


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LANGUAGE AND LINGUISTIC NATIONALISM IN THE
UKRAINE¹

Kenneth C. Farmer

For analysts as much as for advocates of ethnic nationalism, language is an important elemental symbol of national identity. The relationship between language and nationalism has received attention in the scholarly literature,² as has the role of linguistic problems in the resurgence of minority nationalism in the USSR, along with state-sponsored intervention in linguistic processes in that country.³

Joshua Fishman refers to the organized pursuit of solutions to language problems as language planning."⁴ Jonathan Pool, in a recent article on the politics of language planning in Soviet Central Asia, sees language planning as consisting of two types: "language status planning," referring to efforts to fix the status, role, and functions of languages (and thus, he notes, the choices among languages that users make); and "language corpus planning," involving intervention, in his words, in "the content and structure of languages themselves: vocabularies, sound systems, word structures, sentence structures, writing systems, and stylistic repertoires."⁵

To the extent that language functions as a *symbol* of ethnic identity, conflict over the symbol displaces conflict over the *substance* of nationality rights and privileges, particularly in an environment such as that in the Soviet Union, where open and frank discussion of the latter is effectively prohibited. Actual ethnic inequities and resentments in the USSR are papered over, and discussion of them short-circuited, by a myth of the "friendship of peoples" which has been raised to ideological status.

Our thesis, then, is that controversy surrounding "language planning" efforts in the Soviet Ukraine lies very close to the heart of the nationality problem as it is experienced by Ukrainians. Thus, our concern is with the perceptions that Ukrainian intellectuals hold of the fate of their language, and of the role of language *qua* symbol of national identity in the postwar Ukrainian nationalist dissent movement. The question of civil and human rights, so prominent among the concerns of dissidents in the RSFSR, is inextricably intertwined with the question of national identity in the Ukraine and other minority republics.⁷

Ukrainian nationalist dissenters have articulated the belief that the Ukrainian language is an integral part of the Ukrainian national moral patrimony,⁸ and there is indirect evidence that this belief is shared by many establishment intellectuals. This concern for the Ukrainian language is connected with these convictions: (a) the

language is threatened in various ways with dilution or extinction, and (b) it merits state-sponsored efforts to alleviate these threats, both for its own sake as a medium of communication, and as a symbol of Ukrainian identity and as the bearer of a distinct Ukrainian cultural heritage. Ukrainian dissident spokesmen such as Dzyuba argue that this conviction is not inconsistent with "Leninist nationality policy."

As a symbol of ethnic identity, a national language serves at least three major symbolic functions. First, it serves as a symbol of *authenticity*: like other cultural forms and expressions, it authenticates the myth of a historic communal bond. Aside from physical features when these are relevant, language is the most obvious and the most tenacious bond linking the members of a community to one another and—through literature, written records, and the oral tradition—to a perceived common past.

Secondly, language serves as a symbol of *differentiation* of the ethnic community from other groups. The differentiating function of language becomes particularly relevant when, as in the case of the Ukrainians who are culturally and religiously close to the Russians, few other unambiguous symbols of differentiation are available.

The third symbolic function of language is in the distribution of relative *status*. Among large parts of the urban population of the Ukraine, the Russian language enjoys higher prestige than the Ukrainian, many Russians regarding Ukrainian contemptuously as a "vulgar peasant dialect." The status-distributing function of language comes into play instrumentally as well as expressively, insofar as fluency in Russian seems to be a necessary condition of promotion for Ukrainians.⁹

After briefly considering the language question in the official ideology and some concrete aspects of the status of the Ukrainian language (both matters treated more extensively elsewhere), we examine controversy generated by Soviet language-planning efforts in two areas: language and education, and language culture and purity. The first of these is an aspect of "language status planning," the second of "language corpus planning." Our focus in both instances is upon conflict relating to the symbolic functions of language, as defined above.

THE LANGUAGE QUESTION IN OFFICIAL NATIONALITIES POLICY

In the official ideology, one of the important concomitants of the eventual merger (*skliania*) of nations in the USSR is to be the adoption

of the Russian language as at least a *lingua franca* throughout the Soviet Union or, at most, as the native language of the minority nationalities. Meanwhile, officially articulated policy stipulates that national languages are to be allowed to develop, and guarantees "full freedom for every citizen of the USSR to speak and educate his children in any language, without permitting any privileges, limitations or compulsions in the use of one language or another."¹⁰

Throughout the interwar period, it had been believed that the final 'merger' of nations would be accompanied by the 'merger' of languages as well, with a new language emerging after the victory of communism. This doctrine was associated with the theories of N. Ia. Marr (1864-1934), who held that there are no language groups or families, only "class languages" arising out of the economic bases of societies. The position of Russian as the language of international discourse rests on Stalin's rejection of Marr's theories. Stalin pronounced that language is not, as Marr had maintained, part of the 'superstructure', but rather a classless attribute of nations and peoples which can be utilized by bourgeois and proletarian classes alike. The result of *slüanie*, therefore, will not be a new, amalgamated language; rather, one will come out on top, its grammatical and lexical "corpus" intact. In the process, national languages will give way to "zonal languages," and these will eventually give way to a single, international language, although Stalin conceded that the process might take centuries.¹¹ The suggestion was very strong in Stalin's writing that Russian would be a zonal language in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.

Stalin's theses on linguistics were significant on practical grounds for the Ukrainians for two reasons. First and favorably, they recognized that national languages, intact and undiluted, were legitimate media of communications; this legitimized language planning efforts for the preservation and even "enrichment" of the Ukrainian language. Secondly and ominously, Stalin's pronouncements legitimized the exceptional claim of Russian to be the language of international discourse. The ambiguity inherent in Stalin's dialectic provides the leeway for conflict over language policy and appropriate language-planning efforts.

Continuing justifications for Russian, rather than any other national language, as the *lingua franca* are of three types: 1) It is spoken as a native language by a majority of the inhabitants of the Soviet Union—up to 60 percent—as well as by more people than any other language; 2) it is close to the other two Slavic languages, Belorussian and Ukrainian, and the East Slavs comprise up to 75 percent of the population of the USSR; and 3) "subjective factors." As one author put it:

As far as subjective factors are concerned, they include the fact that the Russian socialist nation has achieved the heights or worldwide science and culture, that the Russian language has created a completely unique . . . repository of the achievements of civilization . . . that the Russian language is itself an unusually rich and beautiful language, and finally, that Russian was the language of Vladimir Illich Lenin.¹²

For the present, the Soviet regime strongly promotes a policy of encouraging bilingualism, rather than one of complete linguistic assimilation. The emergence of such patterns has not threatened native languages in areas of the world where speakers of small languages do not feel that their language is threatened with extinction. Where the native language is insufficient (for social intercourse and/or mobility) but people feel that the native language is threatened, however, bilingualism emerges accompanied by linguistic nationalism.¹³ This has been the pattern in the Ukraine in the period under study.

