

## THE EAST SLAVIC RESPONSE TO THE MONGOL CONQUEST<sup>1</sup>

Any analysis of East Slavic attitudes toward the Mongol conquest during the thirteenth to fifteenth centuries must confront serious obstacles. Although there are dozens of major narrative texts of various types – tales within the corpus of the chronicles, *vitae*, epics, epistles, travelogues, independent narratives – as well as documentary sources such as wills and treaties,<sup>2</sup> compared to the sources in Chinese,<sup>3</sup> Arabo-Persian<sup>4</sup> or Latin,<sup>5</sup> the aggregate source base is not huge.

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<sup>1</sup> An earlier version of this article was read at the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies Convention, Boca Raton, September 27, 1998.

<sup>2</sup> Charles J. Halperin, "A Chingissid Saint of the Russian Orthodox Church: 'The Life of Peter, *tsarevich* of the Horde'," *Canadian-American Slavic Studies* 9:3 (Fall, 1975), pp. 323-335; *Ibid.*, "Know Thy Enemy: Medieval Russian Familiarity with the Mongols of the Golden Horde," *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas* U.F. 30 (1982), pp. 161-175; *Ibid.*, "Russia and the 'Mongol Yoke': Concepts of Conquest, Liberation and the Chingissid Idea" *Archivum Eurasiae Medii Aevi* 2 (1982), pp. 99-107; *Ibid.*, "*Tsarev ulus*: Russia in the Golden Horde," *Cahiers du monde russe et soviétique* 23:2 (April-June, 1982), pp. 257-263; *Ibid.*, "The Defeat and Death of Batu," *Russian History* 10:1 (1983), pp. 50-65; *Ibid.*, "Russia in the Mongol Empire in Comparative Perspective," *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies* 43:1 (June, 1983), pp. 239-261, especially pp. 258-260; *Ibid.*, "The Ideology of Silence: Prejudice and Pragmatism on the Medieval Religious Frontier," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 26:3 (July, 1984), pp. 442-466; *Ibid.*, "The Tatar Yoke and Tatar Oppression," *Russia Mediaevalis* 5:1 (1984), pp. 20-39; *Ibid.*, *Russia and the Golden Horde: The Mongol Impact on Medieval Russian History* (Bloomington, IN 1985), especially pp. 61-75; *Ibid.*, *The Tatar Yoke* (Columbus, OH 1986) [this volume should have had a subtitle, "The Image of the Mongols in Medieval Russia," and an Index, and been proofread properly].

<sup>3</sup> See the relevant contributions to John D. Langlois, Jr., ed., *China under Mongol Rule* (Princeton, NJ 1981); all of Chan Hok-lam and William Theodore de Bary, eds., *Yüan Thought: Chinese Thought and Religion under the Mongols* (New York, 1982); and Jennifer W. Jay, *A Change in Dynasties: Loyalty in Thirteenth-Century China* (Western Washington University Center for East Asian Studies, Studies on East Asia v. 18; Bellingham, WA 1991).

<sup>4</sup> David O. Morgan, "Persian Historians and the Mongols," in David O. Morgan, ed., *Medieval Historical Writing in the Christian and Islamic Worlds* (London, 1982), pp. 109-124.

<sup>5</sup> The latest monographs are Axel Klopprogge, *Ursprung und Ausprägung des abendländischen Mongolenbildes im 13. Jahrhundert. Ein Versuch zur Ideengeschichte des Mittelalters* (Wiesbaden, 1993), summarized in his "Das Mongolenbild in Abendland," in Stephan Conermann, Jan Kusber, eds., *Die Mongolen in Asien und Europa* (Frankfurt am Main, 1997), pp. 81-101; and with a different problematica, Felicitä Schmieder, *Europa und die Fremden. Die Mongolen in Urteil des Abendlandes von 13. Bis in das 15. Jahrhundert* (Sigmaringen, 1994). I have previously overlooked Devin DeWeese, "The Influence of the Mongols on the Religious

However, it is the qualitative rather than the quantitative limitations of the sources which most inhibit scholarly study. The Rus' sources are almost all anonymous: the exceptions are bishop Serapion of Vladimir's sermons and bishop Vassian of Rostov's "Epistle to the Ugra River." No text was preserved in a manuscript contemporary with the events described; often manuscripts date a century later. Thus, nearly all sources are of uncertain provenance. Texts are commonly assigned dates and locations of composition entirely on the basis of content analysis and *cui bono* argumentation. The social identity of the authors cannot be established definitively. Assuming that all authors were clerics works better for *vitae* than the *Zadonshchina* and is particularly controversial for chronicles,<sup>6</sup> but raises more problems than it solves. A credible history of Church-state relations during the thirteenth to fifteenth centuries has not been written. Controversy continues to surround the attitude of the Church towards the Horde and towards the political unification of northeastern Russia under Muscovite aegis. The metropolitanates of Alexei and Kiprian still arouse heated scholarly disagreement. Some historians continue to take a very cynical view of Church policy toward the Tatars and Moscow as based exclusively upon ecclesiastical material interests.<sup>7</sup> But, the conflict of interests between the Church and secular political powers inevitably resulted in tensions and disagreements. Moreover, the institutional divisions within "the Church" must also be taken into account: the "Church" too often reduces itself to the metropolitan of Kiev-Vladimir-Moscow.<sup>8</sup> Even the hallowed role of Saint Sergius in the

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Consciousness of Thirteenth-century Europe," *Mongolian Studies* 5 (1978-1979), pp. 41-78.

<sup>6</sup> Donald Ostrowski, *Muscovy and the Mongols. Cross-Cultural Influences on the Steppe Frontier, 1304-1589* (Cambridge, England, 1998), p. 153 n. 42 attributes all chronicles to clerical authorship, and posits an extreme degree of cultural separation between Church and State, despite admitting some "overlap" in expertise and attitude (pp. 18-26) and omitting more evidence to the same end. For example, it is impossible to establish the clerical status of the compiler or copyists of the "Tatar lexicon" attached to a Greek lexicon. See P. K. Simoni, "Pamiatnik starinnoi russkoi leksikografii po rukopisiam XV-XVII stoletii I-III," *Izvestiia otdeleniia russkago iazyka islovesnosti Imp. Akad. Nauk* XIII (1908), knizhka 1, pp. 175-212.

<sup>7</sup> A. L. Pliguzov, "Drevneishii spisok kratkogo sobraniia iarlykov, dannikh ordynskimi khanami russkimmitropolitam," *Russkii feodal'nyi arkhiv XIV-pervyi treti XVI veka*, chast' III (Moscow, 1987), pp. 571-594; A. L. Pliguzov, A. L. Khoroshkevich, "Otnoshenie russkoi tserkvy k antiordynskoi bor'be v XIII-XV vekakh (po materiale Kratkogo sobraniia khanskikh iarlykov russkim mitropolitam)," *Voprosy nauchnogo ateizma* 37 (1988), pp. 117-130; A. S. Khoroshev, "Batyevshchina i tserkovnaia propoved' neprotivleniia," *Voprosy nauchnogo ateizma* 37 (1988), pp. 131-139; N. A. Okhotina, "Russkaia tserkov' i mongol'skoe zavoevanie (XIII v.)," in A. I. Klibanov, ed. *Tserkov', obshchestvo i gosudarstvo v feodal'noi Rossii. Sbornik statei* (Moscow, 1990), pp. 67-84; A. I. Pliguzov, A. L. Khoroshkevich, "Russkaia tserkov' i antiordynskaia bor'ba v XIII-XV vv. (po materiale kratkogo sobraniia khanskikh iarlykov russkim mitropolitam)," in *ibid.*, pp. 84-102.

<sup>8</sup> N. S. Borisov, *Russkaia tserkov' v politicheskoi bor'be XIV-XV vekov* (Moscow, 1986); A. S. Khoroshev, *Politicheskaiia istoriia russkoi kanonizatsii (XI-XVI vv.)* (Moscow, 1986), pp. 73-132; N. S. Borisov, *Tserkovnye deiateli srednevekovoi Rusi XIII-XVII vv.* (Moscow, 1988), pp. 17-121; R. G. Skyrnnikov, *Gosudarstvo i tserkov' na Rusi XIV-XVI vv. Podvizhniki russkoi tserkvy*

Muscovite victory over the Tatars at Kulikovo Field in 1380 remains highly contentious.<sup>9</sup> Some recent attempts to address these questions have been greeted quite critically.<sup>10</sup> While additional and more reliable scholarship is on the way,<sup>11</sup> nevertheless, information in particular is lacking on the relationships between chronicles and the principalities, cities or princes for whom they might have been written. It is not credible that differing accounts of political events reflected only ecclesiastical institutional rivalries, such as those between the metropolitan and the archbishop of Novgorod or the bishop of Tver', or between black and white clergy as in the tale of Mitiai, without reference to the secular politics for whom clerics might have served as mouthpieces. East Slavic priests and monks, let alone hierarchs and abbots, did not live in ivory towers.<sup>12</sup> It is difficult to believe that the "pro-Tverian" and "pro-Muscovite" chronicle accounts of the uprising in Tver' in 1327 represented only the opinions, policies, and propaganda of ecclesiastical institutions, not the princely establishments looking over their

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(Novosibirsk, 1991), pp. 1-126. Neither John Fennell, *A History of the Russian Church to 1448* (London, 1995), pp. 118-239 nor Sergei Hackel, "Under Pressure from the Pagans? - The Mongols and the Russian Church," in J. Breck, J. Meyendorff, E. Silk, eds., *The Legacy of St. Vladimir: Byzantium - Russia - America* (Crestwood, NY 1990), pp. 47-56 broke new ground.

