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*Hope in the Tsar: Displaced Naive Monarchism  
Among the Ukrainian Peasants of the Habsburg Empire*

Naive monarchism was widespread among the European peasantry of the nineteenth century. Isolated from each other by the very nature of the small-holding and thus impaired in their ability to function politically as a class, peasants yet had interests—and enemies—in common. In these circumstances they often looked for aid to a supreme power; on earth, this was the benevolent monarch. The French peasants looked to Louis Bonaparte to protect their interests, Russian peasants to “the little father tsar,” and Austrian peasants to “the most illustrious emperor.”<sup>1</sup>

Such naive monarchism had a strong hold on the Ukrainian (Ruthenian) peasants of Austria-Hungary, the “Tyrolians of the East.” In 1848, for example, many Galician peasants boycotted the elections to the constituent Austrian *Reichstag* because they considered the elections treason to the emperor, who had just freed them from serfdom. “We trust no one,” they said, “but God and the emperor alone. The formation of the national guard and the elections to the *Reichstag* are only mystifications (*tumany*) which come from the lords and the officials. The emperor knows nothing about it.”<sup>2</sup> This devotion to the emperor continued into the twentieth century. Oleksandra Kimpins’ka-Tatsiun relates how her grandmother kept a mysterious portrait wrapped in a kerchief and hidden in a box. She would extract the portrait and kiss it, but never show it to the rest of the family. Only upon her death in 1922 did the family discover that the much-kissed portrait was that of Emperor Franz Joseph!<sup>3</sup>

The peasants’ love for and hope in the monarch was to some extent based on a reality, since the monarchy would at times, in its own interests, protect the peasants from the lords. The reforms of Joseph II, for example, which

1. The classic statement on the socio-economic basis of naive monarchism is in Karl Marx, “The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte,” in *Surveys from Exile* (The Pelican Marx Library) (Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1973), pp. 238-39.

2. Roman Rosdolsky, *Die Bauernabgeordneten im konstituierenden österreichischen Reichstag 1848-1849* (Wien: Europaverlag, 1976), p. 70.

3. Oleksandra Kimpins’ka-Tatsiun, *Rik u zhytti ukrains’koi zhinky-hospodyni* (Winnipeg: Nakladom avtorky, 1967), p. 65. It was only shortly before her death in the early 1970s that I convinced my own grandmother to abandon her sentimental devotion to Franz Joseph. Until then she still sang snatches from a song about “the most illustrious emperor” (*naiiasnishyi tsisar*) and spoke with great sympathy about his tragic life.

were aimed at increasing the taxability of the countryside, alleviated the situation of the Austrian peasant and so strengthened monarchist sentiment in the village. The abolition of serfdom in 1848 was considered the most convincing proof of the emperor's good will. But it was also true that reality contradicted the notion of an all-powerful protector. Writing on the myth of the ideal tsar in the Russian Empire, Daniel Field has observed: "The most obvious problem of the myth is that the tsar was not the benefactor of the *narod*—not in the sixteenth century, and not in the nineteenth . . . The peasants were superstitious, but how could they maintain a belief which daily experience confuted?" How could they cling to a myth "so contrary to observation and experience?"<sup>4</sup> We may ask the same question about the Ukrainian peasants of Austria-Hungary.

After the abolition of serfdom, the landlords in Ukrainian-inhabited regions of the empire owned an inordinate proportion of the arable land; they expropriated the forests and pastures for themselves; and they controlled the local government. Why had not "the most illustrious emperor" prevented this? The size of peasant holdings, small to begin with, was steadily shrinking as a result of the high birth rate, partible inheritance, and the inroads of a money economy; education was neglected; and hunger and epidemics took tens of thousands of lives every year—not enough to alleviate the pressure on the land, but more than enough to make tragedy a commonplace. Why did the great protector in Vienna not rectify the situation? How was the myth reconciled with reality?

The contradiction between myth and reality elicited at least three responses among the peasantry. The first was to deny that the monarch was aware of the peasants' misfortune and to place the blame for whatever evils existed on the nobility and bureaucracy. Thus, when the Russian Slavophile populist Vasilii Kel'siev visited Galicia in 1866, a Ukrainian peasant complained that, though the Austrian emperor was good, "the poor man knows nothing about us: the Poles [i.e., landlords] don't allow him access to us."<sup>5</sup> In 1884, the inhabitants of Vyktoriv in Galicia appealed to the emperor for money to build a new and larger church, since they were convinced that he readily gave money for churches. When no response was forthcoming, the villagers decided that the *starosta* was to blame.<sup>6</sup>

Another resolution to the conflict between the myth of the benevolent ruler and the reality of oppression was to project the myth into the future and expect the coming of a monarch-deliverer. The Russian myth of "the tsar

4. Daniel Field, *Rebels in the Name of the Tsar* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1976), pp. 17-18.

5. *Galichina i Moldavia. Putevyia pis'ma Vasiliia Kel'sieva* (St. Petersburg: Pechatnia V. Golovina, 1868), p. 101; see also p. 27.