PRESENT STATUS OF THE UKRAINIAN LANGUAGE

The threat to the vitality of the Ukrainian language is perhaps overestimated by Ukrainian dissidents. Ukrainian was claimed as the native language by 91.4% of all Ukrainians in the Ukrainian SSR in the 1970 census, down 2.1% from the 1959 census.¹⁴ A slightly different picture emerges when these data are grouped according to urban and rural residence of respondents:

TABLE 1
PERCENTAGE OF UKRAINIAN POPULATION OF UKRAINIAN
SSR REPORTING UKRAINIAN AS NATIVE LANGUAGE

URBAN			RURAL		
1959	1970	% point change	1959	1970	% point change
84.7	82.8	-1.9	98.6	98.7	+0.1

Sources: *Itogi vsesoiuz'noi perepisi naseleniia 1959 g. Ukrainskaia SSR* (Moscow: "Gosstatizdat," 1963), pp. 114-191; *Itogi vsesoiuz'noi perepisi naseleniia 1970 g., IV* (Moscow: "Statistika," 1973), pp. 170-191.

TABLE 2
PERCENTAGE OF UKRAINIAN POPULATION OF UKRAINIAN
SSR REPORTING RUSSIAN AS NATIVE LANGUAGE

1959	URBAN		1959	RURAL	
	1970	% point change		1970	% point change
15.3	17.1	+1.8	1.3	1.3	0.0

Sources: Same as for Table 1.

TABLE 3
PERCENTAGE OF UKRAINIAN POPULATION OF
UKRAINIAN SSR GIVING UKRAINIAN AS
NATIVE LANGUAGE: BY OBLAST

OBLAST	URBAN			RURAL		
	1959	1970	% pt. change	1959	1970	% pt. change
Ternopil*	98.2	98.9	+ 0.7	99.9	99.7	-0.2
Ivano-Frankivs'k*	97.9	98.3	+ 0.4	99.9	99.97	+0.07
Volyn*	97.7	98.2	+ 0.5	99.9	99.9	—
Rivne*	95.7	97.6	+ 1.9	99.8	99.9	+0.1
Kyiv (oblast)	96.9	97.1	+ 0.2	99.6	99.9	+0.3
Cherkasy	95.5	96.9	+ 1.4	99.7	99.9	+0.2
Lviv*	94.7	96.5	+ 1.8	99.9	99.95	+0.05
Khmelnys'ts'kyi	95.4	96.4	+ 1.0	99.8	99.95	+0.15
Zakarpattya*	95.7	96.1	+ 0.4	99.5	99.6	+0.1
Poltava	95.9	95.9	—	99.6	99.9	+0.3
Kirovohrad	94.4	95.6	+ 1.2	99.4	99.8	+0.4
Vynnytsia	94.4	95.2	+ 0.8	99.7	99.9	+0.2
Chernivtsi*	92.6	94.2	+ 1.6	99.7	99.8	+0.1
Zhytomyr	93.9	94.0	+ 0.1	99.6	99.9	+0.3
Chernyhiiv	85.8	91.3	+ 5.5	95.0	95.8	+0.8
Sumy	91.2	89.2	- 2.0	94.2	94.1	-0.1
Dnipropetrovs'k	89.2	86.3	- 2.9	99.2	99.5	+0.3
Kherson	64.1	83.4	+19.3	98.6	98.6	—
Zaporizhia	81.9	78.4	- 3.5	97.2	97.5	+0.3
Kyiv (city)	71.9	77.4	+ 5.5	NA	NA	NA
Kharkiv	60.8	75.7	+14.9	99.0	99.3	+0.3

OBLAST	URBAN			RURAL		
	1959	1970	% pt. change	1959	1970	% pt. change
Mykolaiv	74.4	73.3	- 1.1	98.4	98.3	-0.1
Voroshylivhrad	63.7	72.7	+ 9.0	97.7	96.7	-1.0
Odesa	69.4	67.9	- 1.5	98.3	98.6	+0.3
Donets'k	74.9	65.4	- 9.5	95.5	94.2	-1.3
Crimea	42.7	44.9	+ 2.2	64.8	71.9	+7.1

* = West Ukraine.

Sources: *Itogi vsesoiuz noi perepisi naseleniia 1959 g. Ukrainskaia SSR* (Moscow: "Gosstatizdat," 1963), pp. 174, 191; *Itogi Vsesoiuz noi perepisi naseleniia 1970 g. T. IV* (Moscow: "Statistika," 1973), pp. 170-191.

Tables 1 and 2 show that the Ukrainian language gained slightly in the countryside, and its losses in the cities, taking the republic as a whole, were modest. Table 3 shows that the stability of the Ukrainian language in the cities is strongest in the *oblasts* of the West Ukraine. Ukrainian also made dramatic gains in the urban areas of Kherson, Kharkiv, and Voroshylivhrad, and moderate gains in Kyiv (Kiev) city and Chernihiv *oblast*. The most important fact demonstrated by Table 3, however, is that the losses to the Ukrainian language in cities—net Russification—have occurred in only six out of the 25 *oblasts*: Sumy, Dnipropetrovs'k, Zaporizhzhia, Mykolaiv, Odesa, and Donets'k. All other *oblasts* showed a net gain in adherence to the Ukrainian language.

Of the six *oblasts* that show a net gain in Russification in the cities, only Dnipropetrovs'k has shown a significant decrease in the ratio of Ukrainians to Russians (net Russianization). In the other five, the ratio in the 1970 census is comparable to that for 1959, as shown in Table 4.

TABLE 4
RATIO OF UKRAINIANS TO RUSSIANS BY OBLAST

Oblast	Ratio 1959	Ratio 1970	% age change
Ternopil	7.25	10.5	+44.8
Volyn	6.0	7.5	+25.0
Ivan-Frankivs'k	6.4	7.5	+17.2
Chernyhiv	6.6	7.3	+10.6

Oblast	Ratio 1959	Ratio 1970	% age change
Zakarpattya	6.4	6.8	+ 6.3
Cherkasy	5.8	6.4	+10.3
Rivne	3.85	6.1	+58.4
Khmelnys'kyi	5.3	6.0	+13.2
Kyiv (<i>oblast</i>)	6.1	6.0	- 1.6
Poltava	6.8	5.5	-19.1
Kirovohrad	5.0	5.5	+10.0
Vynnytsia	4.6	5.4	+17.4
Sumy	5.3	5.3	0
Zhytomyr	4.7	5.0	+ 6.4
Lviv	3.4	4.6	+35.3
Chernivtsi	2.6	3.8	+46.2
Mykolaiv	2.9	2.9	0
Kherson	3.2	2.9	- 9.4
Kyiv (city)	2.6	2.8	+ 7.7
Dnipropetrovs'k	3.3	2.7	-18.2
Kharkiv	1.9	1.8	- 5.3
Zaporizhia	1.9	1.7	-10.5
Odesa	1.2	1.3	+ 8.3
Donets'k	1.3	1.1	-15.4
Voroshlovhrad	1.2	0.1	-91.7
Crimea	0.25	0.28	+12.0

Sources: Same as for Table 3.