<sup>9</sup> A. A. Shamara, "Kulikovskaia bitva. Dmitrii Donskoi i Sergei Radonezhskii," *Voprosy nauchnogo ateizma* 25 (1980), pp. 36-61; V. A. Kuchkin, "O roli Sergiia Radonezhskogo v podgotovke Kulikovskoi bitvy," *Voprosy nauchnogo ateizma* 37 (1988), pp. 100-116; A. G. Kuz'min, "Tserkov' i svetskaia vlast' v epokhu Kulikovskoi bitvy," *Voprosy nauchnogo ateizma* 37 (1988), pp. 90-99; V. A. Kuchkin, "Dmitrii Donskoi i Sergii Radonezhskii v kanun Kulikovskoi bitvy," in *Tserkov', obshchestvo i gosudarstvo*, pp. 103-126; N. S. Borisov, *I svecha by ne ugasla... Istoricheskii portret Sergiia Radonezhskogo* (Moscow, 1990), especially pp. 204, 220-230, 234-236; V. A. Kuchkin, "Sergii Radonezhskii," *Voprosy istorii* 1992 #10, pp. 75-92.

<sup>10</sup> For a sharp critique of both Khoroshev, *Politicheskaia istoriia russkoi kanonizatsii* and Borisov, *Russkaia tserkov'*, see V. A. Kuchkin, B. N. Floria, "O professional'nom urovne knig po istorii russkoi tserkvy," *Voprosy istorii* 1988, #11, pp. 144-156. For comparison and critique of Borisov and Khoroshev, see Jaroslaw Pelenski, "The Origins of the Muscovite Ecclesiastical Claims to the Kievan Inheritance," in S. W. Swierkosz-Lenart, ed. *Le origini e to sviluppo della Cristianità Slavo-Bizantina* (Istituto Storico Italiano per il medio evo; Nuovi Studi Storici No. 17; Rome, 1992), pp. 217 n. 9, 218 n. 11, 219 n. 4. Much of this Russian scholarship constitutes a response to the earlier, controversial views of G. M. Prokhorov.

<sup>11</sup> On St. Sergius and the Trinity Monastery, now see Pierre Gonneau, "The Trinity-Sergius Brotherhood in State and Society," in A. M. Kleimola, G. D. Lenhoff, eds., *Culture and Identity in Muscovy, 1359-1584* (UCLA Slavic Studies, New Series, Volume III; Moscow, 1997), pp. 116-145, and David Miller, "Donors to the Trinity-Sergius Monastery as a Community of Venerators: Origins, 1360s-1462," in *ibid.*, pp. 450-474, and for a comment on the weakness of the paradigm of the Church as the "handmaiden" of the Muscovite principality, Gail Lenhoff, "Unofficial Veneration of the Daniilovichi in Muscovite Rus'," in *ibid.*, pp. 391-416.

<sup>12</sup> On the problem of ecclesiastical "regionalism," see A. S. Khoroshev, *Tserkov' v sotsial'no-politicheskoi sisteme Novgorodskoi feodal'noi respubliki* (Moscow, 1980) on Novgorod, and Ekkehard Klug, *Kniazhestvo Tverskoe (1247-1485 gg.)* (Tr. A. V. Chernyshova; Tver', 1994), pp. 16-17, 102-103, 169-171, 223-227, 269, 329-332, 353-356, 362-361, 364 [= Ekkehard Klug, "Das Fürstentum Tver' 1247-1485," *Forschungen zur osteuropäischen Geschichte* 37 (1985), pp. 7-335] on the relationship of the Tverian prince to his bishop.

shoulders.<sup>13</sup> Finally, it cannot be proven who read any of these texts, other than the scribes who copied, redacted, or “borrowed” from them. In short, only provisional answers are available as to who, what, when, where, and why the texts were written.

In addition, the sources have often been misinterpreted. The most blatant prejudice has been and remains modern romantic or integral nationalism. Depictions of Aleksandr Nevskii as a “collaborator” are no more than anachronistic projections of extraneous standards onto the medieval context. Categorizing Nevskii as a “quisling,”<sup>14</sup> or describing Nevskii’s policy toward the Mongols as “appeasement,”<sup>15</sup> or ascribing to the Mongols the goal of “the enslavement of entire nations in a medieval version of a ‘new order,’”<sup>16</sup> or interpreting the Mongol proposal to convert north China to pasture as “the most grandiose ‘final solution’ in history,”<sup>17</sup> all equate the Mongols with the Nazis, an unpromising approach. If men like Yeh-lu ch’u-ts’ai and Rashid ad Din are seen as realists, not collaborationists,<sup>18</sup> then the same would apply to Aleksandr Nevskii or Ivan Kalita. It takes an orientalist like Egorov to observe that Nevskii might have drawn relevant conclusions about Mongol power by traveling across 7000 kilometers of Mongol-ruled territory to Karakorum.<sup>19</sup>

Even the most fundamental terms in any discussion of Russo-Tatar relations are themselves anachronisms: the term the “Golden Horde” (*Zolataia orda*) originated in the 1560s in the *Kazanskaia istoriia*,<sup>20</sup> and the term *tatarskoe*

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<sup>13</sup> Halperin, *The Tatar Yoke*, pp. 85-93.

<sup>14</sup> Notably, still, Peter Nitsche, “Mongolensturm und Mongolenherrschaft in Rußland,” in *Die Mongolen in Asien und Europa*, p. 71.

<sup>15</sup> John L. I. Fennell, *The Crisis of Medieval Russia, 1200-1304* (London, 1983), especially pp. 97-121; replies by O. N. Moskvitina, “Aleksandr Nevskii v zerkale noveishei angliiskoi istoriografii (O knige D. Fennela “Krizis srednevekovoi Rusi. 1200-1304”),” in *Kritika kontseptsii sovremennoi burzhuznoi istoriografii* (Leningrad, 1987), pp. 127-134, and of the editors of the Russian translation of this volume, A. L. Khoroshkevich, A. I. Pliguzov, “Rus’ XIII stoletii v knige Dzh. Fennela,” in Dzh. Fennel, *Krizis srednevekovoi Rusi 1200-1304* (Moscow, 1989), pp. 5-32, particularly pp. 22-25.

<sup>16</sup> Henry Wiencik, Glenn D. Lowry with Amanda Haller, *Storm Across Asia. Genghis Khan and the Mongols. The Mogul Expansion* (Imperial Visions. The Rise and Fall of Empires; New York, 1980), p. 49 by Wiencik.

<sup>17</sup> Horace W. Dewey, “Russia’s Debt to the Mongols in Suretyship and Collective Responsibility,” *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 30:2 (April, 1988), p. 256.

<sup>18</sup> Anatoly M. Khazanov, *Nomads and the Outside World* (2nd ed. Madison, WI 1994), pp. 224-225. A. K. S. Lambton, “Mongol Fiscal Administration in Persia [Part 1],” *Studia Islamica* 64 (1986), p. 79 characterizes the readiness of especially Turcoman, Turkish or Qara Khitan local rulers to cooperate with the Mongols “remarkable.”

<sup>19</sup> Although whether Nevskii can be termed the “first Eurasianist” is more problematic. See V. L. Egorov, “Aleksandr Nevskii i Chingizidy,” *Otechestvennaia istoriia* 1997 #2, pp. 48-58, especially 51-55, 56.

<sup>20</sup> The *Nikonian Chronicle*, Serge Zenkovsky, ed/intro, Serge Zenkovsky and Betty Jean Zenkovsky, trs. (Princeton, NJ 1984-1989), 5 vols., habitually translates “*Orda*” as “Golden Horde” (e.g. v. 2, p. 14).

*igo* in the 1660s as part of the complex evolution of the *Synopsis* usually attributed to Innokentii Guizel,<sup>21</sup> yet it is difficult to address the general reader about Russo-Tatar relations without employing them.

The Christian providentialism which infuses our sources has often been treated superficially. It is easy enough to dismiss the assertion that the Mongols invaded the East Slavic principalities out of hatred for Orthodox Christianity. Mikhail of Chernigov's refusal to walk between the two fires was perceived by the Mongols as evidence of political disloyalty, not religious fastidiousness.<sup>22</sup> Mikhail of Tver' was not a victim of Khan Uzbek's adoption of Islam as the state religion of the Horde.<sup>23</sup> Neither Chai khan in 1327<sup>24</sup> nor Mamai in 1380<sup>25</sup> intended to convert the Russians to Islam. Understanding such assertions in the East Slavic sources, however, is another matter.

