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The Khan and the Tribal Aristocracy: The Crimean Khanate under Sahib Giray I

HALIL INALCIK

The history of the Crimean Khanate revolved around the tribal ruling elite. Their constant maneuvering to maintain power in the khanate and control over its policies is the central theme in Crimean history. Beginning with the establishment of Ottoman suzerainty in the northern Black Sea area in the 1470s, both sides attempted to use this new element in the ensuing power struggles to their own advantage, while the Ottoman government skillfully manipulated the rivals to further its own policies. The khanate of Sahib Giray (Şāhib Girāy),* as described in Remmāl Khōdja's *Tārīkh-i Şāhib Girāy Khān*,¹ vividly demonstrates this emerging pattern of internal struggle. At the outset, Sahib Giray, khan from 1532 to 1551, achieved a strong centralized rule on the model of the Ottoman sultans. Afterwards, the tribal elite, held in check and deeply resentful of

* This article follows the transliteration system used by the *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, second edition.

¹ Özalp Gökbilgin, "Quelques sources manuscrites sur l'époque de Sahib Giray I^{er}, Khan de Crimée (1532–1551) à Istanbul, Paris, et Leningrad," *Cahiers du monde russe et soviétique* 11 (1970): 462–69, describes two manuscripts of Remmāl's *History of Sahib Giray*, one in the Bibliothèque nationale (Paris), Supplément turc no. 164, the second in the library of Leningrad University, Oriental manuscripts no. 488. Zygmunt Abrahamowicz informed me that there are two more manuscripts in Leningrad which we have not yet had the opportunity to use. Remmāl indicates that he completed the work at the end of *Radjab* in the Hidjra year 960/13 June–12 July 1553. A critical edition based on all extant manuscripts is a first priority for systematic use of this source, since even a superficial comparison of the two manuscripts of Paris and Leningrad reveals important omissions and the ottomanizing of Tatar words (the latter occurs in the Paris manuscript). Remmāl's work was used by 'Abd al-Ghaffār, *'Umdat al-Tawārīkh*, ed. by Necib Asim (Istanbul, 1343 H./1924), pp. 100–111; and S. Mehmed Ridā, *Al-Sab' al-Sayyār fī akhbār al-Mulūk al-Tatar*, ed. by A. K. Kazim Beg (Kazan, 1832), pp. 91–94. V. D. Smirnov, *Krymskoe xanstvo pod verxovenstvom Otomanskoj porty do načala XVIII veka*, vol. 1 (St. Petersburg, 1887), pp. 412–22, made use of Remmāl, especially for the Ottoman influence on the khanate. Ö. Gökbilgin published the text, *Tārīh-i Şāhib Girāy Hān* (Ankara, 1973), on the basis of the Paris (hereafter P) and Leningrad (hereafter L) manuscripts.

the khan's despotic power, profited from a split between the Ottoman government and the khan, and eliminated the despotic khan to re-establish their own hegemony in the state in 1551. The Crimean crisis of 1551, on the other hand, was a turning point in the history of Eastern Europe, since Muscovy, benefiting from the paralysis of the Crimean forces, made a decisive move to annex the Khanate of Kazan in 1552.

Written by an intimate of Sahib Giray, the *Tārīkh-i Şāhib Girāy* is a work of unusual value for comprehending the internal structure and power politics in the Crimean Khanate in this crucial period of its history. It provides us a firsthand, detailed account of the fatal struggle between Sahib Giray, the khan who tried to transform a typical steppe khanate into a centralist autocratic state on the model of the Ottoman Empire, and the Crimean tribal aristocracy, which struggled to maintain the tribal "feudal" state structure of the khanate according to "the *Töre* or *Yasa* of Genghis Khan."

The author, known to the Crimeans as Remmāl (meaning astrologer, geomancer), was Ḳāysūnī-zāde Meḥmed Nidāi,² a well-known Ottoman polymath. He wrote the history upon the request of the khan's daughter Nūr-Sultān Khānī after the khan's tragic death in 1551. Remmāl had joined the service of Sahib Giray in 1532 when the latter was leaving Istanbul to assume his appointment as khan. He became a personal physician, astrologer, and intimate of Sahib Giray. The khan consulted him in all important decisions (P, 58a). He also confided in him about financial matters such as the collection of taxes and the granting of contributions to the Crimean ulema (L, 6a). Remmāl's closeness to Sahib Giray allowed him to provide information about the khan's opinions and to describe the background to his decisions. His observations and detailed accounts of life and institutions in the Crimea add a special importance and interest to his work. He meticulously incorporated local terminology in his descriptions. Although he wrote the work as an apology for the actions of his beloved lord, Remmāl skillfully disguised critical remarks between the lines. All these facts make *Tārīkh-i Şāhib Girāy* a reliable account of Sahib Giray's reign.³

² Remmāl is described as Sahib Giray's physician. Upon the death of Sahib Giray, he entered the service of Sultan Selim II and wrote several medical books for him (see F. E. Karatay, *Topkapı Sarayı Müzesi Kütüphanesi Türkçe Yazmalar Kataloğu*, 2 vols. [Istanbul, 1961], index: Nidai). Remmāl Khōdja or Ḳāysūnī-zāde Meḥmed Nidāi died in A.H. 966/A.D. 1568/69. For the family of physicians of Ḳāysūnī-zāde, see M. Tahir, *Osmanlı Mu'ellifleri*, vol. 3 (Istanbul, 1342 H.), pp. 239, 249; and M. Süreyya, *Sidjill-i 'Osmani*, vol. 4 (Istanbul, 1893), pp. 107, 312.

³ Ö. Gökbilgin, *1532-1577 Yılları arasında Kırım Hanlığının Siyasi Durumu* (Ankara, 1973), deals with the political history of Sahib Giray's reign. I cannot agree with

THE STRUCTURE OF THE CRIMEAN TRIBAL ARISTOCRACY

The peace treaty concluded between Mehmed Giray I (1514–1523) and the king of Poland-Lithuania⁴ lists the Crimean aristocracy in the following hierarchical order: the khan himself, his eldest son Bahadur Giray Sultan, the other sons of the khan, sultans with a commanding position, *oghlan*s (other members of the royal family), *begs* (heads of the four principal tribes), *mirzas* (sons of *begs*), all *nökers* (or *nökör*, meaning retainer) serving the khan in the court and elsewhere. Remmāl's account gives the same hierarchy: the khan, his sons, the four *begs* called *ķaraču*, and the *iķki begleri* (*begs* attached to the khan's service).⁵ Like other Mongol khanates, the Crimean Khanate rested on the support of the four royal tribes called the *ķaraču* or *ķarači*. Forming a kind of tribal confederation under the *bash-ķaraču* (chief *ķaraču*) of the leading clan, the Shirins, the four clans acted as the main military force in the khanate and directed state policies in their own collective interests. This organization, inherited from the steppe empires (for the Crimean aristocracy, from "the *Yasa* of Genghis Khan") and revered as sacred and immutable in character, was considered the foundation of the khanate. In Remmāl (L, 15), the order of precedence of the *ķaraču* clans is given as the Shirins, the Barins, the Arghins, the *Ķipčaqs*, and the Manghits.⁶ As we shall see, in

him on several points of chronology and interpretation. Our divergences are shown in this paper.

⁴ Published by V. V. Zernov and H. Feydhān, *Materialy dlja istorii Krymskogo xansīva* (St. Petersburg, 1864), doc. 1, pp. 3–5, dated 9 Radjab 926/15 June 1520. The oath on the treaty was sworn collectively: "Ant sharṭ itārmüz."