Table 4 also reveals other anomalies in the relationship of Russification to Russianization. There was dramatic Russianization of Voroshlovhrad *oblast* between the two censuses, accompanied, however, by a dramatic gain in adherence to the Ukrainian language. Equally significant gains in adherence to Ukrainian occurred in Kherson and Kharkiv, and to a lesser extent in Kyiv city and Chernihiv *oblast*, where there was no substantial change in the ratio of Ukrainians to Russians. Similarly, a number of *oblasts* in which the ratio of Ukrainians to Russians has increased have shown no great gains for the Ukrainian language.¹⁵

The policy of promoting bilingualism has been rather more successful. In 1970, 48.5% of the urban and 25.1% of the rural population of the republic reported fluency in Russian as a second language, although we have no way of gauging the quality of this "fluency." But Ukrainian is also strong as a second language. Between 52.4% and 52.5% of those Ukrainians who declared Russian as their

native language also declared Ukrainian as a second language.¹⁶ To the extent that this group can be assumed to be equally fluent in Russian and Ukrainian, having declared Russian native out of deference or social pressure, it reduces the extent of actual Russification; this, of course, can only be a supposition. Unambiguous linguistic Russification can only be attributed with certainty to those Ukrainians who speak Russian but not Ukrainian; only 8.2% of the urban Ukrainian population falls into this more restricted category.¹⁷

Minority nationalities in the Ukraine (other than Jews and Russians) which come from other Soviet republics tend to adopt Russian rather than Ukrainian as a native or a second language, when declaring a language other than their own: this is probably explainable in terms of migration. Czechs and Poles, however, who have lived on Ukrainian territory for generations, tend to assimilate to Ukrainian rather than to Russian.¹⁸ Finally, 25.9% of Russians and 39% of Jews living in the Ukraine report Ukrainian as a second language. The adoption of Ukrainian as a second language by Russians living in urban areas (27%), surprisingly, is higher than by those in rural areas (20%).¹⁹

The data we have presented attest that rampant linguistic denationalization is not taking place in the Ukraine; except for a very few urban areas in the East Ukraine, the Ukrainian language is in fact gaining. There was a net decline for the Ukraine as a whole, but a very modest one.

But the figures also show that Ukrainians are speaking Russian as a second language. This aspect of Soviet nationalities policy is showing success. Brian Silver has argued that bilingualism may be viewed as "a stable form of accommodation between ethnic groups," but for the long term, he is not sanguine that bilingualism will not threaten the maintenance of the native tongue for some Soviet nationalities, such as the Ukrainians, for whom factors that reinforce the native language are weak.²⁰ But for the short term, at least, neither officially sponsored or encouraged discrimination—which certainly exists—against the Ukrainian language nor natural processes have been reflected in any significant decline in adherence to the language overall.

Discrimination against the Ukrainian language is in part the result of social processes, particularly in highly Russianized areas, and in this case is to be attributed to the differential prestige of the Russian and Ukrainian languages.²¹ State policy can be said to discriminate against, or foster discrimination against a language when (to use Joseph Gusfield's concept) policies pursued by the state tend to reinforce one side or the other of a "status" issue.²² Official Soviet policies in the Ukraine have tended to reinforce the prestige of

Russian over Ukrainian, and to encourage the adoption of Russian by Ukrainians with aspirations to rise. These policies and others have, as we have noted, generated controversy over the language question. The entire postwar period, for example, has been marked by demands for greater use of the Ukrainian language in the mass media and the arts, and there is considerable documentation—both Soviet and Western—of the fact that publishing and broadcasting in Ukrainian are not proportional to the percentage of Ukrainian speakers in the republic.²³

Both establishment intellectuals and dissidents have taken part in the controversy over language. Commitment to the preservation of the Ukrainian language is the clearest substantive link between establishment intellectuals, dissidents, and some Ukrainian Party officials. We turn our attention to an examination of this conflict over state policies affecting language as they relate to the issue-areas of language and education, and language culture. As they concern the symbolic role of language in the maintenance of ethnic identity, the former is particularly a question of differentiation and status, the latter primarily of authenticity.

CONTROVERSY OVER LANGUAGE IN THE SOVIET UKRAINE

Language and Education

In the field of education, state policy effectively discriminates against the Ukrainian language. It does so directly, by requiring the study of the Russian language in primary schools (since 1972, also in kindergartens) and by conducting instruction in Russian, and indirectly through the structure of incentives: because the better institutes of higher education conduct much, if not most, of their instruction in Russian, parents wishing to provide their children with the best opportunities for upward mobility do well to send their children to Russian schools.²⁴ The education system thus produces bilingualism, which is an articulated goal of state policy, but it is inescapable that early socialization on this pattern will lower still further prestige of the Ukrainian language: education is a prime medium for the transmission of symbols, and symbols are the vehicles of values.

The education system works against the Ukrainian language as a symbol of differentiation and status in three ways: 1) by retarding the pupils' facility with the language; 2) by communicating, largely by example and nuance, negative symbolic associations with Ukrainian and positive ones with Russian; and 3) by making an irresistible appeal to the students' self-interest, as they learn that there is a

material premium attached to the mastery of Russian, as well as a social stigma attached to speaking Ukrainian in some contexts.

Khrushchev's 1958-59 school reforms abolished the compulsory instruction of children in both the republican language and in Russian, leaving the choice of sending their children to national or to Russian schools to the parents.²⁵ Seemingly innocuous, the decree in fact meant that most parents would opt for Russian schools, mainly to enhance their children's prospects, but also perhaps because of social pressure and perhaps because Russian schools have better facilities. For this reason, opposition to the change was great. The Kyiv Writer's Union passed a resolution against implementation of the reform,²⁶ and a number of Ukrainian Party officials are said to have pleaded that the reform not be instituted.²⁷ Sviatoslav Karavans'kyi somewhat later wrote and circulated an article describing the decree as "fundamentally discriminating," demanding that it be rescinded.²⁸

Many of the feared effects of the reform were in evidence before it was instituted, however. Considerable concern had been publicly expressed in the period 1957-59 over the quality of the mastery of Ukrainian language and literature by applicants to universities. Summarizing the results of admissions examinations to Shevchenko University in Kyiv, one educator concluded that the lowest level of mastery of Ukrainian was shown by those who finished city schools with Russian as the language of instruction, and in particular, schools for working youth. These applicants tended to think in Russian and then translate their sentences into Ukrainian, making frequent syntactic errors and employing a large number of Russicisms.²⁹ Similar generalizations were made about applicants to the University of Chernivtsy in 1960.³⁰

It is therefore difficult to gauge the extent to which the reforms were actually responsible for the effects feared for them. There was, however, an increase in the number of Russian schools in the Ukraine, and articles began appearing urging parents to send their children to Russian schools. Travellers and emigres report that social pressure is brought to bear upon parents not to send their children to Ukrainian schools.

Statistics on the number of Ukrainian schools and Russian schools are frequently published, along with the percentage of schools in the Ukraine that these represent. It was reported in 1958, for example, that there were 25,000 Ukrainian schools in the republic,³¹ constituting 83% of the Ukraine's 30,236 schools of general education, with a total enrollment in all schools of 5,468,000 pupils.³² Rarely published, however, are figures for the percentage of pupils attending Ukrainian schools *versus* those attending Russian schools.³³ Although the majority of schools are Ukrainian schools, many of these are located in

rural areas and are smaller than average. The last time, to our knowledge, that figures on comparative enrollments were released with official approval was for the 1955-56 school year:

TABLE 5
LANGUAGE OF INSTRUCTION, 1955-56
UKRAINIAN SSR

Language of instruction	No. of schools	%	No. of pupils	%
Ukrainian	25,034	85.32	3,845,754	72.79
Russian	4,051	13.81	1,392,270	26.35
Moldavian	159	.54	27,102	.51
Hungarian	93	.32	16,622	.31
Polish	4	.01	1,875	.04
TOTALS	29,341	100.00	5,283,623	100.00

Source: L.V. Cherkashyn, *Zahal'ne navchannia v Ukrains'kii RSR v 1917-1957* (Kiev, 1958), p. 61. Cited by John Kolasky, *Education in Soviet Ukraine* (Toronto), p. 51.

