

Ottoman Protection of Cossack Ukraine under Hetman Petro Doroshenko: Between Legal Aspects and Actual Practice

Tetiana Grygorieva

The Ottoman Empire's neighboring countries – such as Moldavia, Wallachia, Transylvania, Ragusa, and the Crimean Khanate – are commonly referred to as its tributaries.¹ But as a matter of fact, the nature of the relationships between Constantinople and each of these individual states varied across countries and chronological periods and did not follow a single pattern.² A number of tributaries did not even meet the legal set of demands elaborated by Hanafi jurists for accepting exclusive Ottoman sovereign authority. This set of demands included mentioning the sultan's name in the *hutbe* (Friday prayer), offering one-fifth of the plunder taken in holy wars, executing fixed penalties, and in the case of non-Muslims, paying tribute.³ At the same time, some parts of the Ottoman Empire usually regarded as integrated into its core territory (e.g., the Kurdish principalities) in fact enjoyed the same level of autonomy as acknowledged “tributaries” such as Moldavia.⁴ In other words, the de facto status of the Ottoman tributaries often did not fit the patterns established by Ottoman legal sources, while the actual practice of their relationship with the Ottoman Empire was far more nuanced and sophisticated than the stipulations expressed in the chancery language of imperial documents. Cossack Ukraine under the hetman Petro Doroshenko (1665–1676), who accepted Ottoman protection,

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- 1 I am elaborating here upon some ideas expressed in the accompanying commentary to the publication of hetman Petro Doroshenko's correspondence with Sultan Mehmed IV and a number of Ottoman dignitaries from the collection of Rossijskij Gosudarstvennyj Arkhiv Drevnikh Aktov [Russian State Archives for the Old Documents] (henceforth RGADA), fund 124, op. 1, 1670, nr. 25; Tetiana Grygorieva, “Turets'ke pidanstvo het'mana Petra Doroshenka: umovy i tseremonial yoho vyznannia” [The ‘Turkish allegiance’ of Hetman Petro Doroshenko: Conditions and ceremonies], *Zapysky Naukovogo Tovarystva im. Shevchenka* 270 (2017): 449–475.
 - 2 See e.g. Gábor Kármán and Lovro Kunčević, eds., *The European Tributary States of the Ottoman Empire in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries* (Leiden and Boston, 2013).
 - 3 Natalia Królikowska, “Sovereignty and Subordination in Crimean-Ottoman Relations (Sixteenth-Eighteenth Centuries),” in *The European Tributary States*, 47.
 - 4 Dariusz Kołodziejczyk, “What is Inside and What is Outside? Tributary States in Ottoman Politics,” in *The European Tributary States*, 428–429.


illustrates the at times unusual nature of tributaries' relationships to the center. For example, contrary to what we would expect from a territory formally considered a tributary, the obligations of Doroshenko lacked the important component of the payment of tribute. What is more, Doroshenko never participated in imperial military campaigns outside Ukraine.

When exploring the nature of Doroshenko's tributary status, scholars have tended to adopt one of various perspectives that essentially presuppose employing different kinds of sources. The first approach is to explore the proceedings of Doroshenko's negotiations concerning the acceptance of Ottoman protection, including reconstructing the frequency and the order of embassies, identifying personalities of envoys and analyzing diplomatic correspondence and narratives presented by them. In the case of this approach, scholars employ the sources originating from the hetman's chancery or authored within his circles, usually those that were preserved as copies that in many instances were modified via translations into Polish or Russian. Sources of this kind often show Doroshenko's self-presentation strategies or the conditions he was willing to negotiate in exchange for accepting Ottoman protection. The second way to assess Doroshenko's new status goes through analyzing Ottoman formal instruments for cementing bonds with its tributaries. Specifically, the *berat* issued in confirmation of the Ottoman protection of Cossack Ukraine and transferred to the hetman along with the insignia of power can be revealing concerning both Doroshenko's new obligations and the position of Cossack Ukraine within the Ottoman imperial hierarchy. Giving full credit to the aforementioned scholarly strategies, this article will suggest adding yet another approach: examining Doroshenko's performance as an Ottoman subordinate on the basis of the ongoing correspondence he carried out with Ottoman officials.

We will begin with an overview of the context in which Sultan Mehmed IV decided to grant Cossack Ukraine Ottoman protection and Hetman Doroshenko accepted that protection. Then we will proceed to the negotiations over the conditions of the planned relationship and point out the different understandings each side had of the proceedings that led to finalizing the agreement. Finally, we will identify the issues that arose in the correspondence between the two sides as elements of primary importance in confirming Doroshenko's place within the "well-protected domains."

The Road to Protection

Petro Doroshenko was not the first Cossack hetman to consider seeking Ottoman protection for Ukraine. The Ottoman Empire had been an important



MAP 10.1 Ukraine in the 1660s and 1670s

element in the political calculus of Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky (1648–1657), who depended on the military assistance of an Ottoman tributary, the Crimean khan Islam III Giray (1644–1654), to be able to carry out his revolt against the Polish king. Khmelnytsky had also actively sought the alliance of two other Ottoman tributaries – namely, the Moldavian *hospodar* Vasile Lupu (1634–1653), and the Transylvanian prince György Rákóczi II (1648–1660). Thus when Khmelnytsky considered establishing a semi-independent Cossack state, the examples of Moldavia and Wallachia – both of which found themselves under the protection of the Ottoman Empire but still remained politically autonomous and Orthodox – served as ready models of relative independence within the Ottoman system. An unresolved scholarly discussion centers on when exactly Khmelnytsky's direct contacts with Istanbul resulted in the issuance of an imperial document confirming Khmelnytsky's short-term allegiance to the Ottoman Empire,⁵ but all in all, Khmelnytsky's policies and plans created a precedent for the future, demonstrating that such an option was possible.

Petro Doroshenko established his first contact with the Porte shortly after assuming his position as hetman. The fact that Doroshenko was quick to send his envoys to Istanbul is confirmed by a letter of Grand Vizier Köprülüzade Fazıl Ahmed Pasha addressing Doroshenko as the “sultan's subject” – using what was in this case most probably a rhetorical figure.⁶ The first milestone determining Cossack Ukraine's further rapprochement with the Ottoman Empire is seen as the Truce of Andrusovo, signed in January 1667 between the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and the Tsardom of Muscovy.⁷

In the ruling circles of the Ottoman Empire, the reconciliation between the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and Muscovy was interpreted as a direct

5 Viktor Ostapchuk, “Cossack Ukraine In and Out of Ottoman Orbit, 1648–1681,” in *The European Tributary States*, 130–135.

6 Dmytro Dorošenko and Jan Rypka, “Hejtman P. Dorošenko a jeho turecká politika” [Hetman Petro Doroshenko and his Turkish politics], *Časopis Národního Musea* 1–2 (1933): 9–10; Mykola Krykun, “Korsun's'ka kozats'ka rada 1669 roku” [The Cossack Council of Korsun in the year 1669], in *Zapysky NTSh*, t. CCXXXVIII, *Pratsi Istoryko-Filosofskoji Sekciji* (Lviv, 1999), 118.