Medieval East Slavic notions of historical causation require further study. The Mongol conquest was the will of the Christian God, punishment for Orthodox Christian sins. However, the Mongols, as instruments of divine chastisement, were still evil servants of the Devil, who hated Christians; God only permitted the Devil to oppress Christians.<sup>26</sup> The Mongols were not therefore "good," nor was the Tatar conquest "good." Because the Tatars were not Orthodox Christians but blood-sucking, greedy, homicidal barbarians, they listened to the Devil, although it should be remembered that even sinful Orthodox Christians sometimes also did so, and some Mongol khans served the Christian God well by protecting the Orthodox Church.<sup>27</sup> The fluidity of these concepts

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<sup>21</sup> Halperin, "The Tatar Yoke and Tatar Oppression," pp. 21-31 [there is a superfluous line of text on p. 28, next to the bottom, and "Tatiscev" in that paragraph should be "Tatiščev"]. A. L. Khoroshkevich, A. I. Pliguzov, "Rus' XIII stoletia v knige Dzh. Fennela" p. 21 concede that the term "the Tatar Yoke" was applied to the system of Russo-Tatar relations "later;" even this is better than Daniel H. Kaiser and Gary Marker, comp. & ed. *Reinterpreting Russian History. Readings, 860-1860s* (New York, 1994), p. 81 "the Tatar Yoke, as the Rus' chronicles invariably label it..." Ostrowski, *Muscovy and the Mongols*, pp. 244-245, has discovered the earliest Latin evocation of this phrase, in Daniel Printz.

<sup>22</sup> Halperin, *The Tatar Yoke*, pp. 47-53.

<sup>23</sup> Halperin, *The Tatar Yoke*, pp. 81-85. Even DeWeese, who castigates previous historians for underestimating the significance of Islam in the Horde and takes exception to the notion of Mongol "religious toleration," concludes that Uzbek did not persecute Orthodox or Catholic Christians in his realm; see Devin DeWeese, *Islamization and Native Religion in the Golden Horde: Baba Tükles and conversion to Islam in historical and epic tradition* (University Park, PA 1994), especially pp. 95-100. Cf. Denis Sinor, "Some Latin Sources on the Khanate of Uzbek," in Denis Sinor, Bakhtiyar A. Nazarov, eds. *Essays on Uzbek History, Culture and Language* (Uralic and Altaic Series, vol. 156; Bloomington, IN 1993), pp. 110-119.

<sup>24</sup> Halperin, *The Tatar Yoke*, pp. 85-92.

<sup>25</sup> Halperin, *The Tatar Yoke*, pp. 121-124.

<sup>26</sup> See DeWeese, "The Influence of the Mongols," pp. 47-55.

<sup>27</sup> See U. Bamborschke, W. Kosmy, H Meyer-Harder, W-H Schmidt, K-D Seaman, *Die Erzählung über Petr Ordynskij: Ein Beitrag zur soziologischen Forschung altrussischer Texte* (Veröffentlichungen der Abteilung für Slavische Sprachen und Literaturen des Osteuropa-Institut [Slavische Seminar] an der Freien Universität Berlin, Band 148; Wiesbaden, 1979), especially pp.

enabled the bookmen to explain any event in Russo-Tatar relations without questioning the superiority of Orthodox Christianity. Unfortunately, divine punishment for Russian sins could take the form either of infidel raids or infidel conquest.

This narrative framework of vitae and chronicles would be less of a hindrance to an analysis of East Slavic responses to the Mongol conquest if such sources were complemented by a tradition of secular political theory in medieval Rus'. Unfortunately, the East Slavs were silent in this department.<sup>28</sup> Consequently, political concepts were expressed in religious terminology; modernizing medieval discourse is risky business.<sup>29</sup>

Serapion of Vladimir described the East Slavs as having been reduced to "slavery" (*rabota/rabotati*) to the infidel,<sup>30</sup> and in 1380 Dmitrii Donskoi and his cousin reportedly preferred death to "slavery."<sup>31</sup> Such "slavery" can just as easily be construed as a metaphor derived from Exodus as political subordination to the Mongols. The phrase "yoke of slavery" (*igo robotnogo*) merely strengthens the biblical connotations.<sup>32</sup> In some contexts, the term "slavery" must be taken literally, as a reference to the fate of many East Slavs captured by the Tatars, for sale into personal slavery.<sup>33</sup> The dividing line between rhetorical metaphor and

138-159 for an attempt at a distinction between "pro-Tatar" and "Tatarophile" attitudes (in which "pro-Tatar" is actually pro-Chinggisid, and "Tatarophile" is pro-Tatar). Cf. Ostrowski, *Muscovy and the Mongols*, pp. 138, 146.

<sup>28</sup> Nikolay Andreyev, "Pagan and Christian Elements in Old Russia," *Slavic Review* 20 [21?] (1962), pp. 16-23, especially p. 21, responding to Florovsky, blames Russia's "intellectual silence" on the Mongols, although Francis J. Thomson, "The Nature of the Reception of Christian Byzantine Culture in Russia in the Tenth to Thirteenth Centuries and its Implications for Russian Culture," *Slavica Gandensia* 5 (1978), pp. 107-139, who dates this phenomenon to the Kievan period, blames the Church. Cf. Ostrowski, *Muscovy and the Mongols*, p. 141.

<sup>29</sup> V. A. Kuchkin, "Mongolo-tatarskoe igo v osveshchenii drevnerusskikh knizhnikov (XIII-pervaia chetvert' XIV v.)," in *Russkaia kul'tura v usloviakh inozemnykh nashestvii i voini X – nachalo XX v.*, ed. A. N. Kopylev (Moscow, 1990), volume I, pp. 15-69, partially understands the dominance of religious over secular themes in the early sources, but then ascribes a "political" conception of Russian unity to the "Life of Mikhail' of Tver'."

<sup>30</sup> Halperin, *The Tatar Yoke*, pp. 70-73. Kuchkin, p. 45, treats this "slavery" as literal. See also the Nikon Chronicle redaction of the *vita* of Mikhail of Chernigov (Halperin, *The Tatar Yoke*, p. 51), the "Epistle to the Ugra" of Bishop Vassian (Halperin, *The Tatar Yoke*, pp. 155, 159); and *Kazanskaia istoriia* (Halperin, *The Tatar Yoke*, p. 162).

<sup>31</sup> Dmitrii Donskoi in the Chronicle Redaction, and Vladimir Andreevich of Serpukhov in the Expanded Redaction, of the *Skazanie o Mamaevom poboishche* (Halperin, *The Tatar Yoke*, p. 112).

<sup>32</sup> In Mercurius of Smolensk (Halperin, "The Defeat and Death of Batu," pp. 54-60, here p. 57); *Stepennaia kniga* about the wives of the *sinklity* after Batu's campaign (*Polnoe sobranie russkikh letopisei* [hereafter *PSRL*], XXI (St. Petersburg, 1908), pp. 262-263). Note that according to *Kazanskaia istoriia*, "yoke of slavery" described Novgorod's relationship to Moscow (Halperin, "The Tatar Yoke and Tatar Oppression," pp. 22-24).

<sup>33</sup> This was the fate of much of the population of Moscow after the sack of the city by Tokhtamysh in 1382 (Halperin, *The Tatar Yoke*, p. 118).

political reality is difficult to discern.<sup>34</sup>

The Halych-Volhynian princes embarked on joint military expeditions with the Tatars because they were in the Tatars' "will" (*vole*).<sup>35</sup> To avoid subservience to the Tatar "will" some Riurikid princes also preferred death.<sup>36</sup> No text explicitly correlated being in the Tatars' "will" with "slavery." Expressions with *vole* were used in various circumstances, from who dictated the terms of a Novgorodian treaty,<sup>37</sup> to a Tverian diatribe against arrogant Muscovite muscle-flexing after the construction of the Kremlin's stone walls.<sup>38</sup> Obviously this concept was so broad that it encompasses everything from a sphere of influence to colonial subordination.

Similarly, many texts bemoan the Tatar "oppression" (*nasilie*), but left unsaid is whether the "oppressive" Horde ruled the East Slavic principalities or merely ravaged them.<sup>39</sup>

It is commonplace to speak of the Riurikid princes as "vassals" of the khan,<sup>40</sup> who go to the Horde to pledge "fealty" in return for which they receive

<sup>34</sup> The most promising political use was the observation of the Novgorod Fourth Chronicle about Batu's campaign's that from that time the Rus' "*nacha rabotati*" (began to be enslaved) (*PSRL* IV (St. Petersburg, 1848), p. 32).

<sup>35</sup> *PSRL* II (Moscow, 1962), pp. 872(1274), 881(1280), 888(1282), 892(1283), 897(1287). George Perfecky sometimes translates this phrase as "to be subjects;" George Perfecky, ed. & tr. *The Hypatian Codex. Part II. The Galician-Volynian Chronicle. An Annotated Translation* (Munich, 1973), pp. 89, 95.

<sup>36</sup> Vasil'ko Konstantinovich s.a. 1237-1238, perhaps a later interpolation into the Laurentian Chronicle (Halperin, *The Tatar Yoke*, pp. 35-37); Yurii Ingvarevich in the *Povest' o razorenii Riazani Batyem* (Halperin, *The Tatar Yoke*, p. 40).

<sup>37</sup> For example, *Novgorodskaia perviaia letopis' starshego i mladshhego izvodov* [hereafter *NPL*], ed. A. N. Nasonov (Moscow-Leningrad, 1950), pp. 31, 45, 46, 50, 61, 68, 80, 81, 88, 89, 94 just from from Elder Recension. Translations in Robert Michell and Nevill Forbes, trs. *The Chronicle of Novgorod 1016-1471* (rpt. New York, 1970), pp. 23, 43, 44, 49, 63, 69, 72, 95, 104, 105, 119 include "on your terms," "at will," "according to his will," "your liberties," "your rights;" *Gramoty Velikogo Novgoroda i Pskova* (Moscow-Leningrad, 1949), p. 132 (1470-1471 draft treaty with Casimir).