6. *Bat'kivshchyna*, No. 9 (1884), p. 53. A *starosta* was the chief official in a district, the intermediary administrative unit between the village and the crownland as a whole.

to come, the legendary deliverer," has been studied in detail by K. V. Chistov.<sup>7</sup> Its essential features have been well summarized by Field:

The deliverer intends to free his faithful *narod* from serfdom, from oppressive officials and heavy taxes. Wicked courtiers and officials forestall this by overthrowing the deliverer and killing him. The deliverer miraculously escapes . . . and for some years he wanders from place to place as a pilgrim. In his travels, he comes to know and share the sufferings of the *narod*. From time to time he prefigures his triumphant return by declaring his identity to those he meets. . . . [The deliverer legend] required disillusionment with the reigning tsar of the moment and the designation of some person in the ruling house (rarely an imaginary person) as the deliverer to come.<sup>8</sup>

An interesting variant of this legend circulated in Austrian Galicia in the 1890s. It was touched off by the Mayerling tragedy of 1889, when Crown Prince Rudolph and his mistress were found dead in a hunting lodge. The Galician peasants refused to believe that Rudolph had committed suicide. Why should he have killed himself, they asked; were things not going well for him or did he live in poverty? And how could anyone have killed him? He was so good, so gentle, so learned. But he did have enemies, because he had plans "to help the poor, to abolish extortionate taxes, to drive out the Jews,<sup>9</sup> to humble the lords." Rudolph was "the savior who was to put an end to their poverty."<sup>10</sup> He was yet alive, but had fled to a land across the sea: Brazil. At this point the Galician legend differs from the tsar-deliverer legend. Rudolph is said to have set up a new kingdom in Brazil which he wants to populate exclusively with Galician Ukrainian peasants.<sup>11</sup> He is to become a "peasant tsar," who

7. K. V. Chistov, *Russkie narodnye sotsial'no-utopicheskie legendy XVII-XIX vv.* (Moscow: Nauka, 1967). See also A. I. Klibanov, *Narodnaia sotsial'naia utopiia v Rossii* (Moscow: Nauka, 1977), especially bibliography in note 10, p. 8, and Michael Cherniavsky, *Tsar and People: Studies in Russian Myths*, 2nd ed. (New York: Random House, 1969).

8. Field, pp. 6-7.

9. The widespread animosity of Ukrainian peasants to the Jews in the late-nineteenth century had little in common with modern anti-Semitism. The principal sources of Ukrainian-Jewish conflict in the village were the painful transition to a money economy, the unbalanced social structures of both the Ukrainian and Jewish peoples, and the extreme poverty of Ukrainian-inhabited regions. Antagonism was engendered by moneylending, land speculation, commerce, and tavern-keeping. In addition to economic factors, the pro-Polish behavior of many Galician Jews, the growth of Ukrainian nationalism, and religious prejudices contributed to the tension between Ukrainians and Jews. I plan to deal with this whole question in a separate study.

10. "Tsisarevych' Rudolf," *Svoboda* (Jersey City), 11 Sept. 1899. I am grateful to Andrii Makuch for calling my attention to and providing me with material on the Rudolph legend.

11. *Ibid.*, 7 March 1895; Ivan Franko, "Emihratsiia halyts'kykh selian," *Tvory*, 20 vols. (Kiev: Derzhlitvydav URSR, 1950-56), XIX, 314.

will allow neither Jews nor lords to settle in his new kingdom.<sup>12</sup> The legend came complete with an imposter, an emigration agent who posed as Rudolph and agitated throughout eastern Galicia in 1895.<sup>13</sup> And the story was one of the contributing factors to the wave of emigration from Galicia to Brazil in the 1890s.<sup>14</sup>

In addition to the monarch-deliverer legend and the blaming of all evils on lords and officials, there was a third response to the dissonance between the assumptions of naive monarchism and the experience of oppression. This third response forms the proper subject of this study: the displacement of naive monarchism, the transfer of loyalty from the Austrian emperor to the Russian tsar. From the 1860s to the 1890s many Ukrainian peasants in the Habsburg empire placed their hope for justice and liberation in the tsar of Russia.

As Mykhailo Pavlyk has noted, the faith in the tsar that developed among Ukrainian peasants in Austria was a copy of the faith in the tsar that existed among Ukrainian peasants in the Russian empire.<sup>15</sup> The peasant in Russian-ruled Ukraine believed in the tsar and was ready to fight for him against the noble landowners, officials, and priests (cf. the Chyhyryn affair in 1876-77).<sup>16</sup> This naive tsarism, traditional in the Russian empire, crossed the river Zbruch into Austrian Galicia; here, as displaced naive monarchism, it took on a significance akin to the tsar-deliver legend.

