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Problems of Historiography: History and Its Sources

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## COMMENTARY

### Problems of Historiography: History and Its Sources

TARAS HUNCZAK

The article “The Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and Its Attitude toward Germans and Jews: Iaroslav Stets’ko’s 1941 *Zhyttiepys*” by Karel C. Berkhoff and Marco Carynnyk leaves the impression that all those who studied and published on the subject of the OUN somehow evaded the “crucial issues.”<sup>1</sup> They seem intent on demonstrating what it is that we, the researchers and authors in the field, have been missing. For the sake of clarity it should be stated that the article deals only with the issues of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) and its leadership in 1941; yet the authors maintain that “many of the papers that the OUN itself produced [in that period] ended up in Soviet repositories, and few researchers were allowed to see them.” Hence, we could not present those crucial issues.

As a researcher who spent almost thirty years working in various archives and accumulating a respectable collection of documents, I can state that the authors are wrong in their assertion. I also worked in the archives of Ukraine, including the Archive of the Security Service of Ukraine (*Sluzhba Bezpeky Ukraïny*, or SBU). If the authors had examined carefully the documents available in the West, particularly in Germany, they would have discovered that, whether we are talking about the Andrii Mel’nyk faction of the OUN or the Stepan Bandera faction, the crucial issue for both was reestablishing an independent Ukrainian state. Other issues were subordinated to this objective. The position of both factions of the OUN is well documented in various official papers, including those sent by the OUN leadership to the German authorities.<sup>2</sup>

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The Bandera faction of the OUN (henceforth OUN-B) held its second congress at the end of May 1941 and adopted resolutions that emphasized that the principal struggle was for a sovereign and unified [*soborna*], Ukrainian state.<sup>3</sup> A month later, on 23 June 1941, the OUN sent to the German government an extensive memorandum, signed by Stepan Bandera and Volodymyr Stakhiv, the central theme of which is the renewal of an independent Ukrainian state, mentioned at least once on seven different pages.<sup>4</sup> The memorandum included a warning, indeed a threat: “German troops entering Ukraine will be, of course, greeted at first as liberators, but this attitude can soon change, in case Germany comes into Ukraine without appropriate promises of [its] goal to reestablish the Ukrainian state.”<sup>5</sup>

From all available documents it is quite clear, regardless of the occasional departures in terminology, that the ultimate OUN objective was the reestablishment of a sovereign, independent Ukrainian state. I think, therefore, that speculations about the “territorial administration” (*kraiove pravlinnia*), a term that appears from time to time, conveying a limited political objective of the OUN, are not useful since it is taken out of the context of the program of the OUN. The authors of the article suggest that Iaroslav Stets’ko’s proclamation of 30 June was not the proclamation of an “independent” state, but one of a state “presumably of the wartime Slovak or Croatian kind.”<sup>6</sup> In fact, nothing could be farther from the truth. Almost anticipating the authors’ argument, the OUN, in its memorandum of 23 June to the Germans, stated clearly “that there is no analogy for the solution of the Ukrainian question. Since 1938, two states came into existence in Europe: Slovakia and Croatia. Apart from the difference in size and strength of the populations of the countries, the Ukrainian problem is of much greater significance because its solution will effect decisive changes in the political and economic structure of the European continent, which will have intercontinental significance.”<sup>7</sup> The memorandum ends on a powerful note: “a Ukrainian is strongly determined to create conditions that will guarantee national development in an independent state. Each power, pursuing its own interests in building a new order in the East European space, must take this resolution into account.”<sup>8</sup> I quote here the last sentence in the original: “Mit dieser Entschlossenheit muss jede Macht rechnen, die eigene Interessen dabei verfolgend, eine neue Ordnung im osteuropäischen Raum herbeiführen will.” What a powerful statement!

The political objectives of the OUN come through loud and clear. Yet when Stets’ko made the proclamation on behalf of the OUN, the German authorities seemed shocked and took immediate steps to neutralize a potentially—for them—complicated situation. On 3 July, Berlin sent the German Undersecretary of State Ernst Kundt to Cracow for discussions with Bandera.