<sup>38</sup> *PSRL* XV (St. Petersburg, 1863), vypusk 1, p. 84 s.a. 1367.

<sup>39</sup> Re the 1262 uprisings in Vladimir-Suzdalian cities; the death of Berkai 1286; Serapion; *baskak* Akhmat in the 1280s; metropolitan Maksim's departure from Kiev in 1299; 1328 the "peace" under Ivan Kalita (Halperin, "The Tatar Yoke and Tatar Oppression," pp. 31-38; Halperin, *The Tatar Yoke*, p. 64). Donald Ostrowski, "Why Did the Metropolitan Move from Kiev to Vladimir in the Thirteenth Century?" *California Slavic Studies* 16(1993), pp. 83-101 (which does not cite Halperin, "The Tatar Yoke and Tatar Oppression") translates the phrase as "Tatar violence," a reference to the Horde civil war immediately south of Kiev. Since the Orthodox Church was under Tatar patronage and could not claim to be "oppressed" by the Mongols, nor would Vladimir, to which the metropolitan fled, have been safer from the Tatars than Kiev, he rejects the translation of "Tatar oppression." Dr. Ostrowski correctly pointed out in his commentary on the earlier version of this article that the term might have had different meanings in different texts. I believe that in this passage the phrase "from Tatar oppression" was used as a cliché or *topos*, which the Church, without regard to logical consistency, could apply to almost any situation involving the Tatars.

<sup>40</sup> For example, Thomas Noonan, "Forging a National Identity: Monetary Politics During

*yarliki*. But despite Pavlov-Silvanskii, most historians of medieval Rus' deny that the East Slavs had feudalism, reciprocal political obligations and explicitly conditional land tenure. Yet this is what vassalage and investiture entail when the terms are employed in their primary, technical sense. The Mongols, according to Vladimirtsov, did practice "feudal" notions in the Chinggisid era; members of the Imperial family and other nobles held lands, pastures, peoples as "appanages,"<sup>41</sup> i.e. "fiefs"<sup>42</sup> Recent scholarship, by Endicott-West, Schamiloglu and others, de-emphasizes the "autocracy" of the khagans and khans, instead delineating collegial political relations among the pre-Imperial Mongols as well as in the Mongol Empire and its successor states.<sup>43</sup> Grupper describes the relationship between the Chinggis Khans and his Imperial Guard (*kesig*) as "mutual rights and duties," and suggests that this institutional structure was continued under his successors, not only in the Great Khaganate, but in the regional khanates and successor states as well.<sup>44</sup> The inheritance of membership in the Imperial Guard, or in general of political (*darugachi*) and military office, would also constitute a restriction on "autocracy." Manz has suggested that this aspect of the functioning

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the Reign of Vasili I," in *Culture and Identity in Muscovy*, pp. 495-529 *passim*, although in this case the word is used in a generic sense to mean "subject, dependent or servant," rather than its primary meaning.

<sup>41</sup> Of course, Vladimirtsov's conclusions remains controversial, but even his critics conceded that his theory best fit precisely the Imperial Mongol period. On the political vagaries and institutional structure of the appanages in Yüan China, see Elizabeth Endicott-West, *Mongolian Rule in China: Local Administration in the Yüan Dynasty* (Cambridge, MA 1989), pp. 88-103; and David N. Farquhar, *The Government of China under Mongolian Rule. A Reference Guide* (Münchener ostasiatische Studien, Band 53; Stuttgart, 1990), pp. 295-366.

<sup>42</sup> Donald Ostrowski, "The Military Land Grant Along the Muslim-Christian Frontier," *Russian History* 19 (1992), pp. 327-359, equates these appanages and Islamic *iqta*. On *iqta*, see Ann K. S. Lambton, "Reflections on the *iqta*," in G. Makdisi, ed. *Arabic and Islamic Studies in Honor of Hamilton A. R. Gibb* (Leiden, 1965), pp. 358-376 [which did not discuss the Ilkhanid period for reasons of space, p. 373 n. 1]; *Ibid.*, "Reflections on the *iqta* in Medieval Iran," *Iran* 5 (1967), pp. 41-50 [essentially the same material; ditto oh the Ilkhanid period, p. 48 n. 21 ]; *Ibid.*, *Continuity and Change in Medieval Persia. Aspects of Administrative, Economic and Social History, 11<sup>th</sup>-14<sup>th</sup> Centuries* (Albany, NY 1988), pp. 97-129. Lambton and Ostrowski both question the association of *iqta* with feudalism.

<sup>43</sup> Endicott-West, *Mongolian Rule in China*; *Ibid.*, "Hereditary Privilege in the Yüan Dynasty," *Journal of Turkish Studies* 9 (1985), pp. 15-20; *Ibid.*, "Imperial Governance in Yüan Times," *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies* 46:2 (1986), pp. 523-549; *Ibid.*, "The Yüan Government and Society," in Herbert Franke, Denis Twitchett, eds., *The Cambridge History of China. Volume 6: Alien regimes and border states 907-1368* (Cambridge, England, 1994), pp. 587-615; *Ibid.*, "Aspects of Khitan Liao and Mongolian Yüan Imperial Rule: A Comparative Perspective," in Gary Seaman and Daniel Marks, eds. *Rulers from the Steppe: State Formation on the Eurasian Periphery* (Los Angeles, 1991), pp. 199-222; Uli Schamiloglu, "The Qaraci Beys of the Later Golden Horde: Notes on the Organization of the Mongol World Empire," *Archivum Eurasiae Medii Aevi* 4 (1984), pp. 283-297; and *Ibid.*, "Tribal Politics and Social Organization in the Golden Horde," PhD dissertation, Columbia University, 1986.

<sup>44</sup> S. N. Grupper, "A Barulas Family Narrative in the Yüan *Shih*: Some Neglected Prosopographical and Institutional Sources on Timurid Origins," *Archivum Eurasiae Medii Aevi* 8 (1992-1994), pp. 11-97, quotation p. 45.

of Mongol imperial administrations carried over into the Timurid realm.<sup>45</sup> Trepavlov attributes a tendency to “dualism” or corulership to the Mongol Empire and its successor states, which would definitely inhibit autocratic tendencies.<sup>46</sup> Sinor concludes that Mongol and other steppe khans were selected by consensus, not violence.<sup>47</sup> Therefore, Mongol “autocracy” cannot be invoked to deny that there were any limits on the authority of the ruler, and therefore there was no “true” “feudalism” in the Mongol Empire, the Golden Horde, or the Horde’s relationships with the East Slavic principalities.<sup>48</sup> When a Riurikid vassal of the Horde Khan allocated appanages to his sons, this relationship might constitute subinfeudation. When the Khans of the Horde sent joint Russo-Tatar expeditions against Lithuania, Hungary or Poland in the thirteenth century, they might have been fulfilling the obligation of a feudal overlord to protect his vassals, rather than “bleeding” East-Slavic strength to weaken their recalcitrant subjects.<sup>49</sup> Indeed, the *Skazanie o Mamaevom pobishche* and the “Tale of the Battle on the river Vorskla” projected a clear conception of the right of the khan of the Golden Horde (or his surrogate) to invest with the principality of Moscow or its components anyone he chose.<sup>50</sup>

Problems of Christian providentialism, historical causality, and political theory underlie the conundrum of the East Slavic response to the Mongol conquest. The three chronicle accounts of the Mongol campaigns of 1237-1238 and 1239-1240 described the Tatars as “taking” (*vziati*) and “plundering” (*pleniti*) towns and principalities. The verb *pleniti* must be translated as “to plunder” or “to capture” rather than “to conquer.”<sup>51</sup> There is no alternative. It is logically

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<sup>45</sup> Beatrice Forbes Manz, “Administration and the Delegation of Authority in Timür’s Dominion,” *Central Asiatic Journal* 20:3 (1976), pp. 191-207; and *Ibid.*, “The Office of *darugha* under Tamerlane,” *Journal of Turkish Studies* 9 (1985), pp. 59-69.

<sup>46</sup> V. V. Trepavlov, “Sopravitel’stvo v Mongol’skoi imperii (XIII v.),” *Archivum Eurasiae Medii Aevii* 7 (1987-1991), pp. 249-278; and *ibid.*, *Gosudarstvennyi stroi Mongol’skoi imperii XIII v. Problema istoricheskoi preemstvennosti* (Moscow, 1996), pp. 76-102.

<sup>47</sup> Denis Sinor, “The Making of a Great Khan,” in Barbara Kellner-Heinkele, ed., *Altaica Berolinensia. The Concept of Sovereignty in the Altaic World* (Asiatische Forschungen, Band 126; Wiesbaden, 1993), pp. 241-258.

<sup>48</sup> Ostrowski, *Muscovy and the Mongols*, pp. 45-47, 88, although skeptical about “feudalism,” nevertheless describes the Mongol Empire and the Qipchak Khanate as decentralized, not despotic. There are still adherents of the older view: Thomas J. Barfield, *The Nomadic Alternative* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ 1993), p. 160, categorized the Mongol Empire as the exception among steppe polities, not an imperial confederacy, but an imperial autocracy.

<sup>49</sup> Cf. V. L. Egorov, *Istoricheskaiia geografiia Zolotoi Ordy v XIII-XIV vv.* (Moscow, 1985), pp. 187-192.