It is clear from these figures that Russian schools, with an average of 344 pupils per school, are larger than Ukrainian schools, with an average of 154 pupils per school. Later figures are fragmentary, but the number of Russian schools had increased by 1964-65 to over 4500, or over 15% of the total,³⁴ while, by 1967, the percentage of Ukrainian schools had declined to 81.1%.³⁵

In an unusual exception to the rule, figures were published in 1970 for enrollment in Ukrainian schools in Zakarpattya. The following figures are for general schools in the *oblast*:

TABLE 6
LANGUAGE OF INSTRUCTION
IN ZAKARPATTYA, 1970

Language of instruction	No. of Schools	%	No. of pupils	%
Ukrainian	614	82.6	163,000	81.4
Russian	15	2.1	11,000	5.7
Hungarian	70	9.4	21,500	10.7

Language of instruction	No. of Schools	%	No. of pupils	%
Rumanian	12	1.6	4,300	2.1
Mixed	32	4.3	200	0.1
TOTALS	743	100.0	200,300	100.0

Source: A.M. Ignat, "Zdiisnennia lenins'koi polityki v shkolakh Zakarpattia," *Radians'ka shkola*, No. 6 (1970), 43ff. The figures do not include 482 middle and eight-year schools with an unknown attendance.

The exceptional publication of these figures may well have been designed to counter charges of Russification of education, as the figures show an unusually low percentage of enrollment in Russian schools. Zakarpattia is, however, a largely rural *oblast*, with a low Russian presence (3.3%), and a large Hungarian and Rumanian presence. Nationality controversy in education in the city of Uzhhorod is less concerned with Ukrainian-Russian relations than with relations with the East European nationalities, and with the control of contacts of the latter with the neighboring home states.³⁶

There appeared in 1969 a *samvydav* document with interesting statistics on relative Ukrainian and Russian school attendance in the central district of the city of Kyiv:

TABLE 7
GENERAL EDUCATION SCHOOLS IN LENINS'KYI
RAION, KYIV, CIRCA 1969

Ukrainian Schools

School Number	Type	Number of Students
117	English-Ukrainian	350
92	middle	350
87	middle	330
192	middle	130
58	middle	200
	Total	1360

Russian Schools

School Number	Type	Number of Students
57	English-Russian	1600
86	middle	1000
58	middle	900
48	middle	1000
79	middle	1000
33	middle	1000
78	middle	1200
147	middle	1000
?	middle	300
?	middle	800
?	middle	800
Total		10,600

Source: H. H., "Pid shovinistychnym presom," *Ukrains'kyi visnyk*, 6:66-67.

It can be seen from Table 7 that while 31.3% of the school in Lenins'kyi raion are Ukrainian schools, these schools are attended by only 11.4% of the students in the district. We do not have information on the ratio of Ukrainians to Russians in the raion, but we have the *samizdat* author's assurance that the percentage of students in Russian schools is considerably higher than the percentage of Russians in the raion. This source also notes that School No. 57 is a "Central Committee" school, attended by the Children of Shelest, Shcherbitsky, Drozdenko, Paton, and other elites. The children and grandchildren of Podgorny and other elites attend school No. 78.³⁷

Data in the same document for Kurenivka raion in Kyiv show five Russian schools attended by 5,000 students, and five Ukrainian schools attended by 4,945 students in 1969.³⁸ These data are even more revealing, because in 1969 the population of Kurenivka, a working class district, was almost 100% Ukrainian. Thus, approximately 50% of the Ukrainian pupils in this raion attended Russian schools. The same source reports that facilities in the Ukrainian schools are poor compared to those in Russian schools, and that there few Ukrainian kindergartens.³⁹

The quality of instruction in the Ukrainian language in both Ukrainian and Russian schools has also drawn criticism. School textbooks in the Ukrainian language have been found to contain

Russified spellings and grammatical forms, and these persist in edition after edition. Similarly, the culture of teachers' language comes under frequent attack. The most frequently cited shortcoming is the so-called *surzhyk* (hodgepodge)—the mixture of Russian and Ukrainian words. This problem is reported to be much greater in the West Ukraine than in the East Ukraine; there have been complaints, in fact, about the quality of teaching *Russian* in the West Ukrainian schools.

Part of the difficulty has been poor training of teachers. The peculiarities of teaching Ukrainian, it is complained, are not properly conveyed in pedagogical institutes. A *samvydav* document, written in Russian but with numerous misspellings and grammatical errors, by the Chairman of the State Examining Committee of the Crimean Pedinstitute, complains that courses in the Ukrainian language at the Institute are taught in Russian, often by teachers who do not know Ukrainian themselves.⁴⁰

Higher education in the Ukraine is conducted for the most part in Russian. Yuriy Mykolayovych Dadenkov, Ukrainian Minister of Higher and Secondary Education (February 22, 1960-November 13, 1973), proposed far-reaching Ukrainization of higher education in a speech before the rectors of a number of institutions in August, 1965; he subsequently submitted his proposals to the CPSU Central Committee. Dadenkov's proposals were not known in the West before they were described by Viacheslav Chornovil in a *samvydav* document which reached the West in late 1972.⁴¹

Dadenkov informed the conference of rectors that 317,529 students were enrolled in the 50 institutions of higher education under the Ukrainian Ministry for Higher and Secondary Technical Education, of whom 177,050 or 55%, were Ukrainians. Since, in 1965, 1.3 million students were enrolled in higher and secondary schools in the Ukraine,⁴² approximately 982,471, or 75.6% of the students in the Ukraine were enrolled in institutes under the authority, not of the Ukrainian government, but of various USSR ministries. Dadenkov's figures thus apply to only 24.4% of students in institutes in the Ukraine.

In the 50 institutes under his authority, Dadenkov reported that 8,832, or 48.7% of the total teaching staff of 18,132 were Ukrainians. At the eight universities in the republic, 45,954, or 61%, of the 75,207 enrolled students were Ukrainians. Of the teaching staff of 4,400, 2,475 (56%) were Ukrainians. However, only 34% of the teaching staff delivered their lectures in Ukrainian; At Odesa, 10%, and at Uzhhorod University, where 71% of the student body was Ukrainian, 43% delivered their lectures in Ukrainian.

Further, according to Dadenkov, the language of instruction is Russian at the Kyiv Institute for National Economy and the Kharkiv Legal Institute, the only schools in the Ukraine educating cadres in these fields for the republic. Finally, of 36 specialized technical schools under Dadenkov's authority, the language of instruction was Russian in 30, and both Russian and Ukrainian in the remaining six.