Kundt asked Bandera whether the proclamation over the radio was his decision and whether he wanted to take over the leadership of the Ukrainian state. Bandera answered that in the absence of any other organized Ukrainian political entity, the OUN was acting on behalf of the nation in proclaiming the establishment of a Ukrainian state. Kundt countered that in the territories conquered by the German army the authority to decide such status belonged to Hitler alone. Bandera rejected that argument, maintaining that this right properly belonged to the Ukrainian people.<sup>9</sup>

As the German authorities pressed the OUN leadership to annul the proclamation of the *Landesregierung*—which for them within the context of the time was but another name for a Ukrainian state—Bandera and his followers took an uncompromising stance in its defense. That position is reflected in Iaroslav Stets'ko's letters to German authorities on behalf of the Ukrainian government. On 3 July 1941, for example, in a letter to Hitler, Stets'ko speaks of Ukraine as the "sovereign Ukraine state" and as a "completely equal [and] free member of the European family of nations."<sup>10</sup> Surely, this does not sound like a "territorial administration."

On the basis of available documentary evidence one can say that all the subsequent letters and memoranda of the OUN leadership to the German authorities reinforce the position on the right of the Ukrainian people to independent statehood, while praising the victories of the German army and its leadership, and expressing a willingness to participate in the fight against communist Russia.<sup>11</sup> The Germans, however, had already made their decision concerning the future of Ukraine and were in no mood to compromise since they viewed what transpired in Lviv as "a surprise coup d'état by the people of Bandera."<sup>12</sup>

Unable to pressure them into renouncing the proclamation of 30 June, the German police arrested Bandera and Stets'ko and sent them to Berlin. There they remained under house arrest until 15 September, at which time they were sent to the main jail on Alexanderplatz. Concurrently the *Sicherheitsdienst* organized a dragnet against Bandera's followers and arrested many OUN members. Some were sent to concentration camps, and others were executed.<sup>13</sup> Bandera and Stets'ko themselves were transferred in January to the Sachsenhausen concentration camp, where they stayed until fall 1944.<sup>14</sup>

So, who were Bandera and Stets'ko? Were they willing collaborators, as suggested by Berkhoff and Carynyk? Or were they pursuing a national political ideal for which they had to pay a heavy price?

I think that the OUN memorandum of 14 August sets the record straight when it states that "the OUN wishes to work together with Germany not from opportunism, but from a realization of the need of such cooperation for the

well-being of Ukraine” [“die OUN wuenscht eine Zusammenarbeit mit Deutschland nicht aus Opportunizmus [sic], sondern aus der Erkenntnis der Notwendigkeit dieser Zusammenarbeit fuer das Wohl der Ukraine”].<sup>15</sup> Discounting some of the authors’ useless verbiage, the policy pursued by the OUN leadership was aimed at state building. Within the political context of the twentieth century this policy was not some act of moral aberration on the part of the OUN, as Berkhoff and Carynnyk suggest. After all, the two most democratic countries in the world, the United States and Great Britain, became allied with the greatest tyrant the world has ever seen in order to achieve their political objectives. Indeed, it is no revelation that nations and even individuals have acted according to the aphorism that “the enemy of my enemy is my friend”—that is, until things change, as they did in the German-Ukrainian (read OUN-B) relations.

In their article Berkhoff and Carynnyk emphasize the importance of the *zhyttiepys* (biographical sketch) that Iaroslav Stets’ko allegedly wrote during his house arrest in Berlin. For the authors, this would-be autobiography seems to confirm everything they have been looking for—the limited scope of the 30 June proclamation, the pro-German orientation, and the anti-Jewish bias of the OUN-B. Having already dealt with the first two issues, I propose to examine the third: the OUN and the Jewish question.