<sup>50</sup> M. N. Tikhomirov, ed. *Povesti o Kulikovskoi bitvy* (Moscow-Leningrad, 1959), pp. 44-46; Halperin, “The Russian Land and the Russian Tsar,” p. 52.

<sup>51</sup> Halperin, *The Tatar Yoke*, pp. 35-47, despite Gail Lenhoff, *Early Russian Historiography: The Lives of Prince Fedor the Black* (Berlin 1997), facing text (even numbered pages) and translation (odd numbered pages), pp. 216/217, 220/221, 282/283, 304/305 (although literal translation would mar the literary quality of the translation). The Zenkovskys sometimes translate it as “conquer” (*The Nikonian Chronicle*, v. 3 p. 266), more often as “occupy” (v. 2 p. 313) or

inconceivable for *pleniti* to mean “to conquer” if Nevruī and his Tatars *plenili* the Northeast under Nevskii, in 1327 Chol-khan and Uzbek intended *pleniti* Tver’, Mamai meant *pleniti* the Russian Land in 1380, Tokhtamysh in 1382, Edigei in 1408, and even Akhmat in 1480.<sup>52</sup> The Tatars cannot still have intended to “conquer” Rus’ if they have already “conquered” Rus’. Every “conquest” was not immediately followed by a successful revolt, all of which have somehow escaped recording in the chronicles.<sup>53</sup> It is certainly true that when an army “takes” or “plunders” a city or principality, this could be a raid or the initiation of a conquest; but it is precisely this ambiguity which is at the center of the problem. Even texts written long after Batu’s “campaign” (*nashestvie*) or “incursion” (*nakhozhdenie*) usually retained this deliberately ambiguous vocabulary; the “Tale of the Destruction of Riazan’ by Batu” is one case in point.<sup>54</sup> Clearly the East Slavic bookmen who authored and redacted these texts in later decades chose their vocabulary deliberately.<sup>55</sup>

During incremental conquests, of China or Central Asia, the Mongols did appoint governors and assign garrisons to conquered cities at the time of

“capture” (v. 2 p. 323), depending upon context. Although modern Russian *zavoevanie* means “conquest,” medieval *voevati* should be translated literally as “to make war.”

<sup>52</sup> Halperin, *The Tatar Yoke*, pp. 57 (Nevruī), 97-115 (Kulikovo cycle), 115-121 (Tokhtamysh), 130-135 (Edigei), 149-159 (Akhmat). Cf. Charles J. Halperin, “The Russian Land and the Russian Tsar: The Emergence of Muscovite Ideology, 1380-1408,” *Forschungen zur osteuropäischen Geschichte* 23 (1976), pp. 7-103.

<sup>53</sup> Compare Korea: the Mongols installed *darugachi* after the initial (and insincere) Korean voluntary submission, but had to mobilize major campaigns for decades after the Koreans killed the *darugachi* when they “rebelled.” See W. E. Henthorn, *Korea - The Mongol Invasions* (Leiden, 1963). Cities in north China changed hands often while the Mongols decided to conquer, rather than raid, and even thereafter. See H. Desmond Martin, *The Rise of Chingis Khan and his Conquest of North China* (Baltimore, 1950).

<sup>54</sup> Halperin, *The Tatar Yoke*, pp. 39-43.

<sup>55</sup> N. S. Borisov, *Ivan Kalita* (2nd ed., Moscow, 1997), pp. 89, 152-154 argues that the East Slavs viewed their conquest by the Tatars through the prism of the Slavonic translation of Josephus Flavius’ history of the conquest of Jerusalem by the Romans. N. A. Meshcherskii, *Istoriia Iudeiskoi voiny Iosifa Flaviia v drevnerusskom perevode* (Moscow-Leningrad, 1958), pp. 97-115, dated the text to the pre-Mongol period, although its oldest manuscript comes from the fifteenth century. Francis J. Thomson, ““Made in Russia”: A Survey of Translations Allegedly Made in Kievan Russia,” in Gerhard Birkenfellner, ed. *Millennium Russiae Christianae. Tausend Jahre Christliches Rußland 988-1988* (Schriften des Komitees der Bundesrepublik Deutschland zur Förderung der Slawischen Studien, Band 16; Köln-Weimar-Wien, 1993), pp. 340-341, expresses great skepticism that this translation was done in Kievan Rus’. However, the translation could still have been done before 1223 and would therefore have been available to East Slavic bookmen when the Tatars arrived. The Slavonic text utilized the vocabulary of *plenenie* (its title in Slavonic) and *vziatione* (Meshcherskii, pp. 180, 326, 331, 432, 433, 436, 463) [page references are no more than illustrative, not comprehensive] and *rabota* (Meshcherskii, pp. 264, 342, 384); however, it also manifested a much more articulated consciousness of Roman sovereignty, employing *vlast’*, *pokoriti*, and *tesarstvovati* with great frequency (Meshcherskii, pp. 167, 185, 200, 246, 276-277, 300, 31, 379, 385, 441, 459, 461). The concepts of slavery, conquest, and captivity overlap historically and metaphorically in this text in a fascinating kaleidoscope far more subtle and complex than anything written about Russo-Tatar relations.

conquest.<sup>56</sup> But during the sweeping Russian campaign the Mongol armies had to adhere to a rigid schedule and did not take, or did not have, the time to install a political apparatus.<sup>57</sup> All references in the sources to governors or Tatar officials imposed on Vladimir-Suzdalia or Kiev in 1237-1240 seem to be anachronisms.<sup>58</sup> Assuming that the Mongol armies came, slew and left, did the East Slavs know that they were coming back, that Russia had been conquered, not merely raided? Or did the “yoke” not begin until several years later, when Riurikid princes start traveling to the Horde to receive *yarliki*, a practice the chronicles do not relate to the “campaigns” of 1237-1240?<sup>59</sup>

There can be no doubt that Russia was conquered<sup>60</sup>; when the Tatars returned, they sent census-takers and envoys, not armies of conquest, to the East Slavic princes and cities, including Novgorod. Punitive expeditions followed acts which the Tatars saw as rebellion, disobedience by already conquered regions. The East Slavs knew the difference between alliances among Riurikids and

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<sup>56</sup> Paul D. Buell, “Sino-Khitans Administration in Mongol Bukhara,” *Journal of Asian History* 13 (1979), p. 131.

<sup>57</sup> Nor would the Mongols have stationed garrisons in the Russian forest zone, when its cities were so easily accessible from the steppe.

<sup>58</sup> Only the Nikon Chronicle redaction of the description of the seizure of Kiev mentioned the installation of *voevody* there after its sack; only the Nikon Chronicle redaction of the vita of Mikhail of Chernigov referred to *namestniki i vlasteli* in Kiev and Chernigov. In both cases the use of native terms, rather than *baskaki*, is in and of itself suspicious. Therefore I am skeptical of Donald Ostrowski, “The *Tamma* and the Dual-Administrative Structure of the Mongol Empire,” *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies* 61(1998), pp. 262-277, that *baskaki* or *darugi* were appointed in Rus’ in 1240. [My thanks to Donald Ostrowski for a preprint of this article.] Ostrowski relies upon the chronologically contaminated paragraph 274 of the “Secret History of the Mongols,” supposedly *sub anno* 1229 (*sic re* the imposition of administrators over the East Slavs). More broadly, I am dubious that the “Secret History,” a work more of myth, legend, epic, and folklore than history, can sustain the kind of textual analysis of administrative terminology to which Ostrowski submits it. On the “Secret History” see the revisionist series of articles by Larry Moses: “Triplified Triplets: The Number Nine in the *Secret History of the Mongols*,” *Asian Folklore Studies* 45 (1986), pp. 287-294; “The Quarreling Sons in the *Secret History of the Mongols*” *Journal of American Folklore* 100:395 (1987), pp. 63-68; “Epic Themes in the ‘Secret History of the Mongols’,” *Folklore* 99 (1988), pp. 170-173; “Legends by the Numbers: The Symbolism of Numbers in the *Secret History of the Mongols*” *Asian Folklore Studies* 55(1996), pp. 73-97; and “Motifs of Class, Status, and Unity in the *Secret History of the Mongols*,” *Eurasian Studies Yearbook* 68 (1996), pp. 97-118.

<sup>59</sup> Cf. L. N. Gumilev, *Drevniaia Rus’ i Velikaia Step’* (Moscow, 1992), who argued that the East Slavs were not “conquered” (*podchinenena, pokorena*) at all, the Mongols never intended to conquer them, grand prince Iaroslav’s “submission” was an alliance, the apportionment of *iaryki* was purely symbolic, and other equally dubious assertions (pp. 14 n. 1, 344, 355 n. 336, 418-419 [contradicting his earlier equation of Mongol policy toward Poland and Rus’], 464), despite Bruno Daarden, “‘I am a genius, but no more than that’: Lev Gumilev, Ethnogenesis, the Russian Past and World History,” *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas*, N.F. 44:1 (1996), pp. 62-68.

<sup>60</sup> Cf. Janet Martin, *Medieval Russia 980-1584* (Cambridge, England, 1995), p. 147 describing the situation after 1237-1240: “Nevertheless, the invasions of the Rus’ lands, although not followed immediately by any formal treaty or Mongol occupation, constituted for practical purposes [my emphasis-CJH] a conquest.”