⁵ On the basis of the reports by the Muscovite envoys to the Crimea, V. E. Syroečkovskij, "Muxammed-Giraj i ego vassaly," *Učēnye zapiski Moskovskogo gosudarstvennogo universiteta* 61 (1940):38–39, points out that the ruling elite in the Crimean Khanate consisted, in hierarchical order, of the sons of the reigning khan, the *sayyids*, or the descendants of the Prophet who were leaders of the ulema, *oghlan*s, or relatives of the khan, the *begs*, or leaders of the principal tribes, and the *iķki begleri*, or *begs* and servants in the service of the khan. For an original description of the ruling class in the khanate, see 'Abd al-Ghaffār, *Umdat al-Tawārikh*, especially pp. 193–207. Written in A.H. 1161, this compilation made use of native sources such as Ötemish Hādjdi, *Tārikh-i Dost Sultān* (see Z. V. Togan, *Tarihte Usul* [Istanbul, 1969], p. 224), as well as *Tārikh-i Şāhib Girāy*. 'Abd al-Ghaffār was himself a member of the ruling class and served under the Shirins. This important work has not attracted the attention of modern scholars. The most recent work on the history of the khanate, A. Bennigsen, P. N. Boratav, D. Desai, and C. Lemerrier-Quelquejay, *Le Khanat de Crimée dans les archives du Musée du Palais de Topkapı* (Paris and The Hague, 1978), does not even include it in the bibliography. A new edition of this important source on the Crimea is needed, since that by N. Asim is very unsatisfactory.

⁶ Riḏā, *Al-Sab' al-Sayyār*, pp. 92–93, gives the four *ķaraču* as the Shirin, the Barin, the Arghin, and the *Ķipčaḳ*. S. von Herberstein, *Notes upon Russia*, vol. 2, trans. by

the first half of the sixteenth century there was an intense struggle for precedence and power among the tribal aristocracy in the khanate.

Traditionally, the number of forces put into the field by the Shirins was given as 20,000. However, in 1543, during the second Circassian campaign, when only a select group of the tribal forces was present, the Shirins numbered only 5,000, the Arghins and Kıpçaks 3,000, and the Manghits 2,000 — that is, 10,000 altogether (L, 80–81). I believe this was the actual nucleus of the Crimean tribal aristocracy's army.⁷

The *qaraçu* commanded the main body of tribal forces in the khanate and were its principal policy makers. Their leaders, the *qaraçu*-begs, were present at state council meetings (*körünish* or *körünüsh*) to discuss and decide important matters with the khan.⁸ To protest the khan's policy on a particular issue, a beg abstained from taking part in such meetings. The khan was rendered totally powerless when the *qaraçu*-begs collectively abandoned him, in protest taking their forces to a sacred place called the *Qayalar-Altı*, where the *tamghas*, or seals of the clans in the Crimea, were imprinted on the rock. The allegiance and support of the *qaraçu*-begs was of crucial importance to the khan in remaining on the throne and enforcing his authority in the realm. As we shall see, in 1551 Sahib Giray was totally incapable of putting up any resistance when these begs changed their allegiance to Devlet (Dawlat) Giray.

The observation that the khan himself was elected by the tribal elite

R. H. Major (London, 1852), p. 81, gives the same names: "Schirni, Barni, Gargni, and Tziptzan"; also see Syroëckovskij, "Muxammed-Giraj," pp. 28–34, for the Manghits.

⁷ Cf. L. J. D. Collins, "The Military Organization and Tactics of the Crimean Tatars, 16th–17th Centuries," in *War, Technology, and Society in the Middle East*, ed. by V. J. Parry and M. E. Yapp (London, 1975), p. 260.

⁸ In 1744 'Abd al-Ghaffār ('*Umdat al-Tawārikh*, p. 193) made the following observation: "Let it be known that the meeting of the state council and all the important state affairs in the Crimean Khanate is placed absolutely in the hands of the four *begs* who are as pillars of the state. It is a law not to undertake any important matter without their vote and consent. The first of these four *begs* is the beg of the Shirins, the second that of Maṣṣūr-oghlu, the third that of the Barin, the fourth that of the Sidjivut. They are called in Tatar language the four *Qaraçis*." Ḥusayn (Hüseyin) Hezārfe, "Talkhīs al-Bayān fī Qawānīn-i Āl-i 'Oṣmān" (manuscript, Bibliothèque nationale [Paris], no. 40, fol. 106b), written in 1699, gave the order as the Shirin, the Arın (Arghin), the Barin, or Sidjivut, and the Mankit. He added the note that the khan gives his daughters in marriage only to these begs or to their sons. In *The Secret History of the Mongols*, translated into Turkish by Ahmet Temir, *Moğolların Gizli Tarihi* (Ankara, 1948), p. 8, *kharaçu* meant "commoners" or "those outside the royal household." The phrase *haraçu bo'ol* (ibid., p. 129) apparently corresponds to the Turkish-Ottoman expression *khāṣṣ noker*, or comrade attached to the person of the leader (for *noker* or *nökör*, see below). For the sacred number four with the Turks and Mongols, see Z. V. Togan, *Umumi Türk Tarihine Giriş*, 2nd ed. (Istanbul, 1970), pp. 108, 114; idem, *Ibn Fadlān's Reisebericht* (Leipzig, 1939), excursus nos. 94 and 100a.

reflects only the factual situation.⁹ In the Turkish and Mongol states of the Eurasian steppes, the supreme authority invested in the imperial house (*Altan-Urug*, of heavenly birth)¹⁰ or in a particular khan from this house was always conceived as being derived from divine will, and no human arrangement could alter it.¹¹ However, in reality, the *ulugh-beg* or *ğaraçu-beg*, in agreement with other leaders of the tribal confederation, determined who became khan. It appears that even under Ottoman suzerainty, the Crimean tribal confederation tried to continue this practice. A confidential letter sent to Saadet (Sa'ādet) Giray in Istanbul¹² just before the elimination of Mehmed Giray I illustrates how a new khan was actually chosen by the clan leaders. In it, the leader of the tribal aristocracy, who was apparently Bakhtiyār Beg of the Shirins, assured Saadet Giray that the principal begs, mirzas, and oghlans agreed to have him as their khan and "they all are united for this purpose and took an oath to die for his cause."

United by the common interests of a predominantly pastoralist-tribal society, the four "ruling" tribes of the Crimea acted as a corporate group before the khan, who in turn represented the state framework superimposed upon the tribal organization. The struggle between the khan and the leader of the tribal aristocracy is a recurrent theme in the Eurasian pastoralist nomadic society from earliest times. The particular nature of this socio-political formation is defined in various ways, including "feudal" (Vladimircov) and "corporate" (Krader), referring to the precarious nature of the superimposed state structure which resulted from the preponderant position of the tribal aristocracy.¹³ In this article I try to show

⁹ Martin Broniewski, *Russia seu Moscovia itemque Tartaria* (Leiden, 1630); Turkish translation by Kemal Ortaylı, *Kırım* (Ankara, 1970), p. 42. Syroečkovskij, "Muxammed-Giraj," p. 39. For the election of a *kan* by the *Qazaq* clans, see W. Radloff, *Aus Sibirien Lose Blätter aus meinem Tagebuche*, 2 vols. (Leipzig, 1893), trans. by A. Temir, *Sibirya'dan*, vol. 1 (Ankara, 1954), p. 527.

¹⁰ See O. Pritsak, "Die sogenannte Bulgarische Fürstenliste und die Sprache der Protobulgaren," *Ural-Altäische Jahrbücher* 26, nos. 3/4 (1954):217–20; Togan, *Ibn Faḍlān*, excursus nos. 99a and 100a.

¹¹ See H. Inalcik, "Osmanlılarda Saltanat Verâseti Usûlü ve Türk Hakimiyet Telâk-kisile İlgisi," *Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Derigisi* 14:69–94. Aghış Beg wrote to Vassilii III that since God predestined that Mehmed Giray be khan, four *ğaraçi* made him khan (in Syroečkovskij, "Muxammed Giraj," p. 39).