The authors write that “Stets’ko’s *zhyttiepys* is important [because] it provides a key to the OUN-B attitude toward Jews.”<sup>16</sup> Frankly, even if the document is authentic—and there is no certainty that it is—I do not see how one can ascribe the views of an individual to an organization when the individual, in this case Iaroslav Stets’ko, repeatedly refers to what he says as his personal views. He speaks, for example, of “my world view,” “my position is,” “I think.”<sup>17</sup> Nowhere does he refer to the position of the OUN on these issues. How then can anybody in good conscience ascribe his statements to the entire organization? That applies particularly to his position toward the Jews when he says—provided that it was Stets’ko who wrote it—“I therefore support the destruction of the Jews and the expedience of bringing German methods of exterminating Jewry to Ukraine.”<sup>18</sup> From a historical point of view, what did “German methods” signify in July or August of 1941? The Germans did not yet conduct mass extermination of the Jews, nor was there yet a formal program to that effect. It was only on 20 January 1942 that, according to William Keylor, “a top secret meeting of senior Nazi officials . . . in the Berlin suburb of Wannsee, ushered in . . . the war against the Jews.”<sup>19</sup> Keylor, of course, refers to the criminal “Final Solution” plan of Reinhard Heydrich. Since Stets’ko was already in a concentration camp when Heydrich’s plan was adopted, how could he have written *before the fact* about “German methods” as referring to exter-

mination? And an even larger question is: Did Stets'ko really write the *zhyttiepys*?

As for the OUN-B, which the authors try to connect with the *zhyttiepys*, one can emphatically state that there was no anti-Semitism in its political program, despite Dieter Pohl's argument that it did have "an antisemitic ideology, especially in the spring and summer of 1941."<sup>20</sup> The authors think very highly of Pohl's research and quote him extensively. For example, they cite his report on the session of *Rada sen'ioriv* (Council of Seniors) on 18 July, where some anti-Semitic remarks were made by Oleksa Hai-Holovko and Stepan Lenkav'skyi. At that session, Kost' Levyts'kyi, they write, also spoke. I examined all the minutes of the Council of Seniors and can categorically state that this is an unmitigated fabrication. There never was a meeting of the Council of Seniors on 18 July! There was only a very short meeting on 17 July (session no. 7) and a long meeting (no. 8) on 19 July.<sup>21</sup> Furthermore, at no time was there a separate discussion dealing with the minorities. It should be noted that, contrary to the authors' assertion, neither Hai-Holovko nor Lenkav'skyi was a member of the Council of Seniors.

Berkhoff and Carynnyk make another serious mistake when they write that the Council of Seniors was established on 6 July "to advise the Stets'ko administration."<sup>22</sup> The minutes of the first meeting, however, state that "the Council of Seniors was elected as an emanation of the will of society for the purpose of directing the society toward unity and maintaining contacts with the German military and civilian authorities with the objective of reaching and realizing the national ideal."<sup>23</sup> Had the authors examined their sources more carefully, they would have discovered that indeed there is a document reporting a meeting of individuals (without mentioning their first names), which probably began on 18 July and continued, according to the minutes, on 19 July 1941.<sup>24</sup> It is most unfortunate that Berkhoff and Carynnyk include among the radical participants Kost' Levyts'kyi, the distinguished civic leader with impeccable credentials of service to Ukrainian society and ideals, only four months before his death. As a matter of record I should note that there was indeed a Levyts'kyi in the group, but who he was nobody really knows. I might add that there is no signature under the document.

The Jewish question that Berkhoff and Carynnyk present should be raised, but this should be done on reliable evidence and within the historical context. The problem of Ukrainian-Jewish relations cannot be reduced, as the authors seem to do, to anti-Semitism within the ranks of the OUN. It is a problem that is historical and political, in the course of which stereotypes about the Jewish people on the one hand and Ukrainians on the other have spawned attitudes that have found expression in concrete situations. In several of the statements of the

OUN leaders may be found such expressions as “Jewish-Muscovite dictatorship,” “Jewish-Bolshevik blood-rule,” “Jewish Bolshevism,” and “Jewish-Bolshevik rule of terror,” to mention but a few variations.<sup>25</sup> Also the Germans, managing propaganda for Operation Barbarossa in Eastern Europe, place as the first item (on a set of instructions running four pages) “the Jewish-Bolshevik Soviet government with their functionaries and the Communist Party.”<sup>26</sup> Why did the Germans think that they could exploit the slogan of “Jewish communism” in Eastern Europe?