7 The war between Muscovy and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth started in 1654 as a consequence of Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich's acceptance of the Ukrainian hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky (formerly the subject of the Polish king) under his protection. On his part, Khmelnytsky claimed his authority not just over the voivodeship of Kyiv (according to the stipulations of the agreement of Bila Tserkva in 1651), but over “all Ukraine,” that in his interpretation covered the entire territory of the medieval Old Rus'. The war was terminated in 1656 with the Truce of Wilno after the invasion of Poland by the Swedish army, conventionally called ‘the deluge’ (*Potop*) in Polish historiography. Military activities resumed in 1660.

threat.⁸ Already in January 1667 an envoy of the *hospodar* of Moldavia, Iliáš III Alexandru, an Ottoman vassal, charged the Commonwealth on numerous occasions with intending “to break the peace.”⁹ At the same time, the Ottoman chronicle of Rašid quotes the sultan’s letter to the king, urging him to break up with Moscow.¹⁰ However, the Ottomans seemed to have no real cause for anxiety. The Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth lacked the military and economic resources to develop any aggressive plans against the Ottoman Empire: only in July 1666 did King John Casimir manage to reconcile with the *rokoshany*, the noble insurrection under the leadership of Crown Field Hetman Jerzy Lubomirski. This standoff, which lasted nearly two years, split the country into two warring camps and significantly reduced its military as well as defensive capacities. Thus, immediately after concluding the Truce of Andrusovo, John Casimir dispatched a courier to the sultan announcing the arrival of a grand ambassador, Hieronim Radziejowski, who reached Adrianople in June 1667 with the aim of “renewing olden pacts.”¹¹

At the same time, Doroshenko had every reason to disapprove of the truce and regard it as a pretext for breaking up with the Polish king, his patron, from whom he had received his hetman insignia. The delegation dispatched by Doroshenko to Andrusovo was not granted access to the negotiations. According to the stipulations of the truce, the territory of Ukraine was divided into two parts, placing the Right Bank Ukraine under the supervision of the

8 The making and the outcome of the Treaty of Andrusovo are analyzed in detail in Zbigniew Wójcik, *Traktat Andruszowski 1667 i jego geneza* [The Treaty of Andrusovo in 1667 and its genesis] (Warsaw, 1959); idem, *Między traktatem Andruszowskim a wojną Turecką: stosunki Polsko-Rosyjskie 1667–1672* [Between the treaty of Andrusovo and Turkish War: Polish-Russian relationship 1667–1672] (Warsaw, 1959).

9 Leopold Hubert, “Zatargi z Turcją w 1667 roku i poselstwo Hieronima Radziejowskiego” [Bargaining with Turkey in 1667 and the embassy of Hieronim Radziejowski], in *Pamiętniki Historyczne*, ed. Leopold Hubert, vol. 2 (Warsaw, 1861), 92–95.

10 Viktor Ostapchuk, “Cossack Ukraine In and Out of Ottoman Orbit, 1648–1681,” in *The European Tributary States*, 140.

11 Although both King John II Casimir and Sultan Mehmed IV had ascended to their thrones back in 1648, they seemed not to have renewed the peace treaty (which should have taken place on such an occasion) before 1667. Little evidence suggests that such a treaty would have been obtained by the only grand ambassador from the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth to Istanbul dispatched between 1648 and 1667, namely by Mikołaj Bieganowski in 1654. See Tetiana Grygorieva, “Velyke posol’stvo Mykolaja Bieganowskiego v Stambuli: chy isnuvav dohovir mizh Richchu Pospolytou ta Osmanskoju Imperieju v 1654 roci – ‘za’ i ‘proty’” [The Grand Embassy of Mikołaj Bieganowski in Istanbul: Whether a peace treaty between the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and the Ottoman Empire existed in 1654 – “Pro” and “contra”], *Zapysky Naukovogo Tovarystva im. Shevchenka* 256 (2008): 101–113. The course of Radziejowski’s embassy is analyzed in Hubert, “Zatargi z Turcją.”

Commonwealth and the Left Bank Ukraine under the control of Moscow, thus putting an end to Doroshenko's hopes of becoming established as the hetman of "all Ukraine." Consequently, it is widely accepted that Doroshenko made his final decision concerning Ottoman protection after the Truce of Andrusovo had been concluded.¹² The news about the successful proceedings of the negotiations in Andrusovo reached the hetman in July 1666, possibly prompting him to further his contacts with Istanbul with a view to finding a new protector in the person of the sultan. According to letters by different authors, after having learned of the Polish-Russian agreement, Doroshenko vowed to "keep friendship with the [Crimean] khan and be the subject of the Turkish Caesar."¹³

Few sources are available on the communications between Doroshenko and his embassy in Istanbul in July 1667, but there is general agreement that the hetman's outreach to the sultan was well received. The envoys allegedly declared the hetman's willingness to become the sultan's subject and received the following answer from Mehmed IV: "Be faithful, and you will be protected."¹⁴ One of the indirect sources supporting this conclusion is the report of Franciszek Wysocki, the secretary of the abovementioned Polish grand embassy, headed by Hieronim Radziejowski, which stayed in the Ottoman capital at the same time. Specifically, Wysocki enviously remarked that the Cossack embassy was lodged closer to the imperial palace than the Polish one, that it enjoyed its first audience with the *kaymakam* only a day after its arrival, and that Cossack envoys were granted exquisite kaftans "in an uncommon manner," validating their status as the sultan's subjects. Wysocki also pointed out that all of this was the result "of our reconciliation with Moscow."¹⁵

However, despite the success of Doroshenko's embassies in Istanbul, there were some challenges to the hetman's plan of assuming Ottoman protection. One of these was an ongoing rivalry for hetman power as Doroshenko opposed the hetman of Left Bank Ukraine, Ivan Briukhovetsky, until his deposition and

12 Dmytro Doroshenko, *Hetman Petro Doroshenko: ohliad joho zhyttia i politychnoi dijalnosti* [Hetman Petro Doroshenko: A survey of his life and political activity] (New York, 1985), 145, 156–157; Zbigniew Wójcik, *Między traktatem Andruszowskim a wojną Turecką*, 12–15; Taras Chuhlib, "Vidpovid' Ukrainskoho hetmanatu na Rosyjs'ko-Pol's'ki domovlenosti v Andrusovo 1667 r." [The answer of the Ukrainian Hetmanate to the Russian-Polish agreements in Andrusovo 1667], in *Ukraina v Tsentralno-Skhidnij Evropi (vid Najdavnishykh Chasiv do kintsia XVIII st.)*, ed. Valerij Smolij, vol. 3 (Kyiv, 2003), 193–206.

13 Krykun, "Korsuns'ka kozats'ka rada," 119.

14 Ibid.

15 Archiwum Główne Akt Dawnych [Main Archives for Old Documents] (Warsaw, henceforth AGAD), Archiwum Koronne Warszawskie [Warsaw Crown Archives] (henceforth AKW), dział Turecki [Turkish department] (henceforth dz. Tur.), t. 455, nr. 765, 35.

murder in June 1668.¹⁶ Since September 1668, Doroshenko had also had confrontations with Petro Sukhoviiv, the chieftain (*otaman*) of the Zaporozhian Host, who also claimed hetman authority and was backed up by the Crimean khan, Adil Giray (1666–1671), who simultaneously withdrew his support from Doroshenko.