Hope in the tsar could travel easily because of the regular communication between Ukrainian peasants on both sides of the Russo-Austrian border. Galician peasants would visit Russia and report on the conditions they found there. A Galician peasant told Kel'siev in 1866: "A man from our village was in Muscovy [i.e., Russian-ruled Ukraine]; they say that no one is beaten with cudgels over there, that the tsar took the forests and pastures away from the Poles and gave them to the peasants, that even the courts there are just, and that they pay only half the taxes we do. . . . It used to be that the peasants over there across the border envied us, since we had good priests<sup>17</sup> who freed us from serfdom; and they [the Ukrainians in Russia] wanted to come under

12. "V Brazyl'ii tsarem ia khlops'kym stanu,  
"Tam zhydu dostupu ne dam, ni panu."

Ivan Franko, "Do Brazyl'ii," *Zibrannia tvoriv*, 50 vols. (Kiev: Naukova dumka, 1976- ), II, 263.

13. Severyna, "Emigratsiia v ukrains'kim pys'menstvi," *Propamiatna knyha UNS* (Jersey City: Svoboda Press, 1936), p. 409.

14. A Rudolph legend also circulated among the Polish peasants of western Galicia. In 1893 they engaged in anti-Jewish pogroms, supposedly at the command of Rudolph who was alive in America. S. M. Dubnov, *Noveishaia istoriia evreiskago naroda*, 3 vols. (Berlin: Grani, 1923), III, 74-75.

15. Mykhailo Pavlyk, *Moskvofil'stvo ta ukrainofil'stvo sered avstro-rus'koho narodu* (Lviv: Vydav Mykhailo Pavlyk, 1906), p. 16.

16. Field, pp. 113-207.

17. A reference to the Supreme Ruthenian Council of 1848-49.

our emperor. But now their tsar has done better for them than our priests did for us; he gave them forests and pastures. So now they are summoning us to come under the Russian tsar."<sup>18</sup>

The roots of the tsarist myth in Austro-Hungarian Ukraine may reach back into the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Some events that might have brought the tsar (or tsaritsa) to the attention of the peasants in parts of Ukraine outside Russian rule were the Pereiaslav agreement of 1654, the *haidamak* movement, the partitioning of Poland with the attendant military campaigns against the Polish nobility, and the Russo-Turkish wars of the eighteenth century. During the Napoleonic wars Russian soldiers were in Galicia and Subcarpathia, and the memory of the Russian troops lived on in Galicia until at least 1851. In that year, a peasant in the village of Nove Selo pointed out to his pastor, Father Ivan Naumovych, a fir tree that had two great branches growing straight up, as though the tree branched out into two trunks. The peasant explained: "When the Russians (*moskali*) went to fight the French, one old soldier pulled out his saber and split the fir tree in two while it was still young; and he said as he did it: 'If you grow to maturity, we will come here and take this country.'"<sup>19</sup> The prestige of the Russians rose in 1831 when Russian troops put down the Polish insurrection in the Russian sector of the partitioned lands. To the Ukrainian peasant it appeared as if the Russian government shared with him a common enemy: the Polish nobility. During the revolution of 1848-49, Russian soldiers were once again in Galicia and Subcarpathia, this time to crush the insurgent Magyar nobility and to keep the restive Poles in line. It seemed a propitious moment for the emergence of naive tsarism, but I have searched for and failed to find instances of displaced naive monarchism in 1848-49. Apparently, the peasants were too grateful to the emperor for the abolition of serfdom to consider a transfer of loyalty.

Naive tsarism surfaced in the 1860s. Contributing to this were changes in the economic situation, in Ukrainian society, and in the relative prestige of the Austrian emperor and Russian tsar. By the 1860s the economic consequences of emancipation had become clear. The gratitude for the abolition of serfdom was tempered by the resentment of the nobles' expropriation of forests and pastures, which still kept the peasant in economic bondage to the manor. Furthermore, the Austrian government in the 1860s actively promoted the transition to a fully capitalist economy (abolition of guilds, abolition of restrictions on interest, expansion of railways, etc.); in Ukrainian villages this necessarily undermined the peasant smallholding. The Ukrainian intelligentsia had by the 1860s become divided into two opposing camps. the national pop-

18. *Galichina i Moldaviia*, p. 101.

19. *Stenograficheskii otchet o sudovoi rosprave po delu Ol'gi Grabar' i tov.* (Lviv, 1882), p. 310, cited in Pavlyk, p. 11.

ulists (*narodovtsi*) and the Russophiles. The latter, identifying themselves as part of the Russian nation, pursued an orientation toward tsarist Russia. Thus, a "sophisticated tsarism" had emerged in Ukrainian society. Since the Russophiles, especially Father Ivan Naumovych, did popular educational work among the peasantry, the peasants were aware that even educated Ukrainians were placing their hope in the tsar. Finally, the emperor's prestige had declined considerably (and not only among the Ukrainian peasantry) as a result of Austria's humiliating defeats in 1859 and 1866. Simultaneously, the prestige of the tsar was on the rise: he had liberated the serfs in 1861, struck down the insurgent Polish nobility again in 1863, and instituted a land reform in Right Bank Ukraine in 1864 that was punitive to the Polish nobles and favorable to the Ukrainian peasants.