Polovtsian princes on the one hand, and the subordination of the East Slavs to the Mongol khans on the other. Tribute (*vykhod* or *dan*) would not have been confused with bribes or ransom (*okup*). The indirectness of Mongol rule did not ameliorate the burden of Mongol rule. Thomas Allsen has noted that areas administered directly by the Tatars and areas left in the hands of native dynasties owed exactly the same obligations to the Mongol Empire.<sup>61</sup> The decision of the Mongols to remain in the steppe and leave the East Slavic infrastructure in place should not obscure the facts of Mongol rule: bureaucrats from the Mongol Empire conducted the census, Tatar *baskaki* resided in East Slavic cities, and the Khan of the Volga Horde exercised the right to adjudicate disputes over princely succession, to exempt the Orthodox Church from taxation, and to grant Novgorod merchants customs-free passage through Vladimir-Suzdalia.<sup>62</sup> The East Slavs definitely did not enjoy “autonomy” under indirect Mongol rule.

It is quite implausible that the East Slavs did not know that the Mongol seizure of their cities in 1237-1240 differed from the Polovtsian looting of Kiev in 1203.<sup>63</sup> The East Slavs did not lack<sup>64</sup> the conceptual skills to articulate a consciousness of Mongol conquest, and they definitely understood, knew and expressed a consciousness of Tatar sovereignty.<sup>65</sup> However, the evidence of that consciousness testifies to that very same ambiguity reflected in the narratives of 1237-1240. It was, after all, the chroniclers who recorded the trips of the Riurikid princes to “the Tatars” and the arrival of census-takers, tax-collectors, administrators, and envoys from the Horde. No chronicler ever explained the appearance of these officials as a result of Mongol conquest; Tatar “raids” or punitive expeditions were attributed to Tatar malevolence or Riurikid feuding, not Tatar rule. This reticence is reincarnated in modern discussions of Tatar rule as no more than a prolonged series of acts of extortion.

But the bookmen did not completely hide the “big picture” from their writings. In the thirteenth century, Daniil of Halicz-Volhynia was criticized by his chronicler for becoming the *kholog* of the Tatars and paying tribute (*dan*)<sup>66</sup>

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<sup>61</sup> Thomas T. Allsen, “The Yüan Dynasty and the Uighurs of Turfan in the 13th century,” in Morris Rossabi, ed. *China among Equals: the Middle Kingdom and its Neighbors, 10<sup>th</sup>–14<sup>th</sup> centuries* (Berkeley, 1983), pp. 243-245; Thomas T. Allsen, *Mongol Imperialism: The Policies of the Grand Qan Mongke in China, Russia, and the Islamic Lands, 1251-1259* (Berkeley, 1987), pp. 63-76.

<sup>62</sup> *Gramoty Velikogo Novgoroda i Pskova*, #30, p. 57.

<sup>63</sup> Led by a Riurikid, of course, Riurik Rostislavovich. Cf. *PSRL I* (Moscow, 1962), p. 467 (1237-1238), after the Mongols *plenisha* the city of Vladimir, Yaroslav Vsevolodovich came to “sit” there; the chronicler observed that “with his strong hand” God had rescued the Christians from the godless Tatars. Nietzsche, “Mongolensturm und Mongolenherrschaft in Rußland,” p. 69, interprets this phrase to mean that the East Slavs hoped that the Tatars would not return (which would contradict translating *pleniti* as “to conquer”). The phrase was probably no more than an expression of relief by the survivors of the Mongol siege and storming of the city.

<sup>64</sup> Cf. Ostrowski, *Muscovy and the Mongols*, pp. 146-148.

<sup>65</sup> In my earlier discussions I failed to appreciate this point.

<sup>66</sup> Halperin, *The Tatar Yoke*, pp. 53-56.

The *vita* of Aleksandr Nevskii conceded that Batu has “conquered” (*pokoril*) many lands, and that Nevskii did pay him homage. (The text neglected to mention that Rus’ was among the “lands” already conquered and that Nevskii’s father, grand prince Yaroslav, had already submitted to Batu.)<sup>67</sup> In the fourteenth century, the *vita* of Mikhail of Chernigov explained that since that prince lived on the “land of the khan (*zemli kanove*),” he had to “bow” to Batu. Mikhail of Chernigov was said to have quoted St. Paul to the effect that God had granted authority (*vlast’*), i.e. sovereignty, over Chernigov, to Batu. According to this text, the Tatars “sat” (*osadisha*) in the East Slavic cities, took a census, and collected tribute.<sup>68</sup> This probably fanciful extrapolation from later history employed a very concrete term of East-Slavic political vocabulary: for a prince “to sit” in a city is to assume rule there. In 1327, according to a Tverian account, Chol-khan wanted “to sit” in Tver’, although he also intended “to take” and “to plunder” it.<sup>69</sup> Even these fictitious motives are very suggestive.

In the fourteenth century, a Muscovite spokesman at the Horde supposedly made a speech in which he accused Olgerd of wanting to harm the *tsarev ulus*, the *ulus* of the khan, an admission that Vladimir-Suzdalia was ruled by the Khan of the Horde. Russian princes were described as the *ulusniki* of the Khan in the *Skazanie o Mamaevom poboishche*; Moscow was called the *ulus* of Tokhtamysh in the tale of its sack in 1382; in 1409 Edigei ostensibly described Rus’ as the *tsarev ulus* in his “epistle.” In the debates over succession to the Vladimir Grand Principality in the Horde in 1432, *boyar* Ivan Vsevolozhskii’s repeated this assertion and categorized Vasilii II as the *kholop* of the Khan. Ivan III even tried to dissuade Akhmat from assaulting his own *ulus* in 1480.<sup>70</sup> Whether or not the East Slavic principalities were indeed integrated into the Juchid *ulus*,<sup>71</sup> the use of this terminology is very telling. Note that on the whole it was employed to

<sup>67</sup> Halperin, *The Tatar Yoke*, pp. 56-61.

<sup>68</sup> Halperin, *The Tatar Yoke*, pp. 47-48.

<sup>69</sup> Halperin, *The Tatar Yoke*, pp. 85-92. Note that Choi khan failed.

<sup>70</sup> On these and additional references, see Halperin, “*Tsarev ulus*,” *passim*.

<sup>71</sup> Egorov, *Istoricheskaia geografiia*, p. 30, concluded that the East Slavic principalities were not part of the “*sobstvenno Zolotoi Orde* (Golden Horde properly speaking);” they were semi-dependent tribute-paying lands. The “semi-dependent” is too generous. The Mongols did not organize their world empire for the convenience of modern scholars. On the anomalous position of Tibet under the Yüan, see Farquhar, pp. 153-157, and Luciano Pelech, *Central Tibet and the Mongols. The Yüan-Sa-skyia Period of Tibetan History* (Rome, 1990). On that of Korea see Farquhar, pp. 399-400, and Buell, p. 48 n. 68. Armenia and Georgia both owed military service to the Ilkhanids and Armenian and Georgian military units were “not merely included” but “integrated into the Ilkhanid armies,” despite the fact that Armenia was “merely tributary” to the Ilkhans but Georgia was “fiscally incorporated” into the Ilkhanid state, another anomaly; see A. P. Martinez, “Some Notes on the Ilkhanid Army,” *Archivum Eurasiae Medii Aevi* 6 (1986) [1988], pp. 149-150, 151. There is no simple formula which conceptualizes the relationship of the East Slavic lands in the Juchid *ulus*. Mustafa Kafali, *Aten Orda Hanlığının Kuruluş ve Yükseliş Devirleri* (Istanbul, 1976) and István Vásáry, *Az Arany Horda* (Budapest, 1986) may discuss this theme but are linguistically inaccessible to me.

persuade the Khan to accommodate Russian interests.<sup>72</sup>

The right to issue coinage was a regalian prerogative in the Middle Ages. The first Muscovite coins, minted during the reign of Dmitrii Donskoi, contained the name of the Khan, Tokhtamysh, and an Arabic inscription. Fedorov-Davydov argues that Moscow had to include the name of the khan as a special sign of subservience, because Moscow constituted the grand principality and thus served as intermediary to the Horde; other coinage bore only illegible scribbles representing Arabic inscriptions. Fedorov-Davydov goes so far as to suggest that a Riurikid prince needed permission from the Khan to issue coinage.<sup>73</sup> There can be no doubt, despite Kulikovo, that the Riurikid princes, their *boyars*, the artisans who minted the coins, and the merchants and anyone else who used them, whether they read Arabic or not, understood the significance of the name, slogan, and pictorial representation of the khan, or even the squiggles, on the coins in terms of Tatar sovereignty.<sup>74</sup>

Therefore, the omission of a simple sentence or even clause in the earliest East Slavic tales of 1237-1240, or, even more so, in later versions, that the Tatars *pokorili Rus'* or started *vladeli Rus'*, must be considered significant; the bookmen had the means to do so.<sup>75</sup>

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<sup>72</sup> Russia would have been part of the original *inju* ("patrimony) of Juchi, but once the Golden Horde had been established, grants of *inju* to its khan (= royal domain) or Mongol princes and notables (= appanages) would only have been made of steppe land, where herds could nomadize, not East Slavic forest land. For definitions of this term see George Vernadsky, *The Mongols and Russia* (= George Vernadsky and Michael Karpovich, *A History of Russia*, vol. IV; New Haven, 1953), pp. 122-123; Lambton, *Continuity and Change in Medieval Persia*, p. 356; and Paul D. Buell, "Kalmyk Tanggaci people: thoughts on the mechanics and impact of Mongol expansion," *Mongolian Studies* 6 (1980), p. 47 n. 62. For a reference to *inge begi* in the Golden Horde, see Berthold Spuler, *Die Goldene Horde. Die Mongolen in Rußland* (2<sup>nd</sup> ed.; Wiesbaden, 1965), pp. 293-294. My thanks to Larry W. Moses for discussion of this point.