¹² Bennigsen et al., *Le Khanat de Crimée*, pp. 106–110; compare this letter with that of Eminek Mirza, *ibid.*, doc. E 669/11, pp. 70–75.

¹³ W. Radloff, *Das Kudatku Bilik des Jusuf Chass-Hadschib aus Bâlasagun*, pt. 1: *Der Text in Transscription* (St. Petersburg, 1891), pp. li–lvi; Togan, *Ibn Faḍlān*, pp. 291–92, 295–301; B. Ja. Vladimircov, *Le régime social des Mongols*, trans. by M. Carsow (Paris, 1948); L. Krader, *Social Organization of the Mongol-Turkic Pastoral Nomads* (The Hague, 1963), pp. 326–35; *idem*, "Feudalism and the Tatar Polity of the

how the institution of *nökör*-ship, as manifested in the Crimean society, was the basic social factor, frequently overriding tribal kinship ties and giving the steppe pastoralist society its “feudal” character.

In the Crimea the leader of the tribal confederation was the beg of the Shirins, the strongest tribe of the khanate who had as appanage the area from Karasu to Kerch bordering the Ottoman Sandjak of Kaffa (Kefe). To ensure the support of the hereditary leaders of the Shirins, the Crimean khans established kinship ties with them by giving their daughters in marriage. During Sahib Giray’s reign the leader of the Shirins was Baba (Babay), son of Mamış (Memesh) and Mehmed Giray I’s daughter. Remmāl describes him as the most authoritative figure among the begs (L, 22). At difficult moments Sahib Giray always turned to Baba, who, with his brothers and other relatives — Shıkmamay, Akmamay, Kara-Mirza, Kutlu-Sā’at, and Kay-Pulat Mirza — controlled the larger military forces in the khanate. It is known that the cooperation of the Shirins with the Ottomans was decisive in bringing the Crimean Khanate under Ottoman submission in 1475, and that in the subsequent period it was usually the determining factor in the succession of the khans to the Crimean throne.¹⁴ However, at times when their own authority and interests were at stake, in particular when a proposed campaign did not promise much booty or slaves, the Shirins did not hesitate to support pretenders or khans who opposed the Ottomans. These conditions made Crimean politics very complex. In 1538 Crimean begs participated enthusiastically under Sahib Giray in the Ottoman campaign against Moldavia (Kara-Boghdan), hoping for abundant booty. However, the khan, following Ottoman advice, forbade the enslavement of the Moldavians during the campaign (P, 13–14), since originally they were *dhimmi* subjects of the Ottoman sultan. The Crimeans argued that many of them had incurred debts in equipping themselves to participate in the campaign, in anticipation of rich booty.¹⁵ Thereupon the khan ordered that *çapkul*, or booty raids, be carried out only for livestock, but not for slaves. On the other hand, when in 1547 Süleyman I (1520–1566) called the Crimeans to participate in the campaign against Iran, Sahib Giray, acting as spokes-

Middle Ages,” *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, pp. 76–99. F. Sümer, *Oğuzlar* (Ankara, 1967), p. 387, found that in Türkmen states, the *Begler-begi*, not the khan, wielded the real political power.

¹⁴ See H. Inalcik, “Yeni vesikalara göre Kırım Hanlığının Osmanlı tâbiliğine girmesi ve ahidnâme meselesi,” *Belleten* 8: 185–229.

¹⁵ For those impoverished Crimeans who borrowed money to participate in the booty raids, also see the translation of Bronieviski by Ortaylı, *Kırım*, p. 52; cf. Collins, “Military Organization,” p. 259.

man for the Crimean begs, demanded payment of five thousand *akča* or 83 gold ducats for each Crimean soldier to be employed in this distant campaign in a Muslim country. He argued that they were not paid as the Ottoman soldiery was, but depended wholly on booty for their livelihood (P, 62a). In the end, the Crimeans did not take part in the Iranian campaign, which was to be one of the main causes of the rift between the khan and the Ottomans.

In Remmāl's account (P, 4b, 55a) the Crimean tribal elite included — alongside the begs of the four *qaraču* — the oghlans or *oghlan kiyun begs*, members of the Genghiskhanid dynasty who apparently commanded their own independent forces, as did the *qaraču*-begs. Organized under a leader of their own ranks, the oghlans appear to have had an important part in the process of choosing a khan.¹⁶

In the internal structure of the tribal units under the begs, distinction should be made between the *nökörs*, or *emeldesh*, and the ordinary rank and file. *Nökörs* or *emeldesh* (literally "comrades"), sometimes with the attribute *khāṣṣa* or *sirdash* ("personally attached" or "intimate comrade"), formed a group of devotees or bodyguards who always accompanied their master, a beg or khan, and were ready to make every sacrifice for him.¹⁷ In one passage (L, 164) Remmāl described the *nökörs* of the

¹⁶ See the letter to Saadet Giray in Bennigsen et al., *Le Khanat de Crimée*, pp. 106–110. There two oghlans, Abdullah and Mamish, are mentioned as agreeing to Saadet Giray's khanship.

¹⁷ For the word *nökör* or *nökür*, see J. Németh, "Wanderungen des mongolischen Wortes *Nökür*, Genosse," *Acta Orientalia* (Budapest), 3 (1953): 1–23; G. Doerfer, *Türkische und Mongolische Elemente im Neupersischen*, vol. 1 (Wiesbaden, 1963), pp. 521–26; Vladimircov, *Le régime social*, pt. 1, chap. 3, showed for the first time how *nökör*ship became a lever for Genghis Khan's creation of the army-state framework over the Mongol tribal society. Genghis Khan put the newly formed military units under his *nökörs*, thus bringing about a new feudal hierarchy dependent directly on his own will. *Nökör*ship appears to have been the basic institution in the steppe for explaining not only the emergence of warbands around leaders and ultimately nomadic empires, but also the cause of internal fragmentation and struggle. Cf. E. L. Keenan, "Muscovy and Kazan: Some Introductory Remarks on the Patterns of Steppe Diplomacy," *Slavic Review* 26 (1967): 552. Radloff, *Das Kudatku Bilik*, explains this fragmentation under new leaders by the natural demographic growth within the tribe itself. *Qazaq čkmaq* was just the expression of this flight into the steppes of the leader, either the Genghiskhanid prince or a clan chief with his *nökörs*. Usually the sons of a deceased leader became *qazaq* with his *nökörs*. Leadership and success depended on the leader's personal valor and boldness, his skill in mustering the *ils* (tribes) under his command, but above all on the loyalty of his *nökörs*. In 'Abd al-Ghaffār's *Umdat al-Tawārikh*, pp. 46–47, there is an interesting story about how Rektimür, the beg of the Shirins, became a *nökör* to Toqtamish and his descendants. Remembering that his ancestors were *nökörs* of Toqtamish's forefathers, he rescued him from a dangerous situation and agreed to become his *nökör*. He swore to serve him faithfully until death.

ķaraĉu as “attendants who never abandoned their beg’s threshold.” In most cases these nķķķrs came from Tatar tribes which were reduced to dependency or enslaved by a powerful leader. In 1546 Sahib Giray told the captured wives of the Astrakhan begs that if their husbands submitted and became his nķķķrs, he would grant them each lands (L, 130). The leader, always a beg or somebody related to the Genghiskhanid dynasty, retained his following of nķķķrs even in defeat. Withdrawing to the steppes, an action termed *ķazaķ ĉķķmaķ* by the Tatars, he could wait for an opportune moment to overcome his rivals and regain power. The process of *ķazaķ ĉķķmaķ* seems to have been the real dynamic in the interminable fight for power and state formation in the Turco-Mongol nomadic society.¹⁸ In fact, the Genghiskhanids themselves, along with their nķķķrs, actively participated in this type of power struggle during the period of the dissolution of the Golden Horde (1359–1502).