The earliest documented instance of naive tsarism refers to the period from 1860 to 1865 in Galicia, but was related by Father Naumovych at his trial for treason in 1882. In the early 1860s, a cottage weaver in Stril'che asked his opinion about buying a piece of land. Father Naumovych advised him to buy it, but the weaver objected: "Excuse me, father, but at the bazaar in Horodenka people were saying that the Russian tsar will come here, take land away from the lords, and distribute it to the peasants; so why should I buy it if I will get land for free?"<sup>20</sup> Of course, Father Naumovych's own brand of Russophilism had no place for a tsar with such radical social tendencies. But this was an integral part of the peasants' myth: the tsar would expropriate the lords and give land to the peasants.

The next recorded instance of naive tsarism dates from 1866 and comes from Kel'siev's travel account. A peasant explained to him: "We have already abandoned all hope in [our emperor]; maybe the Russian [tsar] will arise." He urged Kel'siev to describe in detail in his book the poverty of the Galician peasants. "Let the whole world know," he said. "Let all emperors and kings know how we live here, and let the Russian tsar come and drive out from among us the Poles, the Germans [i.e., officials], and Jews."<sup>21</sup>

In 1874 Vladimir Debogorii-Mokrievich, another Russian populist, visited Galicia and Bukovyna. Since he had encountered a great deal of naive monarchism in his native Russian Ukraine, he was interested in comparing the attitudes of peasants in Austrian Ukraine. He was surprised (pleasantly, it seems) to find that he heard almost as much about the Russian tsar in Galicia and Bukovyna as he had in Kiev gubernia. In Austria, too, the peasants understood the tsar (the "white tsar" as they sometimes referred to him) to be a friend of the peasants and an enemy of the landlords. Debogorii-Mokrievich reported that the peasants believed in the tsar and the emperor simultaneously. "There is

20. *Ibid.*, p. 12.

21. *Galichina i Moldaviia*, p. 101.

no one," they said, "like the Muscovite tsar and our emperor." Together, the tsar and emperor would protect them from the landlords' depredations. But, noted Debogorii-Mokrievich, the Russian tsar clearly stood in first place and the Austrian emperor paled in comparison.<sup>22</sup>

The late 1870s, a time of Russo-Austrian tension over the Balkans, was also a period of intense hope in the tsar among Ukrainian peasants in Galicia. Peasants threatened to slaughter landlords and Jews at the coming of the "white tsar," and the viceroy of Galicia, Count Alfred Potocki, had to tour the border districts to reassure the panic-stricken Polish nobility.<sup>23</sup> A rumor circulated among the peasants that the tsar himself had promised to enter Galicia and introduce the agrarian reforms the peasantry desired. First, however, he had to win the war with Turkey and raise the "honorable cross" over the church of St. Sophia in *Tsarhorod* (Istanbul).<sup>24</sup>

The next major wave of naive tsarism came in 1882, and was touched off by a variety of incidents: the Russophiles' open agitation to substitute Orthodoxy for Greek Catholicism, the deposition of Metropolitan Iosyf Sembratovych, the arrest and trial of the popular Father Naumovych and other Russophiles, a series of socialist trials in Galicia, renewed Austro-Russian tension over Bosnia, and the pogroms in Russian Ukraine.

The trial of the Russophiles brought to light the strength of naive tsarism in the Galician villages of Ivanivka and Loshniv, where Father Naumovych had been active. Here religious overtones were prominent. Some peasants said that there was no need to build new Eastern-rite churches (*tserkvy*) because the *moskali* would come in two years and turn the Latin-rite churches (*kosts'oly*) into Eastern-rite churches. One peasant stated: "If the *Moskal'* [i.e., the tsar] came here, he would turn the Latin-rite churches into stables for horses." The same peasant declared that the Ukrainians would prefer the Russian to the Austrian monarch because the Russian tsar was of the same faith.

The villagers expected the tsar to come soon. Several peasants spoke of an agreement between the tsar and the emperor to exchange territory. In return for Warsaw and Lithuania, the tsar was to receive Galicia up to Lviv. (This

22. Vladimir Debogorii-Mokrievich, *Vospominaniia*, 1 vol. in 3 parts (Paris: J. Allémane, 1894-98), pp. 126-27.

23. Stefan Kieniewicz, *Adam Sapieha (1828-1903)* (Lviv: Wydawnictwo Zakładu Narodowego im. Ossolińskich, 1939), p. 364. Kieniewicz uncritically accepts the viewpoint of the Polish nobility and blames the peasant unrest on "Muscovite agitation." Cf. Pavlyk, p. 11: "Here we must correct the erroneous idea of the ruling strata of Galicia that 'Muscovite agents' introduced this Russophilism and propagated it among the Ruthenian popular masses of Galicia. . . . Even if such propaganda was ever conducted outside of Lviv, it was restricted to a very small number of uninfluential individuals from among the Ruthenian people; among the masses of the Ruthenian population Russophilism emerged altogether differently. . . ."