Dadenkov made ten proposals, the effect of which would have been to shift the language of instruction to Ukrainian in stages (specifically, that instruction should be predominantly, but not exclusively, in Ukrainian; the "social disciplines, however, were to be taught exclusively in Ukrainian), to require all professors to learn Ukrainian, to require the publishing houses of Kyiv, Kharkiv and Lviv Universities and *Radians'ka Shkola* to publish texts primarily in Ukrainian, and that all administrative business in universities and institutes be shifted from Russian to Ukrainian.⁴³

Chornovil reports that the CPSU Central Committee was inundated with protest letters from Russians and Russified Ukrainians in Kyiv, and that Moscow was displeased with the proposals in any event; under pressure from Moscow, Chornovil reports, the proposals were filed away and forgotten.⁴⁴

As Chornovil himself notes, it is unlikely that Dadenkov would have made the proposals without Shelest's support. Shelest's interest in quite credible; in a departure from the usual patron-client relation, Shelest based much of his power on the support of the Kyiv intelligentsia, and it was at this time that his contacts with nationalist-oriented dissidents were beginning to be noticeable. In subsequent years, he called for the publication of college textbooks in Ukrainian, and defended the Ukrainian language in an unusually forward manner at the 5th Congress of the Ukrainian Writers' Union in 1966.⁴⁵

A few months prior to Dadenkov's speech before the rectors which contained his proposed reforms, Svyatoslav Karavans'kyi had filed a lengthy complaint with the State Prosecutor of the Ukrainian SSR, demanding that Dadenkov, as Minister of Higher and Secondary Education, be brought to trial for violation of the law, for having permitted Russification of higher education. Karavans'kyi based his complaint on Article 66 of the Criminal Code of the Ukrainian SSR (relating to "Violations of national and racial equality") and Article 167 (relating to "Violations of Leninist norms in organization of higher education").⁴⁶ The complaint did not, of course, produce an indictment, and in all likelihood it was only intended by Karavans'kyi graphically to bring the problem to public attention in legalistic form. A copy of the complaint did, however, apparently reach Dadenkov and Shelest, and they are reported to have been immensely disturbed

by it.⁴⁷ If this is true, it is significant evidence of effective expression of interest outside normal channels.

Language Culture and Purity

Language planning, Joshua Fishman has emphasized, is not inherently a nationalist activity; in prenationalist times, both opponents and proponents of language planning "reveal a typical lack of central concern for the ethnic, the authentic, and indigenously unique spirit and form." Instead, the concern was primarily with "dimensions such as beauty, parsimony, efficiency, feasibility" ⁴⁸ Nationalist language planning, however, is concerned with the pursuit of ethnic authenticity and differentiation through the effort to exclude external linguistic influences—the pursuit of linguistic purity. But while nationalist-oriented language planners—in the effort to reconcile modernization (to which, unlike traditionalists of other kinds, they are not necessarily opposed) and authenticity—are sometimes reluctant to admit foreign words or calques into the language, they are not averse to borrowing modern (and frequently, therefore, foreign) concepts and ideas. What they seek to protect, therefore, is the *vehicle* in which such concepts are couched, precisely for its value as a symbol of authenticity, unity, and differentiation.

In the Ukraine, the external influence against which Ukrainians wish to protect the language is, of course, Russian. Because the two languages are etymologically closely related, and because Ukrainian enjoys a lower status than does Russian, the Ukrainian vernacular is often characterized by lexical and grammatical Russicisms, and in science and technology the tendency is simply to borrow Russian terms for new concepts rather than to base new words on Ukrainian root words. The extensive introduction of Russicisms into the Ukrainian language (and, for that matter, either directly or as calques into all Soviet languages) is in fact a part of official policy. At an All-Union Conference on Problems of Terminology in Moscow in 1959 it was emphasized that the supplementation of lexicons is to be guided by the principle of "minimal differences"—that new words for new scientific and technological concepts in national languages should be based on the same roots (either Russian, or the foreign word borrowed by Russian)—to facilitate interrepublican scholastic communications.⁴⁹

Following the 20th CPSU Party Congress, Ukrainian intellectuals sought to revive interest in and respect for the Ukrainian language among the urban population. Among the earliest of these intellectuals to express concern for popular language culture was Mykyta Shumylo. Other intellectuals who were outspoken in their defense of the language included Maksym Ryl's'kyi, Dziuba, Moroz, and

Karavans'ky. Among the most prolific and outspoken of the defenders of the language has been the linguist Borys Antonenko-Davydovych.⁵⁰ He has sometimes been explicit, and astute, in his analysis of the psychological base of reactive linguistic nationalism. He writes of his high school days:

There was something odd; the more the authorities of the high school relegated the Ukrainian language from use, the deeper it penetrated not only into our usage, but into our hearts as well. Moreover, when we were in the higher grades and became acquainted with the foremost Russian literature . . . using the Ukrainian language became a badge of our nationality, democracy, almost revolutionsim.⁵¹

Perhaps because of his age and his concerns, Antonenko-Davydovych is venerated by nationalist dissidents. He published in 1969, for example, an article in which he advised putting the letter "ґ", which had been dropped in the standardization of Soviet Ukrainian orthography in the early 1930's, back onto the alphabet.⁵² The old letter "ґ" was a voiced, plosive back-palatal consonant, equivalent to the Russian "г" (both transliterated "g"), and used in relatively few words. The Ukrainian "ґ", however, is a voiceless, fricative back-palatal consonant (transliterated "h"). Antonenko-Davydovych's argument was that Russians, and even many Ukrainians, pronounce the Ukrainian "ґ" like the Russian "г", saying, for example, "Grushevs'kyi" rather than the correct "Hrushevs'kyi". Restoration of "ґ" might help to eliminate some confusion. Also, we may note, the distinctive Ukrainian pronunciation of "ґ" is an element of differentiation, and its preservation a matter of authenticity.

Antonenko-Davydovych's article produced only mild rebuffs and good-natured ridicule from establishment critics such as V. Rusanivs'kiy.⁵³ The suggestion was not criticized on ideological grounds. It is reported, however, that the proposal prompted a lively debate in *samvydav* channels over the intralinguistic effects of Russification, and a number of petitions asking that the suggestion be put into effect.⁵⁴

As against intellectuals who have defended the Ukrainian language, I. K. Bilodid deserves brief mention as the Ukrainian champion *par excellence* of the opposing trend. Bilodid was Ukrainian Minister of Education who presided over the implementation of Khrushchev's 1958-59 education reforms, and, in his capacity as a philologist and head of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences' "Instytut Movoznavstva" (Institute of Linguistics), he has championed the Russian language and opposed language-planning efforts directed

toward preservation of the Ukrainian language.⁵⁵

Protest against Russification of the Ukrainian language on the part of dissident intellectuals has from time to time been registered at various official public forums. A Republican Conference on the Problems of the Culture of the Ukrainian language, held in Kyiv February 11-15, 1963, for example, produced numerous unscheduled speakers protesting, to great applause, the Russification of education, public business and governmental transactions, scholarly works, and the arts. The participants reportedly sent a list of their demands to the Central Committee.⁵⁶ Ivan Koshelivets reports similarly outspoken protest at a Republican Conference of Teachers in Kyiv in 1963.⁵⁷