A letter apparently written by the bash-ķaraĉu to the Ottoman sultan in 1533 speaks of the long period of internal struggle in the Crimea since the murder of Mehmed Giray I by the Nogays in 1523.¹⁹ According to the letter, the constant fighting had resulted in the elimination of all the old begs and mirzas of the Crimea, as well as the discontinuance of the raids into the Christian lands which, the letter claimed, were the main source of the Crimean people’s prosperity. In response to the sultan’s request for a compromise between Sahib Giray Khan and Islam Giray that would restore peace and unity in the country, the author of the letter complained that compromise was impossible because Sahib Giray had not followed his advice to reject the principal trouble makers from his court, namely, řafa Giray, Selimshāh Beg, and “Takhıday Mirza who had killed Yūnus,

Then, the four ķaraĉu tribes — the Shirins, Barıns, Arghins, and ķıpĉaķs — also agreed to become Toķtamıř’s nķķķrs (*‘Umdat al-Tawāriķh*, p. 48). Thus, through their support, Toķtamıř became the khan of the Golden Horde and gave his daughter to Reķtimūr’s son Tekine (ibid., pp. 48–55). Among the Tūrkmen the same institution was sometimes called *yoldash* (Sūmer, *Oķuzlar*, pp. 391–92). For the importance of nķķķrship in state formation among the Tūrkmen, see J. E. Woods, *The Aqqıynlu* (Minneapolis and Chicago, 1975), pp. 8–12; 46–54, fn. 17; 230. A Caferoķlu, “Tūrk Tarihinde Nķķķr,” in *IV T. T. Kongresi* (Ankara, 1952), pp. 251–61. Nķķķrship is obviously connected with the ancient Turco-Mongol institution of *and/ant*, *antah* or *andik*; see Abdūlkadir İnan, “Eski Tūrklerde ve Folklorıda ‘Ant,’” *Dil ve Tarih-Coĝrafya Fakūltesi Dergisi* (Ankara), vol. 6, no. 4 (1948).

¹⁸ ķazaķ-Tatar leaders with their sizable nķķķr retinues often sought refuge and served as mercenaries under the rulers of Lithuania and Muscovy. G. Stōkl, “Die Entstehung des Kossakentums,” *Verōffentlichungen des Osteuropa-Institutes* (Munich), vol. 3 (1953), studied their part in the rise of Slavic Cossacks. Also see W. H. McNeill, *Europe’s Steppe Frontier, 1500–1800* (Chicago and London, 1964), pp. 111–23.

¹⁹ Bennigsen et al., *Le Khanat de Crimée*, pp. 121–25. The translation of the document is not always reliable: in lines 8 and 9, the subject is not the begs, but the khan.

the beg of the Shirins." He also said that Sahib Giray, contrary to the customs of the khanate and "their age-old *töre*," was enlisting a number of *tüfenkdjis*, or musketeers, from among "the rabble of the people." From this letter it is evident that the *qaraçu*-beg considered himself the supreme spokesman of the aristocracy in the khanate. His idea of good order was to follow faithfully the old traditions of the khanate so that the raids into Christian countries could be organized and prosperity would return with the acquisition of many slaves. The author of the letter asked the sultan "in the name of the whole Crimean people" to send a new khan to achieve peace and good order in the country.

We have to look back to the reign of Saadet Giray (1524–1532) for the real background to this long struggle in the khanate. The murder of Mehmed Giray I in 1523 was followed by a massacre of the Crimean tribal forces and a ruinous invasion of the Crimea by the Nogays.²⁰ In despair, the Crimeans turned for salvation to the Ottoman sultan. He sent to the Crimea as khan Saadet Giray, accompanied by 500 Janissaries with firearms, and promised him full Ottoman protection. Those favoring Ottoman influence, led by Bakhtiyār Beg of the Shirins, thought to secure power for themselves by supporting Saadet Giray.²¹ It should be noted that this Ottoman faction was both pro-Muscovite and had been unsympathetic to the murdered Mehmed Giray's ambition to revive the Golden Horde Empire under the Girays. Bakhtiyār, an irreconcilable opponent of Mehmed Giray I who had given the office of bash-*qaraçu* to Mamış, had long been in contact with Istanbul to bring to the Crimea Himmet Giray as khan and Saadet Giray as *qalghay*. In 1524, Bakhtiyār welcomed the sultan's appointee Saadet Giray as khan. When Saadet Giray's attempt to assert his absolute authority in the khanate led to open warfare against the powerful Mamış, Bakhtiyār sided with the new khan. Thus, the struggle was complicated by a conflict for power among the Shirins, which caused a split in the ranks of this most powerful tribe of the Crimea. Bakhtiyār replaced Mamış as chief *qaraçu*. Mamış and the other Shirin leaders were executed when they attempted to conspire against the khan in 1528. Saadet Giray's basic policy, however, inevitably led to a rift between the new chief of the *qaraçu* and the khan. Accusing Bakhtiyār and his brother Evliyā(r) Mirza of a conspiracy against his life, Saadet Giray, surrounded by his Ottoman musketeers, came to Qırq-Yer, the chief city of the Shirins, and massacred the conspirators and their

²⁰ Syroečkovskij, "Muxammed-Giraj," p. 57.

²¹ Syroečkovskij, "Muxammed-Giraj," p. 58.

As was true with Turkish and Mongol clans in general,²⁵ seniority was the basic customary rule in leadership among the Shirins. However, the begs often attempted to secure the title for their own sons. Also, it should be remembered that more energetic younger brothers, supported by nökörs, often challenged their elder brothers in leadership, since personal valor was of great functional importance in this military society. It was of vital importance for the society to come by the leader most qualified to unite and organize the tribal forces for booty raids.

As indicated in the Muscovite reports,²⁶ those who endeavored to assert Saadet Giray's authority in the Crimea were actually his brother Sahib Giray, the future khan, who was active in the Crimea until 1531, and the *ički-begs*, or tribal begs in the immediate service of the khan, including Selimsha (Selīmshāh in Remmāl and document E 6474) and his brother or cousin Takhılday (in Remmāl Taghılday, L, 57), who probably belonged to the Kıpçak clan. In their desperate fight against the khan's faction, the Shirins found a leader in Islam Giray, son of Mehmed Giray I, who sought to become, with the support only of the Crimean tribal aristocracy, a khan independent of Istanbul. Joined by most of the Crimean tribal forces, Islam Giray finally inflicted a crushing defeat on Saadet Giray in a decisive battle near Azak (Azov).²⁷ Saadet Giray took refuge in Istanbul. A compromise, apparently reached through the *qaraçu-beg* and the Ottoman Porte, defused the dangerous situation for both sides. In 1532, the sultan appointed Sahib Giray khan of the Crimea²⁸ and Islam Giray his *qalghay*, and this solution was accepted by both sides. However, as the Topkapı document (E 1308/3) mentioned above makes clear, the beg of the Shirins soon showed his disappointment at Sahib Giray's conduct in the Crimea, which proved to be too independent and

younger brothers Evliyā Mirza, Aydishke Mirza, Toğuzak Mirza, and Čihār-Yār Mirza. But the mirzas Djiban Giray, Bağırghan, and Čağırghan are mentioned separately, and they are not included among Bakhtiyār's brothers. Thus, according to this document, Toğhurak or Toğuzak was not the son, but the brother of Bakhtiyār (Bennigsen et al., *ibid.*, p. 109, give Toğuzak, son of Aghış, Bağırghan, son of Evliyā, and Aydishke, son of Mamak; Aghış, *qaraçu-beg* in 1508, is another person). Bakhtiyār was *bash-qaraçu* between 1526 and 1531; cf. Syroëčkovskij, "Muxammed-Giraj," p. 59.

²⁵ Seniority in succession appears to be a general rule among Turkish and Mongol pastoralist nomads; see Krader, *Social Organization*, pp. 129–30, 149, 182, 194–97. For succession in khanship, however, a different concept became prevalent: see Inalcik, "Osmanlılarda Saltanat Verâseti."