Doroshenko's military rivalry with Briukhovetsky and later with Sukhoviiv for the hetman power was followed by a diplomatic rivalry in Istanbul, as all three contenders demonstrated an interest in gaining Ottoman protection. As a matter of fact, in January 1668, Doroshenko and Briukhovetsky, when being subdued by Poland and Muscovy, respectively, both sent their embassies to Istanbul virtually simultaneously, requesting the protection of the sultan. Although Briukhovetsky's embassy, consisting of high-ranking envoys, colonel Hryhorij Hamalija and chancery officer Lavrentij Kashperovich, looked more representative than the one dispatched by Doroshenko, an anonymous informant for Jan Sobieski (the future Polish king) in Adrianople claimed that Doroshenko's embassy was received more favorably.¹⁷ However, both embassies managed to gain positive replies from the sultan, who confirmed his willingness to grant protection to both Doroshenko and Briukhovetsky on virtually the same conditions – namely, expecting that each of the hetmans should be “a friend to the friends and an enemy to the enemies of the sultan” and should control Cossack sea raids.¹⁸ Petro Sukhoviiv reportedly also dispatched his embassy to Istanbul seeking the sultan's protection in September 1668.¹⁹ According to informers from the circle of Lazar Baranovych, archbishop of Chernihiv, Sukhoviiv's envoys were admitted to an imperial audience and Sukhoviiv himself was promised military assistance for the following spring.²⁰ The

16 The letter by Doroshenko informing the grand vizier about his victory over Briukhovetsky is published in Illia Zajcev, “La Politique Turque de Petro Dorošenko: Documents du Fonds de Wojciech Bobowski à la BNF,” *Cahiers du Monde Russe* 50 (2009): 527–529. In the Russian version of this article, Zajtsev dates this letter to June 1669, but it seems improbable that Doroshenko would have informed the grand vizier about his success one year after the event took place and four months after the Cossack Council of Korsun had been visited by the sultan's envoys. Cf. Il'ja Zajtsev, “Novyje osmanskie dokumenty po istorii Moskovsko-Osmansko-Ukrainskikh otnoshenij v konce 60-h – nachale 70-h gg. XVII veka” [New Ottoman documents concerning the history of Muscovite-Ottoman-Ukrainian relationship in the late 1660s–early 1670s], in *Soslovija, instituty i gosudarstvennaja vlast' v Rossii. Srednie veka i novoe vremja: Sbornik Statej Pamiati Akademika L.V. Cherpina*, ed. Valentin Yanin and Vladislav Nazarov (Moscow, 2010), 173–175.

17 Krykun, “Korsuns'ka kozats'ka rada,” 121.

18 Grygorieva, “Turets'ke piddanstvo het'mana Petra Doroshenka,” 455.

19 Smolij and Stepankov, *Het'man Petro Doroshenko*, 181.

20 *Akty, otnosjashchiesja k istorii Juzhnoj Zapadnoj Rossii* [Acts concerning the history of Southern and Western Russia] [henceforth AJuZR], vol. 7 (St. Petersburg, 1872), 154.

favorable reception of this parade of embassies from various Cossack leaders who were claiming authority over different parts of Ukraine can also indicate that the Porte was sending a strong message concerning its disapproval of the newly established alliance between the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and Muscovy. At the same time, after having deposed Briukhovetsky in June 1668 and having defeated Sukhoviiv near Vilkhovets in January 1669,²¹ Doroshenko remained the only prospective partner of the Ottoman Empire in Ukraine.

Conditions of Protection: Expectations Versus Reality

It is a challenging task to reconstruct Doroshenko's negotiations with Sultan Mehmed IV about the conditions of the planned protection negotiated through a series of embassies exchanged between Chyhyryn and Istanbul. One problem relates to the need to rely upon the intelligence of the Posol'sky Prikaz, the Muscovite office of foreign affairs, and the translations of documentary copies collected there. According to these intelligence, the earliest project of the planned agreement allegedly authored by Doroshenko dates back to July 1668. It is reported that this project was dispatched to Istanbul via an Ottoman *çavuş*, Yusuf, who attended the hetman's seat of Chyhyryn to deliver sultanic letters of unknown content to Doroshenko. The project is available in two translations – one in Russian (which, in turn, is a double translation from Latin and Greek), and one in Italian.²²

As Doroshenko did not possess the sole power to make such an important decision as choosing a new protector, it was important that earlier in January 1668 a Cossack council in Chyhyryn – also attended by Josef Neliubovych-Tukalsky, the Metropolitan of Kyiv – for the first time formally approved of the plan of accepting Ottoman protection and allegedly decided to dispatch an extraordinary embassy to discuss its formal conditions.²³ The project thus reflected a collaboration in some form between the Cossack and the Kyivan Orthodox elites and addressed issues that were of concern to each party. Several key topics are discussed in it: the territorial claims of the hetman, the obligations of the Cossacks in exchange for protection, the powers of the hetman after accepting protection, the conditions of the presence of Ottoman subordinates'

21 On the later rivalry between Doroshenko and Sukhoviiv in 1669, see Smolij and Stepankov, *Het'man Petro Doroshenko, 200–202, 207–211.*

22 Krykun, "Korsuns'ka kozats'ka rada," 122.

23 *Ibid.*, 119–120.

troops on the territory of Ukraine, religious matters, and the order of diplomatic communication.

If the documentary copies sent to the Posol'sky Prikaz were accurate, Doroshenko outlined very broad territories to be prospectively united under his rule. Specifically, he mentioned the territories between Peremyshl' and Sambir to Kyiv and twenty miles beyond. Further on, he expanded this plan, mentioning the lands "from the river Vistula," "from Memno,"²⁴ and "from Sevsk and Putivl.'" Moreover, at the very end of the document, it was added that if the Cossacks should conquer any town with the help of the Ottoman army, it would be subject to the hetman's rule and the Ottomans should not place their garrisons or build fortresses there.²⁵ By means of the latter condition, Doroshenko attempted to ensure his autonomous status so that the territories under his rule would not become an integral part of the "well-protected domains."

In fact, the territories claimed by Doroshenko in this document several times exceeded those under his actual rule. He also went far beyond the widest borders ever negotiated by any Cossack hetman up to the year 1668, superseding those proposed by Bohdan Khmelnytsky in the Treaty of Zborov (1648) with the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. So, defining the prospective borders of the Cossack territory under Ottoman protection, Doroshenko disregarded political realities. Instead, he claimed his right to the lands formerly belonging to the medieval state of the Old Rus.²⁶

By doing so, Doroshenko followed the example of former hetmans, Bohdan Khmelnytsky and Ivan Vyhovsky, who regarded the Old Rus' territories as part of Cossack heritage.²⁷ One illuminating earlier example of this mentality is provided by the negotiations over the conditions of the Truce of Wilno (1656) between the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and the Tsardom of Moscow. Bohdan Khmelnytsky, then a subject of Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich, acknowledged

24 The River Nieman. On the tradition of establishing "natural frontiers" via rivers, see Peter Sahlins, "Natural Frontiers Revisited: France's Boundaries since the Seventeenth Century," *The American Historical Review* 95 (1990): 1423–1451.

25 AJuZR, vol. 8 (St. Petersburg, 1873), 219–220.

26 In 1667, Doroshenko put forward similar claims in his negotiations over accepting the protection of the Muscovite tsar: Kirill Kochegarov, "Drevnerusskoe proshloe v politicheskikh koncepcijakh ukrainskoj elity vtoroj poloviny xvii veka" [Old-Rus' past in the political concepts of the Ukrainian elites in the second half of the 17th century], *Slavjanovedenie* 2 (2015): 19–41.