John Kolasky reports having witnessed an argument between V. Rechmedin and Andriy Malyshko with Skaba over Russification at a November, 1964 meeting of the Presidium of the Ukrainian Writers' Union, in which Skaba requested them to write up their complaints and submit them to the Central Committee.⁵⁸ This is significant, as Skaba is widely reputed to have directed Dziuba in a similar manner to write out his complaints and submit them.⁵⁹ Taken together, these incidents suggest that during his tenure, Skaba was either screening intellectual protests from Shelest personally, and/or deliberately evading a confrontation in which he (Skaba) did not feel intellectually competent. The former interpretation is reinforced by Shelest's appointment of F. D. Ovcharenko to replace Skaba as ideological secretary on March 30, 1968. The outstanding qualification of Ovcharenko, a chemist, was his extensive close personal contacts and friendship with Kyiv intellectuals.⁶⁰ Ill-advised as it may appear in retrospect, Shelest was by this time placing himself between Moscow and the Kyiv intelligentsia.

Other aspects of the intralinguistic effects of Russification have also been of concern. Intellectuals complain, for example, about distortions in Ukrainian onomastics. As the study of the origins of proper names, onomastics preserves in the popular memory names, usages and dialects, and emotional connotations that go with them, which are historically and nationalistically rooted. Under the Soviet regime, Russified and Sovietized versions of many Ukrainian place names have come into common usage: *Rovno* instead of *Rivne*, *severodonets'k* rather than *siverodonets'k* or *pivnichnodonets'k*, for example. In some cases of Sovietization, the result is incongruous. *Krasnyi* in Russian means "red" and is symbolic of bolshevism; in Ukrainian (as in Old Russian) *kras'nyy* means "beautiful"; the appropriate translation of "red", as in "Red Army", "Red Guards", etc., would be *chervonyy*. Yet the Ukraine is studded with place means like "*Krasnyi Lyman*," "*Krasnoloko*," "*Krasnoarmiyske*," and

the like.⁶¹

The underdeveloped nature of Ukrainian linguistics has been another area of concern. Demands for a special Ukrainian linguistics journal were voiced at a conference on linguistics in Kyiv, May 27-31, 1958.⁶² This demand was not satisfied until the establishment in January, 1967, of the journal *Movoznavstno* (*Linguistics*), devoted to research on problems such as the connection between thought and language, contacts between languages, and the structural peculiarities of language. The establishment of the journal was not accompanied, as had been demanded, by the establishment of a special department of language culture in the Institute of Linguistics of the Ukrainian SSR Academy of Sciences.

Controversy over the publication of Ukrainian dictionaries marked the entire period. Publication of a six volume Ukrainian-Russian dictionary, several technical and scholastic Ukrainian-Russian dictionaries, and a ten-volume "explanatory" dictionary of the Ukrainian language were held up for many years, drawing numerous protests from intellectuals. Smaller Ukrainian-Russian and Ukrainian-English dictionaries were published, in small production runs, from time to time; they are in chronic shortage, however. On a recent trip, the author was unable to find a single Ukrainian-English dictionary in Kyiv, in spite of diligent search.

Delays in the preparation of dictionaries are the result, in part, of controversy over the question of "minimal differences" *versus* authenticity, and over which literary works are appropriate as standards of usage; there has been controversy as well over the proper extent of inclusion of passive vocabulary: obsolete words, archaisms, rarely used words, and colloquialisms. Expanded attention to such matters would logically seem to be part of the "internal development" of the language. The viewpoint of spokesmen for "international proletarianism" is that such emphasis on authenticity and differentiation artificially impedes internationalization and Sovietization of the language, and the "drawing together" (*sblizhenie*) of peoples, and is thus ideologically faulty.

An important aspect of the Ukrainian language as a vehicle and as a symbol of national distinctiveness has been controversy in recent years over language culture in science. Intellectual and, in modern times especially, scientific excellence on the part of representatives of a nationality can serve as a displacement symbol for more explicit symbols of national greatness.⁶³ It is especially disconcerting to persons conscious of their Ukrainian nationality that Ukrainian achievements in science and technology are classified with and subordinated to *Soviet* achievements. Ukrainian intellectuals perceive this Russian cooptation of Ukrainian achievements to be

particularly strong in international scientific interaction.⁶⁴

Most Ukrainian scientists speak and write in Russian.⁶⁵ Higher education is conducted in Russian, and many scientists are trained in the RSFSR. The necessity for communication with colleagues, not only throughout the Union but in the Ukraine, and the desire to gain Union-wide recognition, make fluency in Russian essential for Ukrainian scientists, and for scholars of minority nationalities in general.

Ukrainian scientists are particularly concerned over the tendency to adopt Russian or other foreign words for technical concepts, rather than Ukrainian or "Ukrainian-sounding" terms. The field of cybernetics—highly developed in the Ukraine—has shown, they argue, that the Ukrainian language is quite adequate for conveying complex technical ideas.⁶⁶ Cyberneticists, it appears, have been in the forefront of the fray: there was apparently muted conflict over the publication of the two-volume *Encyclopedia of Cybernetics* in Ukrainian before it appeared in Russian.⁶⁷

A 1969 *samvydav* article argued that Ukrainian science is in fact undergoing a "crisis" in regard to scientific uses of the Ukrainian language. The author alleges that the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences is acting in an "un-Party-like" manner in permitting the Russification of language through science, insofar as it is the Party's policy to promote the "flowering" of cultures. He also directs his complaints to the *Naukova dumka* publishing house, 212 of whose 375 books (57%) issued in 1969 were in Russian. The document is a letter—written, ironically, in Russian—addressed to the highest organs of leadership in the CPU.⁶⁸

CONCLUSIONS

Attachment to ethnic identity undoubtedly can and will persist even after a group has been linguistically assimilated, as the ethnic experience in America has demonstrated. But the native language, while it persists, is the most prominent badge of nationality. Soviet Ukrainian intellectuals conscious of and placing importance upon their distinct Ukrainian identity, have encouraged and promoted language-planning efforts that will enhance the Ukrainian language as a symbol of ethnic authenticity and differentiation, and are concerned about the status of the language. Many consider the prestige, the purity, and in some cases, even the existence, of the Ukrainian language to be threatened by official policies and attitudes, of which Russification is the effect (whether intended or unintended).

Regime policies, despite the officially articulated policy of promoting the "functional development" and "internal development" of national languages, have fostered the erosion of the Ukrainian language, in large part through influencing the distribution of prestige or status attached to the use of the Russian, as opposed to the Ukrainian, language. These policies and their effects, however, along with increasing bilingualism, have not significantly affected the vitality of the Ukrainian language inside the republic. Except in a very few highly Russianized and urbanized areas of the East Ukraine, adherence to the language between 1959 and 1970 increased, and the losses in the aforementioned Russianized areas were modest. In addition, increased Russianization of Ukrainian *oblasts* in the intercensus period appears to have had no effect on the rate of Russification.