²⁶ Syroëčkovskij, "Muxammed-Giraj," p. 59; cf. doc. E 2365 in Bennigsen et al., *Le Khanat de Crimée*, p. 128.

²⁷ 'Abd al-Ghaffār, 'Umdat al-Tawārikh, p. 99; Riḍā, *Al-Sab' al-Sayyār*, p. 89.

²⁸ The date in *Al-sab' al-Sayyār*, p. 89, is Rabi' I, 939/October 1532.

assertive. Like Saadet, now Sahib Giray, using Ottoman support, tried to establish the khan's authority. However, the beg of the Shirins, representing himself as the only power able to guarantee the peace and status quo in the Crimea that were the principal concerns of the Ottomans, was determined to keep his authority.

In his struggle against Islam Giray and his supporters, the Shirins, Sahib Giray appears to have relied on the cooperation of the powerful Nogay tribes in the Crimea. In addition, the Nogays located in the steppes outside the Crimea were useful as allies against Islam Giray, who stayed in the Or-Ğapu (Perekop) isthmus area and could retreat to the steppes in times of need.

The rise of the Manghit-Nogays' influence in Crimean politics dates back to Mengli Giray's time.²⁹ V. E. Syroečkovskij, using the reports of the Muscovite envoys, emphasizes their influence as being the most important factor in Crimean tribal politics, because the Shirins saw it as a challenge to their leadership over the Crimean aristocracy.³⁰ In 1523, the Shirins' main complaint against Saadet Giray had been his protection of the Manghit-Nogay Tenish, or Tinish Mirza, whom they accused of being the principal conspirator in the murder of Mehmed Giray I and in the Nogay invasion of the Crimea.³¹ In dealing with Islam Giray, Sahib Giray Khan also favored the Manghit leaders, Bāķi Beg and his brothers Davay and Aķ-Bibi (to whom he promised his daughter in marriage). But after the death of Islam Giray at the hands of Bāķi, Sahib Giray found Bāķi himself to be the most dangerous threat to his rule in the Crimea.

Remmāl gives a detailed account of the khan's struggle against Bāķi Beg.³² A nephew of Sahib Giray, distinguished among the Crimean elite

²⁹ As it happened, some time in this period, Yankavut, leader of the Manghits in the Crimea, enjoyed equal status with the Shirins (Syroečkovskij, "Muxammed-Giraj," p. 32). In 1502, when Mengli Giray conquered the *Ulugh-Orda* (Great Horde) and the tribes which composed it were dispersed, the leader of the Manghits there, Azika or Hadjike, took refuge with Ahmed Giray, son of Mengli in the Crimea, and apparently in time became the new leader among the Crimean begs. While a part of the Manghits remained on the Itil River under Tevekkel, son of Temir, Mengli removed some of them to the steppes outside Or-Ğapu (ibid., p. 33) in an attempt to establish the Crimea as the new center of a revived Golden Horde. Using the title "Ulugh-Ordanıñ ulugh khani," the Crimean khan always claimed to be supreme over all the lands of the Golden Horde. In this plan the cooperation of the Nogays was deemed essential.

³⁰ 'Abd al-Ghaffār, *'Umdat al-Tawārikh*, pp. 32–37. The important local evidence about Nogay-Manghits in this work, apparently drawn from *Tārikh-i Dost Sultān*, was not used by Syroečkovskij or, more recently, by A. Bennigsen and C. Lemerrier-Quelquejay, "La Grande Horde Nogay et le problème des communications entre l'Empire Ottoman et l'Asie Centrale en 1552–1556," *Turcica* 8, no. 2 (1976): 203–212.

³¹ Syroečkovskij, "Muxammed-Giraj," p. 58.

³² Bāķi Beg was descended from the famous Edigu or Edike Beg, the ancestral beg of the Nogay tribes, and was himself the beg of the Manghit or Mankit, a branch of the

for his personal bravery and boldness, Bākī became the khan's most dreaded rival until he was killed in 1542. In his long struggle, Bākī Beg was always faithfully accompanied by his *nökörs*, whose number Remmāl gives as about two hundred. At the beginning of Sahib Giray's khanate, Bākī left the Crimea and for some time stayed with the Nogays, and then led a *qazaq*'s life in the steppe, always with his *nökörs* beside him. Eventually Bākī returned,³³ and in a surprise attack killed Islam Giray. At that time, his retinue numbered five or six hundred horsemen. Apparently Bākī claimed to be the beg of the Manghits, one of the *qaraču* tribes in the Crimea, whose leadership Sahib Giray gave to Hodja-Tay Beg. It was Bākī's association with the Nogays in the steppes that made him dangerous to the khan. The danger of a Nogay invasion of the Crimea was thought to be so pressing by the khan that he felt compelled to build the Farah-Kirman fortress at Or-Ğapu to protect the peninsula while he was away on the Moldavian campaign of 1538. Nonetheless, a force of four or five hundred Nogays under Aqsak 'Alı Mirza made a surprise attack at night on Sahib's army while it was crossing the Özü (Dnieper) River en route to Moldavia (P, 10a). Later, in the winter of 946/1539–40, Bākī, together with his brother Davay Mirza, pillaged the Crimean army while returning from a raid on Muscovite territories. Later, Sahib Giray made every effort to convince Bākī to come into the Crimea and join him on a campaign against Muscovy. He promised Bākī the leadership of the Manghits and even command over all the tribal forces in the Crimea, saying that "no one could prosper in pursuing banditry in the steppes with only a handful of *qazaqs*." At this time, "Bākī was together with the

Nogays. Bākī was the son of Temir, *Ulugh-beg* or great emir of the Manghits, who, like the Shirins in the Crimea, constituted the most powerful tribe in the *Ulugh-Orda*. Bākī's mother was Mengli Giray Han's daughter, a sister of Sahib Giray Khan. On the other hand, in 1485, Mengli Giray had married Nūr Sultān, daughter of Temir and widow of Ibrahim, khan of Kazan. In Tatar nomadic society, marriage ties played a crucial role in forming alliances and defining power relations. Such bonds with the khan's family determined the privileged position of one tribe vis-à-vis others, as well as secured the loyal support of a powerful tribe for the khan. As Mengli Giray, by his marriage to Nūr-Sultān, had planned to strengthen his influence over the tribes in the *Ulugh-Orda* on the Itil River, the Manghit influence in the Crimea increased correspondingly. There were also marriage ties between the Nogays and Shirins (see 'Abd al-Ghaffār, *Umdat al-Tawārikh*, p. 81). For the importance of marital ties for political relations in Türkmen states, see Woods, *The Aqquyunlu*, p. 105.

³³ Bennigsen et al., *Le Khanat de Crimée*, pp. 327–28, citing Smirnov's statement based on *Al-Sab' al-Sayyār*, thought that Islam Giray wandered about for some time in the land of "Qumuks." In *Al-Sab' al-Sayyār*, p. 91, this information concerns only Bākī Beg. Remmāl (P, 7a–7b) makes it clear that Bākī Beg, who was not welcomed by Islam Giray, went away and was employed by "the rulers of Persia and Khurasan" for some time.

ķazaks of Azak, who all followed him in his wanderings” (R, 27a). When he eventually came and submitted to the khan, Bākī was always on guard and suspicious of possible attempts on his life by Sahib. During the campaign against Muscovy in 1541, their mutual suspicions delayed their crossing of the Oka River, which gave the Muscovites a chance to organize and block their passage. After their return to the Crimea, Bākī soon withdrew to the steppes along the Özü with his nökörs, this time on the pretext of a hunt. Always awaiting any opportunity to eliminate his foe, the khan, with a small force having cannons and musketeers, surprised and killed Bākī there.