27 Starting from the 1620s, Kyivan intellectuals, claiming that Orthodox inhabitants of early modern Ukraine were the direct successors of medieval Ruthenians, started to include the Cossacks among the representatives of the "old Ruthenian nation." Further on, Cossack leaders developed this idea into a claim for the entire Old Rus' territory. Serhii Plokhyy, *The Cossacks and Religion in Early Modern Ukraine* (Oxford, 2002), 109–111, 162–169.

the tsar as the heir of the medieval dynasty of the Riurykoviychi and believed that the territory of Old Rus' extended as far as the lands that currently had populations of Orthodox and Uniate confessions. Thus, he suggested that the "border of the Ruthenian Duchy should be drawn up to the Vistula river and up to the Hungarian border."²⁸ Further on, already in 1657, his successor Ivan Vyhovsky argued that the territory of the former Old Rus' should be exclusively controlled by Cossacks, and he demanded that the Swedish ambassador, Gotthard Welling, acknowledge Vyhovsky's right to "all olden Ukraine or Roxelania ... up to the Vistula."²⁹ Doroshenko slightly transformed these arguments, claiming not only that the Cossacks belonged to the "olden Ruthenian nation," but that the inhabitants settled on the former Ruthenian lands "[were] all Cossacks."³⁰

Having directly expressed his desire to subdue all the former territory of Old Rus' and his hope that this would come about "in a short time," Doroshenko anticipated not only the assistance of the imperial army, but also the troops of the Crimean, Circassian, Nogay, and Bucak Tartars who "obey the sultan's command." According to Doroshenko, the sultan's "friendship" with the Cossacks also presupposed that he should not conclude agreements with the enemies of Ukraine – that is, with Muscovy and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth.³¹

28 Ivan Krypiakievych and Ivan Butych, eds., *Dokumenty Bohdana Khmelnytskoho* [The documents of Bohdan Khmelnytsky] (Kyiv, 1961), 501. For more on the territorial negotiations over Ukraine in Wilno, see Yaroslav Fedoruk, *Vilenskyi dohovir 1656 roku: skhidnoevropejska kryza i Ukraina u seredyni XVII stolittia* [The treaty of Wilno in 1656: The Eastern-European crisis and Ukraine in the mid-17th century] (Kyiv, 2011), 443–497.

29 Quoted from Yaroslav Zatyliuk, "'Spadkoemtsi,' 'vlasnyky' ta 'okhorontsi' Kyjevo-Rus'koj spadshchyny v ujavlenniakh meshkantsiv het'manshchyny druhoji polovyny 17 stolittia" ["Heirs," "proprietors" and "protectors" of the Kyivan-Rus' heritage in the perception of the inhabitants of the Hetmanate in the second half of the 17th century], *Ukrainsky Istorychny Zhurnal* 5 (2011): 33. For more on the development of the concept of the "territory of Ukraine" in the seventeenth century, see Natalia Yakovenko, "Zhytteprostir versus identychnist' rus'kogo shliakhtycha 17 stolittia (naprykladni Jana/Joakyma Yerlycha)" [Living space versus identity of a Ruthenian nobleman (the case of Jan/Joachim Yerlych)], in eadem, *Dzerkala identychnosti* (Kyiv, 2012), 80–91. On the versions of the territorial boundaries of Ukraine in the policy of Cossack hetmans, see Zenon Kohut, "Mazepa's Ukraine: Understanding Cossack Territorial Vistas," in *Poltava 1709: the Battle and the Myth*, ed. Serhii Plokhly (Cambridge, 2012), 1–28; Tatiana Tairova-Jakovleva, "Predstavlenija o granicakh Ukrainskogo Get'manstva u kazackoj starshyny seredyny 17 veka" [The concept of the borders of the Ukrainian Hetmanate among the Cossack *starshyna* in the mid-17th century], *Canadian-American Slavic Studies* 49 (2015): 294–304. I am grateful to Serhii Bagro for guiding me through the bibliography on the variety of territorial concepts of Ukraine in the seventeenth century.

30 AJuZR, vol. 8, 219.

31 Ibid.

In fact, there was no practical need for this reservation since the Polish grand ambassador to the Ottoman Empire, Hieronim Radziejowski, had already concluded the peace treaty in August 1667.³²

Also, Doroshenko sought to secure the right of the Cossacks to be judged by their elders (*starshyna*) in cases involving both Cossacks and “Turks.”³³ Finally, the hetman requested that when the imperial army or the troops of the sultan’s subordinates came to Ukraine, they should “not turn churches into mosques” and “not captivate a single male or female of the Cossack *gens*, nor dispatch them to the imperial city of Constantinople.” So Doroshenko tried to ensure that after accepting Ottoman protection, Ukraine would remain exclusively Orthodox. At the same time, when mentioning the “sultan’s subordinates” who should not captivate the people of “Cossack *gens*,” Doroshenko clearly meant the troops of the Crimean khan, who used to consider Ukrainian territories a source of *esir* (that is, civilians taken as booty during military raids and later sold as slaves at Ottoman slave markets). Here Doroshenko’s previous statement that all the inhabitants of the lands formerly comprising Old Rus’ were now “all Cossacks” gained its particular meaning. In fact, Doroshenko sought to negotiate that in exchange for his allegiance, no *esir* should further be collected in Ukraine. The issue of *esir* was of a specific sensitivity to both parties. The inability to prevent Tatars from collecting *esir* was the most painful price paid previously by Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky for his alliance with the Crimean khan, Islam III Giray. For the local population, regular Tatar raids served as the epitome of what they meant by being “under the Turkish yoke” and added to their resentment over having an “infidel” protector. So to be successful, Doroshenko would have to gain a powerful instrument not only to preserve the population of his territories, but also to defeat his opponents who agitated for an Orthodox, and thus “safer” patron (i.e., the Muscovite tsar). However, for the Ottoman Empire, consenting to this condition would have meant virtually destroying the economy of its directly controlled coastal cities in southern Crimea, such as Caffa, which gained a sizable profit from its slave trade.³⁴ So Doroshenko’s chances of success with this request were quite slim.

32 Since the grand ambassador Radziejowski unexpectedly died during his mission to the Ottoman Empire, the *ahdname* was actually received by his secretary Franciszek Wysocki. Dariusz Kołodziejczyk, *Ottoman-Polish Diplomatic Relations (15th–18th Century)*. *An Annotated Edition of Ahdnames and Other Documents* (Leiden, 2000), 143.

33 AJuZR, vol. 8, 219.

34 On the importance of slave trade for the economy of Ottoman Crimea, see, e.g., Oleksandr Halenko, “Ekonomichne zhyttia v osmans’komu nadchornomor’i: mizh tsarstvom islamu ta krajem vijny” [Economic life in the Ottoman Black Sea region], in *Ekonomichna istorija Ukrainy* (Kyiv, 2011), 471–481; Mikhail Kizilov, “The Black Sea and the Slave Trade: The

In return, Doroshenko obliged himself “to stand against any enemy of the sultan’s majesty” under the condition that Cossacks would not have to pay any tribute and could freely elect their hetman. The extreme importance of the Cossacks’ right to independently elect their hetman is mirrored by the fact that this demand was repeated twice in the document. Further on, as a manifestation of his consideration of the Orthodox faith, Doroshenko also sought confirmation from the sultan that “nobody will perturb or depose the godly Patriarch [of Constantinople].”³⁵ This condition must have been an initiative of Metropolitan Neliubovych-Tukalsky, the direct subordinate of the Ecumenical Patriarch of Constantinople.³⁶

Finally, Doroshenko requested that the sultan issue his diplomas for the Cossacks “in Ruthenian or in Greek” and that his ambassadors be able to speak the “Ruthenian dialect.”³⁷ This condition must have had a very practical importance. While our knowledge of Doroshenko’s envoys in Istanbul in general is very limited, they appear to have lacked proficiency in the Ottoman language. In general, Cossacks seemed to have had no problems communicating with Ottoman or Tatar envoys. However, it is highly improbable that any of them was able to read Ottoman-Turkish, much less comprehend complicated chancery formulae.