24. *Ibid.*, p. 18. Pavlyk heard this rumor in the village of Pekuriava (Kolomyia district) in December 1877.

talk of an agreement between the monarchs probably referred to the recent formation of the *Dreikaiserbund*.) After the arrest of Father Naumovych, peasants gathered in the tavern at Ivanivka and discussed the coming of the *Moskal'*. He would take the whole Ruthenian land, including Lviv and the capital of Bukovyna, Chernivtsi. Already Russian troops were concentrated at the border, ready to drive out the Jews; the peasants were going to help the Russians do this. On other occasions, the peasants said they were going to slaughter the Poles as well as the Jews when the tsar took over. Some peasants even ascribed supernatural powers to the avenger-tsar. Allegedly, they made the following threat: "You Poles have to sit quiet, because you are intruders in our midst. If we write to the *Moskal'*, he will come here in spirit and root you out by the sword, because this is Red Ruthenia."<sup>25</sup>

Elsewhere in Galicia, too, in that same year, the peasants were looking forward to a Russo-Austrian war, convinced that the *Moskal'* "would do something with the Jews." They were disappointed with Franz Joseph, whom they called "the Jewish emperor."<sup>26</sup> A Ukrainian socialist in the Kolomyia region reported that many peasants had confused notions about socialism and the Russian tsar. They saw the accused of the 1882 Russophile trial as "socialists." In some this awakened rancor, in others sympathy. Some of Father Naumovych's former admirers were embittered that Naumovych had been led astray by socialists. Other peasants, who considered themselves socialists, were sympathetic to the incorporation of Galicia into Russia and expected it to take place after an Austro-Russian war. This was tied up with their hope in the Russian tsar, "who when he appears here 'will divide the land up equally.'"<sup>27</sup>

The radical Ukrainian writer Ivan Franko reported that similar beliefs were expressed in a conversation he had with a peasant in that same year, 1882. Franko was explaining to an illiterate peasant the extent of clerical landholding. The peasant became indignant and said: "Just wait till the *Maskal'* [sic] comes here. He'll do with them what he did over there in Ukraine where he *abolished* the priests."<sup>28</sup> The peasant was referring to the evangelical, priestless Stundist sect in Ukraine. Franko had several times made clear to the peasant that the Russian government was hostile to the Stundists, but the peasant knew better: the *Moskal'* himself had introduced Stundism and would introduce it yet in Galicia.<sup>29</sup> When reporting this conversation, Franko observed

25. *Stenograficheskii otchet*, cited in Pavlyk, pp. 20-21. Red Ruthenia (*Chervona Rus'*) was the old name for Ukrainian Galicia. It is used here to allude to blood.

26. [Mykhailo Pavlyk], "Pis'ma iz Avstriiskoi Ukrainy," *Vol'noe slovo*, No. 52, 8 Jan. 1883, pp. 9-10.

27. "K polozheniiu del v Galitsii," *ibid.*, No. 48, 1 Nov. 1882, p. 7. Cf. Pavlyk, p. 22.

28. For an explanation of the conflict between priests and peasants in Ukrainian Galicia, see John-Paul Himka, "Priests and Peasants: The Greek Catholic Pastor and the Ukrainian National Movement in Austria, 1867-1900," *Canadian Slavonic Papers*, No. 1 (1979), pp. 1-14.

29. The peasant may also have had in mind the abolition of the Uniate church in the Chełm region in the 1870s. This really was the work of the *Moskal'*!

that it had long been a belief in Galician villages that the *Moskal'* would "pacify" or expel the Jews, humble the lords, give land to the poor, and abolish the priesthood. The peasants told Franko of their hope for a Russo-Austrian war ending in a Russian victory. And what would happen, Franko asked, if the *Moskal'* took away our constitution? The peasants laughed. "What kind of constitution is this? What kind of freedom? That everyone is free to fleece us and do us harm?"<sup>30</sup>

Naive tsarism was also rampant in 1882 in Bukovyna, where a legend was circulating about the recently deposed Metropolitan Iosyf Sembratovych. The legend involved a just *Moskal'* and an evil emperor and Jews. The latter were supposed to be responsible for the removal of the metropolitan. The metropolitan promised that Bukovyna would soon be ruled by the *Moskal'*. The peasants of Bukovyna also hoped for a victorious Russian invasion. As soon as the *Moskal'* entered Bukovyna, they would join his side and fight against the Jews.<sup>31</sup>

Russo-Austrian tension over Bulgaria in 1886-87 once again provided an atmosphere in which naive tsarism could flourish, although other incidents sometimes served as the focus for specific legends or rumors. An example of this comes from Ivan Franko. Spending the summer of 1886 in his native Nahuievychi, he met a man who introduced himself as a worker returning from nearby Boryslav, the center of oil and ozocerite extraction. The worker, after breakfast and a shot of *horilka* provided by Franko, began to talk about the unemployment in Boryslav. The unemployment resulted from a prohibition of paraffin candles in Orthodox churches in Russia, which until then had provided the chief outlet for Boryslav's paraffin. Franko's guest explained the prohibition on paraffin as the consequence of a quarrel between the Russian tsar and the Austrian emperor:

The *Moskal'* says to ours [the emperor]: "I've heard that in your Galicia the grain is expensive and people are dying of hunger."