The attempt of the beg of the Manghits to supplant the beg of the Shirins as leader of the Crimean tribal confederation appears to have been one of the underlying causes of the turmoil in the Crimea during the period 1523–1542. Bākī Beg, the true leader of the Manghits, vigorously pursued the struggle for supremacy. Actually, Mengli Giray I, as well as his sons Mehmed Giray I and Sahib Giray I, were cautious about recognizing the leadership of the Manghit begs, because of their connections with the Nogays in the steppes. Sahib Giray, one of the most powerful exponents of the idea of a centralized khanate in the Crimea, finally chose to cooperate with the Shirins rather than with the threatening Manghits. After Bākī Beg’s defeat, Sahib Giray was able to establish his absolute authority in the khanate as the Shirins’ hegemony over the tribal confederation continued. Baba, beg of the Shirins under Sahib Giray, always gave his full support to the khan in his struggle against Bākī Beg and, as Remmāl emphasizes, loyally served him in his military campaigns.

The last major confrontation between the Nogays and Sahib Giray occurred in 1546 or 1547, as the Nogays attempted to retaliate for the khan’s capture of Astrakhan in 1546. Their defeat, recalled in Crimean history as *Nogay Kırghını* or “Massacre of the Nogays,” was won by the cannons and muskets of the khan. Remmāl tells us that the sudden concentrated fire of the muskets and cannons shocked and scattered the Nogays, thus assuring a complete victory for the khan (P, 57–61; L, 133–145).

SAHIB GIRAY’S ATTEMPT TO CENTRALIZE POWER ON THE OTTOMAN MODEL

While the opposing forces in the Crimea tried to employ the Ottomans for their ends, the Ottoman government in turn exploited their rivalries to achieve its own policy goals. These goals were: (1) to have on the Crimean throne a vassal ruler from the dynasty of the Girays who would be fully

loyal to the Ottoman Empire; (2) to make use of Crimean troops as auxiliary forces in Ottoman expeditions against Moldavia, Hungary, or Iran; (3) to prevent the khanate from becoming a threat to Ottoman possessions in the Crimea. The Ottoman government was concerned that, by incorporating the heritage of the Golden Horde in the Itil region and joining with the Nogays in the steppes, the Crimean khan might form a rival empire in the north.

In the period between 1475 and 1484, the Ottomans managed to establish their control over the Crimean Khanate chiefly through the cooperation of Eminek Beg (Iminek Bik), head of the Crimean tribal elite. Eminek himself made use of his close relationship with the Ottoman sultan to choose for the Crimean throne whomever he found most amenable to the interests of the tribal elite. In 1524, it was the beg of the Shirins who cooperated with the sultan to make Saadet Giray khan. As his suzerain, the sultan conferred on him not only the usual symbols of authority — a diploma (*manshūr*), a standard, and a drum — but also a strong escort of Ottoman forces bearing firearms. Upon his appointment, Sahib Giray was also provided with a strong escort of Ottoman *kapu-kulu* forces and artillery capable of imposing his authority.

Our sources give varying figures for the Ottoman *kapu-kulu* escort, which stayed in the Crimea and participated in the khan's expeditions. As an eye-witness, Remmāl gave the following figures:

Janissaries	— in 1532, 600 (P, 4b); but in the Moldavian and second Circassian campaigns (P, 9b), only 300 (the Janissaries were equipped with muskets and swords)
artillery (<i>zarbuzan</i> or <i>darbuzan</i> , small cannons)	— 40 during the second Circassian campaign in 1543 and the expedition against the Nogays; 60 cannon-wagons during the expedition against Muscovy in 1541 and Astrakhan (Hadji-Tarkhan) in 1546
<i>tüfenkdjis</i> or musketeers	— over 1,000 during the Moldavian and Muscovite campaigns, as well as during the expeditions into Circassia in 1543 and Astrakhan (Remmāl distinguishes three separate groups of musketeers: <i>Tüfenkdji-kullar</i> , Janissaries, and <i>Tat Tüfenkdjis</i> . The latter came from the mixed population of Southern Crimea which was known as <i>Tat-ili</i> .)
<i>arabas</i> or field wagons	— 200 during the Moldavian campaign (one for each five musketeers)

The escort forces assigned to Devlet Giray in 1551 at the time of his appointment as khan of the Crimea were as follows: 300 Janissaries, 300 *kul-ḡarındashı* (recruits from outside the corps of the Janissaries), and

400 *athu-‘ulūfelü kıl* (mounted soldiers on the payroll of the sultan), 60 small cannons (*zarbuzan*), and an arsenal of ammunition and military equipment appropriate to a force of this size as well as funds for their payment. The forces previously assigned to the retinue of Sahib Giray must have been very similar. Remmāl usually gives the total number of musketeers in campaigns as 1,000. Remmāl reported that Sahib Giray was actively recruiting salaried musketeers (*‘ulūfelü tufenkdji*) from among the Crimean populace, which is confirmed in the Topkapı document (E 1308/3 in Bennigsen, p. 122). Ottoman troops under the governors of Azak and Kaffa reinforced the khan’s army only when the sultan ordered them to interfere, for instance, during Saadet Giray’s fight against the anti-Ottoman Islam Giray in 1532. However, the beg of Kaffa always cooperated with the khan in his campaigns against the Circassians by providing him with ships to transport troops.

The military support rendered by the Ottomans played a decisive role in the khanate, not only in the internal power struggle as a balance to the traditional Crimean tribal forces, but also as a major component of the khan’s army in campaigns. Under Sahib Giray, the use of the *kapu-kulu* forces with muskets and cannons changed traditional Crimean tactics. The details supplied by Remmāl on the military tactics used by Sahib Giray in his campaigns clearly illustrate that they were a crucial factor in the khan’s military successes and were always relied on at critical moments. In all his successful Circassian campaigns, Sahib Giray was able to penetrate into mountainous country and pursue the Circassians by employing a small force of musketeers and cannons. In 1546 he stormed and easily took Astrakhan in an attack supported by simultaneous fire from his 1,000 muskets and 40 cannons. In his campaign against Muscovy in 1541 he planned to cross the Oka River under the protection of the fire of his cannons and muskets. Apart from using massive fire, Sahib Giray employed his artillery and muskets by arranging them in a *wagenburg* formation of the type used by the Hussites, Hungarians, and Ottomans, that is, the ancient Turco-Mongol tactic of the fortified circular camp made up of wagons chained to one another and known as *küren* or *küriyan, güriyen*.³⁴ Remmāl gave a detailed description of how the new

³⁴ See B. Ja. Vladimircov, *Obščestvennyj stroj Mongolov* (Leningrad, 1934), p. 37; Turkish translation, *Moğolların İçtimai Teskilâtı*, by Abdülkadir İnan (Ankara, 1944); J. Németh, “Neuere Untersuchungen über das Wort Tabor-Lager,” *Acta Linguistica* 3, nos. 3/4 (1953): 431–46; Collins, “Military Organization,” pp. 273–74. About the fortifications with wagons used by the Pečenegs, see O. Pritsak, “The Pečenegs: A Case of Social and Economic Change,” *Archivum Eurasiae Medii Aevi* 1 (1975): 19; H.

küren of Sahib Giray was prepared (P, 69b–70a, L, 169–170). In his last Circassian campaign in 1551 he ordered that each soldier make a sharpened stake. A fence was then erected around a ditch with these stakes in three rows with their pointed ends sticking outwards. Behind the fence he positioned muskets and cannon. The *küren* was so strong, Remmāl added, that it could not be captured by an army of 100,000 men. This was the tactic to which the Ottomans owed their major victories against their rivals in Iran and Egypt. Now Sahib Giray was using it successfully against the Nogays and the Circassians.