That question brings us to events prior to World War II, in particular the Communist Revolution and the role of some Jews in it. The problem has been addressed by some outstanding scholars and thinkers such as Arnold Margolin, a distinguished jurist and Jewish civic leader, who said that “Jews were prominently represented in the ranks of the Bolsheviks.”<sup>27</sup> Arthur Adams discusses this problem in greater detail in his study *Bolsheviks in the Ukraine*: “In the peasant’s brain, Jew and city man and Communist coalesced into an image of a hook-nosed commissar who deprived peasants of land rightfully theirs, enforced grain requisitioning, confiscated movable property and weapons, and carried out the Cheka’s executions.”<sup>28</sup> Leonard Schapiro, professor of political science at the London School of Economics, who studied the role of the Jews in the revolutionary movement, concluded that Jewish participation on all levels of the Communist Party organization was very significant. Of the twenty-one members of the Central Committee, five were Jews. Even more significant, Jews participated prominently in the lower echelons of the organization. According to Schapiro, “Jews abounded at the lower levels of the party machinery—especially in the Cheka, [and if anyone] had the misfortune to fall into the hands of the Cheka he stood a very good chance of finding himself confronted with and possibly shot by a Jewish investigator.”<sup>29</sup>

This was but a prologue to the events of the 1920s and 1930s, when the Jews established their dominant position in the secret police known as the State Political Administration (*Gosudarstvennoe politicheskoe upravlenie*, or GPU) and, later on, in the People’s Commissariat for Internal Affairs (*Narodnyi komissariat vnutrennikh del*, or NKVD). Until recently, lacking access to Soviet archives, we could speculate who did what in the secret police functions in the Soviet Ukraine. However, in 1997 or perhaps earlier, Yuri Shapoval, Volodymyr Prystaiko, and Vadym Zolotar’ov gained access to the archives of the secret police and were able to establish details hitherto unavailable. According to their findings, as well as the research of their associates in Moscow, St. Petersburg, Samara, and Kharkiv, the high officials of the GPU and NKVD in the 1920s and 1930s can be grouped into the following categories.<sup>30</sup>

Jews .....	261
Russians .....	106
Ukrainians .....	48
Latvians .....	30
Poles .....	16
Belarusians .....	8
Germans .....	3
Georgians .....	2
Karaims .....	2
Moldavians .....	2
Hungarians .....	1
Armenians .....	1
Italians .....	1
Czechs .....	1
Members unidentified by nationality .....	69

Jews in high positions of the secret service in Ukraine exceeded in number all the other nationality groups put together. Georgii Sannikov, a former KGB functionary in Ukraine, commenting on the Jewish participation in the Soviet secret services, stated: "I knew, not only from stories told by old members of the Cheka, but also from documents that many Jews worked in the security organs and even earlier in the Cheka."<sup>31</sup>

On the basis of these statistics one can conclude that the preponderance of Jews in high positions created a stereotype. Since in the Soviet system the secret police was an ever-present institution, its functionaries were well remembered by the people who were their victims. I would suggest that it was this perception and not anti-Semitism, which is an entirely different phenomenon, that may explain the sentiments of the OUN-B leadership identifying Jews, together with Poles and Muscovites, as a hostile minority in Ukraine.

The OUN stated clearly its position toward the Jews, based on its perception of the role of the Jews in the USSR, in the resolutions of the Second Congress of the OUN. Resolution 17 reads:

In the Soviet Union the Jews are the most reliable supporters of the ruling Bolshevik regime and a vanguard of Muscovite imperialism in Ukraine. . . . The Muscovite-Bolshevik government exploits the anti-Jewish sentiments of the Ukrainian masses in order to divert their attention from the real perpetrators of their misfortunes and to incite them, in times of upheaval, to carry out pogroms against the Jews. The Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists opposes the Jews as a prop of the Muscovite-Bolshevik regime, explaining at the same time to the masses that the main enemy is Moscow.<sup>32</sup>

The position of the OUN is clear: it was fighting those who supported the enemy. That the OUN did not hold an anti-Jewish position based on nationality or religion is attested by numerous examples of cooperation throughout the war. According to a German report of March 1942, for example, in Zhytomyr, Kremenchuk, and Stalino (Donetsk) several followers of Bandera were arrested for trying to win over the population to the idea of political independence for Ukraine. At the same time it was established that the Bandera group supplied its members and the Jews working for its movement with false passports.<sup>33</sup>