Modernization and mobilization in Ukraine have no doubt created great pressure for Russification, because Russians have been the agents of modernization as well as of Moscow's rule, and therefore, the path of individual promotion often depends on fluency in Russian. Modernization and its effects are probably irreversible; the social processes generated by modernization will continue to exert pressure for the erosion of the Ukrainian language. In spite of this, however, the language has shown an encouraging vitality, and an articulate segment of the Ukrainian intelligentsia has been vocal in its defense.

NOTES

1. The author is grateful to the Graduate School of the University of Wisconsin-Madison, for a travel grant (1976) which in part defrayed the expense of this research. The Research Department of Radio Liberty, Munich, West Germany, generously made its extensive archives available to me.
2. See, for example, Joshua A. Fishman, *Language and Nationalism: Two Integrative Essays* (Rowley, Mass: Newbury House Publishers, 1973).
3. E. Glyn Lewis, *Multilingualism in the Soviet Union* (The Hague: 1972); Zev Katz, Rosemarie Rogers, and Frederic Harned, *Handbook of Major Soviet Nationalities* (New York: The Free Press, 1975), especially pp. 31-39; Harry Lipset, "The Status of national Minority Languages in Soviet Education," *Soviet Studies*, 19, no. 2 (October, 1967):181-89; Yaroslav Bilinsky, "Assimilation and Ethnic Assertiveness among Ukrainians of the Soviet Union," in *Ethnic Minorities in the Soviet Union*, ed. Erich Goldhagen (New York: Praeger, 1968). pp. 147-84; John A. Armstrong, *Ukrainian Nationalism 1939-1945* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1963); Brian Silver, "Social Mobilization and the Russification of Soviet Nationalities," *American Political Science Review*, 68 (March, 1974):45-66, and numerous others.
4. Fishman, *Language*, p. 55.
5. Jonathan Pool, "Developing the Soviet Turkic Tongues: The Language of the Politics of Language," *Slavic Review*, 35, no. 3 (Sept., 1976):406.

6. On the "friendship of peoples" myth, see Lowell Tillett, *The Great Friendship: Soviet Historians on the Non-Russian Nationalities* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1969).
7. See my discussion of the structural and programmatic characteristics of Ukrainian dissent, in "Ukrainian Dissent: Symbolic Politics and Sociodemographic Aspects," a paper presented at the 9th National Convention of AAASS, Washington, D.C., Oct. 14, 1977. *Ukrainian Quarterly* (Spring, 1978).
8. Valentyn Moroz has been the most eloquent exponent of this view. For a more detailed discussion of Moroz, see my "Politics and Culture in the Ukraine in the Post-Stalin Era," forthcoming in *Annals of the Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences in the U.S.*
9. An aspect of this problem which would merit research, although data is scanty, is the differential prestige of the Russian and Ukrainian languages in less Russianized cities, rural areas, and among non-Russian/non-Ukrainian national minorities in the Ukraine.
10. This is an anti-language-planning position. From "The Program of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union," *Pravda* and *Izvestiia*, Nov. 2, 1961, pp. 1-9; translation in Charlotte Saikowski and Leo Gruliov, Eds., *Current Soviet Policies VI* (New York and London: Columbia University Press, 1962), p. 26.
11. J.V. Stalin, *Marxism and Linguistics* (New York: International Publishers, 1951), pp. 11ff, 28, 45.
12. V. Kuznetsov, "The Language of International Discourse," *Pravda Ukrainy*, September 12, 1972, p. 2; translation in *Digest of the Soviet Ukrainian Press*, 1972, 11:21-23. Proclamations of the love of minority nationalities for the Russian language are commonplace in the national and all-Union press. For other explicit discussions of Russian as the *lingua franca*, see *Current Soviet Policies IV*, p. 27, and Iu. Desheriev and M. Melikian, "Development and Mutual Enrichment of the Languages of the Nations of the USSR," *Ukrains'ka mova i literatura v shkoli*, no. 12 (Dec. 1965), 3-13; translation in *Digest of the Soviet Ukrainian Press*, 1966, 2:23-25.
13. Joshua A. Fishman, "National Languages and Languages of Wider Communication in the Developing Nations," *Anthropological Linguistics*, no. 11 (1969), 111-135.
14. *Itogi vsesoiuznoi perepisi naseleniia 1959 g. Ukrainskaia SSR* (Moscow: "Gostatizdat," 1963), pp. 174-191; *Itogi vsesoiuznoi perepisi naseleniia 1970 g.*, 4. (Moscow: "Statistika," 1973):152-153.
15. Statistical analysis yields no significant correlation of these variables.
16. *Itogi vsesoiuznoi perepisi naseleniia 1959 g.* pp. 158-59, 164-65. Data on the declaration of a second language are not available for 1959.
17. Calculated from data in *Itogi vsesoiuznoi perepisi naseleniia 1970 g.* pp. 158-59. 8.2% is that proportion of the urban Ukrainian population speaking a native language other than Ukrainian (for 99.8% of whom that language is Russian), who do not declare Ukrainian as a second language.
18. *Itogi vsesoiuznoi perepisi naseleniia 1970 g.* pp. 152-53. For a more sophisticated statistical treatment, though Union-wide and not by *oblast*, see Brian Silver, "Ethnic Identity Change among Soviet Nationalities: A Statistical Analysis," Ph.D. diss., University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1972.
19. *Radians'ka Ukraina*, April 25, 1971, p. 2; also, *Itogi vsesoiuznoi perepisi*