When the army camped in the field, the *kapu-kulu* forces were deployed in the following manner: the first circle around the khan's pavilion was composed of the wagons of the artillery and arsenal chained to one another, the second circle was composed of Janissaries, the third of court dignitaries (*içki begleri*), and last came the *ğaraçu-begs* (*ğaraçu ulu begleri*) in order of rank. This lineup corresponded exactly to that used by the Ottoman sultans in their campaigns. On marches the artillery wagons came at the rear of the army, behind the wagons carrying cash and valuables and protected on either side by the musket-bearing soldiers (*tüfenkdji kullar*). The Janissaries were at the khan's side beneath the standard mounted with a gold ball, which the sultan had given Sahib Giray upon his appointment as khan to symbolize delegated power and authority. On occasion, as happened during the dangerous crossing of the steppes on their return from the Moldavian campaign (P, 14a), musket-bearing Janissaries were employed to patrol around the army. Sahib Giray's use of divisions equipped with cannon and muskets was definitely an innovation with profound implications for the khanate. However, the tribal cavalry forces remained the mainstay of the Crimean army.

The extraordinary advantages which the firearms gave the khan in overcoming his internal and external foes undoubtedly enhanced his image as a ruler. As Remmāl emphatically underlines throughout his account, Sahib Giray consciously sought to establish his absolute authority in the country over the tribal aristocracy, according to the model of the Ottoman *pādishāh*. Describing an incident during the Moldavian campaign when the khan ordered the tribal forces not to make booty raids, Remmāl said (P, 106): "No one could dare, at the risk of his life, to gainsay his order or to take one step ahead of the khan. He was such an awesome and unveering *pādishāh*. In sum, they were all rendered power-

Inalcik, "The Socio-Political Effects of the Diffusion of Fire-arms in the Middle East," in *War, Technology, and Society in the Middle East*, ed. by V. J. Parry and M. E. Yapp (London, 1975), pp. 197–217; Woods, *The Akquyunlu*, pp. 131, 134, 175.

less under his firm hand." In other places Remmāl refers to Sahib Giray as pādishāh, underlining his imperial stature with this title peculiar to the Ottoman sultans. In keeping with the conception of pādishāh in the Persian theory of kingship, he further interpreted the khan's authority as representing the "shadow of God on earth," or, in mystical terms, "possessing the powers of saintliness," "a pole manifesting divine power," "infallible ruler among men," and so on. Once Remmāl himself was put in charge of a cartload of 800,000 *akča* to be distributed among the Crimean ulema (P, 146). He observed that "those who saw the cart with the purses of money all kept at a distance. See then how firmly the khan has established his authority in the country." Orders were accompanied by threats of execution. During the threat of a Nogay invasion of the Crimea, the khan declared to the defenders at Or-Ğapu that he would execute not only deserters but their whole clans, including children and relatives. Remmāl's remarks on the khan's concern about protecting the *re'āyā*, or ordinary tax-paying subjects, against injustices committed by the begs are noteworthy. Remmāl said that the khan forbade the begs and their nökörs from making tours among the *re'āyā* to collect dues, and encouraged them to make their livelihood solely from booty raids (P, 15a). On the other hand, he assigned fixed monthly salaries to his own nökörs, that is, the palace staff and his personal retinue.

The ulema formed the second most influential group in the Crimean elite. Sahib Giray sought to ensure their support by generous and respectful treatment of them as a group favoring his centralist policies. The ulema were part of the state council in the Crimea and were called upon to approve the decisions taken by the khan in consultation with the begs. Remmāl emphasized the khan's preference for the ulema and his concern for a strict observation of Islamic law (P, 16a). In addition to their regular stipends from the treasury, the ulema received a share of the booty at the conclusion of each campaign. Our source also reports that Sahib Giray met on alternate days with the ulema, shaykhs, ulu begs, his nökörs or *ishik čoraları*, and the ladies of his court for discussion of their requests and other matters (P, 16a). On Fridays, after noon prayers, he convened the state council and heard the petitions and complaints brought by the common people — a practice typical of all Middle Eastern states that adhered to the Persian tradition. In sum, Sahib Giray's chancery practices and conduct of state affairs were in accordance with what he had seen in the Ottoman capital.

Some of the reforms and innovations Sahib Giray introduced into the Crimean administration were aimed at building up a strong treasury with

extensive regular sources of revenue — a prerequisite for a centralized government. Besides the public treasury, whose revenues came from regular state and Islamic taxes and dues as well as from yearly tributes extracted from neighbors — Muscovy, Lithuania-Poland, Moldavia, and the Circassian lord Ƙansavuk — Sahib Giray apparently managed to accumulate a large personal fortune of slaves, horses, cattle, sheep, jewelry, and furs. According to Remmāl (L, 188), at the time of his death the khan owned 3,000 able-bodied slaves, 10,000 horses, 36,000 sheep, and 5,000 to 6,000 cattle. The khan took his share of booty (*savgha*), especially slaves and cattle, at river crossings as his army returned from a campaign. Remmāl reported that of 50,000 slaves captured during the second Circassian campaign in 1543, the khan's share was 2,000 (L, 94). When the Crimean army returned from a campaign with great numbers of slaves, notice was sent out to local merchants and, as Remmāl put it, "a great spate of transactions erupted."³⁵ The fortune and power of the tribal elite also depended on slaves and livestock. Slaves were sold at the slave market or used to cultivate the extensive lands assigned by the khan as fiefs to the begs.³⁶

The huge herds of horses belonging to the tribes were pastured in the area between the Özü River, the Or-Ƙapu isthmus, and the Black Sea. This area was extremely important for the Crimean elite, as was later stated in Gazi Giray Khan's letter to the king of Poland.³⁷ The khan complains that "the Cossacks capture and drive away herds of cattle and horses on the Özü River and cause the Tatars to abandon their usual summer and winter pastureland in the area." In Sahib Giray's time, however, it was the Nogay threat that was paramount in this pasture area of the Crimean Tatars. On one occasion it was feared that Bāḳī and the Nogays might drive away 40,000 to 50,000 horses. Remmāl informs us that to protect the herds, the Tatars stood guard there year round (L, 98).

³⁵ For the importance of the slave trade in the Crimean economy, see my "Servile Labor in the Ottoman Empire," to be published in *Mutual Effects of the Islamic and the Judeo-Christian Worlds*.

³⁶ Syroečkovskij, "Muxammed Giraj," pp. 9–14; Bronievski as translated by Ortaylı, *Kırım*, pp. 12, 28; Evliyā Çelebi, *Seyahatname*, vol. 7 (Istanbul, 1928), pp. 511, 601.

³⁷ Zernov and Feydhān, *Materialy*, doc. 4, pp. 9–12, date Djumāda I, 1000/14 February–14 March 1592. He warned the king that the first condition for peace with Poland was the expulsion of the Cossacks from the Özü River. Bronievski, as translated by Ortaylı, *Kırım*, p. 11 (Russian translation, p. 38), points out how the Tatars in the steppes between the Özü and Or-Ƙapu were fearful of the Christian Cossacks and withdrew to their winter quarters with their herds and families after harvesting their crops. The cultivation of wheat for export to the Ottoman cities was an important economic activity of the steppe Tatars by the sixteenth century. See my forthcoming book, *The Customs Register of Caffa*.