Toward the end of 1942, significant changes were reflected in the large number of Jewish professionals, particularly medical doctors, joining the ranks of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (Ukrain'ska povstans'ka armiiia, or UPA).<sup>34</sup> Their numbers increased, and according to Philip Friedman special camps were created. One such camp near Poryts, Volhynia, contained 100 Jews; another in Kudrynky, some 400 people.<sup>35</sup> There is also a story about the UPA's attacking the German guards of the ghetto in Rivne, liberating several hundred Jews and finding places for them to stay in various nearby villages.<sup>36</sup> I note these items simply to make the point that had the OUN-UPA pursued an anti-Semitic ideology, as Berkhoff and Carynyk suggest, perhaps thousands of Jews would not have survived.

The last issue I wish to address is the authenticity of Stets'ko's biographical sketch or *zhyttiepys*, about which there are serious doubts. The authors of the article do not ask questions that researchers should ask about their source materials. For example, I would like to know why the document is in Ukraine and not in Germany? Why was it only in 1970 that Cherednychenko, a party functionary who served a special purpose within the Soviet propaganda machine, discovered the *zhyttiepys*? Since Michael Hanusiak is the "author" of two books—*Lest We Forget* and *Ukrainischer Nationalismus*—why does not his name, as that of Berkhoff, appear on the user's page in the archive? I understand that when Aharon Weiss called Hanusiak's work "utterly tendentious," John-Paul Himka came to Hanusiak's defense.<sup>37</sup> Before championing Hanusiak's intellectual integrity, Himka should have carefully examined the contents of the two books that appeared under Hanusiak's name. The duplicity of Hanusiak, discounting the fabricated contents of the book *Ukrainischer Nationalismus*, can be easily recognized just by examining two photographs.<sup>38</sup> On page 35 we see Metropolitan Sheptytskyi who on 21 August 1930 was awarded a distinguished Ukrainian Scouting award. Hanusiak, however, identifies this award (in August 1930!) as *eine faschistische Medaille*. On the next page he includes a shockingly inaccurate caption beneath a photograph showing Metropolitan Sheptytskyi standing with two senior Scout leaders: "A picture of Metropolitan A. Sheptytskyi during a military exercise in 1939 in

Poland. The swastika on the reverse of his jacket is proof of the sympathies of this 'Prince of the Church' for the Nazi regime."

In archives in Lviv I examined the originals of these reprints and discovered that they were taken on 21 August 1930 in the Sokil Scout Camp, which is located in the Carpathian Mountains. The fact that the Metropolitan is standing, not sitting, in the photograph indicates that Hanusiak was wrong to date the event in 1939. By 1939 the Metropolitan could have been seen only in an armchair since he was physically incapacitated in the early 1930s. Sheptytskyi could not have been standing during "a military exercise in 1939," and Hanusiak's caption misidentifies the subject matter.

There is another element of deceit in the picture on page 36, which shows only the Metropolitan, Severyn Levytskyi, and an unknown individual. Hanusiak's collaborators cut off the lower part of the picture that portrays a Scout master with distinct Scout insignia.<sup>39</sup> It is also a lie that Sheptytskyi was wearing a swastika. What we see is Metropolitan Sheptytskyi in the Sokil Scout Camp wearing a Cross of Merit, which he was awarded while at the camp for being a "benefactor of Scouting."<sup>40</sup> Reflecting upon Hanusiak as a source of unreliable information, I might add that Berkhoff and Carynnyk would have done well not to mix respectable scholars with such authors as Edward Prus, Klym Dmytruk, and Vitalii Cherednychenko without putting them into a proper perspective.