<sup>73</sup> G. A. Fedorov-Davydov, *Monety Moskovskoi Rusi (Moskva v bor'be za nezavisimoe i tsentralizovannogo gosudarstva)* (Moscow, 1981); *Ibid.*, *Monety Nizhegorodskogo kniazhestva* (Moscow, 1989), p. 154 on Horde permission. However, cf. A. V. Chernetsov, *Types of Russian Coins of the XIV and XV centuries. An Iconographic Study*, tr. H. Barlett Wells (BAR International Series, No. 167; Oxford, 1983), pp. 1, 25-27, 31-33, 63-64, 116, 129-130, 161. For a lucid summary of Fedorov-Davydov's analysis see Noonan, pp. 495-496, 500-505, 507-509, 512-513. Novgorodian (from 1420) and Pskovian (from 1425) coins bore no Arabic inscriptions; neither did Tverian coins (starting 1399-1425), with one fascinating exception (see below). Riazan' coins were almost entirely overstruck Horde coins. On bi-religious Georgian coins under the Ilkhanids, see A. P. Martinez, "The Third Portion of the History of Gazan Khan in Rašidu 'd-Din's *Ta 'xrix-e Mobarak-e Gazani*," *Archivum Eurasiae Medii Aevi* 8 (1992-1994), p. 107 n. 10.

<sup>74</sup> Michael Cherniavsky, "Khan or Basileus: An Aspect of Russian Mediaeval Political Theory," *Journal of the History of Ideas* 20 (1959), pp. 468-470 [rpt in Michael Cherniavsky, ed., *The Structure of Russian History. Interpretive Essays* (New York, 1970), pp. 69-71], initiated modern study of this numismatic iconography.

<sup>75</sup> Such emendations were few and far between and very late: According to the Nikon Chronicle, the Tatars offered to spare Kiev in 1240 if the city *pokorilisia* (Halperin, *The Tatar Yoke*, p. 46). Seventeenth-century redactions of the *Povest' o razorenii Riazani Batyem* employed *vladeti* and *pokoriti* (Halperin, *The Tatar Yoke*, p. 43). Cf. the conclusion of the Slavonic version of the tale

When the Muscovites sought “emancipation from the Tatar Yoke,” they could hardly phrase their ambitions in those terms, since the term “the Tatar Yoke” did not yet exist, and the narratives of 1237-1240 had not described a political situation from which to be “emancipated.”<sup>76</sup> The Kulikovo cycle, notwithstanding nearly all scholarship, contained no hint of anything other than a defeat of Mamai, a prince (emir), not even a legitimate Chinggisid khan. Indeed, the Short Redaction of the Chronicle Tale ended with Khan Tokhtamysh sending envoys to the Riurikid princes, announcing that he had defeated his enemy and their’s, Mamai, and the Muscovites sending “gifts” to Tokhtamysh. There is no possible way to interpret these sources as claiming Russian liberation from the Tatar Yoke. Indeed, according to the *Skazanie o Mamaevom poboishche*, Mamai intended *vladeti* Rus’ and *sideti* in its cities, but failed, as if his were a new dispensation of Russo-Tatar relations.<sup>77</sup>

Donskoi certainly had ambitions. In 1375 he compelled the Tverian grand prince to coordinate payment of tribute.<sup>78</sup> In his 1389 testament he allowed for the possibility of not paying the tribute, and re-allocated its revenues accordingly.<sup>79</sup> Certainly tribute payment was a manifestation of Tatar rule, but note well the understated expression of this aspiration. Donskoi wondered if God would change the Horde, not the Horde’s *vlast*. There is no way to infer whether termination of tribute payment in 1375 or 1389 was understood as temporary maneuvering or a permanent change. Donskoi’s formulation seems modest and ambiguous.<sup>80</sup>

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of the Fourth Crusade: “And thus perished the *tsarstvo* of the God-protected city of Constantine and the Greek Land in the quarrel of the emperors (*tsari*), which the Franks rule (*obladeiut*) [my emphasis-CJH].” *NPL*, pp. 245-246. My sincerest thanks to Paul Bushkovitch for calling this passage to my attention.

<sup>76</sup> The combination of the recalcitrance of the East Slavic chronicles and the anachronism of the term “the Tatar Yoke” led John Fennell to some interesting circumlocutions. After describing the Tatar invasions of 1237-1240, Fennell concluded that “the so-called Tatar Yoke had begun” (Fennell, *The Crisis of Medieval Russia*, p. 84); yet lambasting Nevskii’s role in the Tatar punitive expedition of 1252, he then continued: “The so-called ‘Tatar Yoke’ [N.B. Fennell’s introduction of quotation marks – CJH] began not so much with Baty’s invasion of Russia as with Aleksandr’s betrayal of his brothers” (*Ibid.*, p. 108), and wound up further diluting the concept, referring to “the so-called ‘yoke’ imposed by the Tatars” (*Ibid.*, p. 162).

<sup>77</sup> Halperin, *The Tatar Yoke*, p. 108. However, these texts did evince a clear conception that Russia’s relationship with the Tatars began with Batu. On this image of Batu, see Halperin, “The Defeat and Death of Batu,” especially pp. 50-54.

<sup>78</sup> *Dukhovnye i dogovornye gramoty velikikh i udel’nykh kniaziei XIV-XVI vv.* (Moscow-Leningrad, 1950), #9, pp. 25-28, here p. 26.

<sup>79</sup> *Ibid.*, #12, pp. 33-37, here p. 36. On the passage in Semen Ivanovich’s testament that the “light not go out,” better interpreted as concern over the Black Death than the Tatar Yoke, see now Borisov, *Russkaia tserkov’*, pp. 70-71, who relates it to the Orthodox symbolism of light, the cult of the *Bogoroditsa*, the *Akathistos* hymn, frescoes, and miniatures, which removes it even more from the Tatars.

<sup>80</sup> Johannes Schiltberger, *The Bondage and Travels of Johannes Schiltberger a Native of Bavaria, in Europe, Asia and Africa, 1396-1427* (tr. John Buchan Telfer. Hakluyt Society Works,

In 1480, no text raised the issue of Russian liberation from the Tatar Yoke Akhmat's wish to plunder Rus' fails, and that is all. Vassian's attempt to undermine Chinggisid legitimacy represented a minority opinion within the Church, and found no resonance in other texts.<sup>81</sup> The most ambitious political statement which Ivan III made in this regard, following Cherniavsky, was the issuance of coinage replacing the name of the khan with his own, in Arabic.<sup>82</sup>

After the liquidation of the Great Horde, one might expect retrospective rewriting of the sources about 1380 or 1480 to broach, however tentatively, more theoretical reinterpretations of those events. But it must be remembered that the Muscovites humored the aspirations of the Crimean Horde to succession to the sovereign rights of the Great/Golden Horde,<sup>83</sup> delivering to Crimea "gifts" which the Muscovite diplomats knew were received as tribute. The Muscovite need to

Series I, NO. 58; London, 1879), wrote that the "Kingdom of the Rewschen" was "tributary to the Tatar king," this clearly after Kulikovo. Cf. A. A. Gorskii, "Moskovsko-ordynskii konflikt nachala 80-kh godov XIV veka: prichiny, osobennosti, rezul'taty," *Otechestvennaia istoriia* 1998 no. 4, pp. 15-24.

<sup>81</sup> Now see A. A. Gorskii, "O vremeni i obstoiatel'stvakh osvobozhdeniia Moskvyy ot vlasti Ordy," *Voprosy istorii* 1997 no. 5, pp. 21-37.