"Yes, it is expensive," says *ours*. "It goes for 8 gulden a quintal. But what can I do about it?"

"You know what," says the *Moskal'*, "I have plenty of grain. Let me export grain to Galicia at 5 gulden a quintal."

"Eh," replies *ours*, "how can I allow that? If grain went that cheap, then my lords would go bankrupt."

"Well," said the *Moskal'* in reply, "if you don't want to allow me to export grain to Galicia, then I won't allow your Jews to export wax [i.e., paraffin] to my country."

And so he forbade the illumination of churches with that wax.<sup>32</sup>

30. Ivan Franko [M-on], "Krest'ianskiiia stremieniia i mechtaniia; raschety na voinu s Rossiei," *Vol'noe slovo*, No. 52, 8 Jan. 1883, pp. 8-9.

31. Pavlyk, "Pis'ma," pp. 9-10.

32. Ivan Franko, "Spravy suspil'no-politychni v ustakh rus'koho liudu v Halychyni,"

Pavlyk reports another naive tsarist rumor that circulated in 1886 in connection with the near collapse of the Galician Russophile bank, the *Obshchoe rol'nycho-kredytnoe zavedenie*. The founders and managers of the insolvent bank sent delegates to Russia to find investors. When the delegates returned with over a million gulden and thus saved the bank, many peasants believed that the tsar himself had provided the funds in order to rescue the peasants who had loans out from the bank. Some even thought the tsar had absolved them of their debts to the bank. In the following year, when rumors of war were especially rife and the Galician authorities waged a campaign against Eastern-rite three-barred crosses and village reading clubs, the peasants once again began to await the arrival of the *Moskal'* and even to threaten the Polish nobility and Jews with his imminent coming. The year 1887 was marked by a series of searches, arrests, and trials of Ukrainian peasants on charges of spreading alarming rumors and *lèse-majesté*.<sup>33</sup>

A poem by Ivan Franko depicts the mood in the village in 1887. Since Franko drew from life, we can take the poem to be an accurate representation of peasant attitudes. A group of adolescents are tending horses in the pasture and discussing the possibility of war:

“War? With whom?”

“Why, of course, with the *Moskal'*.”

“What! With the *Moskal'*? Oh, this is our misfortune! The *Moskal'* is tough (*tverdyl*); our boys won't be able to stand up to him. . . .”

“My opinion, brothers, is that the *Moskal'* wouldn't do us any harm. The fellow I work for—and he's an intelligent man—he often says: ‘Lord! If only the *Moskal'* would finally come! Then the fleecing of the people would everywhere disappear; the *Moskal'* would do away with all that. He'd put things right and make the lot of the poor people somewhat easier.’”

“That's just what we need here: the Muscovite's strong (*tverda*) arm.”

Then the discussion turned to the lords and their plot to reintroduce serfdom. The lords had already forced the emperor to sign the proper document, but they were still keeping it a secret because “they were afraid of the *Moskal'*.”<sup>34</sup>

The last recorded instances of naive tsarism date to the early 1890s, to the period of “emigration fever” when the legend about Crown Prince Rudolph was also in circulation. In 1892 Galician peasants emigrated en masse to Russia, just as the year previously they had emigrated to “Rudolph's” Brazil. Be-

in *V naimakh u susidiv* (Lviv, 1914), pp. 83-84. Franko originally published this account in *Przeglad spoleczny* in 1887.

33. Pavlyk, *Moskvofil'stvo*, pp. 61-63.

34. Ivan Franko, “Na pastivnyku,” *Zibrannia tvoriv*, II, 254-57. The poem was written in 1888 but refers to the events of the previous year.

hind the Russian emigration lay a rumor that the tsar had expelled all Jews and Germans from Russia and wanted to replace them with Galician Ukrainian peasants. He promised to give each peasant settler ten *morgs*<sup>35</sup> of land and cattle. A little later another such rumor was current. This time the tsar and the emperor were supposed to have made a trade: the tsar would give all his Jews to the emperor and the emperor promised to give the tsar the same number of Ukrainian peasants. The peasants thus convinced themselves that it was the emperor's will that they emigrate to Russia. Peasants from the border districts poured into Russia without knowing where they were headed or how they were going to live when they got there. "It couldn't be worse than here," they said. "Even if we die of hunger over there, we can't expect anything better if we stay here."<sup>36</sup>