Regarding the content of the *zhyttiepys*, I conclude that the document is filled with factual, terminological, linguistic, and chronological mistakes that Stetsko would not have made, had he been its author. Its content, one can argue, shows that the document was written by somebody who lived under the Soviet system. The language reflects his use of *h* where an individual from western Ukraine, particularly in 1941, would have used the letter *g*. I made a list of words that show such substitutions: *Erklerunh* instead of *Erklerung*, *Henui* instead of *Genui* (Genoa), *propahanda* instead of *propaganda*, *HPU* instead of *GPU*, *Raisrehirunh* instead of *Raisregirung*, *hen. Petriv* instead of *gen. Petriv*, and so forth. Also on the first page of the *zhyttiepys* I found a transparent Russian variation of the Ukrainian *pidpillia*, which is later written as *pidpolnoi*, *pidpolnoho*, and *pidpolnykh*. As for the problems with *g*'s I thought at first that the typewriter did not have the letter *g* in Ukrainian. But on page 162 of the Ukrainian text I found the letter *g*. Hence the typewriter was not the problem. It was the Soviet orthography of the Ukrainian language that was used by the author in the preparation of the *zhyttiepys*. Based on the above, it is very doubtful that Stetsko was the author of this document.

In the *zhyttiepys* I also note the strange collection of titles for an individual who worked within the organizational structure of the OUN. For example,

already in 1932 Stets'ko is presented as a political *leiter* and *shef* [chief] *resortu*. Later in the text he becomes a *politleiter* within the OUN. After the Second Congress of the OUN Stets'ko became a *shef shtabu* of the OUN. Some of the former leading members of the Ukrainian Resistance Movement told me that members of the OUN would not use such terminology.

The ultimate fraud was perpetrated by the author or authors of the *zhyttiepys* when he or they quote Stets'ko as saying: "I edited the OUN ideological journal *Ideia i chyn*."<sup>41</sup> It is interesting to note that, according to the *zhyttiepys*, he allegedly edited this journal while staying in Italy from the summer of 1939 until August 1940.<sup>42</sup> In fact, nothing could be farther from the truth. According to Myroslav Prokop, who collaborated with Dmytro Maiv'skyi in preparing the first edition of *Ideia i chyn*, which was published on 1 November 1942, the editorial work was done in 1942. Iaroslav Stets'ko had nothing to do with it. Besides, on 15 September 1942 he was already in jail.<sup>43</sup> After the first issue, Prokop became the editor-in-chief of *Ideia i chyn*, a position he held the longest among the editors of the journal.

I also note that the contents of the journal reflect the political reality of 1942. Whereas prior to 15 September the correspondence of the OUN leaders—particularly that of Stets'ko and Bandera—conveys their desire to reach an understanding with Berlin while not compromising on their principles, that stand quickly changes after the numerous arrests of OUN members. The content of *Ideia i chyn*, in which Germany is characterized as an "occupier" and "imperialist," tells us that the time of discussions had ended. Commemorating the Gestapo's killing of Dmytro Myron, a leading member of the OUN, Mykola Lebed', the acting leader of the OUN, wrote: "Let the German occupier rejoice [with his] success of murder. Mesmerized with victory on all fronts, [he] does not see that his mindless policy of enslavement, violence and murder leads to his own catastrophe."<sup>44</sup>

From this internal evidence it should be clear that Stets'ko did not edit the journal *Ideia i chyn*, nor did he write the *zhyttiepys*, which, I believe, was written in the offices of KGB functionaries.

I wish to conclude this commentary by stating that very often an entire society becomes the victim of an image created by a few. Throughout history there are always individuals who promote stereotypes, selecting limited and unsubstantiated information, and transmitting those misconceptions across generations. Zvi Gitelman explains that "myth forms the basis for stereotypical images that nationalities develop about themselves and about others. It is not historical fact that shapes people's attitudes toward each other, but the interpretation of fact."<sup>45</sup> Unfortunately individuals or groups engaged in the dissemination of such stereotypes and myths never consider the damage that they are

doing to society as a whole. Perhaps it is not superfluous from time to time to ask oneself the question: What is the purpose of history?