- naseleniia 1970 g., pp. 152-53, 158-59, 164-65.
20. Brian Silver, "Bilingualism and Maintenance of the Mother Tongue in Soviet Central Asia," *Slavic Review*, 35 no. 3 (Sept. 1976):424.
 21. Russian contempt for the Ukrainian language has been well documented; see, e.g., John Kolasky, *Two Years in Soviet Ukraine* (Toronto: Peter Martin Associates, Ltd., 1970), *passim*; Yaroslav Bilinsky, *The Second Soviet Republic: The Ukraine after World War II* (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1964), pp. 156ff; and dissident works, especially Ivan Dzyuba, *Internationalism or Russification?* (New York: Monad Press, Inc., 1974), pp. 149ff.
 22. Joseph R. Gusfield, *Symbolic Crusade* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1963, p. 11.
 23. See Wasyl Veryha, *Communication Media and Soviet Nationality Policy: Status of National Languages in Soviet T.V. Broadcasting*, (New York: Ukrainian Congress Committee of America, 1972).
 24. The 1977 Constitution (Article 45) limits the guarantee of native language instruction to schools, excluding any right to its use in higher education (except, of course, for Russians).
 25. See Section 9 of the "Decree on strengthening ties between school and life, and continued development of public education in the Ukrainian SSR," *Radians'ka Ukraina*, April 19, 1959, pp. 2-3; translation of excerpts in *Digest of the Soviet Ukrainian Press*, 3, 6:1. Also see Yaroslav Bilinsky's excellent analysis of the reforms: "The Soviet Education Laws of 1958-9 and Soviet Nationality Policy," *Soviet Studies*, 14, no. 2 (Oct. 1962):138-57.
 26. *Literaturna hazeta*, Dec. 19, 1958.
 27. V. Borysenko, "Ukrainian Opposition to the Soviet Regime," *Problems of the Peoples of the USSR*, no. 6 (1960), p. 40.
 28. Svyatoslav Karavans'kyi, "Po odnu politychnu pomytku," (Sept., 1965), AS 916, SDS vol. 17. This and subsequent references to *samvydav* documents employ Radio Liberty's *Arkhiv Samizdata* documentation system.
 29. A.M., "About admission examinations in Ukrainian language and literature at the T.H. Shevchenko Kiev State Univerdsity," *Ukrains'ka mova v shkoli*, no. 6 (Nov.-Dec., 1958), pp. 91-93; translation in *Digest of the Soviet Ukrainian Press*, 3, no. 4:19.
 30. I.I. Slynko, "Results of entrance examinations in the Ukrainian language to the University of Chernivtsy," *Ukrains'ka mova v shkoli*, no. 5 (Sept.-Oct., 1960), pp. 90-93; translation in *Digest of the Soviet Ukrainian Press*, 4, no. 12:23.
 31. *Radians'ka osvita*, no. 18 (May 4, 1957).
 32. *Radians'ka osvita*, no. 22 (June 1, 1957), p. 1. These figures do not include 372,600 pupils in 3,195 schools for working and farming youth.
 33. Dissidents, too, have complained about the scarcity of data on this subject. See *Ukrains'kyi visnyk*, 6:63.
 34. *Radians'ka Ukraina*, Dec. 5, 1964.
 35. P.P. Udovychenko, "Rastsvet narodnogo obrazovaniia, nauki, i kul'tury," *Sovetskaia pedagogika*, no. 10 (1967), pp. 38-48.
 36. Interview no. 8. Numbered interviews are with Soviet citizens (and, in some cases, very recent emigres), and will remain anonymous.
 37. H.H. "pid shovynystychnym presom," *Ukrains'kyi visnyk*, 6:66-67.
 38. *Ibid.*, p. 70.
 39. *Ibid.* Also see the *samvydav* document, "Tovaryshi bat'ky shkoliarev," a

- complaint signed by 17 mothers of kindergartners to the Ukrainian Minister of Health, protesting the use of Russian in kindergartens (1964), AS 909, SDS vol. 18.
40. V.N. Skrypka, "pro stanovyshche Ukrains'koi movy v Kryms'komu Pedinstitutu," *Ukrains'kyi visnyk*, 6:73-78. Although the title is in Ukrainian, the article is in Russian.
 41. Vyacheslav Chornovil, "Iak i shcho obstoiue Bohdan Stenchuk?" *Ukrains'kyi visnyk*, 6:12-56.
 42. *Radians'ka Ukraina*, February 5, 1966.
 43. See Chornovil's complete discussion of the Dadenkov proposals, in Chornovil, *op. cit.*
 44. *Ibid.*, pp. 25-27.
 45. *Literaturna Ukraina*, Sept. 6, 1968 and Nov. 17, 1966.
 46. Sviatoslav Karavans'kyi, "Klopotannia prokurorovi URSSR pro seriozni pomilky i progoloshennia rusyfikatsii ministrom vyshchoi ta serd'noi osvita URSSR yu. M. Dadenkova," (Feb. 24, 1964), AS 915, SDS vol. 18.
 47. Interviews 9, 10. These were interviews with recent emigres in Paris who were very close to the Shelest entourage.
 48. Fishman, *Language and Nationalism*, pp. 55, 72, 73.
 49. *Literaturna hazeta*, May 21, 1959; also see Vitality Rusanivs'kiy, "New prospects for the development of national languages," *Literaturna hazeta*, July 28, 1959; translation in *Digest of the Soviet Ukrainian Press*, 3:9-20.
 50. *Iak my hovorymo* (Kiev: Radians'kyi pys'mennyk, 1970). Also see articles in *Zmina*, March, 1964; *Dnipro*, No. 9 (Sept., 1960); *Literaturna Ukraina*, Jan. 1965, and March 5, 1965. For criticisms of Antonenko-Davydovych, see *Literaturna Ukraina*, March 30, 1965, and Jan. 29, 1971.
 51. *Dnipro*, no. 11 (Nov., 1961), 135-45.
 52. "Litera, za iakoiu tuzhat'" *Literaturna Ukraina*, Nov. 4, 1969. The use of the letter "r" was continued in Polish Ukraine until annexation by the USSR.
 53. V. Rusanivs'kyi, "Za chym tuzhyty?" *Literaturna Ukraina*, Nov. 28, 1969.
 54. For a survey of the *samvydav* discussion, see *Ukrains'kyi visnyk*, 3:92-95.
 55. See John Kolasky's description of Bilodid, in *Two Years in Soviet Ukraine*, pp. 66-71.
 56. The events at the conference were not reported in the Soviet press, but a participant's report was published in *Nasha kul'tura* (Warsaw), March, 1963.
 57. Ivan Koshelivets, "Khronika Ukrainського soprotivleniia," *Kontinent*, no. 5 (1975), p. 188.
 58. John Kolasky, *Education in Soviet Ukraine* (Toronto: Peter Martin Associates, Ltd., 1968), p. 194.
 59. Although two of my informants, recent emigres who were particularly close to Dziuba in Kyiv, told me that this particular piece of conventional wisdom is false: that the manuscript was written and submitted without directive or invitation. Interviews 9, 10.
 60. Interviews 10, 11.
 61. Although in Kyiv the thoroughfare is popularly known *Chervonoarmii's'ka*.
 62. *Ukrains'ka mova v shkoli*, no. 5 (Sept.-Oct., 1958), 90-94.
 63. This has been particularly true of nationally-oriented Ukrainian intellectuals. We propose (but do not attempt to demonstrate) as a general hypothesis that any activity which carries status will be employed as a displacement symbol of

national greatness when direct symbols of national distinctiveness are oppressed.

64. See, for example, the extensive debate sparked by the criticisms of Ukrainian and Soviet science made by Vitality P. Shelest, an atomic physicist and the son of Petr Shelest, in an article entitled "Arkhimidy prosiatsia za party," *Literaturna Ukraina*, May 5, 1970, p. 1. For a summary of the debate, see "The State of Soviet Basic Sciences: An Unusual Criticism by Ukrainian Academicians," Radio Liberty Research Paper CRD 335=70, Sept. 16, 1970. Petr Shelest is thought to have been influenced by his son, who was a link between the former First Secretary and the Kyiv intellectuals; interview no. 6.
65. Interviews nos. 1, 2, 3, John A. Armstrong notes that everywhere he travelled in the Ukraine and Belorussia, scholars conversed among themselves in Russian, rather than in their native language. "The Soviet Intellectuals: Observations from Two Journeys," *Studies on the Soviet Union*, 1 (1961):30-33.
66. Serhiy Plachenda, "A genre awaiting its flowering," *Literaturna Ukraina*, April 5, 1968; translation in *Digest of the Soviet Ukrainian Press*, 1968, 5:16-18.
67. Interview no. 6.
68. V.I. Kumpanenko, "Pis'mo s razmyshleniiami po voprosu o glubokom krizise v primenenii Ukrainskogo iazyka v publikatsii nauchnykh issledovani i nauchnykh rabot AN USSR v 1969 g." *Ukrains'kyi visnyk*, 3:94-109.