Radist’ i neradist’!” *Bat’kivshchyna*, 28 March 1890, p. 165.

36. Hroch, p. 106 (emphasis added).

37. Ivan Franko [M-on], “Pis’mo iz Avstriiskoi Ukrainy,” *Vol’noe slovo*, 1 February 1883, p. 4.

drink, because we know who invented sobriety: learned people who don't know anything themselves. The Metropolitan himself in Lviv, although they say he's learned, obviously knows very little or he would have contrived something better than [the sobriety movement]. . . . People! Don't believe these words: learned people drink more than we unlearned people and we don't yell at them that they're drunks.<sup>38</sup>

At the end of the booklet were curses and threats against those active in the sobriety campaign.

The other sphere of conflict between clergyman and rustic was economic. Florian Znaniecki and William Thomas, referring to the somewhat different Polish situation, described the potential for economic antagonism between a pastor and his flock:

There is no inveterate class antagonism preventing collaboration [between priest and peasant], for the priest, as long as he is considered as an essentially religious personality, is in a sense outside of the class system; only when the worldly attributes of the priest begin to predominate in the eyes of the peasant over his sacral character, reflections are made concerning his class connections. There is a certain mistrust resulting from the often exaggerated economic demands of the priest. . . .<sup>39</sup>

Especially in the Ukrainian situation an economic antagonism existed, because the married Greek Catholic clergy was more of an economic burden on the village than was the celibate Roman Catholic clergy.

The Greek Catholic priest generally had three sources of income: a salary from the government, a sizable farm of 12.5 to 50 hectares,<sup>40</sup> and fees for sacramental rites. Even the pastor of a poor parish of eighty households could make more than his salary of 380 gulden on the fees from burials alone.<sup>41</sup> And peasants not only died, but married, gave birth and had bad luck, so the priest earned fees from weddings, christenings and prayer services as well. It was in the priest's interest to keep sacramental fees high; his salary might only pay for one son's education, and, of course, it was necessary to put away something for his daughters' dowries, to buy the right clothing for his wife to wear in society, to buy or repair a carriage, to

38. The inscriptions probably came from the pen of Anna Pavlyk. "Sotsialisty," *Slovo*, 26 January 1878, p. 3.

39. Thomas and Znaniecki, II, 1310.

40. Ivan Franko, "Zemel'na vlasnist' u Halychyni," *Tvory*, 20 vols. (Kiev, 1950-56), XIX, 284.

41. See the budget of a priest published by Ivan Franko in *Molot* in 1878, "Dodatky i vydatky vbohoho sviashchenyka," reprinted in M.F. Nechytaliuk, *Publitsystyka Ivana Franka (1875-1886 rr.)*. *Seminarii* (Lviv, 1972), pp. 60-65.

make some improvement on his farm, and so on. It was in the peasant's interest, however, to keep these fees low, since he was finding it difficult enough to survive taxes, loan repayments and other unpleasant burdens of the money economy. Sacramental fees, however, constituted only one source of economic antagonism. Another problem was that the priest, in the course of farming his large holdings, often became involved in disputes over gleanings and pasture rights.<sup>42</sup> A third source of economic friction was that the Roman and Greek Catholic churches owned 53,250 hectares of manorial estates in Galicia, including 32,000 hectares of forest.<sup>43</sup> Thus village communes involved in legal suits over forest rights might well have the Church for their adversary, engendering profound anti-clerical sentiments.<sup>44</sup>

The reading club frequently became the forum for peasant interests and evolved into an anti-clerical institution. There was the case, for instance, of the two neighbouring villages of Dobrivliany and Volia Iakubova. In both villages reading clubs appeared in the early 1880s. The pastors at first supported the reading clubs, purchasing periodical subscriptions for the clubs, attending club meetings and encouraging their children to attend. But in both villages, serious disputes broke out over ideology and over economic matters — particularly over the issue of sacramental fees. By the mid-1880s, the reading clubs were engaging in blasphemous and anti-clerical agitation and the pastors denounced their parishioners to the police. The leaders of the reading clubs were imprisoned.<sup>45</sup>

Such incidents became by the 1890s a recurring feature of the Galician social landscape.<sup>46</sup> In 1890, young intellectuals in Lviv founded a vehemently anti-clerical political party, the Ruthenian-Ukrainian Radical Party. The radical intellectuals encouraged confrontation in the villages between pastors and reading clubs and published anti-clerical brochures and periodicals for peasant consumption. The irony of the radicals' position was that, in seeking to liberate the Ukrainian movement from clerical influence, they had to wait until the village clergy had prepared the

42. Letter of Ivan Maksymiak to Ivan Franko, 30 October 1883, in Instytut literatury Akademii nauk URSS, Viddil rukopysiv, f. 3, od. zb. 1603, pp. 43-44. [Panas Mel'nyk] "Pys'mo z pid Drohobycha," *Bat'kivshchyna*, 1 August 1884, p. 194.