All in all, Doroshenko’s plan appears to have been a very ambitious one that contradicted previously disseminated information suggesting that Doroshenko would have been ready to pay tribute “as the Wallachian prince does,” in exchange for Ottoman protection.³⁸ This project led some scholars to conclude that “Doroshenko acted as a strong and independent partner who dictated his terms to the other party.”³⁹ Moreover, some scholars believe that these conditions laid the foundation for the actual agreement between the Ottoman Empire and Cossack Ukraine.⁴⁰

Role of Crimean Maritime Towns in the Trade in Slaves and Captives in the Fifteenth to Eighteenth Centuries,” *International Journal of Maritime History* 17, no. 1 (2005): 211–235; Dariusz Kołodziejczyk, “Slave Hunting and Slave Redemption as a Business Enterprise: the Northern Black Sea Region in the 16th to 17th Centuries,” *Oriente Moderno* n. s. 25, no. 1 (2006): 149–159.

35 AJuZR, vol. 8, 219.

36 At that time, Ecumenical Patriarch Methodius III, from whom Neliubovych-Tukalsky gained blessing as the Metropolitan of Kyiv, fought with the previously deposed Patriarch Parthenius IV, to whom he finally lost in 1671.

37 Ibid.

38 AJuZR, vol. 7, 31.

39 Floria, “Nachalo otkrytoj osmanskoj ekspansii v Vostochnoj Evrope,” 87; Smolij and Stepankov, *Het’man Petro Doroshenko*, 171.

40 Smolij and Stepankov, *Het’man Petro Doroshenko*, 197.

What were the Ottoman expectations in exchange for granting protection to Cossack Ukraine, and why was the sultan ready to put aside the usual demand of the payment of tribute from the Cossack hetmans? Here our knowledge is formed by three kinds of sources. First, there are copies of the letters sent by the sultan and the grand vizier to Doroshenko in 1667 and to his rival hetman Briukhovetsky in 1668, which are preserved in Russian translation in the Posol'sky Prikaz. Second, there are the intelligence of the same Posol'sky Prikaz over the year 1668. Finally, there is an official imperial diploma issued to Doroshenko in June 1669. In fact, all of these sources provide quite a different picture.

According to the letter dated July 1667, in addition to “being a friend to the friends and an enemy to the enemies”⁴¹ of the sultan, Doroshenko was expected to prevent the Cossacks of the Zaporozhian Host from engaging in sea raids.⁴² In fact, according to the mentioned Truce of Andrusovo (1667), the Zaporozhian Host was subordinated to neither the Right-Bank nor the Left-Bank hetman, but gained a particular status under the joint supervision of both the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and Muscovy. So although both hetmans maintained close contacts with the Zaporozhian Host, technically they could not claim to exercise power over it. This situation did not change when, after defeating the Left-Bank hetman Ivan Briukhovetsky in June 1668, Doroshenko was proclaimed the hetman of “all Ukraine.” As pointed out earlier, the chieftains of the Zaporozhian Host, such as the mentioned Petro Sukhoviiv, conducted their own policy. To this one should add the famous chieftain Ivan Sirko, who in all probability was the main reason for the condition, embedded in the sultan's letter, about preventing Cossack sea raids. Specifically, Sirko had conducted a series of raids on Ottoman Caffa with the purpose of releasing Ruthenian slaves previously taken as *esir*.⁴³ The interest of the Ottomans in stopping the Cossack raids on Crimea is confirmed by the fact that the same condition was also announced to Left-Bank hetman Ivan Briukhovetsky in 1668.⁴⁴

41 The range of obligations embedded into this formula included not only refraining from any hostile acts, but also participating in the Ottoman military campaigns, supporting Ottoman border governors, and supplying intelligence about prospective hostile actions against the sultan. Viorel Panaite, *The Ottoman Law of War and Peace: The Ottoman Empire and Tribute Payers* (Boulder, 2000), 386–387.

42 Grygorieva, “Turets'ke piddanstvo het'mana Petra Doroshenka,” 452–453, 467.

43 For the activities of Ivan Sirko, see, e.g., Wiesław Majewski, “Sirko Iwan,” *Polski Słownik Biograficzny*, vol. 37/5 (Warsaw and Cracow, 1997), 566–574; Yurii Mytsyk, *Otaman Ivan Sirko* [Chieftain Ivan Sirko] (Zaporizhzhya, 2000).

44 Grygorieva, “Turets'ke piddanstvo het'mana Petra Doroshenka,” 455–456, 472–473.

In contrast, according to the intelligence of the Posol'sky Prikaz, the sultan was not going to content himself with Doroshenko's military help and securing Crimea. In September 1668 an Ottoman *çavuş*, whom the Russian sources call Hachabash,⁴⁵ allegedly delivered to Doroshenko the sultan's conditions of protection, which indeed considered abolishing tribute for the Cossacks but instead demanded the right to place a corps of one thousand janissaries both at the hetmans' seat of Chyhyryn and in the strategically important fortress of Kodak. The informers claimed that Doroshenko was trying to negotiate that the troops should be placed in Kodak rather than Chyhyryn. Moreover, it was reported that the next embassy from Doroshenko to Istanbul, headed by Lukash Buskievich, brought back a sultanic request to place janissary corps "in many towns."⁴⁶ As such requests were never reported to be discussed during Cossack councils, and are not reflected in the existing copies of the Ottoman documents, they could be nothing more than rumors disseminated by the opponents of Doroshenko's plan to accept Ottoman protection. One of these strong opponents was Lazar Baranovych, the bishop of Chernihiv, who is indicated as a dispatcher of the majority of couriers to Moscow who delivered this intelligence to the tsar about the prospective billeting of Ottoman troops in Ukraine.

Not surprisingly, it is difficult to find any traces of all the projects discussed above in the actual imperial diploma granted to Doroshenko on 1 June 1669 and handed to him in Uman on 25 August of the same year. Instead, the diploma contains a condition never mentioned in the above sources but nevertheless extremely important to Doroshenko in the context of his ongoing struggle to be the hetman over "all Ukraine." Specifically, the sultan acknowledged Doroshenko's jurisdiction over three regions, "Sarı Kamyş (Zaporozhians), the Barabaş (Left-Bank Cossacks) and the Potkal (Right-Bank Cossacks)," as a *sancak*, without paying tribute under the condition "that he remain constant on the path of obedience."⁴⁷ It is worth highlighting that mentioning Zaporozhians in the imperial diploma indirectly repeated the expectation expressed in the sultanic letters quoted above – namely, that Doroshenko was declared responsible for restraining the Zaporozhians from conducting sea raids.

45 Upon my inquiry, Oleksandr Halenko suggested that "Hachabash" could refer to the title *hacı başı* – a guide to Mecca and Medina.

46 AJuZR, vol. 7, 103, 153–154.

47 Quoted after Ostapchuk, "Cossack Ukraine," 142. The original document is preserved in RGADA, fond 89, op. 2, nr. 36. Two translations of this document from the copies, sent to Moscow by Khanenko in 1669 and by Doroshenko in 1676, are published in AJuZR, vol. 9 (St. Petersburg, 1877), 173–174; AJuZR, vol. 12 (St. Petersburg, 1882), 758–759.

From the Ottoman point of view, issuing the imperial diploma and transferring the insignia of power – namely, the mace, standard, and *tuğ* (horsetail banner), which Doroshenko publicly accepted at the Cossack Council of Uman (August 1669) – finalized the procedure of granting protection. Previously, at the Council of Korsun (March 1668), Doroshenko had also publicly worn a brocade freesia sewed on with white calfskin, which together with a *kaftan* was sent to him as a present from the sultan. Thus he acknowledged Ottoman supremacy through symbolic means.⁴⁸ However, on the part of the Cossacks, the acceptance of Ottoman protection still needed to be finalized with unanimous confirmation that they had chosen the sultan as their protector, followed by the taking of vows. Indeed, Kaymakam Kara Mustafa Pasha provided Doroshenko in his letter with detailed instructions as to how the hetman should celebrate his new protected status:

Glory should be preserved with firmness of your loyalty, and if it will be so, you will actually be under His Majesty the Sultan's mercy, and your land will be peaceful and safe. ... And His Majesty the Sultan will direct against your enemies not only his own forces, but also the forces of all other countries that enjoy his protection. And he sends his servant, Mustafa Ağa and a kaftan, and when you accept the sultanic letter and presents, do demonstrate your joy with cannon and gun fire.