Like his predecessors Mengli Giray I and Mehmed Giray I, Sahib Giray was very concerned about the security of the caravan routes from Kazan, Central Asia (via Astrakhan), and Iran.³⁸ According to Remmāl, Sahib Giray initiated the campaigns against Astrakhan in 1546 and against the Circassians in 1551 (L, 120, 158), on the grounds that the caravans bound for the Crimea had been attacked and plundered. Remmāl noted that in 1546 the caravan from Kazan carried goods valued at over 100,000 *flori* (gold pieces), an indication of this trade's importance (L, 120). In 1551 a caravan of Persian pilgrims returning from Mecca started out from Kaffa, passed by Azak, and, while crossing the steppes north of the Caucasus, was attacked by the Circassians. The khan promised the Iranians that he would recover the stolen goods or recompensate for them from his treasury.³⁹

Remmāl describes how Sahib Giray alienated the Crimean aristocracy by his harsh and despotic treatment of them, especially during the last Circassian campaign before his fall in 1551. They had always disliked Sahib's authoritarian conduct and his total reliance on musketeers and Janissaries. Finally they found their chance to overthrow the khan when Sahib's mentor, the sultan, turned against him. Remmāl makes it clear that after the capture of Astrakhan in 1546 and the victory over the Nogays, the khan refused to send an auxiliary force to the sultan's campaign in Iran. According to Remmāl, the pashas at the Porte accused the khan thus: "The khan now has a too powerful army and has become too ambitious. He thinks that he is better than you in every way. The proof of it is that he now dares to oppose your orders and to make excuses for not sending auxiliary forces. The moment you pass away he thinks he will gain possession of all the Ottoman territories in the Crimea. He does not show the slightest respect to the envoys sent from the Porte. If he unites his forces with the Nogays, no one can be a match for him and resist." The khan's treatment of the Ottoman authorities in Kaffa and disputes over jurisdiction of the lands just outside the city of Kaffa (see L, 149–53) were cited as indications of his ambitiousness. As an intimate of the khan, Remmāl assures us that he nurtured no such plans. Sahib did have designs on Kazan and Astrakhan, however: on this issue, as before,

³⁸ See Bennigsen and Lemerrier-Quelquejay, "La Grande Horde Nogay," pp. 203–236.

³⁹ For the customs and market dues in the Crimean Khanate, see the *yarlıgh* of Sahib Giray I, published and analyzed by several specialists. For a bibliography of these studies, see J. Pelenski, *Russia and Kazan* (The Hague and Paris, 1974), p. 14, fn. 9, and pp. 59–60.

during the reign of Mehmed Giray I, Ottoman and Muscovite interests coincided. In 1546, Shāh-‘Alī, a Muscovite protégé in Kazan, overthrew Şafā Giray. Sahib Giray reacted by occupying Astrakhan and restoring Şafā Giray to the Khanate of Kazan.⁴⁰ Remmāl reported that upon Şafā Giray’s death in March 1549, envoys from Kazan came to the Crimea (L, 155). Informing Sahib Giray of their resistance to a Muscovite army (obviously referring to Ivan IV’s campaign against Kazan in 1549–1550), the envoys asked for his help and the appointment of Bukay Giray, son of Şafā, as khan of Kazan. But Sahib Giray had a different plan: he asked the Ottoman sultan to appoint Devlet Giray, then in Istanbul, as khan of Kazan. The Ottoman Porte, which was more concerned with the Crimean question, used this opportunity to replace Sahib on the Crimean throne with Devlet Giray, and then to form a common front of the Khanates of Crimea, Kazan, and Astrakhan, and the Nogays against Muscovy.⁴¹

Ostensibly Devlet Giray was appointed khan of Kazan by the sultan in Istanbul. Feigning to be on his way to Kazan, he went to Akkerman and waited there for Sahib Giray to pass through the Taman peninsula on his campaign against the Circassians. Remmāl’s story suggests that Sahib Giray suspected the plot and that before he left his capital he placed an army of 15,000 to 20,000 men at the Or-Ğapu isthmus under the ƛalghay, his son Emīn Giray. Devlet Giray’s intelligence sources informed him that this force was actually designed to eliminate him, and that Sahib intended to make his own sons khans of Kazan and Astrakhan (L, 179). Sahib

⁴⁰ In the first years of his khanate, Sahib Giray considered Şafā Giray a threat to his rule in the Crimea; see doc. E 5434 in Bennigsen et al., *Le Khanat de Crimée*, p. 124. This letter was sent by Sahib Giray to Süleyman I.

⁴¹ The first Ottoman envoy came to İsmā‘īl, *beg* of the Great Nogay, in the spring of 1551. But already in 1449, the Ottomans, apparently on the advice of Sahib Giray, tried to lure the Nogays into the Ottoman alliance: see Bennigsen and Lemerrier-Quelquejey, “La Grande Horde Nogay,” pp. 213–18; at that time the Nogay leaders tried to procure cannons and muskets from Muscovy or the Ottomans (*ibid.*, pp. 215, 220). Bennigsen and Lemerrier-Quelquejey (p. 211) try to show that until the middle of the sixteenth century, “Les Turcs Ottomans ne s’étaient guère intéressés à la Basse Volga et ignoraient presque tous des Nogays.” But I would suggest a different chronology. The Ottomans were concerned with the political developments in the region, since the submission of the Crimean Khanate in 1475 alerted them to the changes affecting their position in the Crimea. That this concern did not lead to a direct involvement until the mid-sixteenth century was due to the Ottoman Porte’s respect for the Crimean khans’ wish to remain independent in their policy towards their northern neighbors. It appears that the Crimeans themselves, realizing the urgent need for Ottoman support in their struggle with Muscovy for Kazan, chose to involve the Ottomans directly in the struggle. At any rate, the Ottoman policy toward the Khanates of Kazan and Astrakhan or Muscovy should be examined within general Ottoman Northern Policy, which was determined largely by conditions in the Crimea.

Giray had taken most of the tribal forces with him to Circassia, but they were uncooperative during the campaign and he reacted harshly against them.

The tribal forces that Sahib Giray had stationed at the isthmus abandoned Emin Giray and joined Devlet Giray as soon as he captured the capital. Similarly, Sahib Giray's tribal forces abandoned him when they arrived at Taman. In the court, Sahib Giray's infant sons and grandsons were all murdered by the begs. Sahib Giray's last hope was to go to Istanbul and convince the sultan of his loyalty (L, 188). But before he could depart, the Janissaries and artillery forces also abandoned him at Taman, enabling Bölek Giray, son of Şafā, who had been released from prison by Devlet Giray, to find and kill him. Remmāl added that once his position on the throne was secured, Devlet Giray executed seven of the Shirin begs to avenge the blood of Sahib Giray and his sons (L, 201). The act was dictated by the vendetta rules of Turco-Mongol pastoralist society.

Following events closely, Ivan IV cleverly exploited the Crimean crisis so as to impose his ally, Shāh-'Alī, for a second time on the throne of Kazan in 1551. Then, in March 1552, he attempted, without success, to place Kazan under a Muscovite governor. That spring, the Crimean army under Devlet Giray I set out against Moscow; it was defeated before the fortress of Tula on 22 June 1552. The tsar, who had left his capital five days earlier, was en route to invade Kazan. The Muscovite army, with an artillery corps having about 150 pieces under experts from the West, captured the city of Kazan on 2 October 1552. This turn of events was undoubtedly a surprise for the Ottomans.⁴²

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⁴² About the fall of Kazan, see Hadi Atlasi, *Kazan Hanlığı* (Kazan, 1920), pp. 134–54; E. Keenan, "Muscovy and Kazan, 1445–1552: A Study in Steppe Politics" (Ph.D. diss., Harvard University, 1965); idem, "Muscovy and Kazan: Some Introductory Remarks," pp. 548–58; Pelenski, *Russia and Kazan*; D. C. Matuszewski, "Peresvetov and the Ottoman Empire" (Ph.D. diss., Columbia University, 1972). For the Ottoman and Crimean policies toward Russia after 1552, see H. Inalcik, "The Origin of the Ottoman-Russian Rivalry and the Don-Volga Canal (1569)," *Annales de l'Université d'Ankara* 1 (1947): 47–110; and Bennigsen and Lemerrier-Quelquejey, "La Grande Horde Nogay," p. 222.

Unfortunately, I was not able to consult B. F. Manz, "The Clans of the Crimean Khanate, 1466–1532," *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 2, no. 3 (September 1978): 282–309, which appeared after the completion of this article.