Yet, by the late 1890s, naive tsarism was a spent force.<sup>37</sup> There was a good reason for this: displaced naive monarchism had been replaced by peasant politics. The initial assumption of this study was that naive monarchism was a result of the isolation of peasants from one another, their incapacity to function politically as a class. While the economic basis of this isolation, the peasant smallholding, remained intact after the 1890s, the political limitations it imposed had been overcome. Peasants no longer had to look to a supreme, transcendent, and thoroughly legendary arbiter to fulfill their desires; they were now able to struggle for what they wanted on their own. By the late 1890s in Galicia (and somewhat later in Bukovyna)—thanks to the progress of the national movement—the Ukrainian village had become organized politically. Most villages now had clubs (*chytal'ni*) in which peasants gathered for public readings of newspapers and booklets; consequently, a new sort of knowledge was supplanting myth. Many villages also boasted cooperative economic institutions which fought "the Jews" much more effectively than naive tsarism had. The three major Ukrainian political currents—Russophilism, national populism, and radicalism—all had roots in the villages, and advocates of each tendency conducted electoral agitation among the peasantry. Even a peasant party had formed by 1890, the Ruthenian-Ukrainian Radical Party. In the new village that had emerged, the *raison d'être* of naive monarchism—and especially of its most radical variant, *displaced* naive monarchism, hope in the tsar-deliverer—had disappeared.<sup>38</sup> All that seems to have lingered on into

35. Ten *morgs* is 5.6 hectares. In 1900, 49 percent of Galician agricultural holdings amounted to less than two hectares; another 31 percent ranged from two to five hectares. Walentyna Najdus, *Szkice z historii Galicji*, 2 vols. (Warszawa: Książka i Wiedza, 1958-60), I, 105.

36. Franko, "Emihratsiia," p. 314.

37. It is possible, however, that the hope in the tsar revived on the eve of and during World War I. Considerations of space preclude a discussion of this problem.

38. "Ruthenian reading clubs . . . are everywhere leading their members to an awareness of their human and constitutional rights, to national consciousness; and by this they undermine Russian tsarism among the mass of the Ruthenian population here. . . ." Pavlyk, *Moskvofil'stvo*, p. 29.

the twentieth century was a *sentimental* attachment to the Austrian emperor, manifested in folk songs and the ubiquitous portraits of Franz Joseph. As a *political* myth naive monarchism had become irrelevant.

It remains to attempt to answer three interrelated questions about the national and social implications of the hope in the tsar among Austrian Ukrainian peasants. Does the tsar myth confirm the present-day Soviet historico-political myth of the Ukrainians' eternal longing for "reunion" with Russia? Was naive tsarism a primarily social or primarily national myth? Assuming the pre-eminence of either the national or social aspect, what was the role of the subsidiary element in the myth?

The notion that naive tsarism in Austrian Ukraine might have been an expression of the Ukrainian desire for "reunion" with Russia is undermined by the fact that hope in the tsar was not confined to the Ukrainians. A naive hope in the tsar was widespread in nineteenth-century Eastern Europe. For example, Debogorii-Mokrievich encountered naive tsarism not only among the Ukrainian peasants of Russia and Austria, but among Czech and Bulgarian peasants as well.<sup>39</sup> Naive tsarism, it turns out, was not something peculiar to the Ukrainians, hence it did not express their particular desire for "reunion" with Russia as elaborated in Soviet theory.

A second reason why naive tsarism cannot be used to confirm the Soviet myth is that the Russian tsar was not the sole monarch to figure in the displaced naive monarchism of the Ukrainian peasantry. This emerges most clearly from Kel'siev's account. Here a Galician peasant relates that the Ukrainian peasants in the Russian Empire had once put their hope in the Austrian emperor—exactly the reverse of displaced naive monarchism as it appeared in Austrian Ukraine! This was the same peasant who urged Kel'siev to write about the poverty in Galicia so that "all emperors and kings" would know. Although the peasant ultimately expected the Russian tsar to be moved to rescue the impoverished peasants, he first told Kel'siev: "Write, sir, that we are living in such poverty that it's hard to describe. Maybe some other monarch will come and then it will be better."<sup>40</sup> In sum, it did not much matter who the deliverer was—whether the Russian tsar, the Austrian emperor, or "some other monarch"—as long as the deliverer would set things right. Witness, too, the similarity between Crown Prince Rudolph and the Russian tsar in the naive monarchist legends of the early 1890s.