43. Tadeusz Pilat, *O stosunkach własności tabularnej w Galicyi* (Lviv, 1888), p. 5.

44. Such was the case in the village of Lōlyn. Franko, *Vol'noe slovo*, 1 February 1883, p. 4.

45. For an introduction to this complex story, see Bezstoronnyi [V. Nahirnyi?], "Pys'mo z Drohobyt's'koho," *Bat'kivshchyna*, 1886, no. 36-37, pp. 214-15, no. 38, pp. 223-24; and E.L. Solecki [El.], "Wojna o 'jura stolae,'" *Gazeta Naddniestrzańska*, 15 June 1886, pp. 2-3. Cf. Petro Berehuliak and Semen Vityk in O.I. Dei (ed.), *Ivan Franko u spohadakh suchasnykhiv. Knyha druha* (Lviv, 1972).

46. One has only to leaf through the issues of the radical newspapers *Narod*, *Khliborob* and *Hromads'kyi holos* to appreciate how widespread and, on occasion, violent was this

way for anti-clerical agitation by endowing the peasants with institutions and raising their educational level. In 1899, the Radical Party split three ways, giving birth to the triumvirate that dominated west Ukrainian politics into the 1930s: the radical, social democratic and national democratic parties. Two of these parties were profoundly anti-clerical while the third, the National Democratic Party, although admitting the clergy to a share in national politics, never allowed it to hold the authority and influence it had once enjoyed in the national movement.<sup>47</sup>

The decisive factor determining the priest's place in the national movement was his relation to the peasant. Urban intellectuals, in the early phases of the popular national movement, depended on the clergy to act as a bridge connecting them with the peasantry. This was the most significant source of the clergy's influence in the national movement. The priest-peasant relationship was also crucial, however, in the loss of the clergy's influence. Economic and intellectual antagonism between priest and peasant grew more acute as the very process of nation-building gave the peasant new institutional and intellectual resources. The new peasant resources, to a great extent engendered by the clergy itself, permitted the intelligentsia to by-pass the hitherto indispensable village clergy and to enter into direct contact with the peasantry.

In conclusion, a few words are in order about the limits of validity of this model beyond the context of Ukrainian Galicia. The model assumes that the clergy is educated enough to be a useful and compatible partner for the intelligentsia in the early phases of the national movement. While

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conflict between pastors and radicalized reading clubs. In Morozovychi (Sambir district), the reading club celebrated the pastor's name day — to commemorate the villagers' "liberation from the inquisitorial enslavement to Rev. Nikolai Bobers'kyi." One radical peasant complained that a partisan of Father Bobers'kyi "made an anarchistic attempt on my life with an iron bar across my head" ("Vicha v seli Morozovychakh," *Hromads'kyi holos*, 1899, no. 3, pp. 19-20). Priests regularly attacked peasant radicals from the pulpit (*ibid.*, 1899, pp. 23, 65-66, 101, 129, 150, 153, 178; 1900, p. 13) and occasionally in the confessional (*ibid.*, 1899, p. 152) and in the schools (*ibid.*, 1900, p. 91). Priests at times withheld burial from radical parishioners, but the radicals would retaliate by arranging their own burial services ("Iak pokhovaly my tovarysha Antona Hrytsuniaka," *ibid.*, 1900, no. 9, pp. 77-79; see also *ibid.*, 1900, p. 4). The village reading club was the focus of many conflicts. Most frequently the clergy tried to ban radical papers from the clubs and to supplant them with *Misionar'*. In other cases, the pastors would wrest control of the club from the peasant leaders and see to it that the club ceased its activity (*ibid.*, 1899, pp. 32-33, 57-58; 1900, p. 135). Other priests opposed the clubs without subterfuge and tried to close them down outright (*ibid.*, 1899, pp. 140, 152). Admittedly, *Hromads'kyi holos* and the other radical papers were biased, but their village reporting was contributed by the peasants themselves; hence these papers' reports reflect authentic peasant attitudes, however subjective.

47. One symptom of the decline of clerical influence can be found in the social composition of the Galician Ukrainian parliamentary delegations. In the 1860s and 1870s, the clergy dominated these delegations, by the 1900s — the secular intelligentsia. Of twenty-eight Ukrainian deputies in the 1909-11 session of Parliament, only four were clerics. *Index zu den stenographischen Protokollen des Hauses der Abgeordneten des Reichsrates* (Vienna, 1911).

this was certainly true of the Greek Catholic clergy, which was educated, for the most part, at universities in Lviv and Vienna, it was not true of the majority of Orthodox clerics in eastern Europe. The model also assumes that the clergy has not been denationalized, as was the case of the Ukrainian clergy in Russia. Certainly, too, the role of the priest would not be so pivotal in ethnic groups that had a well-developed village school system with conational teachers. This was not the case in nineteenth-century Ukrainian Galicia. Moreover, the validity of the potential antagonism between priest and peasant depends on the social and economic position of the religious leader in the community. Finally, it should be noted that the model is most suited to the sociologically simple societies of eastern Europe, those of the so-called non-historic or plebian peoples. More complex societies, such as that of the Poles in Galicia, may have another traditional élite — the nobility — that takes precedence over the clergy. They may also have a potential urban constituency for the national movement in the merchants, artisans and workers of the same ethnic group. The existence of an urban constituency would allow the urban intelligentsia to obviate the problem of reaching the villages and the attendant dependence on the clergy.