## NOTES

1. Karel C. Berkhoff and Marco Carynnyk, "The Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and Its Attitude toward Germans and Jews: Iaroslav Stets'ko's 1941 *Zhyttiepis*," *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 23, no. 3/4 (1999): 149–84, here p. 149.
2. In the "Memorandum ueber die Ziele der ukrainischen nationalistischen Bewegung von der Fuehrung der ukrainischen Nationalisten" (14 April 1941), we read in the very first sentence that "the goal of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) is the reestablishment of an independent, sovereign Ukrainian State . . .," Bundesarchiv, NS 43/41.
3. For details see "Beschlusse des ii. Kongresses der Organisation Ukrainischer Nationalisten—OUN," T 120, roll no. 2533: E 292940, E 292943, E 292944.
4. *Ibid.*, T 120, roll no. 2533: E 292922–35.
5. Since this statement casts aside all speculations as to the real objective of the OUN, let me quote the original: "Wenn auch die deutschen Truppen bei ihrem Einmarsch in die Ukraine selbstverstaendlich dort zuerst als Befreier begruesst werden, so wird sich diese Einstellung bald aendern koennen, falls Deutschland in die Ukraine nicht mit dem Ziel der Wiederherstellung des ukrainischen Staates and den entsprechenden Parolen kommt." See *ibid.*, T 120, roll no. 2533: E 292927.
6. Berkhoff and Carynnyk, "The Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists," p. 151.
7. For the original text see "Beschlusse des ii. Kongresses der Organisation Ukrainischer Nationalisten—OUN," T 120, roll no. 2533: E 292934.
8. *Ibid.*, E 292935; see also "Denkschrift der Organisation Ukrainischer Nationalisten zur Loesung der ukrainischen Frage," Bundesarchiv, R 43 II/1500, pp. 63–77.
9. "Niederschrift ueber die Ruecksprache mit Mitgliedern des ukrainischen Nationalkomitees und Stepan Bandera vom 3.7.1941," Hoover Institution on War and Revolution, NSDAP, no. 52.
10. "Seiner Exzellenz dem Fuehrer und Reichskanzler," T 120, roll no. 2533: E 292957.
11. For details see "Denkschrift der Organisation Ukrainischer Nationalisten—OUN betreffend die Foerderung, die am 30 Juni 1941 in Lemberg gebildete Ukrainische Staatsregierung aufzuloesen," 14 August 1941; "Deklaration der ukrainischen Staatsregierung," 3 July 1941; "Erklaerung," 15 July 1941; "Zur Lage in Lwiw," 21 July 1941, T 120 roll, no. 2532: E 292421–26.
12. See the Baum report "Ausrufung der 'Ukrainischen Staatsgewalt' durch Bandera Anhaenger in Lemberg am 30.6.41," 21 July 1941, T 120, roll no. 2533: E 292423. The German security police understood quite well the Ukrainian political objectives. This is reflected in the report of 3 July 1941, which stated: "Through the proclamation of a Ukrainian republic [and] through the organization of militia the Ukrainian nationalists under the leadership of Bandera try to

- present the German authorities with accomplished facts." See Bundesarchiv, R58/214, Ereignismeldung UdSSR, no. 11, p. 58.
13. For a partial record of OUN-B members arrested during the period 1941–1943, see Bundesarchiv, R 58/223, Meldungen aus den besetzten Ostgebieten, no. 41; see also the National Archives, T 175/279 and T 175/146.
  14. For some of the details concerning the arrests, see Roman Ilnytskyj, *Deutschland und die Ukraine 1934–1945: Tatsachen europäischer Ostpolitik, ein Vorbericht* (Munich, 1955–1956), 2:186–8. See also Bundesarchiv, R58/214, Ereignismeldung UdSSR, no. 11, pp. 3–4.
  15. See "Beschlüsse des ii. Kongresses der Organisation Ukrainischer Nationalisten—OUN," T 120, roll no. 2533: E 292433. For an interesting perception of the Ukrainian question by the Germans, see Hans von Herwarth, "Deutschland und die ukrainische Frage 1941–1945," Institut fuer Zeitgeschichte (Munich), 51, MO 87.
  16. Berkhoff and Carynnyk, "The Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists," p. 152.
  17. *Ibid.*, pp. 161, 162.
  18. *Ibid.*, p. 152.
  19. William R. Keylor, *The Twentieth-Century World*, 4th ed. (New York, 2001), p. 196.
  20. Berkhoff and Carynnyk, "The Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists," p. 152.
  21. For details, see "Protokoly narad Rady sen'ioriv i Ukraïns'koï Natsional'noï Rady vid lypnia 1941 do liutoho 1942," p. 15. Personal archive.
  22. Berkhoff and Carynnyk, "The Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists," p. 154.
  23. "Protokoly Rady sen'ioriv," p. 1.
  24. Tsentral'nyi derzhavnyi arkhiv vyshchychk orhaniv vlady i upravlinnia Ukraïny, 3833, op. 1, spr. 9.
  25. See telegram to Hitler of 10 July 1941, Bundesarchiv, Ereignismeldung UdSSR, no. 23, p. 174; OUN memorandum of 14 August 1941, "Beschlüsse des ii. Kongresses der Organisation Ukrainischer Nationalisten—OUN," T 120, roll no. 2533: E 292431.
  26. ENTWURF, Handhabungen der Propaganda im Fall "Barbarossa," T 312, roll no. 674, 83084444.
  27. Arnold D. Margolin, *The Jews in Eastern Europe* (New York, 1926), p. 130.
  28. Arthur E. Adams, *Bolsheviks in the Ukraine: The Second Campaign, 1918–1919* (New Haven, 1963), p. 142.
  29. Leonard Schapiro, "The Role of the Jews in the Russian Revolutionary Movement," *Slavonic and East European Review* 40 (December 1961):164–5.
  30. For extensive biographical data for each official, see Yuri Shapoval, Volodymyr Prystaiko, Vadym Zolotar'ov, *ChK—HPU—NKVD v Ukraïni: Osoby, Fakty, Dokumenty* (Kyiv, 1997), pp. 431–579; see also Yuri Shapoval, Vadym