Naive tsarism, then, was not exclusively Ukrainian and displaced naive monarchism among the Ukrainians was not exclusively tsarist: This not only shows the irrelevance here of the Soviet myth of longed-for "reunion," but it also strongly suggests that naive tsarism in Austrian Ukraine was less a national

39. Debogorii-Mokrievich, pp. 126-27.

40. *Galichina i Moldaviia*, p. 101; see also p. 132.

or ethnic phenomenon than a social phenomenon. The content of the tsar myth underscores its primarily social character: the tsar was supposed to drive out or put to the sword all groups considered inimical to the peasantry, and he was also supposed to take away land from the lords and give it to the peasants. On the whole, then, we can agree with Roman Rosdolsky that Austrian naive tsarism "was primarily *socially* motivated. The Galician peasants simply hoped that the legendary tsar (to whom they merely transferred their traditional faith in the Austrian emperor) would *free them from the high-handed rule of the 'lords'* and would divide the lords' lands among themselves—exactly as the *Russian* peasants had expected this sort of 'freedom' from every tsar and even from Napoleon! The peasants' faith in the tsar (or emperor) was an inevitable component of the *peasant psychology of that time* and its roots were firmly planted in social conditions."

But Rosdolsky seems to be overstating the case when he says that "this faith [in the tsar-liberator] had nothing at all to do with nationalism and even less with an Orthodox religious consciousness. . . ."41 As we have seen, religious solidarity did come to the fore in 1882; and certainly a form of nationalism is implicit in the anti-Polish and anti-Jewish aspects of naive tsarism.

Whether the national-religious element in naive tsarism formed an autonomous, active component of the myth or a mere reinforcement to the social element is not something that can be answered with certainty solely on the basis of the documentation of naive tsarism itself. My own instinct is to view the hope in the tsar as pre-eminently social in origin with national-religious factors acting as reinforcements. To illustrate how such factors might come into play, we should note a "psycho-linguistic" element that may also have served to reinforce the myth. In his own language, the Ukrainian peasant would be likely to think of the Russian monarch as the *rus'kyi tsar*.42 *Rus'kyi* here would have a double meaning: Russian (*ruskii*) and Ruthenian (i.e., Ukrainian). The *rus'kyi tsar*, therefore, would seem to be the natural protector of the *rus'ki khlopy* (Ukrainian peasants). Furthermore, the very word *tsar* had an almost sacred connotation. The emperor of Austria was a *tsisar*, the former king of Poland a *korol'* or *krul'*, but only the Russian monarch was a *tsar*. The word *tsar* (an old Slavic word for "king") was the word used in Church Slavic to denote the "King of Heaven," as in the frequently-recited prayer *Tsariu nebesnyi*. Hence, the earthly tsar of Russia might have been considered the natural counterpart of the heavenly tsar. Such undertones to

41. Roman Rosdolsky, "Friedrich Engels und das Problem der 'geschichtslosen' Völker (Die Nationalitätenfrage in der Revolution 1848-1849 im Lichte der 'Neuen Rheinischen Zeitung')," *Archiv für Sozialgeschichte*, 4 (1964), 113-14n. Emphasis in original.

42. *Stenograficheskii otchet*, p. 310, cited in Pavlyk, *Moskvo fil'stvo*, p. 12; *Galichina i Moldavia*, p. 101.

the concept of *rus'kyi tsar*, while evidently not sufficient to *give rise* to displaced naive monarchism, would, however, make the hope in the tsar that much more acceptable to the peasant. It is in just such a way, I would imagine, that religious factors reinforced the myth of the tsar in Austrian Ukraine. To this unconscious reinforcement, moreover, must be added the role of religion as a more consciously perceived symbol. The Eastern rite, shared with the tsar and other *moskali*, was the peasants' religion; Roman Catholicism and Judaism were the religions of the lords and money lenders.

This brings us to the final point to be made about the role of extra-social factors in naive tsarism. The myth was very clearly anti-Jewish and anti-Polish, and there can be no denial that this was an expression of national hatred. But to one who is familiar with the socio-economic conditions of Austrian Ukraine, particularly of Galicia, it is equally clear that this national hatred, as alienating as we rightfully find it to be, was a phenomenal form of class hatred. This is confirmed by the free interchange of the terms "Poles" and "lords" within the corpus of evidence previously cited. In the case of Jews, it is true, no class term was ever substituted for the ethno-religious term. But this is hardly surprising, since the class position of the Jewish population in the village was very complex. The role of rural Jews in this part of Eastern Europe was to perform almost exclusively those functions in the economy in which money was paramount: lending, trading, buying and selling land, innkeeping, and recruitment of hired labor. To the Ukrainian peasant, therefore, "the Jews" was a term expressing a coincident ethno-religious and socio-economic category of people. That the peasant was as yet unable to distinguish the different sorts of categories involved is only natural; after all, he was still unsophisticated enough to put his hope in the tsar of Russia. That the anti-Jewish dimension in his naive tsarism seems to have been as prominent if not more prominent than the anti-Polish/anti-landlord dimension is not surprising either; in the late nineteenth century, the main point of conflict between lord and peasant, serfdom, had been abolished, and it was the new money economy that was now threatening the peasant smallholding. In this light, naive tsarism in Austrian Ukraine still appears to be muddled and misguided, but very firmly grounded nonetheless in social reality.

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