<sup>82</sup> G. V. Fedorov, "Muskovskie den'gi Ivana III i Vasiliia III," *Kratkie soobshcheniia o dokladakh i polevykh issledovaniakh Instituta istorii material'noi kul'tury AN SSSR*, 30 (1949), pp. 71-72 dates the Muscovite coins with *Iban* to the 1480s, despite arguing that they were issued in honor of the 1487 installation of a puppet khan in Kazan', in or near which all the coins were found. (Jaroslaw Pelenski, *Russia and Kazan. Conquest and Imperial Ideology (1438-1560s)* [The Hague-Paris, 1973], pp. 28-29, discusses Muscovite-Kazani political relations in 1487 but does not mention Ivan III's Arabic coins.) Fedorov dated the coins reading "this is a Moscow *denga*" in Arabic to "the end of the reign" of Ivan III, again for use in Kazan'. He also wrote that under Ivan III all Arabic inscriptions were removed from Muscovite coinage except those indicating Muscovite dominance over Kazan', enumerating both the Muscovite coins with *Iban* (p. 72) and those which read "this is a Moscow *denga*" (pp. 73-74). V. A. Kalinin, "Monety Ivana III s russko-tatarskimi legendami," *Trudy Gosudarstvennogo Ermitazha* t. 21, *Numismatika* 5 (1981), pp. 111-116, endorsed Fedorov's 1487 connection, but argued that more of the coins were found in Muscovy than in Kazan. Cherniavsky, p. 470 [rpt. pp. 70-71], accepted the 1480s dating of the *Iban* coins without discussing the Kazan' connection (noted by Robert M. Croskey, *Muscovite Diplomatic Practice in the Reign of Ivan III* [New York, 1987], p. 203 n. 37). Gustave Alef, *The Origins of Muscovite Autocracy. The Age of Ivan III (Forschungen zur osteuropäischen Geschichte 39* [Berlin, 1986]), p. 83 n. 94, endorsed Cherniavsky's, not Fedorov's, interpretation of the *Iban* coins to 1480. See also Noonan, p. 505. Gorskii, "O vremeni...", does not mention the coins. Ostrowski, *Muscovy and the Mongols*, pp. 48, 166, attributes to 1480 the effect of ending Arabic inscriptions on Muscovite coins, which overlooks the *Iban* and "this is a Moscow *denga*" coins. Neither Cherniavsky nor Klug mention a Tverian coin from grand prince Mikhail Borisovich (1461-1486), which, uniquely among Tverian coins, bears an Arabic inscription: the name of the Tverian grand prince. Chernetsov, pp. 332, 129-130, quoting A. V. Oreshnikov, *Russkie monety do 1547* (Moscow, Istoricheskii muzei; Opisanie pamiatnikov, t. 1; 1896), p. 52, #320. The Arabic inscription was deciphered by Baron V. G. Tizengauzen (Tiesenhausen). (Same pagination and enumeration in the 1996 Moscow reprint of this volume.)

<sup>83</sup> For an affirmation of the legitimacy of this continuity and an evaluation of the historiography of Russo-Tatar relations, see Leslie Collins, "On the alleged 'destruction' of the Great Horde in 1502," in A. Bryer, M. Ursinus, eds., *Manzikert to Lepanto: the Byzantine World and the Turks, 1071-1571* (Amsterdam, 1991 = *Byzantinische Forschungen* 16), pp. 361-399.

deal not only with the Crimea, but also Kazan', Astrakhan', the Nogais, and the serving Kasimov khanate also dictated that bishop Vassian's attempt to impugn Chinggisid legitimacy could not be followed: it would have seriously undermined the nexus of diplomatic and political relations of Muscovy and the steppe.<sup>84</sup>

It would not be until the middle of the sixteenth century that Muscovy felt sufficiently assured, militarily and politically, for someone to venture to rewrite 1480. In the 1530s or so, the Nikon Chronicle's depiction of the battle of Kulikovo noted that Batu "conquered" [sic] (*plenil*) and "ruled" (*vladet*) the entire *russkuiu zemliu*; Mamai "ruled" the Horde and wanted to imitate Batu, but he failed.<sup>85</sup> This interpolation implied a sort of lifetime-only sovereignty over the East Slavs to Batu; however, there was no consistent application of such a concept by the Nikon Chronicle over the full course of Russo-Tatar relations. An epistle attributed to the priest Silvester mentioned the "Stand on the Ugra" as one of four major events in world history.<sup>86</sup> The *Kazanskaia istoriia* finally periodized Tatar rule, *vlast'* and *pokorenie*, from Batu to 1480, although in the process it conflated the "Stand on the Ugra," the death of Akhmat, and the destruction of the Great Horde in 1502. The "freedom" from "slavery" to which the text alluded subsumed both religious and political connotations.<sup>87</sup> Neither source represented official Muscovite ideology. The *Stepennaia kniga*, with its emphasis upon dynastic continuity, retreated into a largely metaphorical description of Tatar "slavery." By and large, mid sixteenth century Muscovite rewriting of Russo-Tatar relations dismissed most realia of Tatar rule as obsolete "customs" (*obychai*) from which the new tsardom was by definition immune.<sup>88</sup>

In conclusion, there is something different, unique, idiosyncratic and significant about the East Slavic response to the Mongol conquest; the ambivalence and ambiguity with which concepts of Tatar suzerainty or its termination were or were not applied,<sup>89</sup> do distinguish the East Slavic sources

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<sup>84</sup> For a different interpretation of the attitudes of Church and Court to the Tatars from 1448 to 1559, see Ostrowski, *Muscovy and the Mongols*, pp. 135-248.

<sup>85</sup> *The Nikonian Chronicle*, v. 3, p. 266.

<sup>86</sup> Halperin, *The Tatar Yoke*, pp. 160-161.

<sup>87</sup> Halperin, *The Tatar Yoke*, pp. 161-165. *Obrok* (pp. 162, 164) should be translated here as quitrent, the dues in kind and money owed by a peasant to his landlord, which is still socially demeaning.

<sup>88</sup> Halperin, *The Tatar Yoke*, pp. 172-174. *Die Erzählung über Petr Ordynskij*, pp. 252-253 (text and German translation), the Vita redaction, dated c. 1600, states that bishop Kirill of Rostov went to the Orda "v to bo vremia kniazhenie Rostovskoe pod" *oblastiui tsarei tekh biashe* (because at that time the Rostov principality was in the region [translated as: Herrschaft = *vlast'iu*] of the tsars [khans]," a borrowed formulation.

<sup>89</sup> A. I. Pliguzov, in the "Prilozheniia" to Fennel, *Krizis srednevekovoï Rusi*, p. 270, citing Halperin, *The Tatar Yoke*, describes the "silence" of the East Slavic sources for the 13<sup>th</sup> century, which knew more than they wrote and had not yet developed a paradigm of a "yoke" to describe Russo-Tatar relations, but he suggests that this phenomenon ended with 1380. Some appreciation for the lack of explicit repudiations of Horde sovereignty in the "anti-Tatar" sources of the time can be found in A. A. Gorskiï, "Politicheskaia bor'ba na Rusi v nachale XIV v. i moskovsko-ordynskie

from those of other sedentary civilizations conquered by the Mongols.<sup>90</sup> Thomas Allsen's observation about the parochialism of the depiction of the 1250s in the East Slavic chronicles, "On the basis of these sources alone, it is not at all apparent that the Rus principalities were part of a much larger political entity stretching from Korea to Asia Minor,"<sup>91</sup> is only the tip of the iceberg. A strong

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otnosheniia," *Russia Mediaevalis* 7:1 (1992), pp. 88-111 and *Ibid.*, "Moskva, Tver' i Orda v 1300-1339 godakh," *Voprosy istorii* 1995 no. 4, pp. 34-46.

<sup>90</sup> The closest analogy to the situation of the East Slavs might be the Armenians, another Christian society which was conquered by "infidels" but retained its political infrastructure under the Ilkhanids. But the Armenians, who had previously been conquered by various non-Christians, had no conceptual difficulty in admitting that the Mongols had "conquered" them. See Robert Blake and Richard Frye, "The History of the Nation of Archers (Mongols) by Grigor of Akanc," *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies* XIII: 3-4 (December, 1949), p. 297. Georgia had a similar history and experience under the Ilkhanids. The Georgian Royal Annalist explicitly translated Mongol rule as a "conquest" which made the khans the "sovereign" lords over Georgia with the right to invest its dynasts and require tribute and military service; see *Histoire de la Georgia depuis l'antiquité jusqu'au XIX<sup>e</sup> siècle, traduite du georgien par M. Brosset*, v. 1 *Histoire ancienne jusqu'en 1469 de J.* (St. Petersburg, 1849), pp. 512-517, 523, 534-535, 563-564, 589, 607, 607, 612, 643, 628, 638-639, 646, despite which C. Toumanoff, "Armenia and Georgia," *Cambridge Medieval History* v. IV pt. 1 (Cambridge, England, 1966), pp. 625-627, concluded that the Mongols left Georgia "autonomous." Cf. Ronald Grigor Suny, *The Making of the Georgian Nation* (Bloomington, IN - Stanford, CA 1988), pp. 40-41, 44.

<sup>91</sup> Allsen, *Mongol Imperialism*, p. 16. Cf. the conclusion of Sh. B. Chimitdorzhiev,

case can be made that the very ambiguity in the sources about the relationship between Tatar sovereignty and its realia, between de jure and de facto, is at the root of scholarly disputes over the date at which the “Tatar Yoke” ended.<sup>92</sup> The only reason historians can debate whether Tatar rule ended in 1380, or with the establishment of the serving khanate of Kasimov, or 1480, or any other date, is that the East Slavic sources did not say what historians expect them to have said. Their intellectual failure to employ terms of sovereignty, except grudgingly and late, in describing the Mongol conquest, or, when using such concepts, their logical failure to connect that development with the Mongol campaigns of conquest, was a large element of their response to that conquest, almost raising denial to an ideological level, a phenomenon not yet fully appreciated or understood in scholarship.

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“Russkie letopisi kak istochnik po istorii srednevekovykh mongolov,” in *Srednevekovaia kul'tura mongol'skikh narodov. Sbornik nauchnykh trudov* (Novosibirsk, 1992), p. 78, that the Russian chronicles contained less information on Russo-Mongol economic and cultural ties than on political relations. Even he concedes (p. 77) that most cultural exchange took place with the Golden Horde, not Mongolia.

<sup>92</sup> See Lawrence N. Langer, “The End of Mongol Rule in Medieval Rus’,” paper, American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies Convention, Boston, November 15, 1996.