- Zolotar'ov, *Vsevolod Balyts'kyi: osoba, chas, otochennia* (Kyiv, 2002), pp. 362–445.
31. Georgii Sannikov, *Bol'shaia okhota: razgrom vooruzhennogo podpol'ia v Zapadnoi Ukraine* (Moscow, 2002), pp. 371–2.
  32. Bundesarchiv (Berlin), Reichskanzlei, Akten betreffend Ukraine, A. A. Ukraine, 1500, E 292947–8.
  33. Taetigkeit und Lagebericht nr. 11 der Einsatzgruppen der Sicherheitspolizei und des SD in der UdSSR (Berichtzeit vom 1.3.–31.3.1942), 20, Bundesarchiv, Koblenz, R70/31.
  34. Mykola Lebed', head of the OUN-B in 1941–1943, stated: “The majority of doctors in the UPA were Jews whom the UPA rescued from the destructive Hitlerite actions. The Jewish doctors were treated as equal citizens of Ukraine and as officers of the Ukrainian Army.” See Mykola Lebed', *UPA, Ukraïns'ka povstans'ka armia: ĭi heneza, rist i diï u vyzol'nii borot'bi ukraïns'koho narodu za Ukraïns'ku Samostiinu Sobornu Derzhavu*, 2d ed. (s.l., 1987), p. 69.
  35. Philip Friedman, “Ukrainian-Jewish Relations during the Nazi Occupation,” *YIVO Annual of Jewish Social Science* 12 (1958–1959): 286.
  36. D. Kulyniak, “Ievrei v UPA: Problema, kotra shche chekaie svoho doslidnyka,” *Shliakh peremohy*, 3 December 1997, no. 29 (2275), p. 6.
  37. Berkhoff and Carynnyk, “The Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists,” p. 156.
  38. Michael Hanusiak, *Ukrainischer Nationalismus: Theorie und Praxis* (Vienna, 1979).
  39. Tsentral'nyi derzhavnyi istorychnyi arkhiv Ukraïny m. Lviv, Fund no. 746 (collections of photographs), opys 1, sprava 28. At this point I wish to thank Diana Pelz, director of the archive, and Oksana Haiova, a section director, who were most helpful during my research in Lviv.
  40. Ibid.
  41. Berkhoff and Carynnyk, “The Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists,” p. 160. For the English text, see p. 168.
  42. Ibid., p. 168.
  43. For the history of the journal and the contents of the various issues, see *Litopys Ukraïns'koï povstans'koï armii* (Toronto, 1995), vol. 24.
  44. Ibid., p. 41.
  45. Zvi Gitelman, “Contemporary Soviet Jewish Perceptions of Ukrainians: Some Empirical Observations,” in Peter J. Potichnyj and Howard Aster, eds., *Ukrainian–Jewish Relations in Historical Perspective* (Edmonton, 1988), p. 440.