At the same time, he requested that the entire Cossack community (including the representatives of the Left-Bank Ukraine [*zadnepriane*] and the Zaporozhian Host) unanimously recognize the sultan as their protector and that the council swear an oath.⁴⁹

Both specified conditions seemed to have been fulfilled already during the Council of Korsun. The anonymous Polish author of the “Memorial” (who could be an eyewitness belonging to the Polish embassy that attended the event)⁵⁰ recalled that Doroshenko hosted a banquet, fired guns and cannons, and asked the Cossacks who had gathered for the council, “Whose side are you on: your patrimonial lord, Moscow, or the Turk?” He then attested that “everyone exclaimed: ‘Neither on the side of our [patrimonial] lords, nor on Moscow’s, but [we] entirely submit to the Turk.’” Further on, the Cossacks sent a

48 Krykun, “Korsuns’ka kozats’ka rada,” 131.

49 Grygorieva, “Turets’ke pid danstvo het’mana Petra Doroshenka,” 462, 474–475.

50 Krykun, “Korsuns’ka kozats’ka rada,” 143.

horse to take the sultan's envoy to the council, and the colonels and captains proclaimed: "We submit to the Turk and we acknowledge him as our lord."⁵¹

However, even if in his imperial diploma the sultan acknowledged Doroshenko as the hetman of "all Ukraine" including the Right Bank, the Left Bank, and the Zaporozhian Host, it is unknown whether "all Ukraine" confirmed the sultan as its protector. Although in his letter sent to Grand Vizier Köprülüzade Fazıl Ahmed Pasha immediately after the council Doroshenko claimed that "at the Council all the colonels, the Cossack *starshyna* [officers], and the mob [that is, ordinary Cossacks] of the Zaporozhian Host from the towns on both banks of the Dnipro river were present,"⁵² in fact the council was a much less representative body. According to the reports, not a single colonel from Left Bank Ukraine attended, and no more than twenty representatives of Left Bank officers were there. In contrast, Right Bank regiments were represented by about five hundred officers. Even the Right Bank colonels did not turn out in full numbers, with notable names missing such as Ostap Gogol, Stefan Shcherbyna, and, most important, Ivan Sirko. As for the representatives of the Zaporozhian Host, the sources attest that shortly before the council seventy Zaporozhians appeared before Doroshenko, but the council was attended by no more than eleven of them.⁵³ So Doroshenko's optimistic account about the representative character of the Council of Korsun is not confirmed by other sources. Moreover, one of the specific accusations of Doroshenko's opponents against the hetman was that he had accepted Ottoman protection without proper council. For example, in the beginning of August 1669, Mykhailo Khanenko, Doroshenko's new rival for the position of hetman, wrote: "Striving for life-long hetmanship without the permission and council of all of us, including the colonels of this side [Right Bank] and of that side [Left Bank], [Doroshenko] signed his hand in the allegiance to the Turkish sultan."⁵⁴

There are also intriguing contrasting reports as to whether Doroshenko and the Cossack officers actually took vows at the Council of Korsun. Scholars tend to conclude that at this event the Cossacks only confirmed their intention to accept protection but did not finalize it with a vow.⁵⁵ There is also no evidence that vows would have been taken during the subsequent Council of Uman, where Doroshenko was presented with the Ottoman insignia of power.

51 Ibid., 144.

52 The original letter, dated 12 March 1669, was most probably intercepted in Poland and thus never found its way to the addressee. It is published in: Krykun, "Korsuns'ka kozats'ka rada," 146–147.

53 Ibid., 127–128.

54 Quoted after Smolij and Stepankov, *Het'man Petro Doroshenko*, 211.

55 Krykun, "Korsuns'ka kozats'ka rada," 134–135.

Available reports demonstrate that in 1670 the Cossack officers were still not sure about Ukraine's status in relation to the Ottoman Empire. The informers who were trying to clarify the situation to their patrons or news-seekers seemed equally unsure about this. For example, Waclaw Kamiński, a Polish informer from Akkerman, claimed that envoys from Doroshenko had arrived in Istanbul in June 1670 and were favorably accepted by the *kaymakam*, who promised every freedom and help on the part of Tartar troops if only Cossacks became subordinated to the sultan.⁵⁶

There is another occasion that contemporary scholars often mention as the final point in the process of accepting Ottoman protection of Cossack Ukraine. That event is the Cossack Council that took place either in November or in December 1670. Scholars tend to accept this marker based on the judgment of Dmytro Doroshenko and Jan Rypka. The first of these authors argues that according to Tarasovsky, a runaway captain, the hetman gathered a council with his colonels in November 1670, and they decided to submit to the sultan.⁵⁷ However, the Polish king, Michał Korybut Wiśniowiecki, in his proclamation issued in January 1671 – with reference to information coming from the same Tarasovsky – claimed that he knew about recent proceedings in Ukraine – namely, that Doroshenko had assembled a council in December 1670 and called for “submitting to the Turk.”⁵⁸ Of course, a distinction must be made between “calling for submission” and a “decision to submit.” Similarly, in their collective paper Doroshenko and Rypka concluded that in November 1670 the council of the Cossack officers confirmed that Ukraine was under the protection of the Ottoman Empire.⁵⁹ However their source only remarks that “the council of the *starshyna* was discussing the protection of the sultan.”⁶⁰

Altogether these remarks create the impression that the Cossack officers did not regard the issue of protection as completed and finalized after the Councils of Korsun and Uman. At the same time, the proceedings of these councils show a clear and striking contrast to the Council of Pereyaslav (1654), where Bohdan Khmelnytsky, together with his officers, took vows in front of the

56 Ilona Czamańska, “Czy wojna z Turcją była nieunikniona? Poselstwo Kazimierza Wysokiego do Turcji w latach 1670–1672” [Was the war with Turkey inevitable? The embassy of Kazimierz Wysocki to Turkey in the years 1670–1672], *Kwartalnik Historyczny* 92 (1985): 778.

57 Doroshenko, *Hetman Petro Doroshenko*, 322.

58 AGAD Libri Legationum vol. 25, fol. 193v.

59 Dorošenko and Rypka, “Hejtman P. Dorošenko a jeho turecká politika,” 32–33.

60 *Pratsi komissii dlia vyuvchuvannia istorii zakhidno-ruskogo i ukrainskoho prava* [The works of the Commission for Studying the History of Western-Ruthenian and Ukrainian Law], vol. 6 (Kyiv, 1929), 462.

representatives of Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich.⁶¹ In other words, the available evidence suggests that Doroshenko became the subject of Mehmed IV according to the Ottoman practices, but according to Cossack traditions his status was not fully defined.

Doroshenko himself did his best to increase this uncertainty. He was very cautious when describing his relationship with the Porte after obtaining the Ottoman insignia of power. In fact, he consistently denied that he had become the sultan's subject after the Council of Korsun.⁶² His envoy, Lukash Buskievich, who reportedly finalized in Istanbul the negotiations over Ottoman protection of Cossack Ukraine, expressed this denial in the most resolute manner. In his letter dated 18 April 1669, he claimed: "I suppose that many are troubled with my embassy to the Turks; that His Honor, the hetman sent me [there] to request allegiance," but "God forbid that we could be so imprudently blind to hasten and place our necks under the Turkish yoke."⁶³

It is worth highlighting that having previously declared Moscow and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth "the enemies of Ukraine," and being eager to claim the western border of the prospective Cossack state as far as the Vistula river, Doroshenko continued to maintain a relationship with both of them. Specifically, at the Council of Korsun, Doroshenko simultaneously welcomed both the Ottoman and the Polish envoys.⁶⁴ Moreover, the council chose Cossack envoys to the new king of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth who was to be elected during the election *sejm* in June 1669. In May 1669, Doroshenko publicly accepted the hetmans' insignia of power dispatched from Warsaw and held a banquet to celebrate this occasion.⁶⁵ After having accepted the sultan's diploma during the Council of Uman (August 1669), Doroshenko sent his envoys to the coronation of the newly elected king, Michał Korybut Wiśniowiecki (1669–1673). Simultaneously, he exchanged envoys with Moscow. In other words, Doroshenko behaved as if he were not bound by any obligation of loyalty to Sultan Mehmed IV.

To sum up, Petro Doroshenko's intentions, rhetoric, and conduct during the process of requesting and obtaining Ottoman protection can only be assessed on the basis of sources that are either indirect or of limited reliability. The hetman did request help or protection of some kind from the Sublime Porte, but

61 Mykhailo Hrushevsky, *Istoriija Ukrainy-Rusy* [The history of Ukraine-Rus'], vol. 9, part 1 (Kyiv, 1997), 741.

62 Krykun, "Korsuns'ka kozats'ka rada," 135.

63 AJuZR, vol. 8, 153.

64 The envoys acted in the name of the *primas*, Mikołaj Prażmowski, during the interregnum period of September 1668–June 1669. Krykun, "Korsuns'ka kozats'ka rada," 136.

65 Doroshenko, *Hetman Petro Doroshenko*, 250–252.

the exact nature of that request is impossible to determine since we do not know what language he used in his letters dispatched to Istanbul prior to the Council of Korsun. Mehmed IV understood Doroshenko's request as one of allegiance, and with his imperial diploma, insignia of power, and *kaftan* he granted Doroshenko the *sancak* under the condition of military service. Thus he numbered the hetman "among the totality of subjects of [his] customary grace – Wallachia, Moldavia and others."⁶⁶ Considering both the offer of exemption from tribute and the rumors about the sultan's intention to place janissary corps in some strategically important towns of Cossack Ukraine, one can assume that the Porte from the very beginning considered Cossack Ukraine an important foothold for attacking the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth or Muscovy (or even both), whose 1667 alliance it so heartily opposed. At the same time, Doroshenko made every effort to sweep his new protected status under the rug. Although he publicly accepted the Ottoman *kaftan* as well as Ottoman insignia of power, manifested his "joy" with gun and cannon fire, and, finally, obtained an imperial diploma, in which Ukraine was named a *sancak* under his governorship, afterward he denied being the sultan's subject. The subsequent communication between Doroshenko and the Porte can reveal further facets of the nature of their relationship.

Ottoman Protection at Work

When in 1672 the Ottoman offensive against the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth started, developing into the Ottoman-Polish war of 1672–1676, Hetman Doroshenko, in accordance with the stipulations of the imperial diploma delivered to him at the Council of Uman, joined the Ottoman troops. At this point, he revealed his tributary status regarding the Ottoman Empire. The other peculiarities of his relationship with the Porte could be explored via his official correspondence with the Ottoman dignitaries. Unfortunately, there are not many documents originating from the chancery of Doroshenko that have survived until the present day. Letters mirroring the communication between the hetman and Ottoman officials are even scarcer, and some of them are perhaps waiting to be discovered in the archives of Istanbul. Yet the materials of the Malorussian Affairs in the collection of the Posol'sky Prikaz in the Russian State Archives for Old Documents (Rossijskij Gosudarstvennyj Arkhiv Drevnikh Aktov) can shed some light on the relationship between Istanbul and Chyhyryn after 1669. Of course, working with the translated correspondence always

66 Ostapchuk, "Cossack Ukraine," 142.

involves a considerable risk from the viewpoint of the terminology and the formulations employed. Another problem is that a number of documents are marked with erroneous dates or have lost any indication of their dating altogether. Still, going through this correspondence, one can point out the issues that are discussed consistently and identify them as the most essential questions related to the protected status of Cossack Ukraine.

The first issue is the particular role played by the Crimean khan in the relationship of the Cossacks with the Porte. This role was highlighted starting from the negotiations about protection for Cossack Ukraine, when the sultan directed both Doroshenko and Briukhovetsky to exchange letters about all important matters specifically with the Crimean khan. The correspondence with Briukhovetsky from 1668 provides the most striking and colorful rhetoric on this point. Specifically, the grand vizier informed Briukhovetsky that while expressing his favorable attitude toward accepting the hetman as a servant, the sultan “directed him to maintain a friendship with the Crimean khan, and to regularly send letters to both his imperial majesty and to the Crimean khan.”⁶⁷ In another, undated letter, the grand vizier reveals that the Crimean khan was designated as the person responsible for “executing” the prospective agreement about Ottoman protection over Briukhovetsky:

In exchange for your service that you wished to offer to His Majesty the Sultan, the sultan ordered to write to His Majesty the Crimean Khan so that he would defend you, and your towns, and your villages, and take up arms against your enemies. And His Majesty the Sultan ordered that he, the Crimean khan, should know about all your matters. And you, following the example of previous hetmans, who offered their services to His Majesty the Sultan, should be the friend of his friends and the enemy of his enemies, and you should strictly prohibit our Cossacks from taking to the sea in their boats ... and if you are obedient, upon your request the Crimean khan and the borderland pashas will grant you their help; stay with them in friendship and ask their counsel, and you will be safe under the protection of His Majesty the Sultan.⁶⁸

The same tendency can be observed in the preserved correspondence with Doroshenko. For example, in a sultanic diploma (in the Russian translation, *gramota*, which denotes an official document) dated 4 June 1670, Mehmed IV noted that he had received Doroshenko’s letter where he “humbly asked about

67 Grygorieva, “Turets’ke piddanstvo het’mana Petra Doroshenka,” 471–472.

68 Ibid., 473.

the integrity and safety of Ukraine and its towns,” and he indicated to Adil Giray that “he should not go to Ukraine, and should not send anybody, but should live in peace with you and should protect your Ukraine against all enemies.” Further on, the sultan prescribed, “if some [Cossacks] are not obedient to you, you should write and call the Crimean khan for help. And [he] will subdue those Cossack so that they will be obedient to you.” Finally, the sultan requested the hetman “to keep counsel” with the Crimean khan and often keep in touch with him.⁶⁹ Let us remind ourselves that in June 1670 relations between Doroshenko and Adil Giray were still uneasy and that Adil Giray maintained his support for Petro Sukhoviiv, Doroshenko’s rival for the hetman’s mace. Thus the sultan made Doroshenko responsible for improving his relations with Crimea.

The Porte also recognized the long tradition of relations between the Cossacks and the Crimean khanate in its correspondence with other addressees. In his letter to Deputy Chancellor Andrzej Olszowski, dated 3 October 1671, Grand Vizier Köprülüzade Fazıl Ahmed Pasha claimed, “From ancient times, the Cossack nation resorted to and united with the Crimean countries and [they] offered their long-standing obedience and what is due to the imperial gate for the resort of the entire world, through them.”⁷⁰

A quotation from an undated letter of the grand vizier’s *kethüda* to Doroshenko, who had repeatedly asked for military help from the sultan, can add some understanding as to how the Crimean khan’s “help” looked in practice: “The assistance from the sultan was sent to you a long time ago; and when it was sent, you complained about the devastation of your Ukraine; and when it does not arrive, you [again] ask for an assistance.”⁷¹

The insistent attempts of the Ottomans not just to ensure friendly relations between the Cossack hetmans and the Crimean khans, but also to make Cossack hetmans virtually accountable to Crimean khans, could be connected to the status the Giray rulers had gained in the imperial hierarchy. Dariusz Kołodziejczyk points out that the type of the original diploma for Doroshenko (*berat* or *menşur*), later transferred to Moscow together with the Ottoman attributes of power in 1676, specified the status of the hetman as equal to that of the *hospodars* of Moldavia and Wallachia.⁷² Similarly, Oleksandr Halenko

69 Ibid., 469.

70 Janusz Woliński, “Materiały do dziejów wojny Polsko-Tureckiej 1672–1676” [Materials on the proceedings of the Polish-Turkish war 1672–1676], in *Studia i materiały do historii wojskowości*, vol. 10, no. 1 (Warsaw, 1964), 230.

71 RGADA Fond 124, op. 1, nr. 25, st. 77.

72 Dariusz Kołodziejczyk, “Tertium non datur? Turets’ka alternatyva v zovnishnii politytsi kozatskoi derzhavy” [Tertium non datur? Turkish alternative in the foreign policy of the Cossack state], in *Hadiacka unia 1658 roku*, ed. Pavlo Sokhan’ (Kyiv, 2008), 72–73.

compares the status of Cossack Ukraine to Moldavia, Wallachia, and Transylvania, claiming that the Ottomans perceived Ukrainian hetmans as independent but nonsovereign rulers standing close to *sancakbeys* in the imperial power hierarchy.⁷³ However, the ceremonies of transferring Ottoman insignia to Doroshenko point out that his status was indeed lower than that of the rulers of any of the mentioned state entities. First, the description of the *kaftan* sent to him (a brocade freesia sewn on with white calfskin) in no way resembled the “kapaniche” sewn on with sable furs that were granted to Transylvanian princes and to the *beylerbeys* of the Ottoman provinces. At the same time, unlike Doroshenko, who obtained a single *tuğ*, *hospodars* of Moldavia and of Wallachia obtained two of them, highlighting their status being similar to that of *beylerbeys*.⁷⁴ So although in his projects describing his prospective status within the empire’s “well-protected domains” Doroshenko saw himself as a semi-independent governor, it appears that he was not considered as such in Istanbul but seems to have been attached to one of the “more senior” border governors – in this case, the Crimean khan.

The second issue repeatedly stressed in the correspondence was the concern that Doroshenko was not sending his envoys often enough to provide information about ongoing events.⁷⁵ An undated letter from the *kethüda* to Doroshenko provides an example in that it conveys the complaint that the sultan had ordered the Crimean khan to give his military help, and the khan had obeyed, yet “you, hetman, did not write anything to us about this.”⁷⁶ Another letter, from Kaymakam Kara Mustafa Pasha, includes this reproach: “The *kalga sultan* was near Zaporizhzhya with his people and he asked you to assist him, and you did not come to join him and did not write to us about this, and you should write the whole truth about this matter to us.”⁷⁷

73 Oleksandr Halenko, “Komentar: pro osmansku tytulaturu ukrainskykh hetmaniv” [Commentary: About the Ottoman titlature of the Ukrainian hetmans], *Shhidny Svit* 1–2 (1997), 219.

74 On the reflections on the status of Transylvania, Moldavia, and Wallachia in the realm of the ceremonial, see János B. Szabó, “The Insignia of the Princes of Transylvania,” in *Turkish Flowers: Studies on Ottoman Art in Hungary*, ed. Ibolya Gereelyes (Budapest, 2005), 131–132, 134; Gábor Kármán, “Ein Handkuss für den Pascha? Siebenbürgische Gesandte in Ofen,” in *Interkulturelle Ritualpraxis in der Vormoderne: Diplomatische Interaktion an den östlichen Grenzen der Fürstengesellschaft*, ed. Claudia Garnier and Christine Vogel (Berlin, 2016), 147–152.

75 Grygorieva, “Turets’ke piddanstvo het’mana Petra Doroshenka,” 469; RGADA, fond 124, op. 1, nr. 25, st. 24, 73, 77, 79, 111, 144.

76 RGADA, fond 124, op. 1, nr. 25, st. 24.

77 *Ibid.*, st. 111.

On one hand, the reports of Havrylo Kovalenko, Doroshenko's confidant in Istanbul, who complained about "not having had a single written word"⁷⁸ from Doroshenko for a long time (and also lamented the failings of "unreliable messengers"),⁷⁹ point to the lack of well-tuned communication channels between Chyhyryn and Istanbul. On the other hand, such requests gained additional practical sense as Doroshenko indeed kept in touch with all his potential protectors, and informers brought intelligence to the Sublime Porte about the hetman's plans to betray the padishah. Specifically, one of the major tasks of the diplomatic mission of the Polish envoy Franciszek Kazimierz Wysocki to the Ottoman Empire (1670–1671) was to reveal Doroshenko's double politics and to undermine the "friendship" between the sultan and the hetman.⁸⁰

The mentioned informer, Havrylo Kovalenko, let Doroshenko know that the Porte was constantly seeking information as to whether the hetman was still alive:

There are rumors [spread] through different people, who said in different ways that Moscow caused [your] ill-being and that [you] are not in this world anymore; and the Ottoman Porte, having been notified by different people, partially believed and partially did not believe (*otchasti ne nakloniali ukha*) this untrue news, because they still did not have reliable news from the [Crimean] khan and from İbrahim Pasha.⁸¹

Kovalenko also reported that the Porte was constantly exploring "to what side [the hetman] leans."⁸²

It is probable that doubts about Doroshenko's loyalty motivated the Porte to demand that the hetman constantly prove his adherence to the sultan's protection through uninterrupted communication and public demonstrations of his intention to maintain his loyalty.



In summary, according to Ottoman customs, the procedure of accepting Doroshenko among the "well-protected domains" was finalized with an imperial *berat* and Doroshenko's public acceptance of the *kaftan* and the imperial

78 Ibid., st. 40.

79 Ibid., st. 43.

80 Czamańska, "Czy wojna z Turcją była nieunikniona?," 774; Jan Perdenia, *Hetman Piotr Doroshenko a Polska* [Hetman Piotr Doroshenko and Poland] (Cracow, 2000), 32–33.

81 RGADA, fond 124, op. 1, nr. 25, st. 40.

82 Ibid., st. 40–46.

insignia of power. According to Cossack customs, the procedure seemed not to have been finalized, as the Council of Korsun, where the Cossacks announced their decision to accept the sultan as their protector, was not very representative and did not end with the taking of vows. For his part, Hetman Doroshenko avoided acknowledging that he had become a subject of the sultan, and he used vague language when describing his relationship to the Porte after 1669.

The ongoing correspondence between the hetman's residence of Chyhyryn and Istanbul demonstrates that up until the Polish-Ottoman war (1672–1676), the actual issues discussed were not so much focused on military help for the Cossacks, which they theoretically should have received in exchange for accepting Ottoman protection. Instead, the sultan demanded that Doroshenko constantly stay in touch with both Istanbul and Bahçesaray, proving the firmness of his loyalty and at every turn publicly demonstrating his intention to stay under Ottoman protection. Doroshenko was also supposed to provide information on all ongoing issues, honoring a request that would be appropriate for any borderland governor appointed by